It's possible to convert Linux into a hybrid kernel where it's capable of running drivers as isolated processes. It doesn't require moving the drivers out of the kernel code. It can also take the shortcut of running multiple instances of most of the kernel initially.
GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS () is an open-source mobile operating system focused on security and privacy, available for Google Pixel and future Motorola devices, including smartphones, tablets, and foldables. It is built on the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) and was first released in 2016. More on Wikipedia
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's possible to convert Linux into a hybrid kernel where it's capable of running drivers as isolated processes. It doesn't require moving the drivers out of the kernel code. It can also take the shortcut of running multiple instances of most of the kernel initially.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
One of our replies in the middle of this thread was linked on Reddit in a thread where what we said is being heavily misrepresented. Our posts explained the poor status quo for GrapheneOS due to the foundation it's built on with optimism for the future.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You can't blame LLMs for the incredibly insecure and buggy status quo of large mainstream software, firmware and hardware projects. Linux has hundreds of of preexisting severe vulnerabilities being found and fixed every month. Linux already churned out endless slop without LLMs.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We were responding to someone calling projects like the Linux kernel AI slop for adopting those tools. We pointed out the code was already riddled with bugs written by humans and jokingly called it human slop. The way that's being misrepresented to attack our team is ridiculous.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It wasn't AI models which created the vast majority of the enormous number of Linux kernel bugs being fixed. Plenty of the AI proposed fixes are wrong and new code written with AI assistance still has bugs. However, overall the bug density is dropping in a way it hasn't before.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
What's simplistic about it? The industry could have heavily adopted microkernels and memory safe languages 30 years ago. Instead, it will be forced to adopt those and other major improvements to tooling and software architectures under pressure from LLMs exposing the insecurity.
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Tibo
@thsottiaux
Cyber team wants your feedback on Daybreak. Models, codex plugins, blue/red access, documentation, red teaming & defense factory... What can we do better or improve?
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Daybreak Blue lacks cyber access for GPT-6 Astra or GPT-6.1 Sol/Terra. Anthropic has the far more capable Mythos 5.2 (Fable 5.2) for their Defense Access tier.
Daybreak Red lacks an application process. Anthropic has open applications Red Team Access and we recently applied.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is an open source privacy and security project. We have upstream contributions to core infrastructure security including many reported Android and Pixel vulnerabilities. We have to protect users against orgs with more resources and now more advanced AI models too.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We already applied as an organization and received Daybreak Blue access. Daybreak Blue doesn't permit bypassing basic cybersecurity safeguards for GPT-6 Astra and GPT-6.1 Sol. Those often refuse to make a test case for a non-security Linux kernel bug. It doesn't make much sense.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It makes more sense for an organization doing security engineering and research for important open source software to have Daybreak Red than companies generating fluff pentesting reports. Not only is it far less needed for that but it's far more likely to end up causing harm...
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Anthropic's approach is super problematic too including the fact that they've decided to be a US government / military contractor limiting the best cybersecurity models to them. They did at least provide a better application process and more transparency about the system.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS code quality has greatly increased due to using frontier models for code review and bug finding. Our port of the Pixel 10 drivers from Linux 6.6 (QPR1) / 6.12 (QPR2) to Linux 6.18 went incredibly smoothly because we were able to find most of the issues in advance.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our users report large numbers of upstream bugs to us partly thanks to our user-facing crash reporting system and log viewer built into the OS. We previously couldn't do much with that but now we can rapidly find the cause of most bugs from those crash tracebacks and logs.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're obviously not vibe coding anything shipped to our servers or users. We're improving our code quality and we're fixing far more upstream bugs than ever before. We haven't been shipping many OS features recently since we're currently focused on eliminating bugs and overhead.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We understand the code a lot more than before. Bear in mind we didn't write the vast majority of the code and we have substantially higher quality standards than Google. We now have tools to help understand and work with millions of lines of human slop like the Linux kernel.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You can't blame LLMs for the incredibly insecure and buggy status quo of large mainstream software, firmware and hardware projects. Linux has hundreds of of preexisting severe vulnerabilities being found and fixed every month. Linux already churned out endless slop without LLMs.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Projects can now churn out slop even faster with LLMs but they didn't need them to do it. This was already the status quo for software at large. Being able to so easily find bugs is creating massive pressure to finally use better tools and approaches to create robust software.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Linux was created as a rejection of robust software architecture and tools. It's a monolithic kernel with no internal isolation written as memory unsafe code. A typo in an obscure driver for unused functionality can easily create a fully privileged code execution vulnerability.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Everyone can the Linux kernel and other software written in a similar way is completely riddled with holes with no path to saving it. It's unstable, unreliable, insecure and not on track to being fixed. It took LLMs demonstrating it for more than security researchers to see it.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
What's simplistic about it? The industry could have heavily adopted microkernels and memory safe languages 30 years ago. Instead, it will be forced to adopt those and other major improvements to tooling and software architectures under pressure from LLMs exposing the insecurity.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Everyone can the Linux kernel and other software written in a similar way is completely riddled with holes with no path to saving it. It's unstable, unreliable, insecure and not on track to being fixed. It took LLMs demonstrating it for more than security researchers to see it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Linux was created as a rejection of robust software architecture and tools. It's a monolithic kernel with no internal isolation written as memory unsafe code. A typo in an obscure driver for unused functionality can easily create a fully privileged code execution vulnerability.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Projects can now churn out slop even faster with LLMs but they didn't need them to do it. This was already the status quo for software at large. Being able to so easily find bugs is creating massive pressure to finally use better tools and approaches to create robust software.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You can't blame LLMs for the incredibly insecure and buggy status quo of large mainstream software, firmware and hardware projects. Linux has hundreds of of preexisting severe vulnerabilities being found and fixed every month. Linux already churned out endless slop without LLMs.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We understand the code a lot more than before. Bear in mind we didn't write the vast majority of the code and we have substantially higher quality standards than Google. We now have tools to help understand and work with millions of lines of human slop like the Linux kernel.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're obviously not vibe coding anything shipped to our servers or users. We're improving our code quality and we're fixing far more upstream bugs than ever before. We haven't been shipping many OS features recently since we're currently focused on eliminating bugs and overhead.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our users report large numbers of upstream bugs to us partly thanks to our user-facing crash reporting system and log viewer built into the OS. We previously couldn't do much with that but now we can rapidly find the cause of most bugs from those crash tracebacks and logs.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS code quality has greatly increased due to using frontier models for code review and bug finding. Our port of the Pixel 10 drivers from Linux 6.6 (QPR1) / 6.12 (QPR2) to Linux 6.18 went incredibly smoothly because we were able to find most of the issues in advance.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Anthropic's approach is super problematic too including the fact that they've decided to be a US government / military contractor limiting the best cybersecurity models to them. They did at least provide a better application process and more transparency about the system.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It makes more sense for an organization doing security engineering and research for important open source software to have Daybreak Red than companies generating fluff pentesting reports. Not only is it far less needed for that but it's far more likely to end up causing harm...
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We already applied as an organization and received Daybreak Blue access. Daybreak Blue doesn't permit bypassing basic cybersecurity safeguards for GPT-6 Astra and GPT-6.1 Sol. Those often refuse to make a test case for a non-security Linux kernel bug. It doesn't make much sense.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is an open source privacy and security project. We have upstream contributions to core infrastructure security including many reported Android and Pixel vulnerabilities. We have to protect users against orgs with more resources and now more advanced AI models too.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Daybreak Blue lacks cyber access for GPT-6 Astra or GPT-6.1 Sol/Terra. Anthropic has the far more capable Mythos 5.2 (Fable 5.2) for their Defense Access tier.
Daybreak Red lacks an application process. Anthropic has open applications Red Team Access and we recently applied. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026111300 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43522-grapheneos-version-2026111…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This information in the linked repository is inaccurate and misleading. We regularly have to correct inaccurate information being spread there. It has no value to anyone who wants to use GrapheneOS and only serves to mislead people. We don't want even more people mislead by it.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This information in the linked repository is inaccurate and misleading. We regularly have to correct inaccurate information being spread there. It has no value to anyone who wants to use GrapheneOS and only serves to mislead people. We don't want even more people mislead by it.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 157.0.8103.78.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/157.0.8103.78.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43492-vanadium-version-157081037…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
Accrescent @accrescentapp
Accrescent's impact reaches more than just Accrescent users. GrapheneOS adopted Accrescent's Ina library for their app store, reducing app update sizes by as much as 82% for around half a million users!
You can read their feature announcement here: discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43228-delta-updates-added-to-the… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our port to the Pixel 11 series was nearly complete after around a week of the devices being launched. It had to be cancelled due to lack of MTE support. Android 17 QPR2 has added MTE support for the Pixel 11 series and we've confirmed it works with GrapheneOS with our QPR2 port.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our port to Android 17 QPR2 is nearly complete. Pixel 11 support can be added after we launch it for the other devices. Completing Signature 27 support is our main priority after QPR2 but we essentially finished Pixel 11 support a long time ago so we can ship that after QPR2 too.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 157.0.8103.50.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/157.0.8103.50.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43449-vanadium-version-157081035…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 179 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43419-gmscompatconfig-version-17…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
By default, GrapheneOS disables new connections using USB peripheral drivers, USB gadget drivers or USB-C alternate modes once the device is locked. It also configures the USB controller hardware to block new connections. Once existing USB connections end, it turns off USB data.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, Android doesn't support blocking USB connections at a low level or disabling USB data. That's not the meaning of the "No data transfer" mode in USB Preferences. It has never disabled USB data or even USB peripherals. It controls whether the device acts as a USB peripheral.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's called "Charging only" on some variants of Android rather than "No data transfer" but it doesn't disable USB data or even USB peripherals. It's misleading to call it charging-only. Even the no data transfer name only means the device itself doesn't act as a USB peripheral.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's entirely possible to use an external drive, mouse, keyboard, joystick, audio and DisplayPort at the same time while in the "No data transfer" mode which may be called "Charging only" mode on some variants of Android. Try it for yourself. Hook up a USB peripheral via USB-C.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
On Android 16 and later, Android Advanced Protection Mode blocks new USB connections at a software level after the device is locked. GrapheneOS does that by default with a much more secure implementation which more completely blocks it in software and also blocks it in hardware.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
By default, GrapheneOS disables new connections using USB peripheral drivers, USB gadget drivers or USB-C alternate modes once the device is locked. It also configures the USB controller hardware to block new connections. Once existing USB connections end, it turns off USB data.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
On Android 16 and later, Android Advanced Protection Mode blocks new USB connections at a software level after the device is locked. GrapheneOS does that by default with a much more secure implementation which more completely blocks it in software and also blocks it in hardware.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's entirely possible to use an external drive, mouse, keyboard, joystick, audio and DisplayPort at the same time while in the "No data transfer" mode which may be called "Charging only" mode on some variants of Android. Try it for yourself. Hook up a USB peripheral via USB-C.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's called "Charging only" on some variants of Android rather than "No data transfer" but it doesn't disable USB data or even USB peripherals. It's misleading to call it charging-only. Even the no data transfer name only means the device itself doesn't act as a USB peripheral.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, Android doesn't support blocking USB connections at a low level or disabling USB data. That's not the meaning of the "No data transfer" mode in USB Preferences. It has never disabled USB data or even USB peripherals. It controls whether the device acts as a USB peripheral.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Motorola Signature 27 has a high dedicated secure element from NXP. It also has the less hardened on-die Qualcomm SPU from the SoC but doesn't need to use it since it has a secure element chip. It has a high performance implementation of MTE and everything else we require too.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Motorola Signature 27 has a high dedicated secure element from NXP. It also has the less hardened on-die Qualcomm SPU from the SoC but doesn't need to use it since it has a secure element chip. It has a high performance implementation of MTE and everything else we require too.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026110800 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43392-grapheneos-version-2026110…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
US and EU law enforcement marketed and sold phones to criminals enabling their operations for years via ANOM. They heavily marketed those phones as being based on GrapheneOS. There are more of these companies today and they conflate it with GrapheneOS.
darknetdiaries.com/episode/146/ -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, the @mano_crypto account is posting fabrications not matching the sources. The original article is at www.joint-defense-team.com/post/grapheneos-cracked-police… and you should read it for yourself. It says there's no indication of any exploit and no indication it involves official GrapheneOS releases either.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The original article explains law enforcement presents obtaining someone's PIN/password through a weakness such as it being reused across accounts and devices in the same way as if they exploited a device. It also explains they conflate insecure forks of GrapheneOS with it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The original article is worth reading. It gives two examples of court documents where a device is claimed to be running GrapheneOS. It says that in one of the cases, it was revealed that it was actually running a vibe coded fork of GrapheneOS with built-in remote management.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That account is objectively lying about the content of these articles and documents. It's posted screenshots of small parts of the text and misrepresenting what's said. The claims are directly debunked by the surrounding text. The account deliberately hasn't linked to any of it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Read the original articles at www.joint-defense-team.com/post/grapheneos-cracked-police… and www.crimesite.nl/grapheneos-politie-richt-zich-op-aangepa… for yourself. Reading both quickly proves the @mano_crypto account is overtly lying about what's said in both. The same thing applies to the Swedish court documents the account is also lying about.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's an ongoing state sponsored disinformation campaign against GrapheneOS in multiple western European countries. It's being wrongly conflated with insecure forks marketed to criminals. ANOM was one and turned out to be directly managed by the FBI.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a major state sponsored misinformation and smear campaign towards GrapheneOS in the Netherlands and Germany. The misinformation campaign includes unsubstantiated security claims not holding up to scrutiny to scare people away from it. They're also heavily misrepresenting who uses it overall.
These smear campaigns conflate GrapheneOS with forks and modifications of it sold by shady companies. Those usually include a device management app to remotely manage the devices of their customers as if they're employees. These are largely not GrapheneOS devices or have preinstalled malware apps.
A common tactic being used in these smear campaigns is to make unsubstantiated and outright false claims about the capabilities of forensic data extraction tools. They misrepresent how they get into devices. They want to scare people into using far less secure devices which are easier to exploit.
France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands are becoming increasingly authoritarian surveillance states with an ongoing crackdown against privacy. It's happening throughout the whole EU and it's likely both secure devices and end-to-end encryption without backdoors are going to end up outlawed.
There are a bunch of companies based in the EU selling phones with drastically worse privacy and security than an iPhone including Jolla, Volla, Murena and iodé. These products are effectively backdoored by not providing standard privacy and security patches/protections while misleading users.
France and other EU countries are actively cracking down on legitimate privacy and security projects while supporting unsafe products within their control. These products make it far easier to remotely exploit devices and also to bypass encryption to extract data. They're phony privacy products.
Each of the companies we've listed have participated in the misinformation and smear campaigns against GrapheneOS. Jolla spent years working closely with Putin's regime. Volla, Murena and iodé are building an EU Play Integrity API. None provides the crucial standard privacy patches/protections.
Murena is directly assisting with state anti-privacy campaigns smearing highly private and secure devices as mainly benefiting criminals. They've repeatedly falsely claimed GrapheneOS is mainly used by criminals. Here are 2 of many examples:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142
clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-interview.html
GrapheneOS, end-to-end encrypted messaging apps, Monero and other projects are being targeted with state and corporate propaganda and anti-privacy laws. Meanwhile, the same governments heavily fund and support phony privacy projects clearly downgrading privacy and security compared to an iPhone.
GrapheneOS is only an initial target for these state actors and their sycophants in corporate news organizations. Apple heavily works on protecting users against exploits too. It would be much harder to convince the public that an iPhone is for criminals so they're starting with open source.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
US and EU law enforcement marketed and sold phones to criminals enabling their operations for years via ANOM. They heavily marketed those phones as being based on GrapheneOS. There are more of these companies today and they conflate it with GrapheneOS.
darknetdiaries.com/episode/146/ -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's an ongoing state sponsored disinformation campaign against GrapheneOS in multiple western European countries. It's being wrongly conflated with insecure forks marketed to criminals. ANOM was one and turned out to be directly managed by the FBI.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a major state sponsored misinformation and smear campaign towards GrapheneOS in the Netherlands and Germany. The misinformation campaign includes unsubstantiated security claims not holding up to scrutiny to scare people away from it. They're also heavily misrepresenting who uses it overall.
These smear campaigns conflate GrapheneOS with forks and modifications of it sold by shady companies. Those usually include a device management app to remotely manage the devices of their customers as if they're employees. These are largely not GrapheneOS devices or have preinstalled malware apps.
A common tactic being used in these smear campaigns is to make unsubstantiated and outright false claims about the capabilities of forensic data extraction tools. They misrepresent how they get into devices. They want to scare people into using far less secure devices which are easier to exploit.
France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands are becoming increasingly authoritarian surveillance states with an ongoing crackdown against privacy. It's happening throughout the whole EU and it's likely both secure devices and end-to-end encryption without backdoors are going to end up outlawed.
There are a bunch of companies based in the EU selling phones with drastically worse privacy and security than an iPhone including Jolla, Volla, Murena and iodé. These products are effectively backdoored by not providing standard privacy and security patches/protections while misleading users.
France and other EU countries are actively cracking down on legitimate privacy and security projects while supporting unsafe products within their control. These products make it far easier to remotely exploit devices and also to bypass encryption to extract data. They're phony privacy products.
Each of the companies we've listed have participated in the misinformation and smear campaigns against GrapheneOS. Jolla spent years working closely with Putin's regime. Volla, Murena and iodé are building an EU Play Integrity API. None provides the crucial standard privacy patches/protections.
Murena is directly assisting with state anti-privacy campaigns smearing highly private and secure devices as mainly benefiting criminals. They've repeatedly falsely claimed GrapheneOS is mainly used by criminals. Here are 2 of many examples:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142
clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-interview.html
GrapheneOS, end-to-end encrypted messaging apps, Monero and other projects are being targeted with state and corporate propaganda and anti-privacy laws. Meanwhile, the same governments heavily fund and support phony privacy projects clearly downgrading privacy and security compared to an iPhone.
GrapheneOS is only an initial target for these state actors and their sycophants in corporate news organizations. Apple heavily works on protecting users against exploits too. It would be much harder to convince the public that an iPhone is for criminals so they're starting with open source.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Read the original articles at www.joint-defense-team.com/post/grapheneos-cracked-police… and www.crimesite.nl/grapheneos-politie-richt-zich-op-aangepa… for yourself. Reading both quickly proves the @mano_crypto account is overtly lying about what's said in both. The same thing applies to the Swedish court documents the account is also lying about.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That account is objectively lying about the content of these articles and documents. It's posted screenshots of small parts of the text and misrepresenting what's said. The claims are directly debunked by the surrounding text. The account deliberately hasn't linked to any of it.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The original article is worth reading. It gives two examples of court documents where a device is claimed to be running GrapheneOS. It says that in one of the cases, it was revealed that it was actually running a vibe coded fork of GrapheneOS with built-in remote management.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The original article explains law enforcement presents obtaining someone's PIN/password through a weakness such as it being reused across accounts and devices in the same way as if they exploited a device. It also explains they conflate insecure forks of GrapheneOS with it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, the @mano_crypto account is posting fabrications not matching the sources. The original article is at www.joint-defense-team.com/post/grapheneos-cracked-police… and you should read it for yourself. It says there's no indication of any exploit and no indication it involves official GrapheneOS releases either.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026110700 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43374-grapheneos-version-2026110…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Chromium 157.0.8103.46 only has a single minor change which isn't relevant to Vanadium since we only use 64-bit builds of the browser. There's no reason for us to ship it but the releases are endless and there will be another security update soon anyway.
chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+log/157.0.8103.38… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A random 4-8 digit PIN is 100% dependent on secure element rate limiting. A very strong passphrase doesn't depend on the rate limiting or even key derivation without the secure element. If the secure element is exploited, good key derivation can keep a mediocre password secure.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not GrapheneOS. That's a company wrongly using the GrapheneOS name and logo in violation of our trademarks for their own insecure fork of the OS. Those aren't real GrapheneOS devices. We regularly warn people against buying these insecure devices with fake GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
According to the articles you're referencing yourself, the compromised devices run a vibe coded fork of GrapheneOS with remote management enabling the phone seller to manage the devices. That's not GrapheneOS and these companies violate our trademark by calling it GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're taking a poorly worded sentence from this article out-of-context after it clearly explains it isn't talking about genuine GrapheneOS:
www.crimesite.nl/grapheneos-politie-richt-zich-op-aangepa…
This is the article if references as a source:
www.joint-defense-team.com/post/grapheneos-cracked-police…
The article says it's not GrapheneOS.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The screenshot in your initial post conveniently omits the preceding paragraphs explaining that it's known the device didn't run GrapheneOS but rather a vibe coded fork with remote management access by the seller. You're doing the same thing again with the original article now.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The article you've linked makes it clear there are sellers of phones which claim to run GrapheneOS but actually run their insecure forks with remote management access. It gives an example of 1 case known to involve one of those insecure forks and also another likely case of it.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're conveniently omitting the text below explaining there's no indication anything was exploited or that the device was a device running official GrapheneOS. It's known European law enforcement regularly inaccurately describes devices as running GrapheneOS which do not run it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These phone sellers usually sell forks of GrapheneOS with a remote management system to force people to keep paying for the device. Many of these devices are likely deliberately backdoored. It's proven the police in these countries conflate these devices with actual GrapheneOS.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're conveniently omitting the text below explaining there's no indication anything was exploited or that the device was a device running official GrapheneOS. It's known European law enforcement regularly inaccurately describes devices as running GrapheneOS which do not run it.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The article explains devices running insecure forks of GrapheneOS are regularly referred to by law enforcement as being GrapheneOS devices. It explains there's no indication of the device being exploited or the device running official GrapheneOS directly below your screenshot.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The article gives an example of a case where a device is being said to run GrapheneOS by law enforcement but actually runs a vibe coded fork with a remote access system for the seller. It's a violation of our trademark that these devices were wrongly sold as GrapheneOS devices.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The article also makes it clear that there's no indication the device ran genuine GrapheneOS in the other case it references. It also makes it clear there's no indication of any exploit of the device. It says they may have the PIN or password from it being reused elsewhere.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's clear you have a false narrative you want to push about GrapheneOS. You've repeatedly made posts egregiously misrepresenting the content you're referencing. You avoided providing links to any of it so people couldn't check where they'd see it directly debunks your claims.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
None of this says the device was running official releases of GrapheneOS rather than a fork. It has already been shown that they conflate devices running insecure forks with GrapheneOS itself. That's already clearly demonstrated and yet you're pretending as if it doesn't happen.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
None says a locked device was exploited and it's known that wouldn't provide access to data in profiles for a device in Before First Unlock state. Official GrapheneOS has an 18 hour auto-reboot timer by default. Forks are known to often disable auto-reboot and USB-C protection.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS isn't supposed to be immune to exploitation by an adversary with physical access to a device. It has a locked device auto-reboot timer enabled by default which limits the time they have to exploit it to 18 hours before it goes back to Before First Unlock state.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Once a device is in Before First Unlock state, exploiting the OS doesn't provide access to the data in profiles due to disk encryption. BFU combined with a secure password prevents recovering data regardless of OS or hardware security. True for an $100 Walmart Android phone too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A strong password combined with being shut down will keep data in profiles on even a highly insecure low-end Android device as long as it has the standard disk encryption intact. Reboot doesn't fully restore disk encryption BFU for standard Android but does for actual GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Every device supported by GrapheneOS since Pixel 2 has a secure element implementing aggressive rate limiting. It provides secure encryption even with only a random 6 digit PIN. There's very strong evidence none of these countries can bypass Pixel 6+ secure element rate limits.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We recommend people with a high threat model such as journalists reporting on authoritarian governments use a strong passphrase to avoid depending on the secure element rate limiting. We make this easier by raising the length limit and adding a 2nd factor fingerprint unlock PIN.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's not feasible to break AES-256 disk encryption or the key derivation. It doesn't need multiple algorithms or be moved to new algorithms. It's much better if it isn't changed without very good reasons and any changes should be done extremely carefully. It's known it works.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
AES-256 and other algorithms used for Android disk encryption are post-quantum secure. It could be switched to use a harder to accelerate key derivation algorithm but that's only a factor if the secure element is exploited and the password is more than very weak but not strong.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A random 4-8 digit PIN is 100% dependent on secure element rate limiting. A very strong passphrase doesn't depend on the rate limiting or even key derivation without the secure element. If the secure element is exploited, good key derivation can keep a mediocre password secure.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
AES-256 and other algorithms used for Android disk encryption are post-quantum secure. It could be switched to use a harder to accelerate key derivation algorithm but that's only a factor if the secure element is exploited and the password is more than very weak but not strong.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's not feasible to break AES-256 disk encryption or the key derivation. It doesn't need multiple algorithms or be moved to new algorithms. It's much better if it isn't changed without very good reasons and any changes should be done extremely carefully. It's known it works.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We recommend people with a high threat model such as journalists reporting on authoritarian governments use a strong passphrase to avoid depending on the secure element rate limiting. We make this easier by raising the length limit and adding a 2nd factor fingerprint unlock PIN.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Every device supported by GrapheneOS since Pixel 2 has a secure element implementing aggressive rate limiting. It provides secure encryption even with only a random 6 digit PIN. There's very strong evidence none of these countries can bypass Pixel 6+ secure element rate limits.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A strong password combined with being shut down will keep data in profiles on even a highly insecure low-end Android device as long as it has the standard disk encryption intact. Reboot doesn't fully restore disk encryption BFU for standard Android but does for actual GrapheneOS.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Once a device is in Before First Unlock state, exploiting the OS doesn't provide access to the data in profiles due to disk encryption. BFU combined with a secure password prevents recovering data regardless of OS or hardware security. True for an $100 Walmart Android phone too.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS isn't supposed to be immune to exploitation by an adversary with physical access to a device. It has a locked device auto-reboot timer enabled by default which limits the time they have to exploit it to 18 hours before it goes back to Before First Unlock state.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
None says a locked device was exploited and it's known that wouldn't provide access to data in profiles for a device in Before First Unlock state. Official GrapheneOS has an 18 hour auto-reboot timer by default. Forks are known to often disable auto-reboot and USB-C protection.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
None of this says the device was running official releases of GrapheneOS rather than a fork. It has already been shown that they conflate devices running insecure forks with GrapheneOS itself. That's already clearly demonstrated and yet you're pretending as if it doesn't happen.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's clear you have a false narrative you want to push about GrapheneOS. You've repeatedly made posts egregiously misrepresenting the content you're referencing. You avoided providing links to any of it so people couldn't check where they'd see it directly debunks your claims.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Once the device is in Before First Unlock state, disk encryption combined with a strong password prevents recovery of data in profiles. Most users don't use a strong password which is why a high quality secure element implementing Weaver rate limiting is a hardware requirement.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has a locked device auto-reboot timer set to 18 hours by default. It returns to Before First Unlock state once that triggers and an exploit of the OS is no longer able to recover data from the profiles on the device. The article you keep misrepresenting covers this.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Once the device is in Before First Unlock state, disk encryption combined with a strong password prevents recovery of data in profiles. Most users don't use a strong password which is why a high quality secure element implementing Weaver rate limiting is a hardware requirement.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has a locked device auto-reboot timer set to 18 hours by default. It returns to Before First Unlock state once that triggers and an exploit of the OS is no longer able to recover data from the profiles on the device. The article you keep misrepresenting covers this.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A small sample of the state media campaign against GrapheneOS in France which has happened alongside Murena's similar attacks:
www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/telephones-proteges-utilis…
archive.is/8Jo17
www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/google-pixel-et-grapheneos…
archive.is/AhMsj
www.lefigaro.fr/secteur/high-tech/qu-est-ce-que-grapheneo…
www.franceinfo.fr/faits-divers/narcotrafic-les-autorites-… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Spain is where law enforcement first began smearing GrapheneOS in the media, specifically in the Catalonia region where it's known the Spanish government has mass deployed commercial remote exploits against political opponents.
www.xatakandroid.com/sociedad/cada-vez-que-vemos-google-p…
citizenlab.ca/research/catalangate-extensive-mercenary-sp… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-probes-toronto-sho… is a very fair and balanced article. They did proper research and talked to experts.
That's entirely unlike nearly all of the coverage by the media in Spain, France, Germany and the Netherlands. In the few cases we were asked for our perspective, nearly nothing we said was included. They acted as sycophants for the state and did not challenge or verify their claims.
Why is it that nearly all the western European news coverage is sycophantic? -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These countries are increasingly crack down on end-to-end encryption, financial privacy and secure devices. The same countries want you to believe that you should use products and services built within their borders under their control, especially ones which are heavily state and EU funded.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
See www.ad.nl/binnenland/paniek-in-onderwereld-politie-valt-m… for an example of what's ongoing in the Netherlands to scare people away from using open source privacy projects. It's also ongoing in Germany at the same time with similar talking points. This largely started in Spain and has been worst in France.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a major state sponsored misinformation and smear campaign towards GrapheneOS in the Netherlands and Germany. The misinformation campaign includes unsubstantiated security claims not holding up to scrutiny to scare people away from it. They're also heavily misrepresenting who uses it overall.
These smear campaigns conflate GrapheneOS with forks and modifications of it sold by shady companies. Those usually include a device management app to remotely manage the devices of their customers as if they're employees. These are largely not GrapheneOS devices or have preinstalled malware apps.
A common tactic being used in these smear campaigns is to make unsubstantiated and outright false claims about the capabilities of forensic data extraction tools. They misrepresent how they get into devices. They want to scare people into using far less secure devices which are easier to exploit.
France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands are becoming increasingly authoritarian surveillance states with an ongoing crackdown against privacy. It's happening throughout the whole EU and it's likely both secure devices and end-to-end encryption without backdoors are going to end up outlawed.
There are a bunch of companies based in the EU selling phones with drastically worse privacy and security than an iPhone including Jolla, Volla, Murena and iodé. These products are effectively backdoored by not providing standard privacy and security patches/protections while misleading users.
France and other EU countries are actively cracking down on legitimate privacy and security projects while supporting unsafe products within their control. These products make it far easier to remotely exploit devices and also to bypass encryption to extract data. They're phony privacy products.
Each of the companies we've listed have participated in the misinformation and smear campaigns against GrapheneOS. Jolla spent years working closely with Putin's regime. Volla, Murena and iodé are building an EU Play Integrity API. None provides the crucial standard privacy patches/protections.
Murena is directly assisting with state anti-privacy campaigns smearing highly private and secure devices as mainly benefiting criminals. They've repeatedly falsely claimed GrapheneOS is mainly used by criminals. Here are 2 of many examples:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142
clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-interview.html
GrapheneOS, end-to-end encrypted messaging apps, Monero and other projects are being targeted with state and corporate propaganda and anti-privacy laws. Meanwhile, the same governments heavily fund and support phony privacy projects clearly downgrading privacy and security compared to an iPhone.
GrapheneOS is only an initial target for these state actors and their sycophants in corporate news organizations. Apple heavily works on protecting users against exploits too. It would be much harder to convince the public that an iPhone is for criminals so they're starting with open source.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The article also makes it clear that there's no indication the device ran genuine GrapheneOS in the other case it references. It also makes it clear there's no indication of any exploit of the device. It says they may have the PIN or password from it being reused elsewhere.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The article gives an example of a case where a device is being said to run GrapheneOS by law enforcement but actually runs a vibe coded fork with a remote access system for the seller. It's a violation of our trademark that these devices were wrongly sold as GrapheneOS devices.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The article explains devices running insecure forks of GrapheneOS are regularly referred to by law enforcement as being GrapheneOS devices. It explains there's no indication of the device being exploited or the device running official GrapheneOS directly below your screenshot.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These phone sellers usually sell forks of GrapheneOS with a remote management system to force people to keep paying for the device. Many of these devices are likely deliberately backdoored. It's proven the police in these countries conflate these devices with actual GrapheneOS.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're conveniently omitting the text below explaining there's no indication anything was exploited or that the device was a device running official GrapheneOS. It's known European law enforcement regularly inaccurately describes devices as running GrapheneOS which do not run it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're conveniently omitting the text below explaining there's no indication anything was exploited or that the device was a device running official GrapheneOS. It's known European law enforcement regularly inaccurately describes devices as running GrapheneOS which do not run it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The article you've linked makes it clear there are sellers of phones which claim to run GrapheneOS but actually run their insecure forks with remote management access. It gives an example of 1 case known to involve one of those insecure forks and also another likely case of it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The screenshot in your initial post conveniently omits the preceding paragraphs explaining that it's known the device didn't run GrapheneOS but rather a vibe coded fork with remote management access by the seller. You're doing the same thing again with the original article now.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're taking a poorly worded sentence from this article out-of-context after it clearly explains it isn't talking about genuine GrapheneOS:
www.crimesite.nl/grapheneos-politie-richt-zich-op-aangepa…
This is the article if references as a source:
www.joint-defense-team.com/post/grapheneos-cracked-police…
The article says it's not GrapheneOS. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
According to the articles you're referencing yourself, the compromised devices run a vibe coded fork of GrapheneOS with remote management enabling the phone seller to manage the devices. That's not GrapheneOS and these companies violate our trademark by calling it GrapheneOS.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not GrapheneOS. That's a company wrongly using the GrapheneOS name and logo in violation of our trademarks for their own insecure fork of the OS. Those aren't real GrapheneOS devices. We regularly warn people against buying these insecure devices with fake GrapheneOS.
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GrapheneOS reposted
Tom-monerist @t0monerist
The article : www.crimesite.nl/grapheneos-politie-richt-zich-op-aangepa…
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GrapheneOS reposted
Tom-monerist @t0monerist
which allowed the vendor to manage the devices remotely.
Lödden suspects that the police gained access to the reseller's digital signing keys, which could allow modified software to be installed on the devices to bypass screen locks. -
GrapheneOS reposted
Tom-monerist @t0monerist
Exactly.
The translation :
According to German criminal defense lawyer Christian Lödden, affiliated with the Joint Defense Team, the trader from Ridderkerk sold phones with a custom version of GrapheneOS. This version included a built-in Mobile Device Management (MDM) system, -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is their highest end non-folding device. There will be more supported devices at lower price points once those have MTE support. The price was going to have to increase from the Signature 2026 due to the RAM supply crisis. They chose to go all out with the cameras and SoC.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is their highest end non-folding device. There will be more supported devices at lower price points once those have MTE support. The price was going to have to increase from the Signature 2026 due to the RAM supply crisis. They chose to go all out with the cameras and SoC.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Support for both folding devices and cheaper devices is definitely planned but we can't give any timeline for additional device support. This is mostly up to Qualcomm rather than Motorola. We need Qualcomm to realize MTE is important and should be provided across more SoCs.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Motorola has announced their new high end flagship phone including upcoming official support for GrapheneOS as an OS option.
Motorola Signature 27 will be the first Motorola device supported by GrapheneOS. More devices will be supported in the future.
motorolanews.com/motorola-signature-27-2/Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Motorola is providing official support for GrapheneOS and has multiple engineers helping us port GrapheneOS to their devices and implement the required security features. We'll have what we need provided officially and can work with them to improve driver/firmware security too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Motorola can get Qualcomm to make improvements too. For Pixels, we regularly file issues reporting weaknesses and proposing improvements but have no special access and they often don't listen or prioritize the issues. Official support for GrapheneOS from Motorola resolves this.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Support for both folding devices and cheaper devices is definitely planned but we can't give any timeline for additional device support. This is mostly up to Qualcomm rather than Motorola. We need Qualcomm to realize MTE is important and should be provided across more SoCs.
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GrapheneOS reposted
decentricity 🦔♀️
@decentricity
my cat has had root access to Alpine this entire time
International Cyber Digest
@IntCyberDigest
The bug is like a joke.
On Alpine Linux, type 257 to 1024 characters of anything and you get root. 💀
International Cyber Digest
@IntCyberDigest
‼️ BREAKING: OpenSSH has rushed out a fix for a critical flaw that lets attackers log into some Linux servers without the right password.
The team learned of the bug a day earlier. OpenSSH's Damien Miller says long embargoes now mostly help attackers, because AI agents rediscover bugs, sometimes within hours.
It hits Linux systems on the musl C library with PAM off, such as Alpine Linux. Miller told admins to disable password logins or SSH itself "IMMEDIATELY".
Version 10.6p2 works around it. Systems on glibc or PAM are not affected, and Miller says the root cause sits outside OpenSSH. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Y Combinator invests in dozens of surveillance companies including Flock along with helping to enable them. Their moderators put their thumb on the scales at Hacker News actively supporting attacks on the GrapheneOS project including libel and harassment towards our team members.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Y Combinator investments in police state mass surveillance:
ycombinator.com/companies/flock-safety
ycombinator.com/companies/conntour
ycombinator.com/companies/edgetrace
ycombinator.com/companies/traces
ycombinator.com/companies/ambient-ai
ycombinator.com/companies/lexius
ycombinator.com/companies/verdun
ycombinator.com/companies/synara
ycombinator.com/companies/rimward
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Y Combinator investments in worker/customer surveillance:
www.ycombinator.com/companies/optifye-ai
www.ycombinator.com/companies/tenyks
www.ycombinator.com/companies/aura-vision
Drone surveillance disguised as birds with flapping wings:
www.ycombinator.com/companies/ornadyne
High altitude global surveillance:
www.ycombinator.com/companies/icarus -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've hired 2 quality assurance engineers who are now working on testing pull requests and releases for our apps to far more catch issues prior to our Alpha channel releases. They'll also be helping with OS testing. It should help improve the quality of GrapheneOS even further.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We recently hired 4 experienced Android app developers to overhaul or replace each app included in GrapheneOS. The most recent hire starts at the end of this month. We shipped the Messaging app overhaul which is already far more usable, robust and secure but will get much better.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're working on a bug fix release for the Camera app fixing many issues which have been around for years. Both Camera and Contacts also have experimental overhauls well under way. Gallery has a replacement in progress based on a fork of another app which we'll be changing a lot.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 157.0.8103.38.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/157.0.8103.38.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43312-vanadium-version-157081033…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our latest 2026110200 release has been in our Stable channel for hours. It's our first release in Stable with our port of the Pixel 10, 10 Pro, 10 Pro XL and 10 Pro Fold to the Linux 6.18 LTS branch. There aren't any reported regressions yet. We found one minor issue internally.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are 0 additional changes required for porting the QPR2 drivers from 6.12 instead of 6.6, but most of the remaining patches needed adjustments.
We'll be porting the remaining Pixels from the Linux 6.1 LTS to 6.18. Those use a far different SoC but some work can be reused.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We expect the Pixel 11 series will ship firmware for MTE in Android 17 QPR2 since it's available in the QPR2 Beta releases. As long as it ships in the current form, we'll be able to support those. Most of the port from 6.12 to 6.18 is already done for those via our 10th gen port.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026110200 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43297-grapheneos-version-2026110…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our latest OS release includes our port of the 10th gen Pixels to Linux 6.18 LTS. It's now in Alpha for the Pixel 10, 10 Pro, 10 Pro XL and 10 Pro Fold. We've been doing public pre-Alpha testing and multiple days have passed with no more issues found.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026110100 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43264-grapheneos-version-2026110…
#grapheneos #privacy #securityPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This was caught by the UBSan bounds sanitizer which is used in trapping mode in production as a hardening feature. It's an out-of-bounds read beyond a read-only global constant so MTE can't catch it since those aren't separately tagged. We added the new types and a bounds check.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This wouldn't have caused any real harm beyond incorrect logging without UBSan but it's good the issue was found with it. Due to finding this issue, we checked all other uses of the USB PD enum types in the Pixel drivers and also fixed PPS fast charging for chargers with AVS.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026110100 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43264-grapheneos-version-2026110…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a major state sponsored misinformation and smear campaign towards GrapheneOS in the Netherlands and Germany. The misinformation campaign includes unsubstantiated security claims not holding up to scrutiny to scare people away from it. They're also heavily misrepresenting who uses it overall.
These smear campaigns conflate GrapheneOS with forks and modifications of it sold by shady companies. Those usually include a device management app to remotely manage the devices of their customers as if they're employees. These are largely not GrapheneOS devices or have preinstalled malware apps.
A common tactic being used in these smear campaigns is to make unsubstantiated and outright false claims about the capabilities of forensic data extraction tools. They misrepresent how they get into devices. They want to scare people into using far less secure devices which are easier to exploit.
France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands are becoming increasingly authoritarian surveillance states with an ongoing crackdown against privacy. It's happening throughout the whole EU and it's likely both secure devices and end-to-end encryption without backdoors are going to end up outlawed.
There are a bunch of companies based in the EU selling phones with drastically worse privacy and security than an iPhone including Jolla, Volla, Murena and iodé. These products are effectively backdoored by not providing standard privacy and security patches/protections while misleading users.
France and other EU countries are actively cracking down on legitimate privacy and security projects while supporting unsafe products within their control. These products make it far easier to remotely exploit devices and also to bypass encryption to extract data. They're phony privacy products.
Each of the companies we've listed have participated in the misinformation and smear campaigns against GrapheneOS. Jolla spent years working closely with Putin's regime. Volla, Murena and iodé are building an EU Play Integrity API. None provides the crucial standard privacy patches/protections.
Murena is directly assisting with state anti-privacy campaigns smearing highly private and secure devices as mainly benefiting criminals. They've repeatedly falsely claimed GrapheneOS is mainly used by criminals. Here are 2 of many examples:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142
clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-interview.html
GrapheneOS, end-to-end encrypted messaging apps, Monero and other projects are being targeted with state and corporate propaganda and anti-privacy laws. Meanwhile, the same governments heavily fund and support phony privacy projects clearly downgrading privacy and security compared to an iPhone.
GrapheneOS is only an initial target for these state actors and their sycophants in corporate news organizations. Apple heavily works on protecting users against exploits too. It would be much harder to convince the public that an iPhone is for criminals so they're starting with open source.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
See www.ad.nl/binnenland/paniek-in-onderwereld-politie-valt-m… for an example of what's ongoing in the Netherlands to scare people away from using open source privacy projects. It's also ongoing in Germany at the same time with similar talking points. This largely started in Spain and has been worst in France.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These countries are increasingly crack down on end-to-end encryption, financial privacy and secure devices. The same countries want you to believe that you should use products and services built within their borders under their control, especially ones which are heavily state and EU funded.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-probes-toronto-sho… is a very fair and balanced article. They did proper research and talked to experts.
That's entirely unlike nearly all of the coverage by the media in Spain, France, Germany and the Netherlands. In the few cases we were asked for our perspective, nearly nothing we said was included. They acted as sycophants for the state and did not challenge or verify their claims.
Why is it that nearly all the western European news coverage is sycophantic?
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Spain is where law enforcement first began smearing GrapheneOS in the media, specifically in the Catalonia region where it's known the Spanish government has mass deployed commercial remote exploits against political opponents.
www.xatakandroid.com/sociedad/cada-vez-que-vemos-google-p…
citizenlab.ca/research/catalangate-extensive-mercenary-sp…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A small sample of the state media campaign against GrapheneOS in France which has happened alongside Murena's similar attacks:
www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/telephones-proteges-utilis…
archive.is/8Jo17
www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/google-pixel-et-grapheneos…
archive.is/AhMsj
www.lefigaro.fr/secteur/high-tech/qu-est-ce-que-grapheneo…
www.franceinfo.fr/faits-divers/narcotrafic-les-autorites-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The latest version of our App Store adds support for delta updates. It drastically reduces the bandwidth for package updates by only shipping the changes. It's particularly high impact for our Vanadium browser and WebView. We've used deltas for OS updates for over 10 years.
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2116428430300291158
We're using the Ina library from the Accrescent project to generate and use deltas. We're also using Dropbox's brotli-decompressor library to replace gzip compression using Android's DEFLATE implementation. Both are pure Rust libraries fully avoiding unsafe code other than the exported C FFI API.
Our App Store has always used a signed JSON file for metadata with a timestamp for downgrade protection. That has cryptographic hashes of each APK for verification. There's also the standard OS package manager verification via whole file signatures in each APK and version code downgrade protection.
The latest version extends the cryptographic hashes to covering the compressed APKs and deltas to verify those prior to decompression. This means a compromised update server can't use the new Rust Brotli decompression library and Rust delta library as additional attack surface to exploit the client.
The latest arm64 Vanadium browser APK is 325MB. It was previously downloaded as a 131MB gzip file created with zopfli. It's now downloaded as a 17MB update for users who were on one of the most recent 2 Vanadium releases. It's down to 95MB via Brotli for users on older versions without deltas.
There are similar savings for the Vanadium WebView. Until recently, the Vanadium browser and WebView shared a browser engine library via Trichrome builds. Chromium deprecated Trichrome due to bugs and Chrome stopped using it so we did too. We highly prioritized App Store delta updates due to this.
App Store v37 is in Beta/Alpha. To try it out, select the Beta channel via the menu in App Store's page for itself. Vanadium in GrapheneOS 2026102100 was 2 versions old so you can uninstall WebView updates and update again via a small delta update. WebView has no data to lose via uninstall updates.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS App Store version 37 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/AppStore/releases/tag/37
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43210-grapheneos-app-store-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS App Store version 37 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/AppStore/releases/tag/37
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43210-grapheneos-app-store-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a malicious website copying the content from our website which is trying to trick people into installing malware. It's registered via Namecheap and is using Cloudflare in front of their server. This should be taken down.
installgarphenos [dot] ink
/GrapheneOS [dot] zip
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It was quickly taken down by @Namecheap by putting it into clientHold. Thanks.
Namecheap.com
@Namecheap
Checking!
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS App Store version 37 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/AppStore/releases/tag/37
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43210-grapheneos-app-store-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We won't implement the incorrect functionality available in other forks of AOSP. We can add a toggle for sending Wi-Fi hotspot through the VPN of the profile enabling it which would properly fit into the profile privacy model. It's only possible to do it right since Android 17.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It would be incorrect and a privacy vulnerability to route the hotspot through the Owner user VPN. Android has per-profile VPN configuration. Android also moved to per-profile Wi-Fi network and hotspot configuration in Android 17 so it would be reasonable to add a toggle for it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We won't implement the incorrect functionality available in other forks of AOSP. We can add a toggle for sending Wi-Fi hotspot through the VPN of the profile enabling it which would properly fit into the profile privacy model. It's only possible to do it right since Android 17.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It would be incorrect and a privacy vulnerability to route the hotspot through the Owner user VPN. Android has per-profile VPN configuration. Android also moved to per-profile Wi-Fi network and hotspot configuration in Android 17 so it would be reasonable to add a toggle for it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The post the article cites as a source is highly inaccurate and has been thoroughly debunked:
news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50269447
news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50268748
They used a highly inaccurate post and weak AI model prompted based on it to misinform themselves and you're misinforming more people. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This article is extraordinarily inaccurate and is written in response to blatant misinformation from someone who is actively trying to harm open source projects to promote closed source hardware which falsely purports to be open, secure and private while being the opposite of it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The post the article cites as a source is highly inaccurate and has been thoroughly debunked:
news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50269447
news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50268748
They used a highly inaccurate post and weak AI model prompted based on it to misinform themselves and you're misinforming more people. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This article is extraordinarily inaccurate and is written in response to blatant misinformation from someone who is actively trying to harm open source projects to promote closed source hardware which falsely purports to be open, secure and private while being the opposite of it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The reality is highly insecure, ultra low-end hardware sold at a premium with absolutely atrocious updates and security.
Privacy and security researchers have repeatedly found actual backdoors in these products and services:
x.com/TommyTran732/status/1609885119049007104
forum.f-droid.org/t/brax2-alternatives/22469/5
Tommy
@TommyTran732
“Metadata free end to end encrypted social media platform” brax.me by the definitely-cybersecurity-expert @robbraxmantech leaks BOTH the metadata AND THE ACTUAL ENCRYPTION KEY to the server because why not 🤣
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These products and services are blatant scams. They've repeatedly shipped proven backdoors including sending the keys for supposed end-to-end encryption to their servers for multiple of their services. These toggles are being misrepresented and do not do what is claimed there.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The reality is highly insecure, ultra low-end hardware sold at a premium with absolutely atrocious updates and security.
Privacy and security researchers have repeatedly found actual backdoors in these products and services:
x.com/TommyTran732/status/1609885119049007104
forum.f-droid.org/t/brax2-alternatives/22469/5
Tommy
@TommyTran732
“Metadata free end to end encrypted social media platform” brax.me by the definitely-cybersecurity-expert @robbraxmantech leaks BOTH the metadata AND THE ACTUAL ENCRYPTION KEY to the server because why not 🤣
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These products and services are blatant scams. They've repeatedly shipped proven backdoors including sending the keys for supposed end-to-end encryption to their servers for multiple of their services. These toggles are being misrepresented and do not do what is claimed there.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Messaging version 18 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/releases/tag/18
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43200-grapheneos-messaging-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 156.0.8078.79.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/156.0.8078.79.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43199-vanadium-version-156080787…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're planning on shipping our port of 10th generation Pixels to Linux 6.18 in our next official release. We'll see how that goes with much broader testing in our Alpha and Beta channels. We'll finish the port for the earlier Pixels once that's done and then we'll get everything moved over to 6.18.
Public testing via our experimental releases has been ongoing for several days now. Only a single regression has been discovered so far which was DisplayPort alternate mode no longer working and it was quickly fixed and made available in a new experimental release. It's ready for Alpha testing soon. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google mishandled the issue report. There was likely an internal miscommunication and they handled the report incorrectly. It's possible the issue was already filed internally and they meant to close it as a duplicate instead of WONTFIX. Closing it at all may have been an error.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google committed a fix on June 15th and it was shipped in the security preview patches in mid-July. GrapheneOS shipped it in our security preview releases in July. It's in the upcoming November security bulletin but a patch was pushed to AOSP in October:
android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/opt/telephon…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's assigned CVE-2026-58882 and a Critical severity in the November 2026 Android Security Bulletin. We've had it listed as one of the patches included in our security preview releases since our 2026072901 release which you can see in the release notes:
grapheneos.org/releases
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google mishandled the issue report. There was likely an internal miscommunication and they handled the report incorrectly. It's possible the issue was already filed internally and they meant to close it as a duplicate instead of WONTFIX. Closing it at all may have been an error.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's assigned CVE-2026-58882 and a Critical severity in the November 2026 Android Security Bulletin. We've had it listed as one of the patches included in our security preview releases since our 2026072901 release which you can see in the release notes:
grapheneos.org/releases -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google committed a fix on June 15th and it was shipped in the security preview patches in mid-July. GrapheneOS shipped it in our security preview releases in July. It's in the upcoming November security bulletin but a patch was pushed to AOSP in October:
android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/opt/telephon… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our port of the 10th generation Pixels to the Linux 6.18 GKI LTS branch has been through a day of public testing by a couple dozen users. There are no known issues remaining anymore. We're going to continue heavily reviewing the commits and looking for more unhandled API changes.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The flood of discovered vulnerabilities has caused Linux to start changing approach. Feature development has slowed down and legacy code is starting to be removed. They need to get on board with memory safety and isolation. Pretending everything is fine won't fool people anymore.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android's Linux kernel drivers including Ashmem and Binder are being rewritten in Rust. This is intended to happen for new device drivers for Android devices too. We'll have the Rust Ashmem and Binder on the 6.18 LTS branch. It won't help much until far more gets moved over.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixel 8a is the cheapest device we recommend. Pixel 'a' series are a budget line with the same updates and security features as higher end Pixels. Pixel 8 and later moved to 7 years of support and provide all our current security requirements including hardware memory tagging.
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Fairphone Newsroom
@Fairphone
Introducing the new Fairphone (Gen. 6+). More power, more Fairphone - Now available in the US and Europe. Check it out on us.fairphone.com
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The first Motorola device is an ultra high end flagship. It's higher end than a Pixel 11 Pro XL with better cameras, ~60% faster single threaded, ~80% faster multithreaded and over 2x GPU performance. There will be cheaper devices we can support but it will be at least a year.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixel 8a is the cheapest device we recommend. Pixel 'a' series are a budget line with the same updates and security features as higher end Pixels. Pixel 8 and later moved to 7 years of support and provide all our current security requirements including hardware memory tagging.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The first Motorola device is an ultra high end flagship. It's higher end than a Pixel 11 Pro XL with better cameras, ~60% faster single threaded, ~80% faster multithreaded and over 2x GPU performance. There will be cheaper devices we can support but it will be at least a year.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Experimental releases of GrapheneOS with our initial port to the Linux 6.18 branch are now available for testing on the Pixel 10, Pixel 10 Pro, Pixel 10 Pro XL and Pixel 10 Pro Fold. We've done initial testing but there will likely be at least a dozen more crashes and other issues to find and fix.
People should only help with testing this if they're able to tolerate regular kernel panics and various hardware functionality not working. We've done basic testing of Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular, GNSS, Vulkan and virtual machines via the Terminal app and microdroid API but there's far more to test.
If you're interested in helping with testing, please join either our #testing:grapheneos.org channel on Matrix or #testing on our Discord server. We've posted links to over-the-air updates for each of the 4 releases in both channels. These are production builds signed with the official signing keys.
Users can update to these from our current releases and update from those to future experimental and regular releases. Hardware functionality should be the focus. Bluetooth / BLE, NFC, assorted Wi-Fi APs / standards, DisplayPort alt mode, USB peripherals, USB host modes, GNSS and NFC are examples.
These experimental releases have all of the changes from our current development branch and are security preview releases with the security preview patches from our previous release. We have 4 official build machines so we can build for all 4 devices in parallel and make new releases as people test.
Do not install the experimental releases unless you can tolerate regular freezes, kernel panics and broken hardware functionality. These are highly experimental and you should not expect the device to be very usable during the early testing. We'll make new releases with fixes for discovered issues.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've resolved the lockup occurring during USB transfers which turned out to be caused by a pKVM bug in the common kernel tree. This is the third pKVM bug we've fixed for 6.18 as part of the port. We also fixed an occasional early boot crash caused by a race. There's a Wi-Fi issue left to resolve.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're building new experimental OS releases now after resolving the Wi-Fi suspend issue. There's also likely a PCIe power saving regression to solve. There will be lots of other issues to solve but the end result of using the 6.18 GKI LTS and then getting rid of GKI ABI stability will be much nicer.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 156.0.8078.73.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/156.0.8078.73.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43144-vanadium-version-156080787…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Yahoo resolved this at some point on October 23rd after we posted this thread. Emails from our discussion forum and attestation service have been getting accepted every day since then. Thank you to whoever got this fixed. It was the last known email issue with our new IP space.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Yahoo is still blocking emails from our newly assigned IP space. We've continued using it and aren't going to stop because Yahoo won't accept mails from it. It already has a great reputation elsewhere and there are 0 issues with anything else blocking it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Yahoo is still blocking emails from our newly assigned IPv4 space (206.220.120.0/22). It's likely they're behind on updating their database of allocated IP space. It was already published via www.arin.net/resources/guide/ipv4/blocks_cleared/ and other providers have been accepting it for 2 weeks already.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Yahoo resolved this at some point on October 23rd after we posted this thread. Emails from our discussion forum and attestation service have been getting accepted every day since then. Thank you to whoever got this fixed. It was the last known email issue with our new IP space.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS TalkBack version 23 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/TalkBack/releases/tag/23
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43100-grapheneos-talkback-versio…
#grapheneos #privacy #security
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
One issue has been found but turned out to be an upstream Android Launcher bug which we've fixed for the next OS release:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_Launcher3/pu…
We're ready to move our new major release of TalkBack to Stable once we get more testing feedback in #testing on Matrix or Discord. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Messaging version 17 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/releases/tag/17
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43079-grapheneos-messaging-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google made a change to their RCS service breaking using it for a small number of users. It's likely in the process of being rolled out and is gradually causing issues for more users. We're already working on resolving it. It isn't caused by the OS update about to move to Stable.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Resolving this before it impacts a much larger number of users is one of our highest priorities. It's likely only going to be possible to resolve it with an OS update rather than a GmsCompatConfig release. We've only just started working on it so we don't know the cause yet.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Most of the people reporting RCS no longer working were able to resolve it by enabling the ICC authentication toggle. It's likely the requirement to have it enabled was rolled out to more carriers. The remaining reports may all be non-GrapheneOS-related.
grapheneos.org/usage -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Both the TLD operator and registrar can take over DNS for any domain and obtain valid certificates from a CA. That's not CA misissuance. It will be logged in the transparency logs for all the good it will do. WebPKI is based on validation of control over DNS at one point in time.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Both the TLD operator and registrar can take over DNS for any domain and obtain valid certificates from a CA. That's not CA misissuance. It will be logged in the transparency logs for all the good it will do. WebPKI is based on validation of control over DNS at one point in time.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We'd appreciate if someone working at Yahoo could get it resolved. We're going to continue using our new IPv4 space for email since it works with Google, Microsoft, Proton and hundreds of other mail providers. We'll just block yahoo.com registrations on our forum.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Yahoo is still blocking emails from our newly assigned IPv4 space (206.220.120.0/22). It's likely they're behind on updating their database of allocated IP space. It was already published via www.arin.net/resources/guide/ipv4/blocks_cleared/ and other providers have been accepting it for 2 weeks already.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 178 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43045-gmscompatconfig-version-17…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is Linux. Linux is already enough of a problem without adding the mess of systemd, GNU, GNOME and similar software. We don't want any of that and it should be replaced on the desktop too. Linux should be replaced with a microkernel. It's all increasingly doable now.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our latest OS release moved to using the Linux 6.18 LTS branch for both arm64 and x86_64 for the emulator, Cuttlefish and microdroid targets. We've made a highly experimental port of the Pixel kernel drivers to 6.18 and are planning on moving to it across all supported devices.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
In the past several months, Android's official Generic Kernel Image (GKI) branches have fallen behind the upstream LTS revisions. We're resolving this by moving all of the devices we support to the latest LTS branch and making a GKI replacement for the latest upstream release.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have a Pixel 7 working with the upstream Linux 6.18.58 release. We'll be getting all supported devices fully working with all hardware functionality. The upcoming Motorola flagship uses a fork of the 6.18 GKI LTS branch and we'll need to port it to the upstream kernel too.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is Linux. Linux is already enough of a problem without adding the mess of systemd, GNU, GNOME and similar software. We don't want any of that and it should be replaced on the desktop too. Linux should be replaced with a microkernel. It's all increasingly doable now.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've successfully made an initial port to using the upstream LTS branch for Pixels. We need to do a huge amount of code review and fixing regressions. Once we have it shipped, it will become trivial to ship each upstream revision, although those do often introduce regressions.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Shipping this requires a long term commitment to porting all the relevant Pixel and Motorola/Snapdragon kernel drivers to the latest upstream LTS code. We've determined that's much easier than expected. The hard part is making the device independent LTS with all the backports.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026102100 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/43012-grapheneos-version-2026102…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our discussion forum is the only software we have using PHP. We've taken it down temporarily while waiting for the patches for www.php.net/archive/2026.php due to vulnerability details already being available and proof of concept exploits being developed. Don't want to take the risk.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Details are public and exploits are being written. Too risky to keep the forum up. It's the 1st major downtime for it.
From a PHP core developer:
phpc.social/@Girgias/117476477429221001
> The only thing I can say is that the only mitigation is patching / upgrading PHP. I sadly know too much.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our discussion forum is updated to PHP 8.5.12 and has been available again for over an hour:
discuss.grapheneos.org -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 156.0.8078.47.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/156.0.8078.47.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42992-vanadium-version-156080784…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 177 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42964-gmscompatconfig-version-17…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is the new GrapheneOS boot animation. It's generated frame-by-frame using a script. It has a minimum 3.5s total runtime for the intro including a small pause. The rest of the animation gets interrupted once the device is booted to avoid any delay so there can't be an outro.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Intro
0.00-1.90: Atoms appear one-by-one and gather
1.90-2.70: Bonds expand; name fades in from 2.20
2.70-3.50: Hold
Transition
0.00-1.20: Hold
0.00-0.80: Outer and split inner bonds retract; name fades
0.80-1.40: Ease into spin
Loop
0.00-4.00: One rotation from initial offset
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The animation included in 2026101600 holds the logo for 0.8s rather than 2.0s in the video above since the new zips weren't committed to the OS yet. We've reduced that to 1.6s though.
For the Pixel Tablet, we've reduced the size of the logo to 30% of the screen height from 40%.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The acceleration throughout the animation is currently done with smootherstep (quintic smoothstep) which is working nicely and likely going to be kept.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smoothstep
The top speed for the loop could be reduced but we're getting mixed feedback about that aspect of it. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026101600 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42898-grapheneos-version-2026101…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Yahoo is still blocking emails from our newly assigned IPv4 space (206.220.120.0/22). It's likely they're behind on updating their database of allocated IP space. It was already published via www.arin.net/resources/guide/ipv4/blocks_cleared/ and other providers have been accepting it for 2 weeks already.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We'd appreciate if someone working at Yahoo could get it resolved. We're going to continue using our new IPv4 space for email since it works with Google, Microsoft, Proton and hundreds of other mail providers. We'll just block yahoo.com registrations on our forum.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 155.0.8059.84.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/155.0.8059.84.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42852-vanadium-version-155080598…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
4 of mallace
@IceSolst
No. The opposite: make all firmware images public. They can be dumped anyway. Your best bet is getting more eyes on them.
Open source everything, the code is not a moat. Obfuscation is even dumber today.
Matthew Green
@matthew_d_green
I hate to say this because it goes against everything I believe in. But people are going to need to take down public firmware images for critical infrastructure, like yesterday.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 155.0.8059.79.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/155.0.8059.79.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42801-vanadium-version-155080597…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 155.0.8059.39.0 released:
github.com/grapheneos/Vanadium/releases/tag/155.0.8059.39.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42679-vanadium-version-155080593…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026100600 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42652-grapheneos-version-2026100…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 176 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42570-gmscompatconfig-version-17…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android Security Bulletins have been twisted into a way to mislead the public about security. Patches are only listed in the bulletins 2-6 months after they're disclosed to each Android OEM and allowed to be shipped. Patches listed in the September 2026 bulletin were available to ship for months.
Android Security Bulletins are divided into two sections. The first section contains High and Critical severity Android Open Source Project (AOSP) patches backported to older releases. For years already, Low and Moderate severity AOSP patches have required updating to the latest major releases.
The first section is the main portion of the patches and gets provided 2-6 months in advance as security preview patches. The security preview patches are allowed to be shipped right away, which is sensible. The horrific part is delaying disclosure of the vulnerabilities and patches for months.
The security preview patches aren't only for Android projects but rather also include patches to external projects. Some of these external patches are already publicly disclosed while others are not. As one example, there have been non-publicly-disclosed security preview patches for wpa_supplicant.
GrapheneOS provides security preview releases providing early access to all of the security preview patches. It's the only OS quickly shipping all of these patches. A subset of these patches are shipped early by the stock OS on Pixels and Samsung flagships but far from all and it comes weeks later.
In 2026, Google has been completely overwhelmed by the volume of vulnerabilities being discovered by AI models both internally and externally. They recently announced to OEMs that the full set of High and Critical severity patches will only be available through the latest yearly and QPR2 releases.
Their announcement explains the massive number of vulnerabilities discovered by AI models internally will only be patched in the latest major releases. A subset deemed to pose an imminent risk to users will be backported to the most recent releases but not to older releases with security support.
Each Android Security Bulletin also has a 2nd section with listing an extraordinarily small subset of the vulnerabilities patched in the upstream Linux kernel along with a small subset of vulnerabilities patched in drivers/firmware shared by many devices. This is deliberate to keep the bar very low.
Google wants Android users to feel safe due to believing they have the latest privacy and security patches. Therefore, they delay patches being listed in the bulletins for months and don't list a substantial portion of Linux, driver and firmware patches. It's a very low bar so devices can keep up. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 154.0.8037.126.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/154.0.8037.126.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42548-vanadium-version-154080371…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026100200 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42518-grapheneos-version-2026100…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android 17 QPR1 was released for Pixels on September 15. It has a regression in the Pixel kernel driver tree causing stuttering, lag and outright freezes under memory pressure. It impacts GrapheneOS too since we updated the firmware/drivers but we fixed it for our release today.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixel 11 series received a bug fix release near the start of September 2026 with the 2026-09-01 patch level. That update wasn't Android 17 QPR1 and also doesn't include the September 2026 Pixel firmware/driver security patches. Perhaps they noticed this issue and cancelled it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Standard Android and Pixel updates have a severe issue with delays. It usually takes 2-3 months for Google to ship fixes for both severe regressions and security issues. They often get the issues fixed in days but the release engineering and testing process is completely broken.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here's our fix for the awful Android 17 QPR1 regression causing lag, stuttering and freezes:
gitlab.com/grapheneos/kernel_pixel_6.6/-/commit/ed5a9b87d…
It's so severe that it's causing processes to be killed for stalls. It's unclear when Google will ship a fix for the issue. December 2026 wouldn't be a surprise.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Due to this major Android 17 QPR1 regression, we've been looking into reducing memory usage. We found a way to eliminate most extra memory use from our secure spawning feature without any significant downsides. We'll try to get that huge improvement shipped before November 2026.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Earlier today, ARIN fulfilled our request for an IPv4 /22 via their IPv4 Waiting List. We now own the following IP space:
2602:F4D9::/36
23.149.124.0/24
23.149.125.0/24
206.220.120.0/22
Our initial 2x IPv4 /24 were quickly obtained via NRPM 4.10 for our ns1 and ns2 anycast DNS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
IPv4 addresses have 32 bits. An IPv4 /22 means a block of IPv4 addreses with a specific 22 bit prefix. The smallest IPv4 prefix which can be announced to the internet to have traffic routed to it is an IPv4 /24. Our new IPv4 /22 will be deployed to 4 separate locations as 4x /24.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
An IPv4 /24 has 256 addresses with 254 of those being usable. Therefore, receiving the IPv4 /22 will give us 254 usable addresses in each of 4 separate locations. We've deployed the initial /24 to our Toronto location where we host our mail server to switch to over to it soon.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our server in Toronto is sponsored by Xenyth which is a small Canadian company with locations in Toronto, Ashburn and New York City:
xenyth.net
Xenyth has BGP support for customers which we use to announce our own IP space and perform inbound traffic engineering. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Messaging version 16 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/releases/tag/16
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42469-grapheneos-messaging-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 154.0.8037.92.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/154.0.8037.92.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42431-vanadium-version-154080379…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our massive overhaul of the AOSP Messaging app has reached the Stable channel in our App Store after 3 releases. It's well on the way to becoming our own high quality GrapheneOS Messaging app instead. There are still parts of the interface to overhaul including widgets and important features to add.
Full support for RCS with all of the additional features it brings including proper group chats, media, opt-in read receipts and much more is going to be the largest project. We'll also be adding RCS end-to-end encryption via Messaging Layer Security (MLS) compatible with Google Messages and iOS.
RCS support will be provided via an optional dependency on sandboxed Google Play for activation. In the longer term, we plan to make a fully standalone implementation requiring the carrier to support it. We probably won't make an alternate implementation of using Google's own system for this.
Finishing the user interface overhaul, resolving many minor issues and adding important features including search are going to be the priority before getting to RCS. In the meantime, Google Messages is already fully supported on GrapheneOS including RCS with E2EE via MLS:
grapheneos.org/usage -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026092500 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42350-grapheneos-version-2026092…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The fact that so many people have contacted us trying to convince us to claim this money is highly suspicious. The impression we have is that us claiming it will be passed off as us endorsing it to pump up a token we didn't want people to create in the first place. Is that wrong?
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Messaging version 15 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/releases/tag/15
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42345-grapheneos-messaging-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #androidPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We accept donations through the methods listed at grapheneos.org/donate. If we made a Solana address, it would be from a hardware wallet and unable to use arbitrary smart contracts. There aren't any officially sanctioned tokens for GrapheneOS and there aren't going to be any.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The fact that so many people have contacted us trying to convince us to claim this money is highly suspicious. The impression we have is that us claiming it will be passed off as us endorsing it to pump up a token we didn't want people to create in the first place. Is that wrong?
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We accept donations through the methods listed at grapheneos.org/donate. If we made a Solana address, it would be from a hardware wallet and unable to use arbitrary smart contracts. There aren't any officially sanctioned tokens for GrapheneOS and there aren't going to be any.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're aware there's 5 ETH sitting in smart contract with fee revenue from a token someone made. We'll see if we can claim the money safely without a software wallet. If we can't, we'll simply wait until we've moved on to a new multisig hardware wallet setup. It might be years.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We use hardware wallets with split seeds to receive cryptocurrency donations. We aren't sure if we can even claim the money you're talking about. We're not going to gather seed phrases in 1 location, feed it into an Ethereum software wallet and hook it up to some smart contract.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is freely available to everyone. It's a non-profit open source privacy project. Donations don't come with any personal rewards. The purpose of donating to GrapheneOS is making it better for everyone. GrapheneOS Foundation is non-profit. No one is getting rich from it.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No one other than us should make domains, accounts or anything else using the GrapheneOS name and logo. Those are our registered trademarks. We've been actively dealing with stores using our name/logo despite none being official. We don't want tokens using our name/logo either.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Do not create things using the former name and logo of GrapheneOS from prior to 2018 either. GrapheneOS has an active lawsuit against Copperhead based on their illegal takeover attempt back in 2018. We did not approve creating tokens using either our current or former name/logo.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We can't stop people creating memecoins directing fees to our donation addresses but please think first. Don't make something which looks official or which could create legal issues for us. We'll use whatever donations people send but it doesn't mean we approve of what donors do.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is freely available to everyone. It's a non-profit open source privacy project. Donations don't come with any personal rewards. The purpose of donating to GrapheneOS is making it better for everyone. GrapheneOS Foundation is non-profit. No one is getting rich from it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We use hardware wallets with split seeds to receive cryptocurrency donations. We aren't sure if we can even claim the money you're talking about. We're not going to gather seed phrases in 1 location, feed it into an Ethereum software wallet and hook it up to some smart contract.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're aware there's 5 ETH sitting in smart contract with fee revenue from a token someone made. We'll see if we can claim the money safely without a software wallet. If we can't, we'll simply wait until we've moved on to a new multisig hardware wallet setup. It might be years.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 154.0.8037.57.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/154.0.8037.57.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42260-vanadium-version-154080375…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Messaging version 14 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/releases/tag/14
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42224-grapheneos-messaging-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #androidPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Yes, that will be the initial supported phone. Wait for official news about it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS only uses devices where radio is isolated and unprivileged. Cellular works similarly to Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, GNSS, NFC and UWB. Those run on isolated processors without access to the application processor or OS. Only memory that's explicitly shared is accessible to those.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS only uses devices where radio is isolated and unprivileged. Cellular works similarly to Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, GNSS, NFC and UWB. Those run on isolated processors without access to the application processor or OS. Only memory that's explicitly shared is accessible to those.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 175 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42201-gmscompatconfig-version-17…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We need the person who recently sent a 1000 EUR donation via Wise to contact us via email with their full name so we can get Wise to unfreeze the payment. We regularly run into this issue with Wise but it's usually for small donations such as a 5 EUR one which got returned today.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's someone who keeps trying to donate 5 AUD and it keeps being returned since we don't have their full name to pass this review. It's likely mainly caused by sanctions enforcement. There are often name collisions especially in cases where the sending bank gives initials.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026091900 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42142-grapheneos-version-2026091…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 153.0.8010.52.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/153.0.8010.52.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42105-vanadium-version-153080105…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026091700 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/42090-grapheneos-version-2026091…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The account we responded to at x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2100660847253062138 is clearly using an LLM to masquerade as an expert and make inaccurate attacks on GrapheneOS. Our account was blocked alongside their clearly AI generated reply. They should be enabling the "Made with AI" content disclosure.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not accurate. The cellular baseband is an unprivileged component isolated from the application process and OS. It does not have control over the device. It's similar to Wi-Fi/Bluetooth and the other radios which are all isolated.
The OS on the device definitely does matter for containing an exploit to the isolated component. The OS can also reduce attack surface for the cellular baseband which is part of the GrapheneOS feature set.
Components having vulnerabilities is nothing new and that's why systemic security protections including isolation, attack surface reduction and exploit protections are important.
A firmware patch for this vulnerability is available and currently being tested by GrapheneOS prior to release today. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not accurate. The cellular baseband is an unprivileged component isolated from the application process and OS. It does not have control over the device. It's similar to Wi-Fi/Bluetooth and the other radios which are all isolated.
The OS on the device definitely does matter for containing an exploit to the isolated component. The OS can also reduce attack surface for the cellular baseband which is part of the GrapheneOS feature set.
Components having vulnerabilities is nothing new and that's why systemic security protections including isolation, attack surface reduction and exploit protections are important.
A firmware patch for this vulnerability is available and currently being tested by GrapheneOS prior to release today. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not accurate. The cellular baseband is an unprivileged component isolated from the application process and OS. It does not have control over the device. It's similar to Wi-Fi/Bluetooth and the other radios which are all isolated.
The OS on the device definitely does matter for containing an exploit to the isolated component. The OS can also reduce attack surface for the cellular baseband which is part of the GrapheneOS feature set.
Components having vulnerabilities is nothing new and that's why systemic security protections including isolation, attack surface reduction and exploit protections are important.
A firmware patch for this vulnerability is available and currently being tested by GrapheneOS prior to release today. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's patched in the latest cellular firmware. That will be included in today's GrapheneOS release.
We completed a port to Android 17 QPR1 prior to it being released. We were prepared to ship it on launch day with all the Pixel driver/firmware updates. Android 17 QPR1 wasn't pushed to AOSP and we don't currently have permission to ship it without an AOSP release. That means we couldn't ship what we prepared and need to make backports. We posted a thread about it:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android 17 QPR1 is the first release since Android Honeycomb (3.x) adding new APIs for app developers without a release to the Android Open Source Project. The new APIs are currently exclusive to the Pixel OS and aren't available to other Android OEMs.
developer.android.com/sdk/api_diff/37.1/changes -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's patched in the latest cellular firmware. That will be included in today's GrapheneOS release.
We completed a port to Android 17 QPR1 prior to it being released. We were prepared to ship it on launch day with all the Pixel driver/firmware updates. Android 17 QPR1 wasn't pushed to AOSP and we don't currently have permission to ship it without an AOSP release. That means we couldn't ship what we prepared and need to make backports. We posted a thread about it:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android 17 QPR1 is the first release since Android Honeycomb (3.x) adding new APIs for app developers without a release to the Android Open Source Project. The new APIs are currently exclusive to the Pixel OS and aren't available to other Android OEMs.
developer.android.com/sdk/api_diff/37.1/changes -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is partnered with Motorola Mobility which is Lenovo's mobile division. Motorola Solutions is an entirely different company from the one working with GrapheneOS. These companies aren't part of the same business and don't have the same ownership.
In 2011, Motorola was split into Motorola Mobility and Motorola Solutions. Google acquired Motorola Mobility in 2012 and sold it to Lenovo in 2014. Motorola Mobility is the company selling smartphones and tablets.
Motorola Solutions is a separate company. It's the continuation of the government contract side of Motorola selling radios, cameras and now drones. Both share the same brand for historical reasons but are entirely different things.
People regularly get the companies mixed up due to both using the Motorola brand. It's Motorola Solutions making surveillance cameras, not Motorola Mobility. We're only working with Motorola Mobility.
We're working with Motorola Mobility on upcoming devices meeting all of our requirements for updates and security protections. These devices will provide official support for GrapheneOS and we'll be provided with everything we need to provide proper updates. The first device with GrapheneOS support will be a very high end flagship but it will expand further from there. -
Orwell Day
@OrwellDay
Ban ALL AILPR cameras across the nation
#axon #flock #masssurveillancePost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is partnered with Motorola Mobility which is Lenovo's mobile division. Motorola Solutions is an entirely different company from the one working with GrapheneOS. These companies aren't part of the same business and don't have the same ownership.
In 2011, Motorola was split into Motorola Mobility and Motorola Solutions. Google acquired Motorola Mobility in 2012 and sold it to Lenovo in 2014. Motorola Mobility is the company selling smartphones and tablets.
Motorola Solutions is a separate company. It's the continuation of the government contract side of Motorola selling radios, cameras and now drones. Both share the same brand for historical reasons but are entirely different things.
People regularly get the companies mixed up due to both using the Motorola brand. It's Motorola Solutions making surveillance cameras, not Motorola Mobility. We're only working with Motorola Mobility.
We're working with Motorola Mobility on upcoming devices meeting all of our requirements for updates and security protections. These devices will provide official support for GrapheneOS and we'll be provided with everything we need to provide proper updates. The first device with GrapheneOS support will be a very high end flagship but it will expand further from there. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android 17 QPR1 is the first release since Android Honeycomb (3.x) adding new APIs for app developers without a release to the Android Open Source Project. The new APIs are currently exclusive to the Pixel OS and aren't available to other Android OEMs.
developer.android.com/sdk/api_diff/37.1/changesPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It would be interesting to know if Google's legal team is aware they're giving Pixels months of early access to new Android features and bug fixes including certain important security patches. Pixels being given this competitive edge over Google's OEM partners is very dubious.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google is also once again failing to comply with our GPL source requests for weeks. We requested CD1A.260905.001.A1 sources on September 1st and were only provided access today. The kernel build IDs are the same for 17 QPR1 Beta 9 and 17 QPR1 so we have that already at least.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixels are now significantly harder to support than many other devices. One of the only advantages of Pixels is now a disadvantage instead. They're still the best fit for us due to the updates and security features but it burns time we want to spend on privacy and security work.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It will be far easier for us to support upcoming Motorola devices than Pixels. Qualcomm will hopefully expand MTE support beyond the highest end flagship SoC soon so we can expand to more than flagships. Pixel 11 didn't remove it from hardware, only firmware, so that's good news.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Murena is sabotaging the privacy movement by selling phony privacy products and supporting authoritarian talking points against privacy. No one should be buying products from a company repeatedly claiming highly private and secure devices mainly benefit criminals/pedophiles.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ drastically reduces privacy and security compared to the Android Open Source Project. There's no good reason to use it over LineageOS which it forks. /e/ lags far further behind on updates, adds many invasive services and rolls back security further. It's falsely marketed.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Murena is sabotaging the privacy movement by selling phony privacy products and supporting authoritarian talking points against privacy. No one should be buying products from a company repeatedly claiming highly private and secure devices mainly benefit criminals/pedophiles.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ drastically reduces privacy and security compared to the Android Open Source Project. There's no good reason to use it over LineageOS which it forks. /e/ lags far further behind on updates, adds many invasive services and rolls back security further. It's falsely marketed.
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GrapheneOS reposted
Bobby
@trustless_nyc
Flock, YC17 batch,
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Hacker News is owned by Y Combinator, an American venture capital firm heavily invested in surveillance tech. Their moderators have time to remove our posts for copy-pasting small amounts of text but not to remove years of libel and harassment. Perhaps it's time for legal action.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Secure paste has been merged into GrapheneOS to provide a replacement for focused apps being able to read the clipboard:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_frameworks_base/pull/435
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
More information:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've developed a secure paste feature replacing traditional clipboard APIs. Users will be able to take away clipboard access from apps to use this instead. It integrates into the standard selection toolbar, input methods, accessibility services and keyboard shortcuts. We plan to get it merged soon.
A small subset of apps including those written in Flutter implement their own text selection toolbar. We've worked around this by adding a Paste button to the default keyboard. We'll be replacing AOSP Keyboard with a much better keyboard and will carry over adding this feature to the new one too.
Android only permits the currently focused app and keyboard to read the clipboard. However, sensitive data often lingers around in the clipboard for a while and privacy invasive apps can read it. Android shows a notice for apps reading clipboard content set by other apps but by then it's too late.
Our approach is replacing the inherently problematic API-based clipboard access approach used by both desktop and mobile operating systems. It's another overhaul of the privacy model for apps similar to our Contact Scopes and Storage Scopes features. We have many of these privacy features planned.
Our approach still allows apps to read the clipboard if they set the current content themselves. It only takes away the ability to read content set by other apps. It preserves usability as much as possible by only blocking the most problematic part of the API and replacing it with an alternative. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Nearly all of the recent posts we've made on Hacker News are now being flagged which hides them from everyone by default. You can see this if you log into an account and enable "showdead" in your settings. Please vouch for our posts if you can do that.
news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=grapheneosPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Hacker News is owned by Y Combinator, an American venture capital firm heavily invested in surveillance tech. Their moderators have time to remove our posts for copy-pasting small amounts of text but not to remove years of libel and harassment. Perhaps it's time for legal action.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The past few weeks of our posts on Hacker News are no longer wrongly hidden from everyone not logged into an account with "showdead" on. We spent a lot of time writing replies adding information, answering questions and making corrections as we do here. We didn't want it lost.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The overhauled GrapheneOS Messaging app is available in our App Store via the Alpha channel.
Our new app development team worked on this for months. It's now a far better app with much higher quality code. We'll make a new release based on feedback soon.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Messaging version 13 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/releases/tag/13
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41906-grapheneos-messaging-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're going to be overhauling or replacing most AOSP apps in the near future: Calculator, Clock, Contacts, Gallery, Keyboard and Phone.
The apps we created will be overhauled too. PDF Viewer is done and Camera is next. Camera and PDF Viewer will be getting many new features too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's a massive overhaul and may need a few releases to reach the Stable channel. We're working on a version 14 release fixing issues with the predictive back animation, tapping contacts not always showing the right SIM with dual SIM and some outdated icons/colors we missed.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Messaging will be overhauled even more. We plan to add RCS support with Messaging Layer Security (MLS). That will provide E2EE with contacts using Google Messages or iOS. RCS with MLS can already be used on GrapheneOS via Google Messages but we want to avoid people needing it.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Messaging version 13 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging/releases/tag/13
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41906-grapheneos-messaging-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026091000 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41899-grapheneos-version-2026091…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 174 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41858-gmscompatconfig-version-17…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 153.0.8010.36.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/153.0.8010.36.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41830-vanadium-version-153080103…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
In response to a question on Mastodon, we mentioned we recently started using frontier AI models for code review to catch vulnerabilities before attackers. We're being targeted with a huge amount of abuse.
mas.to/@zzt/117234948476694654
circumstances.run/@davidgerard/117234304144620428 -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026090700 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41800-grapheneos-version-2026090…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're currently making a new OS release to resolve a volume bar UI regression caused by an upstream Android security preview patch. We've also fixed a Private Space UI issue.
The major Messaging app release we've been working on for months has been slightly delayed to after we make the OS release. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've developed a secure paste feature replacing traditional clipboard APIs. Users will be able to take away clipboard access from apps to use this instead. It integrates into the standard selection toolbar, input methods, accessibility services and keyboard shortcuts. We plan to get it merged soon.
A small subset of apps including those written in Flutter implement their own text selection toolbar. We've worked around this by adding a Paste button to the default keyboard. We'll be replacing AOSP Keyboard with a much better keyboard and will carry over adding this feature to the new one too.
Android only permits the currently focused app and keyboard to read the clipboard. However, sensitive data often lingers around in the clipboard for a while and privacy invasive apps can read it. Android shows a notice for apps reading clipboard content set by other apps but by then it's too late.
Our approach is replacing the inherently problematic API-based clipboard access approach used by both desktop and mobile operating systems. It's another overhaul of the privacy model for apps similar to our Contact Scopes and Storage Scopes features. We have many of these privacy features planned.
Our approach still allows apps to read the clipboard if they set the current content themselves. It only takes away the ability to read content set by other apps. It preserves usability as much as possible by only blocking the most problematic part of the API and replacing it with an alternative. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're well into the process of converting the Messaging app included in GrapheneOS into a modern app. We'll be making a new release later today with a completely overhauled user interface written in Android Compose. We've made a massive amount of other improvements and bug fixes beyond that too.
In the longer term, we plan to add support for RCS including support for the standard end-to-end encryption (E2EE) via Messaging Layer Security (MLS). Currently, RCS including E2EE is available on GrapheneOS via Google Messages. We want to avoid the need to use Google Messages for RCS eventually.
RCS on Android is currently implemented with code across the OS, Google Messages and Google Play services. Our plan is to start by making an equivalent to the portion in Google Messages. It would initially require sandboxed Google Play for RCS activation, etc. but we plan to implement that too..
RCS isn't an open platform in practice. It isn't even as open as SMS/MMS. It heavily depends on proprietary Google and carrier infrastructure in practice. We can start by replicating Google's approach and then we can work on only using carrier services for carriers where it's actually supported.
We're also going to be overhauling or fully replacing the rest of the AOSP apps in the near future. AOSP Gallery is incredibly outdated and is being entirely replaced. AOSP Keyboard may be similar. We recently hired a bunch of new people and will be hiring more so our progress will be accelerating.
In the past, our focus was nearly entirely on the base OS rather than bundled apps with alternatives available. We've heavily ramped up the resources we're investing into the bundled apps. We'll also be scaling up our work on the base OS too. More donations will enable us to hire even more people. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026090500 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41757-grapheneos-version-2026090…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026090500 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41757-grapheneos-version-2026090…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Digital sovereignty refers to digital technology being under the control of the government where it's used. One of the primary motivations for it is being able to much more easily access user data on cloud services and limit use of encryption. It's wrongly conflated with privacy.
Services with end-to-end encryption protect user data regardless of where it's hosted. Encryption can also be extended to protecting more metadata. This is a far better approach to privacy than each country needing their own services so only a country's own government has access. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Digital sovereignty refers to digital technology being under the control of the government where it's used. One of the primary motivations for it is being able to much more easily access user data on cloud services and limit use of encryption. It's wrongly conflated with privacy.
Services with end-to-end encryption protect user data regardless of where it's hosted. Encryption can also be extended to protecting more metadata. This is a far better approach to privacy than each country needing their own services so only a country's own government has access. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android Security Bulletins are not the full list of AOSP security patches and do not include the vast majority of Linux kernel, firmware and driver patches. ASBs also come months after patches are available to ship. It's a very low bar and yet /e/ has to pretend to provide it.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The information provided on this page is highly inaccurate and clearly intended to mislead people. Android Security Bulletins are not split up this way and are also not the full set of patches for Android patches. /e/ is claiming to provide patch levels without all the patches.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android Security Bulletins include more than AOSP patches. /e/ does not provide all of the AOSP patches for the claimed patch levels. It also doesn't provide most non-AOSP patches included in the bulletins while still wrongly referring to it as an Android security patch level.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ is both skipping AOSP patches and pretending Android Securitry Bulletins don't include a significant number of Linux kernel, firmware, driver and HAL patches. Android Security Bulletins are also nowhere close to the full set of Android security patches in the first place.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Only the latest major releases of Android provide full AOSP patches. A subset of High and Critical severity patches are backported and listed in the ASB. /e/ doesn't have releases with the full set of AOSP patches. It doesn't even ship all of what's backported to older releases.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android Security Bulletins are not the full list of AOSP security patches and do not include the vast majority of Linux kernel, firmware and driver patches. ASBs also come months after patches are available to ship. It's a very low bar and yet /e/ has to pretend to provide it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Only the latest major releases of Android provide full AOSP patches. A subset of High and Critical severity patches are backported and listed in the ASB. /e/ doesn't have releases with the full set of AOSP patches. It doesn't even ship all of what's backported to older releases.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ is both skipping AOSP patches and pretending Android Securitry Bulletins don't include a significant number of Linux kernel, firmware, driver and HAL patches. Android Security Bulletins are also nowhere close to the full set of Android security patches in the first place.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android Security Bulletins include more than AOSP patches. /e/ does not provide all of the AOSP patches for the claimed patch levels. It also doesn't provide most non-AOSP patches included in the bulletins while still wrongly referring to it as an Android security patch level.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The information provided on this page is highly inaccurate and clearly intended to mislead people. Android Security Bulletins are not split up this way and are also not the full set of patches for Android patches. /e/ is claiming to provide patch levels without all the patches.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is not transparency but rather higher inaccurate information misleading users. The claimed patch levels are highly inaccurate. They do not provide all patches required by these patch levels and are misleading users to promote insecure products from their for-profit company.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is not transparency but rather higher inaccurate information misleading users. The claimed patch levels are highly inaccurate. They do not provide all patches required by these patch levels and are misleading users to promote insecure products from their for-profit company.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is partnered with Motorola Mobility which is Lenovo's mobile division.
In 2011, Motorola was split into Motorola Mobility and Motorola Solutions. Google acquired Motorola Mobility in 2012 and sold it to Lenovo in 2014. Motorola Mobility is the company selling smartphones and tablets.
Motorola Solutions is a separate company. It's the continuation of the government contract side of Motorola selling radios, cameras and now drones. Both share the same brand for historical reasons but are entirely different things. We're working with the smartphone company, not the radio/camera one.
People regularly get the companies mixed up due to both using the Motorola brand. We're clarifying this since people keep asking if GrapheneOS is going to run on Motorola Solutions radios or about their government contracts. That's a different company from the Motorola selling smartphones/tablets. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 152.0.7977.84.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/152.0.7977.84.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41725-vanadium-version-152079778…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're aware of claims spread on German social media about GrapheneOS being exploited. We looked into it in case there was substance behind it. OS and hardware security isn't actually much of a factor in the story. Instead, the central claim is disk encryption with a strong passphrase can be cracked.
A story about a GrapheneOS device in After First Unlock state being exploited would be believable. Similarly, a story that a device with a PIN kept for years eventually having it brute forced via a secure element exploit would be believable. The story is neither of those things and is not credible.
These claims likely originate from documents with omissions and misrepresentations. For example, someone may use the same password for their smartphone and Windows/Linux laptop. Online brute force attacks can be performed based on imaging the laptop and eventually the phone can be unlocked with it.
It isn't believable a device in Before First Unlock state with a strong passphrase had all of the data extracted without obtaining the passphrase elsewhere. It would mean the disk encryption algorithms themselves have been cracked. It's not the first of these stories where the details don't add up.
A bunch of companies in Europe sell devices with forks of GrapheneOS. These don't keep up with our updates and have problematic changes. These are regularly misrepresented as being GrapheneOS by law enforcement. One using a subset of our code was an FBI honey pot:
darknetdiaries.com/episode/146/
Companies using our code frequently attack GrapheneOS with inaccurate claims. They aim to mislead people into believing it isn't safe and to use their products instead. We used to believe this was primarily being done for profit but now believe multiple of these companies are likely also honey pots.
Operation Trojan Shield (ANOM) involved selling backdoored phones to criminals. These phones were regularly marketed as being based on GrapheneOS. In some cases, the marketing claimed the phones were GrapheneOS. Due to this, we had told people it was a scam before it came out it was a honey pot.
Many European law enforcement agencies participated in this operation. Their operation put GrapheneOS developers at risk of being targeted by criminals by selling backdoored products as being based on GrapheneOS. Some of the people who purchased these harassed us due to baselessly blaming us for it.
These agencies want people to use sketchy products instead of GrapheneOS, iPhones and high quality end-to-end encrypted messaging apps. It's in their interest to mislead people into believing they should be buying sketchy devices with poor security whether or not they work with governments.
They want people to believe disk encryption and end-to-end encryption messaging don't work. They simultaneously claim not having mandatory backdoors prevents doing their jobs. They never had a near equivalent to mind reading before but now somehow private thoughts and conversations are unacceptable. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have good news about the Pixel 11. It still has at least bare minimum support for MTE at a hardware level. We think they removed most of the hardware acceleration from the CPU cache to save money. They ruined the performance so it ended up being fully disabled in firmware. It may still be usable.
Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 was released on August 28th. It's the first Beta release with Pixel 11 support. MTE support is still completely disabled in the OS and arm64.nomte is unconditionally passed by the firmware to the kernel. The good news is the firmware itself had MTE support added back to it.
It's possible to enable reserving the tag memory for MTE via `fastboot oem mte on`, boot a non-stock kernel ignoring arm64.nomte and use MTE. We're in the process of determining whether it's fully functional and the performance characteristics. It's likely disabled due to performance being ruined.
We expect performance must be quite bad for Google to have decided to entirely strip out support for it in not only the software but also the firmware so that no would could even try to use it before Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4. That's a very strange thing to do. It's at least added back to firmware now.
We reached out to multiple people at Google asking about the MTE situation on the Pixel 11 prior to making our original thread and didn't receive any responses. We still don't know what's wrong with MTE on the Pixel 11. It isn't clear if there are serious CPU errata or it simply performs very badly.
If the issue is simply that MTE performance is poor, then we can support the Pixel 11 with the major caveat that it will be a significant performance downgrade. Aside from MTE, Google downgraded the Pixel 11 series GPU compared to the Pixel 10 series in addition to reducing RAM for base Pro models.
Google has been increasingly silent in response to our communications since dropping Pixel support from AOSP with Android 16 in June 2025. They could have told us MTE performance was significantly reduced so they disabled it at launch but will add it back to firmware for QPR2. That's still unclear.
Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 releases for the Pixel 11 series were only uploaded around 10 hours ago rather than with the initial release on August 28th so this hasn't been available for very long. It wasn't missed by us or people who looked into it after our initial thread but rather wasn't out yet.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've been testing performance of MTE on the Pixel 11 using the Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 release adding back firmware support for it. MTE in asymmetric mode only has around 5% overhead in the standard benchmarks and other tests we've done. That's more than good enough but we've done limited tests.
Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 on the Pixel 11 force disables MTE for the OS from the firmware. Using it requires ignoring the arm64.nomte parameter being passed to the kernel. It still isn't clear why they're making the feature unavailable. SVE was also force disabled in Android 17 but not in QPR2 Beta 4.
Our initial testing indicates performance isn't substantially worse. The overhead may be higher but there was an incremental CPU performance with the Pixel 11 which should more than make up for it. However, MTE is unavailable with stable firmware and we're bypassing firmware disabling it for QPR2.
Multiple Google engineers we've contacted have said they aren't able to give us any information about this so we're left doing reverse engineering and relying on leaks. The leaks do not seem reliable and do not match what we see. Our concern is that MTE may actually be broken due to CPU errata.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
"SVE was also force disabled in Android 17 but not in QPR2 Beta 4."
is meant to be this:
"SME was also force disabled in Android 17 but not in QPR2 Beta 4."Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has a rapidly growing userbase that's likely more than 1% of Pixel users on recent generations. Pixels have benefited quite a lot from GrapheneOS contributing code, vulnerability reports and multiple security proposals implemented in hardware, firmware and software.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has reported vulnerabilities used by commercial exploit developers to get those fixed for Pixels and Android. We proposed improvements including perf events restrictions, reset attack mitigation, locked device auto-reboot and attestation key pinning which shipped.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The bean counters now in charge across Google may not need the value of GrapheneOS using their devices but their engineers do. Unfortunately, engineers no longer run Google and they laid off many of their best people. Google is incompetently managed and being driven off a cliff.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google calls themselves an AI company but is failing to protect users against AI accelerated exploit development. There are multiple local root exploits on GitHub usable across non-GrapheneOS Android including the Pixel OS. Where are patches and much better exploit protections?
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
iOS on an iPhone 17 is much more secure than the stock OS on a Pixel 11 due to Memory Integrity Enforcement (MIE) and other advantages. iPhone 17 gained a large lead in OS security over Pixels. Google hasn't started shipping the major improvements needed to catch up to them yet.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
iOS security is a lot further ahead of the Pixel OS since the iPhone 17. Google was ahead of Apple on hardware memory tagging but squandered it. Pixel 8 shipped it 2 years earlier and they had HWASan as a debugging tool for a long time before that but barely moved forward.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our replacement 9950X3D from AMD arrived today and is working well. RMA process took a bit under 2 weeks. It was sent back on the same day they provided a prepaid shipping label. It's a common issue with Ryzen 9000 X3D chips and they simply accepted it without questions.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Most recently assembled of the 4 workstations used to build official GrapheneOS releases died today. 9950X3D CPU was likely killed by the ASRock B850 Pro RS motherboard. Many other ASRock customers with AM5 boards and X3D CPUs have experienced it. We were concerned about this so we didn't use PBO2.
We've had a lot of memory issues with the older AM5 7950X machine including it not working with high capacity DIMMs. i9-13900K machine had performance crippled by the updates stopping it bricking itself. The oldest 5950X machine predating DDR5 is the only one which hasn't had any significant issues.
Both the CPU and motherboard should be covered by the warranties from AMD and ASRock. However, it's typically a hassle to get this dealt with and we need another build machine right away. We'll likely buy a new CPU and motherboard. Can upgrade the 5950X machine after the dead parts are replaced. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 152.0.7977.75.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/152.0.7977.75.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41660-vanadium-version-152079777…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google calls themselves an AI company but is failing to protect users against AI accelerated exploit development. There are multiple local root exploits on GitHub usable across non-GrapheneOS Android including the Pixel OS. Where are patches and much better exploit protections?
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The bean counters now in charge across Google may not need the value of GrapheneOS using their devices but their engineers do. Unfortunately, engineers no longer run Google and they laid off many of their best people. Google is incompetently managed and being driven off a cliff.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has reported vulnerabilities used by commercial exploit developers to get those fixed for Pixels and Android. We proposed improvements including perf events restrictions, reset attack mitigation, locked device auto-reboot and attestation key pinning which shipped.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has a rapidly growing userbase that's likely more than 1% of Pixel users on recent generations. Pixels have benefited quite a lot from GrapheneOS contributing code, vulnerability reports and multiple security proposals implemented in hardware, firmware and software.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 5 added support for MTE and it will be available on the next gen Snapdragon used for the upcoming Motorola flagship with official GrapheneOS support. Qualcomm definitely wants to match what Apple has provided even if Google hasn't been taking it seriously.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google is being criticized for shipping MTE years before Apple and then sitting around not broadly deployed it or significantly improving the hardware support. They have not made major improvements to the hardware support since it was added. Qualcomm is working on doing better.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Apple worked with ARM to improve MTE for security hardening usage. That resulted in FEAT_MTE4 with FEAT_MTE_CANONICAL_TAGS to check pointer tags for untagged memory is now a standard ARM feature which will be available on Android hardware. Apple also addressed side channels.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That's completely backwards. Google is being criticized because they haven't significantly improved upon the initial implementation of MTE and haven't broadly deployed it. Removing it will result in far more criticism than going years without making any major improvements to it.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That's completely backwards. Google is being criticized because they haven't significantly improved upon the initial implementation of MTE and haven't broadly deployed it. Removing it will result in far more criticism than going years without making any major improvements to it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Apple worked with ARM to improve MTE for security hardening usage. That resulted in FEAT_MTE4 with FEAT_MTE_CANONICAL_TAGS to check pointer tags for untagged memory is now a standard ARM feature which will be available on Android hardware. Apple also addressed side channels.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google is being criticized for shipping MTE years before Apple and then sitting around not broadly deployed it or significantly improving the hardware support. They have not made major improvements to the hardware support since it was added. Qualcomm is working on doing better.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 5 added support for MTE and it will be available on the next gen Snapdragon used for the upcoming Motorola flagship with official GrapheneOS support. Qualcomm definitely wants to match what Apple has provided even if Google hasn't been taking it seriously.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have a partial port of GrapheneOS to the Pixel 11 series after a week of work on it. We're unable to complete the port due to lack of support for ARM hardware memory tagging in software, firmware and near certainly hardware. It appears Google cut an important security feature to save money.
ARM hardware memory tagging (MTE) is used by GrapheneOS across the entire base OS including the kernel and every standard base OS process. It's only temporarily disabled for a few device-specific processes. It greatly improves protection against nearly all remote exploits and many local exploits.
Pixel 8 launched with hardware MTE support in October 2023. We integrated it into our hardened_malloc project and began using it across the OS later that month. Android and the Pixel OS never started using it by default. Android Advanced Protection Mode in Android 16 enables it for a few processes.
Apple's Memory Integrity Enforcement (MIE) is an always enabled feature on the iPhone 17. It's simply a high quality implementation of MTE using the latest standard extensions. It uses MTE in the most secure mode in the kernel and a large portion of userbase. They did a very good job integrating it.
Apple's MIE and Android 16+ AAPM don't use MTE for user installed apps unless those explicitly opt in. GrapheneOS enables it for more apps automatically and has a toggle for users to opt-in for every user installed app. There's a per-app toggle to opt-out for incompatible apps which is uncommon.
Neither iOS or Android encourage app developers to opt into MTE and other more aggressive security features used in the base OS. Apple's docs warn developers of performance and stability issues. Even Signal doesn't opt-in. Our approach enables forcing using MTE in the standard allocators regardless.
Pixel 11 does have security improvements including moving to post-quantum secure verified boot (ML-DSA) and replacing Samsung Shannon IMS with AOSP IMS. Titan M3 should significantly improve protection against data extraction in Before First Unlock state. It's too bad they ruined it by cutting MTE.
Pixel 11 series is a lot more expensive for an incremental improvement to the CPU, the same underpowered GPU and reduced RAM for the Pro base models. They finally caught up to the last generation of Qualcomm cellular radio. It's overpriced, the upgrades aren't impressive and losing MTE is appalling.
Compared to the Pixel 11, a Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 5 has ~40% higher single threaded CPU performance, ~80% higher multi threaded performance, over 100% higher GPU performance and a far better cellular radio. It also finally has MTE. The next gen is what will be in the first Motorola with GrapheneOS.
Pixel 9a and earlier (including Nexus devices) were the Android Open Source Project reference devices. Pixel support was removed from AOSP with Android 16. It's now harder to support Pixels than many other devices and massive progress towards open source firmware and driver libraries was discarded.
Compared to the stock Pixel OS, GrapheneOS ships AOSP patches months earlier and Linux kernel patches many months earlier. However, we rely on them for firmware and most driver updates. We also want to move to new kernel branches earlier. These things can be improved with our Motorola partnership.
We strongly recommend against buying Pixel 11 devices. Pixel 8, 9 and 10 have much better overall security for GrapheneOS. Pixel 10 is cheaper with similar hardware and MTE. Pixel 11's Titan M3 should improve BFU security for users without a strong passphrase, but losing MTE craters AFU security.
We haven't determined what to do about this situation. It may be best for us to skip the Pixel 11 series devices. We can shift our focus entirely to the upcoming Motorola devices instead. Pixel 10a was really a 9th gen Pixel, so hopefully the Pixel 11a does the same with 10th gen and includes MTE.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Signal finally added MTE support for iOS in April 2026 but hasn't done it for Android yet. It isn't important to anything we were talking about as it was just an example of even a well known security-focused app not prioritizing enabling these opt-in features which remains true.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
See x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2094661263041134767 for updated information. There's at least minimal hardware support for MTE on the Pixel 11. We think they likely fully disabled and removed it from firmware due to a major performance downgrade caused by the removal of hardware for accelerating it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have good news about the Pixel 11. It still has at least bare minimum support for MTE at a hardware level. We think they removed most of the hardware acceleration from the CPU cache to save money. They ruined the performance so it ended up being fully disabled in firmware. It may still be usable.
Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 was released on August 28th. It's the first Beta release with Pixel 11 support. MTE support is still completely disabled in the OS and arm64.nomte is unconditionally passed by the firmware to the kernel. The good news is the firmware itself had MTE support added back to it.
It's possible to enable reserving the tag memory for MTE via `fastboot oem mte on`, boot a non-stock kernel ignoring arm64.nomte and use MTE. We're in the process of determining whether it's fully functional and the performance characteristics. It's likely disabled due to performance being ruined.
We expect performance must be quite bad for Google to have decided to entirely strip out support for it in not only the software but also the firmware so that no would could even try to use it before Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4. That's a very strange thing to do. It's at least added back to firmware now.
We reached out to multiple people at Google asking about the MTE situation on the Pixel 11 prior to making our original thread and didn't receive any responses. We still don't know what's wrong with MTE on the Pixel 11. It isn't clear if there are serious CPU errata or it simply performs very badly.
If the issue is simply that MTE performance is poor, then we can support the Pixel 11 with the major caveat that it will be a significant performance downgrade. Aside from MTE, Google downgraded the Pixel 11 series GPU compared to the Pixel 10 series in addition to reducing RAM for base Pro models.
Google has been increasingly silent in response to our communications since dropping Pixel support from AOSP with Android 16 in June 2025. They could have told us MTE performance was significantly reduced so they disabled it at launch but will add it back to firmware for QPR2. That's still unclear.
Android 17 QPR2 Beta 4 releases for the Pixel 11 series were only uploaded around 10 hours ago rather than with the initial release on August 28th so this hasn't been available for very long. It wasn't missed by us or people who looked into it after our initial thread but rather wasn't out yet. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS users are likely around 5% of the userbase for recent Pixel generations. Our userbase is rapidly growing and are definitely a significant portion of Pixel sales. Many beyond our users buy Pixels to get the most secure Android hardware which won't be the case anymore.
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Wonderfall
@w0nderfall
Google wants to make an AI-first device, fine. Bigger TPU, more Gemini for whoever cares
But you can't convince me it's ready for a future where AI lowers the barrier for skiddies spamming LLMs to find 0 days in large existing C codebases
Pixel 11 is actually an AI downgrade
Wonderfall
@w0nderfall
Pixel 11 firmware not supporting MTE is the last straw I can take. I have no idea whatsoever what Google plans are and why they're leaving the good stuff to Apple now
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS users are likely around 5% of the userbase for recent Pixel generations. Our userbase is rapidly growing and are definitely a significant portion of Pixel sales. Many beyond our users buy Pixels to get the most secure Android hardware which won't be the case anymore.
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GrapheneOS reposted
Wonderfall
@w0nderfall
Google wants to make an AI-first device, fine. Bigger TPU, more Gemini for whoever cares
But you can't convince me it's ready for a future where AI lowers the barrier for skiddies spamming LLMs to find 0 days in large existing C codebases
Pixel 11 is actually an AI downgrade
Wonderfall
@w0nderfall
Pixel 11 firmware not supporting MTE is the last straw I can take. I have no idea whatsoever what Google plans are and why they're leaving the good stuff to Apple now
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/Reptalicant/status/2094322479854702957
This article has a poor assessment of the value of MTE and the importance of protecting against memory corruption vulnerabilities. These attacks are not theoretical and are definitely not only highly targeted as is often portrayed. Exploits are being widely deployed and neither Apple or Google are reliable sources on how widely they're being used. Their consistently misleading claims on the prevalence of exploitation are based on twisting incredibly incomplete information to paint their products in the best possible light.
A developer without extensive expertise can develop working local and even remote for stock Pixels in weeks with the help of a frontier AI model. Pixel 11 cannot be considered AI ready devices when they're built for a world without the massive impact of AI models on security on the present. It's clearly going to improve over the next 7 years and the Pixel 11 is incredibly ill-prepared for it. Google isn't much of an AI company if they aren't going to build products capable of providing reasonable protection from AI accelerated exploits.
MTE isn't only for probabilistic protection. It provides deterministic protections. We dynamically exclude the adjacent tags for a slot and the previous tag used for the slot. We statically exclude 0 as a reserved tag for free data, metadata, etc. That's 100% reliable, not 15/16.
FEAT_MTE4 (EMTE) which was shipped by the iPhone 17 as part of their initial MTE support adds support for enforcing memory tags for untagged memory (FEAT_MTE_CANONICAL_TAGS). For userspace, it means untagged memory is treated as being tagged with the typically reserved 0 tag.
For Android and iOS, nearly all remote exploits involve memory corruption. MTE with FEAT_MTE4 and protection against side channels as the iPhone 17 has provided is the best available defense with a low cost. Pixels had MTE available long before iPhones and could have advanced it.
HWASan provides similar security to MTE for code compiled with it at the cost of around 100% CPU overhead and 25% memory overhead. Unlike MTE, it can't protect code not compiled with it. It does have the advantage of MTE not yet coming in an 8 bit form.
source.android.com/docs/security/test/hwasan
Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 5 has MTE, ~40% faster singlethreaded and ~80% faster multithreaded performance. Comparing HWASan on Tensor G6 to MTE on Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 5 with negligible overhead would be fun. One way of looking at the Pixel 11 dropping MTE is that it's adding around 100% overhead for reasonably secure software. That's quite a performance loss for hardware which was already not providing competitive performance.
Pixel 11 adding post-quantum secure verified boot is not currently useful and likely won't be useful before the end-of-life of the Pixel 11. It isn't the same as key exchange where data can be captured now and decrypted later. Android's standard disk encryption has always been post-quantume secure. Adding this for verified boot is a forward looking improvement but it doesn't make up for losing MTE.
Titan M3 may have improved security in other ways but it's hard for them to show that without finally following through on their commitment to open sourcing the firmware and hardware for it. Titan M based on OpenTitan is not the same as them open sourcing it.
Google could add back Pixel support to AOSP in a day and could quickly follow through on their commitment to open sourcing the Titan M. Their commitment was not moving to it being based on OpenTitan but rather open sourcing the firmware for the Titan M1 and both firmware+hardware for the Titan M2. They committed to 7 years of updates for the Pixel 9a and that includes AOSP updates since it was sold as an AOSP reference device. They cannot retroactively restore MTE support on the Pixel 11, but they can address these things and come out looking much better than they currently do.
Google made a huge mistake with the removal of MTE instead of improving it to match or exceed the iPhone 17. Pixel 11 is incredibly ill-prepared for the age of AI models changing the security landscape. It's a huge downgrade for overall security from the Pixel 10 and it cannot be fixed until the Pixel 12. Google hopefully has time to get MTE added back for the Pixel 12. They're doing an increasingly poor job shipping the rapidly growing number of security patches and need far better systemic security protections simply to defend well against the already known vulnerabilities let alone the unknown ones. They should stop laying off so many engineers and should start taking the impact of AI on security seriously considering how much they brand themselves as an AI company.
Reptalica
@Reptalicant
Hi today I write about the lack of MTE (key security feature that GrapheneOS need) on Pixel 11, the drawbacks of MTE, what Google planned for MTE, and also the upcoming Motorola GrapheneOS phone, so go read so that my sources won't go in vain
www.notebookcheck.net/Leaked-documents-show-Google-planne… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Near the end of May 2026, Russia began filtering access to DataPacket IP space with an enforced domain allowlist for HTTP and TLS SNI. GrapheneOS services aren't on the allowlist so we had to switch from DataPacket Frankfurt to Cherry Servers Amsterdam for Russia. That's now getting filtered too.
We've fixed it again by using Zare London for connections from Russia instead. That's the final of our sponsored servers in Europe we can use so we'll need to fall back to Xenyth Toronto if they filter it. We're using our own IP space in Toronto so it should work unless they specifically block us.
We don't think we'll be blocked directly but we're also unlikely to get placed on the allowlist. That means our services are gradually going to become inaccessible in Russia via the IP space of major cloud services. Our own IP space will still work fine and we don't host any VPN services ourselves.
Our website, OS updates, app repository, connectivity checks, network time, network-based location, geocoding and other main services should work again in Russia. It's likely they'll expand to filtering Zare's IP space and then we'll have to use Toronto where we have our own non-anycast IPv4 /24.
They use a domain blocklist for most of the internet and an allowlist for many VPS and dedicated server hosting providers to block access to VPN services. It's likely they'll expand to enforcing an allowlist for every major server hosting provider. That's far more aggressive than China's filtering.
Our authoritative DNS is hosted via 2 anycast networks using our own ASN and IP space so it hasn't been impacted by this. It's likely we can avoid it for the rest of our services by using our own IP space. If they start filtering netcup IP space, we can make a reverse proxy to those from Toronto.
If our services are blocked, connectivity checks can also be set to Standard rather than Disabled to use the Google servers. That'll keep automatic selection of networks with internet working along with automatic captive portal handling and JobSceduler not assuming every network has internet access. -
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Private Space is more cleanly separated and has a much better user interface. It has separate disk encryption keys with a nested lock method, a system for sharing data across it and a lot more. Work profile can be set up similarly but the management app needs to configure it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For now, it makes sense to use a work profile as a 2nd Private Space solely used for having a 2nd nested set of apps isolated from the rest. We eventually want to make it possible to have multiple nested Private Spaces in the same user or a variant of what Private Spaces provide.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 152.0.7977.64.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/152.0.7977.64.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41465-vanadium-version-152079776…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android Open Source Project and GrapheneOS are both open source Linux distributions. It isn't glibc, systemd, GNU coreutils, GNOME and other userspace software which makes it Linux. Moving to far less private and secure desktop software would defeat the purpose of GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Fairphones are closed source hardware with closed source firmware. Replacing the mostly closed source userspace driver code with open source code is entirely possible, but the hardware and firmware will remain closed source. AOSP and GrapheneOS can use open source drivers too.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android Open Source Project and GrapheneOS are both open source Linux distributions. It isn't glibc, systemd, GNU coreutils, GNOME and other userspace software which makes it Linux. Moving to far less private and secure desktop software would defeat the purpose of GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Fairphones are closed source hardware with closed source firmware. Replacing the mostly closed source userspace driver code with open source code is entirely possible, but the hardware and firmware will remain closed source. AOSP and GrapheneOS can use open source drivers too.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Initial focus for our partnership with Motorola is a regular non-folding device. Current generation Motorola Signature (2026), Razr Fold (2026) and Razr Ultra (2026) are very close to meeting our requirements but lack MTE, adequate secure element integration and other features being added for 2027.
Flagship Snapdragon provides much better CPU and GPU performance and provide more of what's needed via isolated components on the SoC. That includes better cellular, Wi-Fi/Bluetooth and GNSS radios with solid security including good isolation. Snapdragon Pixels worked well for us and it will again.
Tensor was a sidegrade or downgrade from Snapdragon in many ways. Tensor is paired with the fantastic Titan M2/M3 which was a huge security advantage. It also brought hardware memory tagging (MTE) with the Pixel 8. Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 5 finally shipped MTE but it's broken on the non-Elite SoC.
Next generation Snapdragon will have more mature support for MTE and greatly improved secure element support. It's still likely going to be a lot of work to get MTE fully deployed for the kernel and OS. We need all our hardware-based features including our USB-C port protection ported to it too.
These devices will meet or exceed of our official requirements including 7 years of proper updates, starting out with the Linux 6.18 LTS which can be upgraded to a new branch eventually, reset attack protection for firmware boot modes and everything else. There wasn't time to do it all for 2026.
It's very realistic to provide better security than Pixels against remote attacks. It's far harder to provide a secure element as good as the Titan M2/M3. There will definitely be a decent secure element providing the current generation features including the Android 16 QPR2+ rate limiting design.
Pixels have become much harder to support. AOSP 16 removed support for Pixels and they became harder to properly support than many other devices rather than easier. It's crucial to keep up with the major OS updates to provide all the security patches and we do but it's much harder for us now.
Motorola is doing a large portion of the work of porting GrapheneOS to their devices. They'll provide us with what we need for firmware/drivers in the form we need it and it will be far easier than Pixels. We'll be able to get issues in the firmware and drivers fixed through Motorola and Qualcomm.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We do plan to support Motorola's Razr Fold and Razr Ultra (flip) devices in addition to a regular device. We already support the original Pixel Fold (Pixel 7) along with the Pixel 9 Pro Fold and Pixel 10 Pro Fold. We still plan to add support for 11th gen Pixels including the Pixel 11 Pro Fold too.
Supporting a flip device with vertical folding would be a new form factor for GrapheneOS. The main use case for those is a tiny phone to use with one hand in the folded form factor. The tablet-style folding devices we already support are extremely useful for web browsing, reading, maps, etc.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
As we said in the first paragraph, our initial focus is on a non-folding device. We haven't provided a timeline on when we'll be able to expand to folding devices. This thread was published to clarify people should expect a non-folding device first despite media speculation.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
AppCompatConfig version 8 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_AppCompatCon…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41432-appcompatconfig-version-8-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 152.0.7977.54.1 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/152.0.7977.54.1
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41371-vanadium-version-152079775…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here's Murena's COO making outrageously false claims to promote their phony privacy products and attack GrapheneOS:
reddit.com/r/fairphone/comments/1vsfqr6/comment/p4lmxtb/
linkedin.com/in/viergever/
/e/ and Murena were misleading people about GrapheneOS for years before we started actively defending ourselves.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here's the CEO of Murena in one of the many cases he has pushed the false narrative that reasonably private and secure devices are a niche product mainly benefiting criminals and pedophiles:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142
It's not an isolated incident and we can show more examples.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-interview.html has more of the same narrative claiming protecting against privacy and security weaknesses is for criminals and pedophiles. There are many posts from /e/ and Murena dismissing providing stronger privacy and security and justifying their approach this way.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Most recently assembled of the 4 workstations used to build official GrapheneOS releases died today. 9950X3D CPU was likely killed by the ASRock B850 Pro RS motherboard. Many other ASRock customers with AM5 boards and X3D CPUs have experienced it. We were concerned about this so we didn't use PBO2.
We've had a lot of memory issues with the older AM5 7950X machine including it not working with high capacity DIMMs. i9-13900K machine had performance crippled by the updates stopping it bricking itself. The oldest 5950X machine predating DDR5 is the only one which hasn't had any significant issues.
Both the CPU and motherboard should be covered by the warranties from AMD and ASRock. However, it's typically a hassle to get this dealt with and we need another build machine right away. We'll likely buy a new CPU and motherboard. Can upgrade the 5950X machine after the dead parts are replaced. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Many of these companies also largely sell end-of-life Pixels not supported by GrapheneOS since years ago because it greatly increases their profit.
It's highly unlikely these people installed GrapheneOS. They likely bought phony hardened devices, perhaps even from another ANOM. -
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The article doesn't mention GrapheneOS. A bunch of companies in Europe sell phony hardened devices. Devices marketed to criminals are likely law enforcement operations. ANOM was a law enforcement operation marketing their product as based on GrapheneOS.
darknetdiaries.com/transcript/146/
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The devices from sold by these companies mostly use their own fork of AOSP or GrapheneOS. The companies forking GrapheneOS often make insecure changes such as disabling our USB-C port protection and locked device auto-reboot timer. They market these changes as being improvements.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These devices often charge a monthly fee for use of the devices and lock their customers out if they stop paying. If the devices ran standard GrapheneOS, then their customers could simply wipe it via recovery and stop paying them. They need a fork to force paying them monthly.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These companies often provide a remote wipe service through their website based on having a built-in device management system on the devices. They're often set up as if their customers are their employees using company managed devices. Those products are not GrapheneOS devices.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Many of these companies also largely sell end-of-life Pixels not supported by GrapheneOS since years ago because it greatly increases their profit.
It's highly unlikely these people installed GrapheneOS. They likely bought phony hardened devices, perhaps even from another ANOM. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These companies often provide a remote wipe service through their website based on having a built-in device management system on the devices. They're often set up as if their customers are their employees using company managed devices. Those products are not GrapheneOS devices.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These devices often charge a monthly fee for use of the devices and lock their customers out if they stop paying. If the devices ran standard GrapheneOS, then their customers could simply wipe it via recovery and stop paying them. They need a fork to force paying them monthly.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The devices from sold by these companies mostly use their own fork of AOSP or GrapheneOS. The companies forking GrapheneOS often make insecure changes such as disabling our USB-C port protection and locked device auto-reboot timer. They market these changes as being improvements.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The article doesn't mention GrapheneOS. A bunch of companies in Europe sell phony hardened devices. Devices marketed to criminals are likely law enforcement operations. ANOM was a law enforcement operation marketing their product as based on GrapheneOS.
darknetdiaries.com/transcript/146/ -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 152.0.7977.54.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/152.0.7977.54.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41312-vanadium-version-152079775…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 152.0.7977.42.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/152.0.7977.42.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41236-vanadium-version-152079774…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 173 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41221-gmscompatconfig-version-17…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026081300 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41168-grapheneos-version-2026081…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 151.0.7922.137.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/151.0.7922.137.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/41114-vanadium-version-151079221…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android has USB data and a large number of USB drivers available including while locked. Plug in a mouse, keyboard, external drive or other USB accessory and you'll see that's the case. When Android says charging-only, it means not allowing file transfer.
𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑥 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟
@linuxuser1996
*laughing in the GrapheneOS way*
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android's standard USB menu being set to charging-only means the device has MTP enabled with file transfer disabled. It always has USB data and USB peripherals enabled. GrapheneOS USB-C port charging-only means USB data is disabled in hardware and kernel USB drivers are disabled.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS blocks new USB connections while locked by default at both a software and hardware level. It can be enabled while unlocked too. It can even be set to fully disable USB while booted including USB-PD and other charging functionality. More info:
grapheneos.org/features
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
USB vulnerabilities are widely exploited. It's used against journalists, activists, dissidents and others at border crossings, protests and elsewhere. Android 16+ has opt-in protection but it's far weaker than our default and blocks installing apps from outside the Play Store.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Standard Android menu for controlling USB mode only controls which services Android offers via USB such as file transfer and MIDI. It does not provide a way to disable USB drivers, USB protocol handling or disable USB data at a hardware level which is what our feature provides.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
USB driver vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel are widely exploited by forensic data extraction tools. It's a very common attack vector with very widely deployed tools for using it. It's typically not set as a trap for someone to plug into though.
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/12/serbia-authorities… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The whole point of the GrapheneOS feature is heavily reducing attack surface for exploits. It disables the USB protocol handling and drivers in the Linux kernel. It blocks new USB connections and disables USB data in the USB controller. It does disable data at a hardware level.
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𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑥 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟
@linuxuser1996
*laughing in the GrapheneOS way*
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The whole point of the GrapheneOS feature is heavily reducing attack surface for exploits. It disables the USB protocol handling and drivers in the Linux kernel. It blocks new USB connections and disables USB data in the USB controller. It does disable data at a hardware level.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
USB driver vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel are widely exploited by forensic data extraction tools. It's a very common attack vector with very widely deployed tools for using it. It's typically not set as a trap for someone to plug into though.
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/12/serbia-authorities…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Standard Android menu for controlling USB mode only controls which services Android offers via USB such as file transfer and MIDI. It does not provide a way to disable USB drivers, USB protocol handling or disable USB data at a hardware level which is what our feature provides.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
People should be moving to open source end-to-end encrypted messaging apps. Carrier-based calls and texts should be phased out. Traditional email has poor privacy and security too. People should be moving away from both of those towards properly designed secure messaging systems.
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Kim Dotcom
@KimDotcom
Signal is not secure because it runs on iOS which has a lot of backdoors. Anything you run on Apple devices is not secure.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These are baseless fabrications. Our founder has publicly worked on major open source projects for over 16 years. He's been targeted with an immense amount of libel and harassment due to his work. GrapheneOS has also been very openly targeted with state sponsored smear campaigns.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Dumb phones have awful security, are entirely dependent on cellular networks and lack any form of secure communication. Carrier-based calls and texts should be avoided. Traditional laptops and desktops have far less secure hardware and software than an iPhone or GrapheneOS phone.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
People should be moving to open source end-to-end encrypted messaging apps. Carrier-based calls and texts should be phased out. Traditional email has poor privacy and security too. People should be moving away from both of those towards properly designed secure messaging systems.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is entirely funded by donations. GrapheneOS Foundation is on track to get between $1m to $2m in donations for 2026 which is up from a bit over $500k in 2024. GrapheneOS Foundation already pays around 15 people and we're hiring more developers.
grapheneos.org/donate -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Dumb phones have awful security, are entirely dependent on cellular networks and lack any form of secure communication. Carrier-based calls and texts should be avoided. Traditional laptops and desktops have far less secure hardware and software than an iPhone or GrapheneOS phone.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is entirely funded by donations. GrapheneOS Foundation is on track to get between $1m to $2m in donations for 2026 which is up from a bit over $500k in 2024. GrapheneOS Foundation already pays around 15 people and we're hiring more developers.
grapheneos.org/donate -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These are baseless fabrications. Our founder has publicly worked on major open source projects for over 16 years. He's been targeted with an immense amount of libel and harassment due to his work. GrapheneOS has also been very openly targeted with state sponsored smear campaigns.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It comes down to whether a Canadian judge is going to agree with us that this massive US corporation is purposely interfering with obtaining the source code. If they don't respond to our requests soon, we'll send out an email to every Google corporate email with a Linux commit.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They aren't providing it in the preferred form for modification. It doesn't support all of the build commands used by the build scripts due to lack of Git repositories queried by those. The delay is also very artificial and not a reasonable part of them servicing the requests.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google is one of the largest companies in the world. There's no excuse for these delays. They used to provide it within hours during business hours. That's reasonable if you consider a human manually handling each download request reasonable. Weeks or months is not reasonable.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Law is not code. GPLv2 not specifying a maximum time for providing the code doesn't mean arbitrary delays are acceptable. They have to provide it in a reasonable time based on what they're expected to do. They're a massive tech company and chose to move from automated to manual.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It comes down to whether a Canadian judge is going to agree with us that this massive US corporation is purposely interfering with obtaining the source code. If they don't respond to our requests soon, we'll send out an email to every Google corporate email with a Linux commit.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Law is not code. GPLv2 not specifying a maximum time for providing the code doesn't mean arbitrary delays are acceptable. They have to provide it in a reasonable time based on what they're expected to do. They're a massive tech company and chose to move from automated to manual.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google is one of the largest companies in the world. There's no excuse for these delays. They used to provide it within hours during business hours. That's reasonable if you consider a human manually handling each download request reasonable. Weeks or months is not reasonable.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They aren't providing it in the preferred form for modification. It doesn't support all of the build commands used by the build scripts due to lack of Git repositories queried by those. The delay is also very artificial and not a reasonable part of them servicing the requests.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This paper is inaccurate slop. It makes a large number of clearly inaccurate claims about GrapheneOS and presents results which are verifiably false. It's filled with nonsense which appears AI generated. > The Clone Strikes Back: Efficient Vulnerable Code Detection in Custom Android-based Systems
The authors wrongly believe GrapheneOS has diverged from the Android Open Source Project (AOSP). The starting point for GrapheneOS is the latest stable release of AOSP with all of the AOSP security backport commits applied. Our changes to AOSP repositories are maintained as cleanly rebased patches.
Our AOSP changes are reviewed and improved on an ongoing basis. It's not only the code being improved but also commit structure. We're always preparing for porting to the next stable release. It's handled as if our AOSP changes are being prepared for submission to the project for the first time.
We start fresh with each stable release of AOSP. All our changes are ported to the new source tree. There's no merging process but rather porting and submitting the changes to the new source tree. Major changes are often required including entirely rewriting certain features for the new release.
This entire paper is based around a misconception. The authors wrongly believe we need to identify and incorporate all of the upstream changes into GrapheneOS. It's our changes we need to make sure to fully and correctly port to each new release of AOSP, not the other way around as they believe.
The authors should have seen that each of releases has all of our changes to AOSP repositories cleanly rebased on top of the latest stable release. We do make substantial changes to AOSP but it can all be reviewed as a set of patches applied on top of the latest AOSP release with zero merge commits.
Android Security Bulletins are a list privacy and security patches backported to older releases of the OS. These aren't the privacy and security fixes made in the development branch but rather incomplete backports. Far more fixes made in the development branch and the approach is often different.
Android's development branch can do major refactoring and rewrites. It can make privacy and security improvements requiring substantial changes to the code. It can fix weaknesses requiring backwards incompatible changes. The backports don't even attempt to cover Low and Moderate severity patches.
The authors of the paper took the diffs from the Android Security Bulletins and created tooling to look for the changes made by those diffs being missing. They present the findings where they manually confirmed lines of code don't appear to be present as if those are missing patches in GrapheneOS.
They should have easily figured out GrapheneOS releases are based on the latest AOSP release. They should have used their tooling on AOSP itself as a control. They would have gotten the same results for AOSP and GrapheneOS if they used versions from the same date. Instead, they're misleading people.
If they checked the latest AOSP release at the time, they would have seen there's no actual difference in what their tooling finds between AOSP and GrapheneOS. The code they identified as not present in GrapheneOS wasn't in the latest AOSP release at the time. It also doesn't show anything is wrong.
Many of the security issues fixed by Android for older releases aren't present in recent releases due to rewrites and changes to the code. Fixes in the development branch are often difficult to backport with major changes or entirely different approaches being needed. Backports are their own thing.
It's common for the initial attempt at fixing a privacy and security issue to be incomplete or incorrect. These changes sometimes even introduce new vulnerabilities. There are often multiple rounds of partial fixes. Truly fixing it often requires major changes or rewrites impractical to backport.
This paper is built around an incorrect understanding of how GrapheneOS is based on AOSP and Android's security patches. All of the patches included in Android at the time were shipped by GrapheneOS. If any of what they found was an actual issue, which is doubtful, then it was missing in AOSP too.
Aside from the incorrect premise and methodology, the paper is filled with many other inaccurate claims about GrapheneOS. Look at this example: > For instance, GrapheneOS eliminates unnecessary background processes and applies exploit-hardening techniques to reduce CPU and battery usage.
Did a human truly write that sentence? We aren't aware of any background processes we've eliminated compared to AOSP. Our exploit protections certainly don't reduce CPU, memory or battery usage. We do take great care to minimize the overhead and provide toggles for features with a substantial cost.
The paper is filled with statements which sound reasonable to non-experts but are nonsense. We wouldn't be surprised if most of the paper and code was LLM generated. There are many strong signs of it and it's hard to believe humans wrote all of this. We think it should be investigated further.
There are 4 authors listed for this. The person listed 3rd is a Senior Research Scientist in the Platforms Security and Privacy team at Google. It's published as part of the 2026 IEEE 11th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). What happened here?
www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings-article/euros-p/2026/10…
Google published Android as an open source project and it succeeded based on it. For years, they've been engaging in illegal anti-competitive tactics to gain control over what was an open platform supposedly governed by a group of companies rather than Google. That includes the Play Integrity API.
Play Integrity API is pushed based on the false premise that it's a security feature. In reality, it's a core pillar of an illegal anti-competitive business model and clearly harms security. It bans GrapheneOS despite it being far more secure than anything they certify including far better patching.
This paper pushes Google's false narrative of alternatives to Google certified Android not providing standard patches and protections. A Google researcher being directly involved as an author is scandalous. The claims made by the paper about GrapheneOS are clearly false and it needs to be retracted.
The paper links to a GitHub repository with code, data and a copy of the paper. It's strange they apparently never thought to run this against the AOSP release which the GrapheneOS release they tested was based on. There are 0 differences in most of the relevant code...
github.com/Demeter2025/AndroVET/tree/mainPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
@DaveKSecure @gulizseray We ship Android Security Bulletin patches months before Google via our security preview releases. Google leaves Android users including Pixel users vulnerable for months. We're quite sure none of you truly believe lack of public sources prevents exploits.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
@DaveKSecure @gulizseray Android succeeded due to being an open source project and open platform. Google has a bunch of monopolies propped up by Android and has special requirements under antitrust law. Play Integrity, AOSP updates and more aren't unnoticed by regulators.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The paper has a table listing the patches they're inaccurately claiming are missing in GrapheneOS. They claim the ones marked as green were manually verified as missing. First patch listed in the table is CVE-2015-6609 which we reported to Google in 2015.
source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2015-11-01
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS shipped every single one of the patches they falsely claim were missed. We quickly moved to each new stable release of AOSP as the new base. Every patch in AOSP or the stock Pixel OS was quickly included in GrapheneOS. We also included many patches they did not ship.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The paper has a table listing the patches they're inaccurately claiming are missing in GrapheneOS. They claim the ones marked as green were manually verified as missing. First patch listed in the table is CVE-2015-6609 which we reported to Google in 2015.
source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2015-11-01 -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google replaced pushing Git tags for certain source code with obtaining source code via Google Drive after making a request through Google Forms. It's completely ridiculous and they've gradually become very slow at handling requests. They're in clear violation of the GPLv2 now.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Initially, Google would usually provide access to the tarballs within a couple hours. Lately, they're often taking weeks to get back to us. They're the ones who chose to use this archaic system instead of pushing Git tags and it's their responsibility to handle requests promptly.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These changes won't negatively impact GrapheneOS on upcoming Motorola Mobility devices. In fact, it's a major part of why our partnership exists. It only negatively impacts Pixels and hurts Google more than anyone else. Google wants to make Pixels worse for no apparent reason.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They're obligated to fulfill our requests. We need each of the Beta tags because we port and test in advance. If they don't want to deal with our endless requests for each release, they can simply push the tags to Git. They chose to waste the time of several employees on this.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For Motorola devices, we plan to prepare our releases early and have everything ready for major Android updates at launch. We should be able to simply push the code to our own repositories for major Android releases. We'll need to host all the AOSP Git repositories ourselves.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 151.0.7922.108.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/151.0.7922.108.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40986-vanadium-version-151079221…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 151.0.7922.83.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/151.0.7922.83.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40971-vanadium-version-151079228…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026080500 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40968-grapheneos-version-2026080…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Revolut recently banned using GrapheneOS without any justification. They're falsely claiming to do be doing it for security reasons. In reality, they're enforcing licensing Google Play. Revolut doesn't enforce security standards. It runs on Android 9 with no patches since 2018.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If Revolut insists on doing a verification of the hardware, OS and app then they can use the hardware attestation API to verify GrapheneOS devices. They've received links to grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide for years prior to their recent ban of GrapheneOS. They have no excuse to ban it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We worked around Revolut's blocking of GrapheneOS in January 2025 and got it working for everyone. However, it's still fully their intention to ban GrapheneOS and we've started seeing reports of users having issues logging in. It still consistently works when already logged in.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Revolut specifically tries to detect and ban GrapheneOS. It has checks for the build user/value values we set for deterministic builds so we had to change those. They also ban yellow verified boot state (locked with non-stock key) but not orange (unlocked) which we worked around.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Multiple traditional banks have started to specifically permit using GrapheneOS in addition to a Google certified OS. Revolut does the opposite. Most apps using Play Integrity or similar checks also don't try to falsely claim GrapheneOS lacks security or compatibility as they do.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/Cybernews/status/2084317413596700690
This isn't accurate framing of what we said. It would be accurate to describe our duress PIN/password feature itself as being completely legal. However, that lacks importance nuance and could lead people to make bad decisions. It's not what we said.
Cybernews
@Cybernews
With a new case in the US possibly determining the future of GrapheneOS users traveling to the country, the developers of the operating system claim that their duress password feature is "completely legal" and that decoy accounts wouldn't help.
Read more: cnews.link/grapheneos-duress-password-14/Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We plan to integrate our duress PIN/password into secure element rate limiting in the future. It will still be done at the OS layer above it, but the secure element can support erasing itself independently from the OS. This will keep it functional after successful OS exploits.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Enabling the duress PIN/password is clearly legal in most of the world. There are situations where it may not be legal to provide it in response to a request. That doesn't make providing it or enabling it illegal. It doesn't make writing it down on a phone case illegal either.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Each of these 5 products being repeatedly promoted by Tuta has poor privacy and atrocious security. These devices provide far easier access to governments via remote attacks, malware and data extraction tools. Each one is a major downgrade from the privacy and security of iPhones.
One of the recommended options (Murena) has aligned themselves with anti-privacy authoritarians with campaigning against serious privacy and security protections. 3 of the other companies are partnered with Murena despite this.
The information below was specifically written about /e/ and Murena. It's fully applicable to the /e/ variants of the products from these companies. All of the info about lack of standard updates and protections is fully applicable to all 5 products:
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/e/ is a highly problematic fork of LineageOS very poor privacy and atrocious security. People would be far better off using standard LineageOS one of the better supported devices. An iPhone is far more private and drastically more secure than Murena products.
/e/ lacks crucial standard privacy and security patches. It has many months and even years of delays to provide those. Nearly all the devices they support lack most Linux kernel, driver and firmware updates. They don't keep up with those for any devices. They don't keep up with Android, Chromium or Linux security updates anywhere either. Many severe patched privacy and security vulnerabilities are left wide open for months and even years with /e/. They heavily mislead their users about what's patched and how long they take to ship it.
/e/ also doesn't provide important standard privacy or security protections. It lags years behind on providing the current generation protections and disables many of the most important ones. An operating system failing to protect against known privacy weaknesses does not have reasonable privacy.
/e/ includes their own privacy invasive services and sends user data to third party including OpenAI without consent. Despite how it's marketed, it includes many Google services with privileged integration into the OS. They have their own privacy invasive services including user tracking with unique identifiers in their update client.
Their own supposed privacy features are incredibly flawed and do not provide what they claim. A small list of blocked domains omitting everything used for useful functionality does not stop tracking by apps or services. It leaves the most privacy invasive behavior of apps and services intact and is trivially bypassed in multiple ways even for what it does cover. Apps and services only need to use the same domains for functionality as tracking to avoid it which is already largely what they do. Apps and services also already widely deploy bypasses for this naive domain-based filtering even for domains dedicated to tracking. /e/ would have you believe that a DNS blocklist is a game changing approach. There are better implementations including RethinkDNS available for use elsewhere.
More information:
community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using-open…
codeberg.org/divested-mobile/divestos-website/raw/commit/…
eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p…
/e/ and their for-profit company Murena have repeatedly pushed anti-privacy talking points from authoritarians claiming devices with strong privacy and security are for criminals and pedophiles. Here are 2 examples where Gaël Duval says that himself about privacy/security hardened devices in general:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142
clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-interview.html
/e/ and Murena many of the same anti-privacy talking points as France's current government and national law enforcement. They've aligned themselves with authoritarians in the country where they're based instead of opposing it. There are dozens of examples where they falsely claim GrapheneOS are mainly useful to criminals and mainly used by criminals. That's more extreme than the claims by France's national law enforcement cracking down on secure devices. They've gone so far to align themselves with anti-privacy authoritarians that they're ahead of them.
Murena is a for-profit company with the founders and owners of it being the same people who run /e/. /e/ includes for-profit paid Murena services and is built for Murena to sell devices with it. Despite being made for profit, /e/ receives millions of euros in government funding from governments which have spent years cracking down on legitimate privacy products:
> The European Union has subsidized us to the tune of several million for this project.
projets-libres.org/en/podcast/e-os-a-degoogled-android-ga…
/e/ makes it far easier to remotely take over devices, violate user privacy from apps and bypass encryption to extract all the data from a device. These are exactly the kinds of devices authoritarians opposed to privacy and security want people to be using. These devices are much less private and drastically less secure than iPhones but are duping people into paying them for it with false marketing. They're regressing privacy and security instead of advancing it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Each of these 5 products being repeatedly promoted by Tuta has poor privacy and atrocious security. These devices provide far easier access to governments via remote attacks, malware and data extraction tools. Each one is a major downgrade from the privacy and security of iPhones.
One of the recommended options (Murena) has aligned themselves with anti-privacy authoritarians with campaigning against serious privacy and security protections. 3 of the other companies are partnered with Murena despite this.
The information below was specifically written about /e/ and Murena. It's fully applicable to the /e/ variants of the products from these companies. All of the info about lack of standard updates and protections is fully applicable to all 5 products:
----
/e/ is a highly problematic fork of LineageOS very poor privacy and atrocious security. People would be far better off using standard LineageOS one of the better supported devices. An iPhone is far more private and drastically more secure than Murena products.
/e/ lacks crucial standard privacy and security patches. It has many months and even years of delays to provide those. Nearly all the devices they support lack most Linux kernel, driver and firmware updates. They don't keep up with those for any devices. They don't keep up with Android, Chromium or Linux security updates anywhere either. Many severe patched privacy and security vulnerabilities are left wide open for months and even years with /e/. They heavily mislead their users about what's patched and how long they take to ship it.
/e/ also doesn't provide important standard privacy or security protections. It lags years behind on providing the current generation protections and disables many of the most important ones. An operating system failing to protect against known privacy weaknesses does not have reasonable privacy.
/e/ includes their own privacy invasive services and sends user data to third party including OpenAI without consent. Despite how it's marketed, it includes many Google services with privileged integration into the OS. They have their own privacy invasive services including user tracking with unique identifiers in their update client.
Their own supposed privacy features are incredibly flawed and do not provide what they claim. A small list of blocked domains omitting everything used for useful functionality does not stop tracking by apps or services. It leaves the most privacy invasive behavior of apps and services intact and is trivially bypassed in multiple ways even for what it does cover. Apps and services only need to use the same domains for functionality as tracking to avoid it which is already largely what they do. Apps and services also already widely deploy bypasses for this naive domain-based filtering even for domains dedicated to tracking. /e/ would have you believe that a DNS blocklist is a game changing approach. There are better implementations including RethinkDNS available for use elsewhere.
More information:
community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using-open…
codeberg.org/divested-mobile/divestos-website/raw/commit/…
eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p…
/e/ and their for-profit company Murena have repeatedly pushed anti-privacy talking points from authoritarians claiming devices with strong privacy and security are for criminals and pedophiles. Here are 2 examples where Gaël Duval says that himself about privacy/security hardened devices in general:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142
clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-interview.html
/e/ and Murena many of the same anti-privacy talking points as France's current government and national law enforcement. They've aligned themselves with authoritarians in the country where they're based instead of opposing it. There are dozens of examples where they falsely claim GrapheneOS are mainly useful to criminals and mainly used by criminals. That's more extreme than the claims by France's national law enforcement cracking down on secure devices. They've gone so far to align themselves with anti-privacy authoritarians that they're ahead of them.
Murena is a for-profit company with the founders and owners of it being the same people who run /e/. /e/ includes for-profit paid Murena services and is built for Murena to sell devices with it. Despite being made for profit, /e/ receives millions of euros in government funding from governments which have spent years cracking down on legitimate privacy products:
> The European Union has subsidized us to the tune of several million for this project.
projets-libres.org/en/podcast/e-os-a-degoogled-android-ga…
/e/ makes it far easier to remotely take over devices, violate user privacy from apps and bypass encryption to extract all the data from a device. These are exactly the kinds of devices authoritarians opposed to privacy and security want people to be using. These devices are much less private and drastically less secure than iPhones but are duping people into paying them for it with false marketing. They're regressing privacy and security instead of advancing it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 93 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/93
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40877-grapheneos-camera-app-vers…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #camera #android -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The situation was avoidable but it wasn't avoided.. It's very likely the data would have been safe without using the duress PIN/password, but not guaranteed without a strong passphrase. The user who chose to use it understood the feature and it was their call to risk using it.
-
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That's not true. We've made multiple detailed posts about our duress PIN/password feature explaining the design and how it can be used. Enabling a duress PIN/password is legal and there are many ways it can be used legally. Here's one of our recent posts:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/niemerg/status/2081832876325077088
This proposal wouldn't hide that a wipe occurred and would help adversaries exploit and recover data from the device. It isn't a new idea and people have proposed variations of this hundreds of time for years. These proposals wouldn't hold up against widely available forensic software. Giving an attacker access to a decoy profile would make it far easier for them to exploit the device. Without a shut down or reboot, a device was previously in After First Unlock state would be very vulnerable to having data extracted.
GrapheneOS has strong protection against data extraction without depending on a duress PIN/password. The default enabled protections combined with a strong passphrase and 2nd factor fingerprint PIN would have provided fantastic protection for the data on the device. Reducing the device auto-reboot timer would be even better. The secure element would have protected the data with only a random 6 digit PIN instead of a passphrase in practice too.
All of our features are designed to work against adversaries aware of GrapheneOS. Our duress PIN/password is no different. Adversaries aware of GrapheneOS face a dilemma about whether a PIN/password provided by the user is going to unlock the device or wipe it. It wasn't designed around being a secret resulting in an unpleasant surprise for an adversary. We also plan to provide it as part of secure element rate limiting on future devices built to run GrapheneOS to prevent bypassing it with an OS exploit.
Triggering our duress PIN/password feature wipes both hardware keystores, the secure element as a whole and disk encryption metadata. Each of these 3 steps is enough on their own to reliably wipe material needed to obtain the key encryption keys for disk encryption. It happens nearly instantly and it wouldn't be secure if it took a bunch of time or depended on actually erasing any of the encrypted data. Shutting down the device triggers clearing sensitive data from RAM and registers to complete the process. It's necessary to clear a lot of sensitive data from memory and registers including decrypted encryption keys in TEE memory.
Giving an adversary access to a profile on the device instead of shutting down or rebooting would be very problematic. It would give them an immense amount of attack surface for exploiting the device to recover sensitive user data. If the Owner user is in After First Unlock state, the adversary has given massive attack surface for exploiting the device to obtain all of the data from the main user. It would be the extreme opposite of the attack surface reduction and exploit protections provided by GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS and apps running on it could continue to function indefinitely after the key derivation material is wiped. It already has disk encryption keys loaded into Trusted Execution Environment memory and is using those for inline disk encryption via wrapped keys. Only functionality depending on hardware keys would be broken. If there were profiles in After First Unlock state those would still be available. An attacker exploiting the device would recover the same data as before wiping the key encryption keys.
Forensic data extraction companies have access to GrapheneOS and we don't have access to their software. We cannot rely on security through obscurity or knowing how their software works including which vulnerabilities they exploit. Fooling widely available forensic software into believing a decoy profile is the Owner user isn't feasible. It would need to provide a fully functional Android Debug Bridge (ADB) environment which is completely impractical.
People should consider the fact that they likely haven't thought about this nearly as much as us. There are good reasons for why we designed this feature the way we did and it's working as intended in the real world. The feature becoming widely known about is a requirement for it to work as intended by creating a dilemma for adversaries. The main thing we need now is secure element support for it which we can get implemented for future devices as part of our Motorola Mobility partnership and future OEM partnerships.
Allan
@niemerg
“duress” password is incorrectly designed—it shouldn’t be apparent to the attacker that it was triggered and should instead open to an innocuous and data free home screen while nuking everything in the background
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS does not depend on a duress PIN/password to protect against data extraction. It provides strong protection against it without one. A duress PIN/password is very useful to take recovering data via coercion or any other method off the table.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40700-grapheneos-protections-aga…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS enables using a strong passphrase and our 2-factor fingerprint unlock feature makes it convenient without the insecurity of biometric-only unlock. Most people use a basic PIN/password depending on secure element throttling. A secure element can eventually be exploited.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The situation was avoidable but it wasn't avoided.. It's very likely the data would have been safe without using the duress PIN/password, but not guaranteed without a strong passphrase. The user who chose to use it understood the feature and it was their call to risk using it.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS enables using a strong passphrase and our 2-factor fingerprint unlock feature makes it convenient without the insecurity of biometric-only unlock. Most people use a basic PIN/password depending on secure element throttling. A secure element can eventually be exploited.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS does not depend on a duress PIN/password to protect against data extraction. It provides strong protection against it without one. A duress PIN/password is very useful to take recovering data via coercion or any other method off the table.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40700-grapheneos-protections-aga… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That's not true. We've made multiple detailed posts about our duress PIN/password feature explaining the design and how it can be used. Enabling a duress PIN/password is legal and there are many ways it can be used legally. Here's one of our recent posts:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/niemerg/status/2081832876325077088
This proposal wouldn't hide that a wipe occurred and would help adversaries exploit and recover data from the device. It isn't a new idea and people have proposed variations of this hundreds of time for years. These proposals wouldn't hold up against widely available forensic software. Giving an attacker access to a decoy profile would make it far easier for them to exploit the device. Without a shut down or reboot, a device was previously in After First Unlock state would be very vulnerable to having data extracted.
GrapheneOS has strong protection against data extraction without depending on a duress PIN/password. The default enabled protections combined with a strong passphrase and 2nd factor fingerprint PIN would have provided fantastic protection for the data on the device. Reducing the device auto-reboot timer would be even better. The secure element would have protected the data with only a random 6 digit PIN instead of a passphrase in practice too.
All of our features are designed to work against adversaries aware of GrapheneOS. Our duress PIN/password is no different. Adversaries aware of GrapheneOS face a dilemma about whether a PIN/password provided by the user is going to unlock the device or wipe it. It wasn't designed around being a secret resulting in an unpleasant surprise for an adversary. We also plan to provide it as part of secure element rate limiting on future devices built to run GrapheneOS to prevent bypassing it with an OS exploit.
Triggering our duress PIN/password feature wipes both hardware keystores, the secure element as a whole and disk encryption metadata. Each of these 3 steps is enough on their own to reliably wipe material needed to obtain the key encryption keys for disk encryption. It happens nearly instantly and it wouldn't be secure if it took a bunch of time or depended on actually erasing any of the encrypted data. Shutting down the device triggers clearing sensitive data from RAM and registers to complete the process. It's necessary to clear a lot of sensitive data from memory and registers including decrypted encryption keys in TEE memory.
Giving an adversary access to a profile on the device instead of shutting down or rebooting would be very problematic. It would give them an immense amount of attack surface for exploiting the device to recover sensitive user data. If the Owner user is in After First Unlock state, the adversary has given massive attack surface for exploiting the device to obtain all of the data from the main user. It would be the extreme opposite of the attack surface reduction and exploit protections provided by GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS and apps running on it could continue to function indefinitely after the key derivation material is wiped. It already has disk encryption keys loaded into Trusted Execution Environment memory and is using those for inline disk encryption via wrapped keys. Only functionality depending on hardware keys would be broken. If there were profiles in After First Unlock state those would still be available. An attacker exploiting the device would recover the same data as before wiping the key encryption keys.
Forensic data extraction companies have access to GrapheneOS and we don't have access to their software. We cannot rely on security through obscurity or knowing how their software works including which vulnerabilities they exploit. Fooling widely available forensic software into believing a decoy profile is the Owner user isn't feasible. It would need to provide a fully functional Android Debug Bridge (ADB) environment which is completely impractical.
People should consider the fact that they likely haven't thought about this nearly as much as us. There are good reasons for why we designed this feature the way we did and it's working as intended in the real world. The feature becoming widely known about is a requirement for it to work as intended by creating a dilemma for adversaries. The main thing we need now is secure element support for it which we can get implemented for future devices as part of our Motorola Mobility partnership and future OEM partnerships.
Allan
@niemerg
“duress” password is incorrectly designed—it shouldn’t be apparent to the attacker that it was triggered and should instead open to an innocuous and data free home screen while nuking everything in the background
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 92 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/92
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40874-grapheneos-camera-app-vers…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #camera #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 91 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/91
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40836-grapheneos-camera-app-vers…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #camera #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Secure PDF Viewer app version 33 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases/tag/33
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40835-secure-pdf-viewer-app-vers…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #pdf #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 151.0.7922.71.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/151.0.7922.71.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40822-vanadium-version-151079227…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026072900 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40806-grapheneos-version-2026072…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
In response to recent suggestions mentioning it:
> If you need plausible deniability, you must not use VeraCrypt to encrypt any part of (or create encrypted containers on) a device (or file system) that utilizes a wear-leveling mechanism.
veracrypt.io/en/Wear-Leveling.htmlPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
reddit.com/r/embeddedlinux/comments/1josb0i/embedded_linu…
> Company: Magnet Forensics
>
> [...] experience in both embedded Linux, and also FPGA gateware. Deep understanding of the USB protocol and stack is a major differentiator - experience here sets you apart [...]
>
> Technologies: [...] GrapheneOS, [...]
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We make privacy and security tech. Privacy and security involve defending against adversaries actively adapting and improving. Companies developing offensive security tech including remote exploits and data extraction tools are aware of GrapheneOS. It's made with that in mind.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our recommended setups:
1) Random 6 digit PIN relying on secure element rate limiting without fingerprint unlock.
2) Strong passphrase such as 6-8 random diceware words not depending on secure element rate limiting with 2-factor fingerprint+PIN secondary unlock for convenience. -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our recommended setups:
1) Random 6 digit PIN relying on secure element rate limiting without fingerprint unlock.
2) Strong passphrase such as 6-8 random diceware words not depending on secure element rate limiting with 2-factor fingerprint+PIN secondary unlock for convenience. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has strong defenses against data extraction. It heavily builds upon the standard security features provided by Android 17 and the most secure hardware available for Android. Currently, only Pixels provide the hardware security features and updates required by GrapheneOS. That's going to change in 2027 thanks to our partnership with Motorola Mobility and progress being made by Qualcomm.
Disk encryption provides strong protection for data. Even the most sophisticated attackers aren't going to be directly breaking it. They either need to exploit the OS while in After First Unlock state or brute force the PIN/password.
Android 16 QPR2 calls for a secure element implementing rate limiting ramping up delays. It's 4 hours after 10 and 41 days after 15. Only 20 attempts are allowed. For usability, It rejects the most recent 5 unique failed attempts early to avoid wasting attempts on repeated errors. GrapheneOS only supports devices implementing the latest generation secure element rate limiting.
source.android.com/docs/security/features/authentication/…
The secure element on the supported devices also has insider attack resistance. That's implemented by requiring the Owner user to successfully authenticate before the secure element firmware can be updated. A valid signing key and greater version number aren't enough alone. The purpose of this is preventing any government from bypassing the rate limiting by coercing the creation of a firmware update removing the rate limit.
Pixels have used a secure element with an internal timer implementing rate limiting and insider attack resistance since the Pixel 2 launched near the end of 2017. Here's a post about this from back in 2018:
android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/05/insider-attack-…
The secure element and integration into the OS has become far better since then, but it shows this goes back a long way and isn't a new feature.
GrapheneOS also raises the character limit for passwords from 16 to 128. This enables using high entropy diceware passphrases not depending on the secure element rate limiting.
To make a strong passphrase convenient to use without ruining it with biometric unlock, GrapheneOS adds an optional 2nd factor fingerprint PIN. We reduce the allowed fingerprint attempts from 20 to 5 and failure to enter the correct 2nd factor PIN counts towards it. This enables using 6-8 random diceware words as the main unlock method required in Before First Unlock and fingerprint+PIN using a short PIN for convenience. Using a valid fingerprint prompts to enter the 2nd factor PIN which is needed to complete unlocking the screen and hardware keystore.
GrapheneOS greatly improves the exploit protections for the OS with hardened memory allocators and other features. It heavily uses hardware-based security features including hardware memory tagging (MTE) to protect against exploits. A partial overview of those protections is here:
grapheneos.org/features
GrapheneOS adds specialized protection against attacks with physical access too. For example, it blocks new USB connections at a software and hardware level by default while locked and disables USB data as soon as there are no active USB connections.
GrapheneOS shipped a locked device auto-reboot timer back in June 2021. It can be set between 10 minutes and 72 hours. We enabled it by default using 72 hours and then lowered it 18 hours. It automatically returns the device to Before First Unlock state due to our memory zeroing as part of tearing down the OS and booting. We got Pixels to add memory zeroing for booting the firmware fastboot mode in April 2024. Apple and Google added a locked device auto-reboot timer in iOS 18.1 and Android 16. For Android, it can be enabled with the Android Advanced Protection Mode. Our implementation is better for multiple reasons but it's a useful feature regardless.
Android uses separate encryption keys for each secondary user and Private Space. GrapheneOS adds support for putting both back into Before First Unlock state without a reboot via end session for secondary users or toggles for either to do it by default. It's still much better for the device to be rebooted to get the main user back at rest, completely clear leftover data from RAM and block secure element updates.
Our duress PIN/password feature is a minor feature fitting into the bigger picture. It wipes the device when it's entered in any OS prompt for the current profile's PIN or password. It will wipe the device when entered into the authentication prompt for changing a sensitive setting or anything else requiring it, not only the lockscreen. It works across every profile including secondary users and Private Spaces, not only the main user.
There are multiple ways to use the duress PIN/password feature including writing it down on a phone case or a paper kept in a wallet. People should carefully consider how to use it in an actual duress situation where there can be physical or legal consequences for wiping the device. GrapheneOS doesn't require it to protect data from being extracted from the device, but it takes recovering it completely off the table even with the PIN/password for each profile on the device.
GrapheneOS doesn't depend on the duress PIN/password to protect user data. It's one of the tools it provides among the major privacy and security improvements it offers as a whole. Our features page provides an overview of what GrapheneOS offers compared to standard Android 17. It covers most of the major features we provide and many of the minor ones but there's also a lot more beyond it. Our release notes are a lot more exhaustive since we make sure to cover everything when it's added, changed or removed.
grapheneos.org/features
grapheneos.org/releases -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It doesn't need to be guessed, you can write it down on the phone case.
You can also avoid bringing sensitive data somewhere you can predict it's going to be inspected. Encrypted backup/restore is useful.
GrapheneOS provides strong protection against data extraction without the duress PIN/password needing to be used. US has legal protection for refusing to provide the PIN/password.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40700-grapheneos-protections-aga… -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It doesn't need to be guessed, you can write it down on the phone case.
You can also avoid bringing sensitive data somewhere you can predict it's going to be inspected. Encrypted backup/restore is useful.
GrapheneOS provides strong protection against data extraction without the duress PIN/password needing to be used. US has legal protection for refusing to provide the PIN/password.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40700-grapheneos-protections-aga… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/niemerg/status/2081832876325077088
This proposal wouldn't hide that a wipe occurred and would help adversaries exploit and recover data from the device. It isn't a new idea and people have proposed variations of this hundreds of time for years. These proposals wouldn't hold up against widely available forensic software. Giving an attacker access to a decoy profile would make it far easier for them to exploit the device. Without a shut down or reboot, a device was previously in After First Unlock state would be very vulnerable to having data extracted.
GrapheneOS has strong protection against data extraction without depending on a duress PIN/password. The default enabled protections combined with a strong passphrase and 2nd factor fingerprint PIN would have provided fantastic protection for the data on the device. Reducing the device auto-reboot timer would be even better. The secure element would have protected the data with only a random 6 digit PIN instead of a passphrase in practice too.
All of our features are designed to work against adversaries aware of GrapheneOS. Our duress PIN/password is no different. Adversaries aware of GrapheneOS face a dilemma about whether a PIN/password provided by the user is going to unlock the device or wipe it. It wasn't designed around being a secret resulting in an unpleasant surprise for an adversary. We also plan to provide it as part of secure element rate limiting on future devices built to run GrapheneOS to prevent bypassing it with an OS exploit.
Triggering our duress PIN/password feature wipes both hardware keystores, the secure element as a whole and disk encryption metadata. Each of these 3 steps is enough on their own to reliably wipe material needed to obtain the key encryption keys for disk encryption. It happens nearly instantly and it wouldn't be secure if it took a bunch of time or depended on actually erasing any of the encrypted data. Shutting down the device triggers clearing sensitive data from RAM and registers to complete the process. It's necessary to clear a lot of sensitive data from memory and registers including decrypted encryption keys in TEE memory.
Giving an adversary access to a profile on the device instead of shutting down or rebooting would be very problematic. It would give them an immense amount of attack surface for exploiting the device to recover sensitive user data. If the Owner user is in After First Unlock state, the adversary has given massive attack surface for exploiting the device to obtain all of the data from the main user. It would be the extreme opposite of the attack surface reduction and exploit protections provided by GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS and apps running on it could continue to function indefinitely after the key derivation material is wiped. It already has disk encryption keys loaded into Trusted Execution Environment memory and is using those for inline disk encryption via wrapped keys. Only functionality depending on hardware keys would be broken. If there were profiles in After First Unlock state those would still be available. An attacker exploiting the device would recover the same data as before wiping the key encryption keys.
Forensic data extraction companies have access to GrapheneOS and we don't have access to their software. We cannot rely on security through obscurity or knowing how their software works including which vulnerabilities they exploit. Fooling widely available forensic software into believing a decoy profile is the Owner user isn't feasible. It would need to provide a fully functional Android Debug Bridge (ADB) environment which is completely impractical.
People should consider the fact that they likely haven't thought about this nearly as much as us. There are good reasons for why we designed this feature the way we did and it's working as intended in the real world. The feature becoming widely known about is a requirement for it to work as intended by creating a dilemma for adversaries. The main thing we need now is secure element support for it which we can get implemented for future devices as part of our Motorola Mobility partnership and future OEM partnerships.
Allan
@niemerg
“duress” password is incorrectly designed—it shouldn’t be apparent to the attacker that it was triggered and should instead open to an innocuous and data free home screen while nuking everything in the background
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/niemerg/status/2081832876325077088
This proposal wouldn't hide that a wipe occurred and would help adversaries exploit and recover data from the device. It isn't a new idea and people have proposed variations of this hundreds of time for years. These proposals wouldn't hold up against widely available forensic software. Giving an attacker access to a decoy profile would make it far easier for them to exploit the device. Without a shut down or reboot, a device was previously in After First Unlock state would be very vulnerable to having data extracted.
GrapheneOS has strong protection against data extraction without depending on a duress PIN/password. The default enabled protections combined with a strong passphrase and 2nd factor fingerprint PIN would have provided fantastic protection for the data on the device. Reducing the device auto-reboot timer would be even better. The secure element would have protected the data with only a random 6 digit PIN instead of a passphrase in practice too.
All of our features are designed to work against adversaries aware of GrapheneOS. Our duress PIN/password is no different. Adversaries aware of GrapheneOS face a dilemma about whether a PIN/password provided by the user is going to unlock the device or wipe it. It wasn't designed around being a secret resulting in an unpleasant surprise for an adversary. We also plan to provide it as part of secure element rate limiting on future devices built to run GrapheneOS to prevent bypassing it with an OS exploit.
Triggering our duress PIN/password feature wipes both hardware keystores, the secure element as a whole and disk encryption metadata. Each of these 3 steps is enough on their own to reliably wipe material needed to obtain the key encryption keys for disk encryption. It happens nearly instantly and it wouldn't be secure if it took a bunch of time or depended on actually erasing any of the encrypted data. Shutting down the device triggers clearing sensitive data from RAM and registers to complete the process. It's necessary to clear a lot of sensitive data from memory and registers including decrypted encryption keys in TEE memory.
Giving an adversary access to a profile on the device instead of shutting down or rebooting would be very problematic. It would give them an immense amount of attack surface for exploiting the device to recover sensitive user data. If the Owner user is in After First Unlock state, the adversary has given massive attack surface for exploiting the device to obtain all of the data from the main user. It would be the extreme opposite of the attack surface reduction and exploit protections provided by GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS and apps running on it could continue to function indefinitely after the key derivation material is wiped. It already has disk encryption keys loaded into Trusted Execution Environment memory and is using those for inline disk encryption via wrapped keys. Only functionality depending on hardware keys would be broken. If there were profiles in After First Unlock state those would still be available. An attacker exploiting the device would recover the same data as before wiping the key encryption keys.
Forensic data extraction companies have access to GrapheneOS and we don't have access to their software. We cannot rely on security through obscurity or knowing how their software works including which vulnerabilities they exploit. Fooling widely available forensic software into believing a decoy profile is the Owner user isn't feasible. It would need to provide a fully functional Android Debug Bridge (ADB) environment which is completely impractical.
People should consider the fact that they likely haven't thought about this nearly as much as us. There are good reasons for why we designed this feature the way we did and it's working as intended in the real world. The feature becoming widely known about is a requirement for it to work as intended by creating a dilemma for adversaries. The main thing we need now is secure element support for it which we can get implemented for future devices as part of our Motorola Mobility partnership and future OEM partnerships.
Allan
@niemerg
“duress” password is incorrectly designed—it shouldn’t be apparent to the attacker that it was triggered and should instead open to an innocuous and data free home screen while nuking everything in the background
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've seen years of proposals for hiding or stealthily wiping data for years. None of the proposals would work against an adversary with access to widely available forensic software since it's aware of GrapheneOS. It also wouldn't work against an adversary aware of it themselves.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS doesn't depend on a duress PIN/password to protect against data extraction via exploits. It needs it to protect against coercion. The news coverage will help it provide the intended deterrence. See discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40700-grapheneos-protections-aga… for a broader overview of our overall approach.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our duress PIN/password wipes 3 different forms of key material needed with derive the key encryption keys with the user's PIN/password. All of the encrypted data still exists but is fully unrecoverable due to multiple things needed to derive the keys to decrypt it being gone.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our duress PIN/password wipes 3 different forms of key material needed with derive the key encryption keys with the user's PIN/password. All of the encrypted data still exists but is fully unrecoverable due to multiple things needed to derive the keys to decrypt it being gone.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Secure element rate limiting and insider attack protection preventing bypassing it under state coercion are standard Pixel features not specific to GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS heavily improves exploit protection including exploits used to bypass encryption. All of it is clearly legal.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is completely legal. We have no obligation to weaken any of the security protections it provides. Creating and using GrapheneOS is strongly protected by the US constitution. Laws attempting to make it illegal or require weakening the security would be unconstitutional.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Data cannot be recovered after the key derivation material is reliably wiped. It's not possible and there's nothing we can do to assist with it. Similarly, it's not possible to assist with bypassing encryption because the hardware and software has been designed to prevent it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
By default, GrapheneOS devices automatically return to Before First Unlock state if they aren't unlocked within 18 hours of being locked. Users can set it as low as 10 minutes. GrapheneOS has strong generic exploit protections and specialized defenses against physical attacks.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's no way to bypass a strong encryption passphrase once data is at rest. A typical weak PIN or password depends on the secure element limiting the number of attempts. Secure element only accepts firmware updates after Owner authenticates to protect against state coercion.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is completely legal. We have no obligation to weaken any of the security protections it provides. Creating and using GrapheneOS is strongly protected by the US constitution. Laws attempting to make it illegal or require weakening the security would be unconstitutional.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Secure element rate limiting and insider attack protection preventing bypassing it under state coercion are standard Pixel features not specific to GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS heavily improves exploit protection including exploits used to bypass encryption. All of it is clearly legal.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's no way to bypass a strong encryption passphrase once data is at rest. A typical weak PIN or password depends on the secure element limiting the number of attempts. Secure element only accepts firmware updates after Owner authenticates to protect against state coercion.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
By default, GrapheneOS devices automatically return to Before First Unlock state if they aren't unlocked within 18 hours of being locked. Users can set it as low as 10 minutes. GrapheneOS has strong generic exploit protections and specialized defenses against physical attacks.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Data cannot be recovered after the key derivation material is reliably wiped. It's not possible and there's nothing we can do to assist with it. Similarly, it's not possible to assist with bypassing encryption because the hardware and software has been designed to prevent it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Reliable deletion of data requires hardware support. It needs to be set up in advance. GrapheneOS can reliably wipe the overall data. It can reliably wipe data in secondary profiles by deleting those due to per-user encryption with per-profile secure element slots for Weaver.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has strong protection against user data being extracted from a locked device. It doesn't depend on the duress PIN/password. Duress PIN/password is not one of the main protections. It likely wasn't the best option in this case but worked fine.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40700-grapheneos-protections-aga…Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Deleting files doesn't prevent data being recovered. It remains around on the SSD. Overwriting data in files doesn't prevent it being recovered either. New data is written elsewhere. Replaced data ends up as free space which can be reused but writes are spread out across storage.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Reliable deletion of data requires hardware support. It needs to be set up in advance. GrapheneOS can reliably wipe the overall data. It can reliably wipe data in secondary profiles by deleting those due to per-user encryption with per-profile secure element slots for Weaver.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Deleting files doesn't prevent data being recovered. It remains around on the SSD. Overwriting data in files doesn't prevent it being recovered either. New data is written elsewhere. Replaced data ends up as free space which can be reused but writes are spread out across storage.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has strong protection against user data being extracted from a locked device. It doesn't depend on the duress PIN/password. Duress PIN/password is not one of the main protections. It likely wasn't the best option in this case but worked fine.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40700-grapheneos-protections-aga… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Soundness bugs in the compiler and standard libraries aren't exclusive to Rust. Pointing to 3rd party libraries deliberately not following the rules isn't evidence of Rust not being safe. Fil-C has all of regular C as an unsafe subset via FFI and isn't memory safe within objects.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Fil-C doesn't prevent all overflows within allocations, only between them. It still has memory corruption within an array or struct. That can be exploited as a security vulnerability. Fil-C also has an unsafe API for calling regular C via FFI similarly to Rust having unsafe.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Rust does provide much more safety than memory safety. It supports integer overflow checks and uses those in debug builds by default. It has a far better type system than Java helping avoid many kinds of logic vulnerabilities and the ecosystem has near zero dynamic code loading.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Soundness bugs in the compiler and standard libraries aren't exclusive to Rust. Pointing to 3rd party libraries deliberately not following the rules isn't evidence of Rust not being safe. Fil-C has all of regular C as an unsafe subset via FFI and isn't memory safe within objects.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Rust does provide much more safety than memory safety. It supports integer overflow checks and uses those in debug builds by default. It has a far better type system than Java helping avoid many kinds of logic vulnerabilities and the ecosystem has near zero dynamic code loading.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Fil-C doesn't prevent all overflows within allocations, only between them. It still has memory corruption within an array or struct. That can be exploited as a security vulnerability. Fil-C also has an unsafe API for calling regular C via FFI similarly to Rust having unsafe.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has strong defenses against data extraction. It heavily builds upon the standard security features provided by Android 17 and the most secure hardware available for Android. Currently, only Pixels provide the hardware security features and updates required by GrapheneOS. That's going to change in 2027 thanks to our partnership with Motorola Mobility and progress being made by Qualcomm.
Disk encryption provides strong protection for data. Even the most sophisticated attackers aren't going to be directly breaking it. They either need to exploit the OS while in After First Unlock state or brute force the PIN/password.
Android 16 QPR2 calls for a secure element implementing rate limiting ramping up delays. It's 4 hours after 10 and 41 days after 15. Only 20 attempts are allowed. For usability, It rejects the most recent 5 unique failed attempts early to avoid wasting attempts on repeated errors. GrapheneOS only supports devices implementing the latest generation secure element rate limiting.
source.android.com/docs/security/features/authentication/…
The secure element on the supported devices also has insider attack resistance. That's implemented by requiring the Owner user to successfully authenticate before the secure element firmware can be updated. A valid signing key and greater version number aren't enough alone. The purpose of this is preventing any government from bypassing the rate limiting by coercing the creation of a firmware update removing the rate limit.
Pixels have used a secure element with an internal timer implementing rate limiting and insider attack resistance since the Pixel 2 launched near the end of 2017. Here's a post about this from back in 2018:
android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/05/insider-attack-…
The secure element and integration into the OS has become far better since then, but it shows this goes back a long way and isn't a new feature.
GrapheneOS also raises the character limit for passwords from 16 to 128. This enables using high entropy diceware passphrases not depending on the secure element rate limiting.
To make a strong passphrase convenient to use without ruining it with biometric unlock, GrapheneOS adds an optional 2nd factor fingerprint PIN. We reduce the allowed fingerprint attempts from 20 to 5 and failure to enter the correct 2nd factor PIN counts towards it. This enables using 6-8 random diceware words as the main unlock method required in Before First Unlock and fingerprint+PIN using a short PIN for convenience. Using a valid fingerprint prompts to enter the 2nd factor PIN which is needed to complete unlocking the screen and hardware keystore.
GrapheneOS greatly improves the exploit protections for the OS with hardened memory allocators and other features. It heavily uses hardware-based security features including hardware memory tagging (MTE) to protect against exploits. A partial overview of those protections is here:
grapheneos.org/features
GrapheneOS adds specialized protection against attacks with physical access too. For example, it blocks new USB connections at a software and hardware level by default while locked and disables USB data as soon as there are no active USB connections.
GrapheneOS shipped a locked device auto-reboot timer back in June 2021. It can be set between 10 minutes and 72 hours. We enabled it by default using 72 hours and then lowered it 18 hours. It automatically returns the device to Before First Unlock state due to our memory zeroing as part of tearing down the OS and booting. We got Pixels to add memory zeroing for booting the firmware fastboot mode in April 2024. Apple and Google added a locked device auto-reboot timer in iOS 18.1 and Android 16. For Android, it can be enabled with the Android Advanced Protection Mode. Our implementation is better for multiple reasons but it's a useful feature regardless.
Android uses separate encryption keys for each secondary user and Private Space. GrapheneOS adds support for putting both back into Before First Unlock state without a reboot via end session for secondary users or toggles for either to do it by default. It's still much better for the device to be rebooted to get the main user back at rest, completely clear leftover data from RAM and block secure element updates.
Our duress PIN/password feature is a minor feature fitting into the bigger picture. It wipes the device when it's entered in any OS prompt for the current profile's PIN or password. It will wipe the device when entered into the authentication prompt for changing a sensitive setting or anything else requiring it, not only the lockscreen. It works across every profile including secondary users and Private Spaces, not only the main user.
There are multiple ways to use the duress PIN/password feature including writing it down on a phone case or a paper kept in a wallet. People should carefully consider how to use it in an actual duress situation where there can be physical or legal consequences for wiping the device. GrapheneOS doesn't require it to protect data from being extracted from the device, but it takes recovering it completely off the table even with the PIN/password for each profile on the device.
GrapheneOS doesn't depend on the duress PIN/password to protect user data. It's one of the tools it provides among the major privacy and security improvements it offers as a whole. Our features page provides an overview of what GrapheneOS offers compared to standard Android 17. It covers most of the major features we provide and many of the minor ones but there's also a lot more beyond it. Our release notes are a lot more exhaustive since we make sure to cover everything when it's added, changed or removed.
grapheneos.org/features
grapheneos.org/releases
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We posted this on the official GrapheneOS discussion forum too. Our forum enables more in-depth discussion and these kinds of threads often remain active for many months. If you want to have a serious discussion about it with others, it works better.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40700-grapheneos-protections-aga…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We can freely edit the post on the forum and will likely expand and improve it a bit. One improvement has been made compared to the post available on X so far:
> The duress PIN will also wipe the device when entered as a 2nd factor PIN for fingerprint unlock, but not a SIM PIN. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We posted this on the official GrapheneOS discussion forum too. Our forum enables more in-depth discussion and these kinds of threads often remain active for many months. If you want to have a serious discussion about it with others, it works better.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40700-grapheneos-protections-aga… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has much better memory corruption protections with our hardened allocators, memory tagging and more. It blocks new USB connections while locked at both a software and hardware level along with disabling USB data. It wins if it isn't exploited before auto-reboot.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's nonsense to claim our niche duress PIN/password is the only functioning feature. It's not a major feature of the OS and isn't at all required to protect data from extraction. GrapheneOS strongly protects the device from exploits and auto-reboots to Before First Unlock state.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It has proper disk encryption and secure element throttling only permitting a total of 20 attempts to guess the correct PIN/password. A random 6 digit PIN is enough to protect data from an attacker unable to exploit the secure element. A strong passphrase avoids depending on it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS raises the password length limit from 16 to 128 characters to support diceware passphrases. It fixes the weaknesses of fingerprint unlock with support for a 2nd factor PIN to have a convenient unlock method with only 5 max attempts alongside the main strong passphrase.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has much better memory corruption protections with our hardened allocators, memory tagging and more. It blocks new USB connections while locked at both a software and hardware level along with disabling USB data. It wins if it isn't exploited before auto-reboot.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS raises the password length limit from 16 to 128 characters to support diceware passphrases. It fixes the weaknesses of fingerprint unlock with support for a 2nd factor PIN to have a convenient unlock method with only 5 max attempts alongside the main strong passphrase.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It has proper disk encryption and secure element throttling only permitting a total of 20 attempts to guess the correct PIN/password. A random 6 digit PIN is enough to protect data from an attacker unable to exploit the secure element. A strong passphrase avoids depending on it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's nonsense to claim our niche duress PIN/password is the only functioning feature. It's not a major feature of the OS and isn't at all required to protect data from extraction. GrapheneOS strongly protects the device from exploits and auto-reboots to Before First Unlock state.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 151.0.7922.47.1 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/151.0.7922.47.1
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40679-vanadium-version-151079224…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That doesn't invalidate privacy and security protections provided by GrapheneOS. People have conversations, pictures, videos, documents and much more to protect. Someone's legal name and address being online doesn't make their data public or all accounts tied to that identity.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That doesn't invalidate privacy and security protections provided by GrapheneOS. People have conversations, pictures, videos, documents and much more to protect. Someone's legal name and address being online doesn't make their data public or all accounts tied to that identity.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Standard biometric secondary unlock makes a long passphrase convenient but is a major security risk itself. However, GrapheneOS changes this with the option to add a 2nd factor PIN to fingerprint unlock. Incorrect PIN counts towards the attempt limit which we reduce from 20 to 5.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has strong protection against data being extracted without a duress PIN/password. It has strong protection against exploits and will wipe RAM when an automatic reboot is triggered 18 hours after the device was locked. That can be set between 10 minutes and 72 hours.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The hardware we use has a secure element which only permits 20 attempts to enter the correct PIN or password. It has a rapidly growing delay between attempts. The OS temporarily keeps incorrect entries in RAM to reject those without trying it again to avoid wasting attempts.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
6 random digits is the recommendation for standard security even 4 random digits is quite secure now due to the limit of 20 attempts.
GrapheneOS adds support for long passphrases for people who want higher security where a secure element exploit can be used to bypass encryption.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS raises the character limit for passwords from 16 to 128. Using 6-8 random diceware words prevents bypassing encryption with even the most sophisticated exploits. That may sound too inconvenient, but GrapheneOS completely changes that with our 2-factor unlock feature.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Standard biometric secondary unlock makes a long passphrase convenient but is a major security risk itself. However, GrapheneOS changes this with the option to add a 2nd factor PIN to fingerprint unlock. Incorrect PIN counts towards the attempt limit which we reduce from 20 to 5.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS raises the character limit for passwords from 16 to 128. Using 6-8 random diceware words prevents bypassing encryption with even the most sophisticated exploits. That may sound too inconvenient, but GrapheneOS completely changes that with our 2-factor unlock feature.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
6 random digits is the recommendation for standard security even 4 random digits is quite secure now due to the limit of 20 attempts.
GrapheneOS adds support for long passphrases for people who want higher security where a secure element exploit can be used to bypass encryption. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The hardware we use has a secure element which only permits 20 attempts to enter the correct PIN or password. It has a rapidly growing delay between attempts. The OS temporarily keeps incorrect entries in RAM to reject those without trying it again to avoid wasting attempts.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has strong protection against data being extracted without a duress PIN/password. It has strong protection against exploits and will wipe RAM when an automatic reboot is triggered 18 hours after the device was locked. That can be set between 10 minutes and 72 hours.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our partnership with Motorola Mobility will provide more devices meeting all of our standard requirements. Those will provide official GrapheneOS support with the driver and firmware updates we need provided directly to us instead of needing to hack together support for devices.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Your claims are inaccurate. GrapheneOS has massive privacy and security benefits over the Android Open Source Project. External privacy and security experts have extensively reviewed and written about it. There's proven success vs. sophisticated adversaries including Cellebrite.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is completely legal and is one of the most widely used alternatives to Android and iOS. It's not far from having more users than official LineageOS builds. GrapheneOS is easy to use and has near perfect app compatibility. It's far easier to use than other alternatives.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is a privacy and security hardened OS. It needs devices providing the hardware-based security features it uses to protect users along with good driver/firmware updates. Pixels are the only devices providing it. That's changing due to our Motorola Mobility partnership.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's no evidence of these claimed backdoors in any support devices. There's strong evidence against it from repeated leaks on government and commercial exploit capabilities. Those leaks have repeatedly shown GrapheneOS is protecting far better against sophisticated attackers.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has many high impact privacy features including overhauling a growing portion of the permission model. It adds Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, Sensors toggle, Network toggle, per-connection Wi-Fi privacy beyond MAC randomization, fixes many VPN leaks and much more.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
All of those features and many other privacy and security features provided by GrapheneOS require an OS. Many of the security features we provide are based on hardware features including memory tagging. We're getting into the hardware and firmware space to make changes there too.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS heavily protects against remote and proximity attacks, takeover of the OS by apps, data extraction with physical access, privacy invasive behavior by apps, privacy invasive behavior by nearby networks and much more. It improves anti-persistence but it's a minor focus.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS exists to provide highly private and secure mobile devices, not specifically avoiding Google. It doesn't connect to third party servers by default, not only Google ones, and provides control over those connections. Users can install and use Google apps/services on it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixels are the only Android devices meeting a reasonable standard of security combined with providing proper support for using another OS with the security intact. Pixels get by far the most attention from external privacy/security researchers too. What else would we have used?
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our partnership with Motorola Mobility will provide more devices meeting all of our standard requirements. Those will provide official GrapheneOS support with the driver and firmware updates we need provided directly to us instead of needing to hack together support for devices.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixels are the only Android devices meeting a reasonable standard of security combined with providing proper support for using another OS with the security intact. Pixels get by far the most attention from external privacy/security researchers too. What else would we have used?
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS exists to provide highly private and secure mobile devices, not specifically avoiding Google. It doesn't connect to third party servers by default, not only Google ones, and provides control over those connections. Users can install and use Google apps/services on it.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS heavily protects against remote and proximity attacks, takeover of the OS by apps, data extraction with physical access, privacy invasive behavior by apps, privacy invasive behavior by nearby networks and much more. It improves anti-persistence but it's a minor focus.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
All of those features and many other privacy and security features provided by GrapheneOS require an OS. Many of the security features we provide are based on hardware features including memory tagging. We're getting into the hardware and firmware space to make changes there too.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has many high impact privacy features including overhauling a growing portion of the permission model. It adds Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, Sensors toggle, Network toggle, per-connection Wi-Fi privacy beyond MAC randomization, fixes many VPN leaks and much more.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's no evidence of these claimed backdoors in any support devices. There's strong evidence against it from repeated leaks on government and commercial exploit capabilities. Those leaks have repeatedly shown GrapheneOS is protecting far better against sophisticated attackers.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is a privacy and security hardened OS. It needs devices providing the hardware-based security features it uses to protect users along with good driver/firmware updates. Pixels are the only devices providing it. That's changing due to our Motorola Mobility partnership.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is completely legal and is one of the most widely used alternatives to Android and iOS. It's not far from having more users than official LineageOS builds. GrapheneOS is easy to use and has near perfect app compatibility. It's far easier to use than other alternatives.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Your claims are inaccurate. GrapheneOS has massive privacy and security benefits over the Android Open Source Project. External privacy and security experts have extensively reviewed and written about it. There's proven success vs. sophisticated adversaries including Cellebrite.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Info app version 7 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Info/releases/tag/7
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40606-grapheneos-info-app-versio…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 151.0.7922.47.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/151.0.7922.47.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40605-vanadium-version-151079224…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
Brad Spengler
@spendergrsec
434 Linux kernel CVEs published today, FYI
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 172 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40515-gmscompatconfig-version-17…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Join Josh from Side Of Burritos and our Community Manager spring-onion in a live conversation about everything GrapheneOS on July 20th!
PDT - 10:00 / 10:00 AM
EDT - 13:00 / 1:00 PM
UTC - 17:00 / 5:00 PM
BST - 18:00 / 6:00 PM
CEST - 19:00 / 7:00 PM
AEST - 03:00 / 03:00 AM / July 21st
To accommodate for different preferences the stream will be available simultaneously on both YouTube and a self-hosted instance of Owncast. Additionally, we will also be watching for your questions and comments in the media channels within our Discord and Matrix chats.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=56-DCAHU29Y
sideofburritos.com/live/
grapheneos.org/contact -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 151.0.7922.29.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/151.0.7922.29.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40463-vanadium-version-151079222…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
V-Key's libraries depend on private APIs and implementation details. This causes compatibility issues with new Android releases, OEM changes and GrapheneOS security protections. We're now aware of it and worked around the known compatibility issues. However, they need to start fixing it themselves.
We already have a notification for apps using the Play Integrity API and can start detecting these libraries consistently causing compatibility issues to warn users about it. These notifications can have a shortcut for leaving a Play Store review for users with the sandboxed Play Store installed. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026071500 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40416-grapheneos-version-2026071…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Dumb phones use plenty of applications. Outdated software and hardware without modern functionality includes lack of modern privacy and security protections. Those lack important security patches and protections along with only supporting insecure calls/texts through a carrier.
-
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS phones are far more secure computers than any traditional laptop or desktop.
Dumb phones force using non-private carrier-based calls/texts and are entirely dependent on cellular connections. Dumb phones also nearly always lack basic security updates and protections.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Dumb phones use plenty of applications. Outdated software and hardware without modern functionality includes lack of modern privacy and security protections. Those lack important security patches and protections along with only supporting insecure calls/texts through a carrier.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS phones are far more secure computers than any traditional laptop or desktop.
Dumb phones force using non-private carrier-based calls/texts and are entirely dependent on cellular connections. Dumb phones also nearly always lack basic security updates and protections. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our users are reporting the Chase banking app is banning using GrapheneOS but permits it when a VPN is enabled and set to another country:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40289-chase-app-error-on-latest-…
We're aware of this compatibility issue with several apps and are actively working on improvements to resolve it.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We found one anti-tampering SDK was crashing due to being incompatible with secure (exec-based) spawning and therefore permitting having any OS. By fixing compatibility with it, we enabled it to detect and ban GrapheneOS. We'll fix that too. Banking app code is ultra low quality.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've resolved the new compatibility issues with anti-tampering code in banking apps. We're in the process of making a new release with the workarounds. We posted a new thread about it:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We solved the recent regression in compatibility with a small subset of banking apps. It was caused by a Zimperium anti-tampering SDK checking the Linux kernel mount ID for /system/framework/framework.jar and banning it being above 900. Our new secure spawning was tripping it.
Our new secure spawning implementations runs the same code run by the Zygote after exec to improve compatibility. Many apps which didn't work before are now compatible. However, that tripped this mount ID check by recreating a mount namespace. It doesn't need that part so we've simply removed it.
Our new secure spawning also added a per-app toggle. Alongside this, we made is possible to disable secure spawning and hardened_malloc at the same time. This requires an extra zygote with hardened_malloc disabled which we spawned on-demand. It has to be spawned at boot instead for low mount IDs.
Our new secure spawning implementation has better app compatibility. This made it possible for the V-KEY V-OS Mobile App Protection anti-tampering SDK to run instead of crashing and it began blocking GrapheneOS. We've solved this problem by simply blocking their code from running for the time being.
Our new secure spawning improved overall app compatibility despite these 2 anti-tampering SDKs causing new issues with it. We've solved the regressiond and are currently building a new release with the improvements. It will be available in around 12 hours. App compatibility will be better than ever. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We solved the recent regression in compatibility with a small subset of banking apps. It was caused by a Zimperium anti-tampering SDK checking the Linux kernel mount ID for /system/framework/framework.jar and banning it being above 900. Our new secure spawning was tripping it.
Our new secure spawning implementations runs the same code run by the Zygote after exec to improve compatibility. Many apps which didn't work before are now compatible. However, that tripped this mount ID check by recreating a mount namespace. It doesn't need that part so we've simply removed it.
Our new secure spawning also added a per-app toggle. Alongside this, we made is possible to disable secure spawning and hardened_malloc at the same time. This requires an extra zygote with hardened_malloc disabled which we spawned on-demand. It has to be spawned at boot instead for low mount IDs.
Our new secure spawning implementation has better app compatibility. This made it possible for the V-KEY V-OS Mobile App Protection anti-tampering SDK to run instead of crashing and it began blocking GrapheneOS. We've solved this problem by simply blocking their code from running for the time being.
Our new secure spawning improved overall app compatibility despite these 2 anti-tampering SDKs causing new issues with it. We've solved the regressiond and are currently building a new release with the improvements. It will be available in around 12 hours. App compatibility will be better than ever.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You can see the relevant changes here:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_frameworks_base/pull/410
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_core/pull/43 -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 150.0.7871.124.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/150.0.7871.124.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40347-vanadium-version-150078711…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
Ellie Winters
@N104AP
google needs to realise that hiding patches wont do shit, its not going to hide it from ai models or anyone else, the priority needs to be getting patches out to everyone asap, and even if that means daily updates so be it
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android's security policy for the past several years has been to backport patches for Critical and High severity Android vulnerabilities to the past 3 major yearly releases. Moderate and Low severity patches including most fixes for privacy weaknesses have required upgrading to the latest releases.
Google recently informed OEMs of greatly reduced security support for older releases of Android. For the vast majority of discovered vulnerabilities, only Critical severity issues deemed to be an imminent risk will be backported at all and only to the most recent 2 major yearly releases (16 and 17).
Externally reported vulnerabilities will currently still follow the same policy for backports as before. High and Critical severity vulnerabilities reported to Google by external parties will be backported to releases going back around 3 years (currently 14, 15, 16 and the current latest stable 17).
Android Security Bulletins already omit Moderate and Low severity patches. They're already dated 2-4 months after the vulnerabilities were disclosed to OEMs and allowed to be shipped. Only Samsung flagships and Pixels ship any of it 'early' on practice. Only GrapheneOS ships the full set 'early'.
The vast majority of vulnerabilities are now being discovered internally by Google for Android and Chrome. These are largely being discovered with AI. The subset deemed Critical severity and an imminent risk will be backported to 16 and 17. Bare minimum security support for older releases is over.
Bare minimum Android security patches now require being on Android 16, 16 QPR2 or 17 and quickly moving to Android 18 when it's released. Once Android 18 is released, it will be the only release with current High and Critical severity patches. Serious support for older Android releases has ended.
Android 17 is the only Android release with the current set of disclosed Moderate and Low severity patches. Android 16, 16 QPR2 and 17 will soon be the only releases with the current set of disclosed Critical and High severity patches too. Once Android 18 is released, it will be the only one.
Vast majority of Linux kernel vulnerabilities aren't covered by Android Security Bulletins, externally disclosed patches are backported very slowly and Android Security Bulletins come 2-4 months later than when Android patches can be shipped. If you want bare minimum patches, use iOS or GrapheneOS.
We're going to need to do a lot of work with Motorola and Qualcomm to provide serious patches for GrapheneOS devices. We're going to need more developers. After the launch of the new devices with GrapheneOS support, we want to repeatedly port to the latest Linux LTS branch among other major changes.
Google is completely overwhelmed by the massive torrent of vulnerabilities discovered by AI models. They've done repeated cycles of layoffs and buyouts crippling their ability to handle it. The change to the schedule for Android Security Bulletins is also extremely at odds with this new reality.
Google switched to a performative Android Security Bulletin system with vulnerabilities listed 2-4 months after they're shipped. They're pretending as if not open sourcing patches protects people from OEMs not patching them. Our community has people successfully reverse engineering binary patches.
Google needs to start open sourcing QPR1 and QPR3 releases again along with open sourcing security preview patches shortly after disclosure to OEMs. Otherwise, we'll just hire people to start doing reverse engineering work in an official capacity to start publishing the changes as open source early. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android's security policy for the past several years has been to backport patches for Critical and High severity Android vulnerabilities to the past 3 major yearly releases. Moderate and Low severity patches including most fixes for privacy weaknesses have required upgrading to the latest releases.
Google recently informed OEMs of greatly reduced security support for older releases of Android. For the vast majority of discovered vulnerabilities, only Critical severity issues deemed to be an imminent risk will be backported at all and only to the most recent 2 major yearly releases (16 and 17).
Externally reported vulnerabilities will currently still follow the same policy for backports as before. High and Critical severity vulnerabilities reported to Google by external parties will be backported to releases going back around 3 years (currently 14, 15, 16 and the current latest stable 17).
Android Security Bulletins already omit Moderate and Low severity patches. They're already dated 2-4 months after the vulnerabilities were disclosed to OEMs and allowed to be shipped. Only Samsung flagships and Pixels ship any of it 'early' on practice. Only GrapheneOS ships the full set 'early'.
The vast majority of vulnerabilities are now being discovered internally by Google for Android and Chrome. These are largely being discovered with AI. The subset deemed Critical severity and an imminent risk will be backported to 16 and 17. Bare minimum security support for older releases is over.
Bare minimum Android security patches now require being on Android 16, 16 QPR2 or 17 and quickly moving to Android 18 when it's released. Once Android 18 is released, it will be the only release with current High and Critical severity patches. Serious support for older Android releases has ended.
Android 17 is the only Android release with the current set of disclosed Moderate and Low severity patches. Android 16, 16 QPR2 and 17 will soon be the only releases with the current set of disclosed Critical and High severity patches too. Once Android 18 is released, it will be the only one.
Vast majority of Linux kernel vulnerabilities aren't covered by Android Security Bulletins, externally disclosed patches are backported very slowly and Android Security Bulletins come 2-4 months later than when Android patches can be shipped. If you want bare minimum patches, use iOS or GrapheneOS.
We're going to need to do a lot of work with Motorola and Qualcomm to provide serious patches for GrapheneOS devices. We're going to need more developers. After the launch of the new devices with GrapheneOS support, we want to repeatedly port to the latest Linux LTS branch among other major changes.
Google is completely overwhelmed by the massive torrent of vulnerabilities discovered by AI models. They've done repeated cycles of layoffs and buyouts crippling their ability to handle it. The change to the schedule for Android Security Bulletins is also extremely at odds with this new reality.
Google switched to a performative Android Security Bulletin system with vulnerabilities listed 2-4 months after they're shipped. They're pretending as if not open sourcing patches protects people from OEMs not patching them. Our community has people successfully reverse engineering binary patches.
Google needs to start open sourcing QPR1 and QPR3 releases again along with open sourcing security preview patches shortly after disclosure to OEMs. Otherwise, we'll just hire people to start doing reverse engineering work in an official capacity to start publishing the changes as open source early. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android's security policy for the past several years has been to backport patches for Critical and High severity Android vulnerabilities to the past 3 major yearly releases. Moderate and Low severity patches including most fixes for privacy weaknesses have required upgrading to the latest releases.
Google recently informed OEMs of greatly reduced security support for older releases of Android. For the vast majority of discovered vulnerabilities, only Critical severity issues deemed to be an imminent risk will be backported at all and only to the most recent 2 major yearly releases (16 and 17).
Externally reported vulnerabilities will currently still follow the same policy for backports as before. High and Critical severity vulnerabilities reported to Google by external parties will be backported to releases going back around 3 years (currently 14, 15, 16 and the current latest stable 17).
Android Security Bulletins already omit Moderate and Low severity patches. They're already dated 2-4 months after the vulnerabilities were disclosed to OEMs and allowed to be shipped. Only Samsung flagships and Pixels ship any of it 'early' on practice. Only GrapheneOS ships the full set 'early'.
The vast majority of vulnerabilities are now being discovered internally by Google for Android and Chrome. These are largely being discovered with AI. The subset deemed Critical severity and an imminent risk will be backported to 16 and 17. Bare minimum security support for older releases is over.
Bare minimum Android security patches now require being on Android 16, 16 QPR2 or 17 and quickly moving to Android 18 when it's released. Once Android 18 is released, it will be the only release with current High and Critical severity patches. Serious support for older Android releases has ended.
Android 17 is the only Android release with the current set of disclosed Moderate and Low severity patches. Android 16, 16 QPR2 and 17 will soon be the only releases with the current set of disclosed Critical and High severity patches too. Once Android 18 is released, it will be the only one.
Vast majority of Linux kernel vulnerabilities aren't covered by Android Security Bulletins, externally disclosed patches are backported very slowly and Android Security Bulletins come 2-4 months later than when Android patches can be shipped. If you want bare minimum patches, use iOS or GrapheneOS.
We're going to need to do a lot of work with Motorola and Qualcomm to provide serious patches for GrapheneOS devices. We're going to need more developers. After the launch of the new devices with GrapheneOS support, we want to repeatedly port to the latest Linux LTS branch among other major changes.
Google is completely overwhelmed by the massive torrent of vulnerabilities discovered by AI models. They've done repeated cycles of layoffs and buyouts crippling their ability to handle it. The change to the schedule for Android Security Bulletins is also extremely at odds with this new reality.
Google switched to a performative Android Security Bulletin system with vulnerabilities listed 2-4 months after they're shipped. They're pretending as if not open sourcing patches protects people from OEMs not patching them. Our community has people successfully reverse engineering binary patches.
Google needs to start open sourcing QPR1 and QPR3 releases again along with open sourcing security preview patches shortly after disclosure to OEMs. Otherwise, we'll just hire people to start doing reverse engineering work in an official capacity to start publishing the changes as open source early. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026071100 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/39301-grapheneos-version-2026071…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ is a highly problematic fork of LineageOS very poor privacy and atrocious security. People would be far better off using standard LineageOS one of the better supported devices. An iPhone is far more private and drastically more secure than Murena products.
/e/ lacks crucial standard privacy and security patches. It has many months and even years of delays to provide those. Nearly all the devices they support lack most Linux kernel, driver and firmware updates. They don't keep up with those for any devices. They don't keep up with Android, Chromium or Linux security updates anywhere either. Many severe patched privacy and security vulnerabilities are left wide open for months and even years with /e/. They heavily mislead their users about what's patched and how long they take to ship it.
/e/ also doesn't provide important standard privacy or security protections. It lags years behind on providing the current generation protections and disables many of the most important ones. An operating system failing to protect against known privacy weaknesses does not have reasonable privacy.
/e/ includes their own privacy invasive services and sends user data to third party including OpenAI without consent. Despite how it's marketed, it includes many Google services with privileged integration into the OS. They have their own privacy invasive services including user tracking with unique identifiers in their update client.
Their own supposed privacy features are incredibly flawed and do not provide what they claim. A small list of blocked domains omitting everything used for useful functionality does not stop tracking by apps or services. It leaves the most privacy invasive behavior of apps and services intact and is trivially bypassed in multiple ways even for what it does cover. Apps and services only need to use the same domains for functionality as tracking to avoid it which is already largely what they do. Apps and services also already widely deploy bypasses for this naive domain-based filtering even for domains dedicated to tracking. /e/ would have you believe that a DNS blocklist is a game changing approach. There are better implementations including RethinkDNS available for use elsewhere.
More information:
community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using-open…
codeberg.org/divested-mobile/divestos-website/raw/commit/…
eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p…
/e/ and their for-profit company Murena have repeatedly pushed anti-privacy talking points from authoritarians claiming devices with strong privacy and security are for criminals and pedophiles. Here are 2 examples where Gaël Duval says that himself about privacy/security hardened devices in general:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142
www.clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-interview.html
/e/ and Murena many of the same anti-privacy talking points as France's current government and national law enforcement. They've aligned themselves with authoritarians in the country where they're based instead of opposing it. There are dozens of examples where they falsely claim GrapheneOS are mainly useful to criminals and mainly used by criminals. That's more extreme than the claims by France's national law enforcement cracking down on secure devices. They've gone so far to align themselves with anti-privacy authoritarians that they're ahead of them.
Murena is a for-profit company with the founders and owners of it being the same people who run /e/. /e/ includes for-profit paid Murena services and is built for Murena to sell devices with it. Despite being made for profit, /e/ receives millions of euros in government funding from governments which have spent years cracking down on legitimate privacy products:
> The European Union has subsidized us to the tune of several million for this project.
www.projets-libres.org/en/podcast/e-os-a-degoogled-androi…
/e/ makes it far easier to remotely take over devices, violate user privacy from apps and bypass encryption to extract all the data from a device. These are exactly the kinds of devices authoritarians opposed to privacy and security want people to be using. These devices are much less private and drastically less secure than iPhones but are duping people into paying them for it with false marketing. They're regressing privacy and security instead of advancing it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ is a highly problematic fork of LineageOS very poor privacy and atrocious security. People would be far better off using standard LineageOS one of the better supported devices. An iPhone is far more private and drastically more secure than Murena products.
/e/ lacks crucial standard privacy and security patches. It has many months and even years of delays to provide those. Nearly all the devices they support lack most Linux kernel, driver and firmware updates. They don't keep up with those for any devices. They don't keep up with Android, Chromium or Linux security updates anywhere either. Many severe patched privacy and security vulnerabilities are left wide open for months and even years with /e/. They heavily mislead their users about what's patched and how long they take to ship it.
/e/ also doesn't provide important standard privacy or security protections. It lags years behind on providing the current generation protections and disables many of the most important ones. An operating system failing to protect against known privacy weaknesses does not have reasonable privacy.
/e/ includes their own privacy invasive services and sends user data to third party including OpenAI without consent. Despite how it's marketed, it includes many Google services with privileged integration into the OS. They have their own privacy invasive services including user tracking with unique identifiers in their update client.
Their own supposed privacy features are incredibly flawed and do not provide what they claim. A small list of blocked domains omitting everything used for useful functionality does not stop tracking by apps or services. It leaves the most privacy invasive behavior of apps and services intact and is trivially bypassed in multiple ways even for what it does cover. Apps and services only need to use the same domains for functionality as tracking to avoid it which is already largely what they do. Apps and services also already widely deploy bypasses for this naive domain-based filtering even for domains dedicated to tracking. /e/ would have you believe that a DNS blocklist is a game changing approach. There are better implementations including RethinkDNS available for use elsewhere.
More information:
community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using-open…
codeberg.org/divested-mobile/divestos-website/raw/commit/…
eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p…
/e/ and their for-profit company Murena have repeatedly pushed anti-privacy talking points from authoritarians claiming devices with strong privacy and security are for criminals and pedophiles. Here are 2 examples where Gaël Duval says that himself about privacy/security hardened devices in general:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2040887784253141142
www.clubic.com/actualite-604786-murena-e-os-interview.html
/e/ and Murena many of the same anti-privacy talking points as France's current government and national law enforcement. They've aligned themselves with authoritarians in the country where they're based instead of opposing it. There are dozens of examples where they falsely claim GrapheneOS are mainly useful to criminals and mainly used by criminals. That's more extreme than the claims by France's national law enforcement cracking down on secure devices. They've gone so far to align themselves with anti-privacy authoritarians that they're ahead of them.
Murena is a for-profit company with the founders and owners of it being the same people who run /e/. /e/ includes for-profit paid Murena services and is built for Murena to sell devices with it. Despite being made for profit, /e/ receives millions of euros in government funding from governments which have spent years cracking down on legitimate privacy products:
> The European Union has subsidized us to the tune of several million for this project.
www.projets-libres.org/en/podcast/e-os-a-degoogled-androi…
/e/ makes it far easier to remotely take over devices, violate user privacy from apps and bypass encryption to extract all the data from a device. These are exactly the kinds of devices authoritarians opposed to privacy and security want people to be using. These devices are much less private and drastically less secure than iPhones but are duping people into paying them for it with false marketing. They're regressing privacy and security instead of advancing it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 150.0.7871.114.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/150.0.7871.114.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/37990-vanadium-version-150078711…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Secure PDF Viewer app version 32 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases/tag/32
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/37983-secure-pdf-viewer-app-vers…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #pdf #android -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> Maybe it would be better to start supporting other devices than google things.
GrapheneOS requires hardware providing standard security protections and driver/firmware updates. Most non-iPhone smartphone hardware doesn't provide reasonable security. Pixels are still the only available option with both reasonable security and proper support for another OS.
GrapheneOS has an official partnership with Motorola Mobility where they're improving their next gen devices to meet our requirements. Those will provide official GrapheneOS support.
> Buying Jolla phone don't fuel their pockets at least
It fuels a company selling phony privacy products and attacking actual privacy projects with false claims to promote those.
Google isn't the only company with privacy unfriendly services. Nearly all non-Apple devices are from companies with much worse privacy than Google. Other companies not receiving the same attention for their violations of user privacy doesn't mean they're doing better. Privacy doesn't mean specifically avoiding Google services.
Jolla brands their products as private while shipping devices with drastically worse privacy protections than iOS or AOSP along with not having anything close to current privacy/security patches. They also don't avoid having invasive services built into the OS. iPhones have far better privacy and drastically better security than Jolla's products. It's a night and day difference.
> BTW, how is Calyx Institute dispute going?
The founder and leader of Calyx who engaged in repeated attacks on GrapheneOS was forced out of the organization after abusing his position. He's no longer part of it. All of the CalyxOS core developers left the project and organization. Most of the people who still work at Calyx weren't involved in the attacks on us. It's not the same group of people.
CalyxOS went a whole year without receiving updates. It recently relaunched with a new development team as a heavily LineageOS based OS. There's no direct upgrade path from the previous OS to the new one.
CalyxOS wasn't ever a privacy or security hardened OS and still isn't one. It was never in the same space as GrapheneOS despite common misconceptions and misleading marketing. The new CalyxOS doesn't have the same team and is a significantly different codebase. The group which was attacking us isn't the group developing the new OS with the same name. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
SailfishOS combines the insecurity of desktop operating systems with the problems of low-end Android devices. It doesn't provide anything close to competitive privacy or security with iOS or the Android Open Source Project (AOSP).
Jolla's Android app compatibility layer destroys the privacy and security model of Android, leaving apps without basic sandboxing and exposing far more kernel attack surface to those. It's not only running the apps on top of a much less private and secure host OS but also throwing away most of Android's privacy and security protections too.
Jolla's hardware has atrocious security combining low security components lacking important hardware-based security protections with lack of firmware security updates. It's absolutely not the most privacy friendly phone on the market. It's awful hardware for privacy and security.
Unlike AOSP, SailfishOS isn't open source. A large portion of the OS including the user interface is closed source. It isn't possible for others to make a fork of the OS without a commercial partnership.
Marketing SailfishOS and Jolla with the European Union flag is a poor fit. Jolla developed SailfishOS in close partnership with the Russian government. A large portion of the OS was written by Russia's government and it has a fork called Aurora OS despite it not being possible for others to do the same. Jolla claims to have gotten rid of the Russian state ownership and ended ties with them in 2023. However, it still has the same management who entered into a close partnership. They did it for marketing reasons and nothing prevents them from restoring those ties in the future.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> Maybe it would be better to start supporting other devices than google things.
GrapheneOS requires hardware providing standard security protections and driver/firmware updates. Most non-iPhone smartphone hardware doesn't provide reasonable security. Pixels are still the only available option with both reasonable security and proper support for another OS.
GrapheneOS has an official partnership with Motorola Mobility where they're improving their next gen devices to meet our requirements. Those will provide official GrapheneOS support.
> Buying Jolla phone don't fuel their pockets at least
It fuels a company selling phony privacy products and attacking actual privacy projects with false claims to promote those.
Google isn't the only company with privacy unfriendly services. Nearly all non-Apple devices are from companies with much worse privacy than Google. Other companies not receiving the same attention for their violations of user privacy doesn't mean they're doing better. Privacy doesn't mean specifically avoiding Google services.
Jolla brands their products as private while shipping devices with drastically worse privacy protections than iOS or AOSP along with not having anything close to current privacy/security patches. They also don't avoid having invasive services built into the OS. iPhones have far better privacy and drastically better security than Jolla's products. It's a night and day difference.
> BTW, how is Calyx Institute dispute going?
The founder and leader of Calyx who engaged in repeated attacks on GrapheneOS was forced out of the organization after abusing his position. He's no longer part of it. All of the CalyxOS core developers left the project and organization. Most of the people who still work at Calyx weren't involved in the attacks on us. It's not the same group of people.
CalyxOS went a whole year without receiving updates. It recently relaunched with a new development team as a heavily LineageOS based OS. There's no direct upgrade path from the previous OS to the new one.
CalyxOS wasn't ever a privacy or security hardened OS and still isn't one. It was never in the same space as GrapheneOS despite common misconceptions and misleading marketing. The new CalyxOS doesn't have the same team and is a significantly different codebase. The group which was attacking us isn't the group developing the new OS with the same name. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
SailfishOS combines the insecurity of desktop operating systems with the problems of low-end Android devices. It doesn't provide anything close to competitive privacy or security with iOS or the Android Open Source Project (AOSP).
Jolla's Android app compatibility layer destroys the privacy and security model of Android, leaving apps without basic sandboxing and exposing far more kernel attack surface to those. It's not only running the apps on top of a much less private and secure host OS but also throwing away most of Android's privacy and security protections too.
Jolla's hardware has atrocious security combining low security components lacking important hardware-based security protections with lack of firmware security updates. It's absolutely not the most privacy friendly phone on the market. It's awful hardware for privacy and security.
Unlike AOSP, SailfishOS isn't open source. A large portion of the OS including the user interface is closed source. It isn't possible for others to make a fork of the OS without a commercial partnership.
Marketing SailfishOS and Jolla with the European Union flag is a poor fit. Jolla developed SailfishOS in close partnership with the Russian government. A large portion of the OS was written by Russia's government and it has a fork called Aurora OS despite it not being possible for others to do the same. Jolla claims to have gotten rid of the Russian state ownership and ended ties with them in 2023. However, it still has the same management who entered into a close partnership. They did it for marketing reasons and nothing prevents them from restoring those ties in the future. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026070500 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/37871-grapheneos-version-2026070…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 150.0.7871.63.1 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/150.0.7871.63.1
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/37692-vanadium-version-150078716…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 150.0.7871.63.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/150.0.7871.63.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/37454-vanadium-version-150078716…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026062800 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/37214-grapheneos-version-2026062…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS opposes authoritarianism. It's a core part of why we're building privacy technology as part of a non-profit open source project. We're opposed to it regardless of whether it comes from left, center or right. The flood of people lying about what we believe and have said won't change this.
Our beliefs are not defined by what people who use GrapheneOS or donate to it believe. We decide what's acceptable within our community and we do a lot of moderation. We don't police what's done fully outside it. We clearly won't only have users, donors and supporters with beliefs aligned with ours.
We don't usually allow much political discussion in our community unless it's directly related to GrapheneOS. Today has been a very good demonstration of why that's the case. Many people are unable to tolerate even a minor disagreement on semantics without being absolutely enraged over it. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS update downloads are usually around 20MB to 80MB when updating from a recent release. The download for updating from our final Android 16 QPR2 release to Android 17 ranges from 620MB to 760MB depending on device model. We're in the process of rolling it out to the Stable channel now.
Current bandwidth usage with 2026062300 in Stable for only 9th and 10th gen Pixels:
Frankfurt: 12Gbps out of 50Gbps
Amsterdam: 6Gbps out of 20Gbps
Toronto: 6Gbps out of 10Gbps
Los Angeles: 6Gbps out of 10Gbps
London: 4Gbps out of 10Gbps
Dallas: 2.5Gbps out of 50Gbps
Miami: 2Gbps out of 10Gbps
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
2026062300 is now available in Stable for all of the supported devices. Bandwidth usage in Frankfurt is now at 20Gbps and the other locations have also increased a similar proportion. We'll need more update servers within a year or two but we have enough to avoid staggering the largest updates.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our update servers are sponsored by Mullvad, ReliableSite, Cherry Servers, Zare and Xenyth. You can see those here:
grapheneos.org/articles/grapheneos-servers
The screenshot shows bandwidth usage for Frankfurt with staggered rollout to 10th gen, then 9th, then 8th and finally 7th+6th together. -
GrapheneOS reposted
Alexandro Sanchez
@AlexAltea
Just filed an EU DMA complaint against Alphabet for gatekeeping against secure Android derivatives like @GrapheneOS via Play Integrity.
TL;DR: not certified ≠ not secure. Google lacks a FRAND certification process for non-OEMs that comply with objective security requirements. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Download Manager is an Android component handling long-term HTTP(S) downloads for apps in the background. Apps with the INTERNET permission (GrapheneOS Network toggle) can offload their downloads to it. Download Manager doesn't trigger any connections itself.
developer.android.com/reference/android/app/DownloadManager
Unlike regular apps with a unique uid/gid, DownloadManager shares a UID with several other OS media components. Components with a shared UID have shared permission toggles, data usage statistics, etc. Apps attributing connections to apps based on UID often attribute it to another app in the group.
Chromium uses Android's DownloadManager for a bunch of functionality including user downloads, saving and updating offline pages. Search the Chromium sources for DownloadManager to get an overview. DownloadManagerService is a Chromium service implemented on top of Android's DownloadManager.
By default, apps are limited in how much they can run in the background. Users can change the default Optimized to Restricted to delay tasks apps want to run in the background to the next time the app is started including being started by another app. Apps can run for a little bit after being run.
Download Manager exists to provide a way for apps to trigger a download for a large file while running and then get woken up when it completes. It avoids the app needing to continuously run to perform the download, which would require a foreground service to keep running when user switches away.
MTP Host and several other media components share a UID with Download Manager. Connection monitoring software attributing connections to those is incorrect and doesn't correctly handle shared UID apps. RethinkDNS properly attributes it to the UID group instead of picking an arbitrary app to blame.
DownloadManager is used by the OS, Vanadium and many user installed apps. The connections don't come from DownloadManager or the other media components such as MTP Host. Downloads can be set to require charging or idle, causing those to trigger it:
developer.android.com/reference/kotlin/android/app/Downlo…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android 16 added certificate transparency enforcement for apps. It checks Signed Certificate Timestamps proving certificates were logged in at least 2 logs for certificates with <= 180 day expiry or 3 logs for > 180 day. It was opt-in for targeting Android 16 but is opt-out for targeting Android 17.
Some users have reported seeing a connection to www.gstatic.com when the device starts charging which is due to certificate transparency logs being fetched. We've been planning to review certificate transparency log updates for a while but hadn't gotten to it yet. We'll have our own approach soon. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
AppCompatConfig version 7 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_AppCompatCon…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36776-appcompatconfig-version-7-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 149.0.7827.197.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/149.0.7827.197.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36770-vanadium-version-149078271…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026062300 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36765-grapheneos-version-2026062…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Hyundai and Kia added official GrapheneOS support to their apps months before Volkswagen banned GrapheneOS:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31697-myhyundai-app-has-official…
Pressure from Volkswagen customers on them can achieve the same thing. There's no legitimate reason to ban GrapheneOS so they'll undo it with pressure.
Leave a 1 star review for Volkswagen's apps on the Play Store asking them to stop banning GrapheneOS. Explain it's a far more secure operating system and fully possible for them to verify the hardware, OS and their app on it if they insist on doing it. It's far more secure than anything they allow.
Google has misled companies about what the Play Integrity API provides. It doesn't genuinely enforce having a secure device or legitimate app, it only pretends to. It leaves huge security holes open. It enforces Google's business interests and bans having a reasonably secure device with GrapheneOS.
Most companies are unlikely to stop using the Play Integrity API but most are willing to start permitting GrapheneOS via hardware attestation with enough pressure.
In addition to every user of their app on GrapheneOS leaving a 1 star review on the Play Store, multiple other steps can be taken too.
Every GrapheneOS user with one of their cars using the app should file a customer support request. Keep answering them and countering the template responses. Escalate the request higher up. Tell them you want money back for the vehicle due to reduced functionality after the fact and insist on it.
They can trivially stop enforcing the anti-security and anti-competitive Play Integrity API or easily add hardware-based verification of GrapheneOS. Link to grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide in the customer support request, but don't add any links to Play Store reviews to avoid filtering.
A bunch of apps have added explicit support for GrapheneOS due to pressure from our users. Our userbase is rapidly growing and we'll gain the ability to apply massive pressure to companies doing this. We plan to ship a feature for our Info app for people to opt-in to getting asked for their help.
GrapheneOS is production quality OS from a non-profit paying around 15 people to work on it. It's far more secure than anything supported by the Play Integrity API. We have an official partnership with Motorola and we'll have more. Just counter template responses and insist on compensation or a fix. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google shipped an out-of-band update to droidguard breaking using RCS with sandboxed Google Play. We've already fixed it and it will be included in the OS release we're making later today (2026062300). That will likely be our first Android 17 to reach our Stable channel.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_frameworks_base/pull/385
Our 2026062200 release is currently available in our Alpha channel and will likely be available in our Beta channel soon. It may be solid enough to reach our Stable channel but it won't have the opportunity to get there since our 2026062300 release will replace it once it's built, signed and tested.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google heavily criticized Apple for their closed iMessage ecosystem and initial refusal to implement RCS. Apple then took ages to provide end-to-end encryption support for RCS and it was kept as an iMessage exclusive feature until recently. Google is doing the same kind of thing as Apple with RCS.
RCS isn't truly an open standard or open ecosystem. It isn't open to anyone making a client working with any carriers which can interoperate with the Apple and Google implementations. Google does device integrity checks which supposedly exist to combat spam without testing it works on GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Resolving most of Google's anti-competitive behavior with Android would be straightforward for regulators: ban the Google Mobile Services licensing model and require Google to make their apps and services work on any AOSP-based OS without privacy invasive access and massive control over the OS.
Android was successful due to being open source and an open platform. Google chose that approach to catch up and get near universal adoption by OEMs and carriers. They've gradually phased in illegal anti-competitive practices making it into a bait and switch. They can be forced to roll it all back. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026062200 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36689-grapheneos-version-2026062…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is a hardened OS providing massive privacy and security improvements over the standard Android Open Source Project. None of it depends on obscurity. GrapheneOS becoming more mainstream provides more resources accelerating the pace of privacy and security improvements.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Fairphones lack essential security patches and protections regardless of OS choice. Fairphones lag far behind on privacy and security patches from day one and it gets drastically worse over time. Fairphone 5 and earlier have an end-of-life Linux kernel with no updates planned...
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ lacks bare minimum privacy/security patches and protections along with having many invasive services. Read discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p… for details.
The post has a link to the earlier codeberg.org/divested-mobile/divestos-website/raw/commit/… from Divested Computing with a lot of details and examples of this too. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ and CalyxOS have poor privacy and atrocious security. Neither has essential standard privacy and security patches or protections. Neither is a safe option for general usage. Murena and /e/ regularly claim strong privacy and security are for criminals.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ lacks bare minimum privacy/security patches and protections along with having many invasive services. Read discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p… for details.
The post has a link to the earlier codeberg.org/divested-mobile/divestos-website/raw/commit/… from Divested Computing with a lot of details and examples of this too.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Fairphones lack essential security patches and protections regardless of OS choice. Fairphones lag far behind on privacy and security patches from day one and it gets drastically worse over time. Fairphone 5 and earlier have an end-of-life Linux kernel with no updates planned...
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is a hardened OS providing massive privacy and security improvements over the standard Android Open Source Project. None of it depends on obscurity. GrapheneOS becoming more mainstream provides more resources accelerating the pace of privacy and security improvements.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ and CalyxOS have poor privacy and atrocious security. Neither has essential standard privacy and security patches or protections. Neither is a safe option for general usage. Murena and /e/ regularly claim strong privacy and security are for criminals.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026062100 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36627-grapheneos-version-2026062…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 171 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36593-gmscompatconfig-version-17…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our community is helping us test the initial release of GrapheneOS based on Android 17. It's working very well for most people with very few issues. We've resolved the main regressions reported to us already. We'll start builds for a 2nd public release based on 17 later today after a few more fixes.
The most serious issue we fixed is an upstream memory corruption bug in the Broadcom Wi-Fi driver memory corruption bug for the Pixel 10, 10 Pro, 10 Pro XL and 10 Pro Fold. The invalid memory access is caught by our use of hardware memory tagging which causes a kernel panic instead of allowing it.
We already fixed this Broadcom Wi-Fi bcm4383 memory corruption bug in our 2026050900 release for the Pixel 8a, 9a and 10a. Pixel 6 through 9a share the same kernel source tree which the 10a is based on. Android 17 added the new code with this bug for real 10th gen Pixels which we missed initially.
Android 17 added a unified PIN interface to SystemUI for use outside of the lockscreen. Our PIN scrambling feature now works beyond the lockscreen too. We increase the DevicePolicyManager PIN and password length to 128 but Android's new PIN entry had it hard-wired to 16 which we've resolved now.
We add a feature making system quick tiles require unlocking by default and exclude tiles where it isn't needed which accidentally caused the new flashlight quick tile to require unlocking which is now fixed. Those are the main issues found so far other than minor UI quirks we're working on fixing. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026061800 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36568-grapheneos-version-2026061…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Including a 1GiB randomly generated file would be a production quality fix for the issue by Google's quality control standards. This bug is present in the official release of Android 17 including in the Pixel OS but it's so bloated that it doesn't ever use the normal update path.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
Blue Orkestra
@MadOrkestra
just filling up disk space as a workaround is my kind of humor
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We built an initial release of GrapheneOS based on Android 17 (2026061700) but aren't going to release it through our Alpha channel due to discovering a serious upstream bug. Android 17 broke support for sideloading updates via recovery unless the OS images are large enough to exhaust COW space.
The stock Pixel OS is drastically larger than GrapheneOS due to having a massive amount of additional bundled app code for Google Mobile Services, many other Google apps and various Pixel apps. It's always above the threshold triggering the fallback code path for sideloading OS updates in recovery.
Over-the-air updates from both older versions to Android 17 and Android 17 to Android 17 work fine. It's only sideloading impacted by this. We don't want to release an OS version with broken OS update sideloading so we've cancelled 2026061700 and are building 2026061800 with a workaround for it.
Our current workaround is to force enable the fallback code path triggered by large OS images. This will fix sideloading an Android 17 version of GrapheneOS to another Android 17 version of GrapheneOS. However, sideloading Android 17 updates to older versions won't work without a further workaround.
We've tried making a build with a randomly generated 1GiB file included to make GrapheneOS about as large as the stock Pixel OS which fully works around the issue. We're not actually going to do that but rather we'll use the workaround forcing the fallback path for now and we'll find a proper fix.
Our workaround will provide working sideloading from our initial Android 17 release to a future release. However, it isn't currently possible to sideload from 16 QPR2. We could make an extra 16 QPR2 update for people who only sideload updates with the workaround to use until we make a proper fix.
Google didn't run into this because they add so much bloat to the OS for Google Mobile Services including Google Play services along with a bunch of other Google and Pixel apps. Pixel OS is a lot smaller than the OS on most Android devices but it's drastically larger than AOSP and even GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS uses ahead-of-time compilation for Java/Kotlin code which greatly increases the size of the apps in the OS images. Despite this, it's still drastically smaller than the Pixel OS. It would be substantially larger if we bundled as much code as they do but instead it's the opposite...
Blue Orkestra
@MadOrkestra
just filling up disk space as a workaround is my kind of humor
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Including a 1GiB randomly generated file would be a production quality fix for the issue by Google's quality control standards. This bug is present in the official release of Android 17 including in the Pixel OS but it's so bloated that it doesn't ever use the normal update path.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 149.0.7827.159.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/149.0.7827.159.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36496-vanadium-version-149078271…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026061600 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36483-grapheneos-version-2026061…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Today is the official release day for Android 17. We've already fully ported GrapheneOS to Android 17 and are in the process of pushing the code to our public repositories. We're building a final official release based on Android 16 QPR2 today and we'll do an initial Android 17 release tomorrow.
We've already tested the Android 17 port of GrapheneOS on the Pixel 6a, 7, 7a, 8, 10a, 10 and 10 Pro Fold. It will be possible for people to start building and testing it themselves later today once we finish pushing the code. We'll start the process of public testing for official releases tomorrow.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
To clarify the 2nd paragraph, we've ported GrapheneOS to Android 17 for all of the supported devices. That's a list of the devices we already built and tested it. Our initial public release will be available for all the supported devices and we'll have tested it on each by then.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Speech Services version 3 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/SpeechServices/releases/tag/3
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36408-grapheneos-speech-services…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Mike Kuketz has never had any role in the GrapheneOS project. He certainly isn't a GrapheneOS developer. He uses GrapheneOS and has a widely known privacy blog and community where he has written about it. That doesn't somehow make him part of GrapheneOS.
Lain on the Blockchain
@CryptoCyberia
Drama strikes Graphene OS developer Mike Kuketz, as it is revealed a server he operation was logging all user data.
This could be overblown drama, to be honest, but I figured I'd get some eyes on it.
mastodon.social/@bongo20201/116742073362454225Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our forum at discuss.grapheneos.org is hosted with Flarum rather than Discourse. Neither is written in a language we would have chosen and we would have done things differently. We prefer Flarum over Discourse though and have made small changes to improve privacy and security.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum software needs IP addresses to protect against spammers. We use StopForumSpam's database to block spammers from registering. For privacy reasons, we download IP blocklists instead of querying their API and they made a special setup for us to get more than hourly updates.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 149.0.7827.114.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/149.0.7827.114.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36329-vanadium-version-149078271…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 170 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36251-gmscompatconfig-version-17…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Purism's devices have Intel ME and don't attempt to break it anymore. Purism spent years portraying it as a backdoor and claiming they were stopping it. Purism switched to leaving ME fully intact a while ago and their past content claiming to be neutralizing it isn't applicable.
Purism misrepresents their products with closed source hardware and firmware as being open hardware. They mislead people and benefit from uninformed tech media sites spreading it. Their products also have atrocious security far worse than the norm but are marketed as secure.
Purism's approach is avoiding bundling closed source firmware in the OS by having an extra CPU core to load and run it, using much less secure components with firmware stored on a flash chip and using a separate partition for the OS to load it from. They claim this makes it open.
Their devices leave remotely exploitable radio vulnerabilities unpatched and don't address severe CPU vulnerabilities. They choose components lacking proper security updates and protections. They also can't use important standard security protections due to the semantic games.
Your reply history is filled with you using the auto-generated text from a search engine as your main source of information. It's a bottom of the barrel LLM model run with minimal resources. If you're going to place so much trust in LLM output, then at least start paying for access to a decent model instead of using a search engine for it. You shouldn't trust the output regardless but it wouldn't be nearly as ridiculous. -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a massive amount of evidence against your unsubstantiated claims and none to support it. You're trying to convince people not to protect with their privacy and security with a bunch of different unsubstantiated claims and outright fabrications.
x.com/kekzploit/status/2060530978360037487Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
RISC-V is an open instruction set. Most RISC-V hardware is closed source and there isn't an open source RISC-V SoC to use for a smartphone.
Pixels have a RISC-V secure element based on OpenTitan. The SE being RISC-V instead of a fully custom ARM chip doesn't make it more secure.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The account makes a mix of false and unsubstantiated claims to convince people not to improve their privacy and security. Claiming there are backdoors in everything without evidence and in conflict with a lot of actual evidence about exploit capabilities is bad faith tactic.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That's a strange claim coming from an account which was cleared out and repurposed for AI slop propaganda against privacy and security technologies in March 2026.
Here's the first available post discouraging using disk encryption and encrypted messaging:
x.com/kekzploit/status/2033333580005364074
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Second available post continuing to discourage using privacy technologies including private cryptocurrencies and E2EE messaging:
x.com/kekzploit/status/2033543820479173017
Your posts aim to stop people protecting their privacy with illogical claims about backdoors contradicted by actual evidence.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Your account is openly acting in bad faith and posting content you know is untrue. These posts trying to trick people into believing our non-exclusive partnership with Lenovo is with a different company is a great example:
x.com/kekzploit/status/2060530978360037487
It's also clearly AI slop.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Purism's devices have Intel ME and don't attempt to break it anymore. Purism spent years portraying it as a backdoor and claiming they were stopping it. Purism switched to leaving ME fully intact a while ago and their past content claiming to be neutralizing it isn't applicable.
Purism misrepresents their products with closed source hardware and firmware as being open hardware. They mislead people and benefit from uninformed tech media sites spreading it. Their products also have atrocious security far worse than the norm but are marketed as secure.
Purism's approach is avoiding bundling closed source firmware in the OS by having an extra CPU core to load and run it, using much less secure components with firmware stored on a flash chip and using a separate partition for the OS to load it from. They claim this makes it open.
Their devices leave remotely exploitable radio vulnerabilities unpatched and don't address severe CPU vulnerabilities. They choose components lacking proper security updates and protections. They also can't use important standard security protections due to the semantic games.
Your reply history is filled with you using the auto-generated text from a search engine as your main source of information. It's a bottom of the barrel LLM model run with minimal resources. If you're going to place so much trust in LLM output, then at least start paying for access to a decent model instead of using a search engine for it. You shouldn't trust the output regardless but it wouldn't be nearly as ridiculous. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Motorola Mobility was fully split from Motorola Solutions in 2011. Motorola Mobility was subsequently acquired by Google in 2012 and sold to Lenovo in 2014. The companies are entirely separate and aren't sister divisions. You should pay for a better LLM because this is garbage.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Your account is openly acting in bad faith and posting content you know is untrue. These posts trying to trick people into believing our non-exclusive partnership with Lenovo is with a different company is a great example:
x.com/kekzploit/status/2060530978360037487
It's also clearly AI slop. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Second available post continuing to discourage using privacy technologies including private cryptocurrencies and E2EE messaging:
x.com/kekzploit/status/2033543820479173017
Your posts aim to stop people protecting their privacy with illogical claims about backdoors contradicted by actual evidence. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That's a strange claim coming from an account which was cleared out and repurposed for AI slop propaganda against privacy and security technologies in March 2026.
Here's the first available post discouraging using disk encryption and encrypted messaging:
x.com/kekzploit/status/2033333580005364074 -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS needs a partnership with OEMs to get them to improve their hardware, firmware and drivers to meet our security requirements. We need them to provide us with the firmware and drivers in a usable form for GrapheneOS with the updates we need instead of us depending on getting them from their less frequent OS releases. Otherwise, Pixels will remain the only devices meeting our requirements.
Your claims in the post above are objectively false. Motorola Mobility and Motorola Solutions haven't been part of the same company since 2011. We have a non-exclusive partnership with Motorola Mobility (Lenovo) and no form of partnership with Motorola Solutions. It would be a poor attempt at scaring people away from GrapheneOS regardless. Most people want us to support more hardware and will choose what they want from the supported devices.
We want to eventually have devices with better hardware security than Pixels rather than the drastically worse security we'd have with any alternatives today.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Motorola Mobility was fully split from Motorola Solutions in 2011. Motorola Mobility was subsequently acquired by Google in 2012 and sold to Lenovo in 2014. The companies are entirely separate and aren't sister divisions. You should pay for a better LLM because this is garbage.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The account makes a mix of false and unsubstantiated claims to convince people not to improve their privacy and security. Claiming there are backdoors in everything without evidence and in conflict with a lot of actual evidence about exploit capabilities is bad faith tactic.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
RISC-V is an open instruction set. Most RISC-V hardware is closed source and there isn't an open source RISC-V SoC to use for a smartphone.
Pixels have a RISC-V secure element based on OpenTitan. The SE being RISC-V instead of a fully custom ARM chip doesn't make it more secure. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a massive amount of evidence against your unsubstantiated claims and none to support it. You're trying to convince people not to protect with their privacy and security with a bunch of different unsubstantiated claims and outright fabrications.
x.com/kekzploit/status/2060530978360037487 -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google Mobile Services licensing has been found to be illegal in multiple countries including South Korea. The terms are outrageously coercive and monopolistic. Play Integrity API exists to enforce an illegal licensing model to crush competition. It's not a security feature.
-
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> Why? GrapheneOS restricts camera and biometric APIs. A scan that works on stock Android can fail in a loop on GrapheneOS. The repeated failure isn't fraud. It's a technical incompatibility.
GrapheneOS is fully compatible with Android apps using the standard APIs. Apps with memory corruption bugs happening in regular use are usually incompatible with it when the full exploit protections are enabled for user installed apps. However, it can be worked around with the per-app compatibility toggles.
The reason apps like this are sometimes incompatible is because they use the Play Integrity API to ban using an OS / device not certified by Google. Some use similar mechanisms to detect users not using a Google Mobile Services OS. Other than that, all apps are compatible with GrapheneOS in practice.
When apps aren't compatible even with the per-app compatibility mode toggle, it's usually deliberate. We're gradually working around these deliberate incompatibilities from apps trying to detect a non-stock OS. It's getting better but it takes time. We don't have a non-regulatory solution to long term compatibility with services enforcing the Play Integrity API but we can work around what apps do themselves to ban alternatives and are making quick progress.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is complete nonsense. There's nothing illegal about using GrapheneOS and it doesn't do anything interfering with the secure operation of apps and services. It's far more secure than any Google-certified OS. Play Integrity API banning GrapheneOS is an antitrust law violation.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is nothing but lies and misinformation. We haven't said anything of the kind. GrapheneOS fully supports hardware attestation. Play Integrity API banning using GrapheneOS despite it being far more secure and fully supporting hardware-based verification is blatantly illegal.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android was successful due to being open source and an open platform. Google has spent years scaling up illegal coercion of OEMs forcing them to deeply integrate Google apps/services and comply with outrageously illegal anti-competitive requirements in order to have a viable OS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google Mobile Services licensing has been found to be illegal in multiple countries including South Korea. The terms are outrageously coercive and monopolistic. Play Integrity API exists to enforce an illegal licensing model to crush competition. It's not a security feature.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android was successful due to being open source and an open platform. Google has spent years scaling up illegal coercion of OEMs forcing them to deeply integrate Google apps/services and comply with outrageously illegal anti-competitive requirements in order to have a viable OS.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is nothing but lies and misinformation. We haven't said anything of the kind. GrapheneOS fully supports hardware attestation. Play Integrity API banning using GrapheneOS despite it being far more secure and fully supporting hardware-based verification is blatantly illegal.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is complete nonsense. There's nothing illegal about using GrapheneOS and it doesn't do anything interfering with the secure operation of apps and services. It's far more secure than any Google-certified OS. Play Integrity API banning GrapheneOS is an antitrust law violation.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026060600 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36207-grapheneos-version-2026060…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
In April, @mullvadnet provided sponsored DataPacket servers for GrapheneOS in Dallas and Frankfurt which each have 50Gbps peak bandwidth capacity. These now serve a large portion of the updates to GrapheneOS users and add a lot of capacity to our other services including our anycast authoritative DNS.
We also have sponsored servers from ReliableSite, Cherry Servers, Zare and Xenyth. There are a total of 8 sponsored servers where 7 are primarily update mirrors. The update mirror servers also serve our website and network services as a replacement for VPS instances for the locations we have them.
We host 2 anycast networks with our own ASN and IP space in order to self-host anycast DNS servers providing the authoritative DNS resolution for all of our services. Both IPv4 /24 blocks we use for anycast DNS were obtained for free via from ARIN via NRPM 4.10 along with the IPv6 space.
We host 2 anycast networks with our own ASN and IP space in order to self-host anycast DNS servers providing the authoritative DNS resolution for all of our services. Both IPv4 /24 blocks we use for anycast DNS were obtained for free via from ARIN via NRPM 4.10 along with the IPv6 space.
If one of our DNS servers goes down or fully loses connectivity, BGP routing across the internet will quickly adjust to send traffic to the other servers in the network. If a DNS resolver fails to get an answer from one of the anycast DNS networks, it will automatically fall back to the other one.
Our GeoDNS was recently massively improved via @ipinfo sponsoring us with free access to their standard GeoIP database. They use over 1300 probes to scan the internet instead of relying on very inaccurate/incomplete WHOIS/geofeed data. We nearly always use the right server thanks to this database.
We need additional dedicated servers for updates and other services in APAC where bandwidth is more expensive (Singapore, Sydney and Tokyo). We also need another server in North America to go along with our 2nd server from Cherry Servers in Amsterdam used to provide our opt-in geocoding service.
We have enough bandwidth for updates in Europe and North America to handle quite a lot of further userbase growth. We do need additional servers for other things. Several other server providers contacted us with sponsorship offers but we mainly need several APAC servers now which is more costly.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A full list of our public-facing servers is available at grapheneos.org/articles/grapheneos-servers with links to repositories with the per-service configuration. The most interesting parts are BGP communities configuration for our anycast DNS networks and our email server hosted with Postfix/Dovecot/Rspamd.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> Why? GrapheneOS restricts camera and biometric APIs. A scan that works on stock Android can fail in a loop on GrapheneOS. The repeated failure isn't fraud. It's a technical incompatibility.
GrapheneOS is fully compatible with Android apps using the standard APIs. Apps with memory corruption bugs happening in regular use are usually incompatible with it when the full exploit protections are enabled for user installed apps. However, it can be worked around with the per-app compatibility toggles.
The reason apps like this are sometimes incompatible is because they use the Play Integrity API to ban using an OS / device not certified by Google. Some use similar mechanisms to detect users not using a Google Mobile Services OS. Other than that, all apps are compatible with GrapheneOS in practice.
When apps aren't compatible even with the per-app compatibility mode toggle, it's usually deliberate. We're gradually working around these deliberate incompatibilities from apps trying to detect a non-stock OS. It's getting better but it takes time. We don't have a non-regulatory solution to long term compatibility with services enforcing the Play Integrity API but we can work around what apps do themselves to ban alternatives and are making quick progress. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
AppCompatConfig version 6 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_AppCompatCon…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36136-appcompatconfig-version-6-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
AppCompatConfig version 5 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_AppCompatCon…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36102-appcompatconfig-version-5-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 149.0.7827.59.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/149.0.7827.59.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36054-vanadium-version-149078275…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026060100 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36027-grapheneos-version-2026060…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
June 2026 Android Security Bulletin notes CVE-2025-48595 is being exploited in the wild. It's being widely misreported in tech media as a 0-day vulnerability being exploited. That's a major misunderstanding of Android Security Bulletins and how poorly OEMs keep up with patches.
Google disclosed CVE-2025-48595 to OEMs in a security preview release near the end of September 2025. Those patches are allowed to be shipped right away, so it was included in our 2025092501 release. We noted it was already publicly fixed so it was added to our regular releases too in 2025100300.
We quickly shipped the patch after it was disclosed to OEMs by Google but we plan to do better in the future. SQLite 3.44.5 was released with this backport on 2025-07-24. We weren't previously aware SQLite maintained upstream LTS branches for Android but our plan is to closely follow those now.
In this case, Google slipped up and took 2 months to add the patch to the security preview releases. We plan to avoid that in the future by handling this ourselves because this happens too often. It's also a nice example of how Android Security Bulletins are set extremely low expectations for OEMs.
GrapheneOS quickly ships all security preview patches. Every AOSP patch included in the Android Security Bulletins was already available in GrapheneOS for over a month. We end up shipping patches 2-3 months earlier. Google having such low expectations for OEMs and even themselves is ridiculous.
Android's security patch system doesn't make any sense and is completely at odds with how quickly people can discover and exploit vulnerabilities with the help of LLMs. The security preview release system would be far more reasonable if the embargo for sources and details was no more than 48 hours.
Google's embargo system harms security for nearly all Android users by setting the expectation of patches taking 2 to 6 months for OEMs to ship after disclosure. Patches are available to sophisticated attackers as soon as Google discloses them to OEMs. A partial embargo for months makes no sense. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Speech Services version 2 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/SpeechServices/releases/tag/2
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/36001-grapheneos-speech-services…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS won't have any warnings for apps from unverified developers. Google is mainly shooting their own foot with these warnings. It's Google Play Integrity and Apple App Attest severely harming GrapheneOS and other present and future alternatives to the Apple/Google duopoly.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS won't have any warnings for apps from unverified developers. Google is mainly shooting their own foot with these warnings. It's Google Play Integrity and Apple App Attest severely harming GrapheneOS and other present and future alternatives to the Apple/Google duopoly.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 92 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/92
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35939-auditor-app-version-92-rel…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS needs a partnership with OEMs to get them to improve their hardware, firmware and drivers to meet our security requirements. We need them to provide us with the firmware and drivers in a usable form for GrapheneOS with the updates we need instead of us depending on getting them from their less frequent OS releases. Otherwise, Pixels will remain the only devices meeting our requirements.
Your claims in the post above are objectively false. Motorola Mobility and Motorola Solutions haven't been part of the same company since 2011. We have a non-exclusive partnership with Motorola Mobility (Lenovo) and no form of partnership with Motorola Solutions. It would be a poor attempt at scaring people away from GrapheneOS regardless. Most people want us to support more hardware and will choose what they want from the supported devices.
We want to eventually have devices with better hardware security than Pixels rather than the drastically worse security we'd have with any alternatives today. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 149.0.7827.48.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/149.0.7827.48.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35921-vanadium-version-149078274…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
X communities are being shut down on May 30th:
x.com/nikitabier/status/2047147126183137468
GrapheneOS users and supporters using our X community should migrate to our discussion forum at discuss.grapheneos.org and our chat rooms on Matrix/Discord. See grapheneos.org/contact for more details.
Nikita Bier
@nikitabier
We've heard you.
To give sufficient time to migrate: You'll have until May 30th to transition to XChat.
We'll also increase groupchat limits to 500 members tomorrow and aim to reach 1000 in the next couple weeks. This should cover all but a handful of communities on X. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
X communities are being shut down on May 30th:
x.com/nikitabier/status/2047147126183137468
GrapheneOS users and supporters using our X community should migrate to our discussion forum at discuss.grapheneos.org and our chat rooms on Matrix/Discord. See grapheneos.org/contact for more details.
Nikita Bier
@nikitabier
We've heard you.
To give sufficient time to migrate: You'll have until May 30th to transition to XChat.
We'll also increase groupchat limits to 500 members tomorrow and aim to reach 1000 in the next couple weeks. This should cover all but a handful of communities on X. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It doesn't make any sense for a company to add referral codes directing money to an obscure Instagram influencer. The logical explanation based on the initial facts and the response is a developer working for Device Native or a dependency they used slipped it in to get money.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The code was added by a company making functionality bundled by Motorola, likely as a form of insider attack where a developer working for that company included it to direct money to themselves. It wouldn't have been relevant to a GrapheneOS device.
9to5google.com/2026/05/27/motorola-amazon-app-unintended/ -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The code was added by a company making functionality bundled by Motorola, likely as a form of insider attack where a developer working for that company included it to direct money to themselves. It wouldn't have been relevant to a GrapheneOS device.
9to5google.com/2026/05/27/motorola-amazon-app-unintended/
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It doesn't make any sense for a company to add referral codes directing money to an obscure Instagram influencer. The logical explanation based on the initial facts and the response is a developer working for Device Native or a dependency they used slipped it in to get money.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026052400 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35816-grapheneos-version-2026052…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS protects user data on a stolen device with the combination is much stronger exploit protections making it highly unlikely even a sophisticated adversary can get into the device quickly with a locked device auto-reboot timer.
After a GrapheneOS device is locked, it will reboot after 18 hours without a successful unlock which can be configured between 10 minutes and 72 hours. GrapheneOS clears freed memory which results in clearing most memory as part of processes exiting and kernel tasks ending while the OS shuts down for either a shutdown or reboot. GrapheneOS also clears all of the memory at boot. Pixels added memory clearing at boot to the firmware boot modes based on our request so those are covered too.
For a device running non-hardened Android, rebooting won't fully restore Before First Unlock state due to lack of fully clearing memory. Even the most secure non-GrapheneOS devices based on Android still fail to protect against widely available devices for data extraction sold by multiple companies. Turning off the device is crucial for non-hardened Android devices to protect data against an attacker with physical access.
Nearly all Linux-based devices are extremely vulnerable to being exploited while locked via USB. GrapheneOS heavily protects against exploits with hardware memory tagging and other generic exploit protections. GrapheneOS also has specialized USB protection which blocks new USB devices at both a Linux kernel and USB controller after the device is locked along with disabling USB data at a hardware level in the USB controller. There are lots of other attack vectors such as the radios too.
If there's no locked device auto-reboot feature, then an attacker only needs to keep a device charged and unable to connect to a network by blocking the signals. They'll have an indefinite amount of time to come up with a way to exploit it. They can wait around until there are public exploits for a device. Most mobile devices have anti-theft protection preventing using them for anything else without access to the Apple or Google account so it's quite typical for devices to be waiting around for an exploit to at least bypass factory reset protection.
There's the whole separate issue of a large portion of Android devices still not having a secure element throttling attempts at guessing the PIN/password along with not providing support for conveniently using a strong passphrase without biometric-only unlock as GrapheneOS does via the 2nd factor fingerprint PIN feature.
Most aftermarket operating systems including Evolution X and LineageOS which it's based on do not keep basic defenses against data extraction intact let alone greatly improving them. Lack of verified boot means no real exploit is needed to bypass encryption for After First Unlock state making it even more important to turn off the device before it's obtained by an attacker or for them to turn it off themselves. A thief turning off an insecure phone like this is giving you a gift and helping protect your data. Trying to stop them doing that is a bad move. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, this isn't a security feature but rather is the direct opposite and reduces security. It won't prevent theft and won't help people recover a stolen device in practice either. Making it more difficult to return a device to Before First Unlock state directly weakens the security of user data rather than improving it.
A thief can still forcefully trigger a shutdown or reboot by holding the power button. On a device where that triggers a reboot rather than a shutdown, the device can be forced to go into a special mode rather than the OS or can also usually be forcefully powered off afterwards. If devices didn't include a way to force reboot/shutdown then they could get easily stuck with the OS booted if it stops responding to input but is still functioning under the hood. There's nearly always a way to force reboot/shutdown and also a way to forcefully get out of a boot loop into a powered off state if holding power only triggers a reboot at first.
The remote location detection service from both Apple and Google supports finding an iPhone or Pixel while it's otherwise turned off via nearby Apple or Google Play devices. In general, a thief needs to use a faraday bag or battery removal to block a device being located. Both approaches also work against an OS trying to make shutting down require authentication but it's not required since it can be bypassed by holding power.
Once a device is unlocked for the first time, the encrypted data remains accessible to the operating system until it's powered off again. Only a tiny portion of data is inaccessible to the OS while locked in After First Unlock state. For most devices, fully restoring the security of Before First Unlock state requires shutting down and waiting for memory to degrade. Rebooting won't fully restore Before First Unlock state unless the operating system zeroes memory at boot and/or shutdown/reboot with both of those ideally being done.
Devices in After First Unlock state can have all user data extracted by exploiting the hardware, firmware or software running on the device. A device with Evolution X is far more vulnerable to data extracted than an iPhone or stock Pixel due to lack of strong security protections and incomplete security patches.
Most Android devices including anything running most alternate operating systems have atrocious security against exploits and data extraction from After First Unlock state is very easy. Being able to quickly turn off a device or having someone mistakenly do that themselves is needed for encryption to work against even a well informed university student with access to basic equipment. A thief turning off your device helps keep with the data safe. Many Android devices also lack truly working disk encryption for users without a strong passphrase but that's a separate problem.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS protects user data on a stolen device with the combination is much stronger exploit protections making it highly unlikely even a sophisticated adversary can get into the device quickly with a locked device auto-reboot timer.
After a GrapheneOS device is locked, it will reboot after 18 hours without a successful unlock which can be configured between 10 minutes and 72 hours. GrapheneOS clears freed memory which results in clearing most memory as part of processes exiting and kernel tasks ending while the OS shuts down for either a shutdown or reboot. GrapheneOS also clears all of the memory at boot. Pixels added memory clearing at boot to the firmware boot modes based on our request so those are covered too.
For a device running non-hardened Android, rebooting won't fully restore Before First Unlock state due to lack of fully clearing memory. Even the most secure non-GrapheneOS devices based on Android still fail to protect against widely available devices for data extraction sold by multiple companies. Turning off the device is crucial for non-hardened Android devices to protect data against an attacker with physical access.
Nearly all Linux-based devices are extremely vulnerable to being exploited while locked via USB. GrapheneOS heavily protects against exploits with hardware memory tagging and other generic exploit protections. GrapheneOS also has specialized USB protection which blocks new USB devices at both a Linux kernel and USB controller after the device is locked along with disabling USB data at a hardware level in the USB controller. There are lots of other attack vectors such as the radios too.
If there's no locked device auto-reboot feature, then an attacker only needs to keep a device charged and unable to connect to a network by blocking the signals. They'll have an indefinite amount of time to come up with a way to exploit it. They can wait around until there are public exploits for a device. Most mobile devices have anti-theft protection preventing using them for anything else without access to the Apple or Google account so it's quite typical for devices to be waiting around for an exploit to at least bypass factory reset protection.
There's the whole separate issue of a large portion of Android devices still not having a secure element throttling attempts at guessing the PIN/password along with not providing support for conveniently using a strong passphrase without biometric-only unlock as GrapheneOS does via the 2nd factor fingerprint PIN feature.
Most aftermarket operating systems including Evolution X and LineageOS which it's based on do not keep basic defenses against data extraction intact let alone greatly improving them. Lack of verified boot means no real exploit is needed to bypass encryption for After First Unlock state making it even more important to turn off the device before it's obtained by an attacker or for them to turn it off themselves. A thief turning off an insecure phone like this is giving you a gift and helping protect your data. Trying to stop them doing that is a bad move. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, this isn't a security feature but rather is the direct opposite and reduces security. It won't prevent theft and won't help people recover a stolen device in practice either. Making it more difficult to return a device to Before First Unlock state directly weakens the security of user data rather than improving it.
A thief can still forcefully trigger a shutdown or reboot by holding the power button. On a device where that triggers a reboot rather than a shutdown, the device can be forced to go into a special mode rather than the OS or can also usually be forcefully powered off afterwards. If devices didn't include a way to force reboot/shutdown then they could get easily stuck with the OS booted if it stops responding to input but is still functioning under the hood. There's nearly always a way to force reboot/shutdown and also a way to forcefully get out of a boot loop into a powered off state if holding power only triggers a reboot at first.
The remote location detection service from both Apple and Google supports finding an iPhone or Pixel while it's otherwise turned off via nearby Apple or Google Play devices. In general, a thief needs to use a faraday bag or battery removal to block a device being located. Both approaches also work against an OS trying to make shutting down require authentication but it's not required since it can be bypassed by holding power.
Once a device is unlocked for the first time, the encrypted data remains accessible to the operating system until it's powered off again. Only a tiny portion of data is inaccessible to the OS while locked in After First Unlock state. For most devices, fully restoring the security of Before First Unlock state requires shutting down and waiting for memory to degrade. Rebooting won't fully restore Before First Unlock state unless the operating system zeroes memory at boot and/or shutdown/reboot with both of those ideally being done.
Devices in After First Unlock state can have all user data extracted by exploiting the hardware, firmware or software running on the device. A device with Evolution X is far more vulnerable to data extracted than an iPhone or stock Pixel due to lack of strong security protections and incomplete security patches.
Most Android devices including anything running most alternate operating systems have atrocious security against exploits and data extraction from After First Unlock state is very easy. Being able to quickly turn off a device or having someone mistakenly do that themselves is needed for encryption to work against even a well informed university student with access to basic equipment. A thief turning off your device helps keep with the data safe. Many Android devices also lack truly working disk encryption for users without a strong passphrase but that's a separate problem. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 149.0.7827.22.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/149.0.7827.22.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35718-vanadium-version-149078272…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The first public release of GrapheneOS Speech Services is now available in our App Store. After installing it, it can be activated as a text-to-speech service by tapping it in Settings > System > Language & region > Speech > Text-to-speech output > Preferred engine and approving it in the dialog.
It currently has a single voice for US English. If you have the system language set to anything other than English (United States), then you need to change Settings > System > Language & region > Speech > Text-to-speech output > Language to English (United States) from Use system language for now.
Once it's bundled with the OS, it will be enabled by default so activating it won't be necessary. Needing to activate the TTS engine causes a lot of confusion since Android's standard user interface shows the first TTS engine as active if none is active due to assuming one is bundled.
Our Speech Services app uses a fully open source model for text-to-speech which we created ourselves using existing open source code and data. We'll be able to train a better model to replace this one now that we have an RTX 5090 for this purpose. We also plan to make voices for other languages too.
The second most used language by GrapheneOS users is very likely German and then likely French. UK English would likely be much easier to add than those due to shared code and data sources so we may do that first but German will likely be next if we can find high quality open data to use for it.
In the short term, we could alias all of the other English variants to US English to have it working by default with those selected as system languages. We don't really want to train more than US and UK voices in the mid term rather than adding other languages so we'll just alias those to US or UK.
We also plan to make our own speech-to-text implementation to go along with the text-to-speech implementation. The models are end up very large so it's unclear if we want to bundle more than US English with the OS. The other languages could be available as extra language packs in App Store instead. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A fresh install of GrapheneOS has far lower idle power usage than the stock Pixel OS. Power usage while active is comparable. Making a similar setup to the stock Pixel OS by installing sandboxed Google Play and a couple dozen apps doing a bit of background work will result in similar battery life.
GrapheneOS doesn't come doesn't come with anything keeping open a push connection and barely has any scheduled work. Waking every 8 hours for update checks doesn't use significant power. It doesn't have better battery life due to any major efficiency improvements but rather the lack of bloatware.
Installing sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS results in having a push connection for Firebase Cloud Messaging and doing a lot more work in the background. Idle power usage will still tend to be better than the stock Pixel OS, but adding more apps to match their bloatware will make it comparable.
Battery life heavily varies based on apps, networks and OS configuration. Many people end up with far better battery life on GrapheneOS and many people end up with far worse battery life due to differences in how they set up their devices. It's easy to end up with either result with simple choices.
Play Store policy coerces apps into using Firebase Cloud Messaging for push messaging including push notifications. Having every app sharing the same push connection is very efficient. Multiple push connections are inherently less efficient and many implementations of this aren't power efficient.
Installing Signal in a profile without sandboxed Google Play and granting the power optimization exception it requests is enough to destroy battery life and end up worse than the stock Pixel OS. The power efficient choices are either using Molly with UnifiedPush (Signal fork) or Signal with FCM.
Running both sandboxed Google Play and an efficient UnifiedPush app can have competitive battery life with the stock Pixel OS. Those should be the only 1-2 battery optimization exceptions for most users. Signal's fallback push will drain more power than all the bloatware in the stock OS itself.
On a Google Mobile Services OS, Play services is built into the OS as a highly privileged component with immense access and handles work across profiles.
Sandboxed Google Play are regular sandboxed apps without any special access. Each installation in a separate profile is entirely independent.
Setting up a work profile, Private Space and secondary user on the stock Pixel OS results in all 3 secondary profiles using the global Play services instance running in the Owner user for a shared FCM push connection, etc. Installing sandboxed Google Play in 4 profiles would run 4 FCM connections.
Network-based location is much more power efficient than the power hungry GNSS radio for satellite-based location. Maps/navigation apps will continuously use both when available but many apps will avoid using GNSS to save power if network-based location is available, so it can save a lot of power.
For GrapheneOS, network-based location is an opt-in feature in the Owner user setup. For Google Mobile Services Android, it's opt-out there and you'll be regularly nagged to enable it if you didn't. It's a common pitfall since people expect indoor location positioning and it can save a bit of power.
Cellular, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are power hungry. 5G is particularly power hungry prior to the improved cellular radio in 9th/10th gen Pixels with the exception of the Pixel 9a. Either way, setting the cellular mode to 4G (meaning 4G and below) or the GrapheneOS 4G-only mode can save a lot of power.
Stock Pixel OS has an Adaptive Connectivity service which largely keeps 5G disabled. GrapheneOS doesn't have an equivalent to this yet but you can do it manually. Other than that, the stock Pixel OS doesn't really have any significant power saving tricks and it has a lot of bloatware draining power. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 148.0.7778.178.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/148.0.7778.178.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35670-vanadium-version-148077781…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Apple and Google are gradually expanding their use of hardware-based attestation. They're convincing a growing number of services to adopt it. Google's Play Integrity API and Apple's App Attest API are very similar. Apple brought it to the web via Privacy Pass, which Google intends on doing too.
Google's Play Integrity API requires hardware attestation for the strong integrity level and is gradually phasing in requiring it for the more commonly used device integrity level. Apple already has it as a requirement. Over the long term, this will increasingly lock out hardware and OS competition.
The purpose of these systems is disallowing people from using hardware and software not approved by Apple or Google. This is wrongly presented as being a security feature. Banks and government services are the main ones adopting it but Apple and Google are encouraging every service to use it.
Apple's Privacy Pass brought hardware attestation to the web to help with passing captchas on their own hardware. Many people saw that as harmless since few sites would be willing to lock out non-Apple-hardware users. Apple and Google are both likely to bring broader hardware attestation to the web.
Google's reCAPTCHA is planning an approach where they use Privacy Pass on Apple hardware, their own approach on Google Mobile Services Android devices and a QR code scanning system to require an iOS or Google certified Android device for Windows and other systems:
support.google.com/recaptcha/answer/16609652
Banking and government services increasingly require using a mobile app where they can use attestation to force using an Apple or Google approved device and OS. Apple's privacy pass, Google's 'cancelled' Web Environment Integrity and now reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification are bringing this to the web.
Current media coverage for reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification misunderstands it and the impact of it. They're bringing a hardware attestation requirement to Windows, desktop Linux, OpenBSD, etc. by requiring a QR scan from a certified smartphone to pass reCAPTCHA in some cases. They could expand it more.
Control over reCAPTCHA puts Google in a position where they can require having either iOS or a certified Android device to use an enormous amount of the web. Google defines certification requirements for Android which includes forcing bundling Google Chrome, etc. It's enormously anti-competitive.
Google's Play Integrity API bans using GrapheneOS despite it being far more secure than anything they permit. It also bans using any other alternative. This isn't somehow specific to an AOSP-based OS. You can't avoid this by using a mobile OS based on FreeBSD instead. You'll just be more locked out.
Google's Play Integrity API permits devices with no security patches for 10 years. The device integrity level can be bypassed via spoofing but they can detect it quite well and block it once it starts being done at scale. The strong integrity level requires leaked keys from TEEs/SEs to bypass it.
It doesn't provide a useful security feature, but it does lock out competition very well. Services requiring Apple App Attest or Google Play Integrity are primarily helping to lock in Apple and Google having a duopoly for mobile devices. Play Integrity is more relevant due to AOSP being open source.
Governments are increasingly mandating using Apple's App Attest and Google's Play Integrity for not only their own services but also commercial services. The EU is leading the charge of making these requirements for digital payments, ID, age verification, etc. Many EU government apps require them.
Instead of governments stopping Apple and Google from engaging in egregiously anti-competitive behavior, they're directly participating in locking out competition via their own services. Requiring people to have an Apple device or Google-certified Android device is anti-competition, not security.
reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification will currently work with sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS but it clearly exists to provide a way for them to start using hardware attestation on systems without it. People without an iOS or Android device will be locked out when this is required even without that.
This isn't about security or any missing functionality. GrapheneOS can be verified via hardware attestation. Google bans using GrapheneOS for Play Integrity because we don't license Google Mobile Services and conform to anti-competitive rules already found to be illegal in South Korea and elsewhere.
Services shouldn't ban people from using arbitrary hardware and operating systems in the first place. Google's security excuse is clearly bogus when they permit devices with no patches for 10 years but not a much more secure OS. It's for enforcing their monopolies via GMS licensing, that's all. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
CVE-2026-0073 was included in the May 2026 ASB as a critical severity RCE vulnerability. GrapheneOS shipped the patch in March 2026. GrapheneOS is the only AOSP-based OS shipped all the patches quickly. It also has literally hundreds of upstream security patches shipped earlier.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Apple and Google are gradually expanding their use of hardware-based attestation. They're convincing a growing number of services to adopt it. Google's Play Integrity API and Apple's App Attest API are very similar. Apple brought it to the web via Privacy Pass, which Google intends on doing too.
Google's Play Integrity API requires hardware attestation for the strong integrity level and is gradually phasing in requiring it for the more commonly used device integrity level. Apple already has it as a requirement. Over the long term, this will increasingly lock out hardware and OS competition.
The purpose of these systems is disallowing people from using hardware and software not approved by Apple or Google. This is wrongly presented as being a security feature. Banks and government services are the main ones adopting it but Apple and Google are encouraging every service to use it.
Apple's Privacy Pass brought hardware attestation to the web to help with passing captchas on their own hardware. Many people saw that as harmless since few sites would be willing to lock out non-Apple-hardware users. Apple and Google are both likely to bring broader hardware attestation to the web.
Google's reCAPTCHA is planning an approach where they use Privacy Pass on Apple hardware, their own approach on Google Mobile Services Android devices and a QR code scanning system to require an iOS or Google certified Android device for Windows and other systems:
support.google.com/recaptcha/answer/16609652
Banking and government services increasingly require using a mobile app where they can use attestation to force using an Apple or Google approved device and OS. Apple's privacy pass, Google's 'cancelled' Web Environment Integrity and now reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification are bringing this to the web.
Current media coverage for reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification misunderstands it and the impact of it. They're bringing a hardware attestation requirement to Windows, desktop Linux, OpenBSD, etc. by requiring a QR scan from a certified smartphone to pass reCAPTCHA in some cases. They could expand it more.
Control over reCAPTCHA puts Google in a position where they can require having either iOS or a certified Android device to use an enormous amount of the web. Google defines certification requirements for Android which includes forcing bundling Google Chrome, etc. It's enormously anti-competitive.
Google's Play Integrity API bans using GrapheneOS despite it being far more secure than anything they permit. It also bans using any other alternative. This isn't somehow specific to an AOSP-based OS. You can't avoid this by using a mobile OS based on FreeBSD instead. You'll just be more locked out.
Google's Play Integrity API permits devices with no security patches for 10 years. The device integrity level can be bypassed via spoofing but they can detect it quite well and block it once it starts being done at scale. The strong integrity level requires leaked keys from TEEs/SEs to bypass it.
It doesn't provide a useful security feature, but it does lock out competition very well. Services requiring Apple App Attest or Google Play Integrity are primarily helping to lock in Apple and Google having a duopoly for mobile devices. Play Integrity is more relevant due to AOSP being open source.
Governments are increasingly mandating using Apple's App Attest and Google's Play Integrity for not only their own services but also commercial services. The EU is leading the charge of making these requirements for digital payments, ID, age verification, etc. Many EU government apps require them.
Instead of governments stopping Apple and Google from engaging in egregiously anti-competitive behavior, they're directly participating in locking out competition via their own services. Requiring people to have an Apple device or Google-certified Android device is anti-competition, not security.
reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification will currently work with sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS but it clearly exists to provide a way for them to start using hardware attestation on systems without it. People without an iOS or Android device will be locked out when this is required even without that.
This isn't about security or any missing functionality. GrapheneOS can be verified via hardware attestation. Google bans using GrapheneOS for Play Integrity because we don't license Google Mobile Services and conform to anti-competitive rules already found to be illegal in South Korea and elsewhere.
Services shouldn't ban people from using arbitrary hardware and operating systems in the first place. Google's security excuse is clearly bogus when they permit devices with no patches for 10 years but not a much more secure OS. It's for enforcing their monopolies via GMS licensing, that's all.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Unified Attestation is another anti-competitive system being pushed by multiple European companies. It will similarly lock people out from using arbitrary hardware and software. That's not a solution and is far worse than Android's much more open hardware attestation API.
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2033925685568250119
Android's hardware attestation shouldn't be used to lock out users not using specific hardware or OSes. However, the fact that it permits arbitrary roots of trust and OSes at least allows services to permit more. Google could use it to permit GrapheneOS for Play Integrity if that was about security.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android provides a standard hardware attestation system with support for alternate operating systems via allowing their verified boot key fingerprints. It's mainly used with Google's root of trust and remote key provisioning service but the API supports alternative roots of trust.
Volla's Unified Attestation is fully built on Android's hardware attestation API. It solely exists to create a centralized authority and service determining what's allowed under their control.
Unified Attestation will permit using products from the companies involved in it while forbidding using arbitrary alternatives. They clearly aren't going to enforce reasonable security standards since their products wouldn't meet those. The whole purpose of the system is to permit their products regardless of merit and convince banking/government apps to adopt it.
There's nothing neutral or fair about a system controlled by companies approving their own products while disallowing other options.
Companies forming an anti-competitive cartel providing a service which permitting their products and while disallowing others isn't legal regardless of how they market it. It's not legal when Google does it with the Play Integrity API and it's not legal when it's Volla, Murena and iodé doing it. We won't be participating in a system which gives these companies veto power over app compatibility on GrapheneOS. These companies will not be given the power to make arbitrary demands of GrapheneOS.
We've been talking back and forth with multiple regulators over the past several years about the Play Integrity API to have action taken against it. Unified Attestation is a massive disruption to our efforts and will get in the way of having regulators take action against this. We've also been considering filing a lawsuit against Google over the Play Integrity API.
Unlike Google, the companies involved in Unified Attestation don't have massive resources to defend their anti-competitive system.
Android's standard hardware API doesn't require delegating verification to a centralized service. One or more neutral organizations could exist certifying devices and operating systems without providing a centralized API. Those organizations could simply provide signed releases with the roots of trust, revoked keys and operating system key fingerprints. Apps could use multiple different certifying organizations. This is already something Android's hardware attestation API fully supports today.
Volla, Murena and iodé are each a for-profit company selling devices. Each of them has failed to keep up with important security patches and protections. Each has marketed their products as providing a level of security they don't provide. It's very clear why these 3 companies want to be in charge of choosing which devices and operating systems people are allowed to use. They want to make sure their products are permitted and want to have an advantage over others to boost their profits.
Unified Attestation is an anti-competitive cartel turning a decentralized decision into a centralized one. Instead of neutral organizations being formed to certify devices without a massive conflict of interest, these companies will sign off on their products regardless of the level of insecurity. Multiple competing companies forming a cartel which locks out other options is not legal. We're fully willing to file one or more lawsuits over this. It should be discontinued now prior to harming us.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has stronger security including hardware-based security features than Android. It's incredibly wrong to portray it as if we're missing a security feature. Desktop OSes don't have anything close to the security model or hardware-based security features of AOSP or iOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Status quo is the Play Integrity API bans GrapheneOS despite it being far more secure than anything they permit. Google won't allow GrapheneOS to obtain certification even if we were willing to cripple privacy and security protections/patches to comply with the problematic rules.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Play Integrity API permits a device with no updates for 10 years but not a heavily privacy/security hardened mobile OS based on AOSP.
GrapheneOS has far better exploit protections and patches. It has stronger verified boot and hardware-based attestation. Why isn't it permitted?Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, software licensing has nothing to do with it. GrapheneOS does not use more restrictive licenses than AOSP regardless. Google bans GrapheneOS for business reasons. Play Integrity API exists for anti-competition, not security. It absolutely doesn't check for a secure device.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Play Integrity API device integrity level and even the strong integrity level both permit devices with years of missing security patches. Strong integrity level only checks not being more than 1 year behind Android Security Bulletins for Android 13+ and ASBs are published late.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Being up to a year behind on easy to ship partial security backports to older Android releases would be a joke even without the loophole for below Android 13. It's also more than a year behind since ASBs are published months after sharing patches with OEMs and allowing shipping.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
CVE-2026-0073 was included in the May 2026 ASB as a critical severity RCE vulnerability. GrapheneOS shipped the patch in March 2026. GrapheneOS is the only AOSP-based OS shipped all the patches quickly. It also has literally hundreds of upstream security patches shipped earlier.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Being up to a year behind on easy to ship partial security backports to older Android releases would be a joke even without the loophole for below Android 13. It's also more than a year behind since ASBs are published months after sharing patches with OEMs and allowing shipping.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Play Integrity API device integrity level and even the strong integrity level both permit devices with years of missing security patches. Strong integrity level only checks not being more than 1 year behind Android Security Bulletins for Android 13+ and ASBs are published late.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, software licensing has nothing to do with it. GrapheneOS does not use more restrictive licenses than AOSP regardless. Google bans GrapheneOS for business reasons. Play Integrity API exists for anti-competition, not security. It absolutely doesn't check for a secure device.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Play Integrity API permits a device with no updates for 10 years but not a heavily privacy/security hardened mobile OS based on AOSP.
GrapheneOS has far better exploit protections and patches. It has stronger verified boot and hardware-based attestation. Why isn't it permitted? -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Status quo is the Play Integrity API bans GrapheneOS despite it being far more secure than anything they permit. Google won't allow GrapheneOS to obtain certification even if we were willing to cripple privacy and security protections/patches to comply with the problematic rules.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has stronger security including hardware-based security features than Android. It's incredibly wrong to portray it as if we're missing a security feature. Desktop OSes don't have anything close to the security model or hardware-based security features of AOSP or iOS.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 148.0.7778.167.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/148.0.7778.167.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35483-vanadium-version-148077781…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They force using Google's Play Store variants of a whole bunch of functionality instead of the open source Android Open Source Project functionality. Google is increasingly cracking down on their OEM partners and they're not happy. They're a highly abusive and greedy partner.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Play Integrity API is clearly anti-competitive, anti-security and blatantly illegal. It isn't dangerously close to those but rather way over the line. App developers being able to directly use key attestation and explicitly allow specific non-Google software doesn't make it okay.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android key attestation is inherently biased towards stock operating systems and their reference implementation of a verification library only permits Google as a root of trust. We're talking about the Play Integrity API which is drastically worse than that and blatantly illegal.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is drastically more secure than the stock Pixel OS. It makes major systemic security improvements and also has downstream patches for a bunch of severe security weaknesses. It also has a massive amount of additional upstream security patches shipped months earlier.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Stock Pixel OS is the most secure OS permitted by the Play Integrity API. Nearly everything it permits has absolutely atrocious security. They permit devices with years without any security patches. Play Integrity API has one real requirement: licensing Google's apps/services.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google Mobile Services licensing requirements don't have stringent security requirements and don't require keeping up with patches. They're mainly focused on app compatibility and reinforcing Google's monopolies by forcing shipping Chrome, Google Search, Google Maps, etc.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They force using Google's Play Store variants of a whole bunch of functionality instead of the open source Android Open Source Project functionality. Google is increasingly cracking down on their OEM partners and they're not happy. They're a highly abusive and greedy partner.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google Mobile Services licensing requirements don't have stringent security requirements and don't require keeping up with patches. They're mainly focused on app compatibility and reinforcing Google's monopolies by forcing shipping Chrome, Google Search, Google Maps, etc.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Stock Pixel OS is the most secure OS permitted by the Play Integrity API. Nearly everything it permits has absolutely atrocious security. They permit devices with years without any security patches. Play Integrity API has one real requirement: licensing Google's apps/services.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is drastically more secure than the stock Pixel OS. It makes major systemic security improvements and also has downstream patches for a bunch of severe security weaknesses. It also has a massive amount of additional upstream security patches shipped months earlier.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android key attestation is inherently biased towards stock operating systems and their reference implementation of a verification library only permits Google as a root of trust. We're talking about the Play Integrity API which is drastically worse than that and blatantly illegal.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Play Integrity API is clearly anti-competitive, anti-security and blatantly illegal. It isn't dangerously close to those but rather way over the line. App developers being able to directly use key attestation and explicitly allow specific non-Google software doesn't make it okay.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026050900 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35409-grapheneos-version-2026050…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Trying to portray someone as insane and delusional with fabrications isn't criticism. Our founder being upset with Rossmann in private after months and mistreatment from Rossmann doesn't absolutely justify him starting a massive harassment campaign based around blatant lies.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
CVE-2026-0073 is a Critical severity Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability included as the only vulnerability fixed in the May 2026 Android Security Bulletin. GrapheneOS first shipped the patch in our 2026030501 security preview release on March 5th. It also isn't nearly as severe as it sounds.
This was a bypass for TLS client certificate authentication in the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) for the Wireless debugging feature. It's only relevant to users enabling developer options, enabling Android Debug Bridge and then enabling Wireless debugging. Wireless debugging is disabled on reboot.
Our security preview releases are recommended in the initial setup wizard via a dedicated page with toggle that's enabled by default. Existing users who weren't shown the page received a notification at boot opening a similar page with a save button. It reappears until a choice is made either way. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS isn't vulnerable to the 3 recently disclosed Linux kernel vulnerabilities named Copy Fail, Copy Fail 2 and Dirty Frag. Current Android Open Source Project SELinux policies block exploiting all 3 bugs. Standard AOSP GKI kernel configuration also has 2/3 of the vulnerable features disabled.
Attack surface reduction via fine-grained SELinux policy rules and stripping out unused kernel features via kernel configuration goes a long way to protecting against vulnerabilities. There's also seccomp-bpf for various standard sandboxes but most of the attack surface reduction is via SELinux.
AOSP uses SELinux to allowlist ioctl commands for drivers, permitted socket types, etc. in a fine-grained way. It strictly controls a lot of functionality prone to vulnerabilities including user namespaces and io_uring which aren't allowed to be used by apps or nearly any of the base OS processes.
These kinds of issues are rare and attack surface reduction is the best way to defend against them. GrapheneOS does additional kernel attack surface reduction but in these 3 cases it's enough to have modern AOSP GKI kernel and SELinux policies. We also greatly improve generic exploit protections.
Local privilege escalation vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel are very common. However, the vast majority are memory corruption bugs rather than these memory-related logic errors. We defend against the memory corruption bugs with hardware memory tagging, zero-on-free and similar generic defenses.
Linux has a massive amount of code for the core kernel and drivers for the hardware. All of the code runs with full privileges with no isolation. In a microkernel, each of these 3 recent vulnerabilities would have been in isolated processes. Virtualization will have a major role in addressing this.
Despite these not being traditional memory corruption, a memory safe language with a better type system would definitely help. Containing low-level handling of memory to a much smaller portion of the kernel and mostly using safe abstractions for networking, device drivers, etc. would help a lot.
Linux has a relentless flood of severe memory corruption bugs being discovered. Nearly all exploit chains for Linux-based systems by commercial and government exploit developers use Linux kernel memory corruption bugs. It's a lot harder to make very portable and reliable exploits for those bugs.
A lot can be done to further reduce Linux kernel attack surface in GrapheneOS and much better generic memory corruption exploit protections can also be developed. However, it clearly needs to be replaced. Hardware-based virtualization on smartphones keeps getting better and has a major role to play.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Main discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35353-grapheneos-isnt-vulnerable… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026050700 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35349-grapheneos-version-2026050…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026050600 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35327-grapheneos-version-2026050…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixels are the most secure Android devices. Pixels have better updates and hardware-based security protections than any other Android devices. GrapheneOS greatly improves the software updates but we fully depend on the device's OEM for firmware and most driver/HAL updates.
Our hardware security requirements are listed at grapheneos.org/faq. Our requirements for standard updates and standard hardware-based security features are very reasonable. We aren't requiring anything exotic. Most devices have atrocious security and we can't use those.
Pixels are the best that's available. That doesn't mean they're extremely focused on security. The updates could be a lot better and they could better more hardware-based security features. They're far better than other Android devices and other devices lack the bare minimum.
We're working with Motorola towards a subset of next generation devices in 2027 meeting all these requirements and providing official GrapheneOS support. It's not easy and there's a lot of work to do. We're not going to drop our reasonable requirements to use insecure devices. -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixels are the most secure Android devices. Pixels have better updates and hardware-based security protections than any other Android devices. GrapheneOS greatly improves the software updates but we fully depend on the device's OEM for firmware and most driver/HAL updates.
Our hardware security requirements are listed at grapheneos.org/faq. Our requirements for standard updates and standard hardware-based security features are very reasonable. We aren't requiring anything exotic. Most devices have atrocious security and we can't use those.
Pixels are the best that's available. That doesn't mean they're extremely focused on security. The updates could be a lot better and they could better more hardware-based security features. They're far better than other Android devices and other devices lack the bare minimum.
We're working with Motorola towards a subset of next generation devices in 2027 meeting all these requirements and providing official GrapheneOS support. It's not easy and there's a lot of work to do. We're not going to drop our reasonable requirements to use insecure devices. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026050400 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35281-grapheneos-version-2026050…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
grsecurity
@grsecurity
For RHEL/RHEL-derived configurations, this approach will work (the function name has been stable since 2015 and initcall_blacklist has been supported since 2014): news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47956504
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GrapheneOS reposted
grsecurity
@grsecurity
Don't rely on mitigation suggestions from others floating around: non-readable suid binaries only does something for this specific exploit, it's exploitable in other ways that don't involve suid binaries at all.
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GrapheneOS reposted
grsecurity
@grsecurity
For it to be effective at all, you would need to have CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m. If it's =y, there is no module and the mitigation is a no-op. oracle.github.io/kconfigs/?config=CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD& shows the setting for common distros/versions, but it's most reliable to check your running kernel's config.
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GrapheneOS reposted
grsecurity
@grsecurity
Creating a separate post so more people see this: the mitigation recommended by theori.io for copy.fail *WILL NOT WORK* for any RHEL or RHEL-derived distro, including CentOS, Fedora, Oracle, and Alma as the vulnerable code is built-in.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is immune to the Copy Fail vulnerability due to the deep integration of SELinux in the Android Open Source Project (AOSP). AOSP only permits using specific types of sockets throughout the OS. It only permits the dumpstate process used to create bug report zips to access AF_ALG sockets.
SELinux is based on explicitly listing out everything that's permitted and anything not listed isn't allowed. AOSP uses strict, fine-grained SELinux policies for the whole OS. Instead of simply permitting everything that's used in a fine-grained way, the rest of the OS is developed with it in mind.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
AOSP also doesn't permit setuid or setgid binaries which was the chosen attack vector for exploiting it in the proof of concept exploit. It similarly doesn't permit io_uring, user namespaces and a lot of other functionality outside of a few core processes for security reasons.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Standard Android GKI kernels also have the userspace API for Linux kernel crypto disabled including CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD being unset. Many Android vendors enable a lot more functionality in the kernels but probably haven't had an actual reason to enable this functionality.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 148.0.7778.96.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/148.0.7778.96.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/35111-vanadium-version-148077789…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 148.0.7778.60.1 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/148.0.7778.60.1
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/34939-vanadium-version-148077786…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS App Store version 36 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/AppStore/releases/tag/36
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/34820-grapheneos-app-store-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 148.0.7778.60.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/148.0.7778.60.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/34592-vanadium-version-148077786…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 148.0.7778.49.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/148.0.7778.49.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/34577-vanadium-version-148077784…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here's another series of replies which you can see is the origin for their out-of-context screenshot:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2037189488271569144
They're not linking to what we said but rather showing a small part of it out-of-context so they can heavily misrepresent it and mislead people.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has gone through the kind of formal audits by security firms they're referring to and none of those found even a minor improvement we could make. They're not nearly as valuable as the ongoing review by downstream projects familiar with AOSP code and GrapheneOS code.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is audited on an ongoing basis by multiple companies building on top of it with experienced Android OS developers. This is much more meaningful than paying for a security consulting company to run scans and do shallow review. it has a lot of other external review too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Companies publish audit reports from security consulting firms based on basic scans and shallow review for marketing purposes. GrapheneOS hasmuch more thorough auditing on an ongoing basis by different parties using the code. Each commit is reviewed by multiple externals parties.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The @WatarmelonTrade account has made hundreds of posts attempting to misleading people about GrapheneOS with fabrications about it and what we've said. Here's a series of our replies in the original thread with what we actually said in response to this:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
External review and testing of GrapheneOS by ANSSI, Mullvad, other organizations and independent researchers have found a bunch of AOSP issues to address. Various minor issues have been externally reported and resolved for our own code too. Ongoing review is what's most valuable.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here's another series of replies which you can see is the origin for their out-of-context screenshot:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2037189488271569144
They're not linking to what we said but rather showing a small part of it out-of-context so they can heavily misrepresent it and mislead people.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has gone through the kind of formal audits by security firms they're referring to and none of those found even a minor improvement we could make. They're not nearly as valuable as the ongoing review by downstream projects familiar with AOSP code and GrapheneOS code.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The @WatarmelonTrade account has made hundreds of posts attempting to misleading people about GrapheneOS with fabrications about it and what we've said. Here's a series of our replies in the original thread with what we actually said in response to this:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
External review and testing of GrapheneOS by ANSSI, Mullvad, other organizations and independent researchers have found a bunch of AOSP issues to address. Various minor issues have been externally reported and resolved for our own code too. Ongoing review is what's most valuable.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Companies publish audit reports from security consulting firms based on basic scans and shallow review for marketing purposes. GrapheneOS hasmuch more thorough auditing on an ongoing basis by different parties using the code. Each commit is reviewed by multiple externals parties.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is audited on an ongoing basis by multiple companies building on top of it with experienced Android OS developers. This is much more meaningful than paying for a security consulting company to run scans and do shallow review. it has a lot of other external review too.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 147.0.7727.111.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/147.0.7727.111.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/34488-vanadium-version-147077271…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Most of our users aren't active on these social media platforms and don't receive news about GrapheneOS beyond our release notes. Hundreds of thousands of people use it as a daily driver without closely following the project. We plan to reduce our dependence on these platforms.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We can migrate towards posting longer form content made available via our discussion forum and Info app. It can still be posted to these platforms but without relying on them so much. Our news posts don't reach most of our users this way and it heavily limits how we can post too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We aren't saying we're going to stop posting on these platforms. It means the posts on our timeline will shift towards being links to forum threads with longer form content. We can have proper formatting, edits and a more unified discussion primarily happening on our forum.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026042100 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/34377-grapheneos-version-2026042…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
WIRED (@WIRED) has gone ahead with publishing an extraordinarily inaccurate article about GrapheneOS. It presents a highly inaccurate history of the GrapheneOS project heavily based on fabrications from James Donaldson. WIRED failed to incorporate most of our responses to his inaccurate claims.
Donaldson has fabricated a whole alternate history of the project and Copperhead including leaving out the fact that it had 3 co-founders rather than 2. Donaldson lived off income brought in by Daniel's open source project created prior to the company. He certainly didn't fund it as he claims.
Prior to publishing the article, a fact checker at WIRED asked us a long series of questions about the project. These questions made it extremely clear that the article was largely sourced from fabrications from Donaldson despite it not being specified. It's not a real history of GrapheneOS at all.
Our community manager spring-onion (Dave Wilson) handled nearly all of the communications with WIRED. He's a public-facing member of our moderation team and well known in our community. WIRED first reached out to Daniel, promised the story wouldn't be about him and were handed off to spring-onion.
WIRED heavily misled about the article. They led us to believe the article would be about GrapheneOS with little coverage of the history. They repeatedly reassured us it would hardly have any of the content it ended up being based around. Therefore, we had no opportunity to properly address it.
We made a forum post at discuss.grapheneos.org/d/34369-original-grapheneos-respon… which contains an overview of the situation along with the unmodified answers we provided to WIRED's fact checker. You can see for yourself what we provided and that it wasn't anywhere close to adequately incorporated into the article.
After the article was submitted, we received that list of questions from WIRED's fact checker. We realized the article was largely going to be a fake account of the history of the project based on Donaldson's claim. That's when we made these posts:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2043854907116027914
bsky.app/profile/grapheneos.org/post/3mjyyndedqc2i
A small portion of our response to those questions was incorporated, but not most of it. There's also more we weren't asked about which we can now see is in the article. We tried to address that at in the initial overview at discuss.grapheneos.org/d/34369-original-grapheneos-respon… prior to the submitted answers.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The editors of Wired (@WIRED) appear determined to turn an article about GrapheneOS into a hit piece. Wired contacted James Donaldson, CEO of Copperhead, and appears to be treating his thoroughly debunked fabrications about the history of the project as their primary source. This is outrageous.
Wired wants a clickbait article with lots of controversy and isn't accepting it without it. We spent months talking to the author of the story and received repeated assurances about how it was being approached. The author of the article was clearly pressured into making it an inaccurate hit piece.
We're posting this to reach someone at Wired who can pause this and have it handled with the appropriate care it needs. Sourcing an article about GrapheneOS from a person who has spent years trying to harm us and is losing a legal battle including having to withdraw these claims makes no sense. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've added a JSON API making it easier for services to permit GrapheneOS in addition to Google-certified operating systems:
grapheneos.org/attestation.json
grapheneos.org/attestation.json.sig
The verifiedBootKeys array lists GrapheneOS key fingerprints to permit via Android hardware attestation.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We provide a guide for app developers on moving away from the Play Integrity API to the standard Android hardware attestation API to permit GrapheneOS at grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide. It can also be used to permit other operating systems. We plan to update and overhaul our guide soon.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android's hardware attestation API is biased towards stock operating systems but fully supports allowing alternatives. It fully supports arbitrary roots of trust instead of only the Google-certified hardware ecosystem. There's no need for a non-Google Play Integrity API on top.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Leaked keys chaining up to Google's roots of trust are abundant. Most devices don't support the less insecure remote key provisioning system with shorter lives for keys. Root-based attestation is only as secure as the least secure devices, and those are absolutely atrocious.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These checks aren't a security feature in practice. If an app doesn't need to comply with regulations forcing this, it shouldn't do it. If it has to be done, apps should use the Android hardware attestation API to permit GrapheneOS and other OSes meeting the requirements too.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS doesn't persistently store notifications unless users explicitly enable notification history. For users enabling notification history, it's a 24 hour log that's cleared as soon as the feature is disabled again. This is the standard Android Open Source Project approach.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 147.0.7727.101.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/147.0.7727.101.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/34177-vanadium-version-147077271…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Privacy and security on computing devices need to become far stronger to protect people from pervasive violations of their rights. Users have their privacy pervasively violated by corporations, criminals and governments. There are endless privacy and security weaknesses in software with exploits of those happening on a large scale. Operating systems, browsers and other apps need to do a much better job protecting users. Enormous progress is needed on both privacy and security.
GrapheneOS provides a massive upgrade for privacy and security over the standard Android Open Source Project. GrapheneOS is nowhere near good enough and we have an enormous amount of work to do improving both. Our work is an ongoing process and doesn't have an end point. Privacy and security heavily involve competition between attackers and defenders. Most defenders are making little progress and falling increasingly far behind.
Attackers continue improving their exploits of privacy and security weaknesses. Commercial exploit tools are increasingly widely deployed for broad attacks. Software has a very high density of privacy and security vulnerabilities. LLMs are accelerating both vulnerability discovery and exploit development. For most computing devices, defense is increasingly far behind offense. iOS and GrapheneOS are exceptional cases not representative of degrading privacy and security across computing devices.
Growing numbers of internet connected devices are incorporated into botnets. This harms the privacy and security of the internet as a whole through heavily pushing it towards centralization behind services such as Cloudflare. Insecure devices without security patches harm the internet as a whole. It isn't only embedded devices but also desktops, mobile devices and servers being used as part of these botnets. It isn't only people with these insecure devices who are harmed. It can get much worse.
We're building GrapheneOS to protect everyone's privacy and security. It's aimed at widespread adoption and is highly usable. It's compatible with the vast majority of Android apps. It has major privacy benefits for every user including stopping a lot of data collection by apps and services with a better permission model increasingly addressing being coerced to grant access. GrapheneOS has many users with little technical knowledge and isn't hard to install or use.
We're continuing to work on improving privacy, security, usability and app compatibility for all of our users. Contact Scopes, Storage Scopes, per-app Sensors toggle, VPN leak protection and many other features we provde are very important privacy protections. We're building alternatives to the Camera, Microphone and other permissions too. Our major improvements to exploit protections are there to protect user privacy. Privacy depends on security and that's why we heavily work on security too.
Contrary to what's often claimed, GrapheneOS is far more usable and requires far less sacrifice compared to other alternatives. Providing far better protection against sophisticated exploits isn't at the expense of that. Our opt-in sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer combines privacy and high usability. We're gradually making replacements for more Google services apps rely on. Location services, network-based location, geocoding and more has already been replaced and much more is coming. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The editors of Wired (@WIRED) appear determined to turn an article about GrapheneOS into a hit piece. Wired contacted James Donaldson, CEO of Copperhead, and appears to be treating his thoroughly debunked fabrications about the history of the project as their primary source. This is outrageous.
Wired wants a clickbait article with lots of controversy and isn't accepting it without it. We spent months talking to the author of the story and received repeated assurances about how it was being approached. The author of the article was clearly pressured into making it an inaccurate hit piece.
We're posting this to reach someone at Wired who can pause this and have it handled with the appropriate care it needs. Sourcing an article about GrapheneOS from a person who has spent years trying to harm us and is losing a legal battle including having to withdraw these claims makes no sense. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The smear campaign against GrapheneOS by France's national law enforcement with assistance by corporate and state media caused rapid growth of the GrapheneOS userbase in France. People want an operating system protecting them from state surveillance which angers authoritarians.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is fully legal in France. Law enforcement in France is stepping outside of their mandate and abusing their position of power to smear GrapheneOS and threaten action against it. We were genuinely concerned about this and threats they made so we migrated many servers.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We previously primarily used OVH to host our public-facing servers. Our most sensitive infrastructure for builds and signing has always been on local hardware under our physical control so that's not the issue. Our concern was our website and other services being hijacked.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
See snikket.org/blog/on-the-jabber-ru-mitm/ for the kind of thing we were worried about them justifying and carrying out against our website and various network services. Our OS and app updates are cryptographically signed with downgrade protection so those wouldn't be at risk from this.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
France previously hijacked OVH server infrastructure for multiple companies selling phones marketed as being private and secure. We were concerned about our discussion forum, mail server and website. It's all dealt with and we're continuing to improve infrastructure security.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The smear campaign against GrapheneOS by France's national law enforcement with assistance by corporate and state media caused rapid growth of the GrapheneOS userbase in France. People want an operating system protecting them from state surveillance which angers authoritarians.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
France previously hijacked OVH server infrastructure for multiple companies selling phones marketed as being private and secure. We were concerned about our discussion forum, mail server and website. It's all dealt with and we're continuing to improve infrastructure security.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
See snikket.org/blog/on-the-jabber-ru-mitm/ for the kind of thing we were worried about them justifying and carrying out against our website and various network services. Our OS and app updates are cryptographically signed with downgrade protection so those wouldn't be at risk from this.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We previously primarily used OVH to host our public-facing servers. Our most sensitive infrastructure for builds and signing has always been on local hardware under our physical control so that's not the issue. Our concern was our website and other services being hijacked.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is fully legal in France. Law enforcement in France is stepping outside of their mandate and abusing their position of power to smear GrapheneOS and threaten action against it. We were genuinely concerned about this and threats they made so we migrated many servers.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ and Murena have been been promoting their products by misleading people about GrapheneOS for years. This has turned into an all out war on GrapheneOS by their company and supporters. We began regularly debunking their inaccurate claims and they try to frame it as aggression.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They've created widespread misconceptions about the GrapheneOS project with inaccurate claims about the purpose of the project and what it provides to users. Many people incorrectly believe they aren't our target audience or that it wouldn't be a good fit for them due to this.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ isn't a privacy project but rather a digital sovereignty project. It receives millions of euros in funding from the EU with the goal of moving technology within the control of the EU. /e/ supports violating people's right to privacy as long as it's France and the EU doing it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
www.projets-libres.org/en/podcast/e-os-a-degoogled-androi…
> The European Union has subsidized us to the tune of several million for this project.
Murena sells products largely built with funding received from the EU. It's government funding being used to heavily enrich the shareholders of the Murena company.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
People shouldn't underestimate the harm which is going to be caused by them repeatedly telling people serious privacy and security are for pedophiles, criminals and spies. It's not a one time statement but rather a consistent narrative in years of their posts. This is a problem.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Murena and /e/ have been largely successful in how they've branded themselves despite lack of substance. Many people believe their false marketing. Governments now have an ally accepted within a lot of the privacy community which is saying strong privacy only helps pedophiles.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Apple and Google both provide support for offline speech-to-text using local models. Users can configure it to be fully offline.
The Murena Voice to Text service in /e/OS sends the user's audio to OpenAI which is hidden away in their terms of services:
community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using-open… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These are the verified boot requirements from Google for OEMs licensing Google Mobile Services:
source.android.com/docs/compatibility/16/android-16-cdd
Google strongly recommends firmware rollback protection while we made it into a requirement. We only expand it beyond that by requiring alternate OS support. -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The main features required by GrapheneOS are documented at grapheneos.org/faq. Verified boot is only one of the requirements and involves more than it simply being available. Samsung doesn't permit another OS to use verified boot and DivestOS didn't have it for most devices.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here's a section of the DivestOS site where they said they supported verified boot on 36 out of ~170 devices they supported:
divestos-archive.codeberg.page/page/home.html
A large portion of those 36 devices were Nexus and Pixel phones. Out of the others, many had a blatantly insecure implementation.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS requires devices to have proper updates for drivers and firmware along with the security features we use to protect users. Verified boot is a requirement for Google's certification but many implementations of it are incomplete or insecure. Most don't allow another OS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These are the verified boot requirements from Google for OEMs licensing Google Mobile Services:
source.android.com/docs/compatibility/16/android-16-cdd
Google strongly recommends firmware rollback protection while we made it into a requirement. We only expand it beyond that by requiring alternate OS support. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS requires devices to have proper updates for drivers and firmware along with the security features we use to protect users. Verified boot is a requirement for Google's certification but many implementations of it are incomplete or insecure. Most don't allow another OS.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here's a section of the DivestOS site where they said they supported verified boot on 36 out of ~170 devices they supported:
divestos-archive.codeberg.page/page/home.html
A large portion of those 36 devices were Nexus and Pixel phones. Out of the others, many had a blatantly insecure implementation. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The main features required by GrapheneOS are documented at grapheneos.org/faq. Verified boot is only one of the requirements and involves more than it simply being available. Samsung doesn't permit another OS to use verified boot and DivestOS didn't have it for most devices.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026040800 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33971-grapheneos-version-2026040…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have an official partnership with Motorola. We're working with them to improve their devices to meet our requirements. They're working on fully porting GrapheneOS to their devices including supporting all of our hardware-based security features such as hardware memory tagging.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has supported every single mode of Pixel phone. It officially supports all of the ones which aren't end-of-life including 6th gen Pixels. Non-Pixel devices don't yet provide the hardware-based security features and driver/firmware updates we need to protect our users.
-
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has supported every single mode of Pixel phone. It officially supports all of the ones which aren't end-of-life including 6th gen Pixels. Non-Pixel devices don't yet provide the hardware-based security features and driver/firmware updates we need to protect our users.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have an official partnership with Motorola. We're working with them to improve their devices to meet our requirements. They're working on fully porting GrapheneOS to their devices including supporting all of our hardware-based security features such as hardware memory tagging.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026040600 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33898-grapheneos-version-2026040…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval is the founder and president of the /e/ foundation along with the CEO of Murena. Duval and his organizations have consistently taken a stance against protecting users from exploits. In this video, he once again claims protecting against exploits is for only useful pedophiles and spies.
Translation to English:
> There's the attack surface, on that front we're not security specialists here, so I couldn't answer you precisely, but from the discussions I've had, it seems that everything we do reduces attack surface. However, we don't have a "hardened security" approach, we aren't developing a phone for pedo(censored) so they can evade justice. So there aren't difficult things to check if the memory is corrupted, really hardened security stuff that could clearly be useful for executives, in the secret service, or whatever. That's not our goal, our goal is to start from an observation: today our personal data is constantly being plundered and that wouldn't be legal in real life with the mail or the telephone, we want to change that. So we are making you a product that changes that by default for anyone.
Transcription in French:
> Il y a la surface d'attaque, là pour le coup on est pas des spécialistes de la sécurité, donc je ne pourrais pas te répondre avec précision, mais des discussions que j'ai eu, il semblerait que tout ce qu'on fait, ça réduit la surface d'attaque. Donc oui, probablement ça aide. Par contre, on a pas une approche "sécurité durcie", on développe pas un téléphone pour les pédo(bip) pour qu'ils puissent échapper à la justice. Donc il y a pas des trucs pas possibles pour voir si la mémoire est pas corrompue, des trucs de sécu vraiment durcis qui pourraient être utiles clairement pour des dirigeants, dans les services secrets ou que sais-je. C'est pas notre but, notre but c'est de partir d'un constat, aujourd'hui nos données personnelles sont pillées en permanence et ça serait pas légal dans la vraie vie avec le courrier ou le téléphone, on veut changer ça. Donc on vous fait un produit qui change ça par défaut pour n'importe quelle personne.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here are several particularly egregious examples:
www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/telephones-proteges-utilis…
www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/google-pixel-et-grapheneos…
www.franceinfo.fr/faits-divers/narcotrafic-les-autorites-…
Gaël Duval and Murena participated in these attacks. They even spread harassment content towards our team and shared it with sites attacking us.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ and Murena are based in France. They've been pushing false narratives about GrapheneOS falsely claiming it isn't usable by regular people and doesn't benefit them for years. Duval has been making the ludicrous claim GrapheneOS is only useful to criminals and spies for years.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Gaël Duval has repeatedly spread harassment content targeting our team with fabricated stories and bullying. Perhaps all of this is because he wants to maximize profits for Murena, but how is he going to achieve that by claiming serious privacy and security is for pedophiles?
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here's a paywall bypass for the 2 paywalled articles above:
archive.is/UrlvK
archive.is/AhMsj
These are among the most egregious cases of France's corporate and state media presenting highly inaccurate state smearing of GrapheneOS as fact but there's much more. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026040300 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33810-grapheneos-version-2026040…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 147.0.7727.49.1 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/147.0.7727.49.1
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33753-vanadium-version-147077274…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 147.0.7727.49.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/147.0.7727.49.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33728-vanadium-version-147077274…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS was founded in Toronto by a Canadian. GrapheneOS Foundation is a Canadian federal non-profit. Our lead developer is from Ukraine. Our non-profit has 3 directors: our founder, our lead developer and a long time project member from Kazakhstan.
Diana🎯 🇪🇺🇺🇦🇪🇸
@Diana_European
Get that American software out of Europe.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Nearly all of our fiat currency expenses are for paying accounting, legal and auditing firms. We also use a fair bit for the local hardware we use for our official builds and other infrastructure. We also need to pay for endless smartphones for our main device testing farm.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It wouldn't be that hard to move everything to another non-profit in another country. We definitely don't want to create another one with how expensive and time consuming it is to deal with it. However, there's nothing stopping us from doing it. We aren't somehow stuck in Canada.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're currently perfectly happy with Canada as a legal home for the project rather than it being based in the EU or US. Only reason we'd make a non-profit in the US or Europe would be for tax deductible donations from individuals. For businesses we can just make them invoices.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
Proton VPN
@ProtonVPN
we already have @GrapheneOS
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is an open source project. Open source means it can be modified and used for any purpose including commercial ones. People making forks of GrapheneOS are supposed to rebrand it and make it clear that it's not the official GrapheneOS but rather a derivative of it.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Apple and Google regularly tell the media they haven't seen exploits of a specific vulnerability or exploits of devices with a security protection enabled. This is heavily misinterpreted as meaning exploits aren't happening. They don't ever find out about many successful attacks.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Brazil's authoritarian age verification law became active this month. It won't be implemented by GrapheneOS. Complying would require integrating a mandatory process for each user where a third party service checks government identification and confirms a match using the camera.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There aren't yet devices supporting GrapheneOS directly sold in South America. Brazil in particular has unusually high import duties/taxes which add up to around 100%. This has resulted in us not having a lot of users there but our Motorola partnership will start changing this.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
People are going to have their personal info leaked by third party age verification services due to these laws. Children are going to be harmed by apps and websites changing their behavior to exploit them. It isn't going to stop minors finding pornography if they want to find it.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Giving an age bracket to every app and site used by a child is what's incredibly creepy and disturbing. Think a bit about how that information is going to be abused. It's extremely naive to think the laws mandating only using it to gate access will work.
Marco Deleu
@deleugyn
“Bullshit that pedophiles would say”
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This law requires telling the world when a device is verified to be used by a child. It could be abused to show creepy things only to users verified to be children. This isn't a law that's protecting children. It's exposing children's personal info and putting them at risk.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
People are going to have their personal info leaked by third party age verification services due to these laws. Children are going to be harmed by apps and websites changing their behavior to exploit them. It isn't going to stop minors finding pornography if they want to find it.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has gone through the kind of formal audits by security firms they're referring to and none of those found even a minor improvement we could make. They're not nearly as valuable as the ongoing review by downstream projects familiar with AOSP code and GrapheneOS code.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
External review and testing of GrapheneOS by ANSSI, Mullvad, other organizations and independent researchers have found a bunch of AOSP issues to address. Various minor issues have been externally reported and resolved for our own code too. Ongoing review is what's most valuable.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS started in 2014 and was originally named CopperheadOS. In late 2015, the Copperhead company was founded which was meant to support the project. Copperhead didn't create CopperheadOS and didn't own or control it. Copperhead made a failed takeover attempt on it in 2018.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Copperhead made the attacks personal and targeted the founder of GrapheneOS with fabricated stories and vile personal attacks. Henry Fisher (Techlore) collaborated with Copperhead to make it into widespread harassment. Others opportunistically took advantage of the situation.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Nicolas Merrill took advantage of the situation. He hired a Copperhead employee involved in the takeover to create CalyxOS. CalyxOS heavily used our code and documentation. It was promoted by attacking us and portraying themselves as being above the situation with Copperhead.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No one should believe the false narratives peddled by these people. They've always been in it for personal benefit and have caused immense harm to actual efforts to improve privacy and security. We're willing to forgive people who were duped by their fabrications, just reach out.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're offering forgiveness to people who have engaged in years of libel/harassment towards us if they take down their attacks, debunk it and help repair the harm caused to us. This offer even extends to Henry Fisher and Louis Rossmann. Alternatively, we can address it in court.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are at least a dozen people spending at least several hours attacking GrapheneOS across platforms on a daily basis. It's a very strange situation. How do these people have so much time and dedication to keep making posts across platforms attacking us? It's relentless.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Privacy projects are more vulnerable to these attacks because the userbase and supporters largely avoid social media and other platforms where it happens. Many people believe what they read on social media if it isn't countered and it builds echo chambers hostile to GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Many people think these must be state sponsored attacks. However, our experience is these attacks are primarily orchestrated by companies selling dubious products marketed as private and secure. We did get targeted by state sponsored smear campaigns in France and Spain though.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 147.0.7727.24.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/147.0.7727.24.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33526-vanadium-version-147077272…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 169 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33525-gmscompatconfig-version-16…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If apps are required to verify the hardware, operating system and their app for regulatory reasons they should use an approach supporting arbitrary roots of trust and operating systems. Android already has a standard hardware attestation system usable for this.
Android's documentation and sample libraries are biased towards Google by using them as the only valid root of trust and the API is biased towards stock operating systems but it's better than a centralized API.
infosec.exchange/@rene_mobile/116286110700616525
Apps should only resort to this if they're forced to do it. Root-based attestation provides minimal security and is easy to bypass. It's inherently insecure due to trusting the weakest security systems. A leaked key from the TEE/SE on any device can be used to spoof attestations for any device.
Play Integrity permits a device with years of missing security patches. It isn't a legitimate security feature. It checks for a device in compliance with Google's Android business model, not security.
Unified Attestation is another anti-competitive system putting companies selling products in control of which devices and operating systems are allowed. As with the Play Integrity API, it's a phony security feature existing to permit their products preventing a free and open market from existing.
Android's hardware attestation API is problematic for a free and open market because it supports root-based attestation. However, it does at least support choosing arbitrary trusted roots and arbitrary trusted operating systems. It isn't locked to Google's roots or stock OSes they certify.
We made a proposal to Google for pinning-based attestation support for Android hardware attestation and they ended up implementing it. It can be used in combination with root-based attestation or without it. It doesn't have the anti-competitive properties and provides far more actual security value.
Root-based attestation trusts the whole hardware attestation ecosystem. Leaked keys from any device can be used to bypass it. Pinning-based attestation starts trust from first use and then provides a high level of security based on the security of the device's early boot chain and secure element.
Root-based attestation is mainly used to disallow an arbitary device, OS or modified app for control rather than security. Pinning-based attestation lacks those negatives and can be very secure. It can be bootstrapped by root-based attestation but it works without it and it's not the only approach. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're receiving security patches from a different OEM rather than Motorola. These patches are strictly userspace AOSP patches including patches for external projects. They're the same patches released in the AOSP security tags but they're provided to OEMs to ship early prior to being released as part of AOSP. It isn't where driver, firmware or Linux kernel patches come from. We disagree with the lengthy partial embargo which exists to make OEMs look better due to being unable to quickly ship patches. These should become fully public within a few days of being broadly shared which provides easy access to any sophisticated attacker.
Both our web installer and releases page use our regular releases rather than our security preview releases. Our System Updater has a toggle for security preview releases. It shows a prompt at boot for users who haven't made an explicit choice one way or the other yet. For fresh installs, it's covered in the Setup Wizard for the Owner user so they'll never see the System Updater prompt. Clearing app data for System Updater and rebooting the OS which will trigger the prompt since it isn't explicitly set anymore. -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're receiving security patches from a different OEM rather than Motorola. These patches are strictly userspace AOSP patches including patches for external projects. They're the same patches released in the AOSP security tags but they're provided to OEMs to ship early prior to being released as part of AOSP. It isn't where driver, firmware or Linux kernel patches come from. We disagree with the lengthy partial embargo which exists to make OEMs look better due to being unable to quickly ship patches. These should become fully public within a few days of being broadly shared which provides easy access to any sophisticated attacker.
Both our web installer and releases page use our regular releases rather than our security preview releases. Our System Updater has a toggle for security preview releases. It shows a prompt at boot for users who haven't made an explicit choice one way or the other yet. For fresh installs, it's covered in the Setup Wizard for the Owner user so they'll never see the System Updater prompt. Clearing app data for System Updater and rebooting the OS which will trigger the prompt since it isn't explicitly set anymore. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android Open Source Project no longer includes Android device trees for Pixels so we stopped using them. We don't use Android device trees for any of the supported Pixel phones. Our adevtool project analyzes factory images to generate the necessary build system, overlays, etc.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android Open Source Project no longer includes Android device trees for Pixels so we stopped using them. We don't use Android device trees for any of the supported Pixel phones. Our adevtool project analyzes factory images to generate the necessary build system, overlays, etc.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
People being able to lie about their birth date won't protect minors with their real birth date entered from having it leaked on the day their age bracket increases. California's law is quite clearly harmful to the privacy of minors, but more harmful laws were passed elsewhere.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS will remain usable by anyone around the world without requiring personal information, identification or an account. GrapheneOS and our services will remain available internationally. If GrapheneOS devices can't be sold in a region due to their regulations, so be it.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The vast majority of Android devices either don't allow installing another OS or cripple functionality if you do. GrapheneOS has an official long term partnership with Motorola. We plan to support multiple of their new devices each year starting in 2027:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. We're collaborating on future devices meeting our privacy and security standards with official GrapheneOS support.
motorolanews.com/motorola-three-new-b2b-solutions-at-mwc-…Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We provide clear information on which devices are officially supported by GrapheneOS:
grapheneos.org/faq
We have a list of our hardware requirements:
grapheneos.org/faq
Our Motorola partnership will provide devices meeting our requirements with GrapheneOS support.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These laws are a privacy disaster for minors. Apps or websites being sent an age bracket leaks the birth date of the user on the day the range is updated. These laws mandate leaking private data of minors. The law disallowing it being used for other purposes or shared won't work.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
California is mandating leaking the private information of minors to corporations known to invade privacy and disregard privacy laws. We won't comply with laws harming the privacy of minors using GrapheneOS. It doesn't matter how they dress it up, that's the actual impact of it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
People being able to lie about their birth date won't protect minors with their real birth date entered from having it leaked on the day their age bracket increases. California's law is quite clearly harmful to the privacy of minors, but more harmful laws were passed elsewhere.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
California is mandating leaking the private information of minors to corporations known to invade privacy and disregard privacy laws. We won't comply with laws harming the privacy of minors using GrapheneOS. It doesn't matter how they dress it up, that's the actual impact of it.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These laws are a privacy disaster for minors. Apps or websites being sent an age bracket leaks the birth date of the user on the day the range is updated. These laws mandate leaking private data of minors. The law disallowing it being used for other purposes or shared won't work.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 146.0.7680.164.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/146.0.7680.164.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33474-vanadium-version-146076801…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The CPU in every modern computer is a massively complex closed source component. The reason people are talking about AMD PSP or cellular radios is because they've been misled by companies scamming people who claim they've changed things while actually making devices less secure.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, this is a common misconception. Cellular basebands are implemented in a similar way as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC and many other components running their own firmware on a separate processor. Modern smartphones have isolated cellular basebands with very limited access/control.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are government regulations for Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and electronics as a whole. It does not mean governments have access to those. Cellular radios are very similar to how Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and other radios. Many components have their own processors and firmware, that's the norm.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Sure, here's a post from the founder of Divested Computing debunking the false marketing for many of Braxman's products/services:
forum.f-droid.org/t/brax2-alternatives/22469/6
You can find a lot of other content from actual privacy and security experts debunking his products, services and content.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Braxman's products have atrocious security. Multiple reputable security researchers have even proven his products contain backdoors including sharing encryption keys with servers. He regularly claims mainstream products have backdoors with no evidence but yet his products do.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Security engineers/researchers watching Braxman's content will quickly see he doesn't have a clue what he's talking about. His content is largely him telling people what they want to hear and filling in the huge gaps in his basic knowledge about the topics with fabrications.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's nothing preventing having a cellular radio with open hardware and firmware. There are no laws or regulations against it. Even software defined radios are widely legal. The concept that cellular radios have to be closed source is a baseless widespread misconception.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The idea that cellular radios are unique in being closed source is wrong itself. Every mainstream CPU, GPU and many other components used in computers are closed source. Open source firmware and especially hardware isn't nearly as successful as higher level software has been.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are MANY components in a modern computer with a separate processor running firmware. There are multiple on a main SoC with the CPU and then many more, even batteries. Cellular and Wi-Fi are similar in implementation and regulations, yet people only talk about cellular.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The CPU in every modern computer is a massively complex closed source component. The reason people are talking about AMD PSP or cellular radios is because they've been misled by companies scamming people who claim they've changed things while actually making devices less secure.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are MANY components in a modern computer with a separate processor running firmware. There are multiple on a main SoC with the CPU and then many more, even batteries. Cellular and Wi-Fi are similar in implementation and regulations, yet people only talk about cellular.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The idea that cellular radios are unique in being closed source is wrong itself. Every mainstream CPU, GPU and many other components used in computers are closed source. Open source firmware and especially hardware isn't nearly as successful as higher level software has been.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's nothing preventing having a cellular radio with open hardware and firmware. There are no laws or regulations against it. Even software defined radios are widely legal. The concept that cellular radios have to be closed source is a baseless widespread misconception.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Security engineers/researchers watching Braxman's content will quickly see he doesn't have a clue what he's talking about. His content is largely him telling people what they want to hear and filling in the huge gaps in his basic knowledge about the topics with fabrications.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Braxman's products have atrocious security. Multiple reputable security researchers have even proven his products contain backdoors including sharing encryption keys with servers. He regularly claims mainstream products have backdoors with no evidence but yet his products do.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Sure, here's a post from the founder of Divested Computing debunking the false marketing for many of Braxman's products/services:
forum.f-droid.org/t/brax2-alternatives/22469/6
You can find a lot of other content from actual privacy and security experts debunking his products, services and content. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are government regulations for Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and electronics as a whole. It does not mean governments have access to those. Cellular radios are very similar to how Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and other radios. Many components have their own processors and firmware, that's the norm.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, this is a common misconception. Cellular basebands are implemented in a similar way as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC and many other components running their own firmware on a separate processor. Modern smartphones have isolated cellular basebands with very limited access/control.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Graphene is a 2D grid of carbon atoms. It has nothing to do with anything occult or a virus. We're not going to change the name of the project because of engagement bait nonsense on social media rotting people's brains. It started after we were already using the name GrapheneOS.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is highly usable and nearly all Android apps can be used on it. It has over 400k users who are nearly all very happy. Many people choose to use it in a very minimal way where they avoid using mainstream apps and services but GrapheneOS doesn't impose that on people.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS provides our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer enabling the option to install and use Google apps as regular apps with no special access. This enables using nearly all apps from the Play Store. A tiny number of apps ban using a non-GMS OS and aren't available.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Many of our users choose to largely or fully avoid Google apps/services along with many far more privacy invasive apps/services. There's a huge app ecosystem without sandboxed Google Play. People who use it often use a dedicated profile for it but it's sandboxed without that.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Graphene is a 2D grid of carbon atoms. It has nothing to do with anything occult or a virus. We're not going to change the name of the project because of engagement bait nonsense on social media rotting people's brains. It started after we were already using the name GrapheneOS.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Many of our users choose to largely or fully avoid Google apps/services along with many far more privacy invasive apps/services. There's a huge app ecosystem without sandboxed Google Play. People who use it often use a dedicated profile for it but it's sandboxed without that.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS provides our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer enabling the option to install and use Google apps as regular apps with no special access. This enables using nearly all apps from the Play Store. A tiny number of apps ban using a non-GMS OS and aren't available.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is highly usable and nearly all Android apps can be used on it. It has over 400k users who are nearly all very happy. Many people choose to use it in a very minimal way where they avoid using mainstream apps and services but GrapheneOS doesn't impose that on people.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Motorola's current devives don't meet our hardware requirements and aren't capable of running GrapheneOS. Motorola has a long term OEM partnership with us where they're improving their devices to meet our requirements and implementing everything we need.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. We're collaborating on future devices meeting our privacy and security standards with official GrapheneOS support.
motorolanews.com/motorola-three-new-b2b-solutions-at-mwc-… -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not true. Samsung has been crippling functionality including security for anyone using an alternate OS on their devices since before we started in 2014. What we've actually said is a small subset of their recent high end devices have the security features we require.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Samsung's devices closest to meeting our requirements didn't allow using another OS and wouldn't have allowed us to use the required security features if they did. Samsung has been in the process of universally removing support for using another OS so none of this really matters.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's also quite a difference between a device meeting our requirements on paper and being usable in practice. Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 5 has spec sheet MTE support but that doesn't mean it's usable in production yet. We have a lot of work to do with Motorola on these things.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Motorola's current devives don't meet our hardware requirements and aren't capable of running GrapheneOS. Motorola has a long term OEM partnership with us where they're improving their devices to meet our requirements and implementing everything we need.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. We're collaborating on future devices meeting our privacy and security standards with official GrapheneOS support.
motorolanews.com/motorola-three-new-b2b-solutions-at-mwc-… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's also quite a difference between a device meeting our requirements on paper and being usable in practice. Snapdragon 8 Elite Gen 5 has spec sheet MTE support but that doesn't mean it's usable in production yet. We have a lot of work to do with Motorola on these things.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Samsung's devices closest to meeting our requirements didn't allow using another OS and wouldn't have allowed us to use the required security features if they did. Samsung has been in the process of universally removing support for using another OS so none of this really matters.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not true. Samsung has been crippling functionality including security for anyone using an alternate OS on their devices since before we started in 2014. What we've actually said is a small subset of their recent high end devices have the security features we require.
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BrendanEich
@BrendanEich
arstechnica.com/gadgets/2026/03/google-details-new-24-hou…
OH: "What a disaster, the full process is cumbersome and ridiculous. A lot of users will switch to iOS 😞 and I honestly can't blame them."
Switch to iOS or @grapheneos.
Alan
@buxdabomb
My buddy uses graphene and I still have to text him when I’m calling his WhatsApp cuz his phone never rings from it; ntm, when he tries to open another app while on the call, the mic stops working 🤷♂️
Functionality vs security
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
WhatsApp calls and other functionality based on push messaging work fine on GrapheneOS. You're describing an issue created by how he set up his device rather than any missing functionality on GrapheneOS. There are multiple ways apps can handle push messaging and all work fine.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Companies like Cellebrite can take open source fuzzers, extend it to have better coverage of an attack surface such as USB and churn out a huge amount of vulnerabilities they can exploit. There are no serious barriers to exploiting those. Linux kernel security is getting worse.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The design and implementation of the Linux kernel is an ongoing rejection of robustness and security in favor of performance. It heavily factors into many of the decisions. It leads to atrocious real world security where vulnerabilities are dense and exploits are easy to write.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Apple has a traditional style microkernel hardly qualifies as a microkernel anymore today. There's no serious argument to be made that a modern microkernel design would be security compromise vs. everything being fully trusted with immensely complex lifetimes and concurrency.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The Linux kernel makes an ongoing decision to prefer improving performance by 2% on servers for Meta and Google over providing strong protection from exploits. They do bare minimum work on security including weak exploit protections which don't move the needle much in practice.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Even the implementation of potentially strong exploit protections in the Linux kernel is done as weak protections because they aren't willing to do the work to seriously integrate them. Instead, most serious Linux kernel hardening is in the downstream PaX and grsecurity projects.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's an ongoing choice to keep adding more complex and attack surface. Huge complexity is added for tiny benefits. There's massive resistance to major improvements because it's not tradition. There's a culture of not caring about correctness and robustness let alone security.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's no serious adoption of Rust or any strong exploit protections happening in the upstream Linux kernel. They have a bunch of automated fuzzing but a large portion of the bugs aren't investigated or fixed. Exploit companies are directly using these open source fuzzers.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Companies like Cellebrite can take open source fuzzers, extend it to have better coverage of an attack surface such as USB and churn out a huge amount of vulnerabilities they can exploit. There are no serious barriers to exploiting those. Linux kernel security is getting worse.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Linux hasn't made a serious investment in security. It has a very small and shallow investment in it. Major security improvements such as automatic integer overflow checks with opt-in to wrapping are rejected based on tradition. Most security improvements are blocked by politics.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's no serious adoption of Rust or any strong exploit protections happening in the upstream Linux kernel. They have a bunch of automated fuzzing but a large portion of the bugs aren't investigated or fixed. Exploit companies are directly using these open source fuzzers.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's an ongoing choice to keep adding more complex and attack surface. Huge complexity is added for tiny benefits. There's massive resistance to major improvements because it's not tradition. There's a culture of not caring about correctness and robustness let alone security.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Even the implementation of potentially strong exploit protections in the Linux kernel is done as weak protections because they aren't willing to do the work to seriously integrate them. Instead, most serious Linux kernel hardening is in the downstream PaX and grsecurity projects.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The Linux kernel makes an ongoing decision to prefer improving performance by 2% on servers for Meta and Google over providing strong protection from exploits. They do bare minimum work on security including weak exploit protections which don't move the needle much in practice.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Apple has a traditional style microkernel hardly qualifies as a microkernel anymore today. There's no serious argument to be made that a modern microkernel design would be security compromise vs. everything being fully trusted with immensely complex lifetimes and concurrency.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The design and implementation of the Linux kernel is an ongoing rejection of robustness and security in favor of performance. It heavily factors into many of the decisions. It leads to atrocious real world security where vulnerabilities are dense and exploits are easy to write.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Linux hasn't made a serious investment in security. It has a very small and shallow investment in it. Major security improvements such as automatic integer overflow checks with opt-in to wrapping are rejected based on tradition. Most security improvements are blocked by politics.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If compatibility with existing software isn't an issue, why not use a microkernel-based OS written in largely memory safe languages from the beginning? The only reason to use the Linux kernel at all is compatibility with software including applications, libraries and drivers.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
postmarketOS is the opposite of a privacy/security hardened OS compared to the Android Open Source Project. It's cobbled together out of many fragmented projects that are largely anti-security. It has far more memory unsafe language use and lack of systemic privacy/security work.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Regressing to a desktop software stack where privacy and security has never been taken seriously would be the opposite of progress. We would still need a fork of the Android Open Source Project for app compatibility. It wouldn't bring us any closer to replacing the Linux kernel.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The Linux kernel is a fundamentally anti-security project. It started as a rejection of a more robust and secure OS design. It continues being nearly entirely written in a memory unsafe language where tiny mistakes lead to endless severe vulnerabilities.
lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Bringing glibc, systemd and GNOME to mobile definitely doesn't look like progress to us. Building a new ecosystem with a modern OS makes far more sense. Redox OS is a compelling project making a lot of progress towards building a far more secure desktop OS. Why not start there?
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If compatibility with existing software isn't an issue, why not use a microkernel-based OS written in largely memory safe languages from the beginning? The only reason to use the Linux kernel at all is compatibility with software including applications, libraries and drivers.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Bringing glibc, systemd and GNOME to mobile definitely doesn't look like progress to us. Building a new ecosystem with a modern OS makes far more sense. Redox OS is a compelling project making a lot of progress towards building a far more secure desktop OS. Why not start there?
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The Linux kernel is a fundamentally anti-security project. It started as a rejection of a more robust and secure OS design. It continues being nearly entirely written in a memory unsafe language where tiny mistakes lead to endless severe vulnerabilities.
lore.kernel.org/linux-cve-announce/ -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Regressing to a desktop software stack where privacy and security has never been taken seriously would be the opposite of progress. We would still need a fork of the Android Open Source Project for app compatibility. It wouldn't bring us any closer to replacing the Linux kernel.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
postmarketOS is the opposite of a privacy/security hardened OS compared to the Android Open Source Project. It's cobbled together out of many fragmented projects that are largely anti-security. It has far more memory unsafe language use and lack of systemic privacy/security work.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 168 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33369-gmscompatconfig-version-16…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026032000 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33367-grapheneos-version-2026032…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We provide clear information on which devices are officially supported by GrapheneOS:
grapheneos.org/faq
We have a list of our hardware requirements:
grapheneos.org/faq
Our Motorola partnership will provide devices meeting our requirements with GrapheneOS support. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The vast majority of Android devices either don't allow installing another OS or cripple functionality if you do. GrapheneOS has an official long term partnership with Motorola. We plan to support multiple of their new devices each year starting in 2027:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. We're collaborating on future devices meeting our privacy and security standards with official GrapheneOS support.
motorolanews.com/motorola-three-new-b2b-solutions-at-mwc-… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is heavily focused on usability and compatibility. It's highly usable as a daily driver. The claims about compatibility are wrong. Nearly all Android apps can be used on GrapheneOS. Tiny minority of unavailable apps ban using an alternate OS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not true. Nearly all Android apps work on GrapheneOS. Only a tiny portion of apps banning using an alternate OS with the Play Integrity API are unavailable. 99.999% of overall apps and 90% of banking apps work on GrapheneOS. There are multiple working tap-to-pay apps.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not true. Nearly all Android apps work on GrapheneOS. Only a tiny portion of apps banning using an alternate OS with the Play Integrity API are unavailable. 99.999% of overall apps and 90% of banking apps work on GrapheneOS. There are multiple working tap-to-pay apps.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not true. Nearly all Android apps work on GrapheneOS. Only a tiny portion of apps banning using an alternate OS with the Play Integrity API are unavailable. 99.999% of overall apps and 90% of banking apps work on GrapheneOS. There are multiple working tap-to-pay apps.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is heavily focused on usability and compatibility. It's highly usable as a daily driver. The claims about compatibility are wrong. Nearly all Android apps can be used on GrapheneOS. Tiny minority of unavailable apps ban using an alternate OS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's not true. Nearly all Android apps work on GrapheneOS. Only a tiny portion of apps banning using an alternate OS with the Play Integrity API are unavailable. 99.999% of overall apps and 90% of banking apps work on GrapheneOS. There are multiple working tap-to-pay apps.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a group coordinating attacks on GrapheneOS on X via a Telegram group. They have a couple dozen accounts here. They've based their attacks around claiming modular builds and updates via packages somehow aren't open source. We debunked this here:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've written this post as a thorough debunking of extraordinarily inaccurate and misinformed claims being made about GrapheneOS. The main post making these claims is linked at the bottom.
A growing number of our apps are built and signed separately from the OS to provide out-of-band updates. Each of these apps has reproducible builds. The official standalone releases are included in the OS rather than making separate builds for each device as part of building the OS. This is the standard and most sensible way to do things. It means the apps bundled with the OS are the same builds as the standalone releases instead of having two separate types of builds with two separate build systems. Both forms of building the apps are reproducible. It makes far more sense to use Android's standard app build system and tooling for standalone apps. It makes it much easier to work with them and for people to contribute. Needing to build apps as part of building the whole OS is a major barrier to contributions and can be avoided.
Android supports out-of-band updates for the vast majority of the OS. These out-of-band updates are a major advantage over iOS. Many people aren't aware of how much can be updated out-of-band for Android. It's gradually turning into the entire OS having quite modular out-of-band updates which are fully compatible with the verified boot system. It still makes sense to have regular full OS updates which update all of the bundled components.
A huge portion of Android is shipped as APKs which can be updated out-of-band. These can be built with the OS for simplicity but can also be built separately with their own standalone releases. If they have their own standalone releases, those are supposed to be bundled with the OS as a prebuilt instead of using a separate build system for the OS updates and out-of-band updates. It would also not be reproducible if separate build systems and toolchains were being used for both.
An even larger portion of the OS can be updated out-of-band via APEX components which are an APK containing a structured filesystem with native libraries, services, data, nested APKs and other arbitrary files.
Both APEX components and APKs are fully compatible with verified boot. GrapheneOS enables enforced verified boot for system APK updates rather than only APEX components.
Android also has out-of-band updates to images via chained vbmeta (verified boot metadata) images. This works by having a hash of a key for chained vbmetas stored in the main vbmeta where each vbmeta has separately enforced downgrade protection via the secure element.
GrapheneOS has very frequent OS releases and doesn't need out-of-band updates as much as the stock Pixel OS or especially the broader Android ecosystem. We mainly use out-of-band updates for our own apps with standalone releases and include the official releases of those in the OS releases rather than making separate builds. That's the way it's supposed to be done.
Google Mobile Services Android operating systems use Google Play system updates providing APEX updates via standard builds from the Google Play Store. This provides monthly updates to large portions of the OS across devices regardless of their OS update cycle. We have no use for their approach since we have consistent OS updates which are more frequent than monthly releases. We could still set up out-of-band APEX updates to enable shipping an urgent for a specific component without an OS release but we don't currently use them as it would only save build time rather than improving usability.
Android uses prebuilts for the kernels and Chromium WebView which are built separately from the OS. The expected way to bundle most apps with the OS is to have standalone releases with the official releases bundled with it. This is how the stock Pixel OS handles APK and APEX components updated out-of-band. It doesn't interfere with reproducible builds.
Building, signing and shipping updates to the OS via modular components instead of building the entire OS for every change is going to be increasingly important as GrapheneOS scales up to a larger development team and a larger number of supported devices. It makes it far easier for people to work on smaller parts of the OS and we can release smaller updates for specific components. We're using it on a case-by-case basis for components we need to update frequently such as our GmsCompatConfig APK shipping the text file setting up most of our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer shims. We also plan to start shipping GmsCompatLib as a standalone app but it was delayed due to banking apps wrongly believing updating it out-of-band was tampering.
The claims which are being made in the linked post are extremely misinformed and backwards. They're attacking us for using approaches focused on security while claiming doing things in a far less secure way would be much better. The motivation for it is quite clearly promoting non-hardened operating systems through desperate attempts at misleading people about GrapheneOS with poorly informed claims.
They're claiming we should be doing builds and signing on cloud servers because they believe having CI web interface is a substitute for third parties reproducing and verifying builds. We make all of our official builds on local infrastructure under our physical control for clear security reasons. Our app and OS builds are both reproducible. We're gradually working on turning reproducible builds into a more useful feature by setting up a system of having alternate build locations and a system for verifying the results match across our locations and also third party locations. Our App Store and System Updater are eventually going to support verifying builds based on other official and third party build locations. Moving our builds and signing to cloud infrastructure would not reduce trust in us but would greatly expand attack surface and how much needs to be trusted.
GrapheneOS is a serious privacy and security project which is in the process of greatly expanding by hiring many developers and other people. We're improving our overall organizational and development processes as part of expanding. Expanding our use of out-of-band updates to the extent that it makes sense is part of this.
Muhammad
@TheVancedGamer
It's kind of funny how @GrapheneOS wants to let everybody know about the "dangers" of "closed source operating systems" yet they themselves ship precompiled, presigned applications that are included in their OS and are NOT reproducible, the most you can do is compile them out of tree and include them manually.
And even then, this is still a MAJOR security risk as their precompiled apps have permissions that you really don't want apps to be granted implicitly.
I've attached a photo of all the permissions available to the Messaging app, which is included in GrapheneOS at build-time as a prebuilt application. I should mention this, the aforementioned Messaging application has no form of reproducible builds, meaning the only way to update these apps is for some developer to manually build this application on their build PC, sign it and then push it to a git repo. Imagine the security implications of that. (You can unzip the app yourself to check the manifest too.)
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_external_Messaging
This is the module included into GrapheneOS. Meanwhile the actual messaging app is at github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging. For reasons beyond me, GrapheneOS devs thought it fit to remove the Android blueprints from it, therefore making this app unbuildable inside the Android source itself.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_manifest/blob/30542c6161c2…
The inclusion of said prebuilt Messaging app.
It's not just this app either. The included App Store, the Camera app, hell, even the Auditor. All of these apps are presigned and precompiled, and granted implicit permissions to do whatever. Why not compile them in-tree? WHY go out of your way to make them unbuildable by removing the blueprints? It's not about adding one yourself and doing it yourself, that's completely besides the point. The point is, why is some OS claiming to be security focused, yet has the ability to infect devices with a theoretical malware spread with these prebuilt apps? Why are these apps not built in-tree in the first place!? There is literally no excuse, every other app is compiled in-tree except these GrapheneOS inclusions.
How does it feel to trust a random person with an app that can theoretically upload all your data to a remote server without your knowledge? Further more, besides doing such things, GrapheneOS devs have the _nerve_ to go forth and cement their beliefs on others? When they themselves don't commit to their standards? If this isn't an absolute form of hypocrisy, I really don't know what is.
Maybe this post will instill some form of awareness in die-hard GOS fans. Maybe I'll get to deal with insane backlash. Who knows. At least I'm putting it out there. Maybe one day we'll get to know that this entire project was a honeypot. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Reading what you've posted publicly isn't an invasion of privacy. We're taking sensible steps to protect ourselves from relentless attacks on our project and team. That includes archiving what we can find from people trying to harm us in case our legal team ends up needing it.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The post you've linked is absolutely not valid critique but rather blatant fabrications and misrepresentations. We thoroughly debunked it with detailed factual information at x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2030402535463506069. The stuff they're claiming doesn't make logical sense and is likely AI slop.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've written this post as a thorough debunking of extraordinarily inaccurate and misinformed claims being made about GrapheneOS. The main post making these claims is linked at the bottom.
A growing number of our apps are built and signed separately from the OS to provide out-of-band updates. Each of these apps has reproducible builds. The official standalone releases are included in the OS rather than making separate builds for each device as part of building the OS. This is the standard and most sensible way to do things. It means the apps bundled with the OS are the same builds as the standalone releases instead of having two separate types of builds with two separate build systems. Both forms of building the apps are reproducible. It makes far more sense to use Android's standard app build system and tooling for standalone apps. It makes it much easier to work with them and for people to contribute. Needing to build apps as part of building the whole OS is a major barrier to contributions and can be avoided.
Android supports out-of-band updates for the vast majority of the OS. These out-of-band updates are a major advantage over iOS. Many people aren't aware of how much can be updated out-of-band for Android. It's gradually turning into the entire OS having quite modular out-of-band updates which are fully compatible with the verified boot system. It still makes sense to have regular full OS updates which update all of the bundled components.
A huge portion of Android is shipped as APKs which can be updated out-of-band. These can be built with the OS for simplicity but can also be built separately with their own standalone releases. If they have their own standalone releases, those are supposed to be bundled with the OS as a prebuilt instead of using a separate build system for the OS updates and out-of-band updates. It would also not be reproducible if separate build systems and toolchains were being used for both.
An even larger portion of the OS can be updated out-of-band via APEX components which are an APK containing a structured filesystem with native libraries, services, data, nested APKs and other arbitrary files.
Both APEX components and APKs are fully compatible with verified boot. GrapheneOS enables enforced verified boot for system APK updates rather than only APEX components.
Android also has out-of-band updates to images via chained vbmeta (verified boot metadata) images. This works by having a hash of a key for chained vbmetas stored in the main vbmeta where each vbmeta has separately enforced downgrade protection via the secure element.
GrapheneOS has very frequent OS releases and doesn't need out-of-band updates as much as the stock Pixel OS or especially the broader Android ecosystem. We mainly use out-of-band updates for our own apps with standalone releases and include the official releases of those in the OS releases rather than making separate builds. That's the way it's supposed to be done.
Google Mobile Services Android operating systems use Google Play system updates providing APEX updates via standard builds from the Google Play Store. This provides monthly updates to large portions of the OS across devices regardless of their OS update cycle. We have no use for their approach since we have consistent OS updates which are more frequent than monthly releases. We could still set up out-of-band APEX updates to enable shipping an urgent for a specific component without an OS release but we don't currently use them as it would only save build time rather than improving usability.
Android uses prebuilts for the kernels and Chromium WebView which are built separately from the OS. The expected way to bundle most apps with the OS is to have standalone releases with the official releases bundled with it. This is how the stock Pixel OS handles APK and APEX components updated out-of-band. It doesn't interfere with reproducible builds.
Building, signing and shipping updates to the OS via modular components instead of building the entire OS for every change is going to be increasingly important as GrapheneOS scales up to a larger development team and a larger number of supported devices. It makes it far easier for people to work on smaller parts of the OS and we can release smaller updates for specific components. We're using it on a case-by-case basis for components we need to update frequently such as our GmsCompatConfig APK shipping the text file setting up most of our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer shims. We also plan to start shipping GmsCompatLib as a standalone app but it was delayed due to banking apps wrongly believing updating it out-of-band was tampering.
The claims which are being made in the linked post are extremely misinformed and backwards. They're attacking us for using approaches focused on security while claiming doing things in a far less secure way would be much better. The motivation for it is quite clearly promoting non-hardened operating systems through desperate attempts at misleading people about GrapheneOS with poorly informed claims.
They're claiming we should be doing builds and signing on cloud servers because they believe having CI web interface is a substitute for third parties reproducing and verifying builds. We make all of our official builds on local infrastructure under our physical control for clear security reasons. Our app and OS builds are both reproducible. We're gradually working on turning reproducible builds into a more useful feature by setting up a system of having alternate build locations and a system for verifying the results match across our locations and also third party locations. Our App Store and System Updater are eventually going to support verifying builds based on other official and third party build locations. Moving our builds and signing to cloud infrastructure would not reduce trust in us but would greatly expand attack surface and how much needs to be trusted.
GrapheneOS is a serious privacy and security project which is in the process of greatly expanding by hiring many developers and other people. We're improving our overall organizational and development processes as part of expanding. Expanding our use of out-of-band updates to the extent that it makes sense is part of this.
Muhammad
@TheVancedGamer
It's kind of funny how @GrapheneOS wants to let everybody know about the "dangers" of "closed source operating systems" yet they themselves ship precompiled, presigned applications that are included in their OS and are NOT reproducible, the most you can do is compile them out of tree and include them manually.
And even then, this is still a MAJOR security risk as their precompiled apps have permissions that you really don't want apps to be granted implicitly.
I've attached a photo of all the permissions available to the Messaging app, which is included in GrapheneOS at build-time as a prebuilt application. I should mention this, the aforementioned Messaging application has no form of reproducible builds, meaning the only way to update these apps is for some developer to manually build this application on their build PC, sign it and then push it to a git repo. Imagine the security implications of that. (You can unzip the app yourself to check the manifest too.)
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_external_Messaging
This is the module included into GrapheneOS. Meanwhile the actual messaging app is at github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging. For reasons beyond me, GrapheneOS devs thought it fit to remove the Android blueprints from it, therefore making this app unbuildable inside the Android source itself.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_manifest/blob/30542c6161c2…
The inclusion of said prebuilt Messaging app.
It's not just this app either. The included App Store, the Camera app, hell, even the Auditor. All of these apps are presigned and precompiled, and granted implicit permissions to do whatever. Why not compile them in-tree? WHY go out of your way to make them unbuildable by removing the blueprints? It's not about adding one yourself and doing it yourself, that's completely besides the point. The point is, why is some OS claiming to be security focused, yet has the ability to infect devices with a theoretical malware spread with these prebuilt apps? Why are these apps not built in-tree in the first place!? There is literally no excuse, every other app is compiled in-tree except these GrapheneOS inclusions.
How does it feel to trust a random person with an app that can theoretically upload all your data to a remote server without your knowledge? Further more, besides doing such things, GrapheneOS devs have the _nerve_ to go forth and cement their beliefs on others? When they themselves don't commit to their standards? If this isn't an absolute form of hypocrisy, I really don't know what is.
Maybe this post will instill some form of awareness in die-hard GOS fans. Maybe I'll get to deal with insane backlash. Who knows. At least I'm putting it out there. Maybe one day we'll get to know that this entire project was a honeypot.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Your support for highly inaccurate attacks on the GrapheneOS project and our team by organizations who feel threatened by it is what's shameful. You're even supporting the ongoing personal attacks on our team with fabricated stories. You're lying about what we've said and done.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You follow an obscure account @TeleviziaSTB made by one of the people involved in the attacks on GrapheneOS with @TheVancedGamer coordinated in his semi-public Telegram group we've been monitoring. You aren't an uninvolved person who was interested in GrapheneOS as you claim.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Reading what you've posted publicly isn't an invasion of privacy. We're taking sensible steps to protect ourselves from relentless attacks on our project and team. That includes archiving what we can find from people trying to harm us in case our legal team ends up needing it.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> Once again: Please stick to the facts.
We're sticking to the facts. You're posting baseless conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS: x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2034339587452174687
> We are not attacking the Graphene OS team. We are clarifying the intent behind UnifiedAttestation and have invited the Graphene OS team to participate.
You are attacking GrapheneOS and the GrapheneOS team.
> Vollaficationist is not an account belonging to Volla Systeme or any Volla Systeme employee.
If it doesn't belong to a Volla employee, how do they know when Volla contacted GrapheneOS and other internal details from Volla? Why do they have a very unique writing style and posts with unique content matching one of Volla's employees on LinkedIn and elsewhere?
> Today, some apps use Google Play Integrity. These are primarily banking, payment, and digital ID apps. In some countries, citizens rely on these apps because government-issued ID apps, for example, are a prerequisite for opening a bank account. We view this development critically.
A tiny portion of Android apps use the Play Integrity API. 90% of banking and government apps do not enforce it. >99.999% of other categories of apps do not enforce it. This is something we can be fought and defeated. Creating another system with a similar design helps the Play Integrity API by legitimizing it and harming efforts to defeat it.
> To be able to offer alternative Android operating systems to all users without limitations, UnifiedAttestation is an open-source, freely available alternative to Google Play Integrity.
It's a centralized, anti-competitive system which will not permit freely using arbitrary hardware and software. It will only permit products from the companies involved in it. It's irrelevant whether the server side code is open source to whether it's anti-competitive. It cannot simply be hosted by anyone else since apps aren't going to trust arbitrary servers. Claiming it's open source is simply a red herring. It being freely available is worse than if it was paid.
> We see a greater chance of convincing app developers and publishers who currently use Google Play Integrity to adopt an alternative rather than to abandon Google Play Integrity altogether. However, this persuasion will only succeed if app developers and publishers see a relevant market. Hence the consortium. Perhaps we will even succeed in making UnifiedAttestation an open standard.
The Android hardware attestation API already exists. Unified Attestation is entirely built on top of it. There's no legitimate reason for it to exist beyond a power grab.
> Once again, for clarification: UnifiedAttestation should not be a prerequisite for apps to be installed and used on alternative Android systems—not at all. It concerns a small subset of apps that currently prevents customers from using an alternative Android operating system.
These apps can use the standard Android hardware attestation API to permit arbitrary operating systems. There's no need for a centralized service wrapping it and putting control over what's allowed in your hands.
> Regarding your statement about Volla as a hardware manufacturer. That is a false statement. Volla Systems is an OEM with complex supply chains for its own hardware, in which our designers and engineers are involved, and with its own production capacities for the final production steps. This gives us full access to the source code generated in the supply chain, starting with the Android source tree of the SoC manufacturer.
No, it's a correct statement. Your devices are designed and produced for you by an ODM. You do not have the full source code as you claim. You're misrepresenting your level of involvement in designing and producing the devices along with how much access you have. You certainly don't have access to all of the sources for the firmware, let alone the hardware. The source tree of the SoC manufacturer (MediaTek) provided to their partners is not even the full sources for userspace.
Vollaficationist quite clearly belongs to someone at Volla who has made very similar posts from his personal accounts on LinkedIn and elsewhere. It's the same writing style and claims coming from the personal accounts elsewhere. How do you explain this account having internal information from Volla and using the same unique writing style and unique claims coming from someone who works for Volla from their personal accounts on other platforms?
> Let’s make good products and develop the market for alternatives.
You're working towards locking out alternatives including GrapheneOS. We aren't on the same side and trying to mislead people with your inaccurate marketing about both Unified Attestation, your products and many inaccurate claims about GrapheneOS further confirms it. You're posting the same stuff you were via the Vollaficationist account dressed up in a more formal way.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We posted a thread on our Mastodon instance addressing the underhanded attacks being made on GrapheneOS by Volla due to our opposition to their Unified Attestation API:
grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116251325625494349
An account previously pretending to be a fan supporting Volla has been clearly exposed as run by them.
Despite how this account has previously posted, it began repeatedly posting on behalf of Volla and referring to themselves as being part of it. They referenced Volla contacting us half a year ago wanting a partnership with us which didn't go anywhere as they're unable to meet our requirements.
We've opposed Unified Attestation on very reasonable grounds which we've once again elaborated on in the linked thread after covering this. This account clearly run by Volla themselves has repeatedly posted outrageous conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS implying we're working for the US government.
We included links to a history of posts predating our opposition to Unified Attestation where they engage in false marketing of Volla products and try to convince people to use those over other options with inaccurate claims. That includes them replying to threads where people discussed GrapheneOS.
They were misleading people about GrapheneOS prior to us speaking of them. They're now attacking us in a super underhanded way because we oppose them seizing control over which devices and operating systems are allowed for European banking/government apps. Don't allow them to memory hole this.
The account is very clearly run by Volla, has openly acknowledged it and proven it with insider knowledge. We also have a very good idea of exactly who is running the account due to the writing style. These companies using sockpuppet accounts and personal accounts to attack us doesn't lessen it. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We posted a thread on our Mastodon instance addressing the underhanded attacks being made on GrapheneOS by Volla due to our opposition to their Unified Attestation API:
grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116251325625494349
An account previously pretending to be a fan supporting Volla has been clearly exposed as run by them.
Despite how this account has previously posted, it began repeatedly posting on behalf of Volla and referring to themselves as being part of it. They referenced Volla contacting us half a year ago wanting a partnership with us which didn't go anywhere as they're unable to meet our requirements.
We've opposed Unified Attestation on very reasonable grounds which we've once again elaborated on in the linked thread after covering this. This account clearly run by Volla themselves has repeatedly posted outrageous conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS implying we're working for the US government.
We included links to a history of posts predating our opposition to Unified Attestation where they engage in false marketing of Volla products and try to convince people to use those over other options with inaccurate claims. That includes them replying to threads where people discussed GrapheneOS.
They were misleading people about GrapheneOS prior to us speaking of them. They're now attacking us in a super underhanded way because we oppose them seizing control over which devices and operating systems are allowed for European banking/government apps. Don't allow them to memory hole this.
The account is very clearly run by Volla, has openly acknowledged it and proven it with insider knowledge. We also have a very good idea of exactly who is running the account due to the writing style. These companies using sockpuppet accounts and personal accounts to attack us doesn't lessen it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here's an archive preserving all of the posts from this account clearly run Volla:
archive.ph/LhddH
It has the whole history of how it was used to promote it pretending to be a supporter with inaccurate marketing to the current outrageous conspiracy theory attacks.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're open to suggestions on a better archiving site since there are some complaints about the one we've been using. archive.org has repeatedly removed archives upon request by companies covering up what they've done to GrapheneOS so their service isn't acceptable.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> Once again: Please stick to the facts.
We're sticking to the facts. You're posting baseless conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS: x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2034339587452174687
> We are not attacking the Graphene OS team. We are clarifying the intent behind UnifiedAttestation and have invited the Graphene OS team to participate.
You are attacking GrapheneOS and the GrapheneOS team.
> Vollaficationist is not an account belonging to Volla Systeme or any Volla Systeme employee.
If it doesn't belong to a Volla employee, how do they know when Volla contacted GrapheneOS and other internal details from Volla? Why do they have a very unique writing style and posts with unique content matching one of Volla's employees on LinkedIn and elsewhere?
> Today, some apps use Google Play Integrity. These are primarily banking, payment, and digital ID apps. In some countries, citizens rely on these apps because government-issued ID apps, for example, are a prerequisite for opening a bank account. We view this development critically.
A tiny portion of Android apps use the Play Integrity API. 90% of banking and government apps do not enforce it. >99.999% of other categories of apps do not enforce it. This is something we can be fought and defeated. Creating another system with a similar design helps the Play Integrity API by legitimizing it and harming efforts to defeat it.
> To be able to offer alternative Android operating systems to all users without limitations, UnifiedAttestation is an open-source, freely available alternative to Google Play Integrity.
It's a centralized, anti-competitive system which will not permit freely using arbitrary hardware and software. It will only permit products from the companies involved in it. It's irrelevant whether the server side code is open source to whether it's anti-competitive. It cannot simply be hosted by anyone else since apps aren't going to trust arbitrary servers. Claiming it's open source is simply a red herring. It being freely available is worse than if it was paid.
> We see a greater chance of convincing app developers and publishers who currently use Google Play Integrity to adopt an alternative rather than to abandon Google Play Integrity altogether. However, this persuasion will only succeed if app developers and publishers see a relevant market. Hence the consortium. Perhaps we will even succeed in making UnifiedAttestation an open standard.
The Android hardware attestation API already exists. Unified Attestation is entirely built on top of it. There's no legitimate reason for it to exist beyond a power grab.
> Once again, for clarification: UnifiedAttestation should not be a prerequisite for apps to be installed and used on alternative Android systems—not at all. It concerns a small subset of apps that currently prevents customers from using an alternative Android operating system.
These apps can use the standard Android hardware attestation API to permit arbitrary operating systems. There's no need for a centralized service wrapping it and putting control over what's allowed in your hands.
> Regarding your statement about Volla as a hardware manufacturer. That is a false statement. Volla Systems is an OEM with complex supply chains for its own hardware, in which our designers and engineers are involved, and with its own production capacities for the final production steps. This gives us full access to the source code generated in the supply chain, starting with the Android source tree of the SoC manufacturer.
No, it's a correct statement. Your devices are designed and produced for you by an ODM. You do not have the full source code as you claim. You're misrepresenting your level of involvement in designing and producing the devices along with how much access you have. You certainly don't have access to all of the sources for the firmware, let alone the hardware. The source tree of the SoC manufacturer (MediaTek) provided to their partners is not even the full sources for userspace.
Vollaficationist quite clearly belongs to someone at Volla who has made very similar posts from his personal accounts on LinkedIn and elsewhere. It's the same writing style and claims coming from the personal accounts elsewhere. How do you explain this account having internal information from Volla and using the same unique writing style and unique claims coming from someone who works for Volla from their personal accounts on other platforms?
> Let’s make good products and develop the market for alternatives.
You're working towards locking out alternatives including GrapheneOS. We aren't on the same side and trying to mislead people with your inaccurate marketing about both Unified Attestation, your products and many inaccurate claims about GrapheneOS further confirms it. You're posting the same stuff you were via the Vollaficationist account dressed up in a more formal way.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We posted a thread on our Mastodon instance addressing the underhanded attacks being made on GrapheneOS by Volla due to our opposition to their Unified Attestation API:
grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116251325625494349
An account previously pretending to be a fan supporting Volla has been clearly exposed as run by them.
Despite how this account has previously posted, it began repeatedly posting on behalf of Volla and referring to themselves as being part of it. They referenced Volla contacting us half a year ago wanting a partnership with us which didn't go anywhere as they're unable to meet our requirements.
We've opposed Unified Attestation on very reasonable grounds which we've once again elaborated on in the linked thread after covering this. This account clearly run by Volla themselves has repeatedly posted outrageous conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS implying we're working for the US government.
We included links to a history of posts predating our opposition to Unified Attestation where they engage in false marketing of Volla products and try to convince people to use those over other options with inaccurate claims. That includes them replying to threads where people discussed GrapheneOS.
They were misleading people about GrapheneOS prior to us speaking of them. They're now attacking us in a super underhanded way because we oppose them seizing control over which devices and operating systems are allowed for European banking/government apps. Don't allow them to memory hole this.
The account is very clearly run by Volla, has openly acknowledged it and proven it with insider knowledge. We also have a very good idea of exactly who is running the account due to the writing style. These companies using sockpuppet accounts and personal accounts to attack us doesn't lessen it. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 146.0.7680.153.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/146.0.7680.153.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33290-vanadium-version-146076801…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You follow an obscure account @TeleviziaSTB made by one of the people involved in the attacks on GrapheneOS with @TheVancedGamer coordinated in his semi-public Telegram group we've been monitoring. You aren't an uninvolved person who was interested in GrapheneOS as you claim.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Your support for highly inaccurate attacks on the GrapheneOS project and our team by organizations who feel threatened by it is what's shameful. You're even supporting the ongoing personal attacks on our team with fabricated stories. You're lying about what we've said and done.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The post you've linked is absolutely not valid critique but rather blatant fabrications and misrepresentations. We thoroughly debunked it with detailed factual information at x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2030402535463506069. The stuff they're claiming doesn't make logical sense and is likely AI slop.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've written this post as a thorough debunking of extraordinarily inaccurate and misinformed claims being made about GrapheneOS. The main post making these claims is linked at the bottom.
A growing number of our apps are built and signed separately from the OS to provide out-of-band updates. Each of these apps has reproducible builds. The official standalone releases are included in the OS rather than making separate builds for each device as part of building the OS. This is the standard and most sensible way to do things. It means the apps bundled with the OS are the same builds as the standalone releases instead of having two separate types of builds with two separate build systems. Both forms of building the apps are reproducible. It makes far more sense to use Android's standard app build system and tooling for standalone apps. It makes it much easier to work with them and for people to contribute. Needing to build apps as part of building the whole OS is a major barrier to contributions and can be avoided.
Android supports out-of-band updates for the vast majority of the OS. These out-of-band updates are a major advantage over iOS. Many people aren't aware of how much can be updated out-of-band for Android. It's gradually turning into the entire OS having quite modular out-of-band updates which are fully compatible with the verified boot system. It still makes sense to have regular full OS updates which update all of the bundled components.
A huge portion of Android is shipped as APKs which can be updated out-of-band. These can be built with the OS for simplicity but can also be built separately with their own standalone releases. If they have their own standalone releases, those are supposed to be bundled with the OS as a prebuilt instead of using a separate build system for the OS updates and out-of-band updates. It would also not be reproducible if separate build systems and toolchains were being used for both.
An even larger portion of the OS can be updated out-of-band via APEX components which are an APK containing a structured filesystem with native libraries, services, data, nested APKs and other arbitrary files.
Both APEX components and APKs are fully compatible with verified boot. GrapheneOS enables enforced verified boot for system APK updates rather than only APEX components.
Android also has out-of-band updates to images via chained vbmeta (verified boot metadata) images. This works by having a hash of a key for chained vbmetas stored in the main vbmeta where each vbmeta has separately enforced downgrade protection via the secure element.
GrapheneOS has very frequent OS releases and doesn't need out-of-band updates as much as the stock Pixel OS or especially the broader Android ecosystem. We mainly use out-of-band updates for our own apps with standalone releases and include the official releases of those in the OS releases rather than making separate builds. That's the way it's supposed to be done.
Google Mobile Services Android operating systems use Google Play system updates providing APEX updates via standard builds from the Google Play Store. This provides monthly updates to large portions of the OS across devices regardless of their OS update cycle. We have no use for their approach since we have consistent OS updates which are more frequent than monthly releases. We could still set up out-of-band APEX updates to enable shipping an urgent for a specific component without an OS release but we don't currently use them as it would only save build time rather than improving usability.
Android uses prebuilts for the kernels and Chromium WebView which are built separately from the OS. The expected way to bundle most apps with the OS is to have standalone releases with the official releases bundled with it. This is how the stock Pixel OS handles APK and APEX components updated out-of-band. It doesn't interfere with reproducible builds.
Building, signing and shipping updates to the OS via modular components instead of building the entire OS for every change is going to be increasingly important as GrapheneOS scales up to a larger development team and a larger number of supported devices. It makes it far easier for people to work on smaller parts of the OS and we can release smaller updates for specific components. We're using it on a case-by-case basis for components we need to update frequently such as our GmsCompatConfig APK shipping the text file setting up most of our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer shims. We also plan to start shipping GmsCompatLib as a standalone app but it was delayed due to banking apps wrongly believing updating it out-of-band was tampering.
The claims which are being made in the linked post are extremely misinformed and backwards. They're attacking us for using approaches focused on security while claiming doing things in a far less secure way would be much better. The motivation for it is quite clearly promoting non-hardened operating systems through desperate attempts at misleading people about GrapheneOS with poorly informed claims.
They're claiming we should be doing builds and signing on cloud servers because they believe having CI web interface is a substitute for third parties reproducing and verifying builds. We make all of our official builds on local infrastructure under our physical control for clear security reasons. Our app and OS builds are both reproducible. We're gradually working on turning reproducible builds into a more useful feature by setting up a system of having alternate build locations and a system for verifying the results match across our locations and also third party locations. Our App Store and System Updater are eventually going to support verifying builds based on other official and third party build locations. Moving our builds and signing to cloud infrastructure would not reduce trust in us but would greatly expand attack surface and how much needs to be trusted.
GrapheneOS is a serious privacy and security project which is in the process of greatly expanding by hiring many developers and other people. We're improving our overall organizational and development processes as part of expanding. Expanding our use of out-of-band updates to the extent that it makes sense is part of this.
Muhammad
@TheVancedGamer
It's kind of funny how @GrapheneOS wants to let everybody know about the "dangers" of "closed source operating systems" yet they themselves ship precompiled, presigned applications that are included in their OS and are NOT reproducible, the most you can do is compile them out of tree and include them manually.
And even then, this is still a MAJOR security risk as their precompiled apps have permissions that you really don't want apps to be granted implicitly.
I've attached a photo of all the permissions available to the Messaging app, which is included in GrapheneOS at build-time as a prebuilt application. I should mention this, the aforementioned Messaging application has no form of reproducible builds, meaning the only way to update these apps is for some developer to manually build this application on their build PC, sign it and then push it to a git repo. Imagine the security implications of that. (You can unzip the app yourself to check the manifest too.)
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_external_Messaging
This is the module included into GrapheneOS. Meanwhile the actual messaging app is at github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging. For reasons beyond me, GrapheneOS devs thought it fit to remove the Android blueprints from it, therefore making this app unbuildable inside the Android source itself.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_manifest/blob/30542c6161c2…
The inclusion of said prebuilt Messaging app.
It's not just this app either. The included App Store, the Camera app, hell, even the Auditor. All of these apps are presigned and precompiled, and granted implicit permissions to do whatever. Why not compile them in-tree? WHY go out of your way to make them unbuildable by removing the blueprints? It's not about adding one yourself and doing it yourself, that's completely besides the point. The point is, why is some OS claiming to be security focused, yet has the ability to infect devices with a theoretical malware spread with these prebuilt apps? Why are these apps not built in-tree in the first place!? There is literally no excuse, every other app is compiled in-tree except these GrapheneOS inclusions.
How does it feel to trust a random person with an app that can theoretically upload all your data to a remote server without your knowledge? Further more, besides doing such things, GrapheneOS devs have the _nerve_ to go forth and cement their beliefs on others? When they themselves don't commit to their standards? If this isn't an absolute form of hypocrisy, I really don't know what is.
Maybe this post will instill some form of awareness in die-hard GOS fans. Maybe I'll get to deal with insane backlash. Who knows. At least I'm putting it out there. Maybe one day we'll get to know that this entire project was a honeypot. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> Please stick to the facts.
We're sticking to the facts. You're posting baseless conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2034339587452174687
> It is legal to release and sell proprietary software like Apple and Google do.
>
> UnifiedAttestation is not proprietary software. It is planned to be fully open-source and freely available software (FOSS).
That's irrelevant. This has nothing to do with open source vs. closed source. It's anti-competitive because there's a cartel formed by companies selling products making a system which only permits their products. Those companies want want many app developers to adopt their system to enforce only using the products it permits to stop people from having the freedom to use any hardware or software they choose.
> For an alternative to Google Play Integrity to succeed, it is necessary to attract developers who currently use Google Play Integrity. This, in turn, requires a system that enables verification and certification independent of OEMs and operating system manufacturers and is used by many of these manufacturers. A compatibility to these apps, that are currently not running on alternative Android operating systems, will increase the appeal of this alternatives.
Google Play Integrity API is quite clearly an illegal anti-competitive system. A lot of progress has been made towards regulators/legislators acknowledging this and acting upon it. Google engaging in illegal anti-competitive behavior doesn't justify other companies doing it. Making another illegal anti-competitive system is not a solution. GrapheneOS will not participate in a system which imposes arbitrary rules on what we're allowed to do under threat of having a large amount of app compatibility taken away. We will not give companies hostile towards GrapheneOS control over which apps can be used on it either. You do not have the right to do it. It is not legal for you to work with your competitors to make a system permitting your products but not everything else. This is clearly an anti-competitive cartel and it's illegal under EU law. You cannot be the ones making it or running it. The only way this is legal is for it to be done by a truly neutral organization where the companies making products aren't involved and don't have undue influence over it. It's entirely possible for this to be done by one or more neutral organizations using the existing Android hardware attestation API with the only new system being a way to fetch a list of what each organization allows.
> There will be no requirement for apps to use UnifiedAttestation. The goal is simply to ensure compatibility with apps that currently use Google Play Integrity.
Apps are not required to adopt the Play Integrity API, but that doesn't change that it's an illegal anti-competitive system. Each app adopting it is participating is illegal suppression of an open market where anyone is free to participate. Unified Attestation will be no different. GrapheneOS is not free to participate in Unified Attestation because it's illegal and because the companies involved have been incredibly hostile towards us with years of underhanded attacks on GrapheneOS.
You're pushing for apps to adopt it. It coincides with efforts by multiple parts of the EU to force certification systems for using banking/government apps. You claim that it won't be required but it's clear that it will be required if it gains widespread adoption. You're building a system for future abuse by the EU to control what people are allowed to use on their devices. With no demand for you to build it, you're making a system enabling a police state to control people.
> It is therefore the exact opposite of a restriction on competition or a cartel. It is an initiative for an open standard that even goes beyond Android.
It's irrelevant whether the code is open source. Google could publish the entirety of the Google Play Integrity code with no change in how illegal it is. They don't require any apps to adopt it which doesn't make it legal. With the Play Integrity API, Google is abusing their market position to lock people into their products. With Unified Attestation, multiple companies forming a significant part of a specific niche market space have formed a cartel to permit their products while locking out others. Both of these things are violations of the law. Engaging in this kind of anti-competitive behavior is not legal. Telling us that we're invited to join an illegal cartel doesn't make it any less illegal. We won't be participating and you must not ban using GrapheneOS or we'll be filing a lawsuit against all of the companies involved.
> The consortium is currently informal and still in the formal founding process. Graphene OS is invited to help shape UnifiedAttestation, just as we have invited Graphene OS in the past to collaborate and partner with us regarding your operating system and our hardware.
GrapheneOS will not participate in an illegal anti-competitive cartel. GrapheneOS also isn't going to support bottom of the barrel MediaTek hardware. You've just made a bunch of inaccurate attacks on GrapheneOS on Mastodon making the outrageous claim that it must be part of a US conspiracy aimed at harming European companies.
> Volla OS is not based on Lineage OS, but on AOSP. It is true that Volla OS uses elements from Lineage OS and other free open source projects. In addition, it includes our own services and apps.
Okay, and what's your point? GrapheneOS isn't based on LineageOS either. Both /e/ and iodéOS are based on LineageOS. It doesn't change anything about Unified Attestation being anti-competitive.
> As an OEM, we have full access to all levels of the firmware, which we carefully review, clean up, and harden. This makes a difference.
Your devices are white labelled products from an ODM partner. We can have a company make devices which are branded as GrapheneOS devices too. We've had numerous opporunities to do so. We aren't interested in having bottom of the barrel MediaTek SoC devices failing to meet our official security requirements. That's why we haven't taken up any of these partnership offers or paid an ODM to make devices for us.
> Maintaining our operating system includes updates to the kernel and device drivers, AOSP, and all other components.
You don't provide proper updates to the kernel, drivers, firmware or AOSP. You provide the standard partial backports to older releases of Android. Linux kernel updates are far more frequent and involve far more than what Android lists, as do the overall Android updates and driver/firmware updates. /e/ and iodéOS do much worse than you along with misleading users about it, yet they're a core part of this initiative. They've consistently set a fake Android security patch level and yet they're going to have control over what's permitted.
> This commitment is verifiable through the publication of our source code. Through UnifiedAttestation, we aim to demonstrate the system’s security via an independent third party as well as through transparent, public testing procedures and test reports.
Unified Attestation has nothing to do with security and a legitimate security review with reasonable standards would not permit these products or most Android devices. Play Integrity API is not about security and neither is your system. These are anti-competitive systems which enforce only using products from certain companies for the benefit of those companies.
> UnifiedAttestation is an initiative born from the realization that, despite competition, collaboration on shared challenges makes sense. It is good that there is not just a single provider of an alternative operating system. It is a sign of a relevant market.
Collusion between companies which are supposed to to be competiting with each other to lock out other participants from the market with a system only permitting the products of the companies participating in it is not an innocent form of collaboration. It's an illegal anti-competitive cartel.
> Let’s bring great products to market! You, Volla and all the other players.
You're welcome to make products which you claim are in the same space and competing with us. You aren't welcome to form an anti-competitive cartel where GrapheneOS devices will be forbidden due to our lack of participation. That's illegal and we'll file a lawsuit against you.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We posted a thread on our Mastodon instance addressing the underhanded attacks being made on GrapheneOS by Volla due to our opposition to their Unified Attestation API:
grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116251325625494349
An account previously pretending to be a fan supporting Volla has been clearly exposed as run by them.
Despite how this account has previously posted, it began repeatedly posting on behalf of Volla and referring to themselves as being part of it. They referenced Volla contacting us half a year ago wanting a partnership with us which didn't go anywhere as they're unable to meet our requirements.
We've opposed Unified Attestation on very reasonable grounds which we've once again elaborated on in the linked thread after covering this. This account clearly run by Volla themselves has repeatedly posted outrageous conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS implying we're working for the US government.
We included links to a history of posts predating our opposition to Unified Attestation where they engage in false marketing of Volla products and try to convince people to use those over other options with inaccurate claims. That includes them replying to threads where people discussed GrapheneOS.
They were misleading people about GrapheneOS prior to us speaking of them. They're now attacking us in a super underhanded way because we oppose them seizing control over which devices and operating systems are allowed for European banking/government apps. Don't allow them to memory hole this.
The account is very clearly run by Volla, has openly acknowledged it and proven it with insider knowledge. We also have a very good idea of exactly who is running the account due to the writing style. These companies using sockpuppet accounts and personal accounts to attack us doesn't lessen it. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android provides a standard hardware attestation system with support for alternate operating systems via allowing their verified boot key fingerprints. It's mainly used with Google's root of trust and remote key provisioning service but the API supports alternative roots of trust.
Volla's Unified Attestation is fully built on Android's hardware attestation API. It solely exists to create a centralized authority and service determining what's allowed under their control.
mastodon.social/@volla/116238706890314617
Unified Attestation will permit using products from the companies involved in it while forbidding using arbitrary alternatives. They clearly aren't going to enforce reasonable security standards since their products wouldn't meet those. The whole purpose of the system is to permit their products regardless of merit and convince banking/government apps to adopt it.
There's nothing neutral or fair about a system controlled by companies approving their own products while disallowing other options.
Companies forming an anti-competitive cartel providing a service which permitting their products and while disallowing others isn't legal regardless of how they market it. It's not legal when Google does it with the Play Integrity API and it's not legal when it's Volla, Murena and iodé doing it. We won't be participating in a system which gives these companies veto power over app compatibility on GrapheneOS. These companies will not be given the power to make arbitrary demands of GrapheneOS.
We've been talking back and forth with multiple regulators over the past several years about the Play Integrity API to have action taken against it. Unified Attestation is a massive disruption to our efforts and will get in the way of having regulators take action against this. We've also been considering filing a lawsuit against Google over the Play Integrity API.
Unlike Google, the companies involved in Unified Attestation don't have massive resources to defend their anti-competitive system.
Android's standard hardware API doesn't require delegating verification to a centralized service. One or more neutral organizations could exist certifying devices and operating systems without providing a centralized API. Those organizations could simply provide signed releases with the roots of trust, revoked keys and operating system key fingerprints. Apps could use multiple different certifying organizations. This is already something Android's hardware attestation API fully supports today.
Volla, Murena and iodé are each a for-profit company selling devices. Each of them has failed to keep up with important security patches and protections. Each has marketed their products as providing a level of security they don't provide. It's very clear why these 3 companies want to be in charge of choosing which devices and operating systems people are allowed to use. They want to make sure their products are permitted and want to have an advantage over others to boost their profits.
Unified Attestation is an anti-competitive cartel turning a decentralized decision into a centralized one. Instead of neutral organizations being formed to certify devices without a massive conflict of interest, these companies will sign off on their products regardless of the level of insecurity. Multiple competing companies forming a cartel which locks out other options is not legal. We're fully willing to file one or more lawsuits over this. It should be discontinued now prior to harming us.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> UnifiedAttestation is legal because the software is an independent, non-derivative work.
It's not legal because it's an anti-competitive cartel from several companies collaborating to ban using anything other than the products of the companies participating in it.
It's irrelevant that it's open source, which doesn't change that it's a centralized anti-competitive system. A court isn't going to care whether your centralized system has open source code.
> > The proposed system is open source under the permissive Apache 2.0 license. The verification and certification process will be transparent and independent of the respective OEM.
For-profit companies choosing what's permitted to be used and imposing rules on others who want to be permitted is inherently anti-competitive and against the law. We're already in the process of winning a lawsuit and we can accept spending a bunch of money on winning another too. That's not an idle threat and you should seriously consider whether you want a legal conflict with us in multiple jurisdictions over this.
> The consortium is already much larger than the manufacturers mentioned, and Graphene OS is invited to participate and contribute for improvements.
GrapheneOS will not participate in an anti-competitive system that's illegal under Canadian law and is clearly being made to permit the products of those participating regardless of their atrocious security. The system needs to be discontinued rather than GrapheneOS being invited to join it which isn't going to happen.
GrapheneOS was not invited to participate until we publicly posted about this. We would have happily spoken our mind about this in private years ago to explain why it's completely unacceptable. You chose to involve multiple companies which have spent years trying to mislead people about GrapheneOS including with vile attacks on our team to promote their products. You only invited us because we strongly publicly opposed the system and it isn't going to change that we oppose it. We could have steered you away from making a completely unacceptable system years ago but now you're going to need to discontinue it after all of this work on it.
Your companies selling phones and operating systems cannot be the ones deciding what's permitted. It's inherently anti-competitive and should never have been attempted. This should only be done by multiple independent third parties with a decentralized system not requiring any centralized service. Android hardware attestation is perfectly usable without you building a centralized service on top of it.
You could be distributing a signed list of approved roots and approved verified boot key fingerprints for Android hardware attestation instead of fully seizing control with a centralized service. That would still be immensely problematic due to the companies making the products being in charge of what's allowed but at least it could work alongside others instead of seizing full control with a centralized service.
> UnifiedAttestation's intention is to promote competition and it has the potential to attract app developers who currently use Google Play Integrity, thereby making alternatives even more appealing to consumers.
It does the opposite of promoting competition. It takes an API which is actually open and permits trusting arbitrary roots of trust and operating systems to build a centralized system giving you control over what's allowed on top of it.
> Regarding Volla OS: Security patches are released monthly, as well as vendor security patches as soon as they become available. Major firmware and kernel updates are also applied. The Volla Phone Quintus will soon receive a kernel 6.6 update.
Android doesn't backport all of the patches to older releases. Keeping up with kernel updates would mean regularly shipping LTS revisions. You aren't actually keeping up with updates at all. The pace you ship partial security backports being monthly doesn't mean you're shipping all of the Android security patches monthly or keeping up with kernel updates on a monthly basis.
You're working with companies which do far worse than you do and mislead users about what's provided including setting an inaccurate Android security patch even if that's something Volla hasn't done themselves. It was your choice to work with Murena and iodé including giving them a say over what's permitted.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p…Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> Please stick to the facts.
We're sticking to the facts. You're posting baseless conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2034339587452174687
> It is legal to release and sell proprietary software like Apple and Google do.
>
> UnifiedAttestation is not proprietary software. It is planned to be fully open-source and freely available software (FOSS).
That's irrelevant. This has nothing to do with open source vs. closed source. It's anti-competitive because there's a cartel formed by companies selling products making a system which only permits their products. Those companies want want many app developers to adopt their system to enforce only using the products it permits to stop people from having the freedom to use any hardware or software they choose.
> For an alternative to Google Play Integrity to succeed, it is necessary to attract developers who currently use Google Play Integrity. This, in turn, requires a system that enables verification and certification independent of OEMs and operating system manufacturers and is used by many of these manufacturers. A compatibility to these apps, that are currently not running on alternative Android operating systems, will increase the appeal of this alternatives.
Google Play Integrity API is quite clearly an illegal anti-competitive system. A lot of progress has been made towards regulators/legislators acknowledging this and acting upon it. Google engaging in illegal anti-competitive behavior doesn't justify other companies doing it. Making another illegal anti-competitive system is not a solution. GrapheneOS will not participate in a system which imposes arbitrary rules on what we're allowed to do under threat of having a large amount of app compatibility taken away. We will not give companies hostile towards GrapheneOS control over which apps can be used on it either. You do not have the right to do it. It is not legal for you to work with your competitors to make a system permitting your products but not everything else. This is clearly an anti-competitive cartel and it's illegal under EU law. You cannot be the ones making it or running it. The only way this is legal is for it to be done by a truly neutral organization where the companies making products aren't involved and don't have undue influence over it. It's entirely possible for this to be done by one or more neutral organizations using the existing Android hardware attestation API with the only new system being a way to fetch a list of what each organization allows.
> There will be no requirement for apps to use UnifiedAttestation. The goal is simply to ensure compatibility with apps that currently use Google Play Integrity.
Apps are not required to adopt the Play Integrity API, but that doesn't change that it's an illegal anti-competitive system. Each app adopting it is participating is illegal suppression of an open market where anyone is free to participate. Unified Attestation will be no different. GrapheneOS is not free to participate in Unified Attestation because it's illegal and because the companies involved have been incredibly hostile towards us with years of underhanded attacks on GrapheneOS.
You're pushing for apps to adopt it. It coincides with efforts by multiple parts of the EU to force certification systems for using banking/government apps. You claim that it won't be required but it's clear that it will be required if it gains widespread adoption. You're building a system for future abuse by the EU to control what people are allowed to use on their devices. With no demand for you to build it, you're making a system enabling a police state to control people.
> It is therefore the exact opposite of a restriction on competition or a cartel. It is an initiative for an open standard that even goes beyond Android.
It's irrelevant whether the code is open source. Google could publish the entirety of the Google Play Integrity code with no change in how illegal it is. They don't require any apps to adopt it which doesn't make it legal. With the Play Integrity API, Google is abusing their market position to lock people into their products. With Unified Attestation, multiple companies forming a significant part of a specific niche market space have formed a cartel to permit their products while locking out others. Both of these things are violations of the law. Engaging in this kind of anti-competitive behavior is not legal. Telling us that we're invited to join an illegal cartel doesn't make it any less illegal. We won't be participating and you must not ban using GrapheneOS or we'll be filing a lawsuit against all of the companies involved.
> The consortium is currently informal and still in the formal founding process. Graphene OS is invited to help shape UnifiedAttestation, just as we have invited Graphene OS in the past to collaborate and partner with us regarding your operating system and our hardware.
GrapheneOS will not participate in an illegal anti-competitive cartel. GrapheneOS also isn't going to support bottom of the barrel MediaTek hardware. You've just made a bunch of inaccurate attacks on GrapheneOS on Mastodon making the outrageous claim that it must be part of a US conspiracy aimed at harming European companies.
> Volla OS is not based on Lineage OS, but on AOSP. It is true that Volla OS uses elements from Lineage OS and other free open source projects. In addition, it includes our own services and apps.
Okay, and what's your point? GrapheneOS isn't based on LineageOS either. Both /e/ and iodéOS are based on LineageOS. It doesn't change anything about Unified Attestation being anti-competitive.
> As an OEM, we have full access to all levels of the firmware, which we carefully review, clean up, and harden. This makes a difference.
Your devices are white labelled products from an ODM partner. We can have a company make devices which are branded as GrapheneOS devices too. We've had numerous opporunities to do so. We aren't interested in having bottom of the barrel MediaTek SoC devices failing to meet our official security requirements. That's why we haven't taken up any of these partnership offers or paid an ODM to make devices for us.
> Maintaining our operating system includes updates to the kernel and device drivers, AOSP, and all other components.
You don't provide proper updates to the kernel, drivers, firmware or AOSP. You provide the standard partial backports to older releases of Android. Linux kernel updates are far more frequent and involve far more than what Android lists, as do the overall Android updates and driver/firmware updates. /e/ and iodéOS do much worse than you along with misleading users about it, yet they're a core part of this initiative. They've consistently set a fake Android security patch level and yet they're going to have control over what's permitted.
> This commitment is verifiable through the publication of our source code. Through UnifiedAttestation, we aim to demonstrate the system’s security via an independent third party as well as through transparent, public testing procedures and test reports.
Unified Attestation has nothing to do with security and a legitimate security review with reasonable standards would not permit these products or most Android devices. Play Integrity API is not about security and neither is your system. These are anti-competitive systems which enforce only using products from certain companies for the benefit of those companies.
> UnifiedAttestation is an initiative born from the realization that, despite competition, collaboration on shared challenges makes sense. It is good that there is not just a single provider of an alternative operating system. It is a sign of a relevant market.
Collusion between companies which are supposed to to be competiting with each other to lock out other participants from the market with a system only permitting the products of the companies participating in it is not an innocent form of collaboration. It's an illegal anti-competitive cartel.
> Let’s bring great products to market! You, Volla and all the other players.
You're welcome to make products which you claim are in the same space and competing with us. You aren't welcome to form an anti-competitive cartel where GrapheneOS devices will be forbidden due to our lack of participation. That's illegal and we'll file a lawsuit against you.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We posted a thread on our Mastodon instance addressing the underhanded attacks being made on GrapheneOS by Volla due to our opposition to their Unified Attestation API:
grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116251325625494349
An account previously pretending to be a fan supporting Volla has been clearly exposed as run by them.
Despite how this account has previously posted, it began repeatedly posting on behalf of Volla and referring to themselves as being part of it. They referenced Volla contacting us half a year ago wanting a partnership with us which didn't go anywhere as they're unable to meet our requirements.
We've opposed Unified Attestation on very reasonable grounds which we've once again elaborated on in the linked thread after covering this. This account clearly run by Volla themselves has repeatedly posted outrageous conspiracy theories about GrapheneOS implying we're working for the US government.
We included links to a history of posts predating our opposition to Unified Attestation where they engage in false marketing of Volla products and try to convince people to use those over other options with inaccurate claims. That includes them replying to threads where people discussed GrapheneOS.
They were misleading people about GrapheneOS prior to us speaking of them. They're now attacking us in a super underhanded way because we oppose them seizing control over which devices and operating systems are allowed for European banking/government apps. Don't allow them to memory hole this.
The account is very clearly run by Volla, has openly acknowledged it and proven it with insider knowledge. We also have a very good idea of exactly who is running the account due to the writing style. These companies using sockpuppet accounts and personal accounts to attack us doesn't lessen it. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These are unsafe devices lacking basic privacy and security patches/protections while including multiple invasive services. Sending sensitive user data to OpenAI without consent and misleading users about which security patches are provided isn't ethical.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p… -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These are unsafe devices lacking basic privacy and security patches/protections while including multiple invasive services. Sending sensitive user data to OpenAI without consent and misleading users about which security patches are provided isn't ethical.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android provides a standard hardware attestation system with support for alternate operating systems via allowing their verified boot key fingerprints. It's mainly used with Google's root of trust and remote key provisioning service but the API supports alternative roots of trust.
Volla's Unified Attestation is fully built on Android's hardware attestation API. It solely exists to create a centralized authority and service determining what's allowed under their control.
Unified Attestation will permit using products from the companies involved in it while forbidding using arbitrary alternatives. They clearly aren't going to enforce reasonable security standards since their products wouldn't meet those. The whole purpose of the system is to permit their products regardless of merit and convince banking/government apps to adopt it.
There's nothing neutral or fair about a system controlled by companies approving their own products while disallowing other options.
Companies forming an anti-competitive cartel providing a service which permitting their products and while disallowing others isn't legal regardless of how they market it. It's not legal when Google does it with the Play Integrity API and it's not legal when it's Volla, Murena and iodé doing it. We won't be participating in a system which gives these companies veto power over app compatibility on GrapheneOS. These companies will not be given the power to make arbitrary demands of GrapheneOS.
We've been talking back and forth with multiple regulators over the past several years about the Play Integrity API to have action taken against it. Unified Attestation is a massive disruption to our efforts and will get in the way of having regulators take action against this. We've also been considering filing a lawsuit against Google over the Play Integrity API.
Unlike Google, the companies involved in Unified Attestation don't have massive resources to defend their anti-competitive system.
Android's standard hardware API doesn't require delegating verification to a centralized service. One or more neutral organizations could exist certifying devices and operating systems without providing a centralized API. Those organizations could simply provide signed releases with the roots of trust, revoked keys and operating system key fingerprints. Apps could use multiple different certifying organizations. This is already something Android's hardware attestation API fully supports today.
Volla, Murena and iodé are each a for-profit company selling devices. Each of them has failed to keep up with important security patches and protections. Each has marketed their products as providing a level of security they don't provide. It's very clear why these 3 companies want to be in charge of choosing which devices and operating systems people are allowed to use. They want to make sure their products are permitted and want to have an advantage over others to boost their profits.
Unified Attestation is an anti-competitive cartel turning a decentralized decision into a centralized one. Instead of neutral organizations being formed to certify devices without a massive conflict of interest, these companies will sign off on their products regardless of the level of insecurity. Multiple competing companies forming a cartel which locks out other options is not legal. We're fully willing to file one or more lawsuits over this. It should be discontinued now prior to harming us. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android provides a standard hardware attestation system with support for alternate operating systems via allowing their verified boot key fingerprints. It's mainly used with Google's root of trust and remote key provisioning service but the API supports alternative roots of trust.
Volla's Unified Attestation is fully built on Android's hardware attestation API. It solely exists to create a centralized authority and service determining what's allowed under their control.
Unified Attestation will permit using products from the companies involved in it while forbidding using arbitrary alternatives. They clearly aren't going to enforce reasonable security standards since their products wouldn't meet those. The whole purpose of the system is to permit their products regardless of merit and convince banking/government apps to adopt it.
There's nothing neutral or fair about a system controlled by companies approving their own products while disallowing other options.
Companies forming an anti-competitive cartel providing a service which permitting their products and while disallowing others isn't legal regardless of how they market it. It's not legal when Google does it with the Play Integrity API and it's not legal when it's Volla, Murena and iodé doing it. We won't be participating in a system which gives these companies veto power over app compatibility on GrapheneOS. These companies will not be given the power to make arbitrary demands of GrapheneOS.
We've been talking back and forth with multiple regulators over the past several years about the Play Integrity API to have action taken against it. Unified Attestation is a massive disruption to our efforts and will get in the way of having regulators take action against this. We've also been considering filing a lawsuit against Google over the Play Integrity API.
Unlike Google, the companies involved in Unified Attestation don't have massive resources to defend their anti-competitive system.
Android's standard hardware API doesn't require delegating verification to a centralized service. One or more neutral organizations could exist certifying devices and operating systems without providing a centralized API. Those organizations could simply provide signed releases with the roots of trust, revoked keys and operating system key fingerprints. Apps could use multiple different certifying organizations. This is already something Android's hardware attestation API fully supports today.
Volla, Murena and iodé are each a for-profit company selling devices. Each of them has failed to keep up with important security patches and protections. Each has marketed their products as providing a level of security they don't provide. It's very clear why these 3 companies want to be in charge of choosing which devices and operating systems people are allowed to use. They want to make sure their products are permitted and want to have an advantage over others to boost their profits.
Unified Attestation is an anti-competitive cartel turning a decentralized decision into a centralized one. Instead of neutral organizations being formed to certify devices without a massive conflict of interest, these companies will sign off on their products regardless of the level of insecurity. Multiple competing companies forming a cartel which locks out other options is not legal. We're fully willing to file one or more lawsuits over this. It should be discontinued now prior to harming us. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> UnifiedAttestation is legal because the software is an independent, non-derivative work.
It's not legal because it's an anti-competitive cartel from several companies collaborating to ban using anything other than the products of the companies participating in it.
It's irrelevant that it's open source, which doesn't change that it's a centralized anti-competitive system. A court isn't going to care whether your centralized system has open source code.
> > The proposed system is open source under the permissive Apache 2.0 license. The verification and certification process will be transparent and independent of the respective OEM.
For-profit companies choosing what's permitted to be used and imposing rules on others who want to be permitted is inherently anti-competitive and against the law. We're already in the process of winning a lawsuit and we can accept spending a bunch of money on winning another too. That's not an idle threat and you should seriously consider whether you want a legal conflict with us in multiple jurisdictions over this.
> The consortium is already much larger than the manufacturers mentioned, and Graphene OS is invited to participate and contribute for improvements.
GrapheneOS will not participate in an anti-competitive system that's illegal under Canadian law and is clearly being made to permit the products of those participating regardless of their atrocious security. The system needs to be discontinued rather than GrapheneOS being invited to join it which isn't going to happen.
GrapheneOS was not invited to participate until we publicly posted about this. We would have happily spoken our mind about this in private years ago to explain why it's completely unacceptable. You chose to involve multiple companies which have spent years trying to mislead people about GrapheneOS including with vile attacks on our team to promote their products. You only invited us because we strongly publicly opposed the system and it isn't going to change that we oppose it. We could have steered you away from making a completely unacceptable system years ago but now you're going to need to discontinue it after all of this work on it.
Your companies selling phones and operating systems cannot be the ones deciding what's permitted. It's inherently anti-competitive and should never have been attempted. This should only be done by multiple independent third parties with a decentralized system not requiring any centralized service. Android hardware attestation is perfectly usable without you building a centralized service on top of it.
You could be distributing a signed list of approved roots and approved verified boot key fingerprints for Android hardware attestation instead of fully seizing control with a centralized service. That would still be immensely problematic due to the companies making the products being in charge of what's allowed but at least it could work alongside others instead of seizing full control with a centralized service.
> UnifiedAttestation's intention is to promote competition and it has the potential to attract app developers who currently use Google Play Integrity, thereby making alternatives even more appealing to consumers.
It does the opposite of promoting competition. It takes an API which is actually open and permits trusting arbitrary roots of trust and operating systems to build a centralized system giving you control over what's allowed on top of it.
> Regarding Volla OS: Security patches are released monthly, as well as vendor security patches as soon as they become available. Major firmware and kernel updates are also applied. The Volla Phone Quintus will soon receive a kernel 6.6 update.
Android doesn't backport all of the patches to older releases. Keeping up with kernel updates would mean regularly shipping LTS revisions. You aren't actually keeping up with updates at all. The pace you ship partial security backports being monthly doesn't mean you're shipping all of the Android security patches monthly or keeping up with kernel updates on a monthly basis.
You're working with companies which do far worse than you do and mislead users about what's provided including setting an inaccurate Android security patch even if that's something Volla hasn't done themselves. It was your choice to work with Murena and iodé including giving them a say over what's permitted.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If X insists on continuing to use attestation, they should implement support for standard Android hardware attestation which can be used to support GrapheneOS.
Details are available at grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide. X shouldn't disallow devices not licensing Google Mobile Services. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If X insists on continuing to use attestation, they should implement support for standard Android hardware attestation which can be used to support GrapheneOS.
Details are available at grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-compatibility-guide. X shouldn't disallow devices not licensing Google Mobile Services. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 146.0.7680.119.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/146.0.7680.119.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33145-vanadium-version-146076801…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 146.0.7680.115.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/146.0.7680.115.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33092-vanadium-version-146076801…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 91 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/91
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33051-auditor-app-version-91-rel…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, since it's neither ethical or legal. If it's going to be done then it cannot be a group of companies collaborating to permit each other's products while locking out arbitrary competition. Here's relevant law where the GrapheneOS Foundation is based:
laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-34/section-45.html -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Okay, so focus solely on what matters for GrapheneOS users. This system has multiple companies incredibly hostile towards GrapheneOS which are relentlessly attacking it involved. Even if we joined it, they'd be able to block GrapheneOS users from using a growing number of apps.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They're going to allow their own products regardless of how insecure they are while forbidding using GrapheneOS. It's nothing short of a declaration of war on GrapheneOS. We're putting together a plan to kill this system with the support of even a small number of app developers.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That's wrong. GrapheneOS users can currently use around 9/10 banking apps because most haven't adopted attestation to ban using alternate operating systems. Unified Attestation will encourage broader banning of arbitrary operating systems. It will hurt GrapheneOS and others.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's completely wrong and this isn't a legitimate useful tool in any sense. The whole purpose of it is allowing their products to use banking apps and not others. They'll allow their products regardless of how insecure they are while it's going to forbid using GrapheneOS.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Unified Attestation is a way for these companies to convince apps to ban using anything other than Google Mobile Services devices or their own products. They don't do the bare minimum for security but yet will allow using their products and not others. It's not legitimate.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, since it's neither ethical or legal. If it's going to be done then it cannot be a group of companies collaborating to permit each other's products while locking out arbitrary competition. Here's relevant law where the GrapheneOS Foundation is based:
laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-34/section-45.html -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Unified Attestation is a way for these companies to convince apps to ban using anything other than Google Mobile Services devices or their own products. They don't do the bare minimum for security but yet will allow using their products and not others. It's not legitimate.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
No, that's completely wrong and this isn't a legitimate useful tool in any sense. The whole purpose of it is allowing their products to use banking apps and not others. They'll allow their products regardless of how insecure they are while it's going to forbid using GrapheneOS.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They're going to allow their own products regardless of how insecure they are while forbidding using GrapheneOS. It's nothing short of a declaration of war on GrapheneOS. We're putting together a plan to kill this system with the support of even a small number of app developers.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
That's wrong. GrapheneOS users can currently use around 9/10 banking apps because most haven't adopted attestation to ban using alternate operating systems. Unified Attestation will encourage broader banning of arbitrary operating systems. It will hurt GrapheneOS and others.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Okay, so focus solely on what matters for GrapheneOS users. This system has multiple companies incredibly hostile towards GrapheneOS which are relentlessly attacking it involved. Even if we joined it, they'd be able to block GrapheneOS users from using a growing number of apps.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 146.0.7680.111.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/146.0.7680.111.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/33004-vanadium-version-146076801…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We strongly oppose the Unified Attestation initiative and call for app developers supporting privacy, security and freedom on mobile to avoid it. Companies selling phones should not be deciding which operating systems people are allowed to use for apps.
uattest.net
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google's Play Integrity API is a horrible system enforcing using devices officially licensing Google Mobile Services. It permits those regardless of how many years behind they are on security patches. The solution to this isn't another anti-competitive system based in Europe.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's no legitimate purpose for either Play Integrity or Unified Attestation to exist. Both will inherently fail to uphold even basic security standards since otherwise their own products wouldn't be allowed. Root-based attestation is also inherently not a secure approach.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Having a European version of the Play Integrity which permits people to use insecure products from specific European companies participating in it while disallowing using arbitrary hardware or software is the opposite of a solution. It's more of the same anti-competitive garbage.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/DMbogo68923/status/2031021997501624426
The vast majority of Android apps work on GrapheneOS with very few apps not working on it. Nearly all of the apps not compatible with GrapheneOS are banning using an alternate OS. It's mostly banking apps doing it but 9/10 banking apps work on GrapheneOS. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've written this post as a thorough debunking of extraordinarily inaccurate and misinformed claims being made about GrapheneOS. The main post making these claims is linked at the bottom.
A growing number of our apps are built and signed separately from the OS to provide out-of-band updates. Each of these apps has reproducible builds. The official standalone releases are included in the OS rather than making separate builds for each device as part of building the OS. This is the standard and most sensible way to do things. It means the apps bundled with the OS are the same builds as the standalone releases instead of having two separate types of builds with two separate build systems. Both forms of building the apps are reproducible. It makes far more sense to use Android's standard app build system and tooling for standalone apps. It makes it much easier to work with them and for people to contribute. Needing to build apps as part of building the whole OS is a major barrier to contributions and can be avoided.
Android supports out-of-band updates for the vast majority of the OS. These out-of-band updates are a major advantage over iOS. Many people aren't aware of how much can be updated out-of-band for Android. It's gradually turning into the entire OS having quite modular out-of-band updates which are fully compatible with the verified boot system. It still makes sense to have regular full OS updates which update all of the bundled components.
A huge portion of Android is shipped as APKs which can be updated out-of-band. These can be built with the OS for simplicity but can also be built separately with their own standalone releases. If they have their own standalone releases, those are supposed to be bundled with the OS as a prebuilt instead of using a separate build system for the OS updates and out-of-band updates. It would also not be reproducible if separate build systems and toolchains were being used for both.
An even larger portion of the OS can be updated out-of-band via APEX components which are an APK containing a structured filesystem with native libraries, services, data, nested APKs and other arbitrary files.
Both APEX components and APKs are fully compatible with verified boot. GrapheneOS enables enforced verified boot for system APK updates rather than only APEX components.
Android also has out-of-band updates to images via chained vbmeta (verified boot metadata) images. This works by having a hash of a key for chained vbmetas stored in the main vbmeta where each vbmeta has separately enforced downgrade protection via the secure element.
GrapheneOS has very frequent OS releases and doesn't need out-of-band updates as much as the stock Pixel OS or especially the broader Android ecosystem. We mainly use out-of-band updates for our own apps with standalone releases and include the official releases of those in the OS releases rather than making separate builds. That's the way it's supposed to be done.
Google Mobile Services Android operating systems use Google Play system updates providing APEX updates via standard builds from the Google Play Store. This provides monthly updates to large portions of the OS across devices regardless of their OS update cycle. We have no use for their approach since we have consistent OS updates which are more frequent than monthly releases. We could still set up out-of-band APEX updates to enable shipping an urgent for a specific component without an OS release but we don't currently use them as it would only save build time rather than improving usability.
Android uses prebuilts for the kernels and Chromium WebView which are built separately from the OS. The expected way to bundle most apps with the OS is to have standalone releases with the official releases bundled with it. This is how the stock Pixel OS handles APK and APEX components updated out-of-band. It doesn't interfere with reproducible builds.
Building, signing and shipping updates to the OS via modular components instead of building the entire OS for every change is going to be increasingly important as GrapheneOS scales up to a larger development team and a larger number of supported devices. It makes it far easier for people to work on smaller parts of the OS and we can release smaller updates for specific components. We're using it on a case-by-case basis for components we need to update frequently such as our GmsCompatConfig APK shipping the text file setting up most of our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer shims. We also plan to start shipping GmsCompatLib as a standalone app but it was delayed due to banking apps wrongly believing updating it out-of-band was tampering.
The claims which are being made in the linked post are extremely misinformed and backwards. They're attacking us for using approaches focused on security while claiming doing things in a far less secure way would be much better. The motivation for it is quite clearly promoting non-hardened operating systems through desperate attempts at misleading people about GrapheneOS with poorly informed claims.
They're claiming we should be doing builds and signing on cloud servers because they believe having CI web interface is a substitute for third parties reproducing and verifying builds. We make all of our official builds on local infrastructure under our physical control for clear security reasons. Our app and OS builds are both reproducible. We're gradually working on turning reproducible builds into a more useful feature by setting up a system of having alternate build locations and a system for verifying the results match across our locations and also third party locations. Our App Store and System Updater are eventually going to support verifying builds based on other official and third party build locations. Moving our builds and signing to cloud infrastructure would not reduce trust in us but would greatly expand attack surface and how much needs to be trusted.
GrapheneOS is a serious privacy and security project which is in the process of greatly expanding by hiring many developers and other people. We're improving our overall organizational and development processes as part of expanding. Expanding our use of out-of-band updates to the extent that it makes sense is part of this.
Muhammad
@TheVancedGamer
It's kind of funny how @GrapheneOS wants to let everybody know about the "dangers" of "closed source operating systems" yet they themselves ship precompiled, presigned applications that are included in their OS and are NOT reproducible, the most you can do is compile them out of tree and include them manually.
And even then, this is still a MAJOR security risk as their precompiled apps have permissions that you really don't want apps to be granted implicitly.
I've attached a photo of all the permissions available to the Messaging app, which is included in GrapheneOS at build-time as a prebuilt application. I should mention this, the aforementioned Messaging application has no form of reproducible builds, meaning the only way to update these apps is for some developer to manually build this application on their build PC, sign it and then push it to a git repo. Imagine the security implications of that. (You can unzip the app yourself to check the manifest too.)
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_external_Messaging
This is the module included into GrapheneOS. Meanwhile the actual messaging app is at github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging. For reasons beyond me, GrapheneOS devs thought it fit to remove the Android blueprints from it, therefore making this app unbuildable inside the Android source itself.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_manifest/blob/30542c6161c2…
The inclusion of said prebuilt Messaging app.
It's not just this app either. The included App Store, the Camera app, hell, even the Auditor. All of these apps are presigned and precompiled, and granted implicit permissions to do whatever. Why not compile them in-tree? WHY go out of your way to make them unbuildable by removing the blueprints? It's not about adding one yourself and doing it yourself, that's completely besides the point. The point is, why is some OS claiming to be security focused, yet has the ability to infect devices with a theoretical malware spread with these prebuilt apps? Why are these apps not built in-tree in the first place!? There is literally no excuse, every other app is compiled in-tree except these GrapheneOS inclusions.
How does it feel to trust a random person with an app that can theoretically upload all your data to a remote server without your knowledge? Further more, besides doing such things, GrapheneOS devs have the _nerve_ to go forth and cement their beliefs on others? When they themselves don't commit to their standards? If this isn't an absolute form of hypocrisy, I really don't know what is.
Maybe this post will instill some form of awareness in die-hard GOS fans. Maybe I'll get to deal with insane backlash. Who knows. At least I'm putting it out there. Maybe one day we'll get to know that this entire project was a honeypot. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The purpose of the partnership for us is expanding GrapheneOS beyond Pixels to a 2nd line of devices to provide people with another option. It's not an exclusive partnership and we're free to support more devices if other OEMs improve their devices to meet our requirements too.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Money isn't changing hands between us and Motorola. It's a non-exclusive partnership for bringing GrapheneOS to their devices. They're improving their devices to meet our requirements and helping us support them. They sell more devices and we get expanded device support.
-
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Nearly all info available to Grok about niche products is from marketing material and press releases. It's parroting marketing material back to you rather than this being based on any form of analysis or expertise. You're not informing yourself by consuming this slop.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Bittium uses ancient firmware and software without current privacy/security patches. They're failing to keep up with Linux kernel, Android releases and privacy/security patches as a whole. Their hardware is far less secure than Pixels and iPhones too. Marketing isn't reality.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Hardly anyone has talked about this and there's nearly zero independent analysis. Nearly all of the information is coming from their marketing and press releases. A future version of Grok will use these discussions as training data. Marketing and social media aren't good sources.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Bittium's currently available products use two operating systems based on Android 11 with an ancient end-of-life Linux kernel on top of an end-of-life Snapdragon 670 SoC. You're conflating what's currently available with a future product they've announced that's already outdated.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Bittium Tough Mobile 2 C uses Android 11 and Snapdragon 670. That's what was being promoted in the thread and has absolutely atrocious security. Their upcoming Bittium Tough Mobile 3 has Android 15 and a Qualcomm Q-6690 FP4 which isn't great and will age badly as the last did.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Bittium's own marketing material says the Tough Mobile 3 will move from Android 11 to Android 15. Their own site says the Bittium Tough Mobile 3 will be available in 2027. The future device uses an industrial SoC from mid-2025 which was based on an older gen platform at launch.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Money isn't changing hands between us and Motorola. It's a non-exclusive partnership for bringing GrapheneOS to their devices. They're improving their devices to meet our requirements and helping us support them. They sell more devices and we get expanded device support.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The purpose of the partnership for us is expanding GrapheneOS beyond Pixels to a 2nd line of devices to provide people with another option. It's not an exclusive partnership and we're free to support more devices if other OEMs improve their devices to meet our requirements too.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 146.0.7680.65.1 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/146.0.7680.65.1
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/32895-vanadium-version-146076806…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Bittium's own marketing material says the Tough Mobile 3 will move from Android 11 to Android 15. Their own site says the Bittium Tough Mobile 3 will be available in 2027. The future device uses an industrial SoC from mid-2025 which was based on an older gen platform at launch.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Bittium Tough Mobile 2 C uses Android 11 and Snapdragon 670. That's what was being promoted in the thread and has absolutely atrocious security. Their upcoming Bittium Tough Mobile 3 has Android 15 and a Qualcomm Q-6690 FP4 which isn't great and will age badly as the last did.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Bittium's currently available products use two operating systems based on Android 11 with an ancient end-of-life Linux kernel on top of an end-of-life Snapdragon 670 SoC. You're conflating what's currently available with a future product they've announced that's already outdated.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Hardly anyone has talked about this and there's nearly zero independent analysis. Nearly all of the information is coming from their marketing and press releases. A future version of Grok will use these discussions as training data. Marketing and social media aren't good sources.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Bittium uses ancient firmware and software without current privacy/security patches. They're failing to keep up with Linux kernel, Android releases and privacy/security patches as a whole. Their hardware is far less secure than Pixels and iPhones too. Marketing isn't reality.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Nearly all info available to Grok about niche products is from marketing material and press releases. It's parroting marketing material back to you rather than this being based on any form of analysis or expertise. You're not informing yourself by consuming this slop.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026030700 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/32885-grapheneos-version-2026030…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a signed tag for every signed binary release of the apps. It's verifiable that the binary releases correspond to the tags. We've provided everything needed to perform the verification. The whole point of verification is that other people do it not cloud CI infra we run...
-
Muhammad
@TheVancedGamer
It's kind of funny how @GrapheneOS wants to let everybody know about the "dangers" of "closed source operating systems" yet they themselves ship precompiled, presigned applications that are included in their OS and are NOT reproducible, the most you can do is compile them out of tree and include them manually.
And even then, this is still a MAJOR security risk as their precompiled apps have permissions that you really don't want apps to be granted implicitly.
I've attached a photo of all the permissions available to the Messaging app, which is included in GrapheneOS at build-time as a prebuilt application. I should mention this, the aforementioned Messaging application has no form of reproducible builds, meaning the only way to update these apps is for some developer to manually build this application on their build PC, sign it and then push it to a git repo. Imagine the security implications of that. (You can unzip the app yourself to check the manifest too.)
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_external_Messaging
This is the module included into GrapheneOS. Meanwhile the actual messaging app is at github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging. For reasons beyond me, GrapheneOS devs thought it fit to remove the Android blueprints from it, therefore making this app unbuildable inside the Android source itself.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_manifest/blob/30542c6161c2…
The inclusion of said prebuilt Messaging app.
It's not just this app either. The included App Store, the Camera app, hell, even the Auditor. All of these apps are presigned and precompiled, and granted implicit permissions to do whatever. Why not compile them in-tree? WHY go out of your way to make them unbuildable by removing the blueprints? It's not about adding one yourself and doing it yourself, that's completely besides the point. The point is, why is some OS claiming to be security focused, yet has the ability to infect devices with a theoretical malware spread with these prebuilt apps? Why are these apps not built in-tree in the first place!? There is literally no excuse, every other app is compiled in-tree except these GrapheneOS inclusions.
How does it feel to trust a random person with an app that can theoretically upload all your data to a remote server without your knowledge? Further more, besides doing such things, GrapheneOS devs have the _nerve_ to go forth and cement their beliefs on others? When they themselves don't commit to their standards? If this isn't an absolute form of hypocrisy, I really don't know what is.
Maybe this post will instill some form of awareness in die-hard GOS fans. Maybe I'll get to deal with insane backlash. Who knows. At least I'm putting it out there. Maybe one day we'll get to know that this entire project was a honeypot.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've thoroughly debunked your extraordinarily inaccurate claims at x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2030402535463506069. You're trying to mislead people by masquerading as an expert when you lack basic subject matter knowledge. Your original post and replies are absolute nonsense and thoroughly backwards.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've written this post as a thorough debunking of extraordinarily inaccurate and misinformed claims being made about GrapheneOS. The main post making these claims is linked at the bottom.
A growing number of our apps are built and signed separately from the OS to provide out-of-band updates. Each of these apps has reproducible builds. The official standalone releases are included in the OS rather than making separate builds for each device as part of building the OS. This is the standard and most sensible way to do things. It means the apps bundled with the OS are the same builds as the standalone releases instead of having two separate types of builds with two separate build systems. Both forms of building the apps are reproducible. It makes far more sense to use Android's standard app build system and tooling for standalone apps. It makes it much easier to work with them and for people to contribute. Needing to build apps as part of building the whole OS is a major barrier to contributions and can be avoided.
Android supports out-of-band updates for the vast majority of the OS. These out-of-band updates are a major advantage over iOS. Many people aren't aware of how much can be updated out-of-band for Android. It's gradually turning into the entire OS having quite modular out-of-band updates which are fully compatible with the verified boot system. It still makes sense to have regular full OS updates which update all of the bundled components.
A huge portion of Android is shipped as APKs which can be updated out-of-band. These can be built with the OS for simplicity but can also be built separately with their own standalone releases. If they have their own standalone releases, those are supposed to be bundled with the OS as a prebuilt instead of using a separate build system for the OS updates and out-of-band updates. It would also not be reproducible if separate build systems and toolchains were being used for both.
An even larger portion of the OS can be updated out-of-band via APEX components which are an APK containing a structured filesystem with native libraries, services, data, nested APKs and other arbitrary files.
Both APEX components and APKs are fully compatible with verified boot. GrapheneOS enables enforced verified boot for system APK updates rather than only APEX components.
Android also has out-of-band updates to images via chained vbmeta (verified boot metadata) images. This works by having a hash of a key for chained vbmetas stored in the main vbmeta where each vbmeta has separately enforced downgrade protection via the secure element.
GrapheneOS has very frequent OS releases and doesn't need out-of-band updates as much as the stock Pixel OS or especially the broader Android ecosystem. We mainly use out-of-band updates for our own apps with standalone releases and include the official releases of those in the OS releases rather than making separate builds. That's the way it's supposed to be done.
Google Mobile Services Android operating systems use Google Play system updates providing APEX updates via standard builds from the Google Play Store. This provides monthly updates to large portions of the OS across devices regardless of their OS update cycle. We have no use for their approach since we have consistent OS updates which are more frequent than monthly releases. We could still set up out-of-band APEX updates to enable shipping an urgent for a specific component without an OS release but we don't currently use them as it would only save build time rather than improving usability.
Android uses prebuilts for the kernels and Chromium WebView which are built separately from the OS. The expected way to bundle most apps with the OS is to have standalone releases with the official releases bundled with it. This is how the stock Pixel OS handles APK and APEX components updated out-of-band. It doesn't interfere with reproducible builds.
Building, signing and shipping updates to the OS via modular components instead of building the entire OS for every change is going to be increasingly important as GrapheneOS scales up to a larger development team and a larger number of supported devices. It makes it far easier for people to work on smaller parts of the OS and we can release smaller updates for specific components. We're using it on a case-by-case basis for components we need to update frequently such as our GmsCompatConfig APK shipping the text file setting up most of our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer shims. We also plan to start shipping GmsCompatLib as a standalone app but it was delayed due to banking apps wrongly believing updating it out-of-band was tampering.
The claims which are being made in the linked post are extremely misinformed and backwards. They're attacking us for using approaches focused on security while claiming doing things in a far less secure way would be much better. The motivation for it is quite clearly promoting non-hardened operating systems through desperate attempts at misleading people about GrapheneOS with poorly informed claims.
They're claiming we should be doing builds and signing on cloud servers because they believe having CI web interface is a substitute for third parties reproducing and verifying builds. We make all of our official builds on local infrastructure under our physical control for clear security reasons. Our app and OS builds are both reproducible. We're gradually working on turning reproducible builds into a more useful feature by setting up a system of having alternate build locations and a system for verifying the results match across our locations and also third party locations. Our App Store and System Updater are eventually going to support verifying builds based on other official and third party build locations. Moving our builds and signing to cloud infrastructure would not reduce trust in us but would greatly expand attack surface and how much needs to be trusted.
GrapheneOS is a serious privacy and security project which is in the process of greatly expanding by hiring many developers and other people. We're improving our overall organizational and development processes as part of expanding. Expanding our use of out-of-band updates to the extent that it makes sense is part of this.
Muhammad
@TheVancedGamer
It's kind of funny how @GrapheneOS wants to let everybody know about the "dangers" of "closed source operating systems" yet they themselves ship precompiled, presigned applications that are included in their OS and are NOT reproducible, the most you can do is compile them out of tree and include them manually.
And even then, this is still a MAJOR security risk as their precompiled apps have permissions that you really don't want apps to be granted implicitly.
I've attached a photo of all the permissions available to the Messaging app, which is included in GrapheneOS at build-time as a prebuilt application. I should mention this, the aforementioned Messaging application has no form of reproducible builds, meaning the only way to update these apps is for some developer to manually build this application on their build PC, sign it and then push it to a git repo. Imagine the security implications of that. (You can unzip the app yourself to check the manifest too.)
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_external_Messaging
This is the module included into GrapheneOS. Meanwhile the actual messaging app is at github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging. For reasons beyond me, GrapheneOS devs thought it fit to remove the Android blueprints from it, therefore making this app unbuildable inside the Android source itself.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_manifest/blob/30542c6161c2…
The inclusion of said prebuilt Messaging app.
It's not just this app either. The included App Store, the Camera app, hell, even the Auditor. All of these apps are presigned and precompiled, and granted implicit permissions to do whatever. Why not compile them in-tree? WHY go out of your way to make them unbuildable by removing the blueprints? It's not about adding one yourself and doing it yourself, that's completely besides the point. The point is, why is some OS claiming to be security focused, yet has the ability to infect devices with a theoretical malware spread with these prebuilt apps? Why are these apps not built in-tree in the first place!? There is literally no excuse, every other app is compiled in-tree except these GrapheneOS inclusions.
How does it feel to trust a random person with an app that can theoretically upload all your data to a remote server without your knowledge? Further more, besides doing such things, GrapheneOS devs have the _nerve_ to go forth and cement their beliefs on others? When they themselves don't commit to their standards? If this isn't an absolute form of hypocrisy, I really don't know what is.
Maybe this post will instill some form of awareness in die-hard GOS fans. Maybe I'll get to deal with insane backlash. Who knows. At least I'm putting it out there. Maybe one day we'll get to know that this entire project was a honeypot.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Building the apps on a cloud server does not provide verification of reproducible builds as you believe it does. We do have CI building each revision and tag pushed to the repositories or submitted as a pull request. Our own CI is not relevant to external verification of builds.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Many projects using cloud servers for builds and signing for their production releases doesn't mean that's a secure approach suitable for GrapheneOS. We have local build/signing infrastructure for a clear reason. Our own CI is also not relevant to external verification of builds.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our production releases are built and signed on local machines for security reasons. We don't and won't use cloud servers for building and signing the production releases. All of our app builds are reproducible. We fixed upstream reproducibility bugs in TalkBack to provide that.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Builds not being produced and uploaded by a GitHub bot is a good thing for security. We sign our release tags locally and upload corresponding releases which are built and signed locally. Using cloud servers for builds as you're promoting is a massive systemic security problem.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Cloud-based CI infrastructure does not provide the assurance or verification you claim but rather the direct opposite. Seeing the logs in a web UI isn't a security feature. We use dedicated local build/signing hardware for all production releases because we care about security.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're demanding that we massively decrease the security of our builds/signing and add additional trust parties. It would not in any way reduce trust in us. It's a genuinely ridiculous claim similarly to the claims you originally made about our standalone reproducible app builds.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a signed tag for each of our app releases with reproducible builds. We store the official releases of the apps in Git repositories which provides the recent history of app releases. This is the standard way to include packages with standalone releases in Android.
Storing official builds in a Git repository which references the tag to build each release does not somehow make the software not open source or result in it not having reproducible builds. Building the whole OS at once isn't part of reproducibility and isn't how AOSP is built.
Your claims are equivalent to claiming that a traditional Linux distribution cannot provide reproducible builds because they distribute components as standalone packages. That doesn't make any sense and is clearly not true. Repeating clearly untrue statements over and over again isn't going to make them any less inaccurate.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Each of our app releases has both a signed tag release and a signed binary release with a matching version. The binary release can be reproducibly built from the signed tag. It's still unclear why you believe us doing builds/signing via cloud server CI would be an improvement.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a signed tag for every signed binary release of the apps. It's verifiable that the binary releases correspond to the tags. We've provided everything needed to perform the verification. The whole point of verification is that other people do it not cloud CI infra we run...
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Each of our app releases has both a signed tag release and a signed binary release with a matching version. The binary release can be reproducibly built from the signed tag. It's still unclear why you believe us doing builds/signing via cloud server CI would be an improvement.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a signed tag for each of our app releases with reproducible builds. We store the official releases of the apps in Git repositories which provides the recent history of app releases. This is the standard way to include packages with standalone releases in Android.
Storing official builds in a Git repository which references the tag to build each release does not somehow make the software not open source or result in it not having reproducible builds. Building the whole OS at once isn't part of reproducibility and isn't how AOSP is built.
Your claims are equivalent to claiming that a traditional Linux distribution cannot provide reproducible builds because they distribute components as standalone packages. That doesn't make any sense and is clearly not true. Repeating clearly untrue statements over and over again isn't going to make them any less inaccurate. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've thoroughly debunked your extraordinarily inaccurate claims at x.com/GrapheneOS/status/2030402535463506069. You're trying to mislead people by masquerading as an expert when you lack basic subject matter knowledge. Your original post and replies are absolute nonsense and thoroughly backwards.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've written this post as a thorough debunking of extraordinarily inaccurate and misinformed claims being made about GrapheneOS. The main post making these claims is linked at the bottom.
A growing number of our apps are built and signed separately from the OS to provide out-of-band updates. Each of these apps has reproducible builds. The official standalone releases are included in the OS rather than making separate builds for each device as part of building the OS. This is the standard and most sensible way to do things. It means the apps bundled with the OS are the same builds as the standalone releases instead of having two separate types of builds with two separate build systems. Both forms of building the apps are reproducible. It makes far more sense to use Android's standard app build system and tooling for standalone apps. It makes it much easier to work with them and for people to contribute. Needing to build apps as part of building the whole OS is a major barrier to contributions and can be avoided.
Android supports out-of-band updates for the vast majority of the OS. These out-of-band updates are a major advantage over iOS. Many people aren't aware of how much can be updated out-of-band for Android. It's gradually turning into the entire OS having quite modular out-of-band updates which are fully compatible with the verified boot system. It still makes sense to have regular full OS updates which update all of the bundled components.
A huge portion of Android is shipped as APKs which can be updated out-of-band. These can be built with the OS for simplicity but can also be built separately with their own standalone releases. If they have their own standalone releases, those are supposed to be bundled with the OS as a prebuilt instead of using a separate build system for the OS updates and out-of-band updates. It would also not be reproducible if separate build systems and toolchains were being used for both.
An even larger portion of the OS can be updated out-of-band via APEX components which are an APK containing a structured filesystem with native libraries, services, data, nested APKs and other arbitrary files.
Both APEX components and APKs are fully compatible with verified boot. GrapheneOS enables enforced verified boot for system APK updates rather than only APEX components.
Android also has out-of-band updates to images via chained vbmeta (verified boot metadata) images. This works by having a hash of a key for chained vbmetas stored in the main vbmeta where each vbmeta has separately enforced downgrade protection via the secure element.
GrapheneOS has very frequent OS releases and doesn't need out-of-band updates as much as the stock Pixel OS or especially the broader Android ecosystem. We mainly use out-of-band updates for our own apps with standalone releases and include the official releases of those in the OS releases rather than making separate builds. That's the way it's supposed to be done.
Google Mobile Services Android operating systems use Google Play system updates providing APEX updates via standard builds from the Google Play Store. This provides monthly updates to large portions of the OS across devices regardless of their OS update cycle. We have no use for their approach since we have consistent OS updates which are more frequent than monthly releases. We could still set up out-of-band APEX updates to enable shipping an urgent for a specific component without an OS release but we don't currently use them as it would only save build time rather than improving usability.
Android uses prebuilts for the kernels and Chromium WebView which are built separately from the OS. The expected way to bundle most apps with the OS is to have standalone releases with the official releases bundled with it. This is how the stock Pixel OS handles APK and APEX components updated out-of-band. It doesn't interfere with reproducible builds.
Building, signing and shipping updates to the OS via modular components instead of building the entire OS for every change is going to be increasingly important as GrapheneOS scales up to a larger development team and a larger number of supported devices. It makes it far easier for people to work on smaller parts of the OS and we can release smaller updates for specific components. We're using it on a case-by-case basis for components we need to update frequently such as our GmsCompatConfig APK shipping the text file setting up most of our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer shims. We also plan to start shipping GmsCompatLib as a standalone app but it was delayed due to banking apps wrongly believing updating it out-of-band was tampering.
The claims which are being made in the linked post are extremely misinformed and backwards. They're attacking us for using approaches focused on security while claiming doing things in a far less secure way would be much better. The motivation for it is quite clearly promoting non-hardened operating systems through desperate attempts at misleading people about GrapheneOS with poorly informed claims.
They're claiming we should be doing builds and signing on cloud servers because they believe having CI web interface is a substitute for third parties reproducing and verifying builds. We make all of our official builds on local infrastructure under our physical control for clear security reasons. Our app and OS builds are both reproducible. We're gradually working on turning reproducible builds into a more useful feature by setting up a system of having alternate build locations and a system for verifying the results match across our locations and also third party locations. Our App Store and System Updater are eventually going to support verifying builds based on other official and third party build locations. Moving our builds and signing to cloud infrastructure would not reduce trust in us but would greatly expand attack surface and how much needs to be trusted.
GrapheneOS is a serious privacy and security project which is in the process of greatly expanding by hiring many developers and other people. We're improving our overall organizational and development processes as part of expanding. Expanding our use of out-of-band updates to the extent that it makes sense is part of this.
Muhammad
@TheVancedGamer
It's kind of funny how @GrapheneOS wants to let everybody know about the "dangers" of "closed source operating systems" yet they themselves ship precompiled, presigned applications that are included in their OS and are NOT reproducible, the most you can do is compile them out of tree and include them manually.
And even then, this is still a MAJOR security risk as their precompiled apps have permissions that you really don't want apps to be granted implicitly.
I've attached a photo of all the permissions available to the Messaging app, which is included in GrapheneOS at build-time as a prebuilt application. I should mention this, the aforementioned Messaging application has no form of reproducible builds, meaning the only way to update these apps is for some developer to manually build this application on their build PC, sign it and then push it to a git repo. Imagine the security implications of that. (You can unzip the app yourself to check the manifest too.)
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_external_Messaging
This is the module included into GrapheneOS. Meanwhile the actual messaging app is at github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging. For reasons beyond me, GrapheneOS devs thought it fit to remove the Android blueprints from it, therefore making this app unbuildable inside the Android source itself.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_manifest/blob/30542c6161c2…
The inclusion of said prebuilt Messaging app.
It's not just this app either. The included App Store, the Camera app, hell, even the Auditor. All of these apps are presigned and precompiled, and granted implicit permissions to do whatever. Why not compile them in-tree? WHY go out of your way to make them unbuildable by removing the blueprints? It's not about adding one yourself and doing it yourself, that's completely besides the point. The point is, why is some OS claiming to be security focused, yet has the ability to infect devices with a theoretical malware spread with these prebuilt apps? Why are these apps not built in-tree in the first place!? There is literally no excuse, every other app is compiled in-tree except these GrapheneOS inclusions.
How does it feel to trust a random person with an app that can theoretically upload all your data to a remote server without your knowledge? Further more, besides doing such things, GrapheneOS devs have the _nerve_ to go forth and cement their beliefs on others? When they themselves don't commit to their standards? If this isn't an absolute form of hypocrisy, I really don't know what is.
Maybe this post will instill some form of awareness in die-hard GOS fans. Maybe I'll get to deal with insane backlash. Who knows. At least I'm putting it out there. Maybe one day we'll get to know that this entire project was a honeypot. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've written this post as a thorough debunking of extraordinarily inaccurate and misinformed claims being made about GrapheneOS. The main post making these claims is linked at the bottom.
A growing number of our apps are built and signed separately from the OS to provide out-of-band updates. Each of these apps has reproducible builds. The official standalone releases are included in the OS rather than making separate builds for each device as part of building the OS. This is the standard and most sensible way to do things. It means the apps bundled with the OS are the same builds as the standalone releases instead of having two separate types of builds with two separate build systems. Both forms of building the apps are reproducible. It makes far more sense to use Android's standard app build system and tooling for standalone apps. It makes it much easier to work with them and for people to contribute. Needing to build apps as part of building the whole OS is a major barrier to contributions and can be avoided.
Android supports out-of-band updates for the vast majority of the OS. These out-of-band updates are a major advantage over iOS. Many people aren't aware of how much can be updated out-of-band for Android. It's gradually turning into the entire OS having quite modular out-of-band updates which are fully compatible with the verified boot system. It still makes sense to have regular full OS updates which update all of the bundled components.
A huge portion of Android is shipped as APKs which can be updated out-of-band. These can be built with the OS for simplicity but can also be built separately with their own standalone releases. If they have their own standalone releases, those are supposed to be bundled with the OS as a prebuilt instead of using a separate build system for the OS updates and out-of-band updates. It would also not be reproducible if separate build systems and toolchains were being used for both.
An even larger portion of the OS can be updated out-of-band via APEX components which are an APK containing a structured filesystem with native libraries, services, data, nested APKs and other arbitrary files.
Both APEX components and APKs are fully compatible with verified boot. GrapheneOS enables enforced verified boot for system APK updates rather than only APEX components.
Android also has out-of-band updates to images via chained vbmeta (verified boot metadata) images. This works by having a hash of a key for chained vbmetas stored in the main vbmeta where each vbmeta has separately enforced downgrade protection via the secure element.
GrapheneOS has very frequent OS releases and doesn't need out-of-band updates as much as the stock Pixel OS or especially the broader Android ecosystem. We mainly use out-of-band updates for our own apps with standalone releases and include the official releases of those in the OS releases rather than making separate builds. That's the way it's supposed to be done.
Google Mobile Services Android operating systems use Google Play system updates providing APEX updates via standard builds from the Google Play Store. This provides monthly updates to large portions of the OS across devices regardless of their OS update cycle. We have no use for their approach since we have consistent OS updates which are more frequent than monthly releases. We could still set up out-of-band APEX updates to enable shipping an urgent for a specific component without an OS release but we don't currently use them as it would only save build time rather than improving usability.
Android uses prebuilts for the kernels and Chromium WebView which are built separately from the OS. The expected way to bundle most apps with the OS is to have standalone releases with the official releases bundled with it. This is how the stock Pixel OS handles APK and APEX components updated out-of-band. It doesn't interfere with reproducible builds.
Building, signing and shipping updates to the OS via modular components instead of building the entire OS for every change is going to be increasingly important as GrapheneOS scales up to a larger development team and a larger number of supported devices. It makes it far easier for people to work on smaller parts of the OS and we can release smaller updates for specific components. We're using it on a case-by-case basis for components we need to update frequently such as our GmsCompatConfig APK shipping the text file setting up most of our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer shims. We also plan to start shipping GmsCompatLib as a standalone app but it was delayed due to banking apps wrongly believing updating it out-of-band was tampering.
The claims which are being made in the linked post are extremely misinformed and backwards. They're attacking us for using approaches focused on security while claiming doing things in a far less secure way would be much better. The motivation for it is quite clearly promoting non-hardened operating systems through desperate attempts at misleading people about GrapheneOS with poorly informed claims.
They're claiming we should be doing builds and signing on cloud servers because they believe having CI web interface is a substitute for third parties reproducing and verifying builds. We make all of our official builds on local infrastructure under our physical control for clear security reasons. Our app and OS builds are both reproducible. We're gradually working on turning reproducible builds into a more useful feature by setting up a system of having alternate build locations and a system for verifying the results match across our locations and also third party locations. Our App Store and System Updater are eventually going to support verifying builds based on other official and third party build locations. Moving our builds and signing to cloud infrastructure would not reduce trust in us but would greatly expand attack surface and how much needs to be trusted.
GrapheneOS is a serious privacy and security project which is in the process of greatly expanding by hiring many developers and other people. We're improving our overall organizational and development processes as part of expanding. Expanding our use of out-of-band updates to the extent that it makes sense is part of this.
Muhammad
@TheVancedGamer
It's kind of funny how @GrapheneOS wants to let everybody know about the "dangers" of "closed source operating systems" yet they themselves ship precompiled, presigned applications that are included in their OS and are NOT reproducible, the most you can do is compile them out of tree and include them manually.
And even then, this is still a MAJOR security risk as their precompiled apps have permissions that you really don't want apps to be granted implicitly.
I've attached a photo of all the permissions available to the Messaging app, which is included in GrapheneOS at build-time as a prebuilt application. I should mention this, the aforementioned Messaging application has no form of reproducible builds, meaning the only way to update these apps is for some developer to manually build this application on their build PC, sign it and then push it to a git repo. Imagine the security implications of that. (You can unzip the app yourself to check the manifest too.)
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_external_Messaging
This is the module included into GrapheneOS. Meanwhile the actual messaging app is at github.com/GrapheneOS/Messaging. For reasons beyond me, GrapheneOS devs thought it fit to remove the Android blueprints from it, therefore making this app unbuildable inside the Android source itself.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_manifest/blob/30542c6161c2…
The inclusion of said prebuilt Messaging app.
It's not just this app either. The included App Store, the Camera app, hell, even the Auditor. All of these apps are presigned and precompiled, and granted implicit permissions to do whatever. Why not compile them in-tree? WHY go out of your way to make them unbuildable by removing the blueprints? It's not about adding one yourself and doing it yourself, that's completely besides the point. The point is, why is some OS claiming to be security focused, yet has the ability to infect devices with a theoretical malware spread with these prebuilt apps? Why are these apps not built in-tree in the first place!? There is literally no excuse, every other app is compiled in-tree except these GrapheneOS inclusions.
How does it feel to trust a random person with an app that can theoretically upload all your data to a remote server without your knowledge? Further more, besides doing such things, GrapheneOS devs have the _nerve_ to go forth and cement their beliefs on others? When they themselves don't commit to their standards? If this isn't an absolute form of hypocrisy, I really don't know what is.
Maybe this post will instill some form of awareness in die-hard GOS fans. Maybe I'll get to deal with insane backlash. Who knows. At least I'm putting it out there. Maybe one day we'll get to know that this entire project was a honeypot. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're demanding that we massively decrease the security of our builds/signing and add additional trust parties. It would not in any way reduce trust in us. It's a genuinely ridiculous claim similarly to the claims you originally made about our standalone reproducible app builds.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Cloud-based CI infrastructure does not provide the assurance or verification you claim but rather the direct opposite. Seeing the logs in a web UI isn't a security feature. We use dedicated local build/signing hardware for all production releases because we care about security.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Builds not being produced and uploaded by a GitHub bot is a good thing for security. We sign our release tags locally and upload corresponding releases which are built and signed locally. Using cloud servers for builds as you're promoting is a massive systemic security problem.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our production releases are built and signed on local machines for security reasons. We don't and won't use cloud servers for building and signing the production releases. All of our app builds are reproducible. We fixed upstream reproducibility bugs in TalkBack to provide that.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Many projects using cloud servers for builds and signing for their production releases doesn't mean that's a secure approach suitable for GrapheneOS. We have local build/signing infrastructure for a clear reason. Our own CI is also not relevant to external verification of builds.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Building the apps on a cloud server does not provide verification of reproducible builds as you believe it does. We do have CI building each revision and tag pushed to the repositories or submitted as a pull request. Our own CI is not relevant to external verification of builds.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's standard operating procedure for these governments to pay enormous amounts of money to contractors for sub-par products. It's very widely acknowledged and discussed. It isn't specific to information security, but they're particularly bad at it compared to other areas.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It has an end-of-life Snapdragon 670 SoC from 2018 with a fork of the end-of-life Android 11. It's missing many years of privacy/security improvements and patches. Most Android devices being sold are more secure than that. What's the basis for claiming that's at all secure?
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Business partnerships, government contracts and marketing claiming products are secure doesn't indicate that a product is secure. Security doesn't come from those things. Government/military grade security usually means outdated technology missing basic patches as it does here.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Security doesn't come from marketing a product as secure and obtaining government contracts. Government contracts do not imply that a product is secure or has substance behind their security marketing. In fact, it usually works the other way around.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It has an end-of-life Snapdragon 670 SoC from 2018 with a fork of the end-of-life Android 11. It's missing many years of privacy/security improvements and patches. Most Android devices being sold are more secure than that. What's the basis for claiming that's at all secure?
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is a freely available open source project. It isn't a product. It's not made by a business but rather by a non-profit organization. Government contracts don't indicate a product is secure. Those government contracts come with constraints which in fact hurt security...
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's standard operating procedure for these governments to pay enormous amounts of money to contractors for sub-par products. It's very widely acknowledged and discussed. It isn't specific to information security, but they're particularly bad at it compared to other areas.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is a freely available open source project. It isn't a product. It's not made by a business but rather by a non-profit organization. Government contracts don't indicate a product is secure. Those government contracts come with constraints which in fact hurt security...
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Business partnerships, government contracts and marketing claiming products are secure doesn't indicate that a product is secure. Security doesn't come from those things. Government/military grade security usually means outdated technology missing basic patches as it does here.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Security doesn't come from marketing a product as secure and obtaining government contracts. Government contracts do not imply that a product is secure or has substance behind their security marketing. In fact, it usually works the other way around.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It has an end-of-life Snapdragon 670 SoC from 2018 with a fork of the end-of-life Android 11. It's missing many years of privacy/security improvements and patches. Most Android devices being sold are more secure than that. What's the basis for claiming that's at all secure?
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 146.0.7680.65.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/146.0.7680.65.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/32825-vanadium-version-146076806…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/_pasterp/status/2030013053895397600
microG chose the very misleading name "LineageOS for microG" for their unofficial fork of LineageOS with full microG integration. We called it the official microG OS project and linked to their page to be clear what we meant. We didn't mislead anyone.
Turbo Pascal 7.0 🪩
@_pasterp
Such a misleading post is wild and make me doubt about grapheneos :(
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The official microG OS project (lineage.microg.org) leaked their private keys for logging into their servers and signing releases:
github.com/lineageos4microg/l4m-wiki/wiki/December-2025-s…
We make our official builds on local machines. Our signing machine's keys aren't ever on any storage unencrypted.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We posted accurate information where we went out of the way to avoid the inevitable confusion caused by the "LineageOS for microG" name. Here's one of several replies we made correcting people misinterpreting it because of the misleading name they chose:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's microG's official OS forked from LineageOS which leaked their keys, not LineageOS. The official upstream LineageOS project wasn't involved.
This is exactly why we enforce our trademarks and won't allow a project forked from ours to name themselves GrapheneOS in any way.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We require that people choose their own branding for their forks of GrapheneOS because otherwise it ends up misleading people. The thread is an example of what microG called it misleading people despite us preemptively trying to work around it by not referring to it by that name.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026030500 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/32816-grapheneos-version-2026030…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The official microG OS project (lineage.microg.org) leaked their private keys for logging into their servers and signing releases:
github.com/lineageos4microg/l4m-wiki/wiki/December-2025-s…
We make our official builds on local machines. Our signing machine's keys aren't ever on any storage unencrypted.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our roadmap for improving security of verifying updates is based on taking advantage of the reproducible builds. We plan to have multiple official build locations and a configurable signoff verification system in the update clients also usable with third party signoff providers.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We don't have faith in any available commercial HSM products being more secure than keeping keys encrypted at rest on the primary local build machine. Instead, we're planning to develop software for using the secure element on GrapheneOS phones as an HSM for signing our releases.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's microG's official OS forked from LineageOS which leaked their keys, not LineageOS. The official upstream LineageOS project wasn't involved.
This is exactly why we enforce our trademarks and won't allow a project forked from ours to name themselves GrapheneOS in any way. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
SailfishOS has very poor privacy and atrocious security. The portions of the OS they make themselves are largely closed source. It's a massive regression from the privacy and especially security of the Android Open Source Project even without the major GrapheneOS improvements. It's strange to see it marketed based on using open source code as the foundation for building it when they don't open source a huge portion of their own code. Android Open Source Project is a complete OS that's open source. SailfishOS user interface and application layer is largely closed source.
SailfishOS doesn't provide anything close to bare minimum privacy and security patches. It lacks many important standard privacy and security protections. Bringing a desktop software stack with much worse privacy and security to mobile but while having much worse updates than a lot of Android OEMs do for similarly priced devices is hardly progress. Their Android compatibility layer is insecure and not a safe way to run Android apps. It also has very poor compatibility in practice anyway.
Jolla worked with the Russian government from 2015 through 2023 and Russia took a large share of the ownership in the company. In 2023, they used a sketchy bankruptcy restructuring to drop Russian ownership of the company. Regardless, they had no problem working with them before. Russia has a state-owned fork of SailfishOS called AuroraOS. It isn't possible for others to do the same since it's not open source. European values apparently mean closely working with Putin for 8 years after initial the invasion of Ukraine. It's a strange way to market it based on their choices and history.
It isn't what they claim it is in their marketing and we strongly recommend against using it. They've chosen to very actively mislead people about GrapheneOS because they feel very threatened by it so we have no problem saying what we think about it. We used to keep quiet since it's simply not very relevant. -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
SailfishOS has very poor privacy and atrocious security. The portions of the OS they make themselves are largely closed source. It's a massive regression from the privacy and especially security of the Android Open Source Project even without the major GrapheneOS improvements. It's strange to see it marketed based on using open source code as the foundation for building it when they don't open source a huge portion of their own code. Android Open Source Project is a complete OS that's open source. SailfishOS user interface and application layer is largely closed source.
SailfishOS doesn't provide anything close to bare minimum privacy and security patches. It lacks many important standard privacy and security protections. Bringing a desktop software stack with much worse privacy and security to mobile but while having much worse updates than a lot of Android OEMs do for similarly priced devices is hardly progress. Their Android compatibility layer is insecure and not a safe way to run Android apps. It also has very poor compatibility in practice anyway.
Jolla worked with the Russian government from 2015 through 2023 and Russia took a large share of the ownership in the company. In 2023, they used a sketchy bankruptcy restructuring to drop Russian ownership of the company. Regardless, they had no problem working with them before. Russia has a state-owned fork of SailfishOS called AuroraOS. It isn't possible for others to do the same since it's not open source. European values apparently mean closely working with Putin for 8 years after initial the invasion of Ukraine. It's a strange way to market it based on their choices and history.
It isn't what they claim it is in their marketing and we strongly recommend against using it. They've chosen to very actively mislead people about GrapheneOS because they feel very threatened by it so we have no problem saying what we think about it. We used to keep quiet since it's simply not very relevant. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026030200 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/32708-grapheneos-version-2026030…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We recently asked for additional sponsored 10Gbps dedicated servers in Europe. We received over a dozen offers and are still looking into and following those up. So far, we've received a 10Gbps update server from Zare in London and a 20Gbps one in Amsterdam from Cherry Servers.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Both network-based location and geocoding are opt-in for GrapheneOS. However, we recently added network-based location to our setup wizard to improve discoverability and are going to be adding geocoding there too once we're self-hosting it. OSM server rate limiting was an issue.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're in the process of getting a sponsored server in Frankfurt from a non-profit with 10G DTAG transit, 10G vodafone and 10G DE-CIX ports in addition to the other transit. DTAG transit is very unique and will be very helpful for serving updates to users in Germany at peak times.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Mullvad will be sponsoring 2 servers for us from DataPacket where DataPacket will bill them for our account under their existing arrangement. We haven't deployed those yet since the locations and specs are more flexible and we want to follow up more less flexible offers first.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These server sponsorships are saving a significant amount of money which can go to hiring more developers instead. There are a bunch other offers we need to filter down to the ones which are a good fit and follow those up. Unfortunately we need to avoid France for the time being.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ is a phony privacy project. It has poor privacy and atrocious security. It isn't at all what it claims to be and actually lacks basic privacy/security patches and has invasive services baked into the OS. Do people care about real privacy or marketing?
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p… -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
/e/ is a phony privacy project. It has poor privacy and atrocious security. It isn't at all what it claims to be and actually lacks basic privacy/security patches and has invasive services baked into the OS. Do people care about real privacy or marketing?
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p… -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It will initially be Motorola's flagship devices but could trickle down to other devices in the future. Look at the Motorola Signature (2026) and Motorola Razr Fold (2026) for the current generation ones not quite meeting our requirements yet. It will be the successors.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're happy to announce a long-term partnership with Motorola. We're collaborating on future devices meeting our privacy and security standards with official GrapheneOS support.
motorolanews.com/motorola-three-new-b2b-solutions-at-mwc-…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You can already use GrapheneOS on a Pixel. Pixels meet our security requirements and will continue to be supported. We're going to be adding Pixel 10a support in the near future. Which major American-owned OEM is there other than Google via Pixel hardware? We already support it.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It will initially be Motorola's flagship devices but could trickle down to other devices in the future. Look at the Motorola Signature (2026) and Motorola Razr Fold (2026) for the current generation ones not quite meeting our requirements yet. It will be the successors.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You can already use GrapheneOS on a Pixel. Pixels meet our security requirements and will continue to be supported. We're going to be adding Pixel 10a support in the near future. Which major American-owned OEM is there other than Google via Pixel hardware? We already support it.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026030100 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/32622-grapheneos-version-2026030…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> And only picked some weak points to argue back against.
We replied to all the slop you posted.
> So what are you guys gonna do if Google or other devices decide one day to lock the bootloader?
We have an OEM partner.
> Closed source is still technically more secure.
Baseless nonsense.
> But you’re ignoring that. Apple keeps pushing the envelope with physical and software changes.
GrapheneOS had hardware memory tagging 2 years earlier among other protections. Apple aren't the only ones shipping hardware and software improvements...
> Getting data on and off your phone has always been the worst.
GrapheneOS has an encrypted backup app built into the OS.
> Apple is working with carriers to limit how accurate their GPS tracking can get. I think that’s amazing and no one else is doing this to push the privacy envelope.
No, that's not what they're doing and it does not prevent carriers detecting your location with a lot of detail when connected to cellular. Android has a proper persistent airplane mode which works in early boot on the devices we support which matters more. GrapheneOS has relevant features to this too including controlling the network mode across carriers. Slightly reducing the precision of the location estimated by cell towers for 5G is not a game changer and it has nothing to do with GPS. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> The best camera is the one that’s with you. Pewds has @GrapheneOS and you can directly see the comparison and how he uses his wife’s iPhone and the footage looks so much better.
Pixels have high quality camera hardware and software which is fully functional on GrapheneOS. The Pixel Camera app is fully compatible with GrapheneOS and doesn't even require sandboxed Google Play.
> Besides the paranoid Apple technically can do whatever speculations. What verifiably bad thing is Apple actually doing? It gets you 95% there. The last 5% you need to give up sooo much. It doesn’t make sense. I love competition, makes everything better.
You know very little about privacy and security. You're spewing a bunch of AI slop.
> But to none tech people in my life. It makes zero sense to get anything besides an iPhone. Yes skill issues. But most people have problems with tech therefore getting 95% with iPhone and helping them change the right settings is much better then telling them to give money to the significantly worse company Google
This is a load of nonsense. Apple isn't any more moral or ethical than Google. They have their own highly unethical practices. People can use GrapheneOS on used devices and we have an OEM partnership being announced by them in a few days. Our OEM partner is building devices meeting our requirements with official GrapheneOS support. They're actively working on it and making progress.
> to then hope they figure out how to install GrapheneOS and if I did it all for them they’ll run into problems eventually because they don’t understand tech.
Installing GrapheneOS is very easy and doesn't require technical aptitude. It only requires a web browser with WebUSB support and pushing a few buttons. It's on the same difficulty level as baking cookies. Following very basic instructions is something most people can do. There's high quality 24/7 free support for people who need help with it.
Devices are already sold with GrapheneOS preinstalled but people can do it themselves. People can buy devices with GrapheneOS installed around the world. There will soon be devices with official support for GrapheneOS from the company making the devices too instead of only official support for running another OS. Our OEM partner is actively working with us on GrapheneOS support for their devices and will be expanding that rather than only giving us what we need. -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has no invasive services by default and is highly functional that way. iPhones can't be configured to provide similar privacy from Apple services. There's a much better privacy friendly, open source app ecosystem which can be used on it.
Sandboxed Google Play isn't part of GrapheneOS and is completely optional. GrapheneOS was started in 2014 and added sandboxed Google Play in 2021. It has existed for a longer period of time without sandboxed Google Play than with it. Many people use the OS without it. Unlike an iPhone without Apple services, GrapheneOS is highly functional and usable without Google services. Unlike an iPhone where people need Apple services for tons of basic functionality and to install/update apps.
On GrapheneOS, there's a very good open source app ecosystem available with many privacy friendly apps and services. People can use services like UnifiedPush instead of an Apple or Google push service. Apple's push service is one of many Apple services you wouldn't be avoiding with your described configuration. iPhones don't provide the option to avoid those services. On GrapheneOS, not using Google services is the default and normal state of the OS.
It's incredibly strange that you're comparing a crippled iPhone setup with barely any usability and functionality where you're still using Apple services to going out of the way to install unnecessary Google apps/services on GrapheneOS. It makes no sense to compare it that way when you wouldn't have the functionality from that in your described iPhone configuration. You get far more functionality with GrapheneOS without installing sandboxed Google Play. If someone only wants to use open source apps from the large open source app ecosystem and focus on using privacy friendly services then there's a whole lot available. There are plenty of commercial apps which work fine without Google Play too.
For people who do use sandboxed Google Play, it's more private than the Apple services included on the iPhone. Sandboxed Google Play doesn't in any way require logging into an account or especially one with personal data.
You're also ignoring privacy and security beyond these things. Also, why would someone need ADP if they aren't using an Apple account? The purpose of it is enabling end-to-end encryption for a larger subset of Apple services. On GrapheneOS, people use services such as the Proton app suite instead which provide end-to-end encryption for more than Apple does.
You don't actually know what you're talking about and it looks like a bunch of AI generated or AI assisted slop...Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> And only picked some weak points to argue back against.
We replied to all the slop you posted.
> So what are you guys gonna do if Google or other devices decide one day to lock the bootloader?
We have an OEM partner.
> Closed source is still technically more secure.
Baseless nonsense.
> But you’re ignoring that. Apple keeps pushing the envelope with physical and software changes.
GrapheneOS had hardware memory tagging 2 years earlier among other protections. Apple aren't the only ones shipping hardware and software improvements...
> Getting data on and off your phone has always been the worst.
GrapheneOS has an encrypted backup app built into the OS.
> Apple is working with carriers to limit how accurate their GPS tracking can get. I think that’s amazing and no one else is doing this to push the privacy envelope.
No, that's not what they're doing and it does not prevent carriers detecting your location with a lot of detail when connected to cellular. Android has a proper persistent airplane mode which works in early boot on the devices we support which matters more. GrapheneOS has relevant features to this too including controlling the network mode across carriers. Slightly reducing the precision of the location estimated by cell towers for 5G is not a game changer and it has nothing to do with GPS.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> The best camera is the one that’s with you. Pewds has @GrapheneOS and you can directly see the comparison and how he uses his wife’s iPhone and the footage looks so much better.
Pixels have high quality camera hardware and software which is fully functional on GrapheneOS. The Pixel Camera app is fully compatible with GrapheneOS and doesn't even require sandboxed Google Play.
> Besides the paranoid Apple technically can do whatever speculations. What verifiably bad thing is Apple actually doing? It gets you 95% there. The last 5% you need to give up sooo much. It doesn’t make sense. I love competition, makes everything better.
You know very little about privacy and security. You're spewing a bunch of AI slop.
> But to none tech people in my life. It makes zero sense to get anything besides an iPhone. Yes skill issues. But most people have problems with tech therefore getting 95% with iPhone and helping them change the right settings is much better then telling them to give money to the significantly worse company Google
This is a load of nonsense. Apple isn't any more moral or ethical than Google. They have their own highly unethical practices. People can use GrapheneOS on used devices and we have an OEM partnership being announced by them in a few days. Our OEM partner is building devices meeting our requirements with official GrapheneOS support. They're actively working on it and making progress.
> to then hope they figure out how to install GrapheneOS and if I did it all for them they’ll run into problems eventually because they don’t understand tech.
Installing GrapheneOS is very easy and doesn't require technical aptitude. It only requires a web browser with WebUSB support and pushing a few buttons. It's on the same difficulty level as baking cookies. Following very basic instructions is something most people can do. There's high quality 24/7 free support for people who need help with it.
Devices are already sold with GrapheneOS preinstalled but people can do it themselves. People can buy devices with GrapheneOS installed around the world. There will soon be devices with official support for GrapheneOS from the company making the devices too instead of only official support for running another OS. Our OEM partner is actively working with us on GrapheneOS support for their devices and will be expanding that rather than only giving us what we need. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has no invasive services by default and is highly functional that way. iPhones can't be configured to provide similar privacy from Apple services. There's a much better privacy friendly, open source app ecosystem which can be used on it.
Sandboxed Google Play isn't part of GrapheneOS and is completely optional. GrapheneOS was started in 2014 and added sandboxed Google Play in 2021. It has existed for a longer period of time without sandboxed Google Play than with it. Many people use the OS without it. Unlike an iPhone without Apple services, GrapheneOS is highly functional and usable without Google services. Unlike an iPhone where people need Apple services for tons of basic functionality and to install/update apps.
On GrapheneOS, there's a very good open source app ecosystem available with many privacy friendly apps and services. People can use services like UnifiedPush instead of an Apple or Google push service. Apple's push service is one of many Apple services you wouldn't be avoiding with your described configuration. iPhones don't provide the option to avoid those services. On GrapheneOS, not using Google services is the default and normal state of the OS.
It's incredibly strange that you're comparing a crippled iPhone setup with barely any usability and functionality where you're still using Apple services to going out of the way to install unnecessary Google apps/services on GrapheneOS. It makes no sense to compare it that way when you wouldn't have the functionality from that in your described iPhone configuration. You get far more functionality with GrapheneOS without installing sandboxed Google Play. If someone only wants to use open source apps from the large open source app ecosystem and focus on using privacy friendly services then there's a whole lot available. There are plenty of commercial apps which work fine without Google Play too.
For people who do use sandboxed Google Play, it's more private than the Apple services included on the iPhone. Sandboxed Google Play doesn't in any way require logging into an account or especially one with personal data.
You're also ignoring privacy and security beyond these things. Also, why would someone need ADP if they aren't using an Apple account? The purpose of it is enabling end-to-end encryption for a larger subset of Apple services. On GrapheneOS, people use services such as the Proton app suite instead which provide end-to-end encryption for more than Apple does.
You don't actually know what you're talking about and it looks like a bunch of AI generated or AI assisted slop... -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 146.0.7680.31.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/146.0.7680.31.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/32423-vanadium-version-146076803…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is based in Canada. In Canada, people have a legal right to refuse to disclose their PIN/password to the police. How is providing a duress PIN/password anti-police? They aren't allowed to coerce people into providing it anyway. If they're doing that they're criminals.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS protects people against criminals violating their human rights. Duress PIN/password is widely desired feature including as a protection against criminals. In Canada and the US, there's legal protection for people not providing their PIN/password to police anyway...
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Privacy and security are very important to the masses. Many people want strong privacy and security protections. Protecting against a device being exploited isn't only relevant to people targeted by governments and many governments target people with exploits at a large scale.
-
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Privacy and security are very important to the masses. Many people want strong privacy and security protections. Protecting against a device being exploited isn't only relevant to people targeted by governments and many governments target people with exploits at a large scale.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS protects people against criminals violating their human rights. Duress PIN/password is widely desired feature including as a protection against criminals. In Canada and the US, there's legal protection for people not providing their PIN/password to police anyway...
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is based in Canada. In Canada, people have a legal right to refuse to disclose their PIN/password to the police. How is providing a duress PIN/password anti-police? They aren't allowed to coerce people into providing it anyway. If they're doing that they're criminals.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 145.0.7632.120.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/145.0.7632.120.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/32310-vanadium-version-145076321…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
hardened_malloc version 14 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc/releases/tag/14
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/32249-hardened-malloc-version-14…
This is a standalone release for use outside of GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS ships these changes shortly after they're implemented as part of our OS releases rather than waiting for these releases.
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our email server (mail.grapheneos.org) has been migrated to our bare metal server sponsored by Xenyth in Toronto. We're now using clean IP space announced via BGP with our AS to improve email deliverability by not having IP/AS neighbours sending spam.
bgp.tools/dns/mail.grapheneos.org -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 145.0.7632.109.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/145.0.7632.109.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/32091-vanadium-version-145076321…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
grapheneos.org/faq
From our FAQ:
There are various companies selling devices with GrapheneOS, something which is permitted by the project's licensing provided that they make it clear that they're not GrapheneOS or officially associated with the project.
We are currently not affiliated with or endorse any company selling devices with GrapheneOS. Our official recommendation is to buy a supported device and install GrapheneOS yourself.
Our official web installer is easy to use, and our community is happy to help with the process should that be needed. On top of that, doing it yourself will also likely be a lot cheaper, as you're avoiding having to pay the premium of having someone else install GrapheneOS for you.
If you decide to buy a device with GrapheneOS installed regardless, here are the things you should pay attention to before doing so, as well as the things you should do after receiving the device:
* Make sure that you're not buying an end-of-life or near end-of-life device. You should consult our recommended devices section and choose one of the devices listed there.
* Verify that the device you have purchased is running genuine GrapheneOS. You can do this by checking the verified boot key hash. We provide the steps to do that in our post-install steps.
* After verifying that you're running genuine GrapheneOS, you should factory reset the device from recovery to make sure that it has not been tampered with. This will wipe all your data, so make sure to do it before you start using your device.
* After factory resetting the device, we recommend setting up local or remote attestation via our Auditor app. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/7SEES_/status/2021731457329156265
GrapheneOS has never pretended to be impenetrable to exploits. We're careful to communicate that it provides much better protection against exploits rather than being immune to them. We've absolutely never misled people as is being falsely claimed.
Pointing to Cellebrite documentation from 2024 and 2025 showing they can only exploit After First Unlock state GrapheneOS devices if they haven't been patched since 2022 shows GrapheneOS working extremely well. Our locked device auto-reboot timer is set to 18 hours by default and triggers memory zeroing restoring the device to Before First Unlock state. Users can set it as low as 10 minutes if they want that to happen quicker. Over 3 years is certainly more than the default 18 hours or the previous default of 72 hours. How is that in any sense a failure? It's far better than what we expected to achieve and is an enormous success at protecting users.
Defending against attackers with physical access is far harder than defending against fully remote attacks. GrapheneOS started in 2014 and was originally primarily focused on defending against remote attacks and overall privacy. Remote attacks are harder to pull off both technically and operationally. GrapheneOS continues building stronger defenses against it.
Defending against attackers with physical access to an After First Unlock state device wasn't originally a focus of GrapheneOS. We had USB peripheral blocking while locked since around 2015 but that was greatly improved in early 2024. We expanded it to block USB connections as a whole while locked at a hardware level in addition to the software level along with disabling USB data at a hardware level. Many other defenses were added to protect devices against data extraction in 2024 and 2025. Our locked device auto-reboot feature was added in 2021 which was then enabled by default (72 hours) and set to a lower timer (18 hours) more recently.
It should be expected that Cellebrite will eventually develop a working exploit chain for an After First Unlock state GrapheneOS device. Delaying them developing a working attack for so long has been a huge success. We'll continue making improvements so if they do succeed at making another it won't last indefinitely. It will also still be heavily constrained by our locked device auto-reboot feature which has now been adopted in a weaker way by iOS 18.1+ and optin for Android 16+.
We make setting a strong passphrase convenient via our 2-factor fingerprint unlock feature. If users set a strong passphrase, they don't depend on secure element throttling as they do with a random 6 digit PIN. A strong passphrase combined with Before First Unlock state prevents any combination of hardware and software exploits bypassing encryption. If people use a random 6 digit PIN then they're choosing to depend on the secure element but in practice that still provides quite a high level of security which has held up for years since the launch of the Pixel 6 with the Titan M2.
GrapheneOS users can use a strong passphrase with fingerprint+PIN secondary unlock combined with a short auto-reboot timer for extremely high security against data extraction where there's only a short window in After First Unlock state. Heavily depending on hardware and OS security against physical data extraction is a choice.
Cellebrite and similar companies have massive resources. The amount of funding, developers, etc. we have available is tiny compared to them. We can achieve far more as our resources continue growing and as we begin making major improvements as a hardware and firmware level with OEM / SoC partners.
GrapheneOS never claimed to be able to provide anything close to the level of security it has ended up providing against these attacks in practice. We greatly underestimated how well it would hold up to them. It doesn't mean it will remain that way but we aren't claiming it will or depending on that happening. It's not supposed to be perfect or impenetrable. We wouldn't have a locked device auto-reboot timer if it was supposed to completely prevent exploitation...
7SEES
@7SEES_
If you have WhatsApp, Signal, if you've ever opened a PDF on your device, if you run iOS, Android, and even an OS like Graphene, your chances of having this software on your phone is more than zero.
Even Graphene pretends to be uncrackable, but clever marketing is used to cover up the fact that many of their distros are only "uncrackable" until you unlock the device the first time, (After First Unlock - AFU), any time you power it on. At least, this was the case in March 2025, I haven't checked on any new indexes lately.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Every individual or company selling phones who claims to do so in any form of partnership or coordination with us is a scammer. Most of those aren't even running genuine GrapheneOS but rather forks or operating systems hardly even based on it. GrapheneOS doesn't have 'resellers'.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is open source. That means it's legal for anyone to use it for any purpose including selling it. That has nothing to do with us. Anyone claiming to sell phones in partnership with us is a scammer. Claiming forks, etc. are GrapheneOS is fraud and trademark infringement.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're helping authoritarians push false narratives based on conflating companies engaging in fraud and trademark infringement with the project they leech off. There are no individuals or companies selling products in any partnership with us. There are many pretending they are...
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
All forks of GrapheneOS are unofficial and MUST use their own name and logo if they're being sold or redistributed. Authoritarians are using these scams as an opportunity to dishonestly attack an open source privacy and security project as part of cracking down on privacy.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are no companies selling devices in partnership with us and we've never made or supported forks of GrapheneOS for any companies. Forks of GrapheneOS are legally obligated to use their own name and logo. We're aware companies are falsely marketing phony GrapheneOS products.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We received our registered US trademarks in December 2025 and are actively using them to take action against scammers. We've already had multiple websites and social media accounts selling phony GrapheneOS products taken down. They're not legitimate but rather are scammers.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There is no such thing as a fork of GrapheneOS officially supported or made by us. Every company selling devices with forks claiming they're in any way official or which are using our name/logo are scammers. It shouldn't be surprising that criminals are scamming other criminals.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Sketchy companies are taking portions of our code and selling sketchy products partially based on it while misrepresenting it as being GrapheneOS. Many are falsely claiming we're involved in it. They're a mix scammers and honey pots like AN0M. NONE of those are our partners.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Any criminals who bought devices from companies claiming to be our partners are idiots who were scammed. They probably bought devices directly from law enforcement. Anyone buying a device marketed to criminals and especially as sold by other criminals is outrageously stupid.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are no companies selling devices as partners with us. There are legitimate companies selling devices with actual GrapheneOS such as NitroKey but it isn't in partnership with us and they do not mislead people into believing it is. There are no official forks of GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
grapheneos.org/faq
From our FAQ:
There are various companies selling devices with GrapheneOS, something which is permitted by the project's licensing provided that they make it clear that they're not GrapheneOS or officially associated with the project.
We are currently not affiliated with or endorse any company selling devices with GrapheneOS. Our official recommendation is to buy a supported device and install GrapheneOS yourself.
Our official web installer is easy to use, and our community is happy to help with the process should that be needed. On top of that, doing it yourself will also likely be a lot cheaper, as you're avoiding having to pay the premium of having someone else install GrapheneOS for you.
If you decide to buy a device with GrapheneOS installed regardless, here are the things you should pay attention to before doing so, as well as the things you should do after receiving the device:
* Make sure that you're not buying an end-of-life or near end-of-life device. You should consult our recommended devices section and choose one of the devices listed there.
* Verify that the device you have purchased is running genuine GrapheneOS. You can do this by checking the verified boot key hash. We provide the steps to do that in our post-install steps.
* After verifying that you're running genuine GrapheneOS, you should factory reset the device from recovery to make sure that it has not been tampered with. This will wipe all your data, so make sure to do it before you start using your device.
* After factory resetting the device, we recommend setting up local or remote attestation via our Auditor app. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are no companies selling devices as partners with us. There are legitimate companies selling devices with actual GrapheneOS such as NitroKey but it isn't in partnership with us and they do not mislead people into believing it is. There are no official forks of GrapheneOS.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Any criminals who bought devices from companies claiming to be our partners are idiots who were scammed. They probably bought devices directly from law enforcement. Anyone buying a device marketed to criminals and especially as sold by other criminals is outrageously stupid.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Sketchy companies are taking portions of our code and selling sketchy products partially based on it while misrepresenting it as being GrapheneOS. Many are falsely claiming we're involved in it. They're a mix scammers and honey pots like AN0M. NONE of those are our partners.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There is no such thing as a fork of GrapheneOS officially supported or made by us. Every company selling devices with forks claiming they're in any way official or which are using our name/logo are scammers. It shouldn't be surprising that criminals are scamming other criminals.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We received our registered US trademarks in December 2025 and are actively using them to take action against scammers. We've already had multiple websites and social media accounts selling phony GrapheneOS products taken down. They're not legitimate but rather are scammers.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are no companies selling devices in partnership with us and we've never made or supported forks of GrapheneOS for any companies. Forks of GrapheneOS are legally obligated to use their own name and logo. We're aware companies are falsely marketing phony GrapheneOS products.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
All forks of GrapheneOS are unofficial and MUST use their own name and logo if they're being sold or redistributed. Authoritarians are using these scams as an opportunity to dishonestly attack an open source privacy and security project as part of cracking down on privacy.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're helping authoritarians push false narratives based on conflating companies engaging in fraud and trademark infringement with the project they leech off. There are no individuals or companies selling products in any partnership with us. There are many pretending they are...
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is open source. That means it's legal for anyone to use it for any purpose including selling it. That has nothing to do with us. Anyone claiming to sell phones in partnership with us is a scammer. Claiming forks, etc. are GrapheneOS is fraud and trademark infringement.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Every individual or company selling phones who claims to do so in any form of partnership or coordination with us is a scammer. Most of those aren't even running genuine GrapheneOS but rather forks or operating systems hardly even based on it. GrapheneOS doesn't have 'resellers'.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have more a lot of services beyond static files which we host on the update servers along with tiny servers in a larger number of locations. We'll also be self-hosting demanding services such as geocoding soon and are asking for servers for that from some of the new sponsors.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We need more 10Gbps or higher dedicated servers for hosting our OS and app updates. We have North America covered well enough via sponsored servers from ReliableSite in both Miami and Los Angeles and a sponsored server from Xenyth in Toronto but no longer have any left in Europe.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It doesn't necessarily need to be fully sponsored. If we could pay for servers at cost and especially cheaper access to bandwidth based on actual transit/peering costs that would help a lot. 10Gbps unmetered is usually quite expensive and also inefficient since our use is bursty.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We received a bunch of potential sponsorship offers for servers which we're following up. We're going to focus on following up the offers from server providers first since they'll be able to get us what we need more quickly. We'll follow up the likely more complex ones after.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Cloudflare doesn't allow their CDN for non-website uses below the Enterprise tier:
www.cloudflare.com/service-specific-terms-application-ser…
They require paying for metered services instead.
There's also a 512MiB file size limit for caching below the Enterprise tier which would prevent it being used for major OS updates where we use the most bandwidth.
Cloudflare also doesn't allow fully disabling JavaScript challenges and captchas for the CDN below the Enterprise tier but rather only "Essentially Off". It's completely broken to use it for anything that's not started via an initial HTML request where the challenge will work.
> Cloudflare’s content delivery network (the “CDN”) Service can be used to cache and serve web pages and websites.
We also want to host all of our services ourselves for privacy and to avoid single point of failures.
We host our own high reliability global CDN by hosting our own authoritative DNS with GeoDNS and health checks. We have 2 separate anycast networks for DNS (ns1 and ns2) and servers around the world to serve both static files and provide other services such as network time, network-based location and updates. We lost the 2 servers we had in Europe for updates but that's going to be solved now and we'll likely be getting some for Asia-Pacific too.
Currently, any single provider going completely down doesn't take down any of our core OS services. It will soon take 2 specific providers going down for that to happen since we plan to make ns2 multi-provider and we'll have more than 2 providers for update servers starting later today.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have more a lot of services beyond static files which we host on the update servers along with tiny servers in a larger number of locations. We'll also be self-hosting demanding services such as geocoding soon and are asking for servers for that from some of the new sponsors.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Cloudflare doesn't allow their CDN for non-website uses below the Enterprise tier:
www.cloudflare.com/service-specific-terms-application-ser…
They require paying for metered services instead.
There's also a 512MiB file size limit for caching below the Enterprise tier which would prevent it being used for major OS updates where we use the most bandwidth.
Cloudflare also doesn't allow fully disabling JavaScript challenges and captchas for the CDN below the Enterprise tier but rather only "Essentially Off". It's completely broken to use it for anything that's not started via an initial HTML request where the challenge will work.
> Cloudflare’s content delivery network (the “CDN”) Service can be used to cache and serve web pages and websites.
We also want to host all of our services ourselves for privacy and to avoid single point of failures.
We host our own high reliability global CDN by hosting our own authoritative DNS with GeoDNS and health checks. We have 2 separate anycast networks for DNS (ns1 and ns2) and servers around the world to serve both static files and provide other services such as network time, network-based location and updates. We lost the 2 servers we had in Europe for updates but that's going to be solved now and we'll likely be getting some for Asia-Pacific too.
Currently, any single provider going completely down doesn't take down any of our core OS services. It will soon take 2 specific providers going down for that to happen since we plan to make ns2 multi-provider and we'll have more than 2 providers for update servers starting later today. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 145.0.7632.75.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/145.0.7632.75.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31885-vanadium-version-145076327…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our latest OS release adds a sandboxed Google Play toggle for extending RCS compatibility in Google Messages to the rest of the carriers supporting it by granting ICC authentication access to sandboxed Play services. T-Mobile is the main one requiring it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026021200 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31873-grapheneos-version-2026021…
#grapheneos #privacy #security
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are also the usual updates to the Linux kernel and the latest Android security preview patches. March 2026 AOSP patches have been finalized for a while other than patches being deferred. Most of the ones being added now are for the next major quarterly batch in June 2026.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We also added a new implementation of call recording which should be more robust including better handling of network handovers. It's an opt-in toggle in the Dialer app until it gets a lot of testing and then it can replace the existing implementation we made a long time ago.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026021200 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31873-grapheneos-version-2026021…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/7SEES_/status/2021731457329156265
GrapheneOS has never pretended to be impenetrable to exploits. We're careful to communicate that it provides much better protection against exploits rather than being immune to them. We've absolutely never misled people as is being falsely claimed.
Pointing to Cellebrite documentation from 2024 and 2025 showing they can only exploit After First Unlock state GrapheneOS devices if they haven't been patched since 2022 shows GrapheneOS working extremely well. Our locked device auto-reboot timer is set to 18 hours by default and triggers memory zeroing restoring the device to Before First Unlock state. Users can set it as low as 10 minutes if they want that to happen quicker. Over 3 years is certainly more than the default 18 hours or the previous default of 72 hours. How is that in any sense a failure? It's far better than what we expected to achieve and is an enormous success at protecting users.
Defending against attackers with physical access is far harder than defending against fully remote attacks. GrapheneOS started in 2014 and was originally primarily focused on defending against remote attacks and overall privacy. Remote attacks are harder to pull off both technically and operationally. GrapheneOS continues building stronger defenses against it.
Defending against attackers with physical access to an After First Unlock state device wasn't originally a focus of GrapheneOS. We had USB peripheral blocking while locked since around 2015 but that was greatly improved in early 2024. We expanded it to block USB connections as a whole while locked at a hardware level in addition to the software level along with disabling USB data at a hardware level. Many other defenses were added to protect devices against data extraction in 2024 and 2025. Our locked device auto-reboot feature was added in 2021 which was then enabled by default (72 hours) and set to a lower timer (18 hours) more recently.
It should be expected that Cellebrite will eventually develop a working exploit chain for an After First Unlock state GrapheneOS device. Delaying them developing a working attack for so long has been a huge success. We'll continue making improvements so if they do succeed at making another it won't last indefinitely. It will also still be heavily constrained by our locked device auto-reboot feature which has now been adopted in a weaker way by iOS 18.1+ and optin for Android 16+.
We make setting a strong passphrase convenient via our 2-factor fingerprint unlock feature. If users set a strong passphrase, they don't depend on secure element throttling as they do with a random 6 digit PIN. A strong passphrase combined with Before First Unlock state prevents any combination of hardware and software exploits bypassing encryption. If people use a random 6 digit PIN then they're choosing to depend on the secure element but in practice that still provides quite a high level of security which has held up for years since the launch of the Pixel 6 with the Titan M2.
GrapheneOS users can use a strong passphrase with fingerprint+PIN secondary unlock combined with a short auto-reboot timer for extremely high security against data extraction where there's only a short window in After First Unlock state. Heavily depending on hardware and OS security against physical data extraction is a choice.
Cellebrite and similar companies have massive resources. The amount of funding, developers, etc. we have available is tiny compared to them. We can achieve far more as our resources continue growing and as we begin making major improvements as a hardware and firmware level with OEM / SoC partners.
GrapheneOS never claimed to be able to provide anything close to the level of security it has ended up providing against these attacks in practice. We greatly underestimated how well it would hold up to them. It doesn't mean it will remain that way but we aren't claiming it will or depending on that happening. It's not supposed to be perfect or impenetrable. We wouldn't have a locked device auto-reboot timer if it was supposed to completely prevent exploitation...
7SEES
@7SEES_
If you have WhatsApp, Signal, if you've ever opened a PDF on your device, if you run iOS, Android, and even an OS like Graphene, your chances of having this software on your phone is more than zero.
Even Graphene pretends to be uncrackable, but clever marketing is used to cover up the fact that many of their distros are only "uncrackable" until you unlock the device the first time, (After First Unlock - AFU), any time you power it on. At least, this was the case in March 2025, I haven't checked on any new indexes lately. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS doesn't do what you're claiming and it's also not a company. It's a non-profit open source project. You're making the typical weak argument against people having privacy from mass surveillance by corporations and authoritarian governments 'to protect the children'.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS doesn't do what you're claiming and it's also not a company. It's a non-profit open source project. You're making the typical weak argument against people having privacy from mass surveillance by corporations and authoritarian governments 'to protect the children'.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 145.0.7632.45.1 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/145.0.7632.45.1
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31757-vanadium-version-145076324…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026020600 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31639-grapheneos-version-2026020…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 145.0.7632.45.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/145.0.7632.45.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31596-vanadium-version-145076324…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026020400 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31576-grapheneos-version-2026020…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS App Store version 35 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/AppStore/releases/tag/35
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31550-grapheneos-app-store-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS App Store version 34 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/AppStore/releases/tag/34
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31526-grapheneos-app-store-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 145.0.7632.26.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/145.0.7632.26.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31313-vanadium-version-145076322…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're now using our own autonomous system and IP space for 3 of our networks. We run 2 entirely separate anycast DNS networks for our authoritative DNS and have a simpler unicast setup on a bare metal server at Xenyth which we'll be using for more soon.
bgp.tools/as/40806Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our plan for our IPv4 /22 from the ARIN waitlist is deploying a single /24 in each of Toronto, Miami, Los Angeles and Seattle. Once we have a /22 deployed for North America, we'll qualify for getting out-of-region space on ARIN via the waitlist or transfers for Europe, Asia, etc.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The interesting parts of our BGP setup can be seen in github.com/GrapheneOS/ns1.grapheneos.org where we have our BGP community configuration for each ns1/ns2 location along with our setup for region steering via GeoDNS + anycast server location and failover via health checks from our DNS servers.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've built our own text-to-speech system with an initial English language model we trained ourselves with fully open source data. It will be added to our App Store soon and then included in GrapheneOS as a default enabled TTS backend once some more improvements are made to it.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our full time developer working on this already built their own Transcribro app for on-device speech-to-text available in the Accrescent app store. For GrapheneOS itself, we want actual open source implementations of these features rather than OpenAI's phony open source though.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Whisper is actually closed source. Open weights is another way of saying permissively licensed closed source. Our implementation of both text-to-speech and speech-to-text will be actual open source which means people can actually fork it and add/change/remove training data, etc.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026012800 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31269-grapheneos-version-2026012…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 144.0.7559.109.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/144.0.7559.109.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31220-vanadium-version-144075591…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026012100 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/31014-grapheneos-version-2026012…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 144.0.7559.90.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/144.0.7559.90.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/30967-vanadium-version-144075599…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 144.0.7559.76.1 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/144.0.7559.76.1
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/30839-vanadium-version-144075597…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 144.0.7559.76.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/144.0.7559.76.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/30717-vanadium-version-144075597…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026011300 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/30696-grapheneos-version-2026011…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026011000 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/30465-grapheneos-version-2026011…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 144.0.7559.59.1 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/144.0.7559.59.1
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/30591-vanadium-version-144075595…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2026010800 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/30419-grapheneos-version-2026010…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 144.0.7559.59.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/144.0.7559.59.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/30231-vanadium-version-144075595…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 143.0.7499.192.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/143.0.7499.192.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/30172-vanadium-version-143074991…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We currently have sponsored update mirrors in Toronto (Xenyth), Miami (ReliableSite) and Los Angeles (ReliableSite). Each of these are 10Gbps servers we manage ourselves. Tempest's new ownership is withdrawing the sponsorship for the one in London which was already not enough.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We could easily afford to start paying for the Tempest server in London but it lacks IPv6 and has issues with network downtime. We also aren't interested in paying a company sending us an ultimatum in the holiday season where we have 6 days to start paying or it's taken down.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For now, we can update our GeoDNS configuration to split Europe between Toronto and Miami combined with using Los Angeles for the rest of Asia. We can afford to pay for update servers in Europe ourselves if needed but sponsors are nice for this to avoid overpaying for bandwidth.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> Your phone’s baseband talks to towers before the OS ever sees anything.
That's absolutely not true for any of the devices supported by GrapheneOS. The cellular radio is an unprivileged, isolated component which is set up by the OS at boot and doesn't transmit/receive anything until the OS activates it. Airplane mode properly disables cellular radio transmit/receive including in early boot.
> But it cannot rewrite telecom protocols or control what the carrier forces the modem to do.
The cellular model in the supported devices is not controlled by the cellular network or carriers. It's configured by the OS including choosing which protocols and features are active or whether it's active at all. Airplane mode works correctly, as does configuring the preferred network mode.
> stops Silent SMS
SMS without content to display are not a privacy issue.
> Carrier / Network Layer = king
No, that's not how mainstream smartphones work at all.
> Modem obeys towers whether you trust Google or not
No, it doesn't obey the cellular network or carriers. It's Samsung that's being trusted, not the cellular network or carriers. It's an unprivileged, isolated radio similar to Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC and UWB. It doesn't give control to the networks it joins just as those other radios don't do that. There can be firmware vulnerabilities so there's a lot of internal hardening and regular updates. We can harden it through attack surface reduction (disabling protocols and features) and we can harden the OS from being exploited from it since it's an isolated component like the other radios. An attacker exploiting the cellular radio does not get control over the device and needs an OS exploit for the drivers/services talking to the cellular radio to take control of the OS, which is certainly something we can and do protect against. -
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> Your phone’s baseband talks to towers before the OS ever sees anything.
That's absolutely not true for any of the devices supported by GrapheneOS. The cellular radio is an unprivileged, isolated component which is set up by the OS at boot and doesn't transmit/receive anything until the OS activates it. Airplane mode properly disables cellular radio transmit/receive including in early boot.
> But it cannot rewrite telecom protocols or control what the carrier forces the modem to do.
The cellular model in the supported devices is not controlled by the cellular network or carriers. It's configured by the OS including choosing which protocols and features are active or whether it's active at all. Airplane mode works correctly, as does configuring the preferred network mode.
> stops Silent SMS
SMS without content to display are not a privacy issue.
> Carrier / Network Layer = king
No, that's not how mainstream smartphones work at all.
> Modem obeys towers whether you trust Google or not
No, it doesn't obey the cellular network or carriers. It's Samsung that's being trusted, not the cellular network or carriers. It's an unprivileged, isolated radio similar to Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, NFC and UWB. It doesn't give control to the networks it joins just as those other radios don't do that. There can be firmware vulnerabilities so there's a lot of internal hardening and regular updates. We can harden it through attack surface reduction (disabling protocols and features) and we can harden the OS from being exploited from it since it's an isolated component like the other radios. An attacker exploiting the cellular radio does not get control over the device and needs an OS exploit for the drivers/services talking to the cellular radio to take control of the OS, which is certainly something we can and do protect against. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Silent SMS is simply SMS without content to show. It's not a privacy issue and doesn't make cellular tracking any worse. It's a misconception that it's a privacy problem. When you're connected to the cellular network, it knows the location of the device without receiving SMS.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Silent SMS is simply SMS without content to show. It's not a privacy issue and doesn't make cellular tracking any worse. It's a misconception that it's a privacy problem. When you're connected to the cellular network, it knows the location of the device without receiving SMS.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2025122500 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/29501-grapheneos-version-2025122…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2025121700 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/29166-grapheneos-version-2025121…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 143.0.7499.146.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/143.0.7499.146.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/29050-vanadium-version-143074991…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've received a 2nd IPv4 /24 subnet from ARIN for our 2nd anycast DNS network. Both our /24 subnets were obtained quickly under the NRPM 4.10 policy for IPv6 deployment for our dual stack DNS use case. 2nd was obtained without waiting 6 months due to being a discrete network.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our ns1 has 11 locations on Vultr: New York City, Miami, Los Angeles, Seattle, London, Frankfurt, Singapore, Mumbai, Tokyo, Sao Paulo and Sydney.
Our ns2 has 4 locations on BuyVM: New York City, Miami, Las Vegas and Bern. We'll be adding a 2nd server provider for more locations.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
DNS resolvers quickly fall back to the other network if traffic is dropped. Having two discrete networks with separate hosting companies and transit providers provides very high reliability. Individual servers which go down also stop having traffic routed to them due to BGP.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have tiny website/network servers and also powerful update mirrors around the world. Our DNS servers use a combination of a GeoIP database and their own location to route users to the closest server that's up. Frequent health checks and low expiry time handle server downtime.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 167 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/28893-gmscompatconfig-version-16…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 143.0.7499.109.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/143.0.7499.109.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/28889-vanadium-version-143074991…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Jolla has spent years disparaging projects based on the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) for marketing. SailfishOS has a largely closed source user interface and application layer with no equivalent to the open source AOSP. It's far less private and secure than AOSP or iOS too.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Several of their supporters are taking the usual approach of calling us crazy and delusional while referencing harassment content at the same time as calling the factual info we posted aggressive. They're brigading discussions about GrapheneOS with attacks so we made this thread.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Brigading threads about an open source project and attacking the team with libelous claims is toxic. Defending ourselves from it with factual statements is not toxic. Repeating dishonest attacks on our team based on similar attacks over and over doesn't make it any less untrue.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2025121000 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/28869-grapheneos-version-2025121…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
An experimental release of GrapheneOS (2025120800) based on Android 16 QPR2 is available for testing via sideloading. It won't be pushed out via Alpha. You can join our testing chat room if you want to help with testing (grapheneos.org/contact). No security preview variant yet.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android 16 QPR2 experimental releases will be available soon. We're dealing with a lot of attacks on the project branching off from the smear campaign in France. We'd appreciate if our community would debunk this nonsense across platforms for us so we can focus on QPR2. Thanks.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You publicly brag about stealing people's Bitcoin and draining their bank accounts with scams. People who scam people are NOT welcome in our community. You are NOT the audience for GrapheneOS. For your own sake, what you posted on TG is hopefully LARPing and not real evidence.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Perhaps you're actually a career criminal who scams people for a living charged with premeditated murder as you claim to be. Perhaps you aren't any of that but rather you're some kid trying to harm GrapheneOS. Either way, you've gotten law enforcement involved with your posts.
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Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're publicly admitting to scamming people and stealing their Bitcoin, draining their bank accounts, etc. on Telegram. You're flaunting supposedly having money stolen from people with scamming. Do you think scammers are welcome in the GrapheneOS community?
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If you were concerned about law enforcement as you claim, it's not believable that you'd be spending your time waging a public war against GrapheneOS because you believe it resulted in the charges already filed against you without it being involved being raised to premeditated.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You connected to our forum with a non-VPN Belgian IP address after claiming to have fled the country. You have atrocious opsec for someone claiming to be a career criminal. It also appears you're likely using AI to assist with writing your posts aimed at harming GrapheneOS.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's not private connection data only we can see. You've visited a bunch of links people have posted with a non-VPN Belgian IP. It's quite possible you've never even used GrapheneOS from your poor attempts at attacking it with shifting stories based on people challenging it.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You have a long history of publicly bragging about scamming people to steal their life savings while flaunting the money you get from it. It's not clear why you think we'd do anything to support you. GrapheneOS is not for people like you and they're not welcome in our community.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Designing GrapheneOS to be private and secure including from us does not mean it's for career criminals scamming people for a living. There's little point of you using it when you relentlessly post self-incriminating evidence publicly bragging about crimes you say you commit.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Perhaps you're actually a career criminal who scams people for a living charged with premeditated murder as you claim to be. Perhaps you aren't any of that but rather you're some kid trying to harm GrapheneOS. Either way, you've gotten law enforcement involved with your posts.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Designing GrapheneOS to be private and secure including from us does not mean it's for career criminals scamming people for a living. There's little point of you using it when you relentlessly post self-incriminating evidence publicly bragging about crimes you say you commit.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You have a long history of publicly bragging about scamming people to steal their life savings while flaunting the money you get from it. It's not clear why you think we'd do anything to support you. GrapheneOS is not for people like you and they're not welcome in our community.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's not private connection data only we can see. You've visited a bunch of links people have posted with a non-VPN Belgian IP. It's quite possible you've never even used GrapheneOS from your poor attempts at attacking it with shifting stories based on people challenging it.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You connected to our forum with a non-VPN Belgian IP address after claiming to have fled the country. You have atrocious opsec for someone claiming to be a career criminal. It also appears you're likely using AI to assist with writing your posts aimed at harming GrapheneOS.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If you were concerned about law enforcement as you claim, it's not believable that you'd be spending your time waging a public war against GrapheneOS because you believe it resulted in the charges already filed against you without it being involved being raised to premeditated.
-
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You're publicly admitting to scamming people and stealing their Bitcoin, draining their bank accounts, etc. on Telegram. You're flaunting supposedly having money stolen from people with scamming. Do you think scammers are welcome in the GrapheneOS community?
-
Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You publicly brag about stealing people's Bitcoin and draining their bank accounts with scams. People who scam people are NOT welcome in our community. You are NOT the audience for GrapheneOS. For your own sake, what you posted on TG is hopefully LARPing and not real evidence.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is the same person who posted similar baseless claims about GrapheneOS in the past on Telegram recently propagated here. Those claims were debunked and now they're back with another story.
x.com/b8r200/status/1997107927841144989
This is their Telegram channel:
t.me/gurtieyPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
B8R20
@b8r200
i was sitting over the fed when he entered it, and i gave correct pin
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This person is continuing to make these unsubstantiated and highly inconsistent claims about GrapheneOS on other platforms, including Reddit where it was heavily upvoted in at least one community:
www.reddit.com/r/degoogle/comments/1pfrdf9/my_grapheneos_…
It would be helpful if others could spread the info here. -
GrapheneOS reposted
maia arson crimew 🐈
@awawawhoami
look ill just say it: posting through a premeditated homicide charge while ur also running a spam campaign and publicly blaming an open source project for getting caught is probably a bad idea
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 166 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re…
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/28746-gmscompatconfig-version-16…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> My lawyer literally told me that I would be let off if the phone was what it promised to be.
You're saying there was incriminating evidence on a phone your lawyer knew about. It's extremely odd for a lawyer to assure you of a specific outcome based on the security of a phone. -
GrapheneOS reposted
eh
@eh_hmmm
Yea we're asking for proof and you've provided nothing so far.
These docs you've submitted so far are more redacted than the Epstein Files.
Your summons says "Wednesday, 12/19/2025", when 12/19/25 is actually a Friday, and "Friday, 12/21/2025", which is a Sunday. What's your explanation for that?
And usually murder suspects are arrested, not sent a summons. -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's nothing GrapheneOS can do about using an easy to guess lock method, being recorded while unlocking, using fingerprint unlock without a 2nd factor PIN or using an unsupported end-of-life device without updates. You haven't provided evidence of GrapheneOS being exploited.
GrapheneOS is not a product and doesn't have any customers. We don't make promises about future capabilities of commercial exploit tools as that would be dishonest. If you purchased a device supposedly running GrapheneOS from a shady company, it likely wasn't genuine GrapheneOS.
Did you install GrapheneOS yourself or did you purchase a device claiming to have it? Your claim about security promises we've never made is a strong indication you purchased a device from a shady company with dishonest marketing. Many of those devices aren't genuine GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Please listen to this podcast about ANOM:
darknetdiaries.com/transcript/146/
The FBI ran a string operation in Europe where they created their own 'secure' phone and messaging platform. Their OS used portions of our code and was heavily marketed as being GrapheneOS or based on GrapheneOS.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> I was firstly arrested by the Homicide Forensics Team,
You were arrested by a forensics team? Can you expand on that further?
> now i have a warrant from the INTEL department. Which means 1thing
What do you mean by an intel department? What's the one thing that it means?Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> My lawyer literally told me that I would be let off if the phone was what it promised to be.
You're saying there was incriminating evidence on a phone your lawyer knew about. It's extremely odd for a lawyer to assure you of a specific outcome based on the security of a phone. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> I was firstly arrested by the Homicide Forensics Team,
You were arrested by a forensics team? Can you expand on that further?
> now i have a warrant from the INTEL department. Which means 1thing
What do you mean by an intel department? What's the one thing that it means? -
GrapheneOS reposted
Christophe Boutry
@Ced_haurus
FAKE. @GrapheneOS don’t worry, this “summons” is bogus.
It says “woensdag 19/12/2025 om 10.00 uur” (“Wednesday 19 December 2025 at 10:00”) even though 19/12/2025 is a Friday,
and “vrijdag 21/12/2025 om 10.00 uur” (“Friday 21 December 2025 at 10:00”) even though 21/12/2025 is a Sunday.
No serious police force summons a “murder suspect” like this in advance. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's nothing GrapheneOS can do about using an easy to guess lock method, being recorded while unlocking, using fingerprint unlock without a 2nd factor PIN or using an unsupported end-of-life device without updates. You haven't provided evidence of GrapheneOS being exploited.
GrapheneOS is not a product and doesn't have any customers. We don't make promises about future capabilities of commercial exploit tools as that would be dishonest. If you purchased a device supposedly running GrapheneOS from a shady company, it likely wasn't genuine GrapheneOS.
Did you install GrapheneOS yourself or did you purchase a device claiming to have it? Your claim about security promises we've never made is a strong indication you purchased a device from a shady company with dishonest marketing. Many of those devices aren't genuine GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Please listen to this podcast about ANOM:
darknetdiaries.com/transcript/146/
The FBI ran a string operation in Europe where they created their own 'secure' phone and messaging platform. Their OS used portions of our code and was heavily marketed as being GrapheneOS or based on GrapheneOS. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2025120400 released:
grapheneos.org/releases
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/28697-grapheneos-version-2025120…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 143.0.7499.52.0 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/143.0.7499.52.0
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/28639-vanadium-version-143074995…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 143.0.7499.34.2 released:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/143.0.7499.34.2
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/28614-vanadium-version-143074993…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #browser -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our security preview releases have provided the December 2025 security patches for the Android Open Source Project since September 2025. December 2025 security patches are now public and being integrated into our regular releases while our security previews have up to March 2026.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Spending a significant amount of time on this is part of the reason GrapheneOS feature development has slowed down. Expanding our servers and now migrating away from OVH is another. We'll be hiring more people and improving our organization structure to get things moving better.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We would greatly prefer it if patches were disclosed to OEMs 1 week ahead instead of 2-4 months ahead so our security preview releases would only need to exist for a week and regular releases would get the patches much faster. OEMs should just hire far more people and do better.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/DarkWebInformer/status/1995232015013335504
The person who originally posted this on Telegram followed it up by explaining the device was obtained while unlocked. Developer options was very likely already enabled and the bootloader was possibly left unlocked based on further info they shared...
Dark Web Informer
@DarkWebInformer
Dread: "FEDs completely f*cked Graphene of one of the Scattered Spider kids"
Thread: https://dreadytofatroptsdj6io7l3xptbet6onoyno2yv7jicoxkny…Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Verified boot key fingerprint is shown at boot and can be used to confirm a device runs GrapheneOS. Auditor can also be used for additional verification including verifying the OS version. Of course, someone could have put a tracking device inside it with an extra cellular radio.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is very easy to install with our web installer after getting one of the recommended devices:
grapheneos.org/install/web
There are a large number of fake private and secure phones. If the official GrapheneOS doesn't fit your needs, just use an iPhone instead of a scam. -
GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
What would you do if France's law enforcement demanded access to data on a server in Canada or the US with a warrant? That's what we're concerned about and why we decided we can't use OVH anymore due to their actions, not yours. They referenced SkyECC and Encrochat repeatedly.
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Octave Klaba
@olesovhcom
On est assez à l'aise de dire qu'il n'y a aucune base juridique pour exécuter cet ordre. Les erreurs juridiques ca existe et il y a les procédures pour les corriger. On les suit.
A.B Zabihiyan @bahadorz
curieux de savoir ce que @olesovhcom pense de ça: www.theregister.com/2025/11/27/canada_court_ovh/
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
What would you do if France's law enforcement demanded access to data on a server in Canada or the US with a warrant? That's what we're concerned about and why we decided we can't use OVH anymore due to their actions, not yours. They referenced SkyECC and Encrochat repeatedly.
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GrapheneOS reposted
The Register
@TheRegister
GrapheneOS bails on OVHcloud over France's privacy stance www.theregister.com/security/2025/11/28/grapheneos-bails-…
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
2nd article published on GrapheneOS by Nicolas Lellouche (@LelloucheNico) in @Numerama is a defamatory hit piece. It's outrageously biased coverage misrepresenting our statements and actions. The way he spins us answering most questions we receive on this platform is disgusting.
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Over the past week, GrapheneOS has received a massive amount of support from not only our users in France but MANY other people there too. The comments on extremely biased news articles attacking us are still extremely supportive of GrapheneOS. France's people support GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has experienced a huge growth in interest from France due to the extraordinarily biased and inaccurate media coverage. We've been planning on forming translation teams for our apps and features added by the OS, and we'll probably start with French + German initially.
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GrapheneOS reposted
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> So you're not denying that your products are used by people who sell poison to children?
>
> So you don't deny your production help criminals to kill children with drugs?
The vast majority of the drug trafficking they're fearmongering over involves cannabis. Recreational cannabis is legal in Canada where the GrapheneOS Foundation is based. Our provincial government sells recreational cannabis through the Ontario Cannabis Store (OCS). It's hardly something serious.
France is one of the largest exporters of alcohol, which is a hard drug and a neurotoxin. It's extremely addictive and consuming any amount of it causes harm. It's a major part of the French economy and kills far more people than any of what they're using to fearmonger about GrapheneOS.
France can simply legalize marijuana if they want to end most illegal drug trafficking in France. Instead, they're heavily supporting organized crime by keeping it criminalized. It provides a major reason for the existence of organized crime and a huge source of funding for it. France has the highest rates of cannabis use in Europe despite it being illegal.
GrapheneOS has ~400k users around the world with likely more than half of those in Europe. Criminals using it are a tiny minority of the userbase. It does not encourage or cause people to commit crime. It's a more private and secure OS for mobile devices. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We no longer have any active servers in France and are continuing the process of leaving OVH. We'll be rotating our TLS keys and Let's Encrypt account keys pinned via accounturi. DNSSEC keys may also be rotated. Our backups are encrypted and can remain on OVH for now.
Our App Store verifies the app store metadata with a cryptographic signature and downgrade protection along with verification of the packages. Android's package manager also has another layer of signature verification and downgrade protection.
Our System Updater verifies updates with a cryptographic signature and downgrade protection along with another layer of both in update_engine and a third layer of both via verified boot. Signing channel release channel names is planned too.
Our update mirrors are currently hosted on sponsored servers from ReliableSite (Los Angeles, Miami) and Tempest (London). London is a temporary location due to an emergency move from a provider which left the dedicated server business and will move. More sponsored update mirrors are coming.
Our ns1 anycast network is on Vultr and our ns2 anycast network is on BuyVM since both support BGP for announcing our own IP space. We're moving our main website/network servers used for default OS connections to a mix of Vultr+BuyVM locations.
We have 5 servers in Canada with OVH with more than static content and basic network services: email, Matrix, discussion forum, Mastodon and attestation. Our plan is to move these to Netcup root servers or a similar provider short term and then colocated servers in Toronto long term.
France isn't a safe country for open source privacy projects. They expect backdoors in encryption and for device access too. Secure devices and services are not going to be allowed. We don't feel safe using OVH for even a static website with servers in Canada/US via their Canada/US subsidiaries.
We were likely going to be able to release experimental Pixel 10 support very soon and it's getting disrupted. The attacks on our team with ongoing libel and harassment have escalated, raids on our chat rooms have escalated and more. It's rough right now and support is appreciated.Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
> So you're not denying that your products are used by people who sell poison to children?
>
> So you don't deny your production help criminals to kill children with drugs?
The vast majority of the drug trafficking they're fearmongering over involves cannabis. Recreational cannabis is legal in Canada where the GrapheneOS Foundation is based. Our provincial government sells recreational cannabis through the Ontario Cannabis Store (OCS). It's hardly something serious.
France is one of the largest exporters of alcohol, which is a hard drug and a neurotoxin. It's extremely addictive and consuming any amount of it causes harm. It's a major part of the French economy and kills far more people than any of what they're using to fearmonger about GrapheneOS.
France can simply legalize marijuana if they want to end most illegal drug trafficking in France. Instead, they're heavily supporting organized crime by keeping it criminalized. It provides a major reason for the existence of organized crime and a huge source of funding for it. France has the highest rates of cannabis use in Europe despite it being illegal.
GrapheneOS has ~400k users around the world with likely more than half of those in Europe. Criminals using it are a tiny minority of the userbase. It does not encourage or cause people to commit crime. It's a more private and secure OS for mobile devices. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A false narrative is being pushed about GrapheneOS claiming we're ending operations in France due to the actions of 2 newspapers. That's completely wrong. If both newspapers and the overall French media had taken our side instead of extreme bias against us, we'd still be leaving.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Please listen to this podcast about ANOM:
darknetdiaries.com/transcript/146/
The FBI ran a string operation in Europe where they created their own 'secure' phone and messaging platform. Their OS used portions of our code and was heavily marketed as being GrapheneOS or based on GrapheneOS. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We were contacted by a journalist at Le Parisien newspaper with this prompt:
> I am preparing an article on the use of your secure personal data phone solution by drug traffickers and other criminals. Have you ever been contacted by the police? Are you aware that some of your clients might be criminals? And how does the company manage this issue?
Absolutely no further details were provided about what was being claimed, who was making it or the basis for those being made about it. We could only provide a very generic response to this.
Our response was heavily cut down and the references to human rights organizations, large tech companies and others using GrapheneOS weren't included. Our response was in English was translated by them: "we have no clients or customers" was turned into "nous n’avons ni clients ni usagers", etc...
GrapheneOS is a freely available open source privacy project. It's obtained from our website, not shady dealers in dark alleys and the "dark web". It doesn't have a marketing budget and we certainly aren't promoting it through unlisted YouTube channels and the other nonsense that's being claimed.
GrapheneOS has no such thing as the fake Snapchat feature that's described. What they're describing appears to be forks of GrapheneOS by shady companies infringing on our trademark. Those products may not even be truly based on GrapheneOS, similar to how ANOM used parts of it to pass it off as such.
France is an increasingly authoritarian country on the brink of it getting far worse. They're already very strong supporters of EU Chat Control. Their fascist law enforcement is clearly ahead of the game pushing outrageous false claims about open source privacy projects. None of it is substantiated.
iodéOS and /e/OS are based in France. iodéOS and /e/OS make devices dramatically more vulnerable while misleading users about privacy and security. These fake privacy products serve the interest of authoritarians rather than protecting people. /e/OS receives millions of euros in government funding.
Those lag many months to years behind on providing standard Android privacy and security patches. They heavily encourage users to use devices without working disk encryption and important security protections. Their users have their data up for grabs by apps, services and governments who want it.
There's a reason they're going after a legitimate privacy and security project developed outside of their jurisdiction rather than 2 companies based in France within their reach profiting from selling 'privacy' products.
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/24134-devices-lacking-standard-p…
Here's that article:
archive.is/AhMsj -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Apple and Google both provide support for offline speech-to-text using local models. Users can configure it to be fully offline.
The Murena Voice to Text service in /e/OS sends the user's audio to OpenAI which is hidden away in their terms of services:
community.e.foundation/t/voice-to-text-feature-using-open… -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These attacks are taking a multi pronged approach including pushing existing fabricated stories and harassment towards our team. We'd appreciate if our community was more active than usual in debunking misinformation and attacks on our team. It's a very abnormal wave of attacks.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
European authoritarians and their enablers in the media are misrepresenting GrapheneOS and even Pixel phones as if they're something for criminals. GrapheneOS is opposed to the mass surveillance police state these people want to impose on everyone.
www.xatakandroid.com/sociedad/cada-vez-que-vemos-google-p… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
iOS 18.1 added an implementation of the auto-reboot timer for locked devices we've been using in GrapheneOS since June 2021:
chaos.social/@jiska/113447894119816217
This was one of our early generation protections against forensic data extraction. We added a lot more protections this year. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Wired was manipulated into spreading misinformation to market Palantir and iVerify by misrepresenting a vulnerability in a disabled demo app as being a serious problem which could be exploited in the real world. They should retract the article but won't.
www.wired.com/story/google-android-pixel-showcase-vulnera… -
Post not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Both SimpleX and Cwtch have advantages along with getting a lot right. Most of what you listed above is awful though. Telegram, OTR, WhatsApp, Briar, etc. should just be avoided.
Signal does have usernames now and you can avoid disclosing phone # to people. Can change username. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 114.0.5735.53.0 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/114.0.5735.53.0.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/5198-vanadium-version-1140573553…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 55 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/5195-gmscompatconfig-version-55-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 54 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/5169-gmscompatconfig-version-54-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 113.0.5672.163.0 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/113.0.5672.163.0.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/5168-vanadium-version-1130567216…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our main chat rooms are on Matrix, but we've added an IRC channel on libera.chat bridged to each Matrix room:
#grapheneos
#grapheneos-offtopic
#grapheneos-testing
#grapheneos-dev
#grapheneos-infra
#grapheneos-media
Previously, we only had the initial 3 IRC channels. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 53 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/5089-gmscompatconfig-version-53-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 113.0.5672.132.0 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/113.0.5672.132.0.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/5052-vanadium-version-1130567213…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our new Contact Scopes feature is now available in the Alpha channel. It provides a way to avoid granting the Contacts permission for apps requiring it. It's similar to our Storage Scopes feature replacing needing any of the media/storage permissions.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023051600 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/5049-grapheneos-version-20230516…
#grapheneos #privacy #security
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We published experimental support for the Pixel 7a within 2 days of it launching. Experimental tag was dropped shortly after on May 14th. This is the first production release supporting and will hopefully make it to stable channel, as long as nothing is wrong with Contact Scopes.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We also plan to replace the need to grant the Camera and Microphone permissions. Our Sensors permission already largely avoids compatibility issues to the extent possible since zeroed data is returned. Network permission similarly pretends that the network is down when revoked.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's already a standard Mock Location feature and we'll be providing a non-developer interface for using it along with providing similar built-in functionality for Camera and Microphone. We'd also like to split the Camera permission for front and rear cameras. Steady progress.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023051600 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/5049-grapheneos-version-20230516…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 70 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/70.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4972-auditor-app-version-70-rele…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
See attestation.app/about and attestation.app/tutorial for info about the app and optional monitoring service.
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android #attestation #verifiedboot #measuredboot #hsm #secureelement #auditor -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our Bluesky account is @grapheneos.org but we aren't planning on posting from it while the platform is invite-only. Our community has gone to a mix of Mastodon, Nostr, Bluesky, cohost and elsewhere. Twitter is still most active and we don't currently have the resources for this.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Mastodon hasn't been a great experience due to a mix of technical limitations and issues with the existing communities predating the exodus from Twitter. We tried to avoid federation conflicts by hosting our own instance for only our project accounts which has done the opposite.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
First experimental release of GrapheneOS for Pixel 7a is available. Can be installed via our staging site web installer or downloaded from the releases page for CLI install.
staging.grapheneos.org/install/web
staging.grapheneos.org/releases
We don't have a Pixel 7a yet so it's entirely untested.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixel 7a support has been tested by a couple users and the experimental release is available through our regular site:
grapheneos.org/install/web
grapheneos.org/releases
No known issues. We're in the process of testing the update system. Auditor support still needs to be added. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 52 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4947-gmscompatconfig-version-52-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We'll be heavily prioritizing adding support for the Pixel 7a, Pixel Tablet and Pixel Fold. It has been years since we supported a tablet (Nexus 9) and there will likely be additional work to support the form factor properly. Pixel Fold is a new form factor and may be difficult.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Providing production quality support for all these new devices will take a substantial amount of development time. We need to balance it with our privacy and security work. We're still very early in the process of scaling up the development team via the GrapheneOS Foundation.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We need to purchase one of each device for our device testing line along with getting multiple devices for multiple device maintainers. We'll be handling funding this round of new devices via the GrapheneOS Foundation. We'll be taking donations specifically for this purpose.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Latest release of GrapheneOS replaces Qualcomm PSDS (XTRA) servers with a GrapheneOS server caching the data by default:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1654708337324244993
We've also fully removed the unnecessary User-Agent header instead of only removing the serial number from it as we did previously.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023050500 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4870-grapheneos-version-20230505…
#grapheneos #privacy #security
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are no longer any default connections to non-GrapheneOS servers other than the network-provided DNS resolvers. We document default connections at grapheneos.org/faq along with a section below covering connections triggered by using a carrier or installing apps, etc.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This was already the case on all the recommended devices (6th and 7th generation Pixels) since they use the Tensor SoC and a separate Broadcom GNSS chip rather than a Qualcomm SoC. However, it's now also the case for 4th and 5th generation Pixels and future Qualcomm SoC devices.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023050500 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4870-grapheneos-version-20230505…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 20 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/20.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4862-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android #repository -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 19 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/19.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4844-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android #repository -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 51 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4840-gmscompatconfig-version-51-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 113.0.5672.77.0 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/113.0.5672.77.0.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4818-vanadium-version-1130567277…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023050100 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4787-grapheneos-version-20230501…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Latest release addresses the privacy issue brought to our attention by NitroKey with Qualcomm SoC devices by stopping xtra-daemon from sending the SoC serial number in the HTTPS User-Agent header:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1652434708494516228
We'll be removing the User-Agent header completely later.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023042900 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4749-grapheneos-version-20230429…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023042900 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4749-grapheneos-version-20230429…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 50 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4748-gmscompatconfig-version-50-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Linux 6.2.13 and 6.1.26 have broken Android builds again by resolving some mmap regressions at the expense of reintroducing others. mmap has been broken since 6.1.
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1642033599686770688
The usable 6.1/6.2 kernel versions are 6.2.9 through 6.2.12 and 6.1.22 through 6.1.25.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Linux 6.1 included a major memory management regression due to the new maple tree VMA implementation. This caused a high chance of spurious mmap failures while compiling dex bytecode to native code during Android/GrapheneOS builds. It's resolved by Linux 6.2.9 and Linux 6.1.22.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The kernel version ranges listed above where Android builds work still have severe issues. They tried to fix those issues at the expense of regressing this again even though there are test cases for this that are now failing. These regressions are in no way hardware specific.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Per our request, NitroKey has fixed one of the main issues in www.nitrokey.com/news/2023/smartphones-popular-qualcomm-c…. XTRA downloads are done by xtra-daemon in the OS, not firmware. It also does use HTTPS by default, but the OS can override the default URLs via gps.conf and some OSes do override to HTTP URLs.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
XTRA is a PSDS implementation, meaning it downloads static files providing predicted satellite locations and geographical data to assist with obtaining a faster GPS lock. It is not SUPL or IZat. Broadcom GPS relies on the AOSP PSDS implementation but Qualcomm uses their own.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Qualcomm originally hosted the databases at izatcloud.net which confused people by making it seem as if IZat is being used when it isn't. IZat is their default disabled network-based location service as an alternative to Google's service. Most devices don't support it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The newer default URLs for the database downloads use xtracloud.net subdomains along with time.xtracloud.net / nts.xtracloud.net for NTP / NTS. NTS (authenticated NTP) is disabled by default which doesn't particularly matter since it's not to set system time.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
NitroKey is correct that xtra-daemon has support for sending information on the device including device model, serial number, etc. They're also correct that the user is never asked about it. It's less of an issue than SUPL which sends nearby cell towers, phone number and IMSI.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS disables sending IMSI and phone number for SUPL, we use our own supl.grapheneos.org proxy by default and we provide a toggle for disabling it or using the standard carrier-selected server (which is usually supl.google.com). We also have our own PSDS caches.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our SUPL service is simply a proxy for now, since we don't have the software or data to run a SUPL service ourselves. Our PSDS services broadcom.psds.grapheneos.org and qualcomm.psds.grapheneos.org are caches which serve from our cache even if data is stale and update it in the background.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We use broadcom.psds.grapheneos.org as default PSDS source for 6th/7th generation Pixels with a toggle to choose standard Google cache instead. We obtain data from Broadcom's service since it can be fresher than Google's cache.
Our Qualcomm PSDS cache will be shipped for 4th/5th gen. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 113.0.5672.62.0 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/113.0.5672.62.0.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4703-vanadium-version-1130567262…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 62 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/62.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4604-grapheneos-camera-app-versi…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 69 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/69.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4597-auditor-app-version-69-rele…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
See attestation.app/about and attestation.app/tutorial for info about the app and optional monitoring service.
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android #attestation #verifiedboot #measuredboot #hsm #secureelement #auditor -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 49 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4593-gmscompatconfig-version-49-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 18 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/18.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4567-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #android #repository -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 112.0.5615.101.0 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/112.0.5615.101.0.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4515-vanadium-version-1120561510…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 48 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4478-gmscompatconfig-version-48-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 47 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4466-gmscompatconfig-version-47-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023041100 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4437-grapheneos-version-20230411…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 46 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4367-gmscompatconfig-version-46-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 45 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4351-gmscompatconfig-version-45-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023040400 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4306-grapheneos-version-20230404…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Linux 6.1 included a major memory management regression due to the new maple tree VMA implementation. This caused a high chance of spurious mmap failures while compiling dex bytecode to native code during Android/GrapheneOS builds. It's resolved by Linux 6.2.9 and Linux 6.1.22.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If you're experiencing these build failures while building GrapheneOS on Linux 6.2 or Linux 6.1, please update to latest 6.2.9 or 6.1.22 kernel.org releases. This is a very simple example of why moving to new Linux LTS branches is so difficult for production devices.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are many serious regressions in each new major Linux kernel release. Very little testing is done and vast majority of regressions don't block releases.
We had to temporarily maintain 5.15 LTS package for our build machines after Arch moved to 6.1 for the linux-lts package. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 44 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4202-gmscompatconfig-version-44-…
#grapheneos #privacy #security #gmscompat -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 112.0.5615.48.0 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/112.0.5615.48.0.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4184-vanadium-version-1120561548…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023032600 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4116-grapheneos-version-20230326…
#grapheneos #privacy #security -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 61 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/61.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4111-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 43 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4099-gmscompatconfig-version-43-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 42 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4074-gmscompatconfig-version-42-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 41 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4072-gmscompatconfig-version-41-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 111.0.5563.116.0 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/111.0.5563.116.0.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4031-vanadium-version-1110556311… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023032000 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4010-grapheneos-version-20230320… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 17 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/17.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3998-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 40 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3986-gmscompatconfig-version-40-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 39 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3925-gmscompatconfig-version-39-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023031500 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3884-grapheneos-version-20230315… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our privacy-focused Camera app now has over 500k downloads through the Play Store:
play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.came…
If the app succeeds at spreading awareness about GrapheneOS we'll be able to devote more resources to adding features like frame rate control and manual exposure controls.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If you're on Android 12 or later, you can also get our Camera app from our own app repository using our modern app repository client. Can download/install that from github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases and it will provide fully automatic updates for itself and other apps like our Camera app.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Features and image quality depend on the Camera2/CameraX support provided by your device.
Zoom-based multi-camera and modes for HDR, Night, Portrait, etc. and other features depend on the device providing them for non-OEM camera apps. Recent Samsung phones have the best support.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Privacy features offered by the app include recording videos without audio, stripping EXIF metadata from images by default and choosing an arbitrary storage location via any storage provider. By default it saves to Media Store in DCIM/Camera without needing storage permissions.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Leaving a 5 star review for our apps on the Play Store will help boost how much it promotes them via search and is an easy way to help raise awareness about GrapheneOS. Make sure you aren't opted into Beta testing first or it counts as testing feedback rather than a review.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023031300 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3843-grapheneos-version-20230313… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
March 2023 release of the Android Open Source Project and stock Pixel OS are finally being published today. Monthly and quarterly releases are usually published on the first Monday of the month (deferred for US holidays like July 4), but that's not always the case.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 38 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3791-gmscompatconfig-version-38-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 37 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3759-gmscompatconfig-version-37-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
March release of the upstream Android Open Source Project and stock Pixel OS have been delayed. We're looking into it and will determine how to proceed soon. We'd prefer to release a single full update instead of a partial one followed by a full update once those are released.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 60 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/60.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3713-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 111.0.5563.58.0 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/111.0.5563.58.0.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3685-vanadium-version-1110556358… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've added much more detailed information on cellular-based A-GNSS (Assisted Global Navigation Satellite System) to our FAQ:
grapheneos.org/faq
It explains the difference between control plane vs. user plane A-GNSS, differences between the devices and what we improve. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023030400 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3649-grapheneos-version-20230304… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 16 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/16.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3637-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our next release will override carrier selected SUPL server (usually supl.google.com) with supl.grapheneos.org by default. Similar to connectivity checks, etc. there will be a new Settings toggle for choosing between GrapheneOS proxy, Standard and Disabled for SUPL.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
On 4th/5th generation Pixels, SUPL is implemented by Qualcomm in the baseband and only uses mobile data for the connections.
On 6th/7th generation Pixels, SUPL is implemented by Broadcom gpsd in userspace. It can use any available network and gets routed through an active VPN.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
SUPL is a form of A-GNSS, meaning it assists satellite geolocation (GNSS). It uses data on nearby cell towers to speed up obtaining a satellite location lock. Carriers were expected to provide either control plane A-GNSS via the cellular network or a user place (SUPL) server.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Carriers can already check which cell towers are near a connected subscriber so carrier-based A-GNSS doesn't give them information they don't already have available. However, in practice, carriers delegate implementing SUPL to Google and don't bother with control plane A-GNSS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
SUPL stands for Secure User Plane Location. User Plane refers to it being based on a TCP/IP connection to the server rather than being part of the cellular protocol (Control Plane). Secure is based on it using TLS. We've improved security of the connections with our proxy.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Qualcomm SUPL on 4th/5th gen Pixels is implemented on the baseband and only uses mobile data. It only supports up to TLSv1.1 and doesn't support ECDSA, ECDHE, AEAD or SHA-2. It sets AES128-SHA as the preferred cipher suite but we use DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA to provide forward secrecy.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We had to switch to a dedicated RSA 3072 certificate for supl.grapheneos.org to work around the lack of ECDSA support.
Pixel 5a was the last Pixel with a Qualcomm baseband and will be end-of-life after August 2024. Newer Qualcomm basebands may have better TLS support.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Broadcom implements SUPL as part of gpsd in userspace and it supports modern cryptography. AOSP and the stock Pixel OS use a standard configuration with only TLSv1.1/TLSv1/SSLv3/SSLv2 but we've set it to TLSv1.2-only instead. Broadcom just didn't define a string for TLSv1.3 yet.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's not worth modifying it to support using TLSv1.3 + TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3-only. We use the same cipher suites either way (ECDHE + AES-GCM/ChaChaPoly + SHA2) so it makes little difference. It's not at all latency sensitive so saving a round trip for connections wouldn't matter.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 36 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3624-gmscompatconfig-version-36-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 111.0.5563.49.0 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/111.0.5563.49.0.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3616-vanadium-version-1110556349… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Myntex (@MyntexInc) was previously selling backdoored EncroChat devices:
web.archive.org/web/20160310025153/http://www.myntex.ca/
If you look at their current marketing, they try to multiple open source projects including Signal, Matrix and GrapheneOS based on them being open source.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/MyntexInc/status/1626688081985261588
Myntex is selling end-of-life Pixel 3a XL devices with an insecure OS without full security patches as a premium priced proprietary 'secure' phone product. This isn't a hardened device but rather a scam, seen many times before from Encrochat and others.This post is unavailable. See it on X.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Their current products are the same kind of scamming based on shoddy engineering and false security claims. As you can see from their Twitter feed, they have a long history of spreading misinformation about open source projects and claiming their faulty products are better...
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 110.0.5481.154.1 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/110.0.5481.154.1.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3574-vanadium-version-1100548115… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/MyntexInc/status/1626688081985261588
Myntex is selling end-of-life Pixel 3a XL devices with an insecure OS without full security patches as a premium priced proprietary 'secure' phone product. This isn't a hardened device but rather a scam, seen many times before from Encrochat and others.This post is unavailable. See it on X.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
See x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1629260329996648450 for details on the underhanded attacks they've launched on GrapheneOS alongside the product. We've seen this before from other groups and expect to continue seeing it. They feel threatened and engage in underhanded attacks to protect their bottom line.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Earlier this month, unknown attackers targeted our website servers by spamming requests in an attempt to overload the servers and prevent users from accessing out website. We provided detailed information on what was happening and how we responded to it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our website was targeted with a Distributed Denial of Service attack using HTTP/2 multiplexing within the 2 minute window from 2023-02-09T00:58:00Z to 2023-02-09T01:00:00Z. OVH detected it and enabled mitigation but enough went through to cause downtime due to memory limits.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's genuinely quite sad so many people including companies, non-profits and governments are duped into paying huge amounts of money for phony 'secure' phones and messaging systems from scammers misleading them about Signal and other open source projects.
This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Earlier this month, unknown attackers targeted our website servers by spamming requests in an attempt to overload the servers and prevent users from accessing out website. We provided detailed information on what was happening and how we responded to it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our website was targeted with a Distributed Denial of Service attack using HTTP/2 multiplexing within the 2 minute window from 2023-02-09T00:58:00Z to 2023-02-09T01:00:00Z. OVH detected it and enabled mitigation but enough went through to cause downtime due to memory limits.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We made it clear we don't know the specific group behind that specific DDoS attack. In response to x.com/kitfunfel/status/1623632234971545600, we explained it's not a sophisticated attack and very likely originates from groups who openly engage in other forms of underhanded attacks on GrapheneOS.
This post is unavailable. See it on X.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A group selling highly problematic proprietary phones and chat services which they claim to be secure has tried to use this short 2 minute DDoS incident to attack the project with blatant spin and fabrications:
medium.com/@Geoff_Green/multiple-ddos-attacks-at-graphene…
This is exactly what we were talking about.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
In this post, they conflate the recent DDoS attack on our website servers (only static content) with previous unrelated attacks targeting the federated Matrix chat ecosystem as a whole. They make many unsubstantiated and outright false claims in an attempt to harm GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They try to portray the fact that GrapheneOS is an open source project funded by a substantial amount of donations rather than a business model as a negative, and try to imply that creates 'security deficits'. This is typical behavior from a typical security industry charlatan.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Conflating the 2 minute DDoS attack on our website this month with overall Matrix ecosystem DDoS attacks last year and news about Cloudflare and OVH doesn't make much sense. They try to portray the DDoS attacks and our transparency about them as somehow eroding our reputation.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Article finishes up with baseless, unsubstantiated claims that we made false accusations about the source of the DDoS. You can see our thread and replies where we talked about why the attacks are unsurprising and gave examples of other ongoing underhanded attacks on our project.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The post comes from the CEO of www.myntex.com, a company selling problematic proprietary phones and messaging services (chatmailsecure.com). You can see why a company like this would feel threatened by open source projects like GrapheneOS, Signal, Matrix and others.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Can the recent DDoS attack lowered our website's 30 day uptime to a bit above 99.99%:
nodeping.com/reports/statusevents/3FL97F6RRQHJIOWL
Our website servers don't provide any services to GrapheneOS so hardly anyone noticed. If their goal is harming our reputation with downtime, they'll need to do better.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If you check out the websites from the group attacking us for being targeted by these DDoS attacks, you'll see their advertising has a major focus on their supposed 99.99% uptime and DDoS protection. We're not surprised by more underhanded attacks by charlatans as it's endless.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 35 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3539-gmscompatconfig-version-35-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS now has an improved implementation of our HTTPS-based network time implementation providing far better precision/accuracy than the insecure network time (NTP without NTS) used by Android. More information available in our latest release notes:
grapheneos.org/releases -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023022300 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3524-grapheneos-version-20230223… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 110.0.5481.154 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/110.0.5481.154.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3518-vanadium-version-11005481154 -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig (sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer configuration) version 34 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/re….
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3446-gmscompatconfig-version-34-… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
An anonymous person donated 39 ETH to GrapheneOS on February 12th. Value of ~$59k at the time and now almost $65k.
Currently, all the developers we pay to work on GrapheneOS are directly funded with cryptocurrency donations. This donation will let us hire another full time dev. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium version 110.0.5481.65 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases/tag/110.0.5481.65.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3422-vanadium-version-1100548165… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023021000 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3356-grapheneos-version-20230210… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our website was targeted with a Distributed Denial of Service attack using HTTP/2 multiplexing within the 2 minute window from 2023-02-09T00:58:00Z to 2023-02-09T01:00:00Z. OVH detected it and enabled mitigation but enough went through to cause downtime due to memory limits.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
In September, a similar attack caused nginx's master process to be killed by the out-of-memory killer causing much longer downtime. Default systemd service lacked auto-restart since master process supervises workers. We fixed that:
github.com/GrapheneOS/infrastructure/commit/320ad2e3a8fe4…
github.com/GrapheneOS/infrastructure/commit/36423fb2bc315…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We also added a large encrypted swapfile to each server:
github.com/GrapheneOS/infrastructure/commit/b93695ecc4862…
We also reduced HTTP/2 multiplexing limit, per-IP connection limit, buffer sizes, etc. last time:
github.com/GrapheneOS/grapheneos.org/commit/2ef894ca47d7e…
github.com/GrapheneOS/grapheneos.org/commit/329bc8fd62633…
github.com/GrapheneOS/grapheneos.org/commit/e57765c650cef…
github.com/GrapheneOS/grapheneos.org/commit/511be885bf9cd…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This time around, they exhausted the overall connection limit and started causing dropped connections, essentially creating downtime.
HTTP/2 streams use comparable resources to an HTTP/1.1 connection so nginx has to count each one as part of overall and per-IP connection limits.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We could do further tuning to reduce resource usage per connection combined with greatly raising overall connection limit. Could further reduce concurrent streams and per-IP connection limits. We'd only want to disable HTTP/2 or use very aggressive limits/timeouts during attacks.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Cloudflare could protect our websites from these attacks but isn't usable for our other services and our users wouldn't be happy about it due to privacy concerns. We're more concerned with other services than the websites so that's not really on the table as a solution anyway.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We could scale up server resources and add more servers but it'd be a very poor use of funds. Our services are already scaled up more than we need when not under attack. Only our update servers are ever overloaded with legitimate traffic and only during quarterly/yearly releases.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are other kinds of ongoing malicious attacks on GrapheneOS including harassment/threats/doxxing targeting our project members and coordinated misinformation being spread across platforms by groups of people using a mix of legitimate and sockpuppet accounts. It's quite bad.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 15 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/15.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3329-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vanadium 110.0.5481.64 is now available our app repository's alpha channel for GrapheneOS users.
This is the first out-of-band update for Vanadium since we resolved weaknesses with Android Verified Boot and fixed an Android 13 original-package bug which were blocking doing this.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This 2023020200 release of GrapheneOS contains the relevant improvements enabling this:
grapheneos.org/releases
Previously, there were multiple blockers. Our app repository client has had the required dependency handling and atomic multi-package update support for a while now.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our app repository client supports these features in a generic way. Dependency handling and atomic multi-package installation were already being used for sandboxed Google Play. Google Play services and Google Play Store have a circular dependency and also each depend on GSF.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Due to sandboxed Google Play, those have a versioned dependency on the sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer (GmsCompat) and the configuration it uses to define shims (GmsConfigCompat) which we update out-of-band to quickly ship compatibility improvements without OS updates.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We use atomic multi-package installation to install a group of apps with dependencies. There's no moment where a partial update is applied. Circular dependencies have first class support. Downloads can be fully parallel and installation is parallel for groups with dependencies.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023020600 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3301-grapheneos-version-20230206… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023020200 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3238-grapheneos-version-20230202… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS requires fs-verity for out-of-band system component updates since our previous release:
grapheneos.org/releases
This is part of our ongoing verified boot improvements to fix massive flaws we've discovered in the standard Android verified boot which largely break it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
On Android, verified boot won't detect malicious updates to APK-based components. An attacker can do privileged persistence via fake APK-based component updates after exploiting the OS. They can't do this for APEX components but many APK-based components are quite privileged too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our next release comes with massive improvements to verified boot addressing all of the issues we know about. It parses packages each boot instead of using a cache which adds less than a second to boot time and performs proper full verification of the signatures and versions.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android has chosen faster boot time over working verified boot. GrapheneOS will be making a slight sacrifice to boot time in order to properly enforce verified boot.
GrapheneOS is also preventing a major weakness caused by permitting equal version out-of-band system APK updates.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We'll be enforcing fs-verity metadata for system component updates in order to provide continuous verification for each read of data instead of only verifying out-of-band updates at boot. Android doesn't even have working signature verification at boot for APK component updates.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android verified boot for firmware, OS images and APEX package updates verifies each read of data. Firmware and core OS images are fully read and verified before use. High-level OS images and APEX data is verified via dm-verity every time it's read. This avoids trusting the SSD.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We'll be extending this nice property to out-of-band APK component updates in the future via enforced fs-verity. Our next release will already have full signature verification each boot and will fully enforce fs-verity at install time but we need to phase in enforcing it at boot.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our app repository already provides fs-verity metadata and our app repository client handles automatically installing it as part of the package installation session.
Manually installing a system package update is still possible but you need to provide the fs-verity metadata too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android had partial work towards fixing some of these issues. They implemented fs-verity to improve performance of verifying out-of-band APK updates at boot but never followed through on shipping it through the Play Store and then enforcing verification or fixing other flaws.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS won't just be completing this unfinished work to make verified boot work much better but we'll also be upgrading the intended security guarantees to have continuous verification of data for out-of-band APK updates, not just the firmware, OS images and APEX updates.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're going to be enforcing fs-verity for system app updates at boot time for system app updates in the next release after all since we've determined it won't cause a serious disruption. Our upcoming release implements all the improvements explained here. We'll write some docs.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 59 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/59.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3217-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 68 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/68.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3216-auditor-app-version-68-rele… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The previous Alpha and Beta channel release for the Pixel 4a (5G) broke loading radio firmware. There will be a new release specifically for the Pixel 4a (5G) to resolve the issue. The issue wasn't reported while in Alpha so the release moved along from there to the Beta channel.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This issue isn't caused by any change but rather an existing upstream Android build issue occurring on rare occasions. These kinds of issues are usually caught internally, but we rely on Alpha and Beta channels to catch issues which slip through. It's unfortunate it got to Beta.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
New release for Pixel 4a (5G) is now available. If you installed the previous Alpha / Beta, the simplest solution is using USB tethering from another device to do an over-the-air update.
Alternatively, download releases.grapheneos.org/bramble-ota_update-2023012600.zip and sideload it: grapheneos.org/usage. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023012500 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3098-grapheneos-version-20230125… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS continues to work on improving verified boot and hardware attestation security significantly beyond the basic system in standard Android 13.
As part of this, our app repository client now supports installing fs-verity metadata with packages:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 14 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/14.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3082-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our next OS release will support the official GrapheneOS fs-verity public key and will enforce fs-verity being used for out-of-band system app updates to close another Android verified boot weakness. This will provide continuous verification for out-of-band system app updates.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android verifies system app updates at install time and at boot. This is weaker than the verified boot system for the firmware and OS where data is verified whenever it's read from the images, providing continuous verification not trusting SSD and offering basic anti-tampering.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our recent 2022122700 release (grapheneos.org/releases) closed a substantial weakness in Android verified boot security. We enforce that out-of-band component updates have a greater version at install/boot time rather than an equal or greater version, which was a major weakness.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For externally released apps, enforcing an equal or greater version is sensible. Each release increases the versionCode and that provides proper downgrade protection. This works fine for externally released apps with a version bundled with the OS too, but not most OS components.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Many OS components are simply shipped with the OS and aren't versioned separately from the OS releases. Their versionCode usually isn't incremented when changes are made, including for security fixes. AOSP doesn't increment versionCode for components changed in monthly updates.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This means it's possible to downgrade many Android system components to older releases by installing older versions from an older OS release since the versionCode is the same. GrapheneOS prevents this, which closes a significant hole in package manager and verified boot security.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're going to continue to improve package manager, verified boot and hardware attestation security. It's an ongoing process. Verified boot is only as useful as the lack of trust in persistent state. By removing trusted state or surfacing it to users, we'll improve this further.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Any persistent state such as the package manager data files, persistent settings, permissions, special access grants, etc. is attack surface for verified boot and attestation. That includes non-user-facing settings including development permissions intended for use via ADB, etc.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our Auditor app (attestation.app) uses pinning-based hardware attestation and is a major part of these improvements. It allows users to get hardware verified data from secure element and chain trust through the verified OS to the app to get data about persistent state.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor provides 2 forms of data: hardware verified data including OS patch level, etc. and OS verified data with trust chained from hardware. To fake OS verified data, an attacker needs to exploit the device each boot, which is hindered by being unable to fake patch level, etc.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Outside GrapheneOS, users don't have tools like this to help determine if their device has been compromised. Someone a user trusts could simply install a malicious app running an accessibility service and hiding itself. Auditor isn't just for detecting very sophisticated attacks.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Enforced fs-verity for system components will allow GrapheneOS to ship Vanadium updates in our app repository without downgrading verified boot security.
Our app repository has generic dependency support using atomic package sessions so it doesn't need special Chromium support.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Modern Android Chromium releases providing the WebView are split into 3 packages: library, WebView and browser. These need to be updated in a single atomic package session. Our app repository has generic dependency support handling this, already used for sandboxed Google Play.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 14 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/14.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3082-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 13 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/13.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/3011-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023011000 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2806-grapheneos-version-20230110… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 12 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/12.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2735-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS source code releases (Git tags) will now be signed with SSH rather than GPG. We've published an SSH allowed signers configuration for GrapheneOS:
grapheneos.org/allowed_signers
Key rotation proof signatures:
grapheneos.org/allowed_signers.sig (signify)
grapheneos.org/allowed_signers.asc (GPG)
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've updated our build instructions to explain verifying the OS source releases with SSH:
grapheneos.org/build
You'll be able to use the same GrapheneOS allowed signers configuration for verifying tags across our Git repositories. We may also use it for other purposes too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
OpenSSH is far more broadly available than signify. It's included in macOS, Windows and most Linux distributions. However, many of these still have an old version without file signing support. We'll likely replace signify with SSH signing for GrapheneOS factory images eventually.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2023010300 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2669-grapheneos-version-20230103… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 11 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/11.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2651-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 10 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/10.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2632-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has a couple dozen moderators across platforms due to how many platforms we use and the level of activity on them. Many of our mods are active elsewhere and are moderators elsewhere. Some are moderators for @privacy_guides, @PrivSec_Dev, @mollyimapp and other projects.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Moderator overlap between a dozen privacy projects doesn't mean the projects are working together or even that they're on good terms with each other. There's a very limited pool of people willing to be active moderators and deal with a high level of abuse directed towards them.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
People being involved elsewhere in the privacy community and already being moderators for other rooms helps us to be added as moderators in the GrapheneOS rooms. It helps to have a lot of moderators but it's a huge problem if a single one starts abusing their moderation powers.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS has been targeted with substantial harassment and misinformation including many fabricated stories about our project and project members from a small group of developers. We have not done any of that in response and have made sure our community doesn't do it either.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS community members, moderators and developers are completely allowed to post factual articles, tweets, etc. with their views on other projects. One of our community members who was later added as a moderator made a fact-based post about technical issues with F-Droid.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
F-Droid inaccurately attributed this post to GrapheneOS and attacked us for it. They've also previously and subsequently attacked us for our own accurate posts about it explaining why we don't bundle it, don't recommend it and are working to obsolete it.
Daniel Micay
@DanielMicay
Several F-Droid developers are involved in repeatedly engaging in bullying, harassment and libel towards me. I've archived a thread with the latest example of it here:
archive.ph/j7qql
Many previous examples including x.com/DanielMicay/status/1497731468491165698. Other devs are involved.This post is unavailable. See it on X.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/PrivSec_Dev/status/1609199831112630272 is a thread from another project (an offshoot of Privacy Guides) about their recent experience with this after they took over hosting the F-Droid article from the original author and improved it. They are not GrapheneOS and are not GrapheneOS developers.
PrivSec
@PrivSec_Dev
There has been some very misleading and quite frankly, toxic statements being made about us by @fdroidorg.
Web archive: web.archive.org/web/20221231114751/https://matrix.f-droid…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Community across privacy-related Matrix rooms heavily overlaps and so do the helpful, active people who are candidates to become mods. We don't want to force people to choose between being a mod in our rooms and involvement in other projects to avoid these claims of conspiracies.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 9 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/9.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2599-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022122700 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2549-grapheneos-version-20221227… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Apps (app repository client) version 8 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases/tag/8.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2522-grapheneos-apps-app-reposit…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our app repository client has been almost entirely rewritten. It has a greatly improved/reorganized UI. It can now display app icons, descriptions, release notes and description of app sources provided by the app repository. Lots of other improvements like swipe to refresh too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It has atomic multi-package installation which is used to install groups of interdependent apps without a dependency being updated before an app depending on it. It also provides proper circular dependency support which is used for sandboxed Play Store / sandboxed Play services.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It also now supports installing only necessary language, density and architecture packages for split APKs. We can now use split APKs for apps as the Play Store is doing when it saves space compared to a universal APK including support for each language, density and architecture.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022122000 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2470-grapheneos-version-20221220… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Twitter community x.com/i/communities/1530455827949273094 is at least temporarily back to having open membership instead of requiring moderator approval for each new member.
discuss.grapheneos.org is our own self-hosted forum and has much more activity and longer form discussions.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Twitter communities have been flooded with spam since the mass layoffs at Twitter. We're going to try open membership again to see if this is still an issue. It's possible we got taken off the list of communities to spam once we restricted membership. We'll see what happens.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Normally, WebPKI certificates lack a secure issuance process and an attacker able to MITM unauthenticated HTTP(S) can obtain one.
GrapheneOS uses the CAA accounturi feature to securely pin our Let's Encrypt account keys for each of our servers for secure certificate issuance.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Let's Encrypt has finally enabled enforcing accounturi in production after years in staging:
community.letsencrypt.org/t/enabling-acme-caa-account-and…
This is a transparent security improvement for GrapheneOS services since we were already using the feature and testing it via the Let's Encrypt staging server. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We are grateful to be part of @ProtonPrivacy's fundraiser: proton.me/blog/2022-lifetime-account-charity-fundraiser.
This will be of tremendous help to fund our team and work on exciting features such as contact scopes and many user onboarding experience improvements to make GrapheneOS even more user friendly! -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Reddit has given a huge boost to the misinformation operation targeting GrapheneOS on their platform with their new blocking feature:
www.reddit.com/r/TheoryOfReddit/comments/sdcsx3/testing_r…
www.reddit.com/r/ModSupport/comments/yx0s1z/user_blocking…
The sockpuppet accounts used to attack GrapheneOS now start out blocking our account and others.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They keep a list of all accounts which have previously debunked their attacks and block them on each of the sockpuppet accounts. Reddit's new blocking design means none of those people can see or respond to their posts or comments. Reddit gave them a way to prevent debunking it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Here are two of the current sockpuppet accounts:
old.reddit.com/user/C00KSP0IS0NAPPL3
old.reddit.com/user/MousseOk2669
They've cycled through dozens of accounts. They upvote and reply to accounts from each other. Each has the same patterns showing that it's the same small group of people doing it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A recent example is falsely claiming GrapheneOS connects to gstatic.google.com and collector.github.com based on a link to this person's thread with a test:
x.com/ComputersCoyle/status/1603641618871226368
100% of default connections made by GrapheneOS are documented in grapheneos.org/faq.
DogMan
@dog39416306
I used the browser to install a launcher as stated in my post... Wow people are dumb for saying its malicious. Legit have an entire video on what was done during this test. setup phone and Installed Olauncher... thats it
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They also misrepresent our PSDS and attestation proxies which are explained in grapheneos.org/faq.
It would be easy for us to copy-paste a reply debunking it and linking to our FAQ. Reddit has blocked us doing that, giving a huge boost to this organized misinformation op.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our FAQ section is the best source of information on this and has been verified to be accurate by many people. We don't give a detailed explanation of the DNS tests there but to be clear those connections are only made to your DNS resolver and don't in any way compromise privacy.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android queries [random number].metric.gstatic.com via DNS-over-TLS to check if DNS-over-TLS works. This code is open source and it can be seen that it generates a fresh random number and does not make a connection to gstatic. It just checks if an uncachable (random) query works.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS could change this to query [random number].query.grapheneos.network instead when you have connectivity checks set to the default GrapheneOS mode. This wouldn't accomplish much beyond avoiding people who look at DNS queries rather than connections getting misled by it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We do plan to change this to a GrapheneOS domain for aesthetic reasons despite no connection being made to it by the OS, but rather by the DNS resolver server.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_bionic/commit/27e0ac7634ab… was similarly added to explain this IP is only used to build an unused UDP socket object... -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our web installer (grapheneos.org/install/web) now requires far less memory to install GrapheneOS.
It didn't used to be much of an issue, but the required memory has grown substantially with new major releases of the Android Open Source Project and for installing on newer devices.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Massive reduction in peak memory use is from replacing ArrayBuffer with Blob. Chromium knows how to use storage as the backing for large blobs instead of memory. Reduces peak memory use for flashing Pixel 7 by ~2GB and increases peak storage use by ~2GB.
github.com/GrapheneOS/fastboot.js/commit/e7a940378ccb570a… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022121400 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2370-grapheneos-version-20221214… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Several of our Matrix rooms have been partly bricked by Matrix protocol/server bugs. We've recently had to upgrade (replace) these rooms to work around it:
#grapheneos:grapheneos.org
#infra:grapheneos.org
#dev:grapheneos.org
Please join the new ones.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our other rooms (grapheneos.org/contact) currently aren't showing symptoms of the same Matrix protocol state corruption bugs. However, we may need to upgrade more of the rooms. It's fairly likely these issues occurred due to the floods of state events from raids on our rooms.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We recommend joining our Matrix rooms if you want to be part of the GrapheneOS community along with our discussion forum at discuss.grapheneos.org.
We're considering other chat platforms as a replacement for Matrix, but we'll keep the Matrix rooms and bridge them if we do that. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022121100 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2332-grapheneos-version-20221211… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've added an FAQ section on non-default connections made by the OS:
grapheneos.org/faq
This aims to explain non-obvious connections made based on your carrier, installed apps or other changes. These connections are not made by a fresh GrapheneOS install with no carrier. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GNSS (GPS, GLONASS, etc.) uses PSDS to provide satellite almanacs with estimated satellite locations, geographic data, etc. for a faster location lock. We cover this at grapheneos.org/faq.
A-GNSS is also used to provide a faster location lock via cellular when available.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A-GNSS has both control plane and user plane implementations. Control plane is provided by the cellular network itself. User plane is a server providing the data. SUPL (Secure User Plane Location) is only used if the APN configuration includes the supl APN type for your carrier.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Default SUPL server is supl.google.com but carriers can choose the implementation. If you don't want SUPL being used, you simply have to delete supl from your APN types. This is not listed as a default connection since it's carrier specific and there's no default carrier.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS converts Pixel stock OS APN database and carrier configuration database to the Android Open Source Project format using our github.com/GrapheneOS/carriersettings-extractor project. Provides comparable compatibility/features other than a couple US carriers requiring bloatware for VoWi-Fi, etc.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Normally, carriers use the carrier configuration database entries to lock various settings including preventing changing preferred network mode, disabling the 2G toggle, locking tethering or locking APN configuration. GrapheneOS ignores that and always makes these available.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This means if you don't want SUPL, you can simply disable supl in the APN types.
Emergency numbers are special and calls send your location to the emergency call service. There's a special case where SUPL is always used for this, since it's an emergency so everything is tried.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We plan to add this information to our FAQ, likely in a section on carrier-related connections below the default connections section. Since the OS implements most of MMS, RCS, SMS on LTE, VoLTE and VoW-iFi those connections are partially made by the OS itself, not cellular layer.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Similarly to supl APN type enabling using SUPL, the dun APN type enables special treatment for tethering. On Android, APN types are read-only when dun is included. On GrapheneOS, you can remove dun as an APN type if you don't want to follow carrier's rules for using tethering.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 58 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/58.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2288-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android 13 QPR1 fixed the issues we reported with hardware-based attestation via the secure element for the Pixel 6, Pixel 6 Pro, Pixel 6a, Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro.
Our Auditor app can now make full use of the bleeding edge hardware-based attestation features on these devices.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
6th generation Pixels were the first devices to ship support for the attest key feature. This allows an app to generate their own attestation signing keys in the hardware keystore. Our Auditor app uses a per-pairing attestation signing key to greatly improve pinning security.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We proposed this feature to them several years before they ended up adding it to Android 12. Pixel 6 and Pixel 6 Pro were the first devices to ship an implementation.
This feature is mandatory for Auditor going forward on newer devices due to the remote key provisioning feature.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android deployed hardware attestation based on batch keys provisioned on at least 100k devices to avoid them being usable as unique identifiers. Unique keys were added as an optional hardware feature only available to privileged OS components since it's an unspoofable identifier.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor works by receiving a random challenge from the Auditor side and generating a key in a hardware keystore with that as the attestation challenge. Keystore includes attestation data in the public key certificate including challenge and metadata from the boot chain and OS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Keystore signs the public key certificate with an attestation signing chain. Auditor side pins this chain for subsequence attestations, which each generate a temporary key used to obtain a fresh one. We keep the initial key as a persistent signing key used to sign each message.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
On the Pixel 6, this is how the attestation certificate chain worked before attest key:
per-pairing signing key generated in secure element → batch key → intermediate -> root
Initial signing key is used to sign each response. Hash of certificate is used as displayed identity.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For subsequent paired verifications, it makes a temporary placeholder key to get a fresh attestation.
Auditor side pins both persistent signing key and attestation signing chain. Batch key (could also be the unique key as a privileged app) must match for paired verifications.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
On the Pixel 6, this is how the attestation certificate chain works now:
per-pairing signing key generated in secure element → per-pairing attestation signing key generated in secure element → batch key → intermediate -> root
A leaked batch key is no problem after pairing.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This feature was not originally intended to be used the way we used it based on pinning. We proposed this feature to them and they were a bit perplexed about how we were using it, but they ended up shipping it. We're very happy this feature now works properly on 6th gen Pixels.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We were previously unable to use it properly because the attest key stopped being usable by the app after an OS upgrade increasing patch level. We reported this to them and it turned out to be an issue in the keymint HAL not triggering version binding upgrades for attest keys.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
On the Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro, a similar issue prevented us from using the StrongBox keystore (secure element keystore) at all since it would stop being usable for attestation by any app after an OS upgrade increasing patch level. We had to temporarily use TEE keystore on them.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
On both 6th and 7th generation Pixels, new pairings with Auditor will now have the Very High security level requiring both StrongBox and attest key. Existing pairings on 6th generation will get upgraded from High to Very High if they were made after we added attest key support.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Remote key provisioning feature results in regularly rotated per-app attestation signing keys where batch/unique key are just used for bootstrapping to get an initial encrypted remotely provisioned key. This improves privacy and security, but breaks pinning without attest key.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We think a major reason they added support for the attest key feature is because they didn't want to break our pinning use case via remote key provisioning. It greatly improves security of our approach so we're very happy with it and it's a great feature request success story.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 67 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/67.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2287-auditor-app-version-67-rele…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
See attestation.app/about and attestation.app/tutorial for info about the app and optional monitoring service.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022120700 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2257-grapheneos-version-20221207… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Despite the short release notes, today's GrapheneOS release is the largest since our initial Android 13 release in August. It's an upgrade to the first quarterly release of Android 13 with a massive amount of improvements. This release took a lot of work.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022120600 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2224-grapheneos-version-20221206…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
December Android security update is also significantly larger than usual:
source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/2022-12-01
Note the monthly Android security bulletins are only a subset of what's fixed every month. Android monthly, quarterly and yearly releases have additional privacy/security fixes.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Most additional privacy/security fixes are listed in the December Pixel bulletin:
source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/2022-12-01
Despite the naming, most of these impact other devices. Android bulletins are the mandatory patches. Pixel bulletins are the recommended patches + Pixel hardware patches.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
One thing to note about monthly Android and Pixel security bulletins is nearly all upstream kernel patches are shipped months earlier by GrapheneOS on 6th/7th generation Pixels. We ship latest GKI LTS revision which is currently 5.10.152 as opposed to 5.10.107 like the stock OS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GKI LTS branch isn't currently fully in sync with the very frequent (often every few days) upstream kernel.org LTS releases (5.10.157), so we also have to cherry-pick important fixes early. We'll do it more aggressively in the future but there are higher priorities.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For example, we're currently working on upgrading Mali GPU driver all the way to the latest release in order to include those security fixes right away. There are substantial changes for the Tensor SoC GPU, especially the Tensor G2. Early patching is also outside our core work.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is focused on implementing privacy and security improvements defending against classes of issues rather than specific bugs.
We'd greater prefer if we didn't need to use our resources applying upstream patches faster than Android/Pixels and pushing them to do better.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We find and fix many vulnerabilities ourselves despite our focus on implementing privacy/security features. x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1591306063454031872 is one of many examples. We report vulnerabilities upstream when we have time but we have limited resources and GrapheneOS users are the priority.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We independently discovered the Android lockscreen bypass fixed in Android's November security update while working on features like a duress PIN/password.
We had an initial patch developed by June 13 but by the time we submitted an upstream bug report, it was a duplicate issue. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022120600 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2224-grapheneos-version-20221206… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've finished the initial port to Android 13 QPR1 for the December release. This is the 1st quarterly release of Android 13 so it's much more than a typical monthly update. We're currently testing it internally. Some changes will be needed for under display fingerprint handling.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We should have this release available in the Alpha channel later today followed by the Beta channel. It's going to be a lot of work. We may keep it in the Beta channel slightly longer than usual, so if you're using the Stable release you can expect more than the usual ~12-24h.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's a GNOME bug causing compatibility issues with installing GrapheneOS or another OS on smartphones.
GVFS wrongly identifies a device in fastboot/fastbootd mode as an MTP device and claims exclusive control over it. CLI install is less impacted since it's faster than GVFS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've added a note about this to both the web and CLI install pages. This issue should be fixed in GNOME but it will take a long time to reach most distributions.
Installing a different environment like KDE or i3, rebooting and using that instead will work around these issues.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are reports from several users that this issue can be worked around by running `echo 0 > /sys/bus/usb/drivers_autoprobe` as root. This can be added to the install guides as a workaround for this GNOME bug if more people help us confirm that it successfully works around it.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Secure PDF Viewer app version 16 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases/tag/16.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2194-secure-pdf-viewer-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022120300 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2176-grapheneos-version-20221203…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We need help testing the Mali kernel GPU driver update included in this release. This release updates from the Mali r36p0 kernel driver to r37p0. We want to upgrade to r41p0 but it will require a lot of work. If you want to help, join #testing:grapheneos.org on Matrix.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixels have substantial changes to the Mali GPU driver for the Tensor SoC. They made a bunch of performance and robustness improvements, especially for the Pixel 7 / Pixel 7 Pro. It will be extremely difficult to update the driver all the way to r41p0 for 7th generation Pixels.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1598188300799733760
We're currently testing the latest r41p0 Mali GPU kernel driver for the Pixel 6, Pixel 6 Pro and Pixel 6a. We re-applied the Pixel-specific changes on top of the upstream driver code. It would be really nice to ship a userspace driver update too...
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixels are currently behind by six Mali GPU driver releases. We're working on updating to latest kernel driver for GrapheneOS while preserving the Pixel specific changes to the driver. Android 13 QPR1 is about to be released so we may have to defer it until a few days after it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro are going to be harder because there are dramatically more Pixel changes to the driver. Strange they did all this work to optimize it downstream but they don't keep it updated...
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1598549420500467714
This is our first thread posted on Mastodon first and then cross-posted to Twitter. Going from Twitter (280 characters) to Mastodon (500) is simpler, but in the long term we want to use a self-hosted platform where our followers choose their own provider.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're now using the same encrypted backup approach for grapheneos.social as our other services with data (attestation.app, discuss.grapheneos.org, matrix.grapheneos.org):
* github.com/GrapheneOS/grapheneos.social/blob/main/remote-…
* github.com/GrapheneOS/grapheneos.social/blob/main/systemd…
* github.com/GrapheneOS/grapheneos.social/blob/main/systemd…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We can also make posts beyond the standard 500 character limit there, but they get displayed in people's feeds as collapsed by default. We'll probably mostly stick to 500 after trying out both approaches. Replying to / boosting specific parts of a thread is a nice thing to keep.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're now using the same encrypted backup approach for grapheneos.social as our other services with data (attestation.app, discuss.grapheneos.org, matrix.grapheneos.org):
* github.com/GrapheneOS/grapheneos.social/blob/main/remote-…
* github.com/GrapheneOS/grapheneos.social/blob/main/systemd…
* github.com/GrapheneOS/grapheneos.social/blob/main/systemd…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've tested restoring from a backup and it all works. Remote media has to be manually refreshed via tootctl since Mastodon lack ability to realize it's missing and fetch it again when the files are gone but the database metadata is still present.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Regular automated key rotation is how we handle reliably dropping legacy data. Servers only get the public keys, not private keys.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The cost of these backups via OVH Cloud Archive is insignificant:
ovhcloud.com/en/public-cloud/prices/…
Incoming traffic $0.011/GB
Outgoing traffic $0.011/GB
Secured cold storage $0.0024/month/GB
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We currently back up to both a local workstation and a separate OVH DC but we'll add another cloud archive provider eventually, especially since we won't be trusting them with data.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixels are currently behind by six Mali GPU driver releases. We're working on updating to latest kernel driver for GrapheneOS while preserving the Pixel specific changes to the driver. Android 13 QPR1 is about to be released so we may have to defer it until a few days after it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
To clarify, since it was misunderstood: we'll defer this GPU driver update until after handling the QPR1 release on Monday. We're not going to delay the QPR1 update since it's how the December security update will be provided which is on the 1st Monday of the month as usual.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's important to ship these GPU driver updates to provide ARM Mali security updates. We wouldn't be bothering with this if the only benefit was improving GPU driver performance. That's outside the scope of what we focus on. The same thing applies to our kernel LTS updates.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022113000 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2100-grapheneos-version-20221130… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Uptime monitoring dashboard for the production GrapheneOS services is available at nodeping.com/reports/statusevents/3FL97F6RRQHJIOWL. Alerts are also posted publicly in our #infra:grapheneos.org Matrix room when a check is added, starts failing or stops failing. It's often not really an outage.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For example, today, the TLS checks for attestation.app detected the certificate would expire in less than 15 days. This ended up being because the removal of a legacy subdomain several weeks ago broke automatic certbot removal. It can do much more advanced checks though.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For example, our "matrix.grapheneos.org HTTPS Federation API" check fetches matrix.grapheneos.org/_matrix/key/v2/server and makes sure that it contains "server_name"\s*:\s*"grapheneos.org". We also have one for the Matrix client API. Checks also also be set to roam around internationally.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
At the moment, we either set the checks to use a specific location for more useful latency monitoring or we set them to roam worldwide. Here's an example of a worldwide check:
nodeping.com/reports/statusevents/check/2021072420071L2VS…
It's also a supplemental way of testing GeoDNS for the services we use it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Since we primarily use OVH for our services, we make sure we're using non-OVH-based check locations for the non-roam checks. This is also part of why using an external service makes more sense than self-hosting and we don't send alerts to our own mail server for the same reason.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our Twitter community (x.com/i/communities/1530455827949273094) is being flooded with spam recently. It hasn't been an issue until days ago. Twitter community moderation tools are very primitive. Mods can manually remove a post or manually remove a member, but that's it. Neither can be undone...
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We strongly recommend making an account at discuss.grapheneos.org. It's a much better format for in-depth discussions, has primary/secondary tags for organizing topics, etc. We get spam there too but we've implemented automated moderation and we're free to implement much more.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Twitter Communities were already neglected. The sidebar entry for Communities only appears after you join one so it's not a discoverable feature. Few people know it exists. mobile.twitter.com/HiCommunities has stopped posting any updates. We're going to focus on our self-hosted forum...
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're now hosting our own Mastodon instance at grapheneos.social and we'll be moving to @GrapheneOS@grapheneos.social from @grapheneos@infosec.exchange.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our server has closed registration and will only be used for official GrapheneOS accounts along with accounts for our project members. It's the same approach we take for our Matrix and email servers.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The remaining setup work will be porting over our age-encrypted cloud backup scripts, improving the sample Mastodon nginx configuration we merged with our standard baseline configuration, tuning PostgreSQL for the instance and setting up localhost access control via nftables.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Donations are appreciated to help cover the cost of this new infrastructure along with the time spent setting it up and maintaining it going forward:
grapheneos.org/donate -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022112500 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/2008-grapheneos-version-20221125… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google publishes the source code for their TalkBack screen reader. GrapheneOS maintains a fork of it and includes it in GrapheneOS with the help of a blind GrapheneOS user who works on their own more elaborate fork. Eventually, we'd like to include more or all of their changes.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
TalkBack depends on a text-to-speech (TTS) implementation installed/configured/activated. It needs to have Direct Boot support to function before the first unlock of a profile. Google's TTS implementation supports this and can be used on GrapheneOS, but it's not open source.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We requested Direct Boot support from both prominent open source implementations:
RHVoice: github.com/RHVoice/RHVoice/issues/271
eSpeak NG: github.com/espeak-ng/espeak-ng/issues/917
eSpeak NG recently added it but it's not yet included in a stable release and their licensing (GPLv3) is too restrictive for us.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
RHVoice itself has acceptable licensing for inclusion in GrapheneOS (LGPL v2.1), but has dependencies with restrictive licensing. Both these software projects also have non-free licensing issues for the voices. Neither provides close to a working out-of-the-box experience either.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google's Speech Services app providing text-to-speech and speech-to-text works perfectly. Their proprietary accessibility services app with extended TalkBack and other services also works fine. However, many of our users don't want to use them and we need something we can bundle.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There aren't currently any usable open source speech-to-text apps. There are experimental open source speech-to-text implementations but they lack Android integration.
We also really need to make a brand new setup wizard with both accessibility and enterprise deployment support.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS still has too little funding and too few developers to take on these projects. These would be standalone projects able to be developed largely independently. There are similar standalone projects which we need to have developed in order to replace some existing apps.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
AOSP provides a set of barebones sample apps with outdated user interfaces / features. These are intended to be replaced by OEMs, but we lack the resources of a typical OEM. We replaced AOSP Camera with our own app, but we still need to do the same with Gallery and other apps.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google has started the process of updating the open source TalkBack, which only happens rarely. We've identified a major issue: a major component has no source code published.
github.com/google/talkback/pull/28
Google has been very hostile towards feedback / contributions for TalkBack...
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This is one example of something seemingly on the right track significantly regressing. Another example is the takeover of the Seedvault project initially developed for GrapheneOS. It has deviated substantially from the original plans and lacks usability, robustness and security.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
In the case of Seedvault, GrapheneOS designed the concept for it and one of our community members created it. It was taken over by a group highly hostile towards us and run into the ground. It doesn't have the intended design/features and lacks usability, security and robustness.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
All of these are important standalone app projects for making GrapheneOS highly usable and accessible. What we need is not being developed by others and therefore we need to the resources including funding and developers to make our own implementations meeting our requirements.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've purchased grapheneos.social and it we'll be hosting an official Mastodon instance for our project accounts there in the near future.
If you follow @grapheneos@infosec.exchange right now, you'll be automatically moved over to following the new account on our instance.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
fedifinder.glitch.me will scan the profiles of the people you follow on Twitter to find them on the fediverse (Mastodon). It helps you choose an instance and gives you a list of their handles to import into your new account so you can keep a lot of the people you follow there.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We'll still be posting the same content on Twitter, but not everyone will be doing that. Most of the people in the infosec community worth following have moved to the fediverse, largely to infosec.exchange, and there's much more activity/discussion in the community there.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We also have chat rooms on Matrix with our own grapheneos.org server for our services / project accounts.
Our main room is #grapheneos:grapheneos.org and #community:grapheneos.org is a Space (similar to a Discord 'server') with all our official rooms.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Mastodon and Matrix are federated like email. You choose a provider and interact with people across providers. Can switch providers if you don't like moderation decisions, etc.
For longer-form community discussions, we have our own discussion forum at discuss.grapheneos.org. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 57 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/57.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1970-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022111800 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1908-grapheneos-version-20221118… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We had to create a new #grapheneos:grapheneos.org chat room to work around state reset bugs in Matrix protocol / server software. Previous room had ~15000 members and is redirected through the room upgrade, but it's not seamless. You need to explicitly join the new room.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
List of our public chat rooms is available at grapheneos.org/contact with links to join through the official Element web client if you're new to Matrix. It's as good a time as any to join our chat rooms. A positive side to needing a room upgrade is that the main room is faster.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GmsCompatConfig version 16 is now in the stable channel of our app repository. It resolves the Play Store trying to update itself and Play services to unsupported versions. It's now back to requesting user install an update which only adds split packages.
github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/co…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're not planning on addressing this for the legacy 3rd generation Pixels which are completely insecure at this point due to lack of full security updates. You can keep sandboxed Google Play working there by rejecting requests by the Play Store to update it, or reinstalling it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If you accepted these self-update requests from the Play Store on legacy 3rd generation Pixels, you need to uninstall both Play Store and Play services followed by reinstalling them from our app repository. Don't uninstall/reinstall GSF or you'll also need to uninstall/reinstall
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
every other app depending on GSF directly including most of the apps depending on Play services. GSF only gets updates alongside major Android releases and isn't updated via the Play Store in practice.
Accepting these Play update requests is fine with GmsCompatConfig v16 again.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We do it this way is so that we're responsible for testing and approving each Play services and Play Store update through our app repository while still supporting installing additional split packages for these apps with extra locales, etc. via the Play Store. Works well again.
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Post not available here, view on XPost not available here, view on X
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If you're having trouble (re)joining our main Matrix room, please let us know. Consider joining our discussion forum at discuss.grapheneos.org in the meantime. Matrix room tends to be nicer for getting quick support and short form answers but our forum is often a better fit now.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've retracted our recommendation to use fastboot from the android-tools package on Arch Linux. It's broken for flashing the Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro.
We currently only recommend using the official platform-tools package or building fastboot from GrapheneOS or AOSP from source.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've updated grapheneos.org/install/cli to remove that recommendation. Most users are installing GrapheneOS via our easy to use web installer at grapheneos.org/install/web instead where we provide the fastboot implementation via fastboot.js library created based on GrapheneOS funding.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's unfortunate that seemingly every Linux distribution has broken Android SDK packages because they insist on checking out the sources their own way and using a custom build system instead of the official one. It's easy to build these tools properly if you do it normally.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are several dozen companies selling phones with GrapheneOS or forks of it. Many of these companies falsely claim to be partnered with us or working with us which isn't true. Most of these companies don't contribute back to GrapheneOS and try to get free support from us.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's easy to install GrapheneOS with grapheneos.org/install/web and we don't expect to have a revenue stream from selling phones not specifically made to run GrapheneOS. Still, it's quite problematic for companies to claim they are supporting us when they aren't actually doing it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
An exception to the rule is @xiphcyber. They've been making donations to GrapheneOS based on a portion of each phone they sell for years.
Some of the companies building on our work are upset that we've made it easier to install GrapheneOS and gradually obsoleted their changes.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Today, one of these companies has impersonated one of our moderators (who is also a moderator for @mollyimapp and @privacy_guides). They've gone to a bunch of Matrix and Telegram rooms posting fabricated stories and doctored screenshots purporting to show GrapheneOS is 'dying'.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
In the past couple years, we've migrated to Android 12 and 13 in a week, quickly launched support for new devices (Pixel 7 in days), added dozens of major new privacy/security features like Storage Scopes, created our web installer, created the sandboxed Google Play compatibility
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
layer and improved it to the point it supports nearly every app on the Play Store, discovered / fixed a bunch of upstream firmware / software vulnerabilities and much more. We've done this with extremely little funding while a few groups make underhanded daily attacks to harm us.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is not 'dying'. It's certainly a struggle doing all of this with extremely little funding. We regularly lose developers due to them needing a full time job with proper pay. We've also been harmed a lot by these organized malicious attacks by countless charlatans.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's unfortunate the privacy and security industries are completely full of scammers. They feel incredibly threatened by a project doing substantial privacy/security research and engineering. We've experienced an extreme level of abuse based on fabricated stories and harassment.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Most people tolerate these groups despite their blatant scamming and underhanded attacks. Journalists and conferences give them a platform to market their products. Their abuse towards us has reached the point it's completely intolerable. We need help we're not getting to end it.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 66 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/66.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1856-auditor-app-version-66-rele… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Security issues we report upstream to Android are often closed as duplicates, but it's difficult to know if they're making a mistake. They don't give you visibility of the issue your duplicate report is merged into. In some cases the bug is still unfixed over a year after filing.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS currently fixes a dozen upstream privacy/security bugs with our own downstream patches. For example, we recently closed a cross-profile package list leak due to leftover compatibility code they added for legacy launchers in 2016, i.e. already considered legacy in 2016.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
On devices with GKI support, we'll always be shipping close to latest kernel.org LTS point release which means there are hundreds of additional fixes including security patches for the kernel:
grapheneos.org/features
We also find/apply missed kernel driver patches.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1591306063454031872
Consider what happened with the lockscreen issue. The person who reported it before us did so in early June. It got fixed upstream in November. They expect to delay disclosure for months. Is it reasonable? We're increasingly not even bothering to report.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We independently discovered the Android lockscreen bypass fixed in Android's November security update while working on features like a duress PIN/password.
We had an initial patch developed by June 13 but by the time we submitted an upstream bug report, it was a duplicate issue.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They regularly break the embargo themselves. For example, the December Android security patch has already been partially released via QPR1 Beta 3 and we've applied / shipped what's already available for GrapheneOS users. We're not sure they even realize they're leaking it early.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For Pixels, the pattern is the overall 2023-06-05 security update will be ready by around 2023-05-01. Kernel build tends to be from at least a week before so June update kernel will have been built in mid to late April. There's also a delay between making a fix and merging it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It may only take them 30 days to fix an issue in most cases but there's an around 60 to 90 day delay from their release engineering process. We think this is unacceptable, and we also think the broad early disclosure of vulnerabilities to vendors for 30 days is unacceptable.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We independently discovered the Android lockscreen bypass fixed in Android's November security update while working on features like a duress PIN/password.
We had an initial patch developed by June 13 but by the time we submitted an upstream bug report, it was a duplicate issue.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Can see the patch shown here was authored June 13th and it took a while for it to be developed and tested. Unfortunately, by prioritizing developing a fix for GrapheneOS users and not getting it immediately reported upstream our developer missed out on a life changing bug bounty.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The developer who discovered this issue for us as part of their work on developing features like a duress PIN/password lives in India. They started out working on GrapheneOS as a volunteer, and as with most regular contributors now receive $1250/month from GrapheneOS donations.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
$70k would be have a life changing amount of money for them. This makes us wonder how many other bug bounties we've narrowly missed out on by prioritizing GrapheneOS users. Not submitting a stub issue report ASAP was a mistake, as were other things that went wrong with this.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're aware of multiple other unfixed Android vulnerabilities. Some of these were closed as duplicates or rejected as valid issue reports upstream. Others haven't been filed upstream. Our experience filing them upstream is very poor and we already have a huge workload without it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS receives very little funding for our substantial work on developing massive privacy and security improvements for Android (grapheneos.org/features). It's entirely supported by donations (grapheneos.org/donate). We don't want to refocus from our work to bug bounties.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's unfortunate that there isn't funding for our developer to work on developing duress features and overall lockscreen security improvements, but instead finding a symptom of a systemic issue could have gotten them $70k if they had focused on filing that upstream ASAP instead.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022111000 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1774-grapheneos-version-20221110… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
TrustCor CA will be removed in the upcoming release of GrapheneOS. They've been proven to engage in malicious domain squatting and have close ties to backdoored software and surveillance operations.
groups.google.com/a/mozilla.org/g/dev-security-policy/c/o…
We won't be waiting for Google and Mozilla to act.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
WebPKI is a poorly designed system. The only verification of any value it provides is Domain Validation (DV) based on the security of DNS and unauthenticated HTTP/SMTP connections to prove domain control. Even Let's Encrypt provides no secure certificate issuance support yet.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
In general, every CA is trusted to issue certificates for every domain. The only protection against this is a reactive mechanism: Certificate Transparency (CT).
CT depends on domain operators monitoring certificates they issue and checking against CT. Hardly anyone is doing it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Secure certificate issuance can be done via DNSSEC and a CAA record permitting only a CA with CAA validationmethods/accounturi support. GrapheneOS uses these features, but Let's Encrypt doesn't enforce those in production, only staging, and we're not aware of a better option.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS also uses DANE TLSA records to pin the leaf keys via DNS for all of our services including our web and email servers. In practice, only a subset of other mail servers enforce DNSSEC + TLSA records. Web browsers and other HTTPS clients don't enforce it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Most of the people with influence at Google are against the adoption of DNSSEC and DANE. They've used their influence to hinder adoption of these technologies in the whole industry based on disingenuous and false claims, including after they've moved on to other companies.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There is NOTHING stopping web browsers from enforcing DNSSEC and TLSA records for users with DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) or DNS-over-TLS (DoT) enabled. The implementation of DNSSEC and DANE can be implemented in a resolver written in a memory safe language like Rust within a sandbox.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google holds the most responsibility for the current state of this and should be held accountable for it when users end up being harmed. Google lied about removing static pinning for Google domains in Chrome when they stopped supporting static pinning for others and dropped HPKP.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Google clearly sees WebPKI as too insecure for Google's own usage. They heavily use static pinning of certificate authorities in their domains in their software. It's used in Chrome, update_engine in ChromeOS and Android, Play services, Play Store and their other major software.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If you use Let's Encrypt, monitor CT and an attacker obtains a Let's Encrypt certificate via intercepting DNS and HTTP requests, would you know? You need to track all your valid certificates. What are you meant to do if you detect an attack? Complain in the policy Google group?
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Control of DNS allows issuance of a valid certificate from any public CA including Let's Encrypt. The only value provided by WebPKI over DANE is Certificate Transparency. Nice thing about DANE is you can use it only for pinning and still keep WebPKI until DANE has a CT system.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Main excuse for not adopting DNSSEC/DANE is broken resolvers/middleboxes. Not applicable with DoT/DoH.
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1590624076258648064
Secondary excuse is it being easy to screw up with painful consequences. It's no worse than setting a bad A record. Low TTL records minimize risk.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There is NOTHING stopping web browsers from enforcing DNSSEC and TLSA records for users with DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) or DNS-over-TLS (DoT) enabled. The implementation of DNSSEC and DANE can be implemented in a resolver written in a memory safe language like Rust within a sandbox.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022110800 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1708-grapheneos-version-20221108… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've released a separate variant of Auditor for the Play Store with the app.attestation.auditor.play app id:
play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.attestation.aud…
If you've installed the original app.attestation.auditor from the Play Store, you should either install our app repository client or switch to this.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Original variant of Auditor with the app.attestation.auditor app id will continue being what we distribute as part of GrapheneOS and our app repository. We're splitting them to prepare for Play Signing potentially becoming mandatory and to fix a sandboxed Play Store UX annoyance.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The only difference between the variants is that app.attestation.auditor gets signed locally by GrapheneOS and app.attestation.auditor.play is signed by the Play Store.
If you want GrapheneOS signed releases outside GrapheneOS, use our app repository client:
github.com/GrapheneOS/Apps/releases
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Latest release of Auditor added support for using the Play Store variant on the device being verified (Auditee):
github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/65
Signed hardware attestation provides app id and signing key fingerprint from the verified OS. Auditor permits both and displays the variant.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For now, we'll continue providing updates to the GrapheneOS signed app.attestation.auditor via Play Store but we'll be unpublishing it for new users. New users will be choosing between GrapheneOS signed releases from our app repository or Play signed release from the Play Store.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor could theoretically add support for additional operating systems beyond GrapheneOS and the stock OS. Thanks to the new support for app variants, we could also add support for builds of Auditor by other projects since it will verify and show the variant in the output.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've reserved @grapheneos@infosec.exchange on Mastodon (infosec.exchange/web/@grapheneos).
The account exists to gauge interest. If it gets a substantial number of followers, we'll host our own instance as we do with Matrix. The followers can be automatically migrated to a new account.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If you've created a @GrapheneOS account on a Mastodon instance, please change the email to contact@grapheneos.org so we can redirect it to our official account. It's our trademarked brand and we don't want users to have trouble finding the official account through searching.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022110600 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1655-grapheneos-version-20221106… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 56 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/56.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1601-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've recovered the @GrapheneOS YouTube handle from the person who was holding it ransom. Has been transferred to our new GrapheneOS YouTube brand account which will be used to publish content in the future. We have no near term plans to make use of it.
www.youtube.com/@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It was registered immediately after YouTube launched handles in order to extort us. GrapheneOS wordmark and logo are our trademarks. We'll never give into this kind of extortion. If needed, we'll pay orders of magnitudes more in legal fees. We've already demonstrated that before.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Based on the number of update downloads, we estimate there are currently around 150k GrapheneOS devices.
Since we're still temporarily publishing GrapheneOS signed Auditor releases (app.attestation.auditor) on the Play Store, the Auditor install statistics give some useful info.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Based on app repository update counts, there are around 40k people using sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS.
Play Store only counts 22k active installs of Auditor but we think it only counts logged in users. Many people use sandboxed Google Play without logging into an account.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These are very rough estimates because we don't have any analytics / telemetry. We can count the number of update checks and downloads via our web server logs. There are a ton of daily factory images downloads but we don't know if they're new users or people upgrading hardware.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Since our update client resumes interrupted downloads, we're counting the total number of fresh downloads (200 response code) while ignoring resumes (206 response code) for a specific release. Frequent releases end up cutting this counting short but we know the rate it drops off.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 55 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/55.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1576-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our official discussion forum at discuss.grapheneos.org is now dramatically faster thanks to simply enabling 2 optimizations with 2 lines of configuration. We hope this helps improve the experience of using the forum and increases adoption. It's great for longer discussions.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1586482010221993984
Our system of using Alpha, Beta and Stable channels for both GrapheneOS and our apps where a specific release goes through each channel works very well.
This regression in v53 wasn't noticed in our internal testing but was quickly found in Alpha testing.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 54 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/54.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1546-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 54 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/54.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1546-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 53 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/53.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1544-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 65 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/65.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1534-auditor-app-version-65-rele… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022102800 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1533-grapheneos-version-20221028… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS support for the Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro is no longer considered experimental.
These phones launched on October 13th and we shipped experimental support in our October 16th release (grapheneos.org/releases). We only ran into one issue and it was from upstream bugs.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our October 18th release (grapheneos.org/releases) worked around the upstream bugs uncovered in the camera service by hardened_malloc and it has essentially been stable since that release. There are a couple things left to do but we're not aware of issues regular users would hit.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixel 7 moved to remote provisioning for hardware-based attestation via the secure element. We discovered a major bug with how that was implemented which we had to work around in Auditor for both the stock OS and GrapheneOS:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1581058548514975744
We hope that's fixed soon.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've discovered a bug on Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro with hardware attestation support via the Titan M2 as part of adding Auditor support. Hardware attestation throws an error after an OS upgrade, likely due to incorrect handling of version binding updates for remote provisioning.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor temporarily uses TEE-based attestation on Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro as a temporary workaround for the secure element attestation breaking after an OS patch level increase. Once this is fixed, we can re-enable StrongBox attestation for them and it'll use it for new pairings.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1585526398210416641
There's already verified boot with downgrade protection for the entire OS along with strict full system SELinux policies, but we decided to turn on forced kernel module signing and forced lockdown confidentiality mode as a simpler kernel level policy.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022102600 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1514-grapheneos-version-20221026…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
These features do slightly reduce trust in privileged core userspace processes particularly if there's a mistake in SELinux policy.
Worth noting that since protected virtual machines are now supported, the kernel isn't all powerful within the OS anymore:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixel 6 and Pixel 7 support protected KVM (pKVM) which is currently being used as an improved sandbox for certain OS functionality. We're interested in greatly expanding usage of this functionality and providing user-facing virtualization support via a management app in the OS.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022102600 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1514-grapheneos-version-20221026… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixel 6 and Pixel 7 support protected KVM (pKVM) which is currently being used as an improved sandbox for certain OS functionality. We're interested in greatly expanding usage of this functionality and providing user-facing virtualization support via a management app in the OS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
This functionality is now properly open sourced as part of Android 13 and you can even use it to run virtual machines via adb on a Pixel 7 with the stock OS via crosvm (VMM written in Rust used by ChromeOS and Android). It's already fairly close to being usable for so much more.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The current usage within the OS is extremely limited but it would be nice to see it replace a lot of the existing fine-grained OS sandboxing done with seccomp-bpf and SELinux. Media stack via pKVM would be quite cool. We plan to focus on uninvasive features built on it for now.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It'd be difficult for us to develop and maintain broader usage for VM-based sandboxing within the OS. On the other hand, there's a fairly clear path to developing uninvasive user-facing functionality for running apps in a more restricted VM-based sandbox or for managing OS VMs.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android provides the Chromium layer-1 sandbox as an OS feature available to every app via isolatedProcess services. It would also be very interesting to move this to per-site virtual machine instance using microdroid. It'd be a large project but very high impact for browsers.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Since isolatedProcess is an OS API, it'd benefit all Chromium-based browsers and other apps using it rather than being specific to Vanadium. That'd be a difficult project but we can consider it as a future large feature on the same scale as our sandboxed Google Play feature.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Make sure to join the new GrapheneOS Twitter community at x.com/i/communities/1530455827949273094. It already has 1500 users since we created it on May 28th. You can tweet to the community instead of your timeline and other GrapheneOS community members will see the posts and can reply to them.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Twitter communities provide a way for people without a bunch of followers to make posts that will be seen and replied to by others. It's essentially a forum.
Discussions about GrapheneOS itself and also apps/services on GrapheneOS are welcome in the GrapheneOS Twitter community.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We also have our new official GrapheneOS discussion forum available at discuss.grapheneos.org. Using the forum is recommended for in-depth discussions.
Our chat rooms are the most established + largest GrapheneOS community with over 14000 users in our main room on Matrix alone. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our mirrors of Play services and Play Store for use with the sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer have major updates available via our app repository Beta/Alpha channels.
To help with testing, go to the page for each in Apps and use the 3 dot menu to select release channel.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Note: the end-of-life 3rd generation Pixels on our extended support Android 12.1 branch have separate older releases of these apps via our app repository. You need to be on the Pixel 4 or later to help with testing the new Google Play updates with the current compatibility layer.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
On Pixel 6 and Pixel 7 phones, GrapheneOS uses the latest Linux 5.10.149 (2022-10-17) release of the 5.10 LTS compared to stock OS using Linux 5.10.107 (2022-03-19) with a small number of backported patches ending at 2022-08-01. GKI (Generic Kernel Image) support makes this easy.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS used to quickly merge kernel.org LTS releases into each device kernel. Device kernels are device-family-specific forks of the SoC vendor kernel which are themselves forks of the Android common kernel. There were regular conflicts and compatibility issues.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We no longer have to do any work of our own in order to ship the latest LTS releases beyond choosing a different revision to build the GKI. Our own changes are easy to port over to the latest kernel.org LTS and we try to get as much of it as possible upstream anyway.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1584260199052779521
Generic Kernel Image (GKI) infrastructure is reliable enough for us to ship kernel.org LTS releases as soon as they're released without needing to merge anything into device kernels. No conflicts to handle. GKIs are a massive improvement.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022102300 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1459-grapheneos-version-20221023…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We were previously shipping the latest stable GKI release tag every month. We've switched from those to the GKI LTS branch maintained by @gregkh alongside the kernel.org LTS releases. This gives us LTS releases right away without having to merge them as we used to.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022102300 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1459-grapheneos-version-20221023… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 64 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/64.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1416-auditor-app-version-64-rele… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022101800 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1361-grapheneos-version-20221018… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've finally updated our storage access documentation to cover the read media permission being split into separate permissions for read images, read video and read audio. GrapheneOS users can use Storage Scopes instead of any of the storage permissions.
grapheneos.org/usage
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The legacy read media permission was a previous evolution of the read external storage permission which granted apps read access to the user's entire home directory (not data of other apps) and had a corresponding write external storage permission. Both are gone for modern apps.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS substantially improves the Android permission model to allow using apps without granting access to sensitive data. Our features page provides an overview of these features and many others:
grapheneos.org/features
It only lists our improvements over Android 13.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our Storage Scopes feature (grapheneos.org/features) is a full alternative to granting any of Android's storage permissions. You can use Storage Scopes instead of granting access to Media, Videos, Photos, Music, storage management permissions or legacy Files / Files and Media.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
When you enable Storage Scopes, GrapheneOS pretends every storage permission is granted while still disallowing app from accessing any files created by other apps. Storage Scopes menu allows adding files / directories as scopes where the app can see/access files from other apps.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Storage Scopes is flexible. When you enable it, other storage permissions are all disabled. However, you can grant a requested storage permission while using Storage Scopes for others. For example, you could grant bulk access to Music but use Storage Scopes for Photos and others.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our Sensors permission toggle allows denying access to all sensors not covered by the existing permissions (Camera, Microphone, Body Sensors, Activity Recognition): compass, barometer, accelerometers, gyroscopes, light, proximity, humidity, temperature and any other sensor APIs.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For compatibility, Sensors permission is enabled by default and we have to provide the toggle for every app since there's no standard low-level sensor permission. We recently added a toggle to the Settings app to disable the Sensors permission by default for newly installed apps.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
When a sensor access is denied by our Sensors permission being disabled, we display a notification so that users are aware it's being denied and can enable it if they want the app to be able to access sensors.
Our Network permission toggle is very similar to our Sensors toggle.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android apps declare if they need network access in their manifest. We have an added Network permission toggle for these apps. Enabled by default for at install time but disabled by default if it's added by an app update. We recently added a toggle to the app install dialog too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
When the Network permission toggle is disabled, we pretend that the network is entirely down and give the appropriate errors. Network permission toggle also disables access to localhost which can otherwise be used to communicate between profiles. We may split it up in the future.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android apps with storage permissions and request install packages permission can write to the hidden obb directory to install app assets used by legacy games, etc. We split this into a separate OBB toggle for the install permission page. Very useful for sandboxed Play Store.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS also turns the incomplete Android 13 location indicator and location access history into a proper full implementation of the feature. We add exclusions for internal components such as Bluetooth service scanning for Bluetooth services whent's enabled to make it usable.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have many under the hood improvements to the app sandbox including removing low-level access to sensitive data. We've submitted some of this to Android over the years. Some of the standard sandbox improvements such as reduced /proc access and hidepid=2 were thanks to us.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We care a lot about app compatibility and design our features to avoid compatibility issues.
Our sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer allows using the Play services, Play Store, Google Play Games, AR services, Search, etc. as regular apps in the full GrapheneOS app sandbox.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Nearly 100% of the apps from the Play Store can be used on GrapheneOS thanks to the combination of our overall approach to compatibility, sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer and per-app exploit protection compatibility mode to disable hardened_malloc / 48-bit address space.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The apps which aren't working are almost all deliberately detecting an OS not certified by Google and refusing to provide certain functionality or to work at all. PayPal recently shipped an app update doing this via the Play Integrity API and then quickly reverted it afterwards.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We're working on our first update for the Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro working around memory corruption bugs being uncovered in the camera service by switching from hardened_malloc to Scudo for it. Our hope is that these issues with be resolved upstream soon.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS now has experimental support for the Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro. More information is available in the forum post announcement:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1345-experimental-grapheneos-sup…
Recommend joining #testing:grapheneos.org on Matrix if you want to help with testing experimental releases. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS now has experimental support for the Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro. More information is available in the forum post announcement:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1345-experimental-grapheneos-sup…
Recommend joining #testing:grapheneos.org on Matrix if you want to help with testing experimental releases.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Support for our easy to use web installer is now available for the Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro:
grapheneos.org/install/web
It's very portable and can even be used to install from another Android phone using almost any Chromium-based browser. It needed some updates for the Pixel 7. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 63 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/63.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1344-auditor-app-version-63-rele… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022101600 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1334-grapheneos-version-20221016… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1580732479031644161
This can't cause compatibility issues for apps from the Play Store, but there are more issues than expected with the app ecosystem outside the Play Store. Main issue is with an F-Droid repository redistributing developer builds that's not shipping 64-bit.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
As a small step towards dropping 32-bit app support from GrapheneOS, we're going to be moving to 64-bit only builds for Vanadium. This will substantially reduce the Vanadium build time and the size of the releases which is a substantial portion of the overall size of GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Android's modern app distribution mechanism system is based around split apks generated from an app bundle (aab). Code/resources specific to architectures, locales or display sizes can be split out. App repository client has to install the base apk and the required splits for it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Split APKs can also be used for dynamic feature and asset delivery to only download portions of an app once they're needed. Play Store implementation unnecessarily tied this to Play Signing where they generate apks from the app bundle but it works fine outside the Play Store too.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Previously, apps were usually distributed as universal apks with support for every architecture, locale and display size supported by an app. Still the primary app distribution mechanism outside Play Store. Some developers generate architecture variants to save bandwidth/storage.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
F-Droid doesn't use modern app distribution approach or package installer API. A certain non-default F-Droid repository redistributing developer app builds is shipping 32-bit-only releases to save space instead of universal releases. This hurts performance/security/portability.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
arm64 provides better exploit mitigations and performance so this is problematic aside from portability. Still, we're going to roll back dropping the 32-bit WebView on older generation devices to work around this. We'll do it only on Pixel 7 where 32-bit apps aren't supported.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022101500 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1301-grapheneos-version-20221015… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've discovered a bug on Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro with hardware attestation support via the Titan M2 as part of adding Auditor support. Hardware attestation throws an error after an OS upgrade, likely due to incorrect handling of version binding updates for remote provisioning.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've reported this issue upstream and worked around in version 62 of our Auditor app:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1581055948189470720
We previously found a similar issue with the app-generated attest key feature introduced in Android 12 and initially shipped by the Pixel 6, Pixel 6 Pro and Pixel 6a.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 62 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/62.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1294-auditor-app-version-62-rele…
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The previous issue we discovered was caused by a bug in the keymint (keymaster) HAL. It was fixed upstream based on our report and they gave us the updated HAL to verify the fix works. We expect it to ship in the 1st quarterly release (QPR1 aka Pixel feature drop) of Android 13.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor works around the previous issue by starting out using the app-generated attest key feature for improved pinning security when it's available. Once it stops working after an OS upgrade, it reverts to the previous approach. This is visible in our UI via the security level.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The new issue caused by the move to remote provisioning for the Titan M2 on the Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro has to be worked around by avoiding the Titan M2 for attestation and temporarily using the TEE. This is unfortunate but we can use Titan M2 for new pairings once it's fixed.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We only discovered this issue because there's an over-the-air update available for the Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro so we ran into the issue on both devices after upgrading them. If we'd installed the update before booting them, we wouldn't have run into the issue until next month.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 62 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/62.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1294-auditor-app-version-62-rele… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 61 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/61.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1291-auditor-app-version-61-rele… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022101400 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1290-grapheneos-version-20221014… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro have fully dropped support for 32-bit apps. We expected 7th generation Pixels to be ARMv9 devices without 32-bit app support but they dropped 32-bit app support despite remaining on ARMv8.2. Shift to ARMv9 has been pushed to next year for unknown reasons.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Play Store stopped supporting publishing apps without 64-bit support on 2019-08-01 for both new apps and app updates. It stopped serving apps without 64-bit support to 64-bit capable devices on 2021-08-01. We expect there would be little impact from dropping it from GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
As a small step towards dropping 32-bit app support from GrapheneOS, we're going to be moving to 64-bit only builds for Vanadium. This will substantially reduce the Vanadium build time and the size of the releases which is a substantial portion of the overall size of GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The only impact of 64-bit-only Vanadium releases will be the end of support for using the WebView from 32-bit apps. That requires having a whole 32-bit build of the browser engine, i.e. close to a whole second copy of Chromium with Java/Kotlin and resources shared between them.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Vast majority of unmaintained 32-bit-only apps people want to run are old games and don't require the WebView. There will be almost zero impact from this change. It won't matter going forward due to the Pixel 7, Pixel 7 Pro and upcoming Pixel Tablet dropping 32-bit app support.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
For ARMv9, Cortex-X2 (performance core) and Cortex-A510 (little core) no longer have 32-bit support. Only Cortex-A710 (big core) has 32-bit support for compatibility. Snapdragon 8 Gen 1 has to run 32-bit code on 3x Cortex-A710 and can't use the 1x Cortex-X2 or 4x Cortex-A510.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We avoid bundling third party apps and services since they're never fully aligned with our approach and goals.
Once an app is included, it's difficult to remove for existing devices since users depend on it. This would result in apps being included past their best before date.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Many people wanted us to bundle Signal with GrapheneOS as the default SMS/MMS app. Signal is now dropping support for SMS/MMS. They also don't care much about keeping their dependencies patched, reducing attack surface or internal sandboxing. It would be an issue for GrapheneOS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
They've made many decisions we disagree with including replacing registration lock PIN with a sync PIN depending on SGX for security, using SGX as a replacement for the previous private contact discovery and making the secure local backup system in the Android app less useful.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If we bundle an app, we're forced to take responsibility for developing a fork of it. If that app depends on a service outside of our control as is the case with Signal, that would leave us at the mercy of their decisions regardless of resources we put into the fork of the app.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Instead, we keep the base install of GrapheneOS very minimal. In some cases, such as our Camera app, we've made the decision to develop our own due to lack of decent options. We plan to do the same with a Gallery app. In most cases, we'll leave it up to users to install an app.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Certain apps must be bundled. For example, there must be a Camera app providing system-only media capture intents and other camera intents.
AOSP Calendar, Music and Search are still included in GrapheneOS as default intent handlers with most of the user-facing portions disabled. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Does anyone know the person who previously had the account @cryptolomeus? We suspect they registered grapheneos.eth. cryptolomeus.eth is owned by the address with grapheneos.eth. They deleted their Twitter account after this was mentioned in this thread:
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We'd appreciate if whoever purchased grapheneos.eth transferred it to our Ethereum donation address:
grapheneos.org/donate
GrapheneOS is a non-profit open source project and we own the GrapheneOS trademark. Official registration was filed in the US and Canada a while ago.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There's an address with assorted 'web3' domains based on major brands along with an out-of-place cryptolomeus.web3 domain:
wnsdomains.io/profile/0x76A217F63727362A6BcD51aAF802B826E…
Ethereum has even weaker base layer privacy than Bitcoin so there's likely a fair bit of info to be gathered from these addresses. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We need lots of help testing the latest GrapheneOS release due to a large set of improvements:
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1580329287718440960
This is currently in the Alpha channel and will take longer to reach the Beta and especially Stable channels than our usual pace due to the amount of changes.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022101200 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1266-grapheneos-version-20221012… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022101200 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1266-grapheneos-version-20221012… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We'd appreciate if whoever purchased grapheneos.eth transferred it to our Ethereum donation address:
grapheneos.org/donate
GrapheneOS is a non-profit open source project and we own the GrapheneOS trademark. Official registration was filed in the US and Canada a while ago.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We aren't sure if someone registered this name to squat on it for money or in order to hold onto it for us. We hope it's the latter.
We won't purchase domain names using GrapheneOS brand name for more than initial price + registration fees since it's an established trademark.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We made a special case for grapheneos.com since it was registered in early 2014 along with a bunch of other graphene names. Person with it gave us a special deal of $500 + an old phone running GrapheneOS. That was a one time thing: we purchased the earliest public usage.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Our privacy and security focused Camera app now has over 300k installs via Play Store. There are around 50k active users via Play Store.
play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=app.grapheneos.came…
Our hope is publishing this tiny piece of GrapheneOS on the Play Store will help raise awareness about the project.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We have a couple of improvements planned for the app on our end and we expect CameraX will significantly improve video support over the next 6 months enabling us to offer frame rate and codec configuration. We don't know when CameraX will add features like manual focus/exposure.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Best experience is on modern Samsung devices where our app has all 5 extension modes (HDR, Night, Portrait, Face Retouch, Auto), zoom-based multi-camera, EIS and ZSL. Pixels are still missing the CameraX extension modes and CameraX ZSL support to make the Latency mode faster.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It has fairly unique privacy features for a camera app: built-in EXIF metadata stripping (enabled by default), recording videos without audio, saving via media store instead of needing any storage permissions and optionally saving images/videos via SAF to any storage provider.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It also has a high quality built-in QR scanning mode much better at scanning dense QR codes than other apps. It also handles color inversion and many other types of barcodes.
Security focus means we've focused on securely handling the standard camera intents and lockscreen mode. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Connectivity checks are one of the 4 Google services used by AOSP. We replace these 4 services with GrapheneOS services by default with toggles to disable them or use the standard Google servers. Connectivity checks are low level and are run on each network to check if it works.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Connectivity checks are a special case since they still need to detect whether each underlying network has internet access when you're using a VPN.
If you're using a VPN and want to hide that you use GrapheneOS, you should switch connectivity check toggle to Standard (Google).
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We also provide a 3rd 'Disabled' option for connectivity checks. This loses support for automatically switching to a working network, handling captive portals from the OS and delaying internet-dependent scheduled jobs until the network has internet connectivity. It's your choice.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
If you're using a VPN and want to appear as a regular Android device, the Standard (Google) option is the best fit. Connectivity checks simply make HTTPS and HTTP GET requests with Android's Java standard library with a standard frozen user agent to look for a 204 response code.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
A full list of default connections made by GrapheneOS is available at grapheneos.org/faq.
If you have Private DNS set to automatic, it tests resolving a randomized subdomain via DoT with the network-provided DNS. We may add a note about it to the page but it's part of DNS.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You should also read our section on app link verification:
grapheneos.org/usage
App link verification allows a domain to delegate handling links to an app by default. For example, youtube.com/.well-known/assetlinks.json authorizes YouTube app. For NewPipe, users need to manually enable it.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Other than replacing insecure network time, we don't consider replacing these services important. It's outside our core focus of making substantial privacy and security improvements. See grapheneos.org/features for an overview of most of the improvements we offer over Android 13.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've added a Cardano donation address:
grapheneos.org/donate
We handle all cryptocurrency donations with a Trezor hardware wallet with a split backup setup. We can't add support for cryptocurrencies without Trezor support and we greatly prefer if we can use Trezor Suite.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The $grapheneos handle was donated to us by @rektChristian so you can also send donations to $grapheneos and they'll go to the address above. Thank you!
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've added an Ethereum donation address:
grapheneos.org/donate
We handle all cryptocurrency donations with a Trezor hardware wallet with a split backup setup. We can't add support for cryptocurrencies without Trezor support and we greatly prefer if we can use Trezor Suite. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We need $3500 to preorder 2x Pixel 7 and 2x Pixel 7 Pro (2x $599 + 2x $799 at local prices with added sales tax). One for main device maintainers and one for main dev/testing set.
Bitcoin donation address specifically for this purpose:
bc1q2fh6j65w3rfvyn00zex2gh9eslhw9nvdnvkfy7.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We chose to keep things simple for this little fundraising effort. It's easiest to handle a specific funding goal with 1 currency and Bitcoin is how we distribute funds to developers.
grapheneos.org/donate has other donation options including Monero, Zcash and credit cards.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've reached our goal for purchasing 2x Pixel 7 and 2x Pixel 7 Pro. We've already preordered one of each for our main set of devices.
mempool.space/address/bc1q2fh6j65w3rfvyn00zex2gh9eslhw9nv…
We'll be deciding on the 2 main device maintainers among ourselves and preordering one of each for those people soon.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS is entirely funded by donations.
We take donations via Bitcoin, Monero, Zcash, GitHub Sponsors (credit cards), PayPal and also Interac e-Transfers within Canada:
grapheneos.org/donate
Donations fund our team of 5 full-time developers, workstations, servers, etc.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We've heard people are interested in more donation methods. We can consider adding other cryptocurrencies with Trezor support.
Zcash shielded address will be added when Trezor Suite support ships.
Lightning node will be added when we have a setup with proper automation/backups.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Pixel 7 and Pixel 7 Pro we've already preordered in Canada will give us 300 CAD of store credit expiring in a year which can go towards a Pixel Tablet / Pixel Mini in 2023. We'll try to take advantage of similar preorder offers for the ones we're getting for device maintainers.
-
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1578073223316619271
We've reached a bit over $2000 out of the $3500 goal, so we can buy 1x Pixel 7 and 1x Pixel 7 Pro for the main set of devices. Meeting the goal will allow us to buy them for the device maintainers too which will definitely be needed since it's a new gen.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We need $3500 to preorder 2x Pixel 7 and 2x Pixel 7 Pro (2x $599 + 2x $799 at local prices with added sales tax). One for main device maintainers and one for main dev/testing set.
Bitcoin donation address specifically for this purpose:
bc1q2fh6j65w3rfvyn00zex2gh9eslhw9nvdnvkfy7. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 60 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/60.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1182-auditor-app-version-60-rele… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 52 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/52.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1179-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022100300 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1156-grapheneos-version-20221003… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 51 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/51.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1140-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 50 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/50.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1139-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Secure PDF Viewer app version 15 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/PdfViewer/releases/tag/15.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1119-secure-pdf-viewer-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS Camera app version 49 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Camera/releases/tag/49.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1111-grapheneos-camera-app-versi… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
Auditor app version 59 released: github.com/GrapheneOS/Auditor/releases/tag/59.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release and a link to the full changelog.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1110-auditor-app-version-59-rele… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022092800 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1106-grapheneos-version-20220928… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
DDoS attacks are currently ongoing against our DNS servers. Service has not been disrupted but IPv4 UDP requests to ns2.grapheneos.org are being filtered and forcing fallback to TCP. They've also tried targeting our website again and it held up well.
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1573705852216905732
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
nodeping.com/reports/statusevents/check/2021072420071L2VS… shows the IPv4 UDP outage caused by OVH DDoS mitigation since the attacker is spoofing packet sources for DNS requests. This forces TCP fallback and slightly degrades latency for clients choosing ns2. Clients would fall back to ns1 if that failed anyway.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
The @Shopify store at grapheneosphone . org is not associated with GrapheneOS and is infringing on the GrapheneOS trademarks.
Selling phones with GrapheneOS is permitted but people cannot do it using our branding this way where customers are misled into thinking it's official.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
It's not legal to create a store branded as GrapheneOS. You must have your own brand name and it must be clear that you are not GrapheneOS.
We'll be actively enforcing our current common law trademarks and we've spent a lot of money on formal trademark registrations already.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1559180928315949057
grapheneos . nl and grapheneos . store domains are still an issue too. grapheneos . de is no longer registered so that part is resolved.
We already have a dozen defensive domain registrations and expanding that would be very a poor use of limited funds.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You can make a store selling GrapheneOS phones, but please don't use a grapheneos.tld domain. It infringes on our trademark.
grapheneos.store should be transferred to us.
grapheneos.de and grapheneos.nl should be allowed to expire. Same for others. -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
We need an additional $100/month of donations to help us cover upcoming OVH price increases caused by rising electricity costs and IPv4 exhaustion:
ovhcloud.com/en-ca/new-services-repricing/ (prices shown in Canadian dollars)
grapheneos.org/donate
Recurring GitHub Sponsors donations are ideal.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are ongoing denial of service attacks on our services which caused downtime for our website in part of the world today. See x.com/GrapheneOS/status/1573688340611727360 for details. We've adjusted to deal with it but it will likely continue and escalate. Upgrading server instances would help.
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are ongoing denial of service attacks on the grapheneos.org website based on abusing HTTP/2 features. We either need to increase the size of the server instances of the website or disable HTTP/2. It may make sense to merge the website and network services together.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
There are ongoing denial of service attacks on the grapheneos.org website based on abusing HTTP/2 features. We either need to increase the size of the server instances of the website or disable HTTP/2. It may make sense to merge the website and network services together.
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GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS version 2022092300 released: grapheneos.org/releases.
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
Forum discussion thread:
discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1010-grapheneos-version-20220923… -
GrapheneOS
@GrapheneOS
You can make a store selling GrapheneOS phones, but please don't use a grapheneos.tld domain. It infringes on our trademark.
grapheneos.store should be transferred to us.
grapheneos.de and grapheneos.nl should be allowed to expire. Same for others.


























