The genie of hatred is easy to let out, but hard to put back" — Interview with Volodymyr Vyatrovych, one of Ukraine's most prominent historical researchers of Ukraine's liberation movements and Ukrainian-Polish relations and head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance in 2014–2019.
Ukrayinska Pravda, 7 July
(1) On May 26, Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree awarding the Special Operations Center "North" (part of Ukraine's Special Operations Forces) the honorary title "named after the Heroes of the UPA." This decision was hardly the true starting point of the current deterioration in relations between Ukraine and Poland. But the Polish political class treated the decree as an opening it couldn't resist. Political opponents — President Nawrocki and Prime Minister Tusk — united in criticizing Ukraine.
An equally sharp reaction followed the long-overdue decision of the Verkhovna Rada to establish a National Pantheon, passed by a near-constitutional majority. In Poland this too was read as another political signal from Kyiv.
Poland's current fixation on the UPA in its information space raises uneasy parallels with how history once became a tool of Russian pressure on Ukraine — except this time it concerns one of Ukraine's key wartime allies.
On the evening of Monday, July 6, Poland's Ministry of Defense declassified data on the volume of military aid to Ukraine, in response to accusations from the right about a secret transfer of Patriot missiles allegedly undermining Warsaw's defense capability.
Whether the tension can be defused, what its real nature is, and where it may lead — this interview with Volodymyr Vyatrovych explores.
"We were children for a very long time, and later teenagers who obeyed our elders"
— Should Ukraine coordinate its own pantheon of heroes with its partners?
— Neither Kraków's Wawel, nor the Pantheon in Rome, nor in Lisbon, nor anywhere else has ever been the subject of international discussion. This is purely an internal national matter. Just recently the reburial of the famous French historian Marc Bloch took place in Paris. It was preceded by an internal French debate, but no international one — because there couldn't be one.
What we're going through now is growing pains. For a very long time we were children, and later teenagers who obeyed our elders. We got used to others writing our history and telling us how to judge our past. The situation is changing, we're growing up. They say history is written by the victors. Right now is the moment when we're beginning to write our own history — partly because we have a chance to win this war.
— The Verkhovna Rada passed a law on the National Pantheon. Who will be buried there?
— The law contains no fixed list, and that triggered another wave of hysteria among Polish politicians. It was almost funny: a few days after the bill was published, President Nawrocki's office was already issuing warnings that they would carefully await the text and study the list. By then the full text had already been on the Verkhovna Rada's website. Even without reading Ukrainian well, one could at least see that the text contains no list at all. The law only sets criteria for which figures may be reburied there.
It concerns heads of state from different eras, from Rus' to the present, army commanders — including commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the war of independence, i.e. since 2014 — as well as figures of culture, science and the arts.
A coordinating commission will be created, which, based on public discussions and research by the Institute of National Remembrance as the responsible executive body, will draw up the list and submit it to the Verkhovna Rada as a law. The president must then sign it.
We're not talking about hundreds of people, but a few dozen of the most significant historical figures. Some will be reburied if their remains exist, especially abroad. But not, for example, Taras Shevchenko — because his burial site is itself iconic. The same goes for Ivan Franko, Mykhailo Hrushevsky and others. Their graves are well kept and are monuments in their own right.
What will be moved are the remains of those buried abroad whose graves are under threat.
I think at least half the pantheon will consist of cenotaphs — symbolic graves — since the burial sites of many Ukrainian figures are unknown.
Vyatrovych: "Every anti-colonial struggle, unfortunately, comes with civilian casualties"
— The Polish president's office expressed disappointment at the passage of the Pantheon law, calling it another step of escalation by Ukraine. Maybe it really is poor timing?
— That's Polish hysteria and Polish assessments that have nothing to do with objective reality. I don't think it needs a response at all. I believe this was the president's spokesman speaking. That particular statement is very personal for me — I know him well, we were practically friends, we used to drink beer together. This is a man who once sang insurgent songs. I believe his wife is Ukrainian. In other words, he was a completely reasonable guy. Unfortunately, hysteria deforms a great many minds.
I'm convinced no Ukrainian reaction will contain what's happening in Poland. Ukraine tried making concessions for a very long time. Those concessions only spoiled Polish politicians further. We have no instruments of pressure. So the only thing we can do is wait for Polish society to sober up from this intoxication.
There are already some signs of this: sober voices are being heard from Polish Catholic bishops, veterans of the Solidarity movement, and Polish journalists together with Ukrainian journalists. There are signs this will eventually stop. But it definitely shouldn't be expected any time soon. For now this hysteria converts very well politically — just look at the sharp rise in Nawrocki's approval rating.
I know him as a colleague. When I headed the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, he was head of the Gdańsk branch of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance.
As a politician, Nawrocki offered Poles nothing else during his election campaign. "Poles first" was his slogan, which one way or another revolved around Ukrainian themes. Like a skilled surfer, he rode the anti-Ukrainian wave that had been sown and cultivated since at least 2013, though its roots go back to 2003.
The genie of hatred is very easy to let out, but hard to put back.
And this is above all a problem for Polish society. They need to realize that such a policy harms not only Ukraine and Polish-Ukrainian relations — it harms Poland. By immersing itself in the past, it throws itself overboard from important political processes happening here and now.
In building a new security architecture, Poland and Ukraine ought to be the central axis. Instead, meetings take place in the format Ukraine–Germany–France–Britain, minus Poland. That's their choice of geo-history over geopolitics. A mistaken choice, but one they'll have to go through.
"Our western neighbors need to somehow mature and realize that today's Ukraine is not the Ukraine of 2013"
— Ukraine's Foreign Minister Sybiha, after the passage of the National Pantheon law, headed to Warsaw for de-escalation. One possible step could be adding General Marko Bezruchko of the UNR Army to the Ukrainian national pantheon. How do you assess the potential of such a step?
— First, it won't help de-escalation.
Second, it won't be Andriy Sybiha who decides who ends up in the pantheon.
I respect him as minister, but there is a law that sets out the procedure and criteria for including specific figures in the pantheon.
And third, Marko Bezruchko's grave in Warsaw is an important site for local Ukrainians. Every time a senior Ukrainian official visits Poland, they go to the cemetery to honor Bezruchko, as the current head of the Institute of National Remembrance recently did.
Ultimately, this is a rallying point for the Ukrainian community, and it's hardly something that needs to be dismantled. I'm not categorically opposed to relocating General Bezruchko, but this step definitely won't lead to de-escalation.
— How would you characterize this figure's role for Ukraine and Poland?
— Marko Bezruchko was one of the figures of the Ukrainian revolution, an outstanding military commander of the 1917–21 Ukrainian revolution era. For Poland, he's the man who saved Warsaw in 1920.
He could be a shared hero for both countries.
I was amused by a piece in the Polish outlet Rzeczpospolita suggesting which figures Ukrainians should accept as heroes. In the Polish version, there could be shared Ukrainian-Polish heroes: Bezruchko, Sahaidachny, Petliura. But, in this version, our pantheon can't include purely Ukrainian heroes — please, listen to your older brother, now the western one.
Our western neighbors need to somehow mature and realize that today's Ukraine is not the Ukraine of 2013, when 149 deputies appealed to the Polish Sejm to recognize the UPA's actions as genocide against Poles. Those deputies were Ukrainian citizens at the time and had not yet appeared in treason cases.
That statement probably spoiled Polish right-wing politicians, who would like to see exactly that kind of Ukraine. They don't want to acknowledge that it wasn't Ukraine, but a Kremlin simulacrum. The initiator of the appeal, Vadym Kolesnichenko, is an obvious Russian agent. But no one wanted to notice that, and he was ceremoniously received in the Polish Sejm.
Now it's 2026. The Ukraine of the 2013 model didn't rest in peace — it went somewhere else entirely, and it isn't coming back.
Polish politicians who think about the future ought to see the real Ukraine. In practically every region, Ukrainians consider UPA heroes to be people who contributed to Ukraine's independence. This is an irreversible process.
Polish politicians talk about their own sensitivity on this topic. But they have a right to that sensitivity on their own territory, and shouldn't use it to blackmail others — especially regarding a country to which they owe their current freedom. Ukrainians are containing an aggression that could directly affect Poland.
— Why has the 2003 Kuchma-Kwaśniewski formula — "I forgive and ask forgiveness" — stopped working?
— That formula isn't unique. It was invented back in the 1960s, in the context of Polish-German reconciliation.
The Polish-Ukrainian conflict during World War II is also not a unique phenomenon. If you move across the world map in any direction, all neighboring peoples, aside from loving and cooperating with each other, also hated and killed one another. That's how national self-awareness and state-building happened.
Everything that needed to be done politically on the Polish-Ukrainian conflict was done in 2003. Besides the presidents' statement, there was a statement from the churches and a joint monument unveiling.
For the 60th anniversary of the Volyn tragedy, the Verkhovna Rada and the Polish Sejm simultaneously adopted a statement with identical text. Politicians did everything necessary — after that, stay out of the topic, let historians debate it.
But that's precisely when certain right-wing circles in Poland decided this wasn't enough. Moreover, they made use of another very important internal Polish debate from the early 2000s — about Polish participation in the Holocaust. That's a debate about mass killings committed by Poles against Jews without German involvement. It shook Poland in the early 2000s after Jan Tomasz Gross's book "Neighbors" appeared.
That debate struck at the mental foundations of Polish society, which was used to seeing itself only as a victim. At that point, shifting the focus from Polish participation in the Holocaust to Ukrainians who killed Poles became a lifeline for part of society.
The statement you mentioned by the two presidents and parliaments was the last attempt to keep this discussion within reasonable bounds. Later there were attempts under presidents Kaczyński and Yushchenko. Even in 2008, for the 65th anniversary of the Volyn events, nothing was marked in Poland.
But President Yushchenko lost the election, and President Kaczyński died along with a significant number of the most reasonable Polish public figures — including historians, by the way. Among the dead was my colleague Janusz Kurtyka, head of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, who used to calmly go to press conferences and say that Shukhevych is and can be a hero for Ukrainians.
Those people wouldn't sound the way today's Polish figures do. The situation was also worsened by events in Ukraine, which became very flexible about accepting Russian historical narratives — for a gas discount, for anything at all.
That increased the temptation for our western neighbors.
The appeal by 149 Ukrainian deputies in 2013 triggered the Sejm's first statement "On the Volyn events bearing signs of genocide." And in 2016 those "signs" turned into full genocide. After that — nothing but forward and upward in terms of politicians fully seizing the historical discussion of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.
On our side and the Polish side, there were still attempts between 2014 and 2016 to hand the topic back to historians. We even created a special Polish-Ukrainian historians' forum. It was great — we debated late into the night, argued. I think it was mutually beneficial. But in 2016 in Poland, Law and Justice took full power, and a full stop was put on that dialogue. They're still clinging to that full stop. Remember the recent statement by Polish Defense Minister Kosiniak-Kamysz that "the Volyn question cannot be discussed." What does "cannot be discussed" even mean?
Vyatrovych: "European integration will not force Ukraine to renounce Bandera and Shukhevych"
— Poland's defense minister also said Ukraine must choose between Bandera and the EU…
— He's not the first. Symptomatic slogans that only reveal the immaturity, unfortunately, of Polish society.
— Every Ukrainian president, and every head of the Institute of National Remembrance, for that matter, was convinced that concessions could achieve reconciliation…
— Not me. Over the years I've often heard that I'm the one to blame for escalating Ukrainian-Polish relations. So now I want to shout, or put on a T-shirt saying "I told you so." From the very start I believed relations had to be built between equals. That's probably the only way normal dialogue is possible. Half-jokingly, half-seriously, people bring up my partial Polish ancestry in this context — my great-grandfather was Kazimierz Wiatrowicz.
— Not from Volyn?
— Not from Volyn, from Galicia, from the older occupiers. Maybe I really do understand better the psychology of people who only respect those who respect themselves. As soon as we start with "what would you like, sir?" — it spirals. It spirals. The demands will keep growing and growing.
So I hope the current situation, unpleasant as it is, will sober up our relationship and it will become normal and equal again. On the Polish side there was always a bet that every new Ukrainian government would…
— Get down on its knees before the victims of the Volyn tragedy, like Poroshenko did?
— By the way, that was a strong gesture from Poroshenko, to which Polish society reacted in a very peculiar way: they simply ignored it. That shows it's not what they actually want. They don't want anyone to ask forgiveness — they want to keep demanding apologies. An equally telling example is exhumation.
Ukraine never banned exhumation; Ukraine banned search excavation work. That ban was a reaction to the fact that 15 monuments at real Ukrainian graves were destroyed during 2014–16. Some of it was livestreamed. People watched online, liked it, asked for more.
Among those destroyed were monuments bearing state symbols. Our response was meant to stop that. And, frankly, it worked — the destruction stopped. In negotiations we made restoring at least one grave a condition for continuing search work.
That never happened. But on the Polish side, manipulation began claiming Ukraine supposedly bans exhumation.
Let me explain the difference: exhumation is when we know exactly where a grave is and that actual remains lie there, but "the Ukrainians, satanists, pagans won't allow reburial." Now, when Ukraine has permitted search work and that work is taking place — oh God, there are no remains. It turns out search work doesn't necessarily produce results. It turns out much of the information used in Poland as reliable actually rests on no credible sources at all. So the remains supposedly needing exhumation simply don't exist.
Now the claim is that Ukrainians are hiding those remains somewhere. And a few years before that, a campaign was pushed claiming Ukrainians can't be EU members because they don't share basic European values and won't let Poles bury their ancestors who lie somewhere on Ukrainian soil.
"Operation 'Vistula' is precisely the war crime that should unite Ukrainians and Poles, because it's a typical communist crime"
— How accurate is the term "genocide," given that at the time of the Volyn tragedy Ukraine was a stateless nation, unlike Poland, which at least had a government in exile?
— The territory was under German occupation, so talk of genocide by either Ukrainians or Poles is misplaced. You rightly noted the stateless status. There is no example in world history of genocide carried out without a state apparatus.
Organizing a genocide requires a colossal disproportion between aggressor and victim — total defenselessness on one side and total territorial control on the other. That requires police, an army, secret services, propaganda.
During World War II, neither Ukrainians nor Poles had that capacity. During the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, Ukrainians killed Poles and Poles killed Ukrainians. Where in world history will you find a genocide where the victims killed their executioners? The ratio was at least close to half and half. Where in world history will you find a genocide where the victims and perpetrators sit down at the negotiating table?
And there were negotiations in 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945 between the two undergrounds. They couldn't find common ground because the two underground movements' concepts were mutually opposed on the basis of territorial claims. Poland insisted on restoring the 1939 borders. Ukrainians couldn't accept that, because they were fighting for an independent, unified Ukrainian state. Giving up Western Ukraine was impossible for them, since it was precisely the staging ground of that struggle.
Imagine Roman Shukhevych saying: "We're withdrawing beyond the Zbruch and will continue the fight there." Moving the Ukrainian Insurgent Army like a piece of furniture further east — that's absurd. So the Ukrainian insurgents couldn't accept the Polish concept.
Negotiations periodically hit a dead end and armed struggle resumed — including war crimes against civilians, absolutely symmetrical on both sides. The only asymmetry, the only disproportion, was in the casualties. The Polish side had more, because the main arena of confrontation was territory where Ukrainians were the overwhelming majority. Take Volyn, for example — the population ratio there was 1:8. So who would you expect to have died more — Ukrainians or Poles? Obviously that ratio is reflected in the casualty numbers too.
— From the standpoint of today's international law, Operation "Vistula" is also a classic war crime…
— Ethnic cleansing.
— Besides the expulsion of people, was there also mass removal of Ukrainian children?
— War crime and genocide are different legal categories. What happened during the Polish-Ukrainian conflict — not only in Volyn but also in Galicia, the Lemko region, the Chełm region, and not only in 1943 but from 1942 to 1947, including the "Vistula" operation you mentioned — all of it contained elements of war crimes on both sides.
"Vistula" itself is precisely the war crime that should unite Ukrainians and Poles, because it's a typical communist crime carried out by the Polish communist authorities. In my view, there was grounds here for a shared position. In fact, one existed: in the 1990s the Polish Senate passed a resolution condemning Operation Vistula.
It was only later, when Karol Nawrocki — Poland's current president — became head of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, that the 20-year investigation was halted.
There were even preliminary conclusions at one point that it wasn't a crime but a forced action to protect the Polish population from "bandits of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army." So compared to the 1990s, Poland has undergone a complete regression in understanding its own past.
Vyatrovych: "Right now we have the chance to write our own history, because we have the chance to win the war"
— Until 2022, Ukraine was an object, not a subject, of international politics, and in the Ukrainian-Polish discussion it never raised counter-demands or claims. Maybe it's time?
— If we're talking about demands like removing Józef Piłsudski from Poland's pantheon of heroes, that's absurd. I'm categorically against matching stupidity with stupidity. Let's not multiply the absurdity. But if we're talking about honoring Ukrainians killed by Poles, that needs to be done.
At the Ukrainian Catholic University, a project is currently underway to verify by name all the victims. So far 30,000 Ukrainians killed by Poles during the conflict have been identified. Of those, 10,000 are victims in Volyn. Nothing comparable exists on the Polish side.
On the Polish side, instead, there's a figure of 100,000 victims that's simply written into law and isn't even up for debate. After all these years of discussion, they haven't managed to methodologically substantiate that number with sources.
Another important factor prompting Polish politicians to declare any revision of the facts unacceptable is the opening of the KGB archives. We've gained unprecedented access to documents, including on the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. The main arena of the conflict was the territory of present-day Ukraine and part of eastern Poland.
Without documents, it's very hard to understand what actually happened. Instead, the vast majority of Polish concepts — especially those popular in the early 2000s, which became the basis of the "genocide" approach — were built on people's memories. Testimonies were recorded only in the 1990s–2000s.
A striking example of how flawed many of these testimonies are is a photograph the Polish side still uses — children tied to a tree with barbed wire. It was even called "the tree of independent Ukraine." Memories began appearing that this happened in various villages. Someone even claimed it wasn't one tree, but an entire avenue of them.
This went on until 2006–2008, when Polish journalists discovered that the photo was actually an illustration from a psychiatry textbook, depicting children killed by their mentally ill mother. This is a vivid example of how distorted memories can be.
That photo has nothing to do with Ukraine. Yet it was seriously considered as a sketch for a monument to the victims of the Volyn tragedy in Warsaw. The only thing debated at the time was aesthetics — whether people might dislike such a horrifying image.
Ukrainian research is built on a documentary basis, and it challenges the one-sided approach in which Ukrainians are only killers and Poles only victims. And I think that's precisely what prompted Polish politicians to stop the discussion at the stage most convenient for them — where everything is settled, and anyone who disagrees is a "revisionist."
My second book, "The Ukrainian-Polish War," was published in Polish and English. If you look at the Polish- or English-language article about the book or about me — clearly edited by Poles — Vyatrovych is called a "Volyn revisionist," because I challenge some key concepts. Yes, I challenge them, because they rest on absolutely no serious methodology, no serious sources whatsoever.
— But some Ukrainian historians also argue for revising the politics of memory around the UPA — Yaroslav Hrytsak, known outside Ukraine, Georgiy Kasianov, Danylo Yanevsky, and others.
— Yaroslav Hrytsak, forgive me, contradicts himself. In the Polish media he says the Volyn events can be classified as genocide. In Ukrainian media, at the same time, he claims it can't be considered genocide.
Danylo Yanevsky is a relay for purely Russian narratives, whether in the context of trashing the Ukrainian liberation movement, decolonization, defending Bulgakov, and so on. It's strange that the Ukrainian publisher "Folio" periodically prints his nonsense, which has nothing to do with actual history. Georgiy Kasianov is another "fine" fellow, living in Poland, from where it's easy to talk about the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists and very hard to notice the crimes of Polish nationalists.
www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2026/07/07/8042727/