As @FedericaMog and I wrote in April in @ForeignAffairs:
“Any future deal, however, will have to hold the United States mutually accountable. That means it must be built to endure political change. The collapse of the JCPOA after the U.S. exit in 2018 exposed a structural vulnerability. Iran front-loaded its most significant nonproliferation concessions—reducing enrichment capacity, shipping out stockpiles, accepting intrusive verification—but many of Washington’s concessions came later. That meant that when the United States pulled out, Iran had already delivered much of what it was supposed to, but the reciprocal economic benefits had yet to fully materialize. For an entire year after sanctions were reimposed, Iran continued to comply with the JCPOA terms in the hopes that other parties would be able to adequately fill the gap. Those countries, including ones in Europe, tried hard to do so, building several instruments and deploying an impressive amount of creativity. But their efforts could not yield sufficient results. Tehran thus concluded that complying with the terms of the deal did not ensure continuity and that domestic political change in Washington could override negotiated commitments made by multiple countries.
A future agreement will need to correct this imbalance at the level of design, not just sequencing. Economic commitments must be designed with deliberate institutional architecture and not left to market forces alone. Sanctions relief, in particular, must be treated as something to be actively delivered, not merely permitted. Both sides should also explore building so-called technical guarantees—or collaborative projects that create shared physical investments in the deal’s continuation. These could include joint infrastructure development as Iran rebuilds after the war, regional nuclear fuel cycle cooperation, and energy modernization programs that benefit all parties but require sustained cooperation to maintain. Such projects demonstrate commitment through concrete action, create domestic constituencies with stakes in the agreement’s survival, and, critically, raise the costs of withdrawal for all parties, not just Iran. For example, the JCPOA included extensive civil nuclear cooperation with countries such as China, Russia, and the United Kingdom on reactor modernization—work that continued years after the U.S. withdrawal precisely because it had created shared physical and institutional investments that were costly to abandon. Economic commitments in any future agreement must be designed with the same deliberate institutional architecture and not left to market forces alone.”
www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/how-end-iran-crisis
Told @FT that #iran wants most of the US commitments frontloaded, while nuclear elements — Trump’s priority — are deferred to the next stage.
If the US agrees to those conditions, they would be willing to take that deal. But I don’t see that, because that would be acceptance of defeat by the US.
www.ft.com/content/eced6084-7cd7-4633-a8ba-559173e0f6c1?s…


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































