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Ukrainian winter: how bad could it get?
It’s pretty clear that Russian President Vladimir Putin will attempt to destroy what is left of Ukraine’s power sector this winter. In fact, the campaign has already started: last year’s bombardment got under way in September; this year’s arguably already started at the end of July.
Russia is increasingly targeting energy and power assets. Not that you’d notice as Bankova, Ukraine’s presidential administration, is focusing on the residential strikes and tragic loss of life in Kyiv as entire families are being killed every day.
Of course, this is perfectly understandable as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is hoping to guilt-trip reluctant allies into giving him desperately needed interceptors and more resources. While Kyiv features prominently in the “Russia is a terrorist state” headlines, the real focus of the war is in Odesa and the Fortress Belt cities of the Donbas and the important casualties are DTEK and Naftogaz – though of course I don’t want to belittle the horrible civilian casualties’ reports.
However, I'm surprised at how little detailed reporting there is on just how much damage the power sector has taken since the war started. In 2022, Ukraine had about 59GW of installed capacity, (of which 22GW was thermal, 28GW hydro and 13.8GW was nuclear).
Going into last year’s winter campaign, Ukraine only had 14GW left with a winter demand of around 17GW. In a rare, detailed comment on the sector Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said yesterday that every single one of Ukraine’s power stations has suffered some sort of damage.
There was about a 3GW deficit in generating capacity last year, but the Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal admitted that in the first half of this year another 2GW has been taken out so the deficit is now on the order of 5GW.
And that is before the Russian winter bombardment has got going. Putin is reportedly stockpiling missiles after missile production capacity doubled last year and according to reports the full year production targets have already been hit. Mr P is not mucking about. This year’s attack is going to be devastating.
You’ll notice that the remain capacity is about the same as the nuclear power plant (NPP) generating capacity as obviously Russia can’t blow up the likes of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP) as would cause an off-the-scale environmental disaster and, more importantly, almost certainly wreck Moscow’s relationship with Beijing, which has been pretty clear on its ban on doing anything nuclear.
But that doesn’t mean nuclear power will stay on the grid. As we reported last autumn, Russia also has the option of taking out the ultra-high voltage 750kV substations – pay attention as I'm sure you will be hearing a lot more about these after the summer is over.
These are especially large substations and are in effect the backbone of the Ukrainian grid. So far, Russia has largely ignored them, as part of Putin’s use of war as a political tool to try and force Zelenskiy to capitulate, but when it took out Odesa's substation last October it plunged the entire region into darkness for a week. As they are a Soviet-legacy piece of infrastructure, they are also very hard to repair or replace as no one makes parts for them.
Now imagine if Russia uses its highly accurate, and now unstoppable, ballistic missiles to target the substations. Even if only half of them were destroyed, bringing Ukraine’s available generation capacity down to 6GW that would blow out the power deficit to over 10GW – an impossible gap to close. And Shmyhal said last week, Bankova is afraid that Russia will also target water and sewage infrastructure. You can live in an apartment with -10°C indoor temperatures – many Kyivian residents did it last year by putting up tents in their living rooms – but how long can you live without running water or working toilets?
Once you start digging into the details you can see why Zelenskiy is starting to look so desperate. There is very little he can do to stop it. US President Donald Trump has flip flopped on the Patriot licensing rights, which is reportedly being blocked by the leading US arms makers who are afraid of losing their profits to Ukraine (!).
There are also several hundred interceptors in Europe (remember Zelenskiy also asked Trump for 300 to get through the winter), but as we reported, and Politicoconfirmed last week, those European governments are refusing to give them up – Spain and Greece in particular which have the most.
Greece is not turning out to be a good friend of Ukraine’s, is it? Athens also blocked the 21stsanctions package until it got an exemption from the oil price cap sanctions and Greek tankers just exported a record amount of oil from Russia, helping to fill the Kremlin’s war coffers… And they said Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was a good friend of Russia’s.
Trump was also badgered into promising to send Ukraine interceptor missiles “every month”. But no one has put a number on that. I strongly suspect the Pentagon is only intending to send new ones as they roll off the conveyor belt – about five a month – so at least keep its depleted stockpile stable. Given Russia is capable of firing five ballistic missiles a day that is not going to make any difference at all. Russia fired an estimated 900 missiles (not counting drones) at Ukraine last year, according to Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). This year that number could easily double.
Another detail that is not getting enough attention is just how much damage Ukraine’s long distance “sanctions” (as Zelenskiy refers to drone strikes now) actually do to Russia’s refineries. But this is more excusable, as obviously neither the Kremlin nor the companies are keen to share this information. But what is becoming clear is that as the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) switches targets from oil refineries to warehouses, many of Russia’s circa 35 refineries that have been hit – and all of them have now been hit – are affecting repairs and at least partially coming back online. The fuel crisis has clearly passed peak and petrol stations are starting to open again. That is also partly thanks to supplies coming from Belarus, Kazakhstan and especially India.
India is another one that has turned out to be especially chummy with the Kremlin, but you can understand that too. As an ex-colony, it has not been particularly well treated by the Trump administration and has a growing resentment for the Western neo-colonial treatment it still gets whenever it goes to the West for help, like in last year’s short war with Pakistan.
Meduza had an interesting go at assessing the damage to Russian refineries by referring to infrared satellite maps in an article today, which concluded what was already assumed: Ukrainian drones are not powerful enough to destroy refineries, but can do serious damage to some of their more sensitive equipment that puts them out of action for months. But the bottom line is, Ukraine doesn’t have the destructive firepower to collapse the Russian economy or force Putin into negotiations in a position of weakness.
So, what does Ukraine with only 6GW in the depths of winter look like? It’s hard to say definitely, especially given the Ukrainian population managed to tough out last year’s attempt to freeze it into submission, but we are probably talking about an electricity emergency approaching a humanitarian crisis, particularly in the large cities.
Ukrainian winter peak electricity demand has been around 16.5–18GW, and the IEA says a cold winter can push demand to 18GW or more. So, 6GW of available/operational generation capacity would cover only roughly one-third of unconstrained peak demand. Even adding the present 2.1GW winter import capability from the EU would leave Ukraine with perhaps 8.1GW against demand of 18GW – about half of what is needed.
The state would be forced to ration electricity heavily and protect critical loads: hospitals, water and sewage pumping (if they are not destroyed too), telecommunications, military facilities, railways, district-heating systems and other essential infrastructure. Households and ordinary businesses would absorb a disproportionate share of extensive rolling blackouts that could extend to 12-18 hours a day for residential.
And that assumes the substations survive. If they are knocked out then the blackouts will be complete and could last for days or even weeks.
Electricity itself isn't necessarily the greatest danger. The lack of heat and water are. One of the big dangers is that if the power to a building is gone, you have to turn the water off, even if Russia doesn’t target the pumping stations, otherwise the water will freeze and burst their pipes – serious damage that can’t be repaired until spring, when the whole system has to be rebuilt.
Where is the cut off? Last year residents could cope with 6–10-hour daily blackouts. With 12–18-hour blackouts you get serious economic and social disruption, but there are some work arounds like generators. However, with only 2–6 hours of electricity per day the cities will begin to be unliveable as apartments become too cold to inhabit and things like water have to be shut off completely and drained from the buildings. Those who can, will leave the city for the dacha or leave the country. Iuliia Mendel, Zelenskiy’s former press secretary, has already reported on traffic jams at the borders as some people are already leaving in anticipation of what might come.
I'm not saying this will happen. Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and the ability to function through last year’s blackouts. But this is a very real scenario that is lurking behind Zelenskiy's frenetic diplomatic outreach at the moment. Ukraine is not ready to repel a large Russian missile bombardment and its partners are either unwilling, but mostly, unable to do much to help it at this point.
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