Les contreforts montagneux du Kurdistan d'Irak, le long de la route Soulaymanieh Erbil, non loin de la frontière iranienne.
Georges Malbrunot
Georges Malbrunot, né le 2 avril 1962 à Montaiguët-en-Forez (Allier), est un journaliste français. More on Wikipedia
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
After elections in October 2024, the KDP again emerged as the largest party with 39 seats, as compared to 23 for the PUK. The KDP went on to argue that the allotment of cabinet roles and other government positions should reflect the parties’ respective seat shares, while the PUK maintained that they should be divided on a 50-50 basis, as stipulated in the 2006 agreement. As a result of this disagreement, the Kurdistan Region has been without a functioning parliament since late 2024.
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
The KDP and the PUK reached an agreement in 2006 whereby the KDP would control the presidency in Kurdistan and the PUK would control the Iraqi presidency in Baghdad. But this strategic agreement came under pressure after the PUK started to lose parliamentary seats to smaller opposition parties in 2009.
This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Irak: Le premier ministre Ali al-Zaidi lance un défi à la plus puissante milice chiite pro-Iran (Kataeb Hezbollah-KH) auquel il donne jusqu'à vendredi soir pour quitter son bastion de Jurf al-Sakr au sud de Bagdad. Aucun de ses prédécesseurs n'avait osé. C'est un test de sa capacité à restaurer l'autorité de l'Etat dans cette région, que je connais bien pour y avoir été détenu, qui était jusqu'alors inaccessible aux forces de sécurité irakiennes. C'est de là que KH lance des attaques contre l'Arabie parfois. La milice pro-iranienne refuse de se retirer. L'Iran a dépêché Esmaïl al-Qaani le patron de la force al-Qods pour négocier. L'armée irakienne se rapproche de Jurf al-Sakr. Les jours à venir pourraient être décisifs.
#irakkataebhezbollah -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani have reached an agreement for Kataib Hezbollah to withdraw “soon” from its stronghold in Jurf al-Sakhar, sources within Iraq’s ruling Coordination Framework told MBN on Tuesday. - Al Hurra
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 مقال مهم لتوماس فريدمان في صحيفة «نيويورك تايمز»، يستند إلى لقاءات أجراها مع مسؤولين ودبلوماسيين ومحللين خلال مؤتمر استضافته الإمارات، ويكشف حجم القلق الخليجي من نتائج الحرب على إيران، واحتمال انتهائها بتعزيز نفوذ طهران بدلاً من إضعافها، وسط استمرار الهجمات الدقيقة على ناقلات النفط في المياه القريبة من الإمارات.
أنصح بقراءة المقال، خصوصاً أنه ينقل أجواء القلق السائدة في المنطقة من حرب بدأت بقرار أمريكي–إسرائيلي، بينما تخشى دول الخليج أن تتحمل تبعاتها الأمنية والاقتصادية لسنوات.
وهذا أبرز ما ورد فيه:
🔷 نقل فريدمان معلومات عن مسؤول نفطي إماراتي رفيع بشأن هجمات إيرانية شبه يومية تستهدف ناقلات نفط مملوكة للإمارات داخل مياهها بمحاذاة الساحل الإماراتي داخل الخليج، وليس فقط أثناء عبورها مضيق هرمز. وأوضح أن الهجمات تُنفذ بدقة باستخدام صواريخ كروز وطائرات مسيّرة تصيب غرف المحركات وتعطل الناقلات، ما يضطر الإمارات إلى إرسال قاطرات لسحب السفن المتضررة إلى الموانئ.
🔷 نقل فريدمان عن المشاركين في المؤتمر شعوراً غير مسبوق بالقلق من نتائج الحرب الأمريكية الإسرائيلية على إيران. فدول الخليج، لم تطلب من واشنطن بدء الحرب، لكنها افترضت أن الأمريكيين يمتلكون خطة لإنهائها. أما الآن، فتخشى أن تنتهي المواجهة دون إسقاط النظام الإيراني أو تجريده من قدراته، بما يسمح لطهران بتقديم صمودها أمام الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل بوصفه انتصاراً استراتيجياً. ونقل عن دبلوماسي أوروبي أن مشكلة التحالف مع الولايات المتحدة تكمن في عدم القدرة على توقع اللحظة التي ستقوض فيها واشنطن موقفها بقراراتها الخاصة.
🔷 كشف المقال عن كثرة التساؤلات التي واجهها فريدمان من مسؤولين ودبلوماسيين بشأن الجهة التي تدير السياسة الأمريكية تجاه إيران، ومدى وضوح أهدافها، وتأثير سيطرة الديمقراطيين على الكونغرس في استمرار الحرب. ويرى أن الغموض الأمريكي يدفع دول الخليج إلى إعادة تقييم اعتمادها الأمني على واشنطن، خصوصاً بعد أن أثبتت إيران قدرتها على تعطيل الملاحة في هرمز ورفع تكلفة المواجهة على جيرانها.
🔷 قدم أكاديميون إيرانيون تفسيراً لاستمرار صمود النظام رغم الضغوط. ووفق ما نقل فريدمان، فإن اغتيال علي خامنئي أزال شخصية كانت تمتلك سلطة واسعة، وقدرة على الموازنة بين التيارات المختلفة، وربما اتخاذ قرار بالتراجع وإلزام المؤسسات به. أما القيادة الجديدة، التي تضم نجله ومراكز قوة متعددة، فتتسم بحسب هؤلاء الأكاديميين بالتنافس والشكوك المتبادلة، ما يجعل أي مسؤول يبدي استعداداً لتقديم تنازلات عرضة لاتهامات بالخيانة.
🔷 وصف أكاديمي إيراني الوضع الداخلي بأنه «بائس لكنه قابل للتحمل»، في إشارة إلى قدرة المجتمع والنظام على التكيف مع الضغوط. وذكر أن السلطات خففت عملياً من فرض بعض القيود الاجتماعية، في محاولة لتجنب إضافة توترات داخلية إلى الأعباء الاقتصادية. ونقل فريدمان عن دبلوماسي عراقي يزور طهران أن النزعة القومية تدفع إيرانيين أكثر مما يُعتقد إلى الالتفاف حول النظام أثناء تعرض البلاد للهجوم.
🔷 اعتبر فريدمان أن المشكلة الاستراتيجية التي تواجه واشنطن تتمثل في أن إيران أثبتت إمكانية استخدام مضيق هرمز سلاحاً اقتصادياً بصورة عملية. فقبل الحرب، كانت طهران تتجنب إغلاق المضيق خشية استدعاء رد عسكري واسع. لكن بعدما استخدمت هذا الخيار، أصبح أداة ردع تستطيع التلويح بها دوما. وقارن ذلك باستجابة الصين للرسوم الجمركية الأمريكية من خلال فرض قيود على تصدير المعادن الأرضية النادرة، التي يعتمد عليها قطاع واسع من الصناعات الأمريكية.
🔷 الخطأ المشترك في التعامل الأمريكي مع الصين وإيران كان تجاهل قدرة الطرف المقابل على الرد بأدوات غير متماثلة. واستحضر المقولة الاستراتيجية الأمريكية الشهيرة: «للعدو صوت في تحديد مسار الأحداث» (The enemy gets a vote).
🔷 تحدث فريدمان عن تفكك منظومة التحالفات التقليدية في الشرق الأوسط، مع تراجع تماسك مجلس التعاون الخليجي وظهور اصطفافات أمنية جديدة. وطرح تصوراً لتقارب يجمع إسرائيل والإمارات واليونان وقبرص والهند، مقابل اتفاق مكة الدفاعي الذي يجمع السعودية وتركيا وباكستان، بينما تسعى قطر وعُمان، وفق تقييمه، إلى بناء تفاهمات منفصلة مع إيران.
🔷 أكد فريدمان أن زيارة وزير الدفاع السعودي خالد بن سلمان إلى طهران في أكتوبر أثارت استياء مسؤولين إماراتيين.
في الخلاصة؛ يرى فريدمان أن الولايات المتحدة تواجه مأزقاً استراتيجياً صنعته الحرب نفسها، فهي تستطيع مواصلة الضغط العسكري والاقتصادي، لكنها لم تنجح في حرمان إيران من قدرتها على تهديد الملاحة والطاقة. ويخشى المشاركون الذين تحدث إليهم أن تنتهي المواجهة بترسيخ هذه القدرة الإيرانية، بينما تتحمل دول الخليج تكاليف التعايش معها لسنوات. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rudaw English
@RudawEnglish
#latest: Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court rejected a request to suspend decisions adopted during the Kurdistan Parliament’s November 4 session, citing a lack of urgency. It also dismissed a separate lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the parliament’s sixth term, ruling that the matter fell outside its jurisdiction.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Anahita shokrollahi
@Anahitashokrol4
با نزدیک شدن به پایان ضربالاجل خروج کتائب حزبالله از جرفالصخر، فرمانده این گروه هشدار داد: اگر جنگ به ما تحمیل شود، خواهیم جنگید.
همزمان، خبرگزاری آسوشیتدپرس فاش کرد که اسماعیل قاآنی، فرمانده نیروی قدس سپاه پاسداران ایران، وارد بحران جرفالصخر شده است؛ آن هم در چارچوب تلاشهایی برای جلوگیری از درگیری میان کتائب حزبالله و دولت عراق.
آخرین تحولات جرفالصخر چیست؟
📌 خبرگزاری آسوشیتدپرس در جریان بازدید خبرنگاران از منطقه #جرفالصخر، به نقل از یکی از مسئولان کتائب حزبالله گزارش داد که دو پالایشگاه #نفت در این منطقه وجود دارد.
با این حال، این مقام تأکید کرد که سوخت تولیدشده در این پالایشگاهها صرفاً برای تأمین سوخت خودروها و ژنراتورهای برق این گروه استفاده میشود و هرگونه قاچاق نفت را رد کرد.
این مسئول که خبرگزاری نامش را فاش نکرده، هشدار داد که اگر جنگ به کتائب حزبالله تحمیل شود، این گروه وارد نبرد خواهد شد.
نقش اسماعیل #قاآنی در این بحران چیست؟
📌 دو مقام وابسته به گروههای شبهنظامی به آسوشیتدپرس گفتهاند که اسماعیل قاآنی، فرمانده نیروی قدس سپاه پاسداران، روز دوشنبه وارد بغداد شده است تا در میانجیگریها برای کاهش تنش مشارکت کند.
این منابع جزئیات بیشتری درباره مأموریت قاآنی ارائه نکردهاند.
تحقیقات درباره قاچاق نفت به کجا رسیده است؟
📌 به گزارش آسوشیتدپرس، یک کمیته قضایی به همراه کمیتهای دولتی، امروز از منطقه جرفالصخر بازدید کردهاند تا درباره قاچاق احتمالی نفت تحقیق کرده و محل وقوع تخلفات را شناسایی کنند.
این خبرگزاری به نقل از علی النهیر، عضو کمیته تحقیق پارلمانی، گزارش داد که بازرسیها که شامل استفاده از تصویربرداری حرارتی نیز بوده، به شناسایی ۲۵ تانکر حامل سوخت منجر شده است.
هر تانکر ظرفیت حمل ۳۶ هزار لیتر را داشته است؛ یعنی مجموعاً ۹۰۰ هزار لیتر ظرفیت حمل سوخت.
ضربالاجل خروج کتائب حزبالله چه زمانی پایان مییابد؟
📌 دولت عراق تأیید کرده است که برای خروج کتائب حزبالله از منطقه جرفالصخر ضربالاجل تعیین کرده است.
رسانههای عراقی نیز به نقل از منابع خود گزارش دادهاند که این ضربالاجل شامگاه جمعه، ۲۰ نوامبر ۲۰۲۶ (۲۹ آبان ۱۴۰۵) به پایان میرسد.
نخستوزیر عراق، الزیدی، دستور ورود نیروهای امنیتی به منطقه جرفالصخر را صادر کرده است؛ در حالی که #کتائب حزبالله همچنان اتهامات مربوط به قاچاق نفت را رد میکند.
در این میان، تلاشهای میانجیگرانه برای جلوگیری از رویارویی نظامی میان دو طرف ادامه دارد. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
איראן הפכה בשנים האחרונות לאחד האיומים המשמעותיים על ביטחון הפנים של בריטניה. לצד ניסיונות לפגוע במתנגדי משטר, בעיתונאים וביעדים יהודיים וישראליים, טהראן פועלת להרחבת השפעתה באמצעות רשת של גופי תקשורת, מוסדות דת, ארגונים ופעילים מקומיים. חלק מהפעילות מתקיים בגלוי ובמסגרת החוק, בעוד שבמקרים אחרים נחשפו קשרים לגורמי מודיעין, לארגונים המזוהים עם איראן ואף להפעלת עבריינים לצורך ביצוע פעולות אלימות. שורת תחקירים ואירועים שנחשפו לאחרונה ממחישה את עומק האתגר הניצב בפני הרשויות הבריטיות: כיצד להתמודד עם תשתיות השפעה איראניות הפועלות בתוך הממלכה, לזהות את המעבר מפעילות אזרחית לגיטימית לפעילות עוינת ולמנוע מטהראן לנצל את פתיחותה של החברה הבריטית לקידום מטרותיה. המאמר ממליץ לבריטניה להעמיק את המעקב והפיקוח על רשתות ההשפעה האיראניות, לחזק את שיתוף הפעולה המודיעיני והבינלאומי, לשפר את האכיפה נגד פעילות סמויה וגורמי פשיעה הפועלים בשליחות טהראן ולהבטיח שהמאבק באיום האיראני לא יפגע בחופש הביטוי, הדת והפעילות האזרחית הלגיטימית
מאמר שלי @INSS_Hebrew
www.inss.org.il/he/publication/iran-uk-threat/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Najafi
@Mostafa_Najafii
پس از مدتها، دامنه حملات ایران فراتر از تنگه هرمز رفته و در ۲۴ ساعت اخیر سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی به مواضع نظامی آمریکا در بحرین و کویت حمله کرده است. به نظر میرسد، گسترش دامنه حملات ایران در پاسخ به تهدیدات ادراک شده، بخشی از راهبرد دفاعی جدید ایران براساس ابلاغ فرماندهی کل قوا به فرماندهان نظامی است.
تشدید حملات ایران به مواضع امریکا در منطقه و افزایش حملات آمریکا به جنوب کشور، بدان معناست که فاصله میان تهدیدات ادراکشده، تصمیمگیری و اقدام عملیاتی به شدت در حال کاهش است. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rudaw English
@RudawEnglish
The ruling Shiite-led Coordination Framework has conditioned its support for the administrative breakaway of Sulaimani and Halabja provinces from the Kurdistan Region to a popular vote rather than partisan demands, an official from the Shiite powerhouse told Rudaw on Tuesday, a day after after the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) met with officials in Baghdad amid disputes with its rival, the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).
www.rudaw.net/english/categories/kurdistan/1080195 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Things are escalating rapidly between #iran and the United States.
🔹Over the past 24 hours, the Iranian armed forces have reported incidents involving four oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in explosions and fires. According to the Iranian account, the vessels struck sea mines. However, it remains unclear whether mines were actually involved or whether the incidents resulted from direct Iranian attacks using drones or cruise missiles.
🔹Meanwhile, there were reports of U.S. strikes on Qeshm Island in the late afternoon. Iranian state media and official outlets have sought to downplay the significance of the strikes, claiming that only military targets were hit. However, unofficial and local sources have reported massive explosions and several casualties.
🔹The timing of the strikes is itself noteworthy. Unlike previous U.S. attacks on Iranian coastal areas and islands, which largely took place at night, these strikes were carried out in broad daylight. This could signal a change in the pattern of U.S. military operations against Iran.
🔹The risk of the confrontation spreading further across the region is also growing. Earlier in the day, the IRGC claimed to have struck U.S. radar installations in Bahrain. Subsequently, the IRGC spokesperson issued a warning to Bahrain over its security partnership with Washington and its treatment of Shia clerics.
🔹The Iranian leadership appears particularly concerned about recent reports of lengthy prison sentences handed down to several senior Shia clerics in Bahrain. Against this backdrop, Bahrain could become one of the first countries to be drawn more directly into the renewed escalation between Tehran and Washington.
🔹There were also reports of drone strikes against positions belonging to Iranian Kurdish insurgent groups in Iraq's Sulaymaniyah province. These followed earlier reports in Iranian media of clashes between Iranian security forces and PJAK militants along the Iran-Iraq border.
🔹In the past hour, there have also been reports of drone strikes in Kuwait, which could be in retaliation for the U.S. strikes on Qeshm Island. But regardless of the immediate motivation, these incidents further highlight the growing risk of the confrontation spreading across the region, potentially drawing more countries into the conflict once again.
🔹All of this is unfolding against the backdrop of stalled diplomacy, with efforts by regional mediators so far failing to bring Tehran and Washington closer to an agreement.
🔹Today's developments should serve as an important reminder of the inherent instability of the current situation. Some within the Trump administration – and perhaps even Trump himself – may believe that Washington can maintain economic pressure and the naval blockade against Iran indefinitely while avoiding another full-scale war. But the developments of the past 24 hours demonstrate how difficult it is to sustain such an arrangement.
🔹Even if neither side intends to enter a broader confrontation, the accumulation of military incidents across multiple fronts increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation beyond what either side originally intended.
🔹Beyond the risk of unintended escalation, the longer the blockade and economic pressure campaign continue, the greater the incentive for Tehran to deliberately escalate in an attempt to break the deadlock by force. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
On n'oublie pas l'ancien président de la République chez les Kurdes d'Irak. Surtout aussi son épouse Danielle Mitterrand. Vue depuis Erbil.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
MUNQITH DAGHER
@MUNQITHDAGHER
Following Qaani’s visit, a political agreement reached during al-Sudani’s government has been activated. The KH will leave al-Jurf on Friday, to be replaced by Popular Mobilization Forces, paving the way for the area to be fully opened at a later stage.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammed A. Salih
@MohammedASalih
My two cents on the current tensions between the KDP and PUK in Kurdistan.
Many tend to view these tensions as part of a perennial rivalry rooted in a much older history. But this obscures our understanding of the current situation.
I believe the starting point for understanding the present tensions should be much more recent— the past decade or so.
This is not an in-depth piece, and I hope to find the time to write something more detailed. But it should offer a reasonable assessment of who bears responsibility for the current impasse and how things can be fixed moving forward.
The New Region
@thenewregion
As the Kurdistan Region faces a major political rift that could threaten its status as an autonomous entity, @MohammedASalih delves into the causes of the divide and discusses possible outcomes for Kurdistan's political future
thenewregion.com/posts/7137 -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Rencontre à Erbil en Irak avec Mahmoud Othman, homme politique kurde, membre du Conseil de gouvernement Intérimaire, après la chute de Saddam Hussein en 2003 que je croisais alors à Bagdad. Il vient d'écrire ses mémoires. En 1963, Mahmoud Othman était venu apporter au Gal de Gaulle un message des Kurdes. Pour cela, ce médecin de formation avait appris le français dans la montagne.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Yémen: les Houthis avancent vers Aden. Les combattants pro-saoudiens subissent un nouveau revers. La mise à l'écart du chef saoudien de la coalition peut-elle changer la donne? Mon analyse dans Le Figaro.
#yémenwar
www.lefigaro.fr/international/tout-proches-d-aden-les-hou… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani adopted an openly combative tone today, showing no indication that he intends to back down in the ongoing dispute with the PUK.
He portrayed the PUK as a minority seeking to impose its will on the majority, arguing that the KDP represents the majority and that, in a democracy, the majority should determine the outcome. He also dismissed the PUK’s position as the rhetoric of “losers”.
Barzani went further, claiming credit for the KRG’s major projects and accusing the PUK of repeatedly attempting to obstruct them. He argued that, despite these obstacles, he had managed to push the projects forward with the support of the people of Kurdistan.
His remarks suggest that he views the dispute from a fundamentally different perspective and remains in a confrontational rather than conciliatory mood. This became even clearer when, asked about negotiations, he insisted that any agreement must reflect each party’s individual political weight. In effect, he rejected treating the PUK and New Generation as a single parliamentary bloc and showed no willingness to accommodate their demands for real power-sharing.
With Barzani showing little appetite for compromise and the PUK apparently having lost confidence in the prospects of a negotiated settlement, the Kurdistan Region appears increasingly headed towards the further consolidation of two separate administrations - as we have explained below. The PUK has already begun taking concrete steps to establish its administrative operations in Sulaimani.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
What is now emerging in the Kurdistan Region? Two administrations within one nominally unified federal region.
Despite media campaigns suggesting otherwise, the administrative split between the KDP and PUK zones is now complete, and KDP-PUK negotiations have reached a deadlock.
As of today, the PUK’s team in the KRG, down to general managers, has begun working from Suleimani. Ministers and deputy ministers are based in the building that formerly housed the Suleimani provincial council, general managers are in a nearby building, and Qubad Talabani, the KRG deputy prime minister, also has an office in the area. Lower-ranking PUK employees will continue working from their current posts, including in Erbil.
Meanwhile, PUK leader Bafel Talabani has reportedly reached a tentative understanding with Baghdad for direct payment of civil servants’ salaries in the PUK-controlled zone, along with separate investment allocations. The PUK appears to be relying partly on a February 2024 Federal Supreme Court ruling that explicitly permits government institutions and their directorates in the Kurdistan Region to deal directly with Iraq’s Finance Ministry over salary payments. The ruling also recognises the Region’s governorates’ investment entitlements under federal budget law, though whether these allocations can legally be transferred directly to Suleimani, bypassing Erbil, would depend on the applicable budgetary framework.
Since the KDP-initiated parliament session on 4 November, the KDP appears to have backed away from further parliamentary moves. The other main parties have refused to attend under current conditions, and the PUK has vowed to escalate in response to any further unilateral KDP action.
For now, parliament may be left dormant while the KDP uses the session as leverage. The PUK, meanwhile, is collecting signatures from 10 percent of Suleimani’s voters as a backup plan for forming a separate federal region. It does not yet appear serious about pursuing this, and wants the option available if relations with the KDP reach a point of no return.
On the ground, however, two completely separate administrations are taking shape. In the near future, the PUK plans to change electricity tariffs and taxes, introduce other populist measures and launch a slew of projects to show that a separate administration is already delivering tangible benefits. One of the PUK’s central arguments is now that KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani deliberately withheld projects from the PUK zone.
The financial separation is also advancing. The PUK has severed financial ties with Erbil, while the Sulaimani branch of the Kurdistan Region's central bank and several major public banks are reportedly already functioning as the financial apparatus of the emerging PUK administration.
So what we will have is no active parliament, and with the newly consolidated administrations, elections, which are due in less than two years, also look highly unlikely, given that the differences are now so deep that the parties are unlikely to agree on even how the elections should be held and under what laws and regulations.This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sinan S. Mahmoud
@sinansm
Iraq's ruling alliance split over Jurf Al Sakhar standoff as militia withdrawal deadline looms www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/11/17/iraqs-ruling…
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Les journalistes de l'association de la presse présidentielle (APP) ont tout à fait raison de demander le "respect" de leur métier au prochain locataire de l'Elysée, après dix ans d'une relation "complexe" avec Emmanuel Macron. Mais alors que celui-ci m'avait attaqué de manière intolérable au Liban en 2020 lors d'un voyage officiel, l'APP s'était alors abstenue de réagir. Ce qui, à postériori, m'avait quand même surpris, alors qu'aucun président de la République ne s'était comporté ainsi sous la Vème République.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammed A. Salih
@MohammedASalih
Happy to share this piece I wrote for @NewlinesInst on Iraq’s new oil pipeline projects and why Baghdad should involve the KRG in their development.
Special thanks to @DaniaArayssi for helping bring this piece to publication.
“At a time of growing regional efforts to enhance connectivity through new trade routes and energy infrastructure, Iraq’s planned pipeline network should be viewed as more than an infrastructure project. It also offers an opportunity for a new political-economic bargain between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The federal government should incorporate the Kurdish oil industry into the corridor’s economic logic. Expanding Kurdish production within an agreed national framework could strengthen the strategic significance of the Fishkhabour-Ceyhan route while fostering deeper political cooperation and economic integration between Baghdad and Erbil.”
newlinesinstitute.org/intl-law-peace/beyond-and-through-p… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
At last night’s meeting of the Shia-led Coordination Framework, PUK's Bafel Talabani, Iraq’s PUK-affiliated president, and New Generation's Shaswar Abdulwahid were hosted as guests. However, photographs suggest they attended broader discussions rather than the Framework’s closed-door meeting itself.
Despite the Shia parties’ own internal challenges, the KDP–PUK split is giving Baghdad considerable room to further weaken the KRG. Talabani appears to be negotiating from a position of weakness, although Baghdad is likely to support his push to secure a separate budget for the PUK-controlled zone. KRG PM Masrour Barzani appeared equally weak during his visit to Baghdad last week.
The irony is that Iraq’s already turbulent political environment, exacerbated by the war with Iran, could have strengthened the KRG’s bargaining position. Instead, the deepening Kurdish divisions have left the region politically fragmented, weakened both parties’ leverage, and handed Baghdad opportunities it might otherwise have struggled to secure.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
What are the KDP’s arguments for its recent moves?
1. On the reactivation of Parliament:
The KDP privately doesn't deny that it worked its “magic” to bring MPs from rival factions to the parliament session. In its view, though, the PUK started it through its alliance with New Generation.
Although the PUK's alliance is with a formal electoral faction, the KDP does not see it that way. Masrour Barzani's circles genuinely believe that Bafel Talabani coerced New Generation leader Shaswar Abdulwahid into the alliance by threatening him, imprisoning him for five months and offering incentives, including a ministerial position for his sister, who is now Iraq's environment minister, and the revival of Shaswar's projects in Sulaimani.
Both Shaswar and Bafel have denied these allegations, but the KDP leadership appears convinced of them. Its argument is that the PUK has effectively taken Parliament hostage.
The immediate trigger for the KDP’s decision to reactivate parliament was something else though: a complaint filed with the Federal Supreme Court that disputes Masrour’s authority and could undo some of the signature projects he launched during the caretaker period.
2. On power-sharing:
The KDP rejects the PUK-New Generation demand for either the presidency or the premiership of the region. It argues that both posts belong to the KDP by right. The premiership goes to the largest faction, which is the KDP. The presidency follows a political norm under which Iraq’s presidency goes to the PUK and Kurdistan president in return goes to KDP.
In the KDP’s view, the PUK broke that norm when it moved unilaterally to appoint its own candidate for the Iraqi presidency. Once again, the argument is that the PUK started it.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
The PUK’s recent moves serve two immediate objectives vs the KDP:
1. Force Masoud Barzani to choose between his son Masrour and the unity of the Kurdistan Region.
Any serious insider now understands that the dispute is increasingly about Masrour Barzani rather than the KDP as a whole. For instance, if Masoud Barzani agreed tomorrow to Nechirvan Barzani's return as prime minister, many (though not all) of the problems would likely disappear because much of the dispute has become personal.
Bafel Talabani's speech immediately after the November 4 parliamentary session was particularly significant. By warning Masoud Barzani that every unilateral move would be met with a corresponding response, he placed him in an exceptionally difficult position.
Masoud’s entire legacy is at stake, but he cannot easily back down. Meeting the PUK’s demands would upset the balance within the Barzani family, a tension that has been building as he has aged. Since the era of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the KDP’s founder, the family has kept an understanding that power must be balanced between the house of Idris, Nechirvan’s father, and the house of Masoud. As a father, however, Masoud wants to make sure Masrour holds a more consolidated position and the upper hand. Masoud now acts more as a father than as anything else, and that risks undoing much of the legacy he wants to be remembered for.
Unfortunately for Masoud, Masrour lacks both social skills and the ability to work as part of a team, and both matter a great deal. The KRG is not institutionalised, so its arrangements have always depended on individuals being able to work together. That makes social skills essential. Teamwork matters just as much because the KRG is not simply a conventional coalition government. It is effectively an alliance between two largely separate political and administrative entities: the KDP- and PUK-controlled zones. Governing such an arrangement requires considerable interpersonal skills, flexibility and an ability to work with political partners rather than treat them as subordinates.
2. Establish a firm red line against the defection of PUK MPs.
The PUK's second objective is to ensure that the three MPs who defected and participated in the November 4 parliamentary session are removed from their seats hence pay a price.
The KDP has a history of buying off or poaching MPs from rival factions, but the PUK had largely remained insulated from this practice. If the PUK accepts what happened, it risks establishing a dangerous precedent.
Otherwise elections will become increasingly meaningless, though they have already largely become so. For the PUK this is a matter of survival: if the tactic works once, it will become the norm.
The argument that these MPs simply exercised their independence and made their own principled political decisions does not stand up. Most MPs across the board are of low calibre and easily bought, and the idea that these three - or the five others from New Generation or Halwest - chose this course on their own is laughable.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
The PUK’s four-track response to the KDP’s parliament push
PUK's Bafel Talabani is in Baghdad as the power struggle with the KDP deepens. Recent moves suggest the PUK is answering the KDP’s unilateral bid to reactivate the Kurdistan Parliament on several fronts at once.
1. The PUK has filed a complaint with Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court, seeking an urgent injunction to halt the parliamentary session pending review and then a ruling that the session is procedurally illegal. Sources familiar with the details and the political negotiations behind them say there is a high probability, though no certainty, that the court will issue an injunction soon and later rule against the session. Some elements within the KDP may also welcome that outcome as a way out. Without it, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani may press ahead with cabinet formation, which would lead to a formal split of the region.
2. The second front is Baghdad itself, which explains the timing of Talabani’s visit. The PUK is working to secure its zone’s budget, particularly civil servant salaries, directly from the federal government. That looks achievable given the Federal Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling allowing directorates in the region to deal directly with the federal Ministry of Finance on salaries.
3. At the same time, the PUK plans to reverse some of Masrour Barzani’s signature policies with more popular measures, such as cutting electricity tariffs and other taxes and service charges, which could help it recover some lost popularity.
4 It has also already separated its finances from Erbil and is running its own projects. Private-sector investment in Suleimani, much of it PUK-backed, has grown notably in recent months. The emerging model appears to be public-sector salaries guaranteed by Baghdad, with the PUK’s own revenue funding development through the private sector.
If the court challenge cancels the session, a formal split may not go ahead. The deadlock over power sharing would remain, however, and the PUK would continue running a separate administration without going as far as forming a separate region.
If the court route fails, a fallback is already in motion. A signature campaign calling for a separate region has begun, and under Iraqi law, signatures from 10% of voters in Suleimani governorate can trigger the procedure for forming a new region. However, because Kurdistan is already a region, the legal process is complex and unclear, and parts of it are not addressed in the constitution at all. Ironically, that ambiguity could give the Federal Court leeway to make it possible through reinterpretation. PUK media covered the campaign extensively today while attributing it to civil society organisations. It is likely the PUK’s plan B, held in reserve in case the other tracks fail.
Talabani has already said in a speech that the PUK will reciprocate any further KDP move. That leaves the KDP in a difficult position. Another parliamentary session, or the formation of a cabinet, would now automatically trigger the PUK’s separation threat. In effect, the PUK has tied separation to the KDP’s next step, which narrows the KDP’s options considerably.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
The PUK and New Generation have filed two separate lawsuits at Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court contesting the legality of the 4 November session the KDP used to reconvene the Kurdistan Parliament.
The session was attended by 52 of the 100 MPs, and all the 52 MPs elected the parliament’s presidium. The suits, brought by Asos Ali, a PUK MP in the Iraqi parliament, and by Kurdistan New Generation MP Mohammad Sulaiman, name the speaker and the head of the parliament’s secretariat as defendants. Both seek an interim order suspending all decisions taken at the session until the court rules on its validity.
The suits make several procedural arguments:
1. The plaintiffs say the session was never lawfully summoned, since neither Sulaiman, who presided over the parliament as its eldest member, nor the head of the parliament’s secretariat, Ardalan Mohammad Sarsapi, a PUK member, issued the call. It was therefore not chaired by the eldest member as required.
2. They argue that the session breached the Kurdistan Parliament law and Article 3 of its bylaws, which govern how a session is resumed, and that it was held without consultation with the other blocs and the minority components.
3. They also argue that the bylaws require the signatures of 51 MPs, an absolute majority of the chamber, to convene a session, and that only 43 signed.
4. Another argument is that the inaugural session cannot lawfully be held open indefinitely. They cite Federal Court ruling No. 55 of 2010, which found Iraq’s open-ended parliamentary session that year unconstitutional when it was chaired by its eldest member, Fuad Masum. This matters because the 4 November session was presented as a continuation of the inaugural session of December 2024, which had been left open because the first session is required to elect the presidium.
5. Finally, they argue that candidacy for the presidium had already been opened in the inaugural session in December 2024 and could not be reopened. On 4 November it was reopened anyway and the slate of candidates changed.
If the court grants an interim order or annuls the session, the KDP’s effort to restart the legislature would stall, and the PUK would return to talks on the next cabinet from a stronger position. The KDP is likely to argue that the court lacks jurisdiction, the grounds it has repeatedly cited when declining to intervene in the parliament’s affairs, including New Generation’s dissolution suit in July 2025 and Halwest’s in October.
These suits, however, challenge the procedure of a single session, an area where the Federal Court has asserted jurisdiction before. In May 2023 it annulled the law extending the parliament’s fifth term and voided every decision the parliament took after that term expired, which may give it more room to act than it had with the earlier dissolution suits.This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
Another indication of the increasingly complex relationship between the Gulf states and Iran in the aftermath of the war.
If even the UAE, arguably one of the most hawkish Gulf states toward Iran during the war, is now pursuing this kind of engagement with Tehran, it is reasonable to assume that similar dynamics are unfolding across other Gulf capitals.
The Gulf states overriding priority is stability, not further escalation. Ideally, they would like to return to the regional order that existed before February 28. Unfortunately for them, that reality is unlikely to return.
Above all, Gulf leaders increasingly recognize the need to take greater ownership of their own security and strategic future. They want to ensure that decisions affecting their security are made in Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, and other Gulf capitals, not dictated by Washington or Jerusalem.
This reflects a deeper strategic dilemma: The Gulf states find themselves caught between an Iran they do not trust and security partners whose decisions they cannot control. While they continue to rely heavily on the United States for their security, they are increasingly determined to avoid being dragged into another regional confrontation.
The bottom line is thay the Gulf states have no illusions about the nature of the Iranian regime or the threat it poses to regional stability. Engagement with Tehran should not be mistaken for trust, reconciliation, or a fundamental shift in their perception of Iran. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic recognition that, in the current regional reality, the alternatives may be even more dangerous.
For the Gulf states, engaging Iran is not necessarily a choice they want to make. It is increasingly a choice they believe they cannot afford not to make.
#iran
#iranwar
#gulf
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
👇Interesting. The latest of six senior UAE visits to Iran since June.
Comes as the UAE has become a key hub for US-backed STS transit through Hormuz, reportedly getting big profits.
Reuters has reported the UAE agreed in June to unlock $10B in Iranian funds to halt attacks.
Egypt's Intel Observer
@EGYOSINT
🇦🇪🇮🇷 Private Jet Linked to UAE Government Lands in Tehran
A VIP Boeing 737 registered as A6-RJF and part of the UAE’s royal fleet flew from Abu Dhabi to Tehran today.
The UAE royal fleet aircraft has flown between the UAE and Iran about six times since June 2026. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kurdistan Watch عربي
@KurdistanWatchA
سلطات إقليم كوردستان أوقفت عمليات تهريب النفط والتهرب من دفع الضرائب في المنافذ الحدودية عقب زيارة الوفد العراقي
كشف منسق تيار الموقف الوطني المعارض في إقليم كوردستان، علي حمة صالح، أن سلطات الإقليم أوقفت عمليات تهريب النفط والتهرب من دفع الضرائب في المنافذ الحدودية، وذلك عقب زيارة الوفد العراقي الذي شكّله رئيس الوزراء العراقي علي الزيدي للتحقيق في ملف تهريب النفط.
وأشار حمة صالح إلى أن عمليات التهريب والتهرب من دفع الضرائب في المنافذ الحدودية كانت تتم، بحسب ما كشفه خلال سنوات سابقة إبان عضويته في برلمان كوردستان، عبر آليات تنسيق بين التجار والمستثمرين والمكاتب الاقتصادية التابعة للحزبين الكورديين الرئيسيين.
وأوضح أن هذه الممارسات شملت المنافذ الحدودية لإقليم كوردستان مع كل من إيران وتركيا وسوريا، حيث كانت تمرّ بضائع وعمليات تجارية من دون دفع الضرائب المستحقة، وفقاً للمعلومات التي سبق أن أعلنها.
Kurdistan Watch عربي
@KurdistanWatchA
من زاخو إلى البصرة: بغداد تفتح ملف النفط المهرَّب وكوردستان في قلب الاتهام
استضافت لجنة الأمر النيابي في البرلمان العراقي، الأحد 15 تشرين الثاني 2026، وزير النفط باسم محمد خضير وكادره المتقدم، وكان الغرض الحصول على إيجاز تفصيلي عن تهريب النفط في جرف الصخر وإقليم كوردستان والاستهدافات التي طالت حقل كورمور الغازي في السليمانية. وجاءت الجلسة بعد يوم واحد من قرارات رئيس الوزراء علي فالح الزيدي، التي أعفى بموجبها تسعة مسؤولين أمنيين وإداريين وأحال المتورطين إلى القضاء. بذلك انتقل الملف من تسريب استخباري إلى مواجهة سياسية وأمنية مفتوحة، وصار يمسّ إقليم كوردستان مباشرة.
كوردستان في صلب التقرير
لم يقتصر التكليف النيابي على جرف الصخر، فقد طلب الحلبوسي من لجنته مراجعة معلومات استخبارية عن تهريب محتمل من حقول كركوك وإقليم كردستان عبر إيران إلى أفغانستان، إضافة إلى التحقيق في استهداف حقل كورمور، وتضم اللجنة رئيس الأمن والدفاع ورؤساء لجان النزاهة والقانونية والمالية والنفط والغاز والأقاليم والمنافذ الحدودية، أي أنها مكلفة بملف شامل وليست لجنة شكلية.
ويأتي ذلك بعد نشر تقرير استخباري حصلت عليه (سكاي نيوز عربية) يرسم مسارين لتهريب النفط من كوردستان العراق، أحدهما نحو إيران ثم أفغانستان، والآخر نحو تركيا. وتنطلق الشحنات، بحسبه، من حقول كركوك والسليمانية عبر شبكات تعمل داخل إقليم كوردستان، وتعبر منفذي باشماخ وبرويز خان إلى مصافٍ إيرانية تُكرَّر فيها أو تُخلط بمشتقات محلية لتقديمها منتجاً إيراني المنشأ، ثم تُباع في أفغانستان، في مسار يستهدف الالتفاف على العقوبات. أما المسار التركي فيمرّ عبر مناطق حدودية خارج السيطرة المركزية، حيث يُباع النفط المهرب في السوق التركية.
أربيل: نفي ومطالبة بمعيار واحد
سبقت أربيل هذه العاصفة بموقف واضح، ففي 29 تشرين الأول 2026 رفضت وزارة الثروات الطبيعية في الإقليم اتهامات النائبة السابقة آلا طالباني، ونفت وجود عمليات تهريب، مؤكدة أن وزارة النفط الاتحادية تشرف على الصادرات، وأوضحت أن 42 ممثلاً عن وزارة النفط الاتحادية يراقبون تصدير نفط الإقليم إلى تركيا. وكانت الوزارة قد وصفت اتهامات مماثلة عام 2025 بأنها محاولة مكشوفة لصرف النظر عن التهريب والفساد الواسع في أجزاء أخرى من العراق. وجاءت وقائع جرف الصخر، لتمنح هذه الحجة وزناً سياسياً لم يكن لها من قبل.
ما وراء عبارة (من زاخو إلى البصرة)؟!
حين قال الزيدي إنه لن يبقى شبر في العراق يمارَس فيه التهريب من زاخو للبصرة، كان يرسم خريطة المساءلة على امتداد العراق، من أقصى شمال الإقليم إلى منفذ الجنوب، والرسالة مزدوجة، فهي تُخبر الفصائل والأجهزة في الوسط والجنوب أن الإعفاءات لن تقف عند بابل، وتُخبر الإقليم أن بغداد لن تستثنيه من التدقيق، وقد بدأت ارتداداتها فعلاً، إذ أعلنت قيادة عمليات كركوك تشديد السيطرات ورصد الأوكار المشبوهة، وشكّلت هيئة النزاهة فريقاً للتحقيق في شبهات التهريب من الحقول الواقعة بين كركوك والإقليم.This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kurdistan Watch عربي
@KurdistanWatchA
ثلاثة سيناريوهات أمام إقليم كوردستان
إلى أين تتجه الأزمة بين الحزبين؟
يرى محمد رؤوف، رئيس تحرير موقع Draw News، أن الأزمة السياسية بين الحزب الديمقراطي الكوردستاني والاتحاد الوطني الكوردستاني وصلت إلى مرحلة معقدة، في ظل تعثر محاولات الوساطة والحوار، وفشل الجهود الرامية إلى تقريب وجهات النظر بين مسعود بارزاني وبافل طالباني.
ويشير رؤوف إلى أن الوساطات الداخلية والإقليمية، بما فيها التحركات الإيرانية الأخيرة، لم تنجح حتى الآن في احتواء الخلاف، خصوصاً مع تمسك الاتحاد الوطني بمطالبه، مقابل رفض الحزب الديمقراطي خطواته السياسية والإدارية.
ويحدد رؤوف ثلاثة سيناريوهات محتملة لمستقبل الأزمة:
أولاً: نظام الإدارتين
ويتمثل في فصل الإدارة المالية والإدارية لمحافظة السليمانية عن أربيل، مع العمل على ضمان رواتب الموظفين مباشرة من بغداد، وفصل حصة السليمانية من الموازنة، وفتح قنوات مالية وإدارية مستقلة. ويرى أن هذا السيناريو أكثر قابلية للتطبيق من إنشاء إقليم جديد، لكنه يحتاج إلى تفاهمات سياسية وقانونية ودعم من الحكومة الاتحادية.
ثانياً: إقليمان منفصلان
ويعني تحويل السليمانية إلى إقليم مستقل عن إقليم كردستان الحالي. إلا أن هذا الخيار يواجه عقبات دستورية وسياسية كبيرة، فضلاً عن عدم وجود رغبة واضحة لدى القوى السياسية العراقية في دعم إنشاء إقليم جديد، خشية أن تتكرر المطالب في محافظات أخرى مثل البصرة ونينوى.
ثالثاً: نظامان إداريان تحت مظلة إقليم واحد
وهو السيناريو الذي يراه رؤوف الأكثر قابلية للتنفيذ، ويقوم على اعتماد نظامين إداريين منفصلين في أربيل والسليمانية، مع بقائهما ضمن إقليم كوردستان موحد، على غرار تجربة الإمارات. ويتيح هذا النموذج لكل إدارة إدارة شؤونها المالية والخدمية، والتنافس في تقديم الخدمات وتوفير الرواتب والطاقة والوقود، دون الحاجة إلى إنشاء إقليم جديد أو تغيير الدستور العراقي.
ويخلص رؤوف إلى أن ما يجري حالياً لا يعني بالضرورة أن الاتحاد الوطني يتجه فعلياً نحو الانفصال الإداري أو تشكيل إقليم مستقل، بل قد يكون جزءاً من استراتيجية ضغط سياسي على الحزب الديمقراطي لانتزاع تنازلات في ملف الشراكة والحكم.
وبين تعثر الحوار وتصاعد المواجهة، تبقى الخيارات مفتوحة، فيما لا تزال ملامح نهاية الأزمة غير واضحة. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
👇Interesting. The latest of six senior UAE visits to Iran since June.
Comes as the UAE has become a key hub for US-backed STS transit through Hormuz, reportedly getting big profits.
Reuters has reported the UAE agreed in June to unlock $10B in Iranian funds to halt attacks.
Egypt's Intel Observer
@EGYOSINT
🇦🇪🇮🇷 Private Jet Linked to UAE Government Lands in Tehran
A VIP Boeing 737 registered as A6-RJF and part of the UAE’s royal fleet flew from Abu Dhabi to Tehran today.
The UAE royal fleet aircraft has flown between the UAE and Iran about six times since June 2026. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammed Al-Qadhiمحمد القاضي
@mohammedalqadhi
In this essay for @newlinesmag , I examine how the #houthis were underestimated by their enemies for the past two decades, starting from the war in #saada in 2004 and until now: these strategic mistakes, miscalculations, and absence of coherent strategies and policies — along with incompetence, inefficiency and divisions among local rivals, beside Iran supoort, also boosted and emboldened them. There was a strategic myopia among all actors — local, regional and international.
newlinesmag.com/argument/how-the-houthis-enemies-made-the… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammed Al-Qadhiمحمد القاضي
@mohammedalqadhi
My comments for @reuters on the withdrawal of the government forces from areas near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait:
Mohammed Al-Qadhi, a political and conflict analyst, said "there is a serious threat to Aden because they are getting closer and closer".
"It is a major setback. The government was aiming to recapture Sanaa, but now they are defending Aden," he said.
www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/houthis-seize-ground-ye… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kamal Chomani
@KamalChomani
For anyone interested in Kurdish politics in Iraq, this is a must-read research report @the_amargi just published, funded by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation - Beirut Office. It is especially timely given the new crisis in the Kurdistan parliament.
The Amargi
@the_amargi
What does an election mean if Parliament itself cannot exercise meaningful power?
The Amargi’s new research project, Elections Without Parliamentary Power: The Kurdistan Region’s Democratic Experience, examines more than three decades of parliamentary politics in the Kurdistan Region.
Authored by former lawmaker Goran Azad, in collaboration with the @rosaluxstiftung – Beirut Office, the study traces how party rivalry, power-sharing deals and decisions made outside Parliament have shaped the institution.
Its publication comes amid a renewed parliamentary crisis, with the legislature only recently reconvened after nearly two years of paralysis and the KDP–PUK dispute again raising questions over institutional authority.
The study asks a timely question: Can parliamentary democracy function when political power is still decided outside Parliament?
Read the full study through the link below.
theamargi.com/posts/the-amargi-study-examines-three-decad… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
The PUK’s recent moves serve two immediate objectives vs the KDP:
1. Force Masoud Barzani to choose between his son Masrour and the unity of the Kurdistan Region.
Any serious insider now understands that the dispute is increasingly about Masrour Barzani rather than the KDP as a whole. For instance, if Masoud Barzani agreed tomorrow to Nechirvan Barzani's return as prime minister, many (though not all) of the problems would likely disappear because much of the dispute has become personal.
Bafel Talabani's speech immediately after the November 4 parliamentary session was particularly significant. By warning Masoud Barzani that every unilateral move would be met with a corresponding response, he placed him in an exceptionally difficult position.
Masoud’s entire legacy is at stake, but he cannot easily back down. Meeting the PUK’s demands would upset the balance within the Barzani family, a tension that has been building as he has aged. Since the era of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the KDP’s founder, the family has kept an understanding that power must be balanced between the house of Idris, Nechirvan’s father, and the house of Masoud. As a father, however, Masoud wants to make sure Masrour holds a more consolidated position and the upper hand. Masoud now acts more as a father than as anything else, and that risks undoing much of the legacy he wants to be remembered for.
Unfortunately for Masoud, Masrour lacks both social skills and the ability to work as part of a team, and both matter a great deal. The KRG is not institutionalised, so its arrangements have always depended on individuals being able to work together. That makes social skills essential. Teamwork matters just as much because the KRG is not simply a conventional coalition government. It is effectively an alliance between two largely separate political and administrative entities: the KDP- and PUK-controlled zones. Governing such an arrangement requires considerable interpersonal skills, flexibility and an ability to work with political partners rather than treat them as subordinates.
2. Establish a firm red line against the defection of PUK MPs.
The PUK's second objective is to ensure that the three MPs who defected and participated in the November 4 parliamentary session are removed from their seats hence pay a price.
The KDP has a history of buying off or poaching MPs from rival factions, but the PUK had largely remained insulated from this practice. If the PUK accepts what happened, it risks establishing a dangerous precedent.
Otherwise elections will become increasingly meaningless, though they have already largely become so. For the PUK this is a matter of survival: if the tactic works once, it will become the norm.
The argument that these MPs simply exercised their independence and made their own principled political decisions does not stand up. Most MPs across the board are of low calibre and easily bought, and the idea that these three - or the five others from New Generation or Halwest - chose this course on their own is laughable.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
The PUK’s four-track response to the KDP’s parliament push
PUK's Bafel Talabani is in Baghdad as the power struggle with the KDP deepens. Recent moves suggest the PUK is answering the KDP’s unilateral bid to reactivate the Kurdistan Parliament on several fronts at once.
1. The PUK has filed a complaint with Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court, seeking an urgent injunction to halt the parliamentary session pending review and then a ruling that the session is procedurally illegal. Sources familiar with the details and the political negotiations behind them say there is a high probability, though no certainty, that the court will issue an injunction soon and later rule against the session. Some elements within the KDP may also welcome that outcome as a way out. Without it, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani may press ahead with cabinet formation, which would lead to a formal split of the region.
2. The second front is Baghdad itself, which explains the timing of Talabani’s visit. The PUK is working to secure its zone’s budget, particularly civil servant salaries, directly from the federal government. That looks achievable given the Federal Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling allowing directorates in the region to deal directly with the federal Ministry of Finance on salaries.
3. At the same time, the PUK plans to reverse some of Masrour Barzani’s signature policies with more popular measures, such as cutting electricity tariffs and other taxes and service charges, which could help it recover some lost popularity.
4 It has also already separated its finances from Erbil and is running its own projects. Private-sector investment in Suleimani, much of it PUK-backed, has grown notably in recent months. The emerging model appears to be public-sector salaries guaranteed by Baghdad, with the PUK’s own revenue funding development through the private sector.
If the court challenge cancels the session, a formal split may not go ahead. The deadlock over power sharing would remain, however, and the PUK would continue running a separate administration without going as far as forming a separate region.
If the court route fails, a fallback is already in motion. A signature campaign calling for a separate region has begun, and under Iraqi law, signatures from 10% of voters in Suleimani governorate can trigger the procedure for forming a new region. However, because Kurdistan is already a region, the legal process is complex and unclear, and parts of it are not addressed in the constitution at all. Ironically, that ambiguity could give the Federal Court leeway to make it possible through reinterpretation. PUK media covered the campaign extensively today while attributing it to civil society organisations. It is likely the PUK’s plan B, held in reserve in case the other tracks fail.
Talabani has already said in a speech that the PUK will reciprocate any further KDP move. That leaves the KDP in a difficult position. Another parliamentary session, or the formation of a cabinet, would now automatically trigger the PUK’s separation threat. In effect, the PUK has tied separation to the KDP’s next step, which narrows the KDP’s options considerably.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
The PUK and New Generation have filed two separate lawsuits at Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court contesting the legality of the 4 November session the KDP used to reconvene the Kurdistan Parliament.
The session was attended by 52 of the 100 MPs, and all the 52 MPs elected the parliament’s presidium. The suits, brought by Asos Ali, a PUK MP in the Iraqi parliament, and by Kurdistan New Generation MP Mohammad Sulaiman, name the speaker and the head of the parliament’s secretariat as defendants. Both seek an interim order suspending all decisions taken at the session until the court rules on its validity.
The suits make several procedural arguments:
1. The plaintiffs say the session was never lawfully summoned, since neither Sulaiman, who presided over the parliament as its eldest member, nor the head of the parliament’s secretariat, Ardalan Mohammad Sarsapi, a PUK member, issued the call. It was therefore not chaired by the eldest member as required.
2. They argue that the session breached the Kurdistan Parliament law and Article 3 of its bylaws, which govern how a session is resumed, and that it was held without consultation with the other blocs and the minority components.
3. They also argue that the bylaws require the signatures of 51 MPs, an absolute majority of the chamber, to convene a session, and that only 43 signed.
4. Another argument is that the inaugural session cannot lawfully be held open indefinitely. They cite Federal Court ruling No. 55 of 2010, which found Iraq’s open-ended parliamentary session that year unconstitutional when it was chaired by its eldest member, Fuad Masum. This matters because the 4 November session was presented as a continuation of the inaugural session of December 2024, which had been left open because the first session is required to elect the presidium.
5. Finally, they argue that candidacy for the presidium had already been opened in the inaugural session in December 2024 and could not be reopened. On 4 November it was reopened anyway and the slate of candidates changed.
If the court grants an interim order or annuls the session, the KDP’s effort to restart the legislature would stall, and the PUK would return to talks on the next cabinet from a stronger position. The KDP is likely to argue that the court lacks jurisdiction, the grounds it has repeatedly cited when declining to intervene in the parliament’s affairs, including New Generation’s dissolution suit in July 2025 and Halwest’s in October.
These suits, however, challenge the procedure of a single session, an area where the Federal Court has asserted jurisdiction before. In May 2023 it annulled the law extending the parliament’s fifth term and voided every decision the parliament took after that term expired, which may give it more room to act than it had with the earlier dissolution suits.This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rudaw English
@RudawEnglish
#latest: "Our weapons are a right and will remain in the hands of our Mujahideen," Iran-backed faction Kata'ib Hezbollah says through its Telegram channel, showing photos of its fighters setting up drones.
The announcement came after the Iraqi government spox said its forces will enter Jurf al-Sakhar, the faction's stronghold north of Babil province, which has recently emerged as the site of major oil smuggling allegations. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
Amid talk of a potential impending clash between Iraqi govt and Kata'ib Hezbollah, useful to consider that Iran and its allies are aware of changing conditions and adapting.
For students of history, there's also "Charge of the Knights" and its lessons.
amwaj.media/en/article/deep-dive-to-shield-weapons-iraqi-… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Guerre en Ukraine. Il y avait les quelques dizaines de membres du Service action qui étaient déjà en Ukraine depuis des années, et dont j'avais annoncé la présence en octobre 2022. Il y a aussi des soldats français dont RFI révèle aujourd'hui le déploiement en Ukraine. « Il ne s’agit pas de combattre mais d’apporter un soutien aux forces de Kiev. Leur mission : veiller aux équipements de l’armée ukrainienne et dispenser des formations », assure RFI.
#ukrainewar -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Lawk Ghafuri
@LawkGhafuri
While everyone is busy with what is happening in Russia regarding Ukraine - Iraq is heating up 🧵
1/ What is unfolding over Jurf Al-Sakhr is potentially one of the most consequential political confrontations between an Iraqi PM & an Iranian-backed armed group in post-2003 Iraq.
Al Arabiya English
@AlArabiya_Eng
🔴 BREAKING: Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has given the Coordination Framework a deadline to persuade armed factions to withdraw from Jurf al-Sakhar, sources tell Al Arabiya English.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ayman Abdel Nour
@aabnour
Syria’s SDF Integration: Progress, Obstacles, and Security Risks
@sameralahmadnq
mei.edu/publication/syrias-sdf-integration-progress-obsta… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Emmanuel Mignot
@EmmanuelMignot2
Encouraging both sides in Erbil and Soulemanieh to dialogue.
Dr. Hemn Hawrami
@heminhawrami
Pleased to receive the @FranceErbil Consul General Emmanuel MIGNOT. Discussed recent political developments and the @KurdistanParl activation. Stressed KDP’s firm readiness to follow President @masoud_barzani recent statement to continue talks and dialogue with PUK. Our position is very clear,Together through dialogue and adherence to national interests of Kurdistan Region and keeping our constitutional institutions we can keep and prosper the Kurdistan Region and protect its unity from any adversary and unconstitutional efforts.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Peregraf
@PeregrafNews
A campaign calling for #sulaymaniyah to become a separate region from #erbil has begun collecting signatures as political tensions between the KDP and PUK continue to escalate.
The PUK has not officially endorsed the initiative. Meanwhile, KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani has warned against attempts to divide the #kurdistan Region, saying his government will take all necessary measures to protect its constitutional status.
More: peregraf.com/en/news/12994
📸 Peregraf, November 15, 2026 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
Rudaw: On November 15, some PUK-affiliated government employees, ranging from ordinary staff to directors, returned to their jobs and resumed normal duties in their respective offices and ministries.
A PUK source told Rudaw Media Network that the return to work extends only to the level of director. This means that director generals, deputy ministers, ministers and other senior officials in the Council of Ministers have not returned
www.rudaw.net/sorani/categories/kurdistan/1876209 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr. Hemn Hawrami
@heminhawrami
Pleased to receive the @FranceErbil Consul General Emmanuel MIGNOT. Discussed recent political developments and the @KurdistanParl activation. Stressed KDP’s firm readiness to follow President @masoud_barzani recent statement to continue talks and dialogue with PUK. Our position is very clear,Together through dialogue and adherence to national interests of Kurdistan Region and keeping our constitutional institutions we can keep and prosper the Kurdistan Region and protect its unity from any adversary and unconstitutional efforts.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House MENA
@CH_MENAP
'A continued impasse between the KDP and the PUK risks setting off an irreversible decline for the frameworks that have enabled Kurdish self-governance for the past two decades,' writes @wrodgers2.
www.chathamhouse.org/2026/10/division-between-iraqs-kurdi… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr. Momen Zellmi
@momenzellmii
"There is no Parliament. I recognize no Parliament. This decision will be reversed; the PUK will never, as far as I know speaking to the other major parties, ever take part in anything that comes from this process. This must be stopped," PUK President Bafel Jalal Talabani @Bafeltalabani stated during his panel at the Slemani Strategic Forum.
Dr. Momen Zellmi
@momenzellmii
@Bafeltalabani is in chat with @_HadleyGamble - #ssf26 #slemani
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shelly Kittleson
@shellykittleson
My latest from the Middle East for @AlMonitor
Can Iraq PM rein in Kataib Hezbollah without triggering armed conflict? www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/11/can-iraq-pm-rein-kat… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
Iraq’s Federal Court has rejected a request filed by PUK and New Generation MPs for an urgent injunction to suspend the Kurdistan Parliament’s activities following its reconvening and election of a new presidium.
However, the main lawsuit challenging the legality of the parliamentary session remains pending, and the court has yet to rule on it. In other words, the court has only rejected the request for an immediate suspension, not the underlying legal challenge.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
The PUK and New Generation have filed two separate lawsuits at Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court contesting the legality of the 4 November session the KDP used to reconvene the Kurdistan Parliament.
The session was attended by 52 of the 100 MPs, and all the 52 MPs elected the parliament’s presidium. The suits, brought by Asos Ali, a PUK MP in the Iraqi parliament, and by Kurdistan New Generation MP Mohammad Sulaiman, name the speaker and the head of the parliament’s secretariat as defendants. Both seek an interim order suspending all decisions taken at the session until the court rules on its validity.
The suits make several procedural arguments:
1. The plaintiffs say the session was never lawfully summoned, since neither Sulaiman, who presided over the parliament as its eldest member, nor the head of the parliament’s secretariat, Ardalan Mohammad Sarsapi, a PUK member, issued the call. It was therefore not chaired by the eldest member as required.
2. They argue that the session breached the Kurdistan Parliament law and Article 3 of its bylaws, which govern how a session is resumed, and that it was held without consultation with the other blocs and the minority components.
3. They also argue that the bylaws require the signatures of 51 MPs, an absolute majority of the chamber, to convene a session, and that only 43 signed.
4. Another argument is that the inaugural session cannot lawfully be held open indefinitely. They cite Federal Court ruling No. 55 of 2010, which found Iraq’s open-ended parliamentary session that year unconstitutional when it was chaired by its eldest member, Fuad Masum. This matters because the 4 November session was presented as a continuation of the inaugural session of December 2024, which had been left open because the first session is required to elect the presidium.
5. Finally, they argue that candidacy for the presidium had already been opened in the inaugural session in December 2024 and could not be reopened. On 4 November it was reopened anyway and the slate of candidates changed.
If the court grants an interim order or annuls the session, the KDP’s effort to restart the legislature would stall, and the PUK would return to talks on the next cabinet from a stronger position. The KDP is likely to argue that the court lacks jurisdiction, the grounds it has repeatedly cited when declining to intervene in the parliament’s affairs, including New Generation’s dissolution suit in July 2025 and Halwest’s in October.
These suits, however, challenge the procedure of a single session, an area where the Federal Court has asserted jurisdiction before. In May 2023 it annulled the law extending the parliament’s fifth term and voided every decision the parliament took after that term expired, which may give it more room to act than it had with the earlier dissolution suits.This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
U.S. intelligence assesses that Iran still has up to 2,500 ballistic missiles in storage (Again)
A WSJ report mentions that, according to U.S. intelligence, Iran may still hold stockpiles of up to 2,500 missiles.
U.S. officials estimate that Iran retains a stockpile of 1,500 to 2,500 ballistic missiles despite damage from previous military strikes. While the evaluation is marked by a low confidence level due to tracking difficulties, officials indicate that Tehran continues slowly rebuilding its arsenal from existing components.
We are facing the same old problem, and this reminds me that CENTCOM publicly estimated before the war that Iran’s total arsenal stood at around 3,000 ballistic missiles.
If that pre-war figure had been accurate, and considering the thousands of missiles Iran has already fired alongside the storage sites destroyed by bombings, it would be mathematically impossible for Tehran to still have up to 2,500 missiles today.
To avoid publicly admitting that they miscalculated the initial stockpile by thousands of units, official reports justify the current figure of 1,500 to 2,500 by claiming that Iran rebuilt more than half of its pre-war arsenal using stockpiled components, even with its factories destroyed and under blockade.
Months ago, I pointed out that Iran likely possessed around 17,000 missiles with the range to strike Israel. This arsenal was built over more than 20 years and includes over 15 different models of ballistic and cruise missiles.
I also noted that there is simply no way a military industry like Iran's would take more than 20 years to produce just 2,000 to 3,000 missiles. We are talking about a defense industry entirely focused on missiles, three times larger than North Korea’s, and one of the largest missile industries on the planet.
At the time, I estimated that the majority of these were cruise missiles, alongside roughly 5,000 to 8,000 ballistic missiles.
This calculation should be done by multiplying the annual production capacity of Iranian factories by the decades each model has been manufactured, including older systems like the Shahab missiles.
The discrepancy in numbers stems primarily from Western intelligence focusing only on projectiles it can identify at active bases and on mobile launchers ready for immediate use.
I also pointed out that Iran is currently prioritizing the maintenance and preparation of its ballistic stockpile over cruise missiles, taking advantage of the vast volume accumulated in reserve over decades.
Another point worth highlighting is the similarity to the script we saw in Ukraine in 2022, when Western reports claimed Russian missiles would run out within weeks because they only counted high-end active stockpiles while ignoring refurbished or semi-finished older reserves.
Read more
global21.substack.com/p/us-intelligence-assesses-that-ira…
*Below are my previous posts on this subject:
global21.substack.com/p/how-many-missiles-does-iran-still…
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
How many missiles does Iran stilll have?
During the 12-day war, I estimated Iran’s missile stockpile at around 20,000, based on the number of different models and the years they entered production. Of that total, I calculated approximately 7,000 to 8,000 ballistic missiles and 12,000 to 13,000 cruise missiles, including both units in service and those in reserve.
Iran began mass-producing ballistic missiles in the early 1990s, starting with the Shahab-2, which was produced for about 15 years, and the Shahab-3, manufactured from 2004 to 2008 before being replaced by more modern systems.
These were lower-precision missiles, which is why, in 2015, Iran launched a major refurbishment and modernization program for these old stocks, replacing guidance systems and warheads.
Today, there are certainly still a few thousand of these older missiles in reserve, and I do count them.
Around 2010, Iran was already producing about 12 different models of ballistic and cruise missiles.
If we assume a conservative average production rate of roughly 100 units per model per year, taking into account multiple parallel production lines, that alone would give Iran, over the last 15 years, an arsenal exceeding 17,000 missiles.
The picture becomes even clearer when we look at 2015 onward. At that time, Iranian production lines were operating with at least 8 to 12 models with ranges over 1,000 km. Cruise missiles like the Soumar and Meshkat already had ranges exceeding 2,000 km, as did about 7 to 10 variants of two-stage solid-fuel ballistic missiles such as the Emad, Sejjil, and others.
In other words, Iran spent at least 10 years producing on a significant scale 8 to 12 models of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of reaching Israel.
Russia, even while fighting a full-scale war in Ukraine, produces around 2,500 precision missiles per year. There is simply no logic in claiming that Iran, after more than 30 years of dedicated missile production with multiple active lines, had only 2,500 missiles in stockpile as of February, as many Western think tanks claim.
These estimates consistently understate Iran’s real industrial capacity.
Iran has an entire ecosystem of public companies, private firms, and startups, with more than 300 companies dedicated to the missiles sector, out of a total of another 6,500 that support the country’s defense in various areas.
Read full article:
open.substack.com/pub/global21/p/how-many-missiles-does-i… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Peregraf
@PeregrafNews
Has Kurdistan’s 35-year political system reached a dead end?
In a new article, former #kurdistan Parliament Speaker Dr. Yousif Mohammed Sadiq argues that the Region needs a new political contract, genuine reunification and fundamental reforms, rather than a return to the power-sharing arrangements that have repeatedly failed.
He calls for a new political order based on democratic governance, the will of the people and equal institutions across the Kurdistan Region.
✍️ @MPYousifSadiq
peregraf.com/en/opinion/12983 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇮🇷 | Iran : les défis de la reconstruction de son arsenal balistique
Selon une évaluation des services de renseignement occidentaux rapportée le 10 novembre 2026, l’Iran serait actuellement capable de produire environ 50 missiles balistiques par mois, soit près de la moitié de sa capacité industrielle d’avant-guerre. Téhéran conserverait également un arsenal estimé à au moins 1 700 missiles. Ces chiffres témoignent d’une résilience industrielle que les frappes américaines et israéliennes n’ont pas totalement neutralisée. Pourtant, ils ne suffisent pas à mesurer le véritable état de la puissance balistique iranienne : disposer de missiles ne garantit pas leur capacité à être effectivement employés.
Le principal défi de Téhéran consiste désormais à reconstituer l’ensemble de la chaîne opérationnelle nécessaire à leur mise en œuvre.
La destruction ou la neutralisation des lanceurs mobiles constitue une contrainte majeure. Ces véhicules, appelés TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher), assurent le transport et le lancement des missiles balistiques. Contrairement aux missiles, dont la production peut être progressivement relancée, les lanceurs sont des équipements spécialisés nécessitant des composants et des capacités industrielles spécifiques. Leur indisponibilité limite directement le nombre de missiles pouvant être déployés et employés.
La stratégie iranienne repose également sur la dispersion et l’enfouissement de ses infrastructures balistiques. Les complexes souterrains, souvent présentés comme des « villes de missiles », permettent de protéger les stocks contre les frappes aériennes. Toutefois, la survivabilité des infrastructures ne garantit pas leur disponibilité opérationnelle. Les tunnels, les accès, les installations de lancement et les systèmes de communication doivent rester fonctionnels. Une infrastructure peut ainsi conserver ses stocks tout en ayant perdu une partie de sa capacité opérationnelle.
La reconstitution dépend aussi de capacités industrielles moins visibles. La production de missiles à propergol solide nécessite des équipements spécialisés pour le mélange des composants du carburant. Les composants électroniques, les systèmes de guidage, les équipements de contrôle qualité et les capacités d’essais des moteurs sont également indispensables. En septembre 2025, une enquête fondée sur l’analyse d’images satellitaires, indiquait que l’Iran avait commencé à reconstruire plusieurs installations endommagées, notamment à Parchin et Shahroud. Ils ont de nouveau été frappés durant l’opération Epic Fury en mars 2026.
Un autre enjeu concerne le commandement et la coordination. L’efficacité d’une campagne balistique dépend autant des missiles et des lanceurs disponibles que des systèmes de communication, des chaînes de commandement et de la coordination entre les unités. Les frappes contre les centres militaires peuvent donc produire des effets dépassant la simple destruction matérielle, notamment en désorganisant les chaînes de commandement et en affectant les personnels spécialisés.
Enfin, l’Iran doit préserver ses capacités de lancement face à la surveillance aérienne et satellitaire adverse. Les lanceurs mobiles offrent des possibilités de dispersion, mais leur utilisation peut les exposer à la détection. La reconstruction de la flotte doit donc s’accompagner du rétablissement des capacités de dissimulation, de protection et de dispersion.
Ainsi la capacité industrielle à fabriquer des missiles, la capacité logistique à les stocker et à les déployer, et la capacité opérationnelle à les lancer de manière coordonnée constituent trois dimensions différentes.
L’Iran peut progressivement reconstituer son arsenal sans retrouver simultanément sa capacité de frappe d’avant-guerre. L’enjeu stratégique n’est donc pas simplement de savoir combien de missiles Téhéran peut produire, mais combien il peut effectivement déployer, lancer et préserver face à une nouvelle campagne militaire. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Washington Post
@washingtonpost
Persian Gulf governments are preparing with dread for the inevitable: A damaging barrage of inquiries into alleged corruption involving President Trump, his administration and family, by Democrats who swept the midterm elections. www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/11/14/middle-east-monar…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi postponed a plan to storm Jurf al-Sakhar, a stronghold of Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah about 60 kilometers (37 miles) southwest of Baghdad, after a senior military commander leaked details of the operation to leaders of the ruling Coordination Framework and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Iraqi security sources told MBN. alhurra.com/en/54564
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
Dana Gas says the Khor Mor gas field suffered significant damage in the November 8 attack and remains incapable of producing any gas. The company has provided no timetable for resuming production.
This is significant because, following all previous attacks on Khor Mor that disrupted operations, production resumed, at least partially, within less than five days. This time, however, six days have passed, and Dana Gas is still emphasising the extent of the damage and the facility’s inability to produce gas.
This suggests that the damage is likely more extensive than in previous attacks and that production is unlikely to resume as quickly as it did before, raising the prospect of a prolonged shutdown.
While Baghdad is now supplying household LPG to the Kurdistan Region to meet its needs until Khor Mor resumes production, electricity blackouts will continue. Households currently receive only around five hours of public electricity per day, as the region relies on Khor Mor gas for approximately 80% of its electricity generation.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
A drone attack targeted the Khor Mor natural gas field in the Chamchamal area, west of Sulaimani, tonight, striking an LPG storage facility.
LPG is separate from the natural gas used for electricity generation, but all production has reportedly been suspended due to its highly flammable nature. It remains unclear whether the shutdown will disrupt electricity generation. The Kurdistan region relies on Khor Mor for about 76% of its electricity production.
The timing is notable amid escalating KDP-PUK tensions. Reports suggest the drone originated from the Tuz Khurmatu area, where previous attacks on Khor Mor have also reportedly originated, given its geographical proximity to the field. Khor Mor has been targeted multiple times in the last few years.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
Some very interesting details have emerged about the Khor Mor attack:
According to a well-connected journalist based in the area, the specific militia responsible is that of al-Hajj Ahmad Asʿad al-Jayirli, a Shia Turkmen commander who leads the Turkmen 63rd Brigade of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) operating around the Tuz Khurmatu–Amerli belt, and who has also served as commander of the Special Forces Regiment under the PMF’s North Axis command.
The attack reportedly originated near the village of Sha Saiwan, just northwest of Tuz Khurmatu district. This area is roughly 35 km from Khor Mor, which suggests the use of extended-range rockets that these militias possess.
More significantly, al-Jayirli is closely linked to Nouri al-Maliki. He ran on Maliki’s list in Salahaddin province but lost; the only successful candidate on that list was another Turkmen from the Badr Organization.
The journalist reporting this is Dilshad Anwar, who is well connected, generally reliable, and until recently worked for VOA Kurdish before its shutdown. He did not name al-Jayirli directly, but said the commander in question is a Shia Turkmen militia leader, a Hajj, very close to Maliki, and from the Tuz Khurmatu–Amerli area - a description that only really fits al-Jayirli.
Politically, this is very telling because Maliki has been unusually silent and has issued no statement on the attack, despite having visited Erbil just days earlier and met with Masoud and Masrour Barzani. By contrast, Qais al-Khazali of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, who is known to be closer to PUK, has condemned the attack and called for an investigation, and even Rayan al-Kildani of the Babylon militia has issued a statement strongly denouncing it.
Another noteworthy detail is that Bafel Talabani waited before releasing his own strongly worded statement, which may suggest he first sought to confirm the actor behind the attack. According to this journalist, the perpetrating force is already known to both KRG and Iraqi security agencies.
Also, if this account is confirmed, it suggests the attack was driven more by intra-Iraqi dynamics than by Iran.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
On the likely perpetrators of the Khor Mor attack:
Drones were reportedly flown over the area first as a way to distract local security forces, after which rockets were fired at the natural gas field.
Khor Mor is roughly 15-20 km from the nearest Iraqi government–controlled areas, so quite close to the grey areas, and 122mm rockets, which many of the militias possess (as they are supplied by the IRGC), can easily reach it from those positions.
The areas closest to Khor Mor on the Iraqi side are effectively Shia Turkmen militia fiefdoms, dominated by units affiliated with the Badr Organization. Other Iran-aligned groups such as Kataib Hezbollah, which has specialised rocket units, can also move into this belt when needed, making it more plausible that better-armed militias like Kataib Hezbollah, rather than the more limited local Turkmen units, were behind last night’s coordinated drone-and-rocket attack.This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amwaj.media
@amwajmedia
Read the full piece 👉 amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/khor-mor-attack-darkens-iraq…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amwaj.media
@amwajmedia
🎥 A single drone strike on Nov. 8 halted the Khor Mor gas field and plunged most of Iraqi Kurdistan into darkness. Iraqi media wants to know why one hit could black out the region, who sent the drone and whether the Kurdish political rift invited it.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amwaj.media
@amwajmedia
NEW: In the summer of 2023, Qais Al-Khazali went to Tehran to meet Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and pushed his own agenda instead. Can the Asa'ib Ahl Al-Haq founder lead Iraq's Shiite establishment, and why does his road to Washington run through Iran?
✍️ @Arranwalshe -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The National
@TheNationalNews
From civil war to political deadlock: the deep roots of Iraqi Kurdistan's KDP-PUK rift www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/11/14/from-civil-w…
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Ma chronique de ce matin sur RTL depuis l'Irak où les Kurdes s'entredechirent, pour le plus grand bénéfice de l'Iran, notamment.
www.rtl.fr/programmes/les-secrets-de-l-actu-international… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
The Iraqi Kurdish party PUK is now lobbying in Baghdad following breakdown in relations with the KDP
PUK President Bafel Talabani and New Generation leader Shaswar Abdulwahid met with several Iraqi political leaders in Baghdad, including the secretary-general of the Iran-backed Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada.
www.pukmedia.com/EN/Details/83410 -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Yémen: L'Arabie saoudite pousse les pays européens à classer comme organisation terroriste les rebelles yéménites Houthis, mais des pays de l'UE ne sont pas très chauds. Certains craignent que cela complique de futurs pourparlers de paix. La France redoute que dans ce cas les Houthis attaquent la base militaire française voisine de Djibouti.
#houthis
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La France craint aussi une attaque des Houthis sur le site de Bahlaf, qui appartient toujours à TotalEnergies, même s'il n'est plus exploité en raison de la guerre.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rudaw English
@RudawEnglish
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan leader Bafel Talabani on Thursday rejected the latest call by ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party President Masoud Barzani for dialogue, dismissing the offer as “an old trick,” as tensions climb between the Kurdistan Region's two ruling parties.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
Iraq's National Security Adviser, Qassem al-Abboudi, has made a significant statement, saying the latest attack on the Khor Mor gas field was different from all previous ones, suggesting it was linked to the ongoing KDP-PUK power struggle and that one of the Kurdish factions may have been behind it.
He did not name the faction but insisted he had enough credible intelligence to be confident in his assessment.
This is the first time Iraq's National Security Adviser has publicly suggested that a Kurdish faction may be responsible for an attack on Khor Mor.
There are also reports that the attack was launched from near Tuz Khurmatu, an area where Shia militias operate. Some reports suggest that a Turkmen militia with influence in the area is effectively available for hire and can allegedly be paid to carry out such attacks.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
A drone attack targeted the Khor Mor natural gas field in the Chamchamal area, west of Sulaimani, tonight, striking an LPG storage facility.
LPG is separate from the natural gas used for electricity generation, but all production has reportedly been suspended due to its highly flammable nature. It remains unclear whether the shutdown will disrupt electricity generation. The Kurdistan region relies on Khor Mor for about 76% of its electricity production.
The timing is notable amid escalating KDP-PUK tensions. Reports suggest the drone originated from the Tuz Khurmatu area, where previous attacks on Khor Mor have also reportedly originated, given its geographical proximity to the field. Khor Mor has been targeted multiple times in the last few years.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
Some very interesting details have emerged about the Khor Mor attack:
According to a well-connected journalist based in the area, the specific militia responsible is that of al-Hajj Ahmad Asʿad al-Jayirli, a Shia Turkmen commander who leads the Turkmen 63rd Brigade of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) operating around the Tuz Khurmatu–Amerli belt, and who has also served as commander of the Special Forces Regiment under the PMF’s North Axis command.
The attack reportedly originated near the village of Sha Saiwan, just northwest of Tuz Khurmatu district. This area is roughly 35 km from Khor Mor, which suggests the use of extended-range rockets that these militias possess.
More significantly, al-Jayirli is closely linked to Nouri al-Maliki. He ran on Maliki’s list in Salahaddin province but lost; the only successful candidate on that list was another Turkmen from the Badr Organization.
The journalist reporting this is Dilshad Anwar, who is well connected, generally reliable, and until recently worked for VOA Kurdish before its shutdown. He did not name al-Jayirli directly, but said the commander in question is a Shia Turkmen militia leader, a Hajj, very close to Maliki, and from the Tuz Khurmatu–Amerli area - a description that only really fits al-Jayirli.
Politically, this is very telling because Maliki has been unusually silent and has issued no statement on the attack, despite having visited Erbil just days earlier and met with Masoud and Masrour Barzani. By contrast, Qais al-Khazali of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, who is known to be closer to PUK, has condemned the attack and called for an investigation, and even Rayan al-Kildani of the Babylon militia has issued a statement strongly denouncing it.
Another noteworthy detail is that Bafel Talabani waited before releasing his own strongly worded statement, which may suggest he first sought to confirm the actor behind the attack. According to this journalist, the perpetrating force is already known to both KRG and Iraqi security agencies.
Also, if this account is confirmed, it suggests the attack was driven more by intra-Iraqi dynamics than by Iran.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
On the likely perpetrators of the Khor Mor attack:
Drones were reportedly flown over the area first as a way to distract local security forces, after which rockets were fired at the natural gas field.
Khor Mor is roughly 15-20 km from the nearest Iraqi government–controlled areas, so quite close to the grey areas, and 122mm rockets, which many of the militias possess (as they are supplied by the IRGC), can easily reach it from those positions.
The areas closest to Khor Mor on the Iraqi side are effectively Shia Turkmen militia fiefdoms, dominated by units affiliated with the Badr Organization. Other Iran-aligned groups such as Kataib Hezbollah, which has specialised rocket units, can also move into this belt when needed, making it more plausible that better-armed militias like Kataib Hezbollah, rather than the more limited local Turkmen units, were behind last night’s coordinated drone-and-rocket attack.This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël-France. Treize organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) ont appelé jeudi les députés à prioriser l'examen et à voter en faveur d'une proposition de loi visant à interdire la vente en France de produits issus des colonies israéliennes en Cisjordanie (AFP).
Porté par plus de 100 députés issus de huit groupes parlementaires et adopté lundi en commission, le texte doit être examiné le 19 novembre dans l'hémicycle.
La proposition de loi prévoit notamment une interdiction d'importer, d'acheter et de mettre en vente des marchandises originaires des colonies israéliennes en Cisjordanie.
Les ONG signataires, parmi lesquelles Amnesty International France, Oxfam France, le CCFD-Terre Solidaire et la Ligue des droits de l'Homme (LDH), demandent au gouvernement de soutenir clairement ce texte, deux mois après les déclarations du ministre de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères, Jean-Noël Barrot, qui avait affirmé l'intention de la France d'interdire ces échanges.
"Derrière le commerce avec les colonies, il y a une réalité humaine que l'on ne peut pas ignorer: celle d'une vie palestinienne progressivement asphyxiée par l'occupation et la colonisation", a déclaré Cécile Duflot, directrice générale d'Oxfam France.
Les signataires s'appuient sur l'avis consultatif rendu en 2024 par la Cour internationale de Justice (CIJ), qui demande aux États d'empêcher les relations commerciales favorisant le maintien des colonies.
Pour la présidente de la LDH, Nathalie Tehio, "les députés auront un choix simple: pour ou contre le droit international".
L'organisation de défense des droits humains estime également qu'inscrire cette mesure dans la loi permettrait de "pérenniser" l'engagement du gouvernement, "quel que soit le résultat des élections présidentielles de 2027".
Les ONG exhortent l'exécutif à donner des consignes de vote en faveur du texte à la majorité parlementaire, déplorant que la reconnaissance diplomatique de l'État palestinien ne s'accompagne à ce jour d'aucune mesure concrète face aux accusations de "génocide" et de colonisation.
Malgré un fragile cessez-le-feu instauré en octobre 2025 après deux ans d'une guerre dévastatrice déclenchée par l'attaque sans précédent du mouvement islamiste palestinien sur le sol israélien le 7 octobre 2023, la bande de Gaza reste plongée dans une crise humanitaire.
En Cisjordanie occupée, la situation sanitaire et sécuritaire continue de se dégrader sous la pression d'une hausse des violences commises par des colons israéliens.
Le Premier ministre israélien sortant Benjamin Netanyahu a rejeté catégoriquement fin septembre au siège de l'ONU les accusations de "projet colonial" et de "génocide" portées contre Israël devant les instances internationales et les ONG.
#coloniesisraël -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
Some very interesting details have emerged about the Khor Mor attack:
According to a well-connected journalist based in the area, the specific militia responsible is that of al-Hajj Ahmad Asʿad al-Jayirli, a Shia Turkmen commander who leads the Turkmen 63rd Brigade of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) operating around the Tuz Khurmatu–Amerli belt, and who has also served as commander of the Special Forces Regiment under the PMF’s North Axis command.
The attack reportedly originated near the village of Sha Saiwan, just northwest of Tuz Khurmatu district. This area is roughly 35 km from Khor Mor, which suggests the use of extended-range rockets that these militias possess.
More significantly, al-Jayirli is closely linked to Nouri al-Maliki. He ran on Maliki’s list in Salahaddin province but lost; the only successful candidate on that list was another Turkmen from the Badr Organization.
The journalist reporting this is Dilshad Anwar, who is well connected, generally reliable, and until recently worked for VOA Kurdish before its shutdown. He did not name al-Jayirli directly, but said the commander in question is a Shia Turkmen militia leader, a Hajj, very close to Maliki, and from the Tuz Khurmatu–Amerli area - a description that only really fits al-Jayirli.
Politically, this is very telling because Maliki has been unusually silent and has issued no statement on the attack, despite having visited Erbil just days earlier and met with Masoud and Masrour Barzani. By contrast, Qais al-Khazali of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, who is known to be closer to PUK, has condemned the attack and called for an investigation, and even Rayan al-Kildani of the Babylon militia has issued a statement strongly denouncing it.
Another noteworthy detail is that Bafel Talabani waited before releasing his own strongly worded statement, which may suggest he first sought to confirm the actor behind the attack. According to this journalist, the perpetrating force is already known to both KRG and Iraqi security agencies.
Also, if this account is confirmed, it suggests the attack was driven more by intra-Iraqi dynamics than by Iran.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
On the likely perpetrators of the Khor Mor attack:
Drones were reportedly flown over the area first as a way to distract local security forces, after which rockets were fired at the natural gas field.
Khor Mor is roughly 15-20 km from the nearest Iraqi government–controlled areas, so quite close to the grey areas, and 122mm rockets, which many of the militias possess (as they are supplied by the IRGC), can easily reach it from those positions.
The areas closest to Khor Mor on the Iraqi side are effectively Shia Turkmen militia fiefdoms, dominated by units affiliated with the Badr Organization. Other Iran-aligned groups such as Kataib Hezbollah, which has specialised rocket units, can also move into this belt when needed, making it more plausible that better-armed militias like Kataib Hezbollah, rather than the more limited local Turkmen units, were behind last night’s coordinated drone-and-rocket attack.This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
Iraq’s Federal Commission of Integrity has announced the formation of an investigative team to examine allegations of oil smuggling from Kirkuk and the Kurdistan Region’s Sulaimani.
The allegations concerning the Kurdistan Region specifically relate to smuggling operations across the border from Sulaimani into Iran. This follows earlier allegations by Iraqi MPs of similar smuggling operations from Erbil into Turkey.
The investigation comes after the publication of an Iraqi intelligence report detailing an alleged smuggling network through which oil and petroleum products are transported from Kirkuk and Sulaimani into Iran, where they are blended with Iranian oil before being shipped to Afghanistan.
It is worth noting that we have published dozens of videos documenting these smuggling operations over the years. However, the tankers involved do not primarily carry crude oil. Instead, they transport two main categories of products: condensate from the Khor Mor gas field and refined petroleum products from local refineries.
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
Long queues of fuel tankers were seen yesterday at the Bashmakh border crossing between eastern Suleimani and Iran.
In the footage, the driver claims that between 4,000 and 5,000 tankers carrying petroleum products were crossing into Iran, even as the Kurdistan Region faces a severe fuel and gas crisis and residents queue for supplies.
It remains unclear what products the tankers carrying. The Kurdistan Region has several possible sources of exportable petroleum liquids. KDP-linked companies such as KAR and Lanaz operate refineries that produce petroleum products, while Sarqala, the main producing oil field in the PUK-controlled zone, produces crude oil.
Khor Mor is primarily a gas field but it also produces substantial quantities of gas condensate and liquefied petroleum gas. These products can also be transported by tanker, while some household gas is reportedly exported by the private PUK-linked company South Kurdistan to Central Asian countries and other markets. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
Good report from @ErikaSolomon and colleagues on why enforcing a “land blockade” to suffocate the Iranian economy probably won’t work—regional countries have their own dependencies on Iran and don’t agree with the blockade’s aims.
Gift link:
www.nytimes.com/2026/11/11/world/middleeast/us-blockade-i… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Je me faisais la même remarque
BD….
@LBC_bd
Pas un gros scoop … ce qui serait intéressant c’est de savoir quelle ambassade n’a pas une équipe de rens en interne … les couvertures diplos permettent cela …
Le Figaro TV
@LeFigaroTV
«Il existe un appareil algérien de renseignement clandestin installé dans l'ambassade de l'Algérie à Paris», révèle @cdubois22 dans Points de Vue.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Trump tells Vance to restart talks with Iran immediately and empowers him to negotiate, with Vance now considering rare face-to-face talks with Iran's SNSC Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, US officials tell WSJ.
However, Iran already ruled out any negotiations with the US unless Trump meets all of Iran's 7 conditions.
"Time to surrender to the seven conditions that Iran has repeatedly set out," Rezaei said this week.
Senior Iranian officials privately dismiss the chance of a deal, convinced Trump will attack anyway to vindicate his decision to go to war.
They also note the US started the war on Feb 28 while talks were already underway. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
US nuclear attack on Iran would trigger war on ‘entirely different level’
A US nuclear attack on Iran would unleash a war of an entirely different magnitude, fundamentally changing the rules of engagement, an analyst has warned, saying Tehran would abandon conventional retaliation.
Speaking to the Press TV website, Patricia Marins, an independent defense analyst based in Brazil, noted that Iran’s retaliation to a potential US nuclear strike will be different from its previous responses.
“No one knows Iran's exact retaliation capability, but all the technicians involved in monitoring the Iranian program agree with the idea that Iran may have already developed a weapon," she said.
"And at this point, I would say this is highly probable and that the idea of a nuclear attack on Iran could trigger a war on an entirely different level, fundamentally changing the rules of engagement of the conflict."
The remarks came amid continued US and Israeli threats to attack Iran’s Kolang Mountain (Pickaxe Mountain) facility, an underground installation near the Natanz nuclear complex in central Iran that US President Donald Trump and his aides have repeatedly threatened to target.
On November 1, Trump said Washington still had "one or two sites" to deal with in Iran, explicitly naming Kolang Mountain, and claimed the United States could strike it within minutes.
He had previously threatened to hit the area "pretty soon, and very heavily."
The facility is a heavily fortified underground complex, buried deep inside a mountain and protected by dense rock formations. The limitations of conventional bunker-busters and tactical nuclear weapons have made the site an exceptionally difficult target.
Against this backdrop, Marins stressed that a nuclear attack would have consequences extending far beyond the destruction of the facility itself.
“In the face of a nuclear attack, there is no way Iran would lean toward a conventional response as it has been doing,” she said.
“A nuclear attack would have a much broader magnitude than what is speculated, as the effects would not be restricted to a single mountain. Iranian cities would be hit directly or indirectly, as would agriculture.”
She added that there would be no way to deploy a subterranean nuclear device in such circumstances, adding that “the artifact would indeed have to be detonated practically on the surface of the lower regions of the mountain.”
The analyst said Iran's response framework had already been established following the suspension of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, which she described as the point at which the country became an "ambiguous power."
She maintained that Iran's deterrence capability already existed, although its precise nature remained unknown.
The risk, she warned, was that Washington and Tel Aviv might underestimate it, just as they had underestimated Iran's conventional military capabilities before they launched the aggression on February 28.
“Iranian deterrence already exists. It remains to be seen whether it will be mistakenly ignored, just as its military capability was,” Marins said.
Read more:
global21.substack.com/p/us-nuclear-attack-on-iran-would-t… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La France passe à l'action contre les colons israéliens. Elle a interdit d'entrer sur son territoire Yossi Dagan, qui "fait l'objet d'une interdiction administrative du territoire en raison de son rôle actif dans la mise en oeuvre de la politique de colonisation de la Cisjordanie", explique le Quai d'Orsay, qui rappelle que "la colonisation est contraire au droit international et compromet la solution des deux états".
Yossi Dagan, chef du mouvement pro-implantations et président du Conseil régional de Samarie, a indiqué que l’entrée en France lui avait été interdite, la semaine dernière, alors qu’il se rendait à Paris pour une série de réunions, rapporte Times of Israël.
Selon nos informations, la France devrait durcir le ton sur d'autres dossiers impliquant Israël.
#israëlFrance -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Israel-Alma
@Israel_Alma_org
The "Hezbollah State" Within the Lebanese State: The Civilian Influence Network That Sustains the "Resistance Society"
In the following study, we mapped Hezbollah's network of area and sector heads across Lebanon.
Hezbollah divides Lebanon into five areas of responsibility, each subdivided into local sectors. Officials in each area and sector maintain direct ties with local authorities, government institutions, religious figures, associations, and political actors.
This mechanism of civilian and political influence enables Hezbollah to extend its reach into the population's daily lives, create dependency on the organization, and strengthen its position as a provider of services in place of the Lebanese state.
These officials are not military commanders, but their activities are essential to sustaining the "resistance society" – the social and civilian infrastructure that enables Hezbollah's continued military activity.
The key finding: Hezbollah's power rests on more than weapons, missiles, and tunnels. Its civilian infrastructure is a central strategic component of its strength and its ability to survive.
Weakening Hezbollah over the long term requires more than degrading its military capabilities. The game changer lies in its civilian mechanisms, which enable it to rebuild and sustain its power.
Read the full study.
israel-alma.org/the-hezbollah-state-within-the-lebanese-s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Alfoneh علی آلفونه
@Alfoneh
"Longer Range, Wider War: Tehran’s Message to Europe" @GulfStatesInst #iranmediareview November 10, 2026. shorturl.at/1PHP0
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Caroline Rose
@CarolineRose8
#jordan has experienced a concerning uptick in terrorist attacks, with its first #islamicstate attack in the Kingdom in a decade with deadly incidents in #karak and #amman in late October and early November.
I write in the latest @TheSoufanCenter IntelBrief how this should raise serious questions about the vulnerability of Jordan's security landscape for #isis sleeper cells, even in the wake of new reforms made to prison sentences and penalties for terrorism-related charges.
thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-november-10/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
Iraq: Iraqi intelligence has uncovered a massive oil smuggling operation through state-owned pipelines that has been ongoing for the last five years in Babil province’s Jurf al-Nasr – a town where the pro-Iran Kataib Hezbollah remains the principal force.
thenewregion.com/posts/7069 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
خبرگزاری ایسنا
@isna_farsi
سرلشکر رضایی: حداکثر طرحی که آمریکا و اسرائیل برای حمله به ایران در نظر گرفتهاند، عملیاتی سه تا پنج روزه است
isna.ir/xdXrmq -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
☀️🇮🇶 | Vers une nouvelle guerre civile au Kurdistan irakien ?
Le risque au Kurdistan irakien n'est pas immédiatement un retour aux combats de 1994. C'est une partition de fait, sans déclaration formelle.
Le 4 novembre, le PDK a réactivé le Parlement régional malgré le boycott de l'UPK, avec 52 élus sur 100. Le lendemain, Bafel Talabani a retiré son parti du gouvernement et prévenu que si Erbil nomme un président de région, Souleimaniyeh en nommera un aussi.
Le fond du conflit est arithmétique. Le PDK détient 39 sièges, l'UPK 23. L'UPK réclame la parité et le ministère de l'Intérieur, ce que le PDK refuse.
Chaque camp est enfermé dans un dilemme. Si le PDK avance seul, il sort du blocage mais offre à l'UPK le prétexte d'une duplication des institutions. S'il cède, il récompense le boycott. Une administration parallèle de l'UPK n'aurait aucune base constitutionnelle, mais un recul sans contrepartie affaiblirait Talabani.
Les forces de sécurité restent le point de fragilité. L'unification des Peshmergas annoncée en septembre a surtout renommé les anciennes forces partisanes en deux commandements distincts. Les services de sécurité et de renseignement restent rattachés à chaque parti.
Le contexte régional aggrave cette vulnérabilité. La coalition internationale a terminé sa mission le 30 septembre, et les drones visent la Région, dont le champ gazier de Khor Mor le 8 novembre. L'Iran, proche de l'UPK, et la Turquie, partenaire du PDK, prônent le dialogue. Washington n'a plus les moyens d'imposer un compromis, et Bagdad peut négocier séparément avec chaque camp.
Les deux partis excluent un affrontement armé. Mais la guerre n'est pas nécessaire à la division. Deux exécutifs, deux appareils de sécurité et deux canaux budgétaires vers Bagdad suffiraient à ramener le Kurdistan irakien à sa configuration d'avant 2006. Une fois ce partage installé, chaque différend sur les postes, les salaires ou les recettes pétrolières opposerait directement deux appareils armés. C'est ce mécanisme qui avait conduit à la guerre de 1994. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Winthrop Rodgers
@wrodgers2
.@USAMBTurkiye in response to question about how the US will protect Kurdish and minority rights: “It’s an Iraqi issue. It’s not a US issue…Get over it. Full stop.”
“We’re not going to intervene, we can encourage…my sound professional advice is: Get over it.” -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alex Ward
@alexbward
“ U.S. intelligence indicates that Iran’s hard-line leadership is determined to hold on to power at nearly any cost, according to two officials with direct knowledge of the information, which suggests economic pain alone may not lead to regime change.” www.nytimes.com/2026/11/10/us/politics/bessent-moved-base…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rahul Jadia
@jadiarahul
जब सद्दाम हुसैन को फांसी के लिए ले जाया जा रहा था, तब अमेरिकी सैनिकों ने उनसे पूछा कि उनकी अंतिम इच्छा क्या है।
सद्दाम हुसैन ने जवाब दिया, "मुझे मेरा कोट दो ताकि मैं उसे पहन सकूं।"
उनकी इच्छा के अनुसार उन्हें एक कोट दिया गया। एक सैनिक आश्चर्यचकित होकर बोला, "आपने कोट क्यों पहना है?"
सद्दाम हुसैन ने जवाब दिया, "आज बहुत ठंड है, कहीं ऐसा न हो कि मेरा शरीर ठंड से कांपने लगे और इराक के लोग यह सोचें कि उनका नेता मौत के डर से कांप रहा है। -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
Iran’s Missile Program: The Limits of Airpower and the Illusion of a Military Solution
Iran’s missile and drone capabilities are not simply the product of imported technology or foreign assistance. They are rooted in decades of indigenous knowledge, accumulated experience, and a national security doctrine built around asymmetric warfare.
The belief that Israel and the United States can permanently prevent Iran from producing missiles and drones through airstrikes has repeatedly collided with reality.
This does not mean that the military campaigns have failed to inflict significant damage. They have. Iranian production facilities, launchers, stockpiles, and supporting infrastructure have suffered substantial losses. But degrading a capability is not the same as eliminating it.
Iran spent decades preparing for precisely this kind of confrontation. Its missile and drone programs were designed not only to survive attacks but also to recover from them.
Factories can be destroyed, but engineering knowledge, technical expertise, operational experience, and the ability to rebuild supply chains are much harder to eliminate. Iran's recovery demonstrates that destroying production facilities does not necessarily destroy the industrial and technological foundations that allow those facilities to be rebuilt.
This leaves Washington and Jerusalem facing an uncomfortable strategic choice: either accept that Iran will retain significant conventional missile capabilities, or commit themselves to repeated military campaigns every few months or years, with enormous and potentially growing costs.
And these costs go far beyond the price of military operations. Every new campaign risks triggering Iranian retaliation against Israel, American military bases, Gulf states, and critical energy infrastructure. In other words, repeated attempts to weaken Iran's military capabilities could ultimately produce greater regional instability rather than lasting security.
There comes a point when national security strategy must rely not only on destroying an adversary's capabilities but also on deterring their use.
This does not mean abandoning military pressure or accepting every aspect of Iran's military buildup. It means recognizing that airstrikes cannot substitute for a comprehensive strategy combining credible deterrence, multilayered missile defense, intelligence operations, efforts to disrupt critical technology transfers, and diplomacy.
Military force can remain an important instrument. But it cannot become the strategy itself. And this is precisely the danger of a strategy built around repeated military campaigns. Tactical successes may create the appearance of progress while leaving the underlying strategic problem unresolved. Worse, they may lock Israel and the United States into an endless cycle of escalation, retaliation, and reconstruction.
Ultimately, the goal of a successful strategy should not be to ensure that Iran has no missiles. It should be to ensure that Iran understands the consequences of using them.
#iran
#iranwar
Bloomberg
@business
A western intelligence estimate says Iran can build about 50 ballistic missiles per month — roughly half its prewar capacity — providing a formidable means of retaliation if hostilities resume, despite months of airstrikes www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-10/iran-producing…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hassan I. Hassan
@hxhassan
Dr @r_aldoughli's new essay goes deep into the state of Salafism in Syria after the downfall of Bashar al-Assad.
Political victory doesn't mean religious authority, especially for Syria's diverse Sunni Muslim traditions. In @newlinesmag today:
newlinesmag.com/argument/is-syria-becoming-salafist/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amberin Zaman
@amberinzaman
A pretty clear “sort out your own quarrels. We have bigger fish to fry” to
PUK & KDP from
@USAMBTurkiye
Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch
This Tom Barrack answer to a question on the KDP-PUK disputes is just remarkable and gets to the core of the issue.
He describes the crisis as “a series of disputes of families” and says “we need to get over these tribal dismays.”
“I’m sure you’re exhausted from them, I’m sure the Barzanis and the Talabanis are and I know Baghdad is. So my sound professional intellectual advice is get over it.”
His full response helps explain why the core US focus is energy and counter-terrorism, which Washington already handles separately with the KDP and the PUK anyways. The US is therefore unlikely to care much about the current power struggle as long as any split remains peaceful.
His Full response:
“The Kurdistan Region, the Barzanis, the Talabanis [have] always been great friends of America. This is an Iraqi issue, this is an Iraqi decision. This is not an American decision. My advice, the president’s advice is get over it. Full stop. You guys need, I can go back to Congress and explain the complexity of the Iraqi constitution and the federalist delineation of the Kurdistan Region and how it dovetails with Baghdad. And then say besides that, we have a series of disputes of families within the Kurdistan Region that are subjecting our American companies and our international companies, who are the source of revenues to the entire region, to be subjugated to what’s happening now. The attacks on Khor Mor, for instance, what we were talking about, untenable. And we all have to attend to that and figure out a way to respond to it. But we need unity from the region, we need unity not only from the KRG but with the KRG and Baghdad. So we’re not going to intervene, there’s no way we can intervene, we can encourage. We can help, we can counsel, we can mediate. But honestly, now is the moment. You have a huge opportunity in front of you, we need to get over these tribal dismays. It just will carry them on for hundreds of years. I’m sure you’re exhausted from them, I’m sure the Barzanis and the Talabanis are and I know Baghdad is. So my sound professional intellectual advice is get over it.”This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post.This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rasha Al Aqeedi
@RashaAlAqeedi
One of the biggest stories in Iraq at the moment is that Iran-backed militia and designated terrorist group Kataeb Hezzbollah (listed for killing Iraqi civilians, btw) built and controls a non-licensed oil refinery in Jurf Al Sakhr. A one liner on Jurf Al
Sakhr: a town north of Baghdad that has been emptied completely of its Sunni population since 2014 by Iran-backed militias. 12 years later, the majority of its displaced population are still in tents and denied entrance to Baghdad or other more habitable areas.
Back to the oil refinery. Because it's not licensed, no one knows where the oil is going, who's buying it, and how much it has generated. Given the well-known fact that the IRGC pretty much remote-controls Kataeb Hezzbollah, there's a high probability that the oil and/or revenue is going to Tehran and simultaneously making the militias richer.
Since Barrack and other US talking heads are currently in London rubbing shoulders with Iraq's corrupt establishment, maybe they can address this topic. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aron Lund
@aronlund
Damascus reportedly considers a major military reform, eliminating the division level and placing 6–8 brigades directly under each one of 5 territorial corps—effectively a sort of military region. Corps led by JN/HTS veterans.
• www.syria.tv/376921
• www.syria.tv/361863 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
In my interview @SkyYaldaHakim @SkyNews , I discussed what Israeli foreign policy might look like if Gadi Eisenkot succeeds in forming a government.
Eisenkot would certainly bring a welcome change in tone and direction. But his priority would likely be Israel’s urgent domestic challenges, rather than launching another military campaign against Iran.
He fully understands the Iranian threat, but he also recognizes something Netanyahu has repeatedly failed to acknowledge: you cannot bring down the Iranian regime through airstrikes alone.
On the Palestinian issue, Eisenkot could bring a positive shift. But expectations should remain realistic. His would still be a right-wing government, likely operating with a narrow parliamentary majority. We should not expect dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs or far-reaching peace initiatives, but he will fight against Jewish terrorism in the west Bank and for improving Palestinian life.
The change would be positive, but it would not be a revolution in Israeli foreign policy.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Former Qatari PM Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani: "Once the countries of the region reach understandings, resolve their differences, and keep foreign interference out of their affairs, everyone will respect their will, and we will work together to lift the blockade imposed on Iran."
حمد بن جاسم بن جبر
@hamadjjalthani
أتمنى أن تُكلَّل الجهود التي تبذلها بلادي لحلّ الصراع القائم في منطقتنا بالنجاح. وأرى أن الجميع خاسر في الحروب، وأن ما يجمع دول المنطقة، بما فيها إيران وباكستان وتركيا والعراق، أكبر بكثير مما يفرّقها.
فلنتخيّل لو أن شعوب هذه المنطقة، التي يبلغ تعدادها نحو نصف مليار نسمة، بما فيها دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي، تعاونت على جعل منطقتنا فضاءً لتبادل المنافع والخبرات، وإتاحة حرية الاستثمار والتجارة والتصدير دون قيود، على غرار تجربة الاتحاد الأوروبي.
فلنبدأ بالتعاون الاقتصادي فيما بيننا، فالمكاسب ستكون عظيمة، وستكون ثمرتها الاستقرار والازدهار لكل دول المنطقة . أما الحروب فلن تفضي إلى نتائج مجدية، وحتى المنتصر فيها سيكون مهزومًا.
إننا باقون في هذه المنطقة كما كنا على مرّ التاريخ، فلا يستطيع أحد أن يحمل وطنه كخيمة وينتقل به إلى منطقة أخرى. ولذلك، ينبغي للساسة في إيران أن يدركوا أن السلام يحقق مكاسب أكبر وأوفر للجميع.
ومتى ما توصّلت دول المنطقة إلى تفاهمات، وعالجت خلافاتها، وأبعدت التدخلات الخارجية عن شؤونها، فإن الجميع سيحترم إرادتها، وسنعمل معًا على رفع الحصار المفروض على إيران.
إن تعاوننا قادر على تحقيق الكثير من الإنجازات والمكاسب المشتركة، فلا تجعلونا نستمر في هذا العداء. أتمنى ان يسود صوت العقل. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ron Bousso
@ronbousso1
This is a very unsual trade, but one that captures how crazy things are in the Gulf since the start of the Iran war - the UAE selling a cargo of Saudi oil from a tanker that was hit by an Iranian projectile, which caused a terrible spill.
www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-is-selling-saudi-oi… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Syria in Transition
@SyriaTransition
Is al-Sharaa Syria's Franco?
"Something resembling a Sunni Arab version of National Catholicism may now be emerging in Syria in the shape of 'neo-Umayyadism'. The political attraction is that al-Sharaa can present his government as defending the majority’s values while preserving his freedom of action."
www.syriaintransition.com/en/home/opinion/democracy-postp… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
Given the expectation that Trump would restart the war after the midterms, optimism has grown that Trump may finally have abandoned the fantasy of a military victory. I suspect that optimism is premature. Instead, I see three possible scenarios: War, peace, and a Swiss cheese status quo.
Though pressure for war has been intensifying, if Trump doesn’t go down this path in the next three to four weeks, I agree that the likelihood will start to dwindle as Trump’s maneuverability will be eclipsed by a Democratic Senate and House; he will likely lose his Secretary of War, and the next Prime Minister in Israel will likely not share Benjamin Netanyahu’s obsession with Iran or his skills in playing the American political system.
But even if the risk of war declines, that does not necessarily mean the likelihood of a deal increases.
The most likely scenario may prove to be neither war nor peace - yet different from the middle path Trump chose last Friday. In this scenario, Trump’s economic warfare and blockade would only exist on paper. Meaning, Trump rejects both war and peace, walks away and claims to retain the blockade and sanctions infrastructure, but in reality imperceptibly begins to let it wither away.
Read full analysis: tritaparsi.substack.com/p/the-swiss-cheese-solution-how-t… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Qutaiba Idlbi قتيبة ادلبي
@Qidlbi
Reports of possible Syrian military cooperation with Saudi Arabia related to Yemen deserve a broader strategic reading.
If focused on expertise in asymmetric warfare, drones, and mountain warfare, it could deepen Syria-Saudi ties, strengthen strategic coordination with Türkiye, & provide Syria an opportunity to play a regional role.
But the scope and risks matter.
1/6 🇸🇦 🇸🇾 🇹🇷 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
A U.S.-Iran deal at this point would be an abridged version of the Islamabad MOU, with a crucial difference: Iran is conditioning the start of talks with Washington on the upfront implementation—and Iranian verification—of its demands.
These include an end to the “regional war”, particularly in Lebanon; the release of roughly $22 billion in frozen Iranian assets; lifting the U.S. blockade; and granting waivers for Iranian oil exports, among several other conditions.
Per the Iranians, only after these steps are implemented and verified would Iran lift its restrictions on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. And even that would mean U.S. acceptance of the Iran-Oman transit agreement and an end to the current U.S.-backed, ship-to-ship southern corridor.
And only then, per what the Iranians are saying, would they enter nuclear negotiations covering enrichment levels, inspections, its enriched uranium stockpile, and other issues. (And here they show no signs of budging from their longstanding bottomlines)
The intermediaries, particularly Qatar, have apparently devised a mechanism that would allow Washington to fulfill these conditions within just two days, clearing the way for nuclear talks.
But will Trump really agree to all this?
It would mean accepting Iran’s sequencing and core demands before even beginning formal nuclear negotiations.
This is something that, much like the Islamabad MOU, could be seen as an admission of defeat.
I’m not optimistic at all that he will. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mahmoud Refaat
@MRefaat_Formal
قناة العربية تنقل الان عن مصادر من قطر وباكستان أن المفاوضات بين #أمريكا و #إيران تتقدم حيث وافقت وشنطن على التالي:
- واشنطن سمحت بتخصيب اليورانيوم داخل إيران بنسبة 3.67% وطهران وافقت.. أي أن #ترمب تنازل عن صفر يورانيوم بيد #طهران.
- واشنطن تطالب بخفض مستوى اليورانيوم الإيراني المخصب بنسبة 60%.. أي كمية الـ 500 كجم يورانيوم عالي التخصيب التي كانت الراية التي تم رفعها لبدأ الحرب ستحتفظ بها ايران ولن تدمرها أو تخرجها لدولة أخرى كما كان يصر ترمب، علما أن نسبة 60% تخصيب تعني القدرة على صنع سلاح نووي أي بمقدور ايران اليوم تصنيع 10 قنابل نووية تقريبا بعد كل هذا الدمار وهذه الحرب الضروس.
- أميركا ستفرج عن أصول إيرانية بقيمة بين 6 و9 مليارات دولار وترفع الحصار البحري عن ايران حال التوصل إلى اتفاق
- مقابل ذلك تفتح ايران #مضيق_هرمز "الذي كان مفتوحا أصلا حتى يوم اندلاع الحرب".
قلت وأكرر، ترمب سيعقد صفقة كبرى مع إيران خلال الشهور القادمة، ملامح الصفقة يمكن تلمسها الان من الحصار المضروب على ترمب والخناق الذي سيضيق عليه بمجرد تسلم الديموقراطيين الكونجرس مطلع يناير القادم وبدأهم فتح التحقيقات معه ومع أسرته ودوائره المالية والسياسية، حيث سيحاول قصار جهده الهروب لأي انجاز وسيكون هذا الإنجاز صفقة مع ايران سيعطيها بموجبها 100 ضعف ما أعطى أوباما في 2015 وستصبح ايران القوة المهيمنة على الإقليم. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
The Gulf’s New Iran Strategy: Engagement Without Illusions
Anwar Gargash is effectively outlining what could become the foundation of the Gulf states’ future approach toward Iran.
At the heart of this approach is a recognition of two realities that may appear contradictory but are actually complementary.
First, Iran is not going anywhere. It will remain a major regional power, and no realistic strategy can be based on isolating it indefinitely, ignoring its interests, or assuming that military pressure will fundamentally change its behavior.
The Gulf states understand that maintaining constructive relations with Tehran is a strategic necessity, not a favor to the Iranian leadership. Pushing Iran into a corner without offering a diplomatic way forward could ultimately undermine their own security.
But there is another side to this equation.
Engagement cannot mean accepting Iranian interference, intimidation, or violations of Gulf sovereignty. Tehran will be expected to respect the independence, security, and legitimate interests of its neighbors. The Gulf states are not prepared to accept a regional order in which Iran dictates the rules simply because it possesses the ability to disrupt regional stability.
What makes Gargash's message particularly significant is that it comes from the UAE, a country that has taken a firm position toward Iran during the confrontation.
This reflects an important strategic recognition: Iran cannot be eliminated from the regional equation, and therefore it must be engaged. But engagement does not mean trust.
The Gulf states are unlikely to build their future Iran policy on diplomacy alone. Alongside efforts to maintain dialogue and reduce tensions, they will continue strengthening their military capabilities, air and missile defenses, intelligence cooperation, and security partnerships, particularly with the United States.
But perhaps the most important lesson of the war is that the Gulf states can no longer afford to leave their security and their relationship with Iran entirely in the hands of Washington or Jerusalem.
The war exposed the limitations of American security guarantees and demonstrated how decisions taken outside the Gulf can impose enormous economic and security costs on countries that have little influence over those decisions.
This does not mean the Gulf states will abandon their strategic partnerships with the United States. Quite the opposite. They will continue investing in these relationships while seeking greater independence in shaping their regional policies.
The implications for Israel are equally significant. The Gulf states do not want their relations with Iran to be dictated by the Israeli-Iranian confrontation. They may continue developing security cooperation with Israel where their interests align, while opposing Israeli military initiatives that could expose their economies, energy infrastructure, and populations to another regional war.
In other words, the Gulf states will increasingly seek to take ownership of their own strategic future, including the management of their relationship with Tehran. Neither Washington nor Jerusalem should assume that Gulf policy toward Iran will automatically follow their preferences.
This approach must also produce practical results. Dialogue with Tehran cannot remain limited to diplomatic statements and symbolic visits. It must eventually address concrete security concerns, including the protection of energy infrastructure, freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, respect for national sovereignty, noninterference in domestic affairs, and mechanisms to prevent military incidents from escalating into broader conflicts.
None of this suggests that the Gulf states have suddenly become optimistic about Iran's intentions. Their concerns regarding Tehran's missile capabilities, regional ambitions, and support for armed groups remain substantial.
Nor does it mean that all Gulf countries will adopt an identical strategy. Their interests and relationships with Iran differ, but the broader strategic lesson is increasingly difficult to ignore.
The Gulf states have learned that they cannot eliminate the Iranian threat, but they also cannot afford another war intended to do so.
Their future approach will therefore combine engagement, deterrence, military preparedness, and a growing determination to shape regional security arrangements themselves.
The message to Tehran is clear: We recognize your place in the region, but you must respect our sovereignty, security, and independence. We are prepared to engage, but we will also prepare for the possibility that engagement fails.
And the message to Washington and Jerusalem is no less important: The Gulf states will not simply accept being drawn into another devastating confrontation with Iran. They intend to have a much greater say in how their region's future is shaped.
#iran
#iranwar
#gcc
Gulf News
@gulf_news
Anwar Gargash emphasizes dialogue with Iran as a strategic necessity, urging respect for sovereignty and concrete actions to rebuild trust.
gulfnews.com/uae/government/anwar-gargash-dialogue-with-i… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
جرئیات پیشنهادات قطر و پاکستان درباره مذاکرات
در پیشنهاد اخیر قطریها مطلقاً حرفی از غنی سازی نیست. غنیسازی اصلاً موضوع ایران و آمریکا نیست و در هیچ یک از سندهای تبادل شده بین طرفین نیست.
مشکل الان آمریکا از بین رفتن ادراک اطلاعاتی از وضعیت داخلی تأسیساتی است که به آن حمله کرده که درخواست بازگشت بازرسان برای از بین رفتن خلأ ادراکی است و مشکل بزرگتر اینکه بتواند تکلیف ۴۲۰ کیلو اورانیوم ۶۰ درصد غنی شده را روشن کند.
در ایران تصویر کلی از تفاوت حرف و رفتار آمریکا این است که درخواست مذاکره واقعی نیست. بی اعتمادی به آمریکا بسیار بالاست.
گره مذاکرات پاسخهای مبهم آمریکا به هفت شرط ایران برای آغاز مذاکرات است. بر اساس پیشنهاد ایران حتی اگر مذاکره هستهای هم در کار باشد مقدمهاش اجرای ۷ شرط مذاکراتی ایران است که رفع تحریم و محاصره بخشی از آن است. جی ونس در آمریکا مذاکره هستهای را راهی برای احیای پتانسیل سیاسی خود میداند.
از سویی هم عاصم منیر و هم قطریها مشکل اصلی را نبود خط مستقیم ارتباطی بین ترامپ و تهران میدانند و خواستار برگزاری جلسه مذاکرات بین ایران و آمریکا شدهاند. حتی میانجیگران گفتهاند مشکل ترامپ یک تماس است که اگر بگیرید مشکلات حل میشود. عاصم منیر هم به دنبال برگزاری جلسه مشترک ایران و آمریکاست که باز هم از طرف آمریکا، ونس طرف مذاکره باشد.
ایران تاکنون پاسخی به این درخواست نداده است و پیش فرض هر گفتوگویی را اجرای شروط ۷ گانه میدانند که آمریکا هم اگرچه در ظاهر پذیرفته ولی اجرای ۷ شرط را موکول به گفتوگوی هستهای میداند. بحث بر سر تقدم و تأخر پیشنهادات است. مذاکره یا عدم مذاکره هرکدام مزایا و معایب خودش را دارد.
به نظر شما بهترین راهبرد برای ایران چیست؟ پاسخ دادن به آمریکا یا تداوم وضعیت سکوت؟
اگر منو فالو نکردید و دوست داشتید تحلیلها را زودتر ببینید منو فالو کنید. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aron Lund
@aronlund
.@APNews’s @AlsayedGhaith and @sammymagdy have more on the Syria-Saudi-Yemen story. apnews.com/article/syria-saudi-yemen-houthis-fighters-d43…
Aron Lund
@aronlund
Syrian denials notwithstanding, an @AFP source in the Yemeni presidential council says Syria may send 3 000 troops to assist against the Houthis. www.france24.com/en/live-news/20261107-thousands-of-syria…
This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
The war left Iran without realistic options to negotiate
Today, the points on which Israel and the United States are pressuring Iran in any potential agreement are exactly the same ones that led to the war.
The main one remains the nuclear program. Internal surveys before the conflict showed the construction of a bomb as a project rejected by more than half the population. Today, according to statements from Iranian authorities and the internal political climate, around 70% support the idea of a nuclear weapon.
After being attacked by nuclear powers, with the assassination of Ali Khamenei in the first hours of the February 2026 operation and of several other leaders, it is natural for this population to seek some form of nuclear deterrence.
How can Iran give up the program today?
The attacks by Israel and the United States made this possibility, if it ever existed in a negotiable form, practically impossible to achieve.
Any government that makes a significant move in this direction risks being overthrown and triggering a wave of internal instability.
Another constant point has been the missile program and its range. We go back to the start of the war.
Iran was saved from complete destruction precisely by its missile program and its ability to respond with force.
How can it give that up now? Without advanced missiles capable of threatening American bases in the region and maintaining an exchange of fire with Israel, Iran would today be a complete pariah.
Demanding this at this moment is unrealistic, and yet it remains one of the American and Israeli demands.
The same applies to restrictions on drone development.
Two powers that failed to win the war decisively now want to disarm Iran through agreements. This sounds completely detached from reality. Let’s be coherent here.
Finally, Washington and Israel demand the immediate end of any financial, logistical, and military support to regional militias. The demands specifically focus on cutting off the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, the Iraqi PMF, the Houthis, and smaller groups.
But how can this demand be met when, at the moment Iran was under intense fire, Hezbollah proved loyal and opened another front against Israel?
I am not judging here the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s operations on Lebanese territory, but the loyalty demonstrated leaves Iran with its hands tied.
The Iraqi PMF acted from the beginning alongside Iran, opening fire on American and NATO targets.
The Houthis, responding to Iranian strategic demand, opened the front in Yemen against the Saudis, pressuring the market, weakening Trump politically, and forcing negotiations.
Today I see no political condition in which Iran would be able to distance itself from its militias.
All of this without mentioning the unrestricted opening of the Strait of Hormuz, another demand Iran cannot meet.
The resources that come through there, even if still not as significant as in the past, will be key to the country’s reconstruction in the coming years. This was the outlet the Iranians found to relieve pressure amid the shortage of foreign currency.
On November 8, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the negotiations with Iran as unproductive and called Tehran’s demands unacceptable, absurd, and ridiculous.
Does Rubio have any reason in this?
Read more:
global21.substack.com/p/the-war-left-iran-without-realist… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Negar Mortazavi
@NegarMortazavi
The risk of new escalation in the US-Israel war on #iran is receding. Five reasons why:
1/5 Republican Defeat
Trump’s party suffered a crushing midterm defeat, losing both chambers. Vance blamed the war itself. The electoral backlash has dramatically raised the political cost of further escalation for Trump. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 كشفت صحيفة «نيويورك تايمز»، في تقرير أعده ديفيد سانغر وإريك شميت، وهما من أبرز مراسليها المتخصصين في الأمن القومي والشؤون العسكرية، أن إدارة ترامب تدرس أربعة مسارات للخروج من الحرب مع إيران، وسط خلاف جوهري لا يتعلق بوسائل إنهائها فحسب، بل بالأهداف التي تسعى واشنطن إلى تحقيقها أصلاً.
🔷 حيث أن مسؤولين أمريكيين مطلعين أقروا بأن الرئيس ومستشاريه لم يتفقوا حتى الآن على الهدف النهائي للحرب، رغم مرور أكثر من ثمانية أشهر على بدايتها. وتؤكد الصحيفة أن ترامب وافق عدة مرات خلال الأشهر الأخيرة على استئناف حملة عسكرية واسعة ضد إيران، ثم تراجع قبل ساعات فقط من تنفيذ العمليات.
🔷 ويأتي ذلك بعد تجاوز تكلفة الحرب 47 مليار دولار، وفق تقديرات أولية للبنتاغون، دون احتساب الخسائر الاقتصادية الناتجة عن ارتفاع أسعار الطاقة، ودون إقرار الكونغرس تمويلاً إضافياً لها.
🔷 ويتضمن الخيار العسكري الأوسع الذي أعدته القوات الأمريكية والإسرائيلية حملة مكثفة تستمر عدة أيام، تستهدف منشآت الطاقة والمواقع النووية ومخزونات الصواريخ والمسيّرات الإيرانية. لكن المسؤولين الأمريكيين لا يتوقعون أن تؤدي هذه العمليات إلى إسقاط النظام، ويعتمدون في تحقيق هذا الهدف على استمرار الضغط الاقتصادي.
🔷 وتشمل الاستعدادات استخدام حاملتي طائرات موجودتين في المنطقة، مع وصول ثالثة خلال نحو أسبوعين، إلى جانب مقاتلات وقاذفات استراتيجية من طرازَي «بي-1» و«بي-2». وكشفت الصحيفة أن القوات الأمريكية والإسرائيلية كثفت تدريباتها الجوية فوق العراق لمحاكاة الضربات، فيما سحبت واشنطن أفراداً من منشآت وقواعد معرضة للخطر، ونقلت بطارية إضافية من منظومة باتريوت إلى إسرائيل.
🔷 وناقش ترامب استهداف منشأة «جبل الفأس» النووية المحصنة باستخدام قنبلة «أم القنابل» التي تزن 22 ألف رطل. لكن خبراء الأسلحة يشككون في قدرتها على تدمير المنشأة المبنية داخل طبقات صخرية من الغرانيت، لأنها مصممة لإحداث انفجار واسع فوق سطح الأرض. وتشير الصحيفة أيضاً إلى أن المواد النووية الإيرانية اللازمة لصناعة قنبلة لا تزال تحت أنقاض المواقع التي استُهدفت في يونيو 2025، بينما توجد تقارير عن تخزين أجهزة طرد مركزي متطورة في المنشأة المحصنة. ويعني ذلك أن تنفيذ ضربة كبيرة قد لا يحقق بالضرورة الهدف النووي المعلن للحرب.
🔷 أما الخيار العسكري الثاني، فيتضمن ضربات أقل اتساعاً تستبعد معظم منشآت الطاقة، وتركز على الأهداف العسكرية والنووية لتقليص احتمالات الرد الإيراني ضد البنية النفطية الخليجية. وكشفت الصحيفة أن القوات الأمريكية نفذت خلال الأسابيع الماضية ضربات محدودة ضد جزيرة قشم ومنصات إطلاق الصواريخ والمسيّرات داخل إيران، بعضها بواسطة مدفعية أمريكية بعيدة المدى متمركزة في دول الخليج، وأن بعض الضربات أصاب منصات إطلاق صواريخ جوالة كانت خالية. ويقر مسؤولون في الإدارة بأن حملة محدودة لن تحقق أهداف الحرب الأصلية، لكنها قد تسمح لترامب بإعلان إنجاز عسكري إضافي والبدء بسحب القوات، مع بقاء قدرة إيران على تهديد مضيق هرمز.
🔷 وفي المسار الدبلوماسي، كشفت الصحيفة أن جي دي فانس عرض في رسالته الأخيرة إلى محسن رضائي، رئيس المجلس الأعلى للأمن القومي الإيراني، أن يتولى شخصياً قيادة المفاوضات الأمريكية، وهو دور غير معتاد لنائب الرئيس. ورغم الترحيب الأولي بالمبادرة، بمشاركة وسطاء من قطر وباكستان وتركيا والسعودية، نقلت الصحيفة عن مطلعين على المباحثات أن بعض المفاوضين الأمريكيين أصبحوا أكثر تشاؤماً، خشية أن تقوض التيارات المتشددة داخل طهران أي اتفاق. ويتمحور الخلاف الأساسي حول ترتيب التنفيذ؛ إذ تريد واشنطن معالجة المواد النووية الإيرانية أولاً قبل الإفراج عن الأموال المجمدة أو تخفيف العقوبات، بينما تصر طهران على الاحتفاظ بهذه المواد حتى نهاية العملية التفاوضية باعتبارها ضمانة لتنفيذ الاتفاق.
🔷 أما المسار الرابع، فيقوم على استمرار الحصار البحري والضغط الاقتصادي دون تصعيد شامل، مع مواصلة حماية مرور ما بين 11 و18 مليون برميل يومياً من النفط غير الإيراني عبر هرمز. ويمكن أن يتطور هذا المسار إلى اتفاق محدود لإعادة فتح المضيق وانسحاب أمريكي تدريجي، مع ترك دول الخليج تتفاوض مباشرة مع إيران بشأن ترتيبات الملاحة. لكن هذه الصيغة ستؤجل حسم الملفين النووي والصاروخي، وقد تُبقي المواجهة مفتوحة طوال ما تبقى من رئاسة ترامب، وربما إلى عهد خلفه. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
جزئیات مجوز ایران به ۴ کشور برای عبور از تنگه هرمز
مهمترین دلیل کلافگی آمریکا در تنگه هرمز این است که ایران تصمیم گرفته فعلاً کشتیهای هند، چین، عراق و قطر امکان تردد آزاد در تنگه هرمز را داشته باشند. به این کشورها اعلام شده مجوز صادر شده «فقط» برای تردد از آبهای سرزمینی ایران است و مسیر موسوم به عمان از منظر ایران غیرقانونی است و هر کشتی که از آنجا تردد کند، هدف قرار خواهد گرفت.
بر اساس هماهنگی انجام شده مشخصات کشتیهای این ۴ کشور قبل از حضور در محدوده تنگه هرمز باید به ایران اطلاع رسانی شود. ایران از این طریق در حال تثبیت مسیر ایران و اعمال حاکمیت بر تنگه است. از طرفی صدور مجوز موردی برای برخی کشورها امکان ایجاد اجماع علیه ایران را سخت میکند. پیام دیگر این تردد این است که امکان پاداش گرفتن بابت رفتار درست با ایران برای همه وجود دارد.
در نهایت هندیها به دلیل تسهیل ورود مواد اولیه دارو، چین به دلیل شراکت راهبردی و حمایت سیاسی از ایران، عراق به دلیل درخواست گروههای مقاومت و قطریها به دلیل دیگری مجوز عبور از تنگه هرمز را پیدا کردهاند. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
مشعل - MESHAL
@mishaltd
🇮🇱 #آيزنكوت يريد طرد #نتنياهو من السلطة.. لكن ماذا يريد من #السعودية و #إيران و #غزة و #لبنان؟
👈🏻 خلني أعطيك اخر مواقفه في هذه الملفات:
📌 🇸🇦 السعودية والتطبيع:
▪️ أيد تعزيز العلاقات مع #مصر و #الأردن ودول اتفاقات أبراهام، والعمل على توسيع دائرة السلام.
▪️ وعندما سُئل عن التغييرات المطلوبة في الضفة الغربية لفتح الطريق أمام ترتيبات إقليمية تشمل السعودية، تعهد بمنع اعتداءات المتطرفين على الفلسطينيين، لكنه قال إنه سيفعل ذلك انطلاقاً من المصلحة الإسرائيلية.
▪️ أما فرص الاتفاق، فلا يرى التطبيع مع السعودية متاحاً في المستقبل القريب.
📌 🇮🇷 إيران:
▪️ قال إن الأهداف ينبغي أن تتركز على وقف البرنامج النووي، وضرب برنامج الصواريخ، وقطع العلاقة بين إيران وحزب الله.
▪️ لكنه اعتبر جعل إسقاط النظام الإيراني هدفاً عسكرياً خطأ، وذكر أن تغيير الحكم يجب أن يأتي من الشعب الإيراني نفسه.
▪️ دعا إلى العمل مع الأميركيين لمنع استعادة القدرة النووية وفرض الرقابة، مستفيدين من الضغط الاقتصادي وملف هرمز.
📌 🇵🇸 غزة وحماس:
▪️ تعهد بإنهاء حكم حماس في غزة خلال 18 شهراً من توليه رئاسة الحكومة، وكرر الوعد في تجمع انتخابي.
▪️ وطرح طريقين لتحقيق ذلك: تنفيذ خطة ترمب، أو استخدام القدرات العسكرية الإسرائيلية.
▪️ وجعل نزع سلاح حماس شرطاً يسبق استعادة الإدارة المدنية، ودخول قوة استقرار متعددة الجنسيات، وبدء الإعمار.
📌 🇱🇧 لبنان وحزب الله:
▪️ أيد بقاء الجيش الإسرائيلي في منطقة أمنية جنوب لبنان إلى حين التوصل إلى ترتيبات أمنية وصفها بالجوهرية، مع حرية العمل ضد حزب الله في بيروت والبقاع أيضاً.
▪️ طالب بنزع السلاح جنوب الليطاني، ومنع تدفق السلاح إلى حزب الله، وقطع علاقته بإيران. واعتبر تفكيك سلاح الحزب مساراً طويل الأمد.
▪️ ونقلت “جيروزاليم بوست” أنه يتمسك بعمق أمني يبلغ 8 كيلومترات لمنع تهديد الصواريخ المضادة للدروع.
📌 هذه مواقفه المعلنة وتقديراته قبل تشكيل الحكومة.. أما ما يستطيع تنفيذه، فسيتوقف أيضاً على اتفاقه مع شركائه وعلاقته بواشنطن.
#إسرائيل #السعودية #إيران #غزة #لبنان -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Miad Maleki
@miadmaleki
I reviewed 110 financial documents and reports of main Iranian land and sea transportation companies along with regional custom data. Here is what @CENTCOM new Task Force Iron Gate — announced today to squeeze Iran’s land borders and the Caspian — is actually up against.
Since April 2026, a U.S. naval blockade has shut Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, ports that handled roughly 163 million tons of cargo and about 80% of Iran’s trade.
But Iran has seven back doors: Iraq, Turkey, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Together they carried about $22 billion in trade in 2024–25 — $15.3B out, $6.8B in. Since the blockade, every one of these corridors shows traffic surging.
That is the gap Iron Gate has to close. A thread with the numbers, corridor by corridor. (1/10) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aron Lund
@aronlund
“The growing criticism of Saudi Arabia from STC officials in the media reflects their confidence that if the north is lost to the Houthis, the Saudis will have to let the STC operate openly.”
@patrickwintour, @guardian: www.theguardian.com/world/2026/nov/05/yemen-president-sac… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 بعد أيام من كشف موقع «ميدل إيست آي» الممول قطريا عن وصول متخصصين سوريين في تشغيل الطائرات المسيرة إلى اليمن. كشفت وكالة الصحافة الفرنسية، اليوم، عن اتفاق سوري سعودي لإرسال آلاف العسكريين السوريين للمشاركة في الحرب ضد الحوثيين.
🔷 نقل موقع «ميدل إيست آي» عن مسؤول غربي أن متخصصين سوريين في تشغيل المسيّرات وصلوا بالفعل إلى اليمن لمساعدة القوات المدعومة من السعودية. وربط التقرير التحركات السورية باتساع حاجة الرياض إلى المساعدة العسكرية على حدودها الجنوبية، مشيراً إلى أن عمليات الحوثيين البرية أصبحت عاملاً إضافياً في حسابات نشر قوات من الدول الحليفة.
🔷 لكن تقرير الوكالة الفرنسية تضمن معلومات أكثر أهمية، أبرزها أن مئات العسكريين السوريين انتشروا بالفعل على جانبي الحدود السعودية اليمنية، وأن اتفاقاً بين الرياض ودمشق ينص على نشر أكثر من 10 آلاف مقاتل على مراحل.
🔷 نقلت الوكالة عن ثلاثة مصادر عسكرية يمنية ومسؤول دفاعي أن مئات السوريين وصلوا إلى السعودية واليمن، فيما أكد أحد المسؤولين أن العناصر الموجودة على الجانب اليمني تتولى بالفعل قيادة عمليات بالمسيّرات ضد الحوثيين. وكشف مصدر في مجلس القيادة الرئاسي اليمني أن البلدين اتفقا على إرسال نحو 3 آلاف عسكري سوري للقتال ضمن التحالف الذي تقوده السعودية، بينما أوضح مصدر في وزارة الدفاع اليمنية أن هذه القوة، التي تضم ضباطاً وخبراء عسكريين، تمثل المرحلة الأولى من خطة أكبر تتجاوز 10 آلاف مقاتل.
🔷 والأهم أن الاتفاق على نشر القوات أُقر خلال زيارة الرئيس السوري أحمد الشرع إلى الرياض هذا الأسبوع، حيث وقّع البلدان اتفاقيات للتعاون، بينها اتفاق دفاعي. وكشفت مصادر الوكالة أن فرقاً فنية من وزارتي الدفاع السورية والسعودية تعمل حالياً في الرياض على استكمال ترتيبات مشاركة القوات السورية في العمليات ضد الحوثيين، وأن الاتفاق الموقّع بين الوزارتين يوفر الإطار القانوني لهذه المشاركة.
🔷 ويكتسب هذا التطور أهمية خاصة لأن القوات السورية، وفق التقرير، ستكون أول قوات برية أجنبية تشارك مباشرة في الحرب اليمنية منذ تجددها خلال الصيف. وتلفت الوكالة أيضاً إلى أن الجيش السوري الجديد يتألف من تشكيلات متعددة، يغلب عليها الطابع الإسلامي ويضم بينها مقاتلين جهاديين أجانب، دون أن تحدد هوية الوحدات المقرر إرسالها إلى اليمن.
🔷 وفي سياق متصل، كشف «ميدل إيست آي» حصرياً، استناداً إلى مسؤولين غربيين وعرب لديهم معرفة مباشرة بالعمليات، أن الحوثيين نفذوا عدة عمليات توغل بري داخل السعودية خلال الأشهر الماضية، استهدفت مواقع عسكرية ونقاطاً حدودية في المناطق الجبلية جنوب غربي المملكة. وأكد مصدر غربي أن إحدى العمليات وقعت في أواخر أكتوبر ورُصدت بأجهزة المراقبة، وأن الحوثيين استولوا على أسلحة خفيفة من أنواع تستخدمها قوات حرس الحدود السعودية. وبحسب التقرير، تُعد هذه أولى عمليات التوغل الحوثية المبلغ عنها داخل الأراضي السعودية منذ انهيار الهدنة اليمنية.
🔷 وتكشف هذه العمليات عن تحول في أساليب الضغط الحوثية، بعدما بدأت الهجمات بالمسيّرات والصواريخ، ثم توسعت إلى استخدام المسيّرات الصغيرة لإسقاط الذخائر وعمليات القنص، وصولاً إلى الغارات البرية المباشرة. وحذر الخبير اليمني محمد الباشا من أن الحوثيين قد يعودون إلى تكتيكات الكر والفر التي استخدموها في المراحل الأولى من الحرب، بما يشمل مهاجمة المواقع الحدودية والاستيلاء على الأسلحة والمعدات وأسر أفراد من القوات المقابلة. وتبرز أهمية هذه المعلومات في أنها تكشف عن تهديد بري مضاف إلى الهجمات الصاروخية والجوية، في وقت تستعد فيه السعودية، بحسب مصادر وكالة الصحافة الفرنسية، لإشراك آلاف المقاتلين السوريين في المواجهة. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
MoloMonitor 🇮🇹
@MoloWarMonitor
The U.S. has just announced the total isolation of Iran, in addition to the naval blockade that has been in place against Iranian ports for months.
CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper has established Task Force "Iron Gate," a team of around 20 civilian and military personnel based in Tampa, Florida.
Their task is to prevent Iran from using land routes and the Caspian Sea to transport advanced weapons, dual-use technology, and sanctioned materials. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Restitutor Orientis 🇱🇮
@restitutorII
🇸🇦🇦🇪🇶🇦🇧🇭🇴🇲🇰🇼
Pays du Golfe: Le prince Turki Al-Faisal alerte sur la forte baisse de la fécondité dans les pays du Golfe depuis plusieurs décennies. Selon les données de la Banque mondiale pour 2024, le nombre moyen d’enfants par femme est estimé à environ 2,5 à Oman, 2,3 en Arabie saoudite, 1,8 à Bahreïn, 1,7 au Qatar, 1,6 au Koweït et 1,2 aux EAU. Quatre de ces six pays sont ainsi passés sous le seuil de renouvellement des générations, fixé à 2,1 enfants par femme.
Il affirme que cette tendance se poursuit, les sociétés du Golfe pourraient connaître de profondes mutations démographiques, dont l’ampleur variera selon les pays. Car la baisse de la natalité n’est que le premier volet du problème.
Le second avertissement concerne le vieillissement progressif de la population. Selon le prince, si les sociétés du Golfe restent encore relativement jeunes, cet avantage démographique ne sera pas éternel. Les générations nombreuses issues des périodes de forte natalité vont progressivement vieillir, tandis que l’allongement de l’espérance de vie et l’amélioration des soins de santé contribueront à augmenter la proportion de personnes âgées. Tout en indique qu'à terme, cette évolution entraînera une hausse des besoins en matière de santé, de retraite et de prise en charge des personnes dépendantes, faisant peser de nouvelles contraintes sur les finances publiques et les systèmes de protection sociale. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
An interesting detail has emerged from Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali’s account of the meeting between Putin and Mohsen Rezaei.
- According to Jalali, Russia condemned the IAEA’s discriminatory treatment of Iran. However, when the possibility of Tehran withdrawing from the NPT was discussed, he noted that major powers have their own reservations and exercise caution, as part of their international influence rests on the existing institutional framework.
- This distinction looks significant. Moscow may share Tehran’s criticism of the IAEA, but it has little interest in seeing the international nuclear non-proliferation framework further weakened.
- Jalali’s remarks suggest that Russia is not necessarily prepared to support Iran should it decide to leave the NPT, a position that has also surfaced on previous occasions. They also point to a potential divergence between Tehran and Moscow over how far the confrontation with the IAEA should go.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Iranian analysts and observers are interpreting today’s statement by the IRGC spokesman that Iran has lifted its self-imposed 2,000-km missile range limit as a significant departure from the military posture established under Ali Khamenei.
- As is well known, the former Supreme Leader had personally imposed that restriction. In 2021, he even acknowledged having prevented the development of missiles with a range of 5,000 km.
- As noted in various analyses, the announcement is now being linked to Mojtaba Khamenei’s emerging military doctrine, particularly his recent call for responses to threats without geographical limitations.
- There is also a clear message to Europe. Iranian commentators argue that the previous 2,000-km ceiling was partly intended to reassure European countries that they were not considered potential missile targets. Following the recent war, that political calculation appears to have changed.
- This may be another indication of a broader shift under Mojtaba Khamenei, with his father’s more restrained approach to the geographical scope of deterrence giving way to a more direct and confrontational posture.
- However, lifting a political restriction does not necessarily mean that Iran already possesses operational missiles capable of reaching substantially greater distances. Indeed, the IRGC spokesman himself acknowledged that such capabilities would need to be demonstrated in practice.
- In the end it looks like the significance of the announcement may be more political and doctrinal than technical.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Taban yiyen Buffett
@briefekonomi
2011 yılında Peugeot, İran’da 458 bin otomobil satıyor. Ülkede satılan yaklaşık her üç yeni araçtan biri Peugeot. İran, Fransa’dan sonra şirketin en büyük ikinci pazarı haline geliyor.
Fabrikalar İranlılara araç yetiştiremiyor. Her şey yolunda görünüyor.
Ama 2012’de bir anda işler tersine dönüyor.
Bankalar para transferlerini kısıtlamaya başlıyor. Peugeot’nun karşısına korkunç bir sorun çıkıyor. Otomobiller satılıyor ama parayı tahsil edip ülkeden çıkarmak zorlaşıyor.
Şubat 2012’de Peugeot parça sevkiyatını durduruyor. İran’daki fabrikalar Fransa’dan parça gelmeyince üretimde zorlanmaya başlıyor. Şirket her ay yaklaşık 10 milyon euroluk kazançtan oluyor.
Bir yıl önce 458 bin otomobil sattığı ülkede artık iş yapamaz hâle geliyor.
Aynı ülkede satış yapan Renault da var.
Renault da Tondar 90 ve Sandero gibi modellerle İran’da büyük bir pazar oluşturuyor. Ama onun da başına benzer bir sorun geliyor. 2013 yılında şirket, İran’daki yatırımları ve tahsilat riski taşıyan alacakları için tam 512 milyon euroluk karşılık ayırıyor.
Yani yüz milyonlarca euroyu geri alamama ihtimalini bilançosuna yazıyor.
Aradan birkaç yıl geçiyor. 2015’te nükleer anlaşma imzalanıyor, 2016’da yaptırımların bir bölümü kalkıyor. Fransızlar yeniden İran’a dönüyor.
Peugeot, Iran Khodro ile 400 milyon euroya kadar yatırım yapmayı planlıyor. Renault ise 2017’de yaklaşık 160 bin otomobil satıyor. Yeni fabrikalar, yeni modeller, büyük yatırımlar konuşuluyor.
Tam her şey yeniden yoluna giriyor derken 2018 yılında ABD Başkanı Donald Trump, İran’la yapılan nükleer anlaşmadan çekildiğini açıklıyor. Yaptırımlar geri geliyor.
Bankalar yeniden İran’dan uzaklaşmaya başlıyor. İran’dan dışarıya para çıkarmak zorlaşıyor. Yıllardır kurulan ticaret düzeni bir anda tepetaklak oluyor.
Peugeot daha fazla risk almıyor. Haziran 2018’de İran’daki faaliyetlerini askıya almaya başlıyor.
Renault ise direniyor. İran’ı tamamen terk etmek istemediklerini, gerekirse küçülerek devam edeceklerini söylüyorlar.
Ama bu plan da tutmuyor.
Birkaç ay sonra Renault da faaliyetlerini durdurmak zorunda kalıyor. Fabrika projeleri askıya alınıyor, satışlar çöküyor.
Renault, 2018’de İran’a gönderdiği montaja hazır parçalardan 319 milyon euro gelir elde ederken 2019’da bu rakam sıfıra düşüyor.
Yani bir yıl önce yüz milyonlarca euroluk iş yaptığınız ülkede ertesi yıl aynı satış kaleminden tek bir euro bile kazanamıyorsunuz.
Sonuçta Peugeot da Renault da İran’dan çekilmek zorunda kalıyor. Yıllarca kurdukları düzen dağılıyor. Fabrika yatırımları yarım kalıyor, satışlar duruyor ve geride yüz milyonlarca euroluk tahsilat riski kalıyor.
Bir zamanlar yüz binlerce otomobil sattıkları pazarda artık iş yapamıyorlar. Bütün bunlar, İran’da otomobil almak isteyen müşteri kalmadığı için değil, yaptırımlar yüzünden yaşanıyor.
Yoksa İran’da hâlâ otomobil almak isteyen çok insan var. Fakat otomobili sattıktan sonra parayı ülkeden çıkarma kısmı zor. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Ma chronique de ce matin sur RTL : pourquoi l'Iran et Donald Trump ont-ils besoin de reprendre la guerre?
www.rtl.fr/programmes/les-secrets-de-l-actu-international… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Ayatollah Kaabi, a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts, says Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei maintains direct communication with the Axis of Resistance not only through official channels, but also through “special channels.”
- According to Kaabi, resistance groups provide the Supreme Leader with detailed reports.
- An interesting acknowledgment of communication channels operating outside formal institutional structures, suggesting that the Supreme Leader remains personally involved in overseeing relations with Iran’s regional allies.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A lire.
Bernard Emié
@BernardEmie
Communication de Bernard Emié, « La DGSE : son rôle et sa transformation - academiesciencesmoralesetpolitiques.fr/2026/11/04/communi… #googlealerts
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Global Impact Intelligence
@globalintel_
🟥 𝐈𝐑𝐀𝐍–𝐔𝐒𝐀 : 𝐖𝐀𝐒𝐇𝐈𝐍𝐆𝐓𝐎𝐍 𝐄𝐍𝐕𝐈𝐒𝐀𝐆𝐄 𝐃𝐄 𝐑𝐀𝐌𝐄𝐍𝐄𝐑 𝐋𝐄𝐒 𝐍𝐄́𝐆𝐎𝐂𝐈𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍𝐒 𝐃𝐄 𝟔𝟎 𝐉𝐎𝐔𝐑𝐒 𝐀̀ 𝟒𝟖 𝐇𝐄𝐔𝐑𝐄𝐒. Selon le 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑡 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙, un projet d’accord réduirait de 60 jours à deux jours les négociations entre Washington et Téhéran. Il pourrait offrir à Trump une sortie honorable pour mettre fin à la guerre. Cette accélération intervient alors que JD Vance pilote discrètement les contacts avec les médiateurs, envisage des discussions directes et prépare une rencontre technique. Parallèlement, Moscou intervient auprès de Téhéran, tandis que Doha poursuit sa médiation. L’Iran maintient ses exigences sur les engagements américains d’Islamabad et Hormuz. Le raccourcissement du calendrier traduit l’urgence politique américaine, sans résoudre les différends de fond. Trump cherche une issue rapide ; Téhéran entend négocier les conditions de la paix, pas seulement sa date. #globalimpact #iranusatalks #hormuz #ceasefire #nucleardiplomacy #gulfsecurity @WSJ @VP @IRIMFA @MofaQatar_AR @WhiteHouse
Global Impact Intelligence
@globalintel_
🟥 𝐈𝐑𝐀𝐍–𝐔𝐒𝐀 : 𝐉𝐃 𝐕𝐀𝐍𝐂𝐄 𝐏𝐈𝐋𝐎𝐓𝐄 𝐋𝐄𝐒 𝐍𝐄́𝐆𝐎𝐂𝐈𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐎𝐍𝐒 𝐄𝐍 𝐂𝐎𝐔𝐋𝐈𝐒𝐒𝐄𝐒.
Selon @axios, le vice-président américain JD Vance dirige discrètement les efforts visant à conclure un accord avec Téhéran. En contact quasi quotidien avec les médiateurs, il a proposé l’ouverture de discussions directes et s’implique personnellement dans la reprise des négociations nucléaires. Vance et les intermédiaires envisagent notamment une réunion technique entre responsables américains et iraniens. Des responsables américains indiquent que Trump est désormais disposé à donner sa chance à la diplomatie, tandis que les médiateurs font état de progrès extrêmement lents. L’implication directe du vice-président traduit une volonté de reprendre la main sur les négociations, sans préjuger d’un rapprochement sur les conditions d’un accord. #globalimpact #irannucleartalks #jdvance #usdiplomacy #irandeal #middleeast
@VP @WhiteHouse @BarakRavid @IRIMFAThis post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇮🇷Vance leads behind-the-scenes push for new Iran deal. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/11/06/vance-leads-push-new-iran-deal -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
מדוע איראן שרדה שתי מלחמות, ומדוע עוד מלחמה לא בהכרח תביא להכרעתה?
איראן לא שרדה את שתי המלחמות משום שהייתה חזקה יותר מישראל או מארצות הברית. העליונות הצבאית והמודיעינית של יריבותיה הייתה ברורה. היא שרדה משום שעוצמה צבאית, מרשימה ככל שתהיה, אינה מספיקה כדי להביא לכניעתו של משטר שנערך במשך עשרות שנים בדיוק לתרחיש הזה.
יש לכך כמה סיבות:
א. המחויבות האידיאולוגית. מבחינת ההנהגה האיראנית, זו אינה רק מלחמה על הישרדות המשטר אלא גם על עתידה של איראן והשיעה, עצמאותה וזהותה. כניעה נתפסת כאיום קיומי, ולכן הנכונות לשלם מחירים עצומים גבוהה בהרבה מכפי שמעריכים בישראל ובארה"ב.
ב. ההיסטוריה והתרבות. המסורת השיעית של הקרבה ועמידה מול אויב חזק, לצד מורשת מלחמת איראן–עיראק, עיצבו הנהגה שרואה ביכולת לספוג מכות קשות ולהמשיך להילחם מקור לעוצמה ולא בהכרח סימן לחולשה.
ג. האתגר האופרטיבי. איראן היא מדינה עצומה, הררית ומורכבת, בעלת מערכות שלטוניות וביטחוניות מבוזרות. אפשר לפגוע קשות בתשתיות וביכולות הצבאיות שלה, אבל הרבה יותר קשה למוטט אותה מהאוויר.
ד. ההכנות למלחמה. במשך עשרות שנים איראן בנתה את כוחה מתוך הבנה שלא תוכל להתמודד עם העליונות האמריקנית והישראלית באופן סימטרי. מערכי טילים, תשתיות תת־קרקעיות, ביזור פיקוד ומנגנוני המשכיות נועדו בדיוק לאפשר לה לשרוד מכה קשה ולהמשיך להילחם.
ה. העמידות המוסדית. הרפובליקה האסלאמית אינה תלויה באדם אחד. יש לה מוסדות, מנגנוני ביטחון ואליטות בעלות אינטרס משותף בהישרדותה. חיסול מנהיגים אינו מבטיח את קריסתה, ולעיתים דווקא מחזק את הגורמים הקיצוניים ביותר.
ו. הלאומיות האיראנית. ההתנגדות העמוקה למשטר אינה מתורגמת בהכרח לתמיכה במתקפה זרה. איראנים רבים שמתנגדים לרפובליקה האסלאמית אינם מעוניינים לראות את מדינתם נהרסת או מתפרקת. יתרה מכך, המשטר אינו זקוק לתמיכת רוב הציבור כדי לשרוד, אלא בעיקר לנאמנות מנגנוני הביטחון ולהיעדר חלופה שלטונית מאורגנת.
ז. הפער בהגדרת הניצחון. ישראל וארה"ב מבקשות הישגים אסטרטגיים שיצדיקו את מחיר המלחמה. מבחינת המשטר האיראני, עצם ההישרדות והיכולת להמשיך להילחם עשויות להספיק. הוא אינו חייב לנצח את ארה"ב בשדה הקרב כדי למנוע ממנה להשיג את יעדיה.
ח. היעדר אסטרטגיית יציאה. ישראל וארה"ב הוכיחו שהן מסוגלות לפגוע באיראן באופן קשה מאוד. אבל הן לא הוכיחו שהן יודעות כיצד לתרגם את ההישגים הצבאיים לכניעה איראנית, לשינוי משטר או להסדר מדיני יציב.
ט. הפקת לקחים בין המלחמות. איראן אינה נכנסת לכל מערכה באותה נקודת פתיחה. היא לומדת את דפוסי הפעולה של יריבותיה, מזהה כשלים במערכי ההגנה והפיקוד שלה ומנסה להתאים את יכולותיה למציאות החדשה. גם אם לא כל הלקחים מיושמים בהצלחה, ההנחה שהצלחות מבצעיות במלחמה אחת יחזרו על עצמן באותה קלות במלחמה הבאה היא מסוכנת.
י. הנכונות להקרבה, גם אישית. חלק ניכר מההנהגה האיראנית צמח מתוך מלחמת איראן–עיראק ומתוך תפיסה שלפיה הקרבה אישית היא חלק בלתי נפרד מהמאבק. מנהיגים ומפקדים יודעים שהם ובני משפחותיהם עלולים לשלם מחיר כבד. אין פירוש הדבר שהם חסינים מפחד או משיקולי הישרדות, אבל האיום בחיסול אישי אינו מבטיח שיוותרו על עקרונות שהם רואים כחיוניים להמשך קיומו של המשטר.
יא. הזיכרון ההיסטורי האיראני. איראן היא לא רק הרפובליקה האסלאמית. זו מדינה בעלת זהות לאומית ותרבותית עמוקה, שנבנתה לאורך אלפי שנים. הזיכרון ההיסטורי של פלישות זרות, מאבקים נגד מעצמות והתערבות חיצונית ממשיך להשפיע על האופן שבו איראנים תופסים איומים על עצמאותם. ההיסטוריה אינה מלמדת שכל ניסיון לכבוש את איראן נכשל, אבל היא בהחלט מלמדת ששליטה חיצונית בה והכנעתה לאורך זמן הן משימות מורכבות ויקרות מאוד.
יב. היכולת להסתגל למציאות קשה. המשטר האיראני פועל עשרות שנים תחת סנקציות, בידוד בינלאומי ואיומים צבאיים. הוא פיתח מנגנונים לעקיפת מגבלות, לניהול משברים ולשימור מוקדי הכוח שלו גם בתנאים של מצוקה כלכלית קשה. הדבר אינו מעיד על כלכלה חזקה או על חברה חסינה, אלא על מערכת שלטונית שהתרגלה לפעול בתנאים שמדינות אחרות היו מתקשות לשאת.
יג. היכולת להרחיב את מחיר המלחמה. איראן אינה חייבת להתמודד עם ישראל וארה"ב רק בשטחה. היכולת שלה לאיים על נתיבי שיט, תשתיות אנרגיה, מדינות המפרץ ונכסים אמריקניים באזור מאפשרת לה להרחיב את העימות ולהפוך אותו לבעיה אזורית ואף עולמית. זהו אחד הכלים המרכזיים שבאמצעותם היא מנסה לפצות על נחיתותה הצבאית.
בסופו של דבר, מי שמבקש להבין מדוע איראן שרדה שתי מלחמות צריך להסתכל מעבר למספר המטוסים שהופלו, המפקדים שחוסלו והמתקנים שהושמדו.
המשטר האיראני אינו בלתי מנוצח, אבל הוא גם אינו עומד לקרוס רק משום שיריביו מסוגלים להנחית עליו מכה צבאית קשה.
הוא נערך למלחמה במשך עשרות שנים, למד מניסיון העבר, בנה מנגנוני הישרדות ומאמין שהמחיר של כניעה עלול להיות גבוה יותר מהמחיר של המשך הלחימה. אפשר לחלוק על ההיגיון הזה, אבל אי אפשר להתעלם ממנו כשמתכננים מלחמה נוספת.
העליונות הצבאית של ישראל וארה"ב אינה מוטלת בספק. השאלה היא מדוע ממשיכים להניח שהיא לבדה תספיק כדי להכריע את איראן, אחרי ששתי מלחמות כבר המחישו את מגבלותיה.
חשוב להדגיש: העובדה שאיראן שרדה אינה אומרת שהיא ניצחה צבאית. היא שילמה מחירים כבדים, והיא בהחלט פגיעה. אבל יש הבדל עצום בין פגיעה קשה במדינה לבין שבירת רצונה של הנהגתה להמשיך להילחם.
וזו השורה התחתונה כלומר הבעיה אינה שישראל וארה"ב אינן יודעות כיצד לפגוע באיראן. הבעיה היא שהן מבינות את נקודות התורפה הצבאיות שלה הרבה יותר משהן מבינות את מקורות העמידות שלה.
מי שטוען שעוד מלחמה, הרסנית יותר מקודמותיה, תביא סוף סוף להכרעה, חייב להסביר מדוע דווקא הפעם המשטר יישבר. כל עוד אין תשובה משכנעת לשאלה הזאת, עוד הרס אינו אסטרטגיה, ועוד ניצחון צבאי אינו בהכרח הישג אסטרטגי.
aviv mizrahi 🐰
@arnaviv
מה אם איראן שרדה כי יש שם אנשים יותר חכמים/מחויבים למדינה שלהם מטראמפ וביבי.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
Told @MarioNawfal that the balance of pressures is still in favor of Trump escalating the war with Iran. The buzz in the region is that something likely will happen this weekend, unless something breaks in the talks...
www.youtube.com/watch?v=jo_SLz5VnYY&t=15s -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Iran International English
@IranIntl_En
Iran will no longer rely on written US commitments and must see concrete action before relations can change, Ali Bagheri-Kani, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said. He accused Washington of derailing all four rounds of negotiations over the past 18 months by failing to honor its commitments.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Told @FT that #iran wants most of the US commitments frontloaded, while nuclear elements — Trump’s priority — are deferred to the next stage.
If the US agrees to those conditions, they would be willing to take that deal. But I don’t see that, because that would be acceptance of defeat by the US.
www.ft.com/content/eced6084-7cd7-4633-a8ba-559173e0f6c1?s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aron Lund
@aronlund
More and more Iranian public figures now openly call for acquiring nuclear weapons, raising questions about whether there’s an organized effort at play and, if so, whether it aims to prepare public opinion or to unnerve the United States.
@ErikaSolomon: www.nytimes.com/2026/11/03/world/europe/iran-nuclear-weap… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷🇶🇦 The war with Iran could be approaching its biggest diplomatic breakthrough in months...
Tehran is now considering nuclear proposals it previously refused to discuss, while Qatar works to broker a deal with Washington.
Trump also spoke directly with Qatar's emir about ending the conflict, just days after the GOP lost control of Congress in an election shaped by public anger over the war and rising gas prices.
Nothing is agreed yet, and major differences remain. But after months of stalled negotiations, both sides appear to be moving again.
Source: Bloomberg / Writer: Samuel -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇷🇺🇮🇷 Russia and Iran are discussing a new GAS PIPELINE network that could turn Tehran into a regional hub for Russian energy.
Mohsen Rezaei says he discussed the plan directly with Vladimir Putin in Moscow.
The idea is rather clever.
Iran has some of the world's largest natural gas reserves, yet STILL struggles with domestic shortages.
Russia has enormous gas supplies but has lost much of its European market.
So Moscow would send gas into Iran, helping cover its shortages, while Tehran could resell Russian gas to neighboring countries.
And all this is being discussed while Washington is trying to pressure Iran into a nuclear deal.
Source: @TabzLIVE on TG / Writer: Oliver -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Najafi
@Mostafa_Najafii
نکاتی درباره نتایج انتخابات آمریکا و تأثیر آن بر پرونده ایران
۱. نتایج انتخابات بار دیگر نشان داد چرا رؤسایجمهور پیشین آمریکا، با وجود اختلافنظرهایشان درباره ایران، در قبال گزینه نظامی محتاط بودند. هزینههای سیاسی، اقتصادی و راهبردی جنگ با ایران اکنون بیش از گذشته در محاسبات سیاستمداران آمریکایی حضور خواهد داشت. از این پس، هر سیاستمداری که به گزینه نظامی فکر کند، ناگزیر است هزینههای سنگین آن را نیز محاسبه کند.
۲. شکست جمهوریخواهان، ترامپ و جریان ماگا، اگرچه نشانه روشنی از هزینهدار بودن جنگ با ایران و فقدان حمایت عمومی از ماجراجویی نظامی است، اما به معنای پایان پروژه فشار و تقابل با ایران نیست. نباید احتمال اقدامات نسنجیده و حتی خطرناک بعدی دولت ترامپ را دستکم گرفت.
۳. حمایت بیقیدوشرط از نتانیاهو و رژیم اسرائیل، به یکی از نقاط آسیبپذیر جمهوریخواهان تبدیل شد و ضربه سیاسی قابلتوجهی به آنها وارد کرد. این وضعیت میتواند نشانهای از کاهش قدرت و نفوذ سیاسی لابی صهیونیستی در آمریکا باشد؛ اما نباید آن را به معنای تجدیدنظر قطعی در مناسبات ترامپ و نتانیاهو تلقی کرد.
۴. در این چارچوب، ارزیابی من این است که اگر توافقی میان ایران و آمریکا شکل بگیرد، ترامپ و ونس آماده عبور از نتانیاهو خواهند بود، اما اگر وضعیت فعلی تداوم یابد، ترامپ همچنان به نتانیاهو نیاز خواهد داشت و به حمایت از وی ادامه میدهد.
۵. توییت ونس و اذعان او به نقش عواملی همچون جنگ با ایران در شکست انتخاباتی جمهوریخواهان، لزوماً به معنای تغییر رویکرد بنیادین یا چرخش اساسی او به سمت توافق با تهران نیست. با این حال، این موضعگیری حامل یک پیام سیاسی روشن است. ونس میخواهد نشان دهد نهتنها در تصمیم به جنگ با ایران نقشی نداشته، بلکه با این رویکرد نیز همراه نبوده است. به بیان دیگر، او در حال ارسال سیگنال به تهران، فاصلهگذاری سیاسی بیشتر با جریان طرفدار جنگ، مصونسازی موقعیت خود از تبعات آن است.
۶. در تهران نباید در باد شکست جمهوریخواهان و تضعیف موقعیت سیاسی ترامپ خوابید! این نتایج، فرصتهایی سیاسی برای ایران ایجاد میکند که باید هوشمندانه از آنها بهره گرفت؛ اما نباید تصور کرد ترامپ از شکستهایش درس میگیرد یا از مسیر تقابل عقبنشینی خواهد کرد. موقعیت سیاسی او تضعیف شده، اما همچنان رئیسجمهور آمریکاست و از قدرت و ابزار کافی برای تکرار محاسبات اشتباه گذشته برخوردار است!
۷. به طورکلی، نتایج انتخابات آمریکا هزینه سیاسی جنگ با ایران را افزایش داده، اما به هیچ وجه خطر جنگ را از میان نبرده است. تهران باید همزمان دو مسیر را دنبال کند: بهرهبرداری هوشمندانه از شکافها و فرصتهای سیاسی در واشنگتن و تقویت آمادگی و بازدارندگی در برابر هرگونه ماجراجویی جدید. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Julien Bahloul
@julienbahloul
Quelle indécence.
J'admirais énormément Delphine Horvilleur.
Ses dernières interviews montrent une toute autre personne.
1. Les mots ont un sens. Parler d'exil est d'une indécence totale lorsque l'on sait qu'elle a choisi de quitter de son plein gré un pays libre et démocratique, tandis que des milliers de personnes fuient des dictatures sanguinaires pour sauver leur vie.
2. Non, elle n'a pas choisi l'exil. Elle a choisi la vie parisienne plutôt que la réalité de la vie en Israël.
3. Elle a décidé de partir, c'est son choix. Mais de là à tenter de se décrire en Charles de Gaulle à Londres, il y a un pas.
4. Elle a fait le choix de Paris, plutôt que de la dureté de la vie ici. Ça se comprend complètement. Israël n'est pas un pays simple, y rester n'est vraiment pas évident.
Je préfère saluer ceux qui ont le courage d'affronter les défis qui nous menacent ici (ou qui n'ont pas d'autre choix), plutôt que ceux qui font parler d'eux parce qu'ils ont choisi le confort parisien.
5. Venir voter en Israël une fois tous les 30 ans c'est bien. Y vivre pour bâtir le futur de notre pays, c'est nettement mieux.
Cette déclaration s'ajoute à celles tenues la veille des commémorations du 7 octobre et qui étaient à bien des égards déplacées et totalement déconnectées de la réalité.
Finalement, les dernières interviews de Delphine Horvilleur ont toutes un point commun, un même objectif : parler d'elle-même. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇮🇷After midterm defeat, Trump faces mostly bad options in Iran. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/11/05/trump-iran-war-midterm-defeat-ba… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Houthis want $51 billion? Not seriously.
The Houthis demanded $51 billion in reparations and the lifting of sanctions to end the conflict with Saudi Arabia.
Of course they know this will not be granted. In fact, the Saudi economy is not in a position for that kind of largesse. The Saudis already pay more than $1 billion for food security, education, and other projects to the Houthis.
What the Yemenis are doing is signaling that the solution to the problem is to include them in the financial package that Iran is negotiating.
Resolving the conflict requires large payments and the mutual normalization of navigation. They want to be part of the compensation. But who pays? This is the question.
Iran has lost 75% of its international revenues and knows that the current situation will only worsen that.
Although military actions are losing momentum with the election results in the US and Israel, Iran itself will be forced to escalate progressively very soon. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ibrahim Hamidi ابراهيم حميدي
@ibrahimhamidi
Trump’s Defeat: Seven Tests for Syria
- The Democrats' victory in both chambers of Congress will not necessarily derail President Donald Trump's opening to Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. But it could bring greater scrutiny when the new Congress takes office in January 2027.
- For Damascus, the challenge is to move beyond Trump and his envoy Tom Barrack and build lasting relationships across Washington.
- Seven issues to watch:
1. Sanctions: Following the repeal of the Caesar Act, Syria's removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list and the lifting of major sanctions, will Congress impose new conditions on investment and reconstruction?
2. Export Controls: Will Syria gain broader access to US technology, aviation equipment and dual-use goods?
3. Tom Barrack: Could the envoy who promoted major energy deals in Syria face congressional investigations into potential conflicts of interest?
4. Political Transition: Will Democrats demand stronger guarantees on minority rights, accountability and political inclusion?
5. Israel: Will Congress influence security negotiations, Israeli withdrawal and arrangements in southern Syria?
6. Turkey and the Kurds: Will lawmakers scrutinise Kurdish rights, SDF integration, Turkish influence and counter-ISIS cooperation?
7. Foreign Relations: Can Sharaa's expanding ties with Russia, China and European powers strengthen Damascus's position amid divided government in Washington?
- The central question: Can Damascus turn a Trump-led rapprochement into a durable relationship with Washington, regardless of who controls Congress? -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Après la lourde défaite subie par Donald Trump, je vous livre l'analyse depuis les Etats-Unis de l'analyste libanais, Ahmad Husseini.
La fin du trumpisme : changement de régime
La lourde défaite républicaine du 3 novembre pourrait marquer le début de la fin du trumpisme. L'effondrement de la mythologie électorale du MAGA n'est qu'une partie de l'histoire. Le trumpisme fut un projet politique qui s'est emparé du Parti républicain, a pénétré les institutions de l'État américain et a concentré une autorité extraordinaire entre les mains d'un seul homme. Donald Trump a fait d'un grand parti politique un instrument de loyauté personnelle. Maintenant que la coalition qui soutenait son pouvoir s'est fracturée, les républicains se trouvent face à une question qu'ils repoussent depuis une décennie, celle de savoir comment un parti recouvre son identité après l'avoir livrée à une seule personnalité.
La mainmise ne s'est pas arrêtée à la politique électorale. Les primaires républicaines sont devenues des tests de loyauté, les dirigeants du Congrès ont renoncé à leur indépendance et les dissidents ont été systématiquement marginalisés. L'administration a cherché à étendre son contrôle sur l'appareil fédéral, a contesté les limites posées au pouvoir exécutif et a soumis les institutions, au premier rang desquelles le ministère de la Justice, à des pressions politiques. La purge de fonctionnaires expérimentés a affaibli les fondements professionnels de l'État. Dans le même temps, les soupçons de corruption et d'enrichissement personnel ont atteint des proportions extraordinaires. Les entreprises de cryptomonnaies, les intérêts commerciaux familiaux, les accès privilégiés, les contrats publics et l'influence des milliardaires de la technologie ont progressivement brouillé la frontière entre l'autorité publique et les intérêts privés. Les réseaux de clientèle et d'influence financière constitués sous Trump ne disparaîtront pas avec son départ.
Le MAGA n'a jamais été la famille politique cohérente que ses mises en scène laissaient paraître. Il réunissait isolationnistes et interventionnistes, nationalistes chrétiens et libertariens, populistes ouvriéristes et oligarques milliardaires. La loyauté envers Trump masquait des contradictions que Gaza a commencé à révéler, notamment chez de jeunes conservateurs de plus en plus mal à l'aise avec un soutien inconditionnel à Israël. La guerre avec l'Iran a creusé la rupture. Un mouvement qui promettait de mettre fin aux engagements extérieurs de l'Amérique s'est retrouvé à défendre une nouvelle guerre au Moyen Orient. Son discours antisystème devenait de plus en plus difficile à concilier avec sa dépendance envers de puissants donateurs, tandis que les promesses de soulagement économique se heurtaient aux droits de douane, à la hausse du coût de la vie et aux conséquences de la guerre. La défaite électorale prive désormais ces factions rivales de l'argument qui les tenait ensemble : la prétendue invincibilité de Trump.
L'excuse de Trump selon laquelle son nom ne figurait pas sur les bulletins ne saurait masquer que le 3 novembre fut un référendum sur sa personne. Sa présidence, sa politique, ses guerres et sa conduite étaient au cœur du scrutin. Les candidats républicains battus ont été les victimes des multiples guerres de Trump, extérieures comme intérieures. Il ne peut s'attribuer chaque victoire républicaine et renier les défaites. Sa réaction a été révélatrice. En quelques heures, il s'est retourné contre le gouverneur du Texas, Greg Abbott, l'accusant d'être devenu un RINO, « républicain de nom seulement », l'étiquette infamante réservée aux républicains jugés insuffisamment loyaux. Il s'agissait du même gouverneur que Trump avait soutenu et encensé plus tôt dans la journée. Dans la logique de Trump, la victoire lui appartient et la défaite incombe aux déloyaux.
Steve Bannon avait averti qu'une défaite républicaine déclencherait une guerre civile au sein du parti. Cette lutte a sans doute déjà commencé. Des factions rivales du MAGA se disputeront l'appareil politique du mouvement, ses donateurs et son héritage idéologique, tandis que les républicains désireux de reprendre leur parti contesteront l'autorité de Trump. Plus il exigera la loyauté et désignera des boucs émissaires, plus il risquera d'accélérer les défections. Ses discours de plus en plus décousus et répétitifs, sa fatigue apparente et sa maîtrise déclinante de la scène publique ajoutent une dimension supplémentaire à la crise. L'humiliation électorale, les enquêtes parlementaires et la dissidence républicaine croissante pourraient nourrir une colère accrue, des décisions plus impulsives et une conduite de plus en plus erratique. Le paradoxe tient à ce que l'autorité politique de Trump pourrait décliner alors que ses pouvoirs présidentiels demeurent considérables. La faiblesse politique n'engendre pas nécessairement la retenue.
La lutte pour la succession sera particulièrement impitoyable pour JD Vance et Marco Rubio, deux hommes qui méprisaient ouvertement Trump avant de compter parmi ses défenseurs les plus en vue. Tous deux ont renié leurs jugements passés et rejoint son cortège triomphal, convaincus que l'ascension politique exigeait la soumission. Ils risquent désormais de devenir les victimes du mouvement qu'ils ont contribué à soutenir. Leur association à la présidence de Trump, à ses guerres et à ses excès ne s'effacera pas aisément. La défaite républicaine devrait servir de leçon pour des décennies à ceux qui sacrifient leurs principes et leur indépendance politique à la quête du pouvoir. Toute une génération de responsables républicains a abdiqué son jugement devant un homme qu'elle tenait autrefois pour inapte à gouverner. L'héritage politique qu'elle convoitait avec tant d'empressement pourrait devenir un fardeau dont elle ne pourra se défaire.
Dans le même temps, une nouvelle génération démocrate a émergé. La victoire de James Talarico au Texas, la réélection de Jon Ossoff en Géorgie et le triomphe d'Abdul El Sayed dans le Michigan laissent entrevoir un parti qui réapprend à s'adresser à d'autres électeurs que ses fidèles. Ils ont compris que la politique des toilettes neutres n'est pas un message électoral gagnant. La sécurité économique, la santé, le logement, les salaires et le coût de la vie offrent un vocabulaire plus convaincant que les provocations culturelles. La victoire d'El Sayed revêt une importance particulière. Malgré les sommes considérables engagées contre sa candidature par l'AIPAC et ses alliés, il l'a emporté, remettant en cause l'idée que les réseaux politiques pro israéliens organisés puissent décider de l'issue d'un scrutin. L'influence israélienne n'a pas disparu, mais Gaza et l'évolution des jeunes Américains ont révélé de nouvelles limites à sa portée politique.
Le MAGA pourrait rester dans les mémoires comme un nouvel avatar du Tea Party. Le Tea Party avait intimidé les dirigeants républicains, évincé des élus de l'establishment et semblait destiné à transformer durablement le conservatisme américain. Son identité propre a pourtant disparu, absorbée par le trumpisme. Le MAGA pourrait suivre une trajectoire semblable et survivre comme un faisceau de griefs bien après que son identité de mouvement de gouvernement se sera effacée. La différence réside dans les dégâts laissés derrière lui. Le Tea Party a influencé le gouvernement, alors que le trumpisme a exercé le pouvoir présidentiel. Reconstruire la fonction publique fédérale, restaurer l'indépendance des institutions et rétablir la confiance dans l'impartialité de la justice pourrait prendre des années.
Les deux années à venir pourraient se révéler particulièrement agitées. Trump conserve les pouvoirs de la présidence alors même que son parti affronte les conséquences de la défaite. La période qui précède l'entrée en fonctions du nouveau Congrès comporte des risques particuliers, notamment au sujet de l'Iran, où un président soucieux de reprendre l'initiative pourrait rechercher un succès militaire spectaculaire ou créer des faits accomplis que ses adversaires au Congrès devraient assumer au lieu de les choisir. La grande ironie veut que le trumpisme, qui promettait de rendre sa grandeur à l'Amérique, puisse laisser à ses successeurs la tâche de réparer à la fois un parti politique et les institutions de l'État américain. La fin du trumpisme, si le 3 novembre l'a inaugurée, pourrait se révéler bien plus tumultueuse que son essor.
#trumpout -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
"A comprehensive Iran deal is not feasible today. A Gulf-brokered outcome on the Strait of Hormuz is. In fact, it may be the only way to stop a mutually hurting stalemate that is poised to last years and cause mounting damage to global markets."
Great piece from @njswanson and @AllisonMinor_.
www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/only-gulf-can-end-ir… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Global Impact Intelligence
@globalintel_
🟥 𝐋𝐈𝐁𝐘𝐄–𝐅𝐑𝐀𝐍𝐂𝐄 : 𝐏𝐀𝐑𝐈𝐒 𝐀𝐔 𝐂Œ𝐔𝐑 𝐃𝐔 𝐉𝐄𝐔 𝐌𝐈𝐋𝐈𝐓𝐀𝐈𝐑𝐄 𝐋𝐈𝐁𝐘𝐄𝐍. La rencontre à Paris entre le général Khaled Haftar (gouvernement de Cyrénaïque) et le général Fabien Mandon, chef d’Etat-major des armées françaises, prend une portée géostratégique particulière : le même jour, ce dernier s’entretenait également avec le général Salah Eddine Al-Namroush, son homologue de Tripoli. En dialoguant avec les deux commandements rivaux, la France consolide son influence sur l’avenir militaire libyen, tout en préservant ses intérêts sécuritaires au Sahel. Cette initiative intervient après le rapprochement entre Benghazi et Niamey, sur fond de compétition d’influence impliquant Alger, Moscou, Ankara et Le Caire. Au-delà de la lutte antiterroriste, une interrogation demeure : Paris prépare-t-elle la réunification militaire libyenne ou institutionnalise-t-elle ses rapports avec deux armées rivales ? Pendant ce temps, Ahmed Attaf, chef de la diplomatie algérienne, est arrivé à N’Djamena, porteur d’un message écrit du président Tebboune au maréchal Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno. Deux démarches parallèles qui illustrent l’importance stratégique croissante de l’axe Libye–Sahel. #globalimpact #libyasecurity #sahelgeopolitics #militarydiplomacy #globalimpact #libyasecurity #frenchstrategicinfluence #sahelsecurity #militarydiplomacy @CEMA_FR @francediplo @Armees_Gouv @mod_libya @GovernmentLY @MidiaGovLibyan @lnaspox_ar @Algeria_MFA @presidencetd @tchadinfos
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammed A. Salih
@MohammedASalih
Two years after the Kurdish parliamentary elections, the KDP appears to be gearing up to get the Kurdistan parliament to convene a session and begin the formal process of forming and declaring a new cabinet.
The move seems to be triggered by fears that the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court might declare the current KRG caretaker government null and illegitimate in its mid-November session.
Of course, this is not an ideal move. It might turn out to be more of a pressure tactic, with the KDP convening tomorrow's parliamentary session with a 50%+1 majority and then forcing the PUK's hand to get it to take the formation of a new government seriously. The PUK has stalled the process for far too long. The dual-track nature of Kurdish politics, with one track running in Kurdistan and the other in Baghdad, incentivizes smaller parties like the PUK to be maximalist well beyond their weight inside the KRG and gain far more in Baghdad than their proportionate share of votes would otherwise allow. No doubt, the Shia parties and Iran deliberately reinforce these dynamics with the aim of undermining the Kurdistan Region. This has caused a structural impediment to KRG's functioning, in addition to other pressures that Baghdad and its dominant groups apply such as the irregular flow of salaries and budget funds and the drone and missile attacks by the militias and the weaponization of the Federal Supreme Court against the KRG.
One would hope the KDP would keep the door open to the PUK and grant it a fair share of the new cabinet (the KDP's proposal to the PUK is already far more generous than the PUK's share of votes and parliamentary seats would warrant), and ideally, the PUK would accept the offer.
The PUK also essentially legitimized such an approach by unilaterally ditching the KDP in Kirkuk two years ago and forming the government with other groups. It did the same in Nineveh. Nor did it stall Iraq's federal government formation over reaching an agreement with the KDP and other Kurdish groups in Baghdad over genuine Kurdish representation in federal institutions (while being a third tier party in Baghdad, its share of positions outweighs the first-tier parties there, again thanks to its cashing in on anti-KDPism in Baghdad and the Shia parties facilitating this outcome to undermine a meaningful Kurdish role in Baghdad and further fomenting divisions in Kurdistan. Of the three major state offices in Baghdad, the PUK-held presidency is the irrelevant and inconsequential one in shaping the course of events in Iraq).
Rudaw English
@RudawEnglish
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) on Tuesday called on lawmakers to convene on Wednesday to complete the opening session of the Kurdistan Parliament’s sixth term, despite lacking the numbers needed for a legal quorum and the interim presiding lawmaker denying that he had officially called the session.
rudaw.net/english/categories/kurdistan/1080003 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Suhail AlGhazi
@putintintin1
#syria's political life is on hold while waiting for the political parties law from the People's Assembly. Yet, two images from two Syrian parties; the pro-Muslim Brotherhood National Party for Justice and Constitution (Left image) held its general conference and elected its president in Istanbul. But the Syrian Liberal Party(right image) held its general conference in Damascus.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amir Tibon אמיר תיבון
@amirtibon
התוצאה הלילה בארצות-הברית היא רעידת אדמה פוליטית, ויש לה השלכות חשובות מאד על ישראל. קחו כמה דקות לקרוא, זה חשוב.
הדמוקרטים השיגו הלילה ניצחון מוחלט, אבל באמת, לא בסיסמא. ניצחון שגם הסקרים הכי אופטימיים עבורם לא יכלו לחזות.
הם מסיימים את הלילה עם כ-250 מושבים בקונגרס, הרוב הכי גדול בעשרים שנה האחרונות, ועם שורה של ניצחונות בלתי-נתפסים בסנאט: טקסס, קנזס, דרום קרוליינה - מדינות שהם לא ניצחו בהן עשרות שנים.
טראמפ חטף מפלה היסטורית, והשנתיים האחרונות של הנשיאות שלו יוקדשו לחקירות בלתי-פוסקות שלו, של משפחתו, של יועציו ואנשיו, על-ידי ועדות הקונגרס בשליטת הדמוקרטים. הוא לא יכול יותר למנות שופטים, לא יכול לקדם חקיקה, וגם הכוח שלו לקדם הסכמים בינלאומיים מאד מוגבל - קשה לדמיין את הקונגרס הזה מאשר חבילת הטבות ענקית לסעודיה בשביל הסכם עם ישראל. לפחות לא כל עוד נתניהו ראש ממשלה.
דבר אחד צריך להיות ברור, גם לאור ההתחזקות המטאורית של הדמוקרטים וגם לאור הכעס והאכזבה בצד הרפבוליקאי: המשך כהונתו של נתניהו זו סכנה מיידית ליחסים המיוחדים שלנו עם ארצות הברית.
נתניהו רעיל בעיני הדמוקרטים, הם זועמים עליו על היחס המשפיל שלו כלפי אובמה וביידן, על כפיות הטובה כלפי יהדות ארצות-הברית, על ההתערבות הבלתי-פוסקת שלו בפוליטיקה הפנימית שלהם.
העניין הוא שאחרי הלילה הזה, נתניהו הופך לרעיל גם בעיני הרפובליקאים. הם הולכים להאשים אותו בהפסד שלהם, בתור מי שדחף את הנשיא טראמפ לסבב לחימה ארוך, יקר ומתסכל מול איראן. פרשנים שמקורבים לסגן הנשיא ואנס כבר מתחילים לצייץ את המסר הזה: הפסדנו בגלל שהקשבנו לנתניהו. המסר הזה רק יילך ויתחזק בימים הקרובים.
המשך כהונה שלו זה מתכון לאסון בזירה האמריקאית, במיוחד אחרי הניסיון המחפיר שלו לבטל את תוצאות הבחירות בישראל ולגייס למשימה המלוכלכת הזו את ראש השב"כ זיני. חשוב לזכור, אין לישראל תחליף לארצות-הברית בזירה הבינלאומית, פשוט אין. וכיום בארה"ב, המותג נתניהו הוא מותג רע מאד, שגורם נזק מסוכן לישראל.
הערה לגבי המשא ומתן הקואליציוני: נתניהו מבטיח לשותפים שלו לצאת לבחירות נוספות ולהביא בהן 61 מנדטים. זו הבטחה שקרית. גם אם הוא יביא 61 מנדטים בבחירות חוזרות (אני בספק אם זה יכול לקרות), נתניהו לא יוכל להקים שוב ממשלה עם בן-גביר, אלא אם הוא רוצה להביא סנקציות משתקות על מדינת ישראל. גם סמוטריץ והמפלגות החרדיות צריכים להבין את זה. ממשלת בן-גביר 2.0 לא תקום, אלא אם רוצים שמדינת ישראל פשוט תתאבד.
אם ישראל רוצה להתחיל לשקם את מעמדה הגרוע מאד בארה"ב, היא חייבת להיפרד מנתניהו. זה לא יפתור את כל הבעיות שלנו בזירה האמריקאית, אפילו לא חצי מהן. אבל זה צעד ראשון והכרחי, שבלעדיו הדברים הולכים להידרדר למקומות מסוכנים מאד. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Caroline Rose
@CarolineRose8
I spoke to @shellykittleson for this @AlMonitor article exploring #jordan's history of aerial strike campaigns into southern #syria and how the recent strike in #daraa takes a page from the Kingdom's counternarcotics playbook.
www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/10/how-syria-balancing-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Adla Massoud
@Adlamassoud
Three camps. Three options for Trump on Iran:
• Make a deal: Vance, Witkoff and most Gulf states.
• Resume war: Netanyahu and Hegseth.
• No war, no deal — keep squeezing Iran economically: Bessent, Ratcliffe and Rubio. @Axios @BarakRavid
www.axios.com/2026/11/02/trump-axios-interview-no-rush-re… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clash Report
@clashreport
Iran’s IRGC released footage of Iran's Supreme Leader’s representative to the IRGC inspecting naval missile tunnels in southern Iran, housing anti-ship missiles and fast attack boats.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Bloomberg
@business
Oman, a Middle Eastern sultanate that rarely draws much attention, is scoring billions of dollars in economic growth and emerging as a big regional winner from the Iran war www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-11-03/oman-seeks-to-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Gholhaki
@aghplt
اخبار متفاوتی از انعطافِ ایران در موضوع هستهای _برخلاف ایستادگیِ مطلقِ مقاماتِ عالیرتبه طی ۸ ماه اخیر_ به گوش میرسد؛ صحبتهای پزشکیان مبنی بر «اخذِ اختیاراتِ جدیدی برای مذاکره» نیز به این گمانه دامن میزند!
گویا آمریکاییها پیشنهاد «رقیقسازیِ ۴۰۰ کیلوگرم اورانیومِ ۶۰٪» را به جایِ «اخذِ اصلِ مواد» آنهم در ازای، «وقفه در جنگ» و «آزادسازی بخشی از اموالِ بلوکه شده ایران» مطرح کردند و «بازگشاییِ تنگه» نیز در برابر «رفع محاصره دریایی» و احتمالا «معافیتهای گزینشیِ تحریمی» انجام خواهد شد؛ اگر توافقی _حتی در حدِ پیشنویس_شکل بگیرد یعنی دو طرف از خطوط قرمزِ خود در حوزه «پرونده هستهای» و «تنگه هرمز» عقب نشینی کردند!
پینوشت: نسبت به جنگِ رمضان، یک پرونده دیگر به مباحثِ اختلافی ایران و آمریکا اضافه شده؛ «پرونده تنگه هرمز» که تا پیش از جنگِ رمضان، مسالهی اختلافی نبود؛ پس طبیعتا شرایطِ «توافق» یا حفظِ موقعیتِ «نه جنگ نه صلح»، دورتر از «جنگ» است!
فقط طی ۷۲ ساعت گذشته نزدیک به ۱۰۰ پرواز ترابریِ نظامی توسط آمریکا و متحدانش به منطقه، ثبت شده است! -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gulf Times
@GulfTimes_QATAR
🚨 Breakthrough in Qatar-led mediation as US approves proposal to Iran.
Qatar's diplomatic efforts have reached a significant milestone, with Washington approving a proposed memorandum of understanding presented to Tehran by the #qatari_delegation.
According to Qatari newspaper Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, citing sources close to the mediation team:
• The #us has approved the draft memorandum submitted by #qatar to #iran.
• #washington and #tehran have reportedly made concessions on the Iranian nuclear issue and frozen assets.
• The development signals significant progress in Qatar's efforts to facilitate an agreement between the two sides.
Source: @alaraby_ar @The_NewArabThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
An Iranian political source told RIA Novosti that contacts with the US are continuing through Qatar, Pakistan and other regional channels, but that American military threats remain a major obstacle.
- According to the source, Tehran does not consider an end to military operations a separate issue. Sanctions, frozen assets and compensation for war damages are all part of the equation.
- This seems consistent with Iran’s broader approach to the negotiations. Tehran is not simply looking for an arrangement on Hormuz or a cessation of hostilities, but for a deal addressing several interconnected issues.
- That does not necessarily exclude a phased agreement. The real question is whether Washington would be prepared to accept such a linkage.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
את הספקנות האמריקנית כלפי ישראל הרווחנו ביושר
אם נשים לרגע את הסרקזם בצד, צריך להודות באמת לא נעימה: מדינת ישראל הרוויחה ביושר את הספקנות האמריקנית כלפי הערכותיה המודיעיניות בנוגע לאיראן.
מהניסיון להציג אפשרות ריאלית לשינוי משטר באיראן באמצעות גורמים כמו אחמדינג'אד והכורדים, דרך טענות על כך שאיראן כבר פיתחה פצצות אטום או עמדה על סף השמדתה של ישראל, ועד להפצת מידע שקרי שמקורו בבוטים הודיים, שלפיו מפקד משמרות המהפיכה באיראן הורה על התקדמות איראנית לעבר נשק גרעיני שחלק מהטענות הללו אף זכו להדהוד מצד הצמרת הישראלית, לא היתה גבול לנסיון הישראלי להשפיע על הממשל להתחיל, להמשיך את המערכה מול איראן או לחדשה.
אנשי המקצוע בוושינגטון מכירים היטב את איראן, את יכולותיה ואת הפער בין הערכות מודיעיניות מבוססות לבין פרשנויות שנועדו לקדם מדיניות מסוימת. אחרי כל כך הרבה טענות שהתבררו כלא מדויקות, מדוע שמישהו יצפה מהם לקבל כל אזהרה ישראלית חדשה כפשוטה?
איראן אכן השקיעה משאבים בפיתוח יכולות כימיות, ובפרט חומרים משתקי פעילות המבוססים על חומרים פרמצבטיים, לרבות נגזרות פנטניל. הדברים אינם חדשים ופורסמו בהרחבה, בין היתר במאמר מצוין של מתיו לויט בנושא לפני מספר שנים.
האם איראן עברה מפיתוח היכולות הללו לפיתוח מבצעי של נשק כימי קטלני מסוג סארין, למרות ההתנגדות המוצהרת של המנהיג האיראני לנשק כימי? אינני יודע. ייתכן שכן, אבל טענה כזו מחייבת ראיות מוצקות, בוודאי כאשר משתמשים בה כדי להצדיק מערכה צבאית נוספת.
אחרי כל כך הרבה חצאי אמיתות, הערכות מופרזות והבטחות אסטרטגיות שלא התממשו, שהיו חלק מתהליך קבלת ההחלטות שהוביל את ישראל לשתי מערכות מול איראן שלא השיגו את יעדיהן האסטרטגיים המרכזיים, הספקנות האמריקנית מובנת לחלוטין.
הבעיה היא שגם אם הפעם המידע נכון, ישראל עלולה לגלות שהפגיעה באמינותה מקשה עליה לשכנע דווקא ברגע שבו האיום אמיתי.
אמינות מודיעינית היא נכס אסטרטגי. ברגע ששוחקים אותה כדי לקדם מדיניות, קשה מאוד לשקם אותה כשבאמת זקוקים לה. את זה הבאנו על עצמנו.
ומילה אחת לגבי האיומים מאיראן.
איראן לא הולכת לשום מקום, וגם המשטר בטהראן לא עומד להיעלם בעתיד הנראה לעין. אבל מדינת ישראל לא יכולה להמשיך ולכסח את הדשא שוב ושוב ושוב, בתקווה שבסופו של דבר האיום האיראני פשוט ייעלם.
בשלב מסוים נצטרך להכיר בכך שלמרות העליונות הצבאית וההרתעה המרשימה שבנינו, לא כל איום ניתן להסיר בכוח הזרוע. בוודאי לא איום שמקורו במדינה הנמצאת כ־2,000 קילומטרים מגבולותינו, בעלת יכולות צבאיות משמעותיות ומשטר שמוכן לשלם מחירים כבדים כדי לשרוד.
אי אפשר להפוך מלחמות חוזרות ונשנות לאסטרטגיה לאומית. צריך ללמוד לחיות עם איומים, לנהל אותם, להרתיע מפניהם ולמצוא גם דרכים מדיניות לצמצם אותם. העובדה שאיראן מאיימת על ישראל אינה מחייבת אותנו לצאת למלחמה בכל פעם מחדש.
מספיק עם הבכי והנהי. ישראל היא מעצמה צבאית אזורית, והגיע הזמן שנתחיל להתנהג ככזו גם מבחינה אסטרטגית. עוצמה אמיתית נמדדת לא רק ביכולת לתקוף, אלא גם בחוכמה לדעת מתי לא לעשות זאת.
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
להתפתחות הזו, אם היא נכונה, יש השלכות חסרות תקדים. למעשה, קיימות רק שתי אפשרויות:
א. המידע נכון. במקרה כזה, החל ממחר מדינת ישראל תצטרך להתחיל לחלק מחדש לאזרחיה מסכות אב"כ וערכות אטרופין, כדי להגן עליהם מפני האיום הכימי שלפתע חזר לחיינו.
ב.המידע אינו נכון, ומדובר בניסיון לנפח מידע מודיעיני כדי לשכנע את הממשל האמריקני לתקוף את איראן, לאחר שהנימוקים האחרים שהוצגו בפניו לא הצליחו להביא אותו להחלטה כזו.
אני מסרב להאמין שממשלת ישראל תהיה מוכנה להפקיר את אזרחיה מול איום כימי ממשי, או לחלופין להטעות במכוון את הממשל האמריקני כדי לגרור אותו למלחמה.
ולכן, אין לי ספק שכבר ממחר תתחיל חלוקה מחודשת של מסכות אב"כ וערכות אטרופין לאזרחי ישראל.
הרי לא ייתכן שמדובר באיום חמור מספיק כדי להצדיק מלחמה, אבל לא חמור מספיק כדי להיערך להגנה על אזרחי ישראל.
Amichai Stein
@AmichaiStein1
ניו יורק טיימס: ישראל חלקה עם ארצות הברית מידע מודיעיני הטוען כי איראן שוקלת שימוש בנשק כימי נגד יריבותיה - מידע שהתקבל בדאגה ובבהלה בקרב חלק מהגורמים הרשמיים בארה"ב, ובספקנות עמוקה בקרב אחרים, כך על פי גורמים אמריקאים ואזוריים.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Is there a chance of victory in the war against Iran?
Why is Netanyahu pressing Trump for the use of nuclear weapons?
Because the war has been lost. The military means employed have solved absolutely nothing and have left a hole of at least $400 billion in war spending and direct losses for GCC countries so far.
Contemplating the use of nuclear weapons is a desperate measure to reverse the failure. And would it work?
As I said before, there is no way to place a bomb inside the mountain. It would be a bomb detonating on the -almost- surface of the mountain and devastating entire regions of Iran.
This is the only way out of this war, however shameful. A victory that tastes of defeat and global condemnation.
By conventional means there is neither enough arsenal to win the war nor the political stamina to sustain it.
The current approach of strangling Iran seemed perfect and counted on phased closures of land borders. The problem with that?
Iran tightened the flow of petrodollars by using the Houthis and opening another front, while also bombing facilities and blocking Saudi shipping traffic in the Red Sea.
These are chess moves: “Squeeze our economy and we squeeze the global oil market.”
It is a crossroads where a solution exists, but it requires large payments and concessions that, in my view, have so far proven irreconcilable.
substack.com/@global21This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Syria Justice Archive
@SyJusticeArc
#syria | Tom Barrack gives a rare reality check on Syria, could be a final warning to STG.
Tom Barrack’s latest statements to CNN on Syria during an interview with Becky Anderson at CNN’s Global Perspectives in Doha, October 29, 2026.
The interview focused on economic/reconstruction challenges and the new Syrian government’s posture toward Israel.
On Syria’s economic and investment situation
Barrack described Syria as still facing severe structural problems:
"Syria, as you know, is not a revenue-producing country at the moment. We have a very good and young president, who came out of Al-Nusra and had foreign terrorist organization designations everywhere."
Some commentators found it odd that Barrack reminded Jolani of his prior designation out of the blue, it seemed deliberate and by design, which could be interpreted as a warning to the Head of STG and making him look as part of the problem despite the "good and young" compliments.
He adds: "We have a currency that's not backed by anything, along with hundreds of billions of dollars of debt."
This statement begs the following question: where did all the "aid" money go? Was it really aid or debt to regional states? Is he implying that the currency is on the brink of collapse?
Syrians have seen many media circuses made by STG to celebrate the aid funds provided by regional and other states, supposed to be used in rebuilding Syria. However, the reality on the ground says that isn't the case with millions still living in refugee camps across Syria and millions others living in dire conditions, some living on one meal a day as revealed by a recent BBC report with corruption reaching unprecedented levels, levels not seen even under Assad regime. So, where did all that money go?
"And we have an Alawite-Kurd-Druze foreign fighter integration problem."
Here Barrack eludes to problems integrating minorities, however he doesn't elaborate because it seems that he himself knows that going down that rabbit hole could incriminate him for covering up for two attempts at genocide and a violent forced integration of SDF that is still incomplete, in a fragile state and could collapse at any moment, however it's absolutely diabolical from Barrack to include foreign jihadist fighters in the same category with minorities, which could mean he sees minorities as a hindrance to his investments and a security threat rather than native communities that needs urgent protection.
He also called private investment extremely difficult, almost an impossibility:
"So trying to find somebody to come in and invest in Syria, by the way, is almost an impossibility… These are billions of dollars of investment with no revenue coming, by the way, for 10 or 15 years in an environment that still has no security guarantor, that doesn't have a cooperative banking that's under some sanctions."
Security comes from a stable state with firm laws and accountability, it seems even in the eyes of Barrack himself this doesn't apply to Syria.
He noted outreach to energy companies and residual restrictions:
"Of course, I went out to people that I knew, including the Big Oil companies, Exxon, Chevron, HKN, ConocoPhillips, Total and France... You still can't get a banking software system in, because even though state-sponsored terrorism is gone, export controls are in place."
This could mean that there are factions within the US government that still sees STG as a security threat and maintains it remains connected to its past which doesn't allow Syria's sanctions relief to come into effect.
Barrack's statements understandably sent STG's supporters into meltdown, with some denying them altogether and others saying that he's out of touch. However, calmer heads believe this change of tone towards Syria is alarming. It means that Syria is at a breaking point, a state which can't be sustained and even Barrack, the patron of STG, can't hide anymore and seeks to absolve himself of what's about to take place in Syria via serving this warning, which could be the last before an imminent collapse. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël/Etats-Unis: Est-ce la fin de plus d'un demi-siècle d'aide militaire américaine à l'Etat hébreu? Donald Trump a annoncé ce mardi avoir "conclu un accord il y a des mois selon lequel nous arrêterions" de donner 3,8 milliards de dollars sur les 4 mds alloués chaque année à son plus proche allié au Moyen-Orient.
Dans une interview à Fox News, il a précisé que le Premier ministre Benjamin Netanyahou était "d'accord" avec cette décision. Si elle se concrétise, cela voudra notamment dire que Tel Aviv ne sera plus tenu d'obéir aux recommandations des Etats-Unis. A suivre!
#israel -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
For the Gulf States, Another War with Iran Is Not Just a Strategic Risk — It Could Become an Existential Threat
Few actors have more to lose from another war with Iran than the Gulf states. They paid a heavy price during the previous conflict, and they understand that another round, particularly one involving attacks on Iran's strategic infrastructure, could be far more devastating.
This explains the intense diplomatic efforts led by Qatar and other Gulf countries to prevent another confrontation between Washington and Tehran. Their immediate objective is to secure an agreement that would prevent war, or at least postpone escalation and create additional space for diplomacy.
At the same time, countries such as Saudi Arabia are sending clear messages to Tehran that they will not participate in or facilitate an American military campaign against Iran, hoping to reduce the likelihood of Iranian retaliation against their territory.
But here lies the fundamental contradiction: Iran genuinely wants to deepen its relations with the Gulf states. Tehran increasingly sees these relationships as strategically important to its long-term regional position. Yet if another major war erupts, particularly one targeting Iran's critical infrastructure, Tehran may still decide to strike strategic and economic facilities in those very same countries to impose an unbearable cost on Washington and its regional partners.
In other words, Iran's desire for regional rapprochement does not necessarily translate into restraint during a major military confrontation.
This is precisely why the Middle East is approaching such a consequential crossroads. For the Gulf states, preventing another war is not simply a diplomatic preference. It is a fundamental national security interest.
Their predicament is particularly difficult. Given their deep security relationships with Washington, they cannot openly challenge the United States or fundamentally undermine their strategic partnership with it. Yet behind the scenes, they are working to persuade the Trump administration to avoid another military campaign and give diplomacy a genuine opportunity to succeed.
Looking further ahead, the recent visit to Tehran by representatives of the so-called Mecca Pact reflects a broader strategic understanding, particularly in Riyadh: the long-term stability of the Gulf may depend less on isolating Iran and more on gradually integrating it into a regional framework of dialogue, cooperation, and mutual security.
This does not mean the Gulf states trust Tehran. Far from it. But they increasingly recognize that geography cannot be changed, Iran cannot simply be wished away, and another devastating war could threaten the economic and strategic foundations of the entire region.
These are critical days for the Middle East. But for the Gulf states, the stakes may be nothing short of existential.
They are caught between an American military campaign they cannot control and an Iranian response they may be unable to escape. Their greatest challenge is to prevent a war in which they could become major casualties despite having done everything possible to avoid it.
#iran
#iranwar
#gulf
#ksa
Cllr Pio Smith
@CllrPioSmith
An interesting development
Open Source Intel
@Osint613
Riyadh to Tehran: No attacks on Iran will launch from Saudi territory or airspace. In return, the Saudis expect Iran to leave the kingdom alone.
Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman delivered the message in Tehran, with Pakistan and Turkey at the table.
Kan News -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Je serai à 13h30 sur LCI pour parler des risques d'une reprise de la guerre entre les États-Unis et l'Iran. #iranwar
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
چرا ونس به جای قالیباف به رضایی نامه نوشت؟
۱-در تهران این تحلیل وجود دارد که نامه ونس به محسن رضایی با هدف اختلاف اندازی بین ارکان نظام و درگیر کردن جناحهای داخل به اختلافی جدید بوده است. عراقچی هم عامدانه در گفتوگو با الجزیره این خط را آشکار کرد و گفت: «اگر هدف آن اختلافافکنی باشد، اشتباه دیگری از سوی آمریکاییهاست».
۲- در ۲۴ ساعت گذشته ۳ نفر شامل عراقچی، بقایی و منوچهر متکی گفتهاند محمدباقر قالیباف مذاکره کننده ارشد نظام است. این موضوع از آن جهت مهمتر است که یک جریان مشکوک داخلی - خبر دستگیری یک زن همراه این جریان امروز منتشر شد- در روزهای اخیر تلاش کرده بودند به بهانه حمایت از محسن رضایی، خط اختلاف بین قالیباف و رضایی را به افکار عمومی القا کنند. این پروژه در نطفه شکست خورد.
۳- در مباحث کلان کشور مطلقاً اختلافی بین پزشکیان، قالیباف و رضایی نیست و هماهنگی کاملی بین هر ۳ در موضوعات وجود دارد. خطوط اصلی کشور هم توسط رهبری تعیین میشود. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran/Etats-Unis. « Les médiateurs s’efforcent de réduire les divergences entre Téhéran et Washington », a déclaré un haut responsable iranien, après que des médiateurs qatariens se sont rendus à Téhéran lundi soir pour discuter d’une version du projet d’accord entre les États-Unis et l’Iran, en cours de négociation depuis huit jours (Reuters).
« Les conditions de Téhéran doivent être respectées si les États-Unis veulent que le détroit d’Ormuz soit rouvert », a averti le responsable iranien, ajoutant que les négociations sur le nucléaire ne pourraient débuter qu’ensuite et que Téhéran n’accepterait pas les « exigences excessives » de Washington.
Le président du Parlement iranien, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, a déclaré mardi que la balle était désormais dans le camp des États-Unis après que Téhéran eut apporté une « réponse ferme et rationnelle » à Washington.
#iranwar#MalbrunotIran -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Avant goût d'une éventuelle reprise de la guerre
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
👇 Very important Associated Press (@AP) investigation into the scale and sophistication of Iran's counterattacks against US military bases across the Middle East during the war.
Iran first targeted critical early-warning radars and air-defense systems, degrading US capabilities to detect and intercept incoming attacks, before systematically striking aircraft, hangars, communications equipment, warehouses, and other infrastructure.
AP verified more than 115 damaging strikes across 26 US military sites, causing billions in damage and reportedly forcing Washington to relocate significant military assets away from the Persian Gulf.
Yet the American public has been given remarkably little visibility into the scale of these losses. The Pentagon has disclosed few details, while major commercial satellite imagery providers have restricted or delayed access to images at the request of US officials.
Whatever the stated security rationale, such restrictions undermine public scrutiny of the military and financial costs of a war fought in the American people's name.
The larger significance: Iran demonstrated an ability not just to retaliate, but to systematically degrade the infrastructure underpinning America's military presence in the region.
Any renewed war risks imposing further substantial costs on US forces, devastating critical regional infrastructure with repercussions for the global economy, and accelerating a fundamental reassessment of Washington's military posture in the Middle East.
apnews.com/article/iran-war-us-base-damage-trump-26e0f05e… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Etats-Unis. Depuis la fin de l'été, le pouvoir iranien est convaincu que la guerre reprendra d'ici la fin de l'année. En marge de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies à New York en septembre, "les Américains ont fait passer le message à Abbas Araghchi (le chef de la diplomatie iranienne) qu'ils recourraient à une frappe sans précédent", rapporte une source informée dans le Golfe. Selon celle-ci, "l'information a été partagée avec les médiateurs qatariens". Les Etats-Unis auraient défini huit sites à bombarder.
#iranwar #malbrunot -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Les États-Unis ont frappé lundi l'île iranienne de Qeshm, dans le détroit d'Ormuz, dans le cadre d'une série de frappes limitées tenues secrètes.
Alors que JD Vance assure que Donald Trump et lui-même se sentaient "plutôt optimistes" quant à un accord négocié pour mettre fin à la guerre avec l'Iran, Mohammad Ghalibaf répond que la balle est dans le camp de Washington pour "éviter la guerre". "Les pays de la région doivent savoir que (...) la République islamique d'Iran se tient prête au combat, le doigt sur la gâchette", a-t-il déclaré dans un discours relayé par la télévision d'État. Ils seront visés en cas de reprise des violences.
#iranwar #malbrunot -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Taban yiyen Buffett
@briefekonomi
Mısırlı milyarder Naguib Sawiris, 2008’de herkesin uzak durduğu Kuzey Kore’ye yatırım yaptı. Kuzey Kore’de o zamana kadar doğru düzgün cep telefonu şebekesi yoktu. Mısırlı milyarder ülkenin ilk cep telefonu şebekesini kurdu. Aslında hesabı basit ve mantıklıydı, ülkede rakip yok, pazar bomboş. Düşündüğü gibi de oldu. Gerçekten işler çok iyi gitti, Mısırlı milyarder Kuzey Kore’de para basıyordu.
Kuzey Kore’nin başkentinde insanlar ellerinde telefonla dolaşmaya başladı ve milyonlarca hat satıldı. Şirket kağıt üzerinde ciddi ciddi para basıyordu.
Ama bir sorun vardı. Müşteriler faturalarını Kuzey Kore wonuyla ödediği için bu parayı ülkeden çıkarmanın bir yolu yoktu. Kağıt üzerinde devlet resmi kuru kullanıyordu, sokakta ise karaborsa kuru geçiyordu. İkisinin arasında ise uçurum kadar fark vardı. Resmi kurla hesaplayınca Mısırlı milyarderin Kuzey Kore’de yaklaşık 450 milyon dolar karı görünüyordu. Gerçek kurla bakınca bu para 8 milyon dolar ediyordu. Yani adam yıllarca çalışmış, kar etmiş, ama kazandığı para ülkenin içinde sıkışıp kalmıştı.
Mısırlı milyarder o dönem bir röportajında şöyle anlattı: Bütün darbeleri ben yiyorum; kolay bozdurulamayan bir parayla ödeme alıyorum, çok para koydum, bu ülkeye otel bile yaptım…
Otel lafı da boşuna değil. Pyongyang’ın simgesi olan 105 katlı Ryugyong Oteli’ni Mısırlı milyarder yaptırdı.
Fakat otel yıllarca bitmeden öylece durdu. Bu otelin sadece dışındaki cam kaplamalara bile o dönem 215 milyon dolar para harcanmış. Sonrasında Kuzey Kore bildiğimiz gibi yine kazık attı.
Mısırlı milyarderin kurduğu şebekenin yanına kendi rakip operatörünü kurdu.
Yani Mısırlı şirket altyapıyı kurdu, insanlara telefon kullanmayı öğretti, pazarı hazırladı, sonra devlet kendi şirketini açıp pastayı ondan aldı. Mısırlı milyarder aynı yıl şirketin kontrolünü kaybettiğini kabul etti ve şirketi kendi hesaplarından çıkardı. 2020’de çıkan haberlere göre milyarder, Kuzey Kore’de kalan yaklaşık 600 milyon dolarlık kârından vazgeçti ve ülkeden çekildi. İçeride de oteli ve şirketi kaldı.
Bu kadar riske neden girdiği sorulduğunda ise şöyle cevap verdi:
Güney Kore ve Kuzey Kore’nin bir gün tek ülke olacağını düşündüm, o zaman varlığımız çok değerli olacaktı.
Yani Mısırlı milyarder aslında bugüne değil, yarına yatırım yapmıştı. Hesabı şuydu: Bir gün Kuzey ile Güney birleşirse, 25 milyon kişilik bir ülkenin tek telefon şebekesi elinde olacaktı. O gün geldiğinde 600 milyon dolar kimsenin aklına bile gelmeyecekti. Elindeki şirketin değeri 20-30 milyar dolar edecekti. Ama o gün hiç gelmedi. Şu an bile şebeke yerinde duruyor, insanlar hala o telefonlarla konuşuyor, camla kaplanan otel de Pyongyang’ın ortasında. Sadece hiçbiri artık Sawiris’in yani Mısırlı adamın değil.
Aslında Kuzey Kore’de para kazanmak zor değil, asıl zor olan o parayı oradan çıkarabilmek. Açıkçası bunu Çinliler bile zor yapıyor… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
L'Orient-Le Jour
@LOrientLeJour
🔍#enquête | Comment l'Iran a mis en place un réseau clandestin d’agences militaires pour contourner le blocus américain.
Lire ici⤵️
www.lorientlejour.com/article/1552932/comment-liran-a-mis… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le principal bloc de l'opposition israélienne doit "accepter la réalité politique" et travailler avec les partis arabes s'il veut évincer le Premier ministre sortant Benjamin Netanyahu, a déclaré lundi à l'AFP l'un de leurs dirigeants, Youssef Jabareen.
Les législatives du 27 octobre n'ont pas dégagé de majorité, ni pour la coalition sortante de M. Netanyahu qui obtient 53 sièges, ni pour le bloc de l'opposition emmené par le centriste Gadi Eisenkot qui en a 48. Il faut un minimum de 61 députés pour contrôler la Knesset.
Les deux principales formations arabes israéliennes, la Liste unifiée et Raam, ont créé la surprise en récoltant 11 sièges pour la première et huit pour la seconde, ce qui leur permet en théorie de couronner l'opposition, qui a jusque-là refusé toute alliance.
C'est dans ce contexte, alors que les tractations débutent pour trouver une coalition gouvernementale, que le chef de file de la Liste unifiée, Youssef Jabareen, a présenté à l'AFP sa vision pour atteindre l'objectif que les partis arabes se sont fixé : faire tomber M. Netanyahu.
"Quiconque est vraiment déterminé à remplacer ce gouvernement a l'obligation d'accepter la réalité politique : les voix de la Liste unifiée pourraient s'avérer décisives", déclare M. Jabareen, cheveux gris en brosse et fines lunettes.
"Une opportunité de changement se présente, et nous sommes réellement disposés à contribuer à sa concrétisation, et à mettre fin au pouvoir de Netanyahu", ajoute cet universitaire de formation, âgé de 54 ans.
Le président, Isaac Herzog, doit recevoir mercredi et jeudi les représentants des partis pour des consultations en vue de désigner un candidat pour former un gouvernement.
Contrairement à Raam qui n'exclut pas d'intégrer une coalition gouvernementale dirigée par Gadi Eisenkot, la Liste unifiée prône plutôt un soutien de l'extérieur, en appuyant de ses voix un possible gouvernement minoritaire.
"Nous sommes prêts à tendre la main en soutenant toute législation ou décision qui fait progresser notre vision politique et sert notre programme", dit-il.
- "Force centrale" -
Les deux listes arabes ont obtenu un score historique grâce à la mobilisation massive de la minorité arabe israélienne, qui représente environ 20% de la population du pays et est victime de fortes discriminations, aggravées sous la coalition sortante, la plus à droite de l'histoire du pays.
Malgré cette percée, la plupart des membres du bloc de l'opposition ont jusque-là refusé l'option d'une alliance, qui braquerait une partie de l'électorat juif.
Une telle perspective est aussi compliquée par les accusations de fraude électorale lancées par le camp Netanyahu contre les partis arabes, même si elles ont été largement rejetées par l'opposition et relativisées par les autorités électorales.
M. Jabareen voit pourtant une "vraie marge de discussions" avec le bloc de l'opposition sur les sujets les moins polarisants, comme l'insécurité qui gangrène les villes arabes israéliennes.
Mais il prévient que quiconque voudrait évincer M. Netanyahu en s'appuyant sur sa Liste unifiée devra apporter des réponses "positives" sur des sujets beaucoup plus clivants, comme "les destructions à Gaza" ou "le terrorisme de colons en Cisjordanie" occupée.
"Nous n'en sommes pas encore au point de discuter de cela", reconnaît-il.
M. Eisenkot, un ancien chef d'état-major, a affiché sa détermination à mettre fin au contrôle de la bande de Gaza par le Hamas, par les armes si nécessaire. Et s'il s'oppose aux avant-postes installés par la frange la plus violente des colons en Cisjordanie, il soutient la colonisation de ce territoire palestinien.
Pour contourner l'obstacle, des commentateurs évoquent l'hypothèse d'un gouvernement d'union entre les partis juifs sionistes, incluant le Likoud de M. Netanyahu, et excluant les partis arabes et ultra-orthodoxes.
"En théorie, cela est possible", admet M. Jabareen. "Mais cela contredirait la promesse de campagne fondamentale des partis d'opposition d'écarter Netanyahu du pouvoir."
Il n'exclut pas que le pays soit conduit au final à de nouvelles élections. Mais même si c'était le cas, le vote du 27 octobre aura, selon lui, eu le mérite "de faire prendre conscience à notre communauté de la force de sa participation politique".
La minorité arabe est désormais "une force politique centrale" en Israël, juge-t-il, s'affirmant "confiant" qu'elle pourrait encore augmenter son taux de participation en cas de nouveau scrutin.
#israelelection -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Un accord avec l'Iran "pourrait arriver", déclare ce lundi Donald Trump, après avoir dit qu’il était prêt à donner un «coup de massue» à la république islamique.
«Les prix du pétrole tombent comme des pierres (...) parce que les gens sentent qu’il n’y aura pas de guerre avec l’Iran. L’Iran veut un accord, aussi rapidement que possible. Cela pourrait arriver! » a écrit le président américain sur son réseau Truth Social, après avoir dit dimanche qu’il était prêt à donner un «coup de massue» à l’Iran.
#iranwar #malbrunot -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Message d'inquiétude transmis depuis Téhéran par un contact régulier: "On a peur d'une attaque lourde américaine et israélienne contre la région de Natanz. On redoute une frappe seminucléaire, le risque est pris au sérieux par de nombreux Iraniens. L'Iran ripostera contre les bases américaines de la région, peut-être contre Diego Garcia et ailleurs. Pendant les récentes négociations au Qatar, l'Iran a demandé des garanties chinoises et russes pour éviter ce scénario. Mohsen Rezaï a parlé à Poutine, le vice-ministre des Affaires étrangères Bagheri-Kani est à Pékin. La diplomatie s'active. Le président de la République, Massoud Pezeskhian, a obtenu des pouvoirs supplémentaires du guide suprême. Je redoute une attaque américaine le jour de l'anniversaire de la prise d'otages des diplomates américains le 4 novembre 1979 à Téhéran".
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Levant24
@Levant_24_
📌 Mazloum Abdi, adviser to the Syrian president and former commander of the Kurdish-led SDF, said Kurdish participation in state institutions is essential to Syria’s stability.
📌 He said the integration of civil and military institutions in the northeast is continuing, particularly in education and security.
📌 According to Abdi, attempts to obstruct integration have failed, and the understandings reached between the relevant committees must be preserved and outstanding issues resolved.
📌 Hasakah province is administered with the participation of its communities, Abdi said, calling for Kurdish political and administrative participation in the coming phase.
📌 He said a committee is working to determine the fate and whereabouts of missing people, while efforts continue to ensure the safe return of displaced residents, with the so-called “Arab Belt” land issue in Hasakah also being addressed through legal channels. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Middle East Letter
@themiddleeastle
BREAKING: Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says Tehran and Washington have now reached what he described as a “two-day plan” for de-escalation.
“On the first day, the U.S. implements a set of measures, and on the second day, the Strait of Hormuz reopens and transit returns to its previous state.”
He said Iran is demanding the cancellation of new sanctions imposed after the memorandum of understanding, a reduction of U.S. military forces to levels before the war, the lifting of the naval blockade, and implementation of previously expected oil-sanctions exemptions. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🇯🇴 🇮🇱 🇵🇸 @AFP: Le roi Abdallah II dit qu'il n'y aura « ni sécurité ni stabilité » régionale sans terre pour les Palestiniens
www.lorientlejour.com/article/1552960/le-roi-abdallah-ii-…
“Le roi de Jordanie Abdallah II, à l'occasion d'un discours devant le Parlement lundi, a martelé que la sécurité dans la région ne pourrait être atteinte tant que les droits des Palestiniens sur leurs terres ne seraient pas respectés.
« Il ne peut y avoir ni sécurité ni stabilité dans notre région sans le respect du droit du peuple palestinien sur ses terres. (...) Les ambitions expansionnistes d'Israël restent la plus grande menace pour l'avenir et les espoirs de la région », a déclaré le souverain au moment où l'Etat hébreu doit se doter d'un nouveau gouvernement.
La Jordanie, voisine d'Israël et de la Cisjordanie occupée, prône depuis longtemps une solution à deux États et a signé un traité de paix avec Israël en 1994.
« En dépit des appels internationaux pour mettre fin aux violations commises par Israël, la catastrophe humanitaire se poursuit à Gaza, tout comme les attaques incessantes à Jérusalem et en Cisjordanie », a ajouté Abdallah II.
Cette prise de parole survient quelques jours après les élections législatives en Israël, à l'issue desquelles le parti du Premier ministre Benjamin Netanyahu est arrivé en tête mais sans obtenir la majorité.
Le roi jordanien s'exprimait aussi alors qu'Israël a annoncé lundi la fin d'une opération militaire israélienne à Hébron qui a entraîné le déplacement de plus de 3 000 habitants palestiniens.
L'armée était entrée il y a dix jours dans la ville, la plus grande de Cisjordanie occupée, juste après une attaque meurtrière à un checkpoint voisin qui avait coûté la vie à deux soldats.
Le secrétaire général de l'ONU, Antonio Guterres, avait dénoncé l'opération, évoquant « le spectre du nettoyage ethnique ».”
via @LOrientLeJour -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران
@ariel_oseran
Joint list senior leader Ahmad Tibi acknowledges that an Eisenkot-led government, which they plan to support, will not advance peace with the Palestinians. "Our first, second, and third priority is to bring down the Netanyahu government. We realize that we must make tough decisions," Tibi told Saudi Al-Hadath.
"That's why the primary issues on the agenda will be domestic issues. I say frankly, the coming government will not be a peace government; it will not be the answer to our dreams. We are choosing between the bad and the worse, but our goal is to remove this current government," Tibi said.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Iran Watcher
@TheIranWatcher
The son of a former IRGC commander admits the regime squandered over $50 billion on its failed Syria project, failed on the nuclear front and held no one accountable.
Hamzeh Rahim-Safavi is the son of Yahya Rahim-Safavi, the former IRGC commander-in-chief and longtime military adviser to the supreme leadership.
His admissions tear through several of the regime’s most important propaganda narratives.
Safavi stated plainly that the Islamic Republic was defeated in Syria. He also rejected the religious explanation used to justify the intervention, saying the project was not primarily ideological or religious but a strategic attempt to reach the Mediterranean through military power, economic networks and proxy forces.
For years, Iranians were told that their money and soldiers were being sacrificed to “defend the shrines.” Safavi has now admitted that this religious language concealed a geopolitical power project designed to establish a land corridor, sustain Hezbollah and expand the Islamic Republic’s regional influence.
That project collapsed with Assad.
Estimates indicate that the Islamic Republic spent between $30 billion and more than $50 billion supporting Assad. The money financed oil shipments, credit lines, military equipment, IRGC operations and foreign proxy forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Lebanon.
Much of that investment is now effectively unrecoverable. The land corridor to the Mediterranean has been severed, supply routes to Hezbollah have been weakened and the economic agreements intended to recover Iran’s investment have largely collapsed.
Safavi’s most damaging question was not simply why Syria was lost. It was why nobody was held responsible.
He said that if he caused even minor financial damage at the University of Tehran, he would be required to repay it. Yet the regime spent tens of billions of dollars on a failed foreign intervention without identifying a single official responsible for the defeat.
That is not an administrative oversight. It is how the Islamic Republic is designed.
The IRGC can gamble the wealth of the Iranian people on foreign wars, proxies and ideological projects without parliamentary control, independent auditing or consequences when those projects collapse. Iranians absorb the inflation, sanctions and lost development while the architects of failure retain their power and receive new positions.
Safavi delivered an equally devastating assessment of the nuclear strategy.
After 20 to 30 years, the Islamic Republic has neither built a bomb nor secured the economic and diplomatic benefits available to a country complying with the international nuclear system.
Instead, the regime imposed decades of sanctions, isolation, economic damage and military danger on the Iranian people without delivering the security it promised.
Its nuclear threshold strategy achieved the worst of both outcomes. Iran paid the economic and geopolitical costs of being treated as a nuclear proliferator while remaining vulnerable to attacks on its leadership, military infrastructure and nuclear facilities.
Billions more were consumed building enrichment facilities, underground complexes and an expansive security apparatus. The result was not deterrence. It was deeper isolation, repeated sabotage and a permanent threat of wider war.
Once again, nobody was held accountable.
Safavi then turned to the intelligence apparatus itself.
He said the intelligence system was not merely failing but effectively “shut down.” He pointed to repeated assassinations, penetrations and precision strikes while asking why nobody had been dismissed, prosecuted or even publicly identified as responsible.
This admission reaches the centre of the regime’s vulnerability.
The Islamic Republic built one of the region’s most intrusive surveillance systems to monitor Iranian women, students, workers and dissidents. Yet that same security state repeatedly failed to protect senior commanders, nuclear personnel and sensitive military infrastructure.
It is powerful against unarmed Iranians and dangerously penetrated against foreign intelligence services.
Safavi also warned that the regime now faces the possibility of mass leadership targeting, the destruction of deep missile infrastructure and a nightmare scenario in which external war coincides with another nationwide uprising.
His warnings reveal how dramatically the internal assessment differs from official propaganda. State media continues promising victory and deterrence while insiders describe defeat, intelligence collapse and existential vulnerability.
The record is devastating.
The Syrian project collapsed. An estimated $50 billion was lost. The nuclear strategy produced isolation without security. The intelligence apparatus failed to protect the leadership. No senior official was held accountable for any of it.
The Islamic Republic calls this resistance.
Its own insiders are beginning to call it what it is. Strategic failure without accountability. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
👇 Very important Associated Press (@AP) investigation into the scale and sophistication of Iran's counterattacks against US military bases across the Middle East during the war.
Iran first targeted critical early-warning radars and air-defense systems, degrading US capabilities to detect and intercept incoming attacks, before systematically striking aircraft, hangars, communications equipment, warehouses, and other infrastructure.
AP verified more than 115 damaging strikes across 26 US military sites, causing billions in damage and reportedly forcing Washington to relocate significant military assets away from the Persian Gulf.
Yet the American public has been given remarkably little visibility into the scale of these losses. The Pentagon has disclosed few details, while major commercial satellite imagery providers have restricted or delayed access to images at the request of US officials.
Whatever the stated security rationale, such restrictions undermine public scrutiny of the military and financial costs of a war fought in the American people's name.
The larger significance: Iran demonstrated an ability not just to retaliate, but to systematically degrade the infrastructure underpinning America's military presence in the region.
Any renewed war risks imposing further substantial costs on US forces, devastating critical regional infrastructure with repercussions for the global economy, and accelerating a fundamental reassessment of Washington's military posture in the Middle East.
apnews.com/article/iran-war-us-base-damage-trump-26e0f05e… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
What is the probability that Iran already has a nuclear bomb and could respond to a nuclear attack?
I start from a simple point: no one, absolutely no one, needs half a ton of uranium enriched to 60 percent unless they are planning a weapon, or operating naval nuclear reactors, which Iran does not and which are not part of its doctrine.
In these cases, what the government says or what the law formally requires is irrelevant.
Whether it is legitimate for Iran, like Israel, to possess a nuclear weapon is a separate discussion. The fact is that today Iran already masters the technology and possesses the material for 15, perhaps even 20 nuclear warheads.
Iran has been skillful in not announcing itself as a nuclear power. Doing so could trigger a rain of American and Israeli tactical missiles on its mountains before its arsenal is even positioned.
There is another detail: with only a few warheads, Iran would first need to have degraded American and Israeli interceptors and radars. An announcement would not generate deterrence, only more exposure and risk, plus condemnation from much of the world.
But does Iran have the technology and the material for a nuclear weapon? Yes, it does.
1. Fissile material production (enrichment)
Mastery: total.
Iran is self-sufficient. The stockpile of 440.9 kg at 60 percent, verified until June 2025, would today be at least 550 kg, and Iran needs only a few weeks to turn 60 percent into 90 percent. These are established facts, with residual and historical North Korean transfer.
2. Conversion of gas into metal (pit)
Mastery: highly probable / practically total.
This is not a real bottleneck. During the Amad Plan, Iran already worked on uranium metallurgy, casting, and machining. In 2021 it produced 20 percent enriched metal under safeguards. It is known that converting UF₆ at 90 percent into machined metal can be done at laboratory scale in weeks, even with damage at Isfahan, and that Iran already has the protocol. Undeclared sites may have preserved this capacity, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi was told that other sites would be visited in the event of an agreement on inspections.
3. Implosion system and explosive lenses
Mastery: highly probable.
The Nuclear Archive shows that the shock wave generator project (multipoint initiation system) was 58-66 percent complete in 2002, with completion expected by July 2003. Full-scale hemispherical implosion tests were conducted (Marivan and others). Work continued after Amad under SPND. 2024 reports indicate renewed activity at Sanjarian and Golab Dareh involving explosive tests and multipoint initiation systems, with former Amad personnel.
The relevant foreign assistance during Amad came more from specialists of Soviet origin than from North Korea.
4. Neutron initiator (UD₃) and firing electronics
Mastery: highly probable.
The same Nuclear Archive documents the production and testing of uranium-deuteride (UD₃) initiators at Lavisan-Shian, integrated into scaled implosion systems and explosively tested. Albright concludes that the work is probably finished and that Iran is capable of manufacturing these initiators (long-life components that can be stored). Work with EBW detonators is also documented.
5. Miniaturization and full warhead integration
Mastery: partial to opaque.
Amad already had a design for a 55 cm device intended for the Shahab-3. Individual components such as implosion and initiator are well advanced. The final integration into a miniaturized, reliable package capable of surviving flight and reentry remains the most obscure stage publicly. American intelligence assessments through 2025 still treated Iran as not having fully mastered all the technologies for a testable and deliverable weapon. Reports from 2025-2026 about possible authorization for compact warheads exist but are unverified; however, this issue could have been easily resolved with North Korean assistance.
Read more
global21.substack.com/p/what-is-the-probability-that-iran… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Tucker Carlson
@TuckerCarlson
Under pressure from Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Trump administration may be within days of launching a nuclear strike on Iran. The target would be Pickax Mountain in central Iran, where Israeli intelligence claims the Iranian government has restarted its nuclear enrichment program. No conventional weapon in the American arsenal can penetrate 300 feet of solid granite to destroy the tunnels where enrichment is supposedly taking place. The only military option is a nuclear strike. Netanyahu has been pushing hard for one. “Bibi calls Trump about it every day,” says an informed observer.
Netanyahu is cornered and desperate. After last week’s election results, he can’t form a government unless Trump intervenes directly in Israeli politics and brokers a deal with other parties that gives Netanyahu 61 seats in the Knesset. Otherwise, he is out as prime minister and on his way to ignominy, investigations and possibly jail. Netanyahu must stay close to Trump. He needs this war.
To that end, he’s applied maximum pressure to his closest allies in the administration, including Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper. Both oppose a negotiated settlement to the war they’ve so grievously mismanaged; both are pushing to restart major combat operations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and CIA director John Ratcliffe are also following Netanyahu’s lead, as are leaders of the Democratic Party. In a recent meeting on the subject, former president Barack Obama said he opposes the current Iran peace deal being drafted in Doha.
The rest of America’s longtime allies in the Middle East are terrified by the prospect of more war. On September 27th, Netanyahu flew secretly to Abu Dhabi to enlist the UAE in his lobbying effort for a final attack on Iran. The Emiratis refused. After eight months of conflict, Gulf economies are teetering. So are global energy and fertilizer markets. They won’t recover soon. Globally, there are a total of about 850 supertankers used to transport oil from producers to the rest of the world. In October alone, 11 of them were badly damaged in Hormuz. At this pace, a global depression is imminent. A nuclear strike would radically accelerate the destruction. Fallout from a ground explosion at Pickax Mountain would contaminate the Persian Gulf, poisoning the water supply for 100 million people.
And those are just some of the immediate consequences for the region. The rest of the world is every bit as exposed. No country other than the United States has ever used a nuclear weapon in war. Some would like to. An American nuclear attack on Iran would set a new precedent. The Russians have already told at least two other governments that an American nuclear strike on Iran would free them to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Pakistan and India would be tempted to do the same against each other, as would North Korea against Seoul. After the first nuclear strike, World War Three is inevitable. That war would be short and final.
We’ve been sleepwalking toward this moment for months. Since February, the administration has quietly rewritten America’s nuclear doctrine to make first use of so-called “battlefield nukes” easier and therefore more likely. No one in Washington in either party seems bothered by this. Now we’re on the brink of it.
Close observers say Trump is likely to decide by next weekend whether or not to use nuclear weapons. That would be November 7, six days from now. To his credit, he’s hesitating. At the moment, Trump is listening to his vice president, JD Vance, and to his envoy and friend Steve Witkoff, both of whom argue a deal with Iran can be made.
They’re right, though it won’t be simple. The Iranians are famously frustrating to negotiate with under any circumstances, and elements of that government have become more radical since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his family were killed in February. After decades of isolation, even relatively moderate Iranian leaders seem confused by how decisions are made in the West. (There is a widespread belief in Tehran, for example, that the United States government controls Israel.) But overall, people who have spoken to decision-makers in Iran say there is consensus there that more war is bad for everyone and a deal is worth making.
One group that hasn’t been consulted so far is the global population — the hundreds of millions of people who will be killed along with their children if Trump is pushed by Netanyahu into launching a nuclear strike next week. Now would be the time for them to speak up. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
Iran's rhetoric on the war has hardened considerably over the past two days. From Mojtabai Khamenei to Rezaie, to senior have all said that if war resumes Iran will react with massive, disproportionate and unrestricted retaliation. This shows that Iran thinks that despite the last minute diplomatic activity war is becoming more likely, and its threats are aimed at deterring war or at least the more massive war plan options Trump is looking at. Iran's hardened rhetoric is not because diplomacy is succeeding but because likely it is not.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
L'Orient-Le Jour
@LOrientLeJour
🔎 #analyse | L'impossible alliance ? Les partis arabes face aux lignes rouges de l'opposition israélienne
Par @stephaniekhou17
www.lorientlejour.com/article/1552723/limpossible-allianc… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
Final results. Netanyahu's bloc has only 53 seats - the lowest he has ever gotten since entering politics 30 in 1996. Despite this failure he may remain in power as caretaker PM & win the next early elex due to the success of the Right in delegitimizing Arab participation in gov
Haaretz.com
@haaretzcom
2026 Election vote count complete: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's bloc holds 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, while opposition parties have 67.
Follow Haaretz's election updates here: www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/2026-10-29/ty-artic… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
New Lines Magazine
@newlinesmag
From the @newlinesmag archives:
The novel that the late Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar wrote in prison 20 years ago helps to reveal both his perspective on the struggle for Palestinian independence and his personal story. newlinesmag.com/review/yahya-sinwars-novel-is-a-tale-of-p… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Haziza Frédéric
@frhaz
Ainsi @netanyahu réaffirme son alliance avec Itamar Ben Gvir et Betzalel Smotrich pour pouvoir se maintenir au pouvoir. Un Premier ministre de l’État d’Israël ne devrait pas faire ça. Car Ben Gvir avait encouragé puis applaudi et fêté l’assassinat d’Yitzhak Rabin. Le 6 octobre 1995, Ben Gvir âgé de 19 ans était apparu à la télévision israélienne en tenant un emblème de capot Cadillac volé à la voiture du Premier ministre Yitzhak Rabin et avait déclaré : « Nous avons atteint sa voiture, et nous l’atteindrons lui aussi » (CF vidéo). Rabin était assassiné trois semaines plus tard, le 4 novembre 1995, par l’extrémiste de droite Yigal Amir.
Son hostilité envers l’héritage et les politiques de Rabin a perduré sous d’autres formes visant à obtenir en tandem avec Smotrich la libération de l’assassin de Rabin. Ben-Gvir a même été disqualifié du service militaire obligatoire d’Israël en raison de son implication dans le mouvement Kach de Meir Kahane (plus tard interdit en tant qu’organisation terroriste).
Et depuis qu’ils sont ministres de Netanyahu, lui et Smotrich multiplient les provocations pour attiser le feu au sein de la société israélienne. Menaces visant les opposants à Netanyahu, racisme vis à vis de la population arabe d’Israël, soutien aux actes de violence commis en Cisjordanie contre les Palestiniens et tentatives de bloquer tout accord avec les voisins d’Israel. Smotrich et Ben Gvir sont à l’origine des décisions les plus controversées de Netanyahu. Leur maintien au gouvernement signifierait qu’Israël tourne définitivement le dos à l’Israël de ses pères fondateurs. Leur place n’est pas au sein gouvernement de l’Etat d’Israël mais devant la Justice et dans les poubelles de l’Histoire. Israël ne doit pas sombrer avec eux dans l’obscurantisme #shalomhaver #שלוםחבר
i24NEWS Français
@i24NEWS_FR
Benjamin Netanyahou réaffirme son alliance avec Itamar Ben Gvir et Betsalel Smotrich
www.i24news.tv/fr/actu/elections-legislatives-2026/artc-b… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
Article link: amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/in-iraq-sudden-ouster-of-spy…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
NEW: Former INIS chief Shatri was a pioneer in engaging with Sharaa after Assad's downfall. Yet he was ousted on the eve of Zaidi's trip to Damascus, the first by an Iraqi PM since 2024.
Zaidi is now also the 3rd consecutive PM to (temporarily?) also head the spy agency. Hmm. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Told @AJEnglish that Tehran is aware of the limits of Vance’s influence within Trump’s administration.
We have seen two wars in less than a year, despite Vance’s objections and differing views. For that reason, I believe the leadership in Tehran still views US initiatives and military threats with considerable suspicion.
At the end of the day, Trump makes the final decisions – and that he has proven to be unpredictable and difficult to trust – remains a major factor shaping Iranian decision-making at this moment.
www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/29/what-we-know-of-vances-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Prof. Matthias Moosdorf MdB
@moosdorfmdb
Beeindruckender Artikel: „Ronald Lauder hat nie in Israel gelebt. Aber im vergangenen Jahr hat der jüdische Milliardär, der als Präsident des Jüdischen Weltkongresses fungiert, seine verbleibenden Immobilien im Land aufgegeben, ein Zeichen für die tiefe Veränderung in seiner Sicht auf dessen Zukunft.
Ein tiefes Gefühl des Ekels zeigt sich auf seinem Gesicht, während er das erzählt. ‚Ich habe meine Wohnung in Tel Aviv verkauft, ich habe mein Haus in Be’er Sheva dem Jüdischen Nationalfonds geschenkt, dessen Vorsitzender ich ebenfalls bin. Ich habe im Grunde meine Bindungen dorthin gekappt. Weil es so geworden ist…‘, verzieht Lauder das Gesicht und macht eine Geste des Erbrechens.“
Er fährt fort, Israel dafür verantwortlich zu machen, keinen Frieden geschlossen zu haben, und erklärt, dass Israel eigentlich keinen Frieden wollte: „Ich habe am Ende des Tages erkannt, dass Israel wirklich keinen Frieden wollte, sondern Dominanz. Und ich habe mich davon abgewandt.“ „Ihr habt die Demokratische Partei verloren, und ihr verliert die Republikanische Partei. Und das alles wegen Dummheit von eurer Seite. Ich will den Israelis sagen: ‚Schande über euch! Schande über euch alle. Eure Väter und Großväter haben für diesen Ort gekämpft, und ihr verliert ihn wegen Dummheit. Aus.‘“
Welche Ansicht spiegelt das wider? Derer, die gekämpft haben, um Israel zu gründen/es bei seiner Entstehung zu unterstützen, die aber gleichzeitig an Frieden geglaubt haben? Vielleicht für einen ungerechten Frieden, aber dennoch für einen Frieden. Aus Lauders Sicht hat Israel längst Dominanz und Kontrolle gegen Frieden eingetauscht, und es hat einige Zeit gedauert, bis viele seiner ursprünglichen Unterstützer und Fürsprecher das erkannt haben – und sich selbst gegenüber zugeben, in welche Richtung Israel tatsächlich unterwegs ist.
Ein wirklich bemerkenwerter Text.
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/2026-10-22/ty-artic… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
IISS News
@IISS_org
The war with Iran has depleted US missile stocks, complicating Washington’s security commitments in the Western Pacific.
Replenishment will take years, and this leaves US allies likely to face delivery shortfalls and competition for limited arms shipments this decade.
FREE TO READ | Find out more: www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2026/09/the-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kareem Shaheen
@kshaheen
Lamis was 8. Her brothers, Osama and Yaseen, were 9 and 11. They were killed alongside their uncle and grandmother when Jordanian jets struck their village in southern Syria, in what Amman called a "precision" attack. @CP__Ward for @newlinesmag newlinesmag.com/spotlight/inside-the-syrian-village-hit-b…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇮🇷🇺🇸 Iran has been rebuilding its missiles through the US blockade the whole time, using 5,000 secret military front agencies nobody had spotted
What a Reuters investigation with risk firm 240 Analytics found:
-More than 5,000 agencies all named “MOD” plus a number, all registered at the same Tehran address as Iran’s Defense Ministry, used to import at least $2 billion in military hardware since January 2025
-One agency alone, MOD 346428, brought in $2.3 billion in 18 months: rocket fuel chemicals, explosives, aircraft engine parts, 435 Iveco trucks and thousands of Toyotas used as missile launchers and drone haulers
-97% of the deals were settled with no money crossing a border, paid by diaspora frontmen using cash already held abroad
-Imports dropped 47% the month after the war began, then climbed back to $77 million by May, arriving by ship across the Caspian from Russia, by truck from Central Asia and by cargo plane from China
-$7.6 million in Russian detonators since 2025, the last batch in June; 93 tonnes of Chinese titanium for missile bodies landed 19 days before the war
-886 tonnes of Chinese rocket fuel chemicals hit Bandar Abbas in early 2025, and three days after the last shipment the port exploded, killing at least 70
-$27 million of goods recorded as coming from the UAE, the same country Iran was firing at, plus $34 million in Iveco trucks listed as shipped from the EU
-An Iveco truck blown up in a CENTCOM strike video from March is the same model this network imported
-Reuters found no evidence any of the 5,000 agencies has ever been sanctioned by a Western government
Treasury says it’s “10 steps ahead,” but this network kept trucks, detonators and rocket fuel flowing through every month of the war.
That’s the hole in the “short, intense” strike planned for after the midterms.
Bombing launchers buys time, and this pipeline replaces them through routes the naval blockade never touches.
Until Washington sanctions these fronts and squeezes the Caspian and Central Asian supply lines, Iran rebuilds whatever gets destroyed and the US fights this war again next summer.
Source: Reuters / Writer: Daniel -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Al-Sakani | علي السكني
@Alsakaniali
Iranian envoy to the Houthis Ali Mohammad Rezaei visited the graves of Houthi leaders in #sanaa, laying flowers and saying their “blood would not be shed in vain” and their “sacrifices” would lead to the expulsion of the “occupier” from all parts of #yemen and the failure of the US-Israeli project in the region.
-via presstvThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sara Massoumi
@SaraMassoumi
ولی نصر:
نامه به رضایی به ونس این امکان را میدهد که با توجه به چشمانداز سیاسی خود برای انتخابات ریاستجمهوری سال ۲۰۲۸ و آگاهی از میزان نامحبوب بودن جنگ در میان پایگاه رأیدهندگان جنبش «ماگا»، بگوید که تمام تلاش خود را برای جلوگیری از دور دیگری از جنگ انجام داده است.
اما مشکل اینجاست که دفعه قبل، ونس درباره تفاهمنامه همکاری (MoU) مذاکره کرد، ولی یک روز پس از آن، این روبیو بود که مسئولیت اجرای آن را بر عهده گرفت و دو هفته بعد، جنگ از سر گرفته شد. بنابراین، ایران احتمالاً ظن خواهد داشت که این بار نیز همان بازی در حال تکرار است.
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
The letter to Rezaie lets Vance who has eyes on 2028 and knows how unpopular the war is with MAGA base, to say that he did his best to avert another round of war. But problem is the last time around he negotiated the MoU and day after it was Rubio that was in charge of implementing it and after two weeks war resumed. Iran will likely suspect the same game being played again.
www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/vance-reaches-out-to-irania… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed’s Stark Warnings on the Houthis, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia’s War
Veteran Saudi journalist and political commentator Abdulrahman Al-Rashed @aalrashed, former general manager of @AlArabiya and former editor-in-chief of @aawsat_News, delivered a series of warnings about the war in Yemen, the Houthis' growing military capabilities, Iranian involvement, and the challenges facing Saudi Arabia.
Speaking with Omar Al-Jeraisy @Ojeraisy on the Socrates podcast, published by @thmanyah, Al-Rashed described the conflict as potentially the most dangerous security crisis in Saudi Arabia's history.
His remarks challenged assumptions about the Houthis' military weakness, questioned the ability of Yemen's divided anti-Houthi forces to defeat them, and warned Saudi audiences against expecting a quick end to the fighting. He also acknowledged that Iran had used the years of relative calm to help the Houthis build an extensive military infrastructure.
Below are ten of his key remarks on the challenges facing Saudi Arabia and the future of the war in Yemen.
1) Saudi Arabia Faces Its Most Dangerous Crisis Since Its Founding
Al-Rashed warned that Saudi Arabia faces simultaneous threats from Iran, Iraqi militias, and the Houthis, describing the current situation as more dangerous than the military threat posed by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.
"The Kingdom today faces the most dangerous crisis in its history since the founding of Saudi Arabia. Perhaps people do not realize how serious this danger is. Even when Saddam invaded Kuwait and positioned nearly half a million soldiers on our borders, it was not as dangerous as what we face today. Iran threatens us, the enormous militias in Iraq threaten us from the north, and the Houthis threaten us from Yemen in the south. We have three open fronts."
2) Iran Used the Ceasefire to Build the Houthis' Military Capabilities
One of Al-Rashed's most significant admissions concerned Saudi Arabia's failure to anticipate the scale of Iranian military assistance to the Houthis during the period of relative calm.
"The one thing we failed to read correctly was that, from the signing of the agreement until yesterday, Iran was working inside Houthi-controlled territory to build enormous offensive military capabilities. Thousands of missiles and drones, factories, assembly facilities, tunnels, and everything else. All of this was built during the period of truce and reconciliation."
3) Abdulmalik Al-Houthi Has Become an Iranian Proxy
Al-Rashed argued that the Houthi leadership had squandered opportunities to secure political recognition and govern Yemen, choosing instead to subordinate its military decisions to Tehran.
"In the end, he turned himself into an Iranian instrument. Having relations with Iran is not the problem. But when Iran tells you, 'I am going to close the Strait of Hormuz,' and two months later you close Bab al-Mandab, or 'I am going to fight Saudi Arabia,' and you attack it from the south, then you have become a proxy. That is the difference between an ally and a proxy."
4) Underestimating Houthi Fighters Is a Serious Military Mistake
Despite his opposition to the Houthis, Al-Rashed acknowledged their combat effectiveness, ideological commitment, and willingness to sustain casualties. He cautioned against dismissing them as poorly equipped irregular fighters.
"All the field information, and everyone who has followed the Houthis and their military history, acknowledges that the Houthis are a powerful fighting group. They are very tough fighters. They lead the battles, and they are the ones who die in those battles. You see them walking in sandals with RPGs on their shoulders, going up and down mountains. These are genuinely very dangerous fighters."
5) The Houthis Know How to Fight but Cannot Build a State
Al-Rashed compared the movement's ideological foundations and military behavior to jihadist organizations. He argued that the Houthis' ability to fight prolonged wars should not be confused with an ability to govern Yemen.
"They resemble Al-Qaeda. In the end, they resemble jihadist groups. If you examine their project and listen to their literature, that is what you find. Like other jihadist forces, they eventually lose their momentum and military capabilities. They cannot build a state. That is their fundamental weakness. They do not have the ability to become a state."
6) Yemen's Anti-Houthi Forces Are Undermined by Their Own Divisions
Al-Rashed acknowledged that Yemen's internationally recognized government and its affiliated military formations continue to struggle with rival leadership structures, political competition, and the absence of unified decision-making.
"I agree that there is a problem among our Yemeni brothers. They fight over power, they fight over decision-making, and they have different views about how things should be managed. In a state, there is a hierarchy, a strategy, a decision-maker, and people who follow that decision. Everyone is supposed to work toward their common interest. They can argue afterward if they want."
7) Without Yemen's Legitimate Government, Saudi Arabia Loses Its Legal Basis for Military Intervention
Responding to criticism of Yemen's political leadership, Al-Rashed defended the internationally recognized government's importance to Saudi Arabia, arguing that its legitimacy provides an essential legal foundation for military operations.
"It is also a mistake to underestimate the value of the legitimate government from a legal perspective. Without that legitimacy, our presence in Yemen would become illegal. Saudi Arabia cannot send a single soldier across the border without legitimacy, because it would be condemned by the United Nations and the major powers. You need that legitimacy."
8) Southern Yemeni Factions Are Mistaken if They Think the Houthis Will Spare Them
Addressing Yemen's southern political movements, Al-Rashed warned that factions seeking accommodation with the Houthis to advance their own political ambitions risk becoming their next targets.
"Why would you enter a military conflict and try to ally yourself with, or court, the Houthis in the hope that they will give you that opportunity? This is a kind of political stupidity. The Houthis will swallow you. They are not even satisfied with the north. If they were satisfied with the north, we would have established relations with them, opened our borders, traded with them, and exchanged embassies. They did not do that with us. Why would they do it with you?"
9) The War Threatens Saudi Arabia's Economic Ambitions
Al-Rashed acknowledged that the conflict could disrupt major Saudi economic projects, commercial activity, and development plans. He stressed that the Kingdom must continue functioning economically while recognizing the possibility of further disruption.
"Construction is continuing, institutions are completing their projects, and activities are continuing. I am not saying life is 100 percent normal. That is not true. But things are moving, and there is an effort not to allow this war, which has been imposed on us, to stop our economic activities. Could the war cause projects to stop? Of course, that is possible."
10) The War Could Last One or Two Years, Not Ten Days
Al-Rashed closed one of his strongest warnings by criticizing commentators who portray the ongoing conflict as an easy military campaign. He urged Saudi audiences to understand the scale of the danger and prepare psychologically for a prolonged war.
"We must understand that we face a major danger, deal with it psychologically, and accept its consequences. It is wrong to think the war will end in ten days. Those who say it will end in two months, God willing it ends in the coming days, but it could last a year, perhaps two years. It is wrong to give people the impression that everything is easy and that the matter is finished. This is a war, not a football match."
www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJvslMvn6_I -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: Iran is unlikely to respond positively to a recent US letter proposing comprehensive direct negotiations. A senior US official and an Iranian official told the New York Times on October 28 that US Vice President JD Vance sent Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei a letter through Qatari mediators that proposed comprehensive direct negotiations. Rezaei recently reiterated hardline negotiating positions, which were demands that the United States end the war on all fronts, release frozen assets, and lift the naval blockade before negotiations over anything else resume. These views are consistent with official Iranian state positions. (1/2)
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🇫🇷 🇮🇱 🤖 “Une gigantesque campagne d’influence, particulièrement bien financée, court depuis trois ans et diffuse, en toute illégalité, des discours racistes et islamophobes. Plusieurs indices situent de manière convaincante son origine dans le secteur privé israélien.”
www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2026/10/29/presidentielle-2…
“De par son ampleur et sa durée, cette opération constitue « l’une des plus grandes campagnes d’influence et de désinformation jamais documentée.” (…)
L’Hexagone est, ces derniers mois, le pays le plus visé : on y recense 120 millions de vues en trois ans. Pourquoi ? Une analyse historique des publicités poussées par les commanditaires suggère qu’à plusieurs reprises ils ont souhaité s’aligner sur le calendrier électoral. En 2024, « les publicités visant la France se sont concentrées sur les mois précédant les élections européennes », notent les chercheurs. En Allemagne, en 2026, ces mêmes achats publicitaires se sont subitement arrêtés juste avant l’élection régionale en Saxe-Anhalt, qui a vu la victoire du parti d’extrême droite Alternative für Deutschland.
« Cette campagne est toujours active dans des pays à l’approche d’élections importantes en 2027, dont la France et l’Italie, écrivent les chercheurs. Sa promotion constante de messages antimusulmans et anti-immigration suggère qu’elle peut avoir pour but d’influencer le climat politique en amont. »
(…)
Une adresse IP localisée en Israël
Qui a réellement payé pour ces milliers de publicités, qui ont coûté des millions d’euros ? (…) L’analyse sur le long terme des campagnes montre que plusieurs semblent conçues pour bénéficier à Israël.”
(…)
Le calendrier d’autres campagnes suggère un intérêt pour le gouvernement de Benyamin Nétanyahou. En novembre 2024, une série de publicités faisant la promotion du premier ministre hongrois d’alors, Viktor Orban, ont été mises en ligne le jour où la Cour pénale internationale a émis un mandat contre M. Nétanyahou, juste avant que M. Orban ne l’invite à se rendre en Hongrie.
Plusieurs indices pointent de manière convaincante en direction du secteur privé de l’Etat hébreu comme principal suspect derrière cette opération. Cette dernière avait aussi un volet ciblant Wikipédia, et avait recours à des faux nez qui masquaient leur véritable adresse IP pour modifier l’encyclopédie en ligne.
Or, à la suite d’un problème technique, la véritable adresse IP d’un de ces éditeurs est brièvement apparue, et indiquait une localisation en Israël.”
(..)
Ces métadonnées indiquent que les monteurs des vidéos travaillaient sur le fuseau horaire israélien, et comportaient même les pseudonymes de plusieurs créateurs, dont un certain « ShukiD ».
Le pseudonyme est bien connu dans les milieux politiques israéliens : il s’agit d’un créateur de vidéos qui a collaboré à de multiples campagnes, par exemple pour Moshe Kahlon, l’ancien ministre des finances de M. Nétanyahou.” -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
The three conflicts shaping the world right now
Ethiopia
The Ethiopian conflict is nowhere near over. If anything, it looks set to escalate.
This week Moscow delivered aircraft a year ahead of the original schedule.
The purchase itself was already agreed; the Russian government simply moved the first physical delivery forward.
Abiy Ahmed announced in Moscow the arrival of 12 Su-35s of the 4++ generation, though only the initial batch of two has actually arrived so far. He also spoke of acquiring four S-400 batteries.
Moscow is supplying weapons while also offering itself as mediator, knowing the jets still need pilot training and munitions.
I would not treat that mediation role as fixed. Ethiopia has previously hired pilots and technicians from Eastern Europe (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians) for its more demanding air operations.
Addis is planning further steps and is still gauging the reaction of Somalia, Egypt and Sudan, all of them opposed to Ethiopian aims.
With Somalia, the trigger for the Eritrean alignment was Ethiopia’s earlier deal with Somaliland for Red Sea access, which Mogadishu treated as a direct breach of its sovereignty.
Ethiopia is working to pull Eritrea deeper into the fight, an involvement that has never really ended.
After Eritrean incursions into Ethiopian territory earlier this month, the ENDF pulled troops from parts of the northern border to concentrate on Tigray rebels.
The result was predictable: TPLF forces reoccupied the border town of Rama, right against Eritrean territory. Eritrean units remain on high alert along the line, watching both the rebels and the Ethiopian army. TPLF is support come from Eritrean territory.
Read more:
global21.substack.com/p/the-three-conflicts-shaping-the-w… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Restitutor Orientis 🇱🇮
@restitutorII
🇮🇷⚔️🇺🇸🇮🇱
Iran: Le sénateur démocrate Chris Murphy affirme être au courant d'un plan d'attaque contre l'Iran: "Certains d’entre nous ont été informés du plan de guerre. Même si je ne peux en révéler aucun détail, je peux vous dire une chose: ce plan est insensé. Il ne permettra pas d’atteindre les objectifs fixés et déclenchera un nouveau cycle d’escalade." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
DAWN MENA
@DAWNmenaorg
Nine days after Emirati poet Habib Al Sayegh published a column criticizing normalization with Israel, he was dead. A new book alleges UAE security forces detained, tortured, and killed him. DAWN is calling on UN experts to investigate. dawnmena.org/un-investigate-the-uaes-alleged-2019-killing…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Levant24
@Levant_24_
Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani:
📌 "We rejected this (the Jordanian airstrikes) and declared there was no coordination, so there would be no misrepresentation on this issue."
📌 "This case requires an official investigation, and the investigation must continue to the end. Daraa is the land of the revolution and the revolutionaries, and ISIS has no presence there."
📌 "We are the guardians of the blood of the martyrs and the wounded in Daraa. We will not give up Syrian blood or accept that any Syrian be wounded anywhere under any pretext."
📌 "We will not accept any inch of Syria being a source of threat to any country, and we have said so since the first day after liberation."
📌 "Rest assured that the state is present and has not been lax on this matter; on the contrary."
📌 "The Syrian people paid for liberation with a million martyrs over 14 years of torment and suffering, so what happened in Syria is no small matter." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Former Mossad chief Tamir Pardo delivers a scathing critique of Israel's assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, calling it a "mega-mistake" and a major strategic failure.
"Anyone who thinks that by taking down a leader you dismantle a country and dismantle capabilities is massively mistaken," Pardo says.
He argues that the assassination failed to achieve its central objective of bringing down the Islamic Republic and instead strengthened the very forces Israel sought to weaken.
"The goal was not to kill Khamenei, the goal was to overturn the regime and in this case we got zero."
According to Pardo, the operation fundamentally altered Iran's internal balance of power, leaving the IRGC substantially stronger and empowering figures he considers more dangerous.
He also warns that Israel has opened a "Pandora's box of revenge for generations" by establishing a precedent for assassinating senior political leaders, potentially exposing Israeli officials to similar operations.
Pardo's broader criticism is that Israel has repeatedly confused operational successes with strategic achievements:
"Your ability to execute a perfect kinetic operation has no connection to the strategic goal. You take wonderful successes, and ultimately they can lead to a terrible failure."
He also sharply criticizes Netanyahu's public unveiling of Iran's nuclear archive in 2018, arguing that the intelligence operation was turned into a political marketing exercise designed to persuade Trump to abandon the JCPOA.
Link to Israel Hayom article on his comments: www.israelhayom.co.il/news/trending-online/article/21708949 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Semafor reports, citing a Trump official, that the US seeks a temporary Iran deal. That makes little sense for Tehran before the midterms, and probably after. Still, even brief relief from the blockade could help it, as during the June MOU.
www.semafor.com/article/10/29/2026/trump-weighs-post-midt… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Saudi Al Hadath reports talks on possible Turkey meeting before Nov 4, with Iran seeking a 4-day timeline to reopen Hormuz & lift US blockade.
One proposal would revive the Sept 2025 Iran-IAEA Cairo inspections deal, which was notably rejected by the US & E3 at the time. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
الإخبارية السورية
@AlekhbariahSY
قيادة الأمن الداخلي في محافظة إدلب للإخبارية:
📌رصدت إحدى دوريات قوى الأمن الداخلي خروج مجموعة مسلحة من مخيم الفرنسيين باتجاه منطقة حارم بريف إدلب خلافاً للاتفاق المبرم بشأن عدم الخروج منه بالأسلحة
📌أثناء توجه الدورية لملاحقة المجموعة لإيقافها بادر أفرادها إلى إطلاق النار باتجاه القوة الأمنية ما استدعى الرد على مصادر النيران
📌الحادثة أسفرت عن مقتل أحد أفراد المجموعة المسلحة وإصابة مواطن مدني إضافة إلى تضرر سيارة تابعة لقوى الأمن الداخلي
📌وزارة الداخلية تستمر في تطبيق القانون وملاحقة كل من يخلّ بالأمن أو يعتدي على القوى الأمنية بما يضمن سلامة المواطنين ويحفظ الاستقرار
#الإخبارية_السورية -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
IISS News
@IISS_org
Iran’s attacks on Gulf energy facilities and in the Strait of Hormuz have resulted in unprecedented disruption to Gulf energy exports and global energy markets.
The upcoming IISS Strategic Dossier examines the multifaceted implications of the 2026 United States–Israel war with Iran for the foreign policies and defence and economic priorities of the Gulf states.
Read the chapter preview ahead of the dossier's publication on 30 October 2026: www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/the-gulf-at-…
IISS Manama Dialogue
30 October–1 November 2026
#iiss_md26 | www.iiss.org/events/manama-dialogue/manama-dialogue-2026/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House MENA
@CH_MENAP
📰 | Division between Iraq’s Kurdish parties risks undermining Kurdistan region’s autonomy
The KDP and PUK largely agree on Kurdish issues in Turkey, Iran and Syria. But division on how to govern at home could invite outside interference and undermine hard-won self-governance, writes @wrodgers2.
www.chathamhouse.org/2026/10/division-between-iraqs-kurdi… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
I was quoted in @WSJ :
The biggest mistakes Israel and the United States continue to make is assuming that another round of strikes against Iran, including attacks on critical infrastructure or the elimination of senior officials, could somehow bring down the regime. More bombing could make the regime dig in on its missile and nuclear programs
#iranwar
www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-warns-gulf-of-possible-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Middle East Letter
@themiddleeastle
BREAKING: Axios now reports that, in the event of a return to war with Iran—beyond targeting Iran’s energy infrastructure and nuclear sites—the U.S. and Israel would once again target the Iranian leadership, including its political leadership. Prominent Iranian figures state that if this occurs, Iran will this time also go after the leadership of regional states allied with the United States.
Several US media outlets have already reported that Iran is preparing to eliminate prominent US diplomatic figures, as well as ambassadors in the region, most likely in response to attacks on Iranian political figures. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
مشعل - MESHAL
@mishaltd
🇴🇲🇮🇷 “اتركوا إيران وشأنها”.. رسالة من وزير الخارجية العُماني إلى الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل، ومعها دعوة لتغيير طريقة إدارة الأمن في الخليج.
تحذير من مزيد من الحرب، وطرح يمنح دول المنطقة دوراً أكبر في حماية أمنها.. ماذا يريد الوزير بدر البوسعيدي؟
📌 في مقابلة مع “القناة الرابعة” البريطانية، دعا وزير الخارجية العُماني إلى إطار أمني إقليمي جديد، يقل فيه الاعتماد على الولايات المتحدة بوصفها الضامن الرئيسي للأمن، وتتحمل فيه دول الخليج دوراً أكبر.
👈🏻 وما الفكرة التي يطرحها؟
ميثاق إقليمي لعدم الاعتداء يشمل إيران.. بالتوازي مع دعوة واشنطن وإسرائيل إلى التراجع عن مزيد من الصراع في المنطقة.
👈🏻 وماذا يعني ذلك؟
الطرح الذي يقدّمه البوسعيدي يقوم على مشاركة دول المنطقة في ترتيبات أمنها، وتقليل اعتمادها على القوى الخارجية.
#عُمان #إيران #الخليج #أميركا #الخليجThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
The Saudis carried out more than 100 strikes on positions in Yemen in just the last 24 hours.
Anyone who read my post from a few weeks ago will remember that the Saudi offensive was only just getting underway at that point.
The big question around protecting energy infrastructure remains a vulnerability and is certainly being negotiated with Iran, but I don’t see any real progress in talks over the fighting in Yemen.
I view this front with considerable pessimism for the global economy. There will come a point where no agreement can hold while the Yemeni capital is being bombed.
Chances of de-escalation? I’m skeptical anything along those lines happens in the next two weeks, especially given the trend of pressure on the Iranian economy. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
An interesting assessment from Iran’s conservative daily Khorasan:
- Netanyahu’s departure would benefit Iran, even if his successor remains equally hostile to Tehran.
- The argument is not that Israel would become less confrontational, but that Netanyahu’s political experience, diplomatic networks and ability to build consensus against Iran would be difficult to replace.
- In other words, an Israel without Netanyahu might not be less hostile to Iran, but could be less effective in confronting it.
- An interesting distinction in Tehran’s strategic thinking.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
.@TheNationalNews: Iran reportedly told Mecca Pact officials it lacks leverage to halt Houthi attacks, instead urging them to secure US backing for 2-week regional truce & gradual Hormuz reopening. Talks also focused on a regional non-aggression framework
www.thenationalnews.com/news/gulf/2026/10/27/exclusive-ir… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
מה עומד מאחורי שליחת המכתב?
באופן עקרוני, שני הצדדים מעוניינים להימנע מהסלמה, וסגן נשיא ארה"ב, ג'יי. די. ואנס, מוביל גישה זו עוד מלפני תחילת מבצע "שאגת הארי".
מעבר לרצונו של ואנס למצב את עצמו כמי שעושה כל שביכולתו למנוע מלחמה, נראה כי בממשל האמריקני מתגבשת ההבנה שהדרך היחידה למנוע הסלמה היא באמצעות מגע ישיר עם איראן. בהקשר זה, הממשל רואה ברזאאי דמות בעלת השפעה משמעותית על תהליך קבלת ההחלטות בטהראן.
אלא שהמכשול המרכזי נותר בעינו: התנגדותה העקרונית של טהראן לדון בסוגיית הגרעין בטרם תמלא ארה"ב את התחייבויותיה במסגרת מזכר ההבנות שנחתם בין הצדדים ביוני.
לפיכך, מדובר בהתפתחות חשובה המעידה על רצון למצוא מוצא מדיני, בוודאי מצדו של ואנס, אך אין פירושה שסכנת ההסלמה הוסרה. פגישה ישירה בין הצדדים בעת הנוכחית תהיה ללא ספק איתות חיובי, אולם כל עוד הם דבקים בעמדותיהם, הסיכוי לפריצת דרך מדינית נותר נמוך.
בסופו של יום השאלה המרכזית אינה אם הצדדים מעוניינים להימנע ממלחמה, אלא אם הם מוכנים לשלם את המחיר המדיני הכרוך בכך. בשלב זה, אין אינדיקציה ברורה לשינוי בעמדות היסוד של מי מהם, ולכן יש להבחין בין עצם הנכונות להידבר לבין הסיכוי להגיע להסכמות. שליחת המכתב היא סימן לרצון למנוע הסלמה, אך עדיין לא סימן להתקרבות בעמדות.
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
סגן נשיא ארה"ב ג'יי.די. ואנס שלח מכתב למזכיר המועצה העליונה לביטחון לאומי של איראן, מוחסן רזאאי, שבו הדגיש כי "כל משא ומתן מחייב דיון בסוגיית הגרעין", כך אמר לי בכיר אמריקני. הפרטים בכתבה שלי ב-@N12News
www.mako.co.il/news-world/2026_q4/Article-175ef07eda481a1… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr. Cinzia Bianco
@Cinzia_Bianco
Russia sharing satellite data with Iran and Houthis against Saudi and other Gulf targets and China delivering weapons needed to strike. Hurting Gulfies to weaken US. This is not a regional war but a global crisis and the Gulfies are collateral damage.
apnews.com/article/russia-iran-satellite-intelligence-hou… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Charles Lister
@Charles_Lister
At @MiddleEastInst, @ChrisMurphyCT says the US Navy base in #bahrain is "obliterated" & Udeid in #qatar is "heavily damaged, but just about usable."
"What good is having any base in the region if its decimated within hours? We clearly can't protect the scope of our assets today"
Charles Lister
@Charles_Lister
Speaking at @MiddleEastInst, Senator @ChrisMurphyCT says on a recent trip to the #gulf, he was denied access to al-Udeid AB in #qatar & blocked from speaking with any DOD employee in the #middleeast.
It's a "cover up," he says, hiding "the extent of damage" done to US bases. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Charles Lister
@Charles_Lister
Speaking at @MiddleEastInst, Senator @ChrisMurphyCT says on a recent trip to the #gulf, he was denied access to al-Udeid AB in #qatar & blocked from speaking with any DOD employee in the #middleeast.
It's a "cover up," he says, hiding "the extent of damage" done to US bases. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
ᴅʀ. ʜ.ᴀ. ʜᴇʟʟʏᴇʀ 🖖🏾 ⚜️
@hahellyer
New @FT piece on Saudi Arabia's effort to mend ties with the UAE in the Houthi crisis, reported by Chloe Cornish, Heba Saleh (@hebamks) and Ahmed Al Omran (@ahmed), quoting my analysis:
www.ft.com/content/97a6cadc-aedb-40a1-b583-c410d3278191?s…
My comments concern Egypt. Cairo is very cautious about the Saudi-Houthi conflict, but "I don't think that they think that they can sit this one out."
Caution and participation are not alternatives here. Egypt's caution is real, and it governs how Cairo engages, not whether it does.
Expect restraint in the form of Egypt's involvement, not an absence of it. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 كشفت إن بي سي نيوز، نقلاً عن مسؤول أميركي حالي وآخر سابق وشخصين مطلعين، أن دول الخليج تخشى بصورة متزايدة أن يسحب ترامب معظم القوات الأميركية من الشرق الأوسط بعد انتهاء الحرب مع إيران. وتعتبر الحكومات الخليجية أن هذا السيناريو قد يقوض الأساس الأمني الذي قامت عليه علاقاتها مع واشنطن طوال عقود، ويتركها معرضة لتهديدات إيرانية إضافية. وتأتي المخاوف بعد اعتراض هذه الدول على قرار بدء الحرب في فبراير، وشعورها بأن واشنطن لا تأخذ أولوياتها الأمنية في الاعتبار عند اتخاذ القرارات العسكرية.
🔷 كشف مسؤول إقليمي أن الولايات المتحدة أبلغت بعض حلفائها الخليجيين ببدء الضربات ضد إيران في 28 فبراير قبل ساعات قليلة فقط من التنفيذ، رغم تحذيرات غالبية دول الخليج من شن الحرب. وأوضح أن القرار الأميركي، وما تبعه من عمليات لم تُستشر فيها الحكومات الخليجية بصورة كافية، أضعف الثقة بواشنطن شريكاً أمنياً يمكن الاعتماد عليه. الأزمة لا ترتبط فقط باحتمال الانسحاب، بل أيضاً بطريقة اتخاذ واشنطن قرارات الحرب التي تعرض القواعد والمدن والبنية التحتية الخليجية للرد الإيراني.
🔷 كشفت الشبكة أن أعداداً من العسكريين الأميركيين أُخرجت من قواعدها الأصلية خلال الحرب لحمايتها من الهجمات الإيرانية، وأن عودة جميع هذه الوحدات إلى مواقعها السابقة ليست مضمونة. ويكتسب ذلك أهمية لأن عدداً من القواعد تعرض لأضرار كبيرة، ما يتيح لإدارة ترامب إعادة تقييم جدوى إصلاحها وإعادة نشر القوات فيها. ويميز التقرير بين الانسحاب الطبيعي للقوات الإضافية التي شاركت في الحرب، وبين احتمال سحب القوات المتمركزة بصورة دائمة في المنطقة منذ التسعينيات، وهو السيناريو الذي يثير المخاوف الخليجية الأساسية.
🔷 الحرب دمرت، وفق إن بي سي نيوز، مبنى مركز العمليات الجوية المشتركة الأميركي في قطر، المعروف اختصاراً باسم CAOC، والذي تصفه الشبكة بأنه مركز عصبي لإدارة العمليات العسكرية الأميركية في المنطقة. كما تشير إلى أضرار لحقت بالقواعد الأميركية في البحرين والكويت والسعودية والإمارات وعُمان والأردن. تقديرات نقلتها الشبكة تضع تكلفة الأضرار بعشرات مليارات الدولارات. وتمثل هذه الخسائر عاملاً مهماً في النقاش حول إعادة بناء البنية العسكرية الأميركية أو تقليصها بصورة دائمة.
🔷 يرى خبراء تحدثوا إلى إن بي سي نيوز أن تدمير أجزاء واسعة من شبكة القواعد الأميركية يفتح أمام إدارة ترامب فرصة لإعادة النظر جذرياً في انتشارها العسكري بالشرق الأوسط. وقد توافق الدول المضيفة على تمويل إصلاح القواعد وتحديثها، لكن التقرير يطرح سؤالاً عن جدوى تحمل هذه التكاليف إذا كانت واشنطن تفكر أصلاً في تقليص وجودها. وتتمثل المخاوف في أن يُنظر إلى هذه القواعد باعتبارها إرثاً من الحروب الأميركية الطويلة، بما يوفر مبرراً سياسياً لإعادة العسكريين إلى الولايات المتحدة بدلاً من إصلاح المنشآت وإعادة تشغيلها.
🔷 أكدت باربرا ليف، السفيرة الأميركية السابقة لدى الإمارات، أن البنية الدفاعية والأمنية التي بنتها واشنطن في المنطقة على مدار 35 عاماً تعرضت لأضرار كبيرة، وأن الغرض من استمرارها أصبح موضع تساؤل لدى الولايات المتحدة وشركائها. وترى أن الانسحاب الواسع قد يخلق فراغاً استراتيجياً لا توجد قوة أخرى قادرة على ملئه، ويمنح إيران مكسباً كبيراً على مستوى توازن القوى الإقليمي. وقالت أن عدم إعادة بناء الوجود العسكري الأميركي قد يسمح لإيران بتحقيق هدف استراتيجي تسعى إليه منذ أربعة عقود؛ إخراج الولايات المتحدة من الشرق الأوسط. ويقوم هذا التقييم على احتمال انتهاء الحرب دون تسوية تضمن الأمن الإقليمي، ثم انسحاب واشنطن من قواعد استقرت فيها لعقود.
🔷 في حين أعلن السفير الأميركي توم باراك، خلال منتدى الأمن العالمي في الدوحة أن مرحلة اعتماد الدول على الولايات المتحدة ضامناً للأمن العالمي قد انتهت. وقال إن الدور الذي أدته أميركا طوال الثمانين عاماً الماضية لم يعد قائماً بالشكل السابق، وإن سياسة إدارة ترامب لا تمثل تخلياً عن الحلفاء بقدر ما تمثل دعوة إلى إعادة ترتيب العلاقات. وأكد أن دول المنطقة ينبغي أن تتخلص تدريجياً من اعتمادها الأمني على واشنطن، لأن تغيير طبيعة الوجود العسكري الأميركي في الشرق الأوسط أصبح أمراً حتمياً.
🔷 ويحذر مسؤولون وخبراء من أن تقليص القدرات الدفاعية الامريكية، وليس مجرد تخفيض أعداد الجنود، قد يضعف الدفاعات الإقليمية ويزيد قدرة إيران على تهديد حلفاء واشنطن. ولهذا فإن طبيعة الوحدات والمنظومات التي قد تُسحب تمثل عاملاً أكثر أهمية من العدد الإجمالي للعسكريين وحده.
🔷 ويخشى مسؤولون وخبراء خليجيون أن تتحمل دول المنطقة أعباء الحرب والردود الإيرانية والحوثية، ثم تواجه انسحاباً أميركياً إضافياً بعد انتهائها، وهو ما قد يزيد شعورها بتراجع قيمة الضمانات الأمنية الأميركية.
🔷 نقلت الشبكة عن مسؤولين خليجيين وخبراء في شؤون الشرق الأوسط احتمال أن ينهي ترامب الحرب من جانب واحد ويعلن الانتصار حتى دون التوصل إلى اتفاق نهائي مع إيران. ويربط هؤلاء هذا السيناريو بتراجع شعبية الحرب داخل الولايات المتحدة وارتفاع أسعار البنزين والديزل والضغوط الانتخابية على الجمهوريين. ويخشون أن يسعى ترامب بعد إعلان انتهاء العمليات إلى إعادة القوات الأميركية إلى الوطن بصورة أوسع، بما يشمل بعض الوحدات الدائمة، بدلاً من المحافظة على مستوى الانتشار السابق. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël. Le chef de la gauche, Yaïr Golan, a appelé l'opposition à Benjamin Netanyahu à s'allier avec les partis arabes pour former un gouvernement et évincer le Premier ministre du pouvoir (AFP).
"Nous ne devons plus accepter la division raciste de Netanyahu entre les voix juives et les voix arabes", a-t-il écrit sur X au lendemain des élections législatives à l'issue desquelles le premier ministre sortant et son rival Gadi Eizenkot sont aux coudes à coudes. "Nous avons une responsabilité. Et nous avons l'opportunité de former un gouvernement de changement en partenariat avec les citoyens arabes d'Israël".
#israelelections -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël. Alors que le premier ministre sortant Benjamin Netanyahou apparait légèrement en tête des estimations de vote ce matin en Israël (55-56 sièges) devant Gadi Eizenkot (autour de 50), ni l’un ni l’autre, à priori, ne pourront former un gouvernement. En attendant de composer une coalition - il lui avait fallu 58 jours en 2022 - Benjamin Netanyahou restera Premier ministre et pourrait être incité à jouer la carte iranienne pour arriver à ses fins. Bibi chercherait à exploiter cette période pour lancer après les élections de mid-terms aux Etats-Unis une nouvelle guerre contre l’Iran, perspective qu’il a appelée de ses vœux pendant sa campagne, afin de souder plus massivement les Israéliens derrière lui. A suivre.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Piteuse sortie de scène pour Flavio Bolsonaro au Brésil au lendemain de sa défaite à la présidentielle. Le sénateur conservateur a fui son pays pour les États-Unis, ont rapporté mardi des médias américains, tandis que le gouvernement de Donald Trump a annoncé qu'il lui accorderait un visa (AFP).
Le fils de l'ex-président d'extrême droite Jair Bolsonaro n'a toujours pas reconnu son échec au second tour face au président sortant de gauche Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, réélu à la surprise générale dimanche avec 52% des voix.
Il est arrivé sur le sol américain mardi soir, ont rapporté le Washington Post et CNN, citant chacun une source anonyme proche du dossier. Le lieu de son arrivée n'a pas été précisé.
Le gouvernement américain "délivrera des visas à Flavio Bolsonaro et à sa famille et leur permettra d'entrer aux États-Unis", a indiqué plus tôt dans la journée un responsable du département d'État sous couvert d'anonymat.
Lundi, le candidat défait avait promis de se plier à un ordre judiciaire le sommant de remettre ses passeports aux autorités. Mais il ne l'a pas fait et ses documents ont été annulés mardi, a indiqué à l'AFP une source policière, y compris le passeport diplomatique qu'il détenait en tant que parlementaire.
Flavio Bolsonaro, 45 ans, fait l'objet de plusieurs enquêtes.
#bresil -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sanam Vakil صنم وكىل
@SanamVakil
It’s unclear yet if all of these diplomatic efforts from Saudi Arabia Turkey Pakistan and Egypt alongside mediation from Qatar and Oman will stop the march to another round of war, but we should make no mistake— no Gulf or Arab country is championing another round of kinetic military activity or hoping that this one will get the job done.
Flurry of Diplomacy in Iran as Regional Countries Try to Stave Off War www.nytimes.com/2026/10/26/world/middleeast/iran-war-new-… via @NYTimes -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Qusay Noor
@QUSAY_NOOR_
The Full Interview with President Ahmed al-Sharaa on #iraq’s Dijlah TV Channel:
📌 The social ties between #syria and Iraq are longstanding and historic. The destinies of the two countries have been interconnected throughout history, remain so today, and will continue to be linked in the future.
📌 #syria is the strategic corridor connecting the West to #iraq and extending onward to the Arabian Gulf.
📌 #syria’s stability serves #iraq’s interests, just as #iraq’s stability positively benefits #syria.
📌 #syria is working to ensure security along its border with Iraq to prevent security breaches and smuggling.
📌 From the very first moments of our arrival in #damascus, our position was clear. We have done more than we have talked.
📌 #syrian policy has focused on reviving economic development, rebuilding the economy, strengthening economic ties, and ensuring security and stability.
📌 The #syrian-#iraqi border is secure so far, and border coordination is functioning effectively.
📌 The #syrian and #iraqi peoples share common experiences of suffering as a result of wars and psychological hardship.
📌 Water resources, border crossings, the economy, development, and agriculture are areas of shared interest that must be developed in ways that make our cooperation difficult to undo in the future.
📌 There should be a joint strategy to make use of the region’s water resources and agricultural potential.
📌 #syria does not view its relationship with #iraq through a sectarian or ethnic lens, but rather through the great historical and economic ties that unite the two countries.
📌 We are continuing to work on the oil connectivity project between #syria and #iraq, with the participation of a group of regional and American companies.
📌 #syria is highly open to strengthening social ties and facilitating travel and the movement of people between #syria and #iraq.
📌 #syria and #iraq possess the capabilities and expertise needed to build a strong state that others respect and that respects itself.
📌 Our peoples deserve us to take an honest look at ourselves and develop a program that helps them achieve a better life, development, and prosperity.
📌 I went to #iraq in 2003 out of a sense of patriotic fervor and solidarity, to defend the #iraqi people and confront the #american occupation. I had no organizational, political, military, or security affiliations. I went on my own initiative.
📌 I entered Iraq approximately a week to ten days before #american forces entered the country. My primary motivation was the sense of responsibility I felt toward the Iraqi people amid the crises and suffering unfolding across the region.
📌 News reached us inside prison months after events had taken place outside because communication had been cut off. Among the detainees were several figures who now hold political responsibilities in Iraq.
📌 We must cooperate at the regional level to find a way out of the crises and reach a state of normalcy that society can understand and that countries can engage with.
📌 We had read in books about Iraqi generosity, and we found it to be true in reality. Iraqis are people of honor, generosity, solidarity, and courage. I take pride in them and in the experience I had in Iraq.
📌 I am proud of my history in Iraq, and I affirm that I have never attacked a civilian or an unarmed person in my life. I have principles that I upheld during military confrontations and passed on to many of those who worked with me. There is a significant difference between the honor of combat and killing.
📌 I share in the Iraqis’ sorrow when they grieve and their joy when they rejoice. I believe we are going through a dangerous phase, but #syria, #iraq, and the countries of the region possess considerable resources and potential that qualify them to become countries with independent decision-making, rather than countries subordinate to others.
📌 We are facing a historic opportunity to reclaim decision-making power in the region and build a strong regional identity capable of expressing its own will, free from international and regional rivalries, occupation, and the sectarian conflicts that have exhausted our peoples.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
العربية
@AlArabiya
وصل قبل دخول القوات الأميركية بـ10 أيام وبعض المعتقلين معه يتصدرون المشهد حالياً.. الرئيس السوري أحمد الشرع يكشف أسباب سفره إلى العراق في 2003 وتفاصيل حياته في السجن
========
🔴 الرئيس السوري أحمد الشرع كشف أنه دخل العراق عام 2003 بمبادرة شخصية لمواجهة القوات الأميركية
🔴 الشرع أضاف لقناة "دجلة" العراقية أنه لم تكن لديه ارتباطات تنظيمية أو سياسية أو عسكرية في ذلك الحين
🔴 الشرع أوضح أنه وصل قبل دخول القوات الأميركية بنحو 10 أيام بدافع المسؤولية تجاه الشعب العراقي
🔴 الرئيس السوري كشف أن انقطاع التواصل داخل السجن جعل الأخبار تصلهم متأخرة لأشهر
🔴 الشرع كشف أن بين المعتقلين معه في السجن شخصيات تتصدر المشهد السياسي في العراق حالياً -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Critical Threats
@criticalthreats
MORE | Hezbollah has exploited its ceasefire with Israel in June 2026 to try to reconstitute military capabilities that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has degraded since March 2026, according to Lebanese security sources speaking to Reuters on October 26.
The sources added that Hezbollah has focused primarily on rebuilding its command-and-control structures, drone capabilities, and explosives arsenals.
CTP-ISW has repeatedly assessed that Hezbollah will likely use the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire in Lebanon to reconstitute its military forces and prepare for future conflict with Israel with Iranian support.
However, current indicators suggest that Hezbollah may not participate in a renewed Iranian conflict by attacking Israel in the near term.
Hezbollah has historically taken military and political action to support Iranian objectives in the region, however the Iranian regime may prefer to limit Hezbollah’s involvement in such a round of conflict in order to prioritize Hezbollah’s military reconstitution, given that any Hezbollah attacks on Israel would almost certainly provoke an Israeli response.
It is possible that neither Iran nor Hezbollah view possible renewed US-Israeli strikes on Iran as an existential threat to the regime at this time.
Critical Threats
@criticalthreats
NEW | Senior officials from the Mecca Pact’s three signatories met with senior Iranian officials in Tehran on October 26 to discuss a new US-Iran deal in concert with ongoing Pakistani and Qatari efforts. The United States and Iran reportedly continue to face roadblocks regarding the sequencing of the agreement.
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey signed a mutual defense agreement, known as the Mecca Joint Defense Pact, in August 2026.
Two diplomats briefed on the ongoing talks told the New York Times on October 26 that Qatari mediators are trying to secure an agreement in which the United States and Iran would make "a series of concessions over a five-day period."
The diplomats added that those concessions include Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for the United States lifting its naval blockade on Iranian ports.
The United States and Iran reportedly continue to disagree on the sequencing of the agreement. Iran has repeatedly maintained that the United States must lift the naval blockade, provide sanctions relief, and recognize Iranian control over the strait before Iran makes any concessions.
The Mecca Pact parties also likely attempted to end current Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia and prevent future Iranian strikes on the kingdom. Gulf-based diplomatic sources told Israeli media that Saudi Arabia attempted to negotiate a ceasefire with the Houthis during a meeting with Iranian officials.
The Houthis may seek to avoid striking US targets in support of Iran if the United States and Israel resume strikes in Iran to prevent US retaliation could weaken the group’s current position relative to Saudi Arabia. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
akram ehghaghi
@AkramEhghaghi
جزییات ابتکار دیپلماتیک مطرح شده درنشست تهران
۱/ رویترز و فایننشالتایمز،جزئیات ابتکار دیپلماتیکی را منتشر کردند که مقامهای عربستان سعودی،ترکیه و پاکستان در سفر به #تهران با مقامهای ایرانی درباره آن گفتوگو کردند؛ابتکاری با هدف جلوگیری از جنگ جدید #آمریکا و #اسرائیل علیه ایران -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
The image of the Houthis as a primitive militia fighting barefoot is misleading and increasingly outdated. This cave-based command post features a satellite-connected laptop, tablet, secured landline telephone, two-way radios, printer, and solar-powered electrical systems. Notice the communications reference card hanging around his neck, it contains radio call signs, unit identifiers, and command codes used for coordination and mobilization. This is an organized military communications infrastructure, not simply men with rifles and sandals. This is the result of 22 years of fighting an insurgency, adapting, and learning on the battlefield, combined with lessons drawn from Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq’s Islamic Resistance, and Iran’s IRGC Quds Force.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Pakistani official to Reuters: At the Mecca pact countries’ Tehran meeting, Asim Munir, with Trump’s approval, presented Iran with a peace proposal.
Talks covered Hormuz, the US blockade & Houthi attacks. Regional states could act as guarantors.
www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/top-officials-mecca-pa… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
צריך להדגיש נקודה משמעותית במיוחד: במצב הפוליטי שנוצר, לנתניהו אין ממשלה. בהיעדר אפשרות להקים קואליציה, התמריץ שלו להשתמש שוב בקלף האיראני עשוי לגדול באופן דרמטי.
מבחינתו, הסלמה מול איראן עשויה להיות הדרך היחידה לשנות את המשוואה הפוליטית, ליצור מצב חירום לאומי ולכפות על יריביו הקמת ממשלת אחדות בראשותו.
לכן, החשש אינו רק שנתניהו ינסה לנצל מלחמה לצרכיו הפוליטיים, אלא שהמבוי הסתום הפוליטי עצמו עלול להפוך לתמריץ משמעותי ליזום הסלמה מול איראן. זו אפשרות שחייבים להביא בחשבון בניתוח הסיכון למערכה נוספת.
Yanir Cozin - יניר קוזין
@yanircozin
להבנתי, אלה האפשרויות כרגע נוכח לתוצאות למדגמים, לא לפי הסדר:
- ממשלת מיעוט של איזנקוט עם רע"מ
- אחדות עם איזנקוט-נתניהו
- בחירות נוספות -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
الاحتمالان الأكثر وروداً بعد الانتخابات الإسرائيلية هما تشكيل حكومة أقلية برئاسة آيزنكوت بدعم من الخارج من الحزب الإسلامي (بحيث يصوّت الحزب مع الحكومة أحياناً ويمنع سقوطها)، بينما الاحتمال الثاني، وأعتبره الأقل حظاً، هو رفض المعارضة اليهودية مشاركة العرب والذهاب إلى انتخابات أخرى. وحتى تشكيل حكومة بديلة، سيبقى نتنياهو رئيس وزراء لتصريف الأعمال.
كيف ستتعامل حكومة آيزنكوت مع الملفات الإقليمية؟
بوجه عام، سنرى استعادة الجيش لمكانته في صدارة صناعة القرار في إسرائيل، بعد 3 سنوات تجاهل فيها نتنياهو كثيراً من توصيات الجيش (مثلاً بشأن وقف الحرب على غزة وقمع إرهاب المستوطنين).
بتقديري، فيما يخص سياسات إسرائيل الخارجية والأمنية، التغييرات المهمة الوحيدة ستكون في قمع إرهاب المستوطنين في الضفة الغربية المحتلة؛ لأنها ظاهرة لا تحظى بتأييد أغلبية الإسرائيليين، وتضر بسمعة إسرائيل دولياً، وقمعها أمر متيسر يتطلب استخدام الاعتقال الإداري ضد إرهابيين يهود وليس فقط ضد الفلسطينيين.
التغيير الثاني، باعتقادي، سيكون إبرام اتفاق أمني مع سوريا بفضل تجدد الضغط الأمريكي على أي حكومة سوف تُشكَّل في إسرائيل للوصول إلى هذا الاتفاق. للأسف، الإدارة تركت ممارسة هذه الضغوطات في الأشهر التي سبقت الانتخابات. علاوةً على ذلك، ما من إجماع داخل المؤسسات الأمنية بشأن جدوى احتلال المنطقة العازلة واستعداء دمشق. في هذا السياق، يلعب الضباط الدروز دوراً ريادياً بالترويج لإبقاء الاحتلال واستعداء دمشق من جراء مجزرة السويداء. إن عدم تقدم الحوار بين دمشق والسويداء يعزز نفوذ اللوبي المعارض لأي اتفاق مع دمشق داخل المؤسسات الإسرائيلية.
أما في باقي الجبهات ومع حماس، فأظن أننا سنرى استجابة أكبر لتطبيق خطة ترامب، لكن لن يحدث أي تقدم حقيقي نحو إقامة دولة فلسطينية للأسف؛ فبعد 7 أكتوبر انهارت نسبة التأييد لإقامة دولة فلسطينية بين الإسرائيليين، وباتت مثل هذه الدولة تُعتبر تهديداً وجودياً بنظر أغلب الإسرائيليين.
سياسات إسرائيل في لبنان لن تتغير كثيراً؛ فاستمرار النهج القائم ناتج عن الإجماع في المؤسسة الأمنية والمستوى السياسي والشعب في إسرائيل على أن الحزب يشكل تهديداً لإسرائيل، وفي الوقت ذاته الإجماع في أوساط قيادة الجيش على أن الجيش اللبناني لا يستطيع أن ينزع سلاح الحزب، وأن القيادة السياسية اللبنانية لا تنوي أن تفعل ذلك خوفاً من الاصطدام بالحزب.
لذلك، بعد الجولة الثالثة من الحرب على إيران والحزب، حين تحتل إسرائيل بلدات لبنانية إضافية، أستبعد حصول انسحاب قريب. ربما ينسحب الجيش إلى الخط الرمادي لأجل تقليص عدد القوات المنتشرة في لبنان، لكن سوف تُمنَع عودة السكان إلى جميع مناطق الخط الأصفر الموسع عبر القصف الجوي.
وفي إيران أيضاً لا أتوقع تغييراً جوهرياً، وقرارات آيزنكوت ستكون مبنيةً أولاً على توصيات الجيش، الذي يرى بالطبع في برنامجَي الصواريخ والنووي الإيرانيَّين تهديدَين وجوديَّين. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Faouzi Badaoui
@al_faouzi68003
استطلاعات الخروج الأولى وهي ليست نتائج نهائية تضع كتلة نتنياهو عند 50 مقعدا وكتلة إيزنكوت عند 53 والأحزاب العربية عند 17 مقعدا وعلى هذا الأساس لا يبلغ إيزنكوت 61 مقعدا إلا بأصوات عربية وهو الذي وعد بإسقاط نتنياهو وتشكيل حكومة "صهيونية". أرجّح أن يتجه أولا إلى منصور عباس ويجعل القائمة المشتركة شبكة أمان تحميه في التصويت على الثقة من غير أن يعطيها حقائب فهذا أقصى ما يقبله شريكاه على يمينه. بينيت وليبرمان قد يمرّران حكومة تقوم على أصوات عربية من الخارج لكنهما لن يجلسا إلى طاولة واحدة مع وزير عربي ويائير جولان على يسارهما يطالب بثمن سياسي أعلى للأصوات نفسها فتبدو حكومة إيزنكوت أضيق هامش مناورة مما توحي به الأرقام: قرارات الحرب وغزة والضفة والميزانية ستختبرها كل أسبوع. أما حكومة التناوب مع نتنياهو فهي أبعد الاحتمالات لأن إيزنكوت يخسر بها ناخبيه ويخسر بها بينيت وليبرمان معا إلا إذا انشق الليكود على نتنياهو وقدّم بديلا عنه. والنتيجة تكشف أمرين. الأول أن عرب 48 صاروا يملكون ما يقارب سُبع الكنيست وأن إسقاط نتنياهو لا يمرّ إلا عبرهم على الرغم من محاولات الإقصاء ومنها قرار المحكمة العليا المرتقب بمنع سامي أبو شحادة من الترشح الذي دفعه إلى الانسحاب. والثاني أن اليمين القومي والصهيونية الدينية برفضهما حل الدولتين وتمسكهما بالضفة وضعا إسرائيل أمام خيارين لا ثالث لهما: إما استمرار حكم ملايين الفلسطينيين من غير حقوق متساوية وإما صيغة الدولة الواحدة بمواطنة كاملة وهذه تتعارض مع فكرة الدولة اليهودية. ومن هنا أتوقع أن يشتد الصراع داخل المجتمع الإسرائيلي حول معنى "يهودية وديمقراطية" وأن يتحول عرب 48 في خطاب اليمين من أقلية تُراقَب إلى خطر يُحاصَر بقوانين المواطنة وحظر القوائم وتشديد الملاحقة فيوضعون في مرتبة قريبة من فلسطينيي الضفة وغزة في أولويات التطرف الإسرائيلي. وهذا الانقسام المتصاعد حول من يحق له أن يقرر هوية الدولة هو المأزق البنيوي الأكبر الذي سيواجه المشروع الصهيوني في السنوات المقبلة. وأبقى دوما عند موقفي المبدئي وهو أن اليمين الديني يضعف مؤقتا لأن الأصولية اليهودية سليمة رغم كل ما يجري وستستعيد صولاتها مع أي أزمة داخلية أو إقليمية جديدة.
التصويت تم ضد شخص نتنياهو وليس ضد سياساته الإقليمية والداخلية ضد غزة والعرب وإيران. وهي بعد هذا كله دليل حيوية المجتمع الإسرائيلي- ويؤسفني قول ذلك - فرغم كل ما قدّمه نتنياهو لإسرائيل في غزة وسوريا وإيران وكل التدمير الذي تسبب به إقليميا لكل المنطقة فإن المجتمع الإسرائيلي لم يغفر له 7 أكتوبر وشروعه في تدمير النظام القضائي الإسرائيلي إضافة إلى فضائحه المالية والعائلية.
والله غالب على أمره ولكن أكثر الناس لا يعلمون -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr.Sam Youssef Ph.D.,Ph.D.,PsyThD.
@drhossamsamy65
🔴 Today , they released the first edition of the book "Princes and Thieves: Jared Kushner's and Mohammed bin Zayed's Secret Conspiracy to Reshape the Middle East." These are the most important points from its first chapter, where investigative journalist Matthew Cole reveals details of a secret meeting that brought together Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and Jared Kushner in New York in December 2016, just before Trump's inauguration as president.
This chapter outlines how the UAE leadership bypassed the Obama administration to reach directly into the inner circle of the president-elect, leveraging its network of financial and investment ties. Most crucially, the book uncovers what was discussed during the meeting regarding Qatar, Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Israel, along with the priorities that Abu Dhabi wanted the new administration to adopt. It also traces the role Kushner played in opening unconventional channels of communication, and how that meeting, according to the author's account, laid the foundation for a political relationship whose effects extended into subsequent years.
🔷 The book reveals a meeting that brought together Jared Kushner and Mohammed bin Zayed in the presidential suite at the Four Seasons Hotel in Manhattan, after Trump's election victory and before his inauguration. Bin Zayed arrived with a delegation that included dozens of people, among them armed individuals. The meeting came after he decided to cancel a farewell banquet that had been scheduled with President Barack Obama at the White House.
🔷 The Emiratis offered no explanation for canceling his meeting with Obama, and the U.S. administration only learned of his New York visit after the State Department received notifications of his diplomatic travel itinerary. The author describes this action as a clear circumvention of diplomatic norms and a signal of the UAE leadership's shift in focus from the outgoing administration to the personal circle of the president-elect.
🔷 Mohammed bin Zayed enlisted the help of a New York-based hedge fund manager with financial ties to the UAE and a personal friendship with Kushner to arrange the meeting. This serves as an indication of how the UAE uses its investment network to access influential American political figures.
🔷 Kushner informed bin Zayed that the Middle East would be the top priority of the Trump administration's foreign policy, and that he would personally take charge of the diplomatic file on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Trump had selected him to handle these matters despite his lack of traditional diplomatic experience. Meanwhile, bin Zayed laid out his grievances to Kushner about U.S. policy over the previous eight years, viewing Obama's support for the Arab Spring uprisings—particularly the protests that toppled Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak—as a betrayal of a key U.S. strategic ally. He explained that Washington's abandonment of Mubarak had heightened Gulf regimes' concerns about the reliability of American guarantees.
🔷 He further argued that the Obama administration's decision to end the U.S. war in Iraq had created a strategic vacuum that enabled the Islamic State to expand and control vast territories in Iraq and Syria. He presented this outcome as evidence of the weakness in U.S. policy in the region. He also told Kushner that the UAE faces two enemies threatening its existence: the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran. He viewed the first threat as political Islam, while the second stemmed from Iran's regional influence and its network of armed groups linked to Tehran.
🔷 He accused Qatar of providing significant funding to the Muslim Brotherhood and using Al Jazeera to stoke regional tensions and support extremist Islamist currents, according to his narrative. He informed Kushner that he hoped the new U.S. administration would address the Qatari problem. This passage reveals that the Qatar file was already on the table in UAE communications with the Trump in Dec. 2016. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
In recent hours, many have been wondering why Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was absent from yesterday’s talks in Tehran with representatives of the Mecca Pact.
In my reading:
- Ghalibaf, who has been identified as a key figure in Iran’s negotiations with the United States, is directly associated with a separate diplomatic track that may eventually also involve nuclear issues.
Interestingly, he was in Tehran yesterday. He attended parliamentary meetings, while a previously scheduled foreign trip had reportedly been cancelled due to unforeseen circumstances.
- My sense is that his absence may have been deliberate. By keeping Ghalibaf out of the meetings, the Iranian leadership could have wanted to signal, including symbolically, that consultations with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey are distinct from negotiations with Washington.
- In other words, Tehran may be trying to preserve a visible separation between two diplomatic tracks: regional consultations with key regional powers on the one hand, and direct negotiations with the US on the other.
- This does not necessarily mean that the two processes are unrelated. They clearly have points of contact. But keeping them formally separate may be politically important for Tehran, particularly given the sensitivity of any future negotiations involving the nuclear file.
- Of course, this remains my interpretation.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
NEW: The Pakistani, Saudi and Turkish guests hosted in Tehran yesterday asked Mohsen Rezaee, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, about the status of talks with Washington. Rezaee is said to have told them Iran could shorten the implementation timeline of its seven-condition proposal to the Trump administration. If “the only issue is the number of days,” Rezaee's deputy at the SNSC, Ali Baqeri-Kani quoted him as saying, Iran could accept five or even four days instead of seven.
Yet the core obstacle is not speed or even substance, but sequencing.
To break the deadlock, senior political sources in Tehran told @amwajmedia, Iran last month proposed through Qatar a seven-day plan to end the war, under which Hormuz would reopen on Day 6 and final-deal talks would resume on Day 7. Squeezing that timeline to four or five days does not change the dispute over sequencing.
The Islamabad MOU agreed between Iran and the United States in June is a two-stage accord. Under its Paragraph 13, talks on a final deal, including on Iran's nuclear program, can begin only once five measures are being implemented, and they must continue while talks run.
The Trump administration now seems to want core elements of the endgame up front. If that includes Iran's uranium stockpile, Tehran would be trading irreversible steps for easily reversible ones. In such a scenario, the Islamic Republic may calculate that peace today could ensure a much more costly war tomorrow.
Trump has said he is weighing a deal with Iran against military action to “finish them off.” It is an open question whether the president has any real interest in a mutually acceptable formula. After all, Trump may already have been persuaded that a deal will not deliver what one final blow against the Islamic Republic just might. If that is the case, Tehran may not be caught off guard this time. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Najafi
@Mostafa_Najafii
چند نکته درباره نشست چهار جانبه تهران
۱. ایران با برگزاری این نشست خارج از چارچوب پیمان مکه موافقت کرد. در واقع، تهران این ابتکار را در قالب «نشست تهران» پذیرفت، نه پیمان مکه!
۲. ایران نشست تهران را در چارچوب ایده امنیت درونزای منطقهای تعریف کرد. به همین دلیل، پروندههای منطقهای از جمله یمن، لبنان، فلسطین، امنیت خلیج فارس و تنگه هرمز در دستور گفتوگوها قرار گرفت.
۳. در این نشست درباره کاهش تنشهای منطقهای و پایان جنگ نیز گفتوگو شد؛ با این حال، موضع قبلی ایران در برابر آمریکا و شروط هفتگانه تهران تغییری نکرد.
۴. در این نشست هیچ گفتوگویی درباره پرونده هستهای ایران انجام نشد.
۵. یکی از نتایج احتمالی این نشست میتواند پذیرش نگرانیهای امنیتی ایران و ترتیبات موردنظر تهران در تنگه هرمز (توافق ایران و عمان) باشد؛ البته به شرط آنکه عربستان حسن نیت خود را نشان دهد و مانند قبل کارشکنی نکند!
۶. ایران در پرونده یمن برای میانجیگری و کمک به حل بحران آمادگی دارد؛ اما انصارالله شروطی دارد که تا زمان پذیرش آنها از سوی عربستان، جنگ را ادامه خواهد داد!
۷. طرفین در این نشست نگرانیهای خود را درباره ماجراجوییهای اسرائیل در منطقه به اشتراک گذاشتند؛ اما این به معنای برخورداری از اهداف و دستورکار واحد نیست!
۸. بسیار زود است در رابطه با نتایج این نشست قضاوت کرد؛ اما به نظر نمیرسد اعتماد جایگزین بیاعتمادی و همکاری جایگزین رقابت شده باشد! در خاورمیانه کنونی منطق نشستها بیشتر برای مدیریت بحران و تنش یا دوری از تبعات آن است تا حل آنها! -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 وصلتني اليوم النسخة الأولى من كتاب «أمراء ولصوص: مؤامرة جاريد كوشنر ومحمد بن زايد السرية لإعادة تشكيل الشرق الأوسط»، سأضع لكم أهم ما ورد في الفصل الأول منه، حيث يكشف الصحفي الاستقصائي ماثيو كول تفاصيل لقاء سري جمع الشيخ محمد بن زايد بجاريد كوشنر في نيويورك، في ديسمبر 2016، قبل تنصيب ترامب رئيساً.
يستعرض هذا الفصل كيف تجاوزت القيادة الإماراتية إدارة أوباما للوصول مباشرة إلى الدائرة المقربة من الرئيس المنتخب، مستعينة بشبكة علاقاتها المالية والاستثمارية. والأهم أن الكتاب يكشف ما دار خلال الاجتماع بشأن قطر وإيران والإخوان المسلمين وإسرائيل، والأولويات التي أرادت أبوظبي من الإدارة الجديدة تبنيها. كما يتتبع الدور الذي لعبه كوشنر في فتح قنوات اتصال غير تقليدية، وكيف أسس ذلك اللقاء، وفق رواية المؤلف، لعلاقة سياسية امتدت آثارها إلى السنوات اللاحقة.
🔷 يكشف الكتاب عن لقاء جمع جاريد كوشنر ومحمد بن زايد في الجناح الرئاسي بفندق فورسيزونز في مانهاتن، بعد فوز ترامب بالانتخابات وقبل تنصيبه. حضر بن زايد برفقة وفد ضم عشرات الأشخاص، بينهم مسلحون. وجاء الاجتماع بعدما قرر إلغاء مأدبة وداع كانت مقررة مع الرئيس باراك أوباما في البيت الأبيض.
🔷 لم يقدم الإماراتيون تفسيراً لإلغاء لقائه بأوباما، ولم تعلم الإدارة الأميركية بزيارته نيويورك إلا بعدما تلقت وزارة الخارجية بيانات رحلته الدبلوماسية. ويصف الكاتب هذا التصرف بأنه تجاوز واضح للأعراف الدبلوماسية وإشارة إلى انتقال اهتمام القيادة الإماراتية من الإدارة المنتهية ولايتها إلى الدائرة الشخصية للرئيس المنتخب.
🔷 استعان محمد بن زايد بمدير صندوق تحوط استثماري في نيويورك، تربطه علاقات مالية بالإمارات وصداقة شخصية بكوشنر، لترتيب الاجتماع. في إشارة على استخدام الإمارات شبكتها الاستثمارية للوصول إلى شخصيات سياسية أميركية مؤثرة.
🔷 أبلغ كوشنر بن زايد أن الشرق الأوسط سيكون أولوية السياسة الخارجية الأولى لإدارة ترامب، وأنه سيتولى شخصياً ملف التسوية الدبلوماسية للصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني. وكان ترامب قد اختاره لإدارة هذه الملفات رغم افتقاره إلى الخبرة الدبلوماسية التقليدية. في حين استعرض بن زايد أمام كوشنر اعتراضاته على السياسة الأميركية خلال السنوات الثماني السابقة، معتبراً أن دعم أوباما لانتفاضات الربيع العربي، خصوصاً الاحتجاجات التي أطاحت بالرئيس المصري حسني مبارك، مثّل خيانة لحليف استراتيجي للولايات المتحدة. وأوضح أن تخلي واشنطن عن مبارك أثار مخاوف الأنظمة الخليجية بشأن موثوقية الضمانات الأميركية.
🔷 واعتبر أن قرار إدارة أوباما إنهاء الحرب الأميركية في العراق أدى إلى فراغ استراتيجي مكّن تنظيم الدولة الإسلامية من التوسع والسيطرة على أراضٍ واسعة في العراق وسوريا. وقدم هذه النتيجة دليلاً على ضعف السياسة الأميركية في المنطقة. كما أخبر بن زايد كوشنر بأن الإمارات تواجه عدوين يهددان وجودها، هما جماعة الإخوان المسلمين وإيران. واعتبر أن الخطر الأول يتمثل في الإسلام السياسي، بينما يتمثل الثاني في النفوذ الإيراني الإقليمي وشبكة الجماعات المسلحة المرتبطة بطهران.
🔷 كما اتهم قطر بتوفير تمويل مهم لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين واستخدام قناة الجزيرة لتأجيج التوترات الإقليمية ودعم تيارات إسلامية متطرفة، بحسب روايته. وأبلغ كوشنر أنه يأمل أن تتعامل الإدارة الأميركية الجديدة مع المشكلة القطرية. وتكشف هذه الفقرة أن ملف قطر كان مطروحاً في التواصل الإماراتي مع فريق ترامب منذ ديسمبر 2016.
🔷 وصف محمد بن زايد الاتفاق النووي الذي أبرمته إدارة أوباما مع إيران عام 2015 بأنه أخطر أخطاء الإدارة السابقة. وأعرب عن اعتقاده بأن طهران لن تلتزم بالقيود النووية، وأن تخفيف العقوبات الاقتصادية سيؤدي إلى تعزيز نفوذها الإقليمي على حساب دول الخليج والولايات المتحدة.
🔷 وعرض أمام كوشنر خريطة للنفوذ الإيراني شملت حزب الله في لبنان والحوثيين في اليمن وحركة حماس في قطاع غزة. واعتبر أن هذه الجماعات تشكل أدوات لتوسيع النفوذ الإيراني وتهديد الاستقرار الإقليمي، وفق التصور الذي نقله الكاتب عن الاجتماع.
🔷 لاحظ الكاتب أن معظم انتقادات محمد بن زايد لأوباما تتطابق مع المواقف التي طرحها ترامب خلال حملته الانتخابية. ولذلك كان اللقاء فرصة للإمارات لاختبار مدى استعداد الإدارة الجديدة لتبني رؤيتها الإقليمية. وينقل الكاتب عن مذكرات كوشنر أنه خرج من الاجتماع متأثراً باحترام القيادة الإماراتية لإسرائيل واعترافها بوجود مصالح مشتركة بين البلدين. ويقدم هذه النقطة بوصفها أحد أهم الأسس التي قامت عليها العلاقة اللاحقة بين كوشنر ومحمد بن زايد.
🔷 بعد الاجتماع، أرسل مدير صندوق التحوط الذي رتّب اللقاء رسالة إلى محمد بن زايد أبلغه فيها بأن فريق ترامب أُعجب به بشدة، وأن أفراده أصبحوا مقتنعين بأنه صديق حقيقي وأقرب حليف لهم. وتكشف الرسالة، وفق الكاتب، النجاح الأولي لمحاولة بناء علاقة مباشرة مع الدائرة المحيطة بالرئيس المنتخب.
🔷 يشرح الكاتب أن الأسرة الحاكمة الإماراتية بنت شبكة واسعة من المصرفيين الاستثماريين والمحامين ومديري الأموال في المدن العالمية الكبرى، يعمل بعضهم بعقود مستمرة لخدمة مصالحها. وتتيح هذه الشبكة الوصول إلى شخصيات نافذة وترتيب اتصالات سياسية بعيداً عن القنوات الدبلوماسية الرسمية.
🔷 ويرى الكاتب أن محمد بن زايد أراد اختبار مسألتين، هما مدى التوافق الأيديولوجي بين الإدارة الأميركية الجديدة والإمارات، وتحديد الشخصيات الأقرب إلى ترامب التي يمكن للإمارات التأثير فيها. وكان كوشنر، بسبب علاقته العائلية المباشرة بالرئيس، مدخلاً استثنائياً إلى مركز القرار الأميركي. ويؤكد الكتاب أن ترامب منح صهره سلطة واسعة في إدارة سياسة الشرق الأوسط دون رقابة مؤسسية تتناسب مع حجم صلاحياته، ودون الحاجة إلى موافقة الكونغرس على تعيينه مستشاراً رئاسياً. وأصبح كوشنر قادراً على التواصل المباشر مع قادة المنطقة وإدارة الملفات السياسية بصفته الشخصية والمؤسسية في آن واحد.
🔷 يخلص الكاتب إلى أن تعيين كوشنر جعل إدارة السياسة الخارجية الأميركية أقرب إلى العلاقات العائلية والشخصية السائدة في الأنظمة الملكية الخليجية. فبالنسبة إلى القادة الخليجيين، كان كوشنر شخصية مألوفة من حيث طبيعة السلطة التي يستمدها من صلة القرابة بالحاكم. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
אירוע חשוב ביותר, בעל משמעות אסטרטגית רחבה הרבה מעבר לעצם קיום הפגישות בטהראן.
א. הסכם מכה היה מלכתחילה התפתחות מבורכת בעיני טהראן באופן עקרוני, שכן הוא שיקף את ההבנה הגוברת של מדינות האזור כי עליהן לגוון את משענותיהן הביטחוניות ולא להסתמך באופן בלעדי על ארצות הברית. מדובר בניסיון לעצב ארכיטקטורה ביטחונית אזורית עצמאית יותר, שאינה תלויה לחלוטין בוושינגטון.
ב. עצם ההגעה לטהראן ממחישה כי מדינות האזור מכירות לא רק בלגיטימיות של המשטר האיראני, אלא גם במעמדה של איראן כשחקן מרכזי וביכולתה להשפיע על ההתפתחויות באזור, בעיקר באמצעות שותפותיה ובראשן החות'ים. זאת, גם אם מידת השליטה הישירה של איראן בחות'ים מוגבלת מאוד. ההבנה היא שלא ניתן לעצב סדר אזורי יציב תוך התעלמות מאיראן.
ג. על רקע האפשרות לחידוש הלחימה בין איראן לארצות הברית, לפגישות הללו חשיבות מיוחדת. מדינות האזור מבינות היטב כי הן עלולות לשלם מחיר כבד על הסלמה נוספת, בעיקר באמצעות פגיעה בתשתיות האנרגיה, בנמלים ובנתיבי הסחר. לכן יש להן אינטרס ברור לשכנע את טהראן לרדת מהעץ בכל הנוגע לדרישותיה, ובמקביל להבהיר לה כי הסכם מכה אינו מכוון נגדה או נגד האינטרסים שלה.
ד. חשוב להבין שהסכם מכה וההידברות עם איראן אינם מהלכים סותרים, אלא שני צדדים של אותה אסטרטגיה: מצד אחד, בניית יכולות ביטחוניות עצמאיות וחיזוק ההרתעה האזורית, ומצד שני, ניסיון להפחית את הסיכון לעימות באמצעות דיאלוג והסדרים מדיניים.
ה. האירוע ממחיש פעם נוספת כי גם מדינות החוששות מאיראן אינן מעוניינות בהכרח במלחמה נוספת נגדה. הן מבינות היטב את מגבלות הכוח הצבאי ואת העובדה שגם מערכה קשה נוספת לא בהכרח תסיר את האיום האיראני, אך בהחלט עלולה לערער את היציבות האזורית ולפגוע קשות בכלכלותיהן, ולכן הן מבקשות להמנע מכך.
ו. יש כאן גם מסר חשוב לישראל. בעוד שבישראל יש מי שממשיכים לראות במערכה צבאית נוספת פתרון אפשרי לאתגר האיראני, מדינות האזור מבקשות דווקא למנוע הידרדרות ולהבטיח שלא יהפכו שוב לזירת עימות בין איראן לארצות הברית.
בשורה התחתונה, פגישה חשובה זו לא תגשר על הפערים העמוקים בין איראן לסעודיה או לתורכיה, אבל היא ממחישה שינוי חשוב בתפיסה האזורית: לצד הצורך להרתיע את איראן ולהתמודד עם האיום שהיא מציבה, גוברת ההבנה שלא ניתן להעלים אותה מהמפה ושיש למצוא דרך לחיות לצדה.
זו התפתחות אסטרטגית משמעותית ביותר, שעשויה להשפיע על עיצוב הסדר הביטחוני במזרח התיכון לאור הצפי לשינוי בפריסת הכוחות האמריקנים באיזור.
roi kais • روعي كايس • רועי קייס
@kaisos1987
אירוע תקדימי: המועצה לביטחון לאומי באיראן מאשרת כי בטהראן יתקיים היום מפגש של שר ההגנה הסעודי, הנסיך ח'אלד בן סלמאן, מפקד צבא פקיסטן, עאסם מוניר, וראש המודיעין הטורקי, איבראהים קאלן, עם בכירים איראנים כדי לבנות מערך ביטחוני אזורי. חברות ברית ההגנה "מכה" - סעודיה, טורקיה, פקיסטן, קורצות למשטר האייתוללות
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Omid Memarian
@Omid_M
What former Mossad chief David Barnea has revealed is a shocking admission of an intelligence operation that knowingly put 1000s of innocent Iranians at risk of imprisonment, torture, and execution, all to protect Israeli agents operating inside Iran. According to @Jerusalem_Post, Barnea acknowledged that Mossad deliberately publicized footage of its covert operations inside Iran during the June 2025 war, intending to provoke mass arrests and overwhelm Iranian security forces.
“We wanted to make sure they arrested so many people in Iran that they wouldn’t be able to distinguish the wheat from the chaff,” he said.
Barnea claimed that Iranian authorities arrested 21,000 people on the 2nd day of the war. He also acknowledged that many of those arrested or executed as alleged Mossad agents had nothing to do with the agency, while nearly all actual Mossad operatives escaped capture.
Think about the extraordinary cruelty of that calculation.
Israeli intelligence officials understood the nature of the govt they were dealing with: a repressive state with a documented record of arbitrary detention, torture, forced confessions, and executions. Yet, according to Barnea’s own account, they deliberately sought to exploit those very practices, making ordinary Iranians the expendable human cost of protecting their operatives.
I think about the 1000s of families who may have been caught between an Israeli intelligence operation and an Iranian security apparatus gripped by fear of infiltration. The fathers and mothers of whose children disappeared into detention centers. The young people whose only political involvement may have been protesting for a better life. The students, workers, and ordinary citizens who could suddenly find themselves accused of collaborating with a foreign intelligence service.
For them, an arrest is not a temporary inconvenience in an intelligence game. It can mean months or years in prison, torture, a coerced confession, a destroyed future, or a death sentence.
Human rights organizations have documented how Iranian authorities used the war to intensify repression, including mass arrests and executions on allegations of espionage and collaboration with Israel.
The Iranian government bears direct responsibility for every arbitrary arrest, every act of torture, and every unlawful execution. Nothing Israel did absolves Tehran of those crimes.
But Israel cannot escape scrutiny and accountability for deliberately engineering conditions in which it knew innocent people could become targets of that repression.
What Barnea describes is not simply clever intelligence work. It raises profound questions about the deliberate exploitation of foreseeable harm to civilians in pursuit of military and intelligence objectives.
And perhaps the most disturbing part is the apparent indifference to what happened to those people afterward.
For Mossad, the measure of success was whether its agents survived and escaped detection. For Iranian families, the consequences could last a lifetime.
The lives of ordinary Iranians are not disposable assets in an intelligence operation. Their imprisonment, suffering, and deaths cannot be dismissed as the acceptable price of protecting foreign agents..
International humanitarian law does not give intelligence agencies a free pass to deliberately expose civilians to foreseeable harm. If Mossad intentionally provoked mass arrests in Iran, knowing that innocent people could face torture, imprisonment, or execution, this raises serious questions of international legal responsibility, including potential complicity in war crimes. As I said, Iranian government bears direct responsibility for its repression, but that does not absolve Israeli officials of responsibility for deliberately exploiting it. The lives of innocent civilians cannot be treated as expendable assets in an intelligence operation.
This revelation deserves serious scrutiny, independent investigation. www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-912809 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇹🇷🇱🇾 | Comment l’accord maritime turco-Haftar pourrait redessiner le destin de la Libye ?
La Turquie occupe désormais une position centrale dans l’ensemble de la Libye. Le 20 octobre, le Parlement de l’Est a ratifié le mémorandum maritime de 2019 qu’il rejetait depuis six ans. Cette ratification découle d’un accord conclu en juillet entre Ankara et l’Armée nationale libyenne, qui aurait inclus le développement d’installations militaires et de systèmes de surveillance.
Saddam Haftar a piloté ce revirement. Aguila Saleh, président du Parlement depuis douze ans et opposé à l’accord, a été écarté le 6 octobre. Il a été remplacé par al-Salihin Abdelnabi, président du groupe d’amitié libyo-turc et aligné sur le clan Haftar. Ankara a pesé directement sur Saddam Haftar, en menaçant de reporter son soutien sur les forces de l’Ouest si la ratification tardait. Saddam a tranché en faveur de la Turquie, malgré la pression contraire d’Israël et des Émirats.
Les contacts sont désormais réguliers et à haut niveau. Saddam Haftar a été reçu par Hakan Fidan à Ankara en juillet, Fidan s’est rendu à Benghazi en août, et des forces de l’Est et de l’Ouest ont participé ensemble à l’exercice militaire turc EFES 2026. L’Égypte rejette l’accord et l’a redit à Ankara après la ratification. Au-delà de la question maritime, elle voit s’éroder sa profondeur stratégique en Cyrénaïque, zone tampon sur sa frontière ouest où la Turquie s’implante désormais. Ankara cherche donc à atténuer cette inquiétude en lui proposant un accord de délimitation plus avantageux que celui conclu avec la Grèce. Saddam Haftar s’est rendu au Caire le 25 octobre pour rassurer son principal parrain historique.
Pour Saddam Haftar, la ratification est donc une contrepartie. Washington soutient un compromis qui le placerait à la tête de l’État tout en maintenant Abdelhamid Dbeibah à la tête du gouvernement. Ankara pourrait appuyer ce scénario en échange du feu vert de Benghazi. Face à un Ouest divisé entre milices, le pouvoir familial déjà installé dans l’Est pourrait ainsi s’étendre à tout le pays.
Cela suppose toutefois de régler des différends jamais résolus : partage des revenus pétroliers, commandement militaire, pouvoirs du gouvernement central et élections.
Le processus bute déjà sur Tripoli. Le 23 octobre, Saddam Haftar rencontrait à Ankara le ministre de la Défense par intérim de Tripoli, Abdelsalam al-Zoubi, pour négocier l’unification des deux armées. Le même jour, le président du Conseil présidentiel, Mohammed al-Menfi, a interdit toute signature sans l’accord du ministère de la Défense, de la commission militaire mixte 5+5 et du haut commandement. Les discussions continuent, mais aucun accord ne pourra être conclu en dehors de ces instances.
La visite annoncée d’al-Salihin Abdelnabi à Tripoli, le 27 octobre, sera à suivre. Le nouveau président du Parlement a déjà engagé des discussions sur la maîtrise des dépenses publiques et un ajustement du taux de change. Si ce rapprochement s’étend aux institutions financières, cela confirmera que le camp Haftar cherche à contrôler la répartition de la rente pétrolière et les organes de contrôle financier, un enjeu aussi décisif que le commandement militaire dans une future autorité unifiée.
La position turque reste fragile sur un point. Ankara a obtenu un traité ratifié difficile à remettre en cause , mais son influence dans l’Est dépend du soutien des Haftar, qui pourrait évoluer selon leurs intérêts. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Françoise Djerejian
@FDjerejian
A taste of Israel’s alliance with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s dictatorship @972mag www.972mag.com/israel-shah-iran-dictatorship/
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
משלל הדיווחים האחרונים עולה תמונה מטרידה, שלא לומר מבהילה.
על פניו, הולך ומתחזק החשש שבנימין נתניהו גמר אומר להשתמש בסוגיה האיראנית ככלי פוליטי, בין אם כדי לדחות את הבחירות ובין אם כדי ליצור מציאות ביטחונית שתאפשר לו לכפות הקמת ממשלת אחדות בראשותו.
מכיוון שאין בעת הנוכחית הצדקה מודיעינית לתקיפה מיידית באיראן, ומכיוון שקשה להניח שצה"ל ייזום מערכה כזו ערב הבחירות ללא הצדקה ביטחונית ברורה, נראה שנתניהו פועל בשני ערוצים: מצד אחד, על פי הדיווח של @BarakRavid , הוא מפעיל לחץ על טראמפ, כנראה לתקוף באיראן. מצד שני, ההתנהלות הישראלית וההצהרות הלוחמניות מעוררות חשש לניסיון לגרור את טהראן לתקוף את ישראל, ובכך לייצר את ההצדקה למערכה נוספת.
בשני התרחישים עולה חשש למעורבות פסולה של שיקולים פוליטיים בסוגיה האיראנית.
אבל גם אם נניח שנתניהו אינו מעוניין במלחמה נוספת, אלא רק מבקש להסיט את השיח הציבורי לסוגיה האיראנית, שנוחה לו יותר מבחינה פוליטית, אין בכך כדי להפחית מחומרת המצב. המתיחות בין ישראל לאיראן כה גבוהה, והחשדנות ההדדית כה עמוקה, עד שכל הצהרה לוחמנית או מהלך צבאי עלולים להצית הסלמה שתצא משליטה. קשה להניח שראש הממשלה אינו מודע לסכנה הזו.
אם אכן זה המצב, מדובר בהתפתחות מסוכנת. האפשרות שמדינת ישראל תיגרר למלחמה נוספת עם איראן, על כל המחירים הכבדים הכרוכים בכך, לא בשל צורך ביטחוני דחוף אלא בשל שיקולים פוליטיים, חייבת להדיר שינה מעיניו של כל אזרח ישראלי.
מערכת הביטחון, ובראשה הרמטכ"ל וראשי ארגוני המודיעין, חייבת להבהיר באופן חד-משמעי שאין מקום למערכה נוספת ללא הצדקה ביטחונית מבוססת, יעדים אסטרטגיים בני השגה ואסטרטגיית יציאה ברורה.
ביטחון ישראל אינו כלי במשחק ההישרדות הפוליטי של איש. המחיר הכבד שישראל עלולה לשלם על מערכה נוספת עם איראן, בחיי אדם, בכלכלה, בחברה ובמעמדה הבינלאומי, מחייב בחינה מעמיקה של כלל השיקולים הביטחוניים והאסטרטגיים, ללא כל השפעה של שיקולים פוליטיים זרים.
Yaron Avraham ירון אברהם
@yaronavraham
חשיפה עכשיו במהדורה |
עימות חסר תקדים בין הרמטכל לבין ראש הממשלה שהגיע לשיא או לשפל ביממה האחרונה
הנושא ברקע: הסוגיה האיראנית
וחשש של זמיר שנתניהו והדרג המדיני עלולים להוביל לתרחיש של מיסקלקולציה מול איראן רגע לפני הבחירות
גורם ביטחוני: מדובר בפעולה שעלולה להוביל לעימות בזק מול איראן בעיתוי רגיש ודרמטי, ולייצר מיסקלקולציה
גורמים בקיאים בפרטים: חשש של הדרג הצבאי מניסיון לנצל את הסוגיה האיראנית לתנופה פוליטית , טענה שגורמים מדיניים מכחישים וטוענים שמדובר בשקר של ממש
כך או כך, 2 מקורות מספרים לי שזה הגיע לרמה שהיום בביקור בפלמחים האווירה בדיון הייתה עכורה עד מאוד
בימים האחרונים זמיר קיבל איזושהי הנחיה מהדרג המדיני אבל ביקש דיון מעמיק לפני ביצוע
הוא גם ביקש אסמכתאות חוקיות וחתומות של הדרג המדיני על המהלך
בכיר ביטחוני: ההיסטוריה לא תשכח את התפקיד שמילא פה זמיר בימים האחרונים
ובשורה התחתונה: עימות יוצא דופן בחריגות שלו בין זמיר לנתניהו, סביב הסוגיה באיראן, רגע לפני מועד הבחירות.
נדגיש: כל הפרטים בידיעה הזו עברו את אישורה של הצנזורה הצבאית -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ronen Bergman
@ronenbergman
חד"ן קְְדָ"מים, חדר הדיונים המרכזי בעומק "מצודת ציון" - מוצב הפיקוד העליון של צה"ל בקריה, שמוכר יותר בכינויו "הבור" - ידע בשנות המלחמה לא מעט רגעים דרמטיים. אבל היה שם גם רגע הזוי, שהמעטים שהיו עדים לו לא ישכחו.
זה קרה כמה ימים לאחר טבח 7 באוקטובר. הרמטכ"ל הרצי הלוי, שלשכתו קרובה לחד"ן קד”מים, הקדים מעט, והתייצב בכניסה לחדר. שם כבר חיכו המאבטחים של משרד ראש הממשלה. אחת המאבטחות הצביעה על נרתיק שטוח שהחזיק הרמטכ"ל לטובת משקפיים מתקפלים. אבל המאבטחת ביקשה שהלוי - נזכיר: ראש המטה הכללי - יפתח אותו לבדיקה. כשתהה מדוע, המאבטחת לא היססה והסבירה: לוודא שאין לו מכשיר הקלטה
הלוי, לא איש שנוהג להרים קול בדרך כלל, הבהיר למאבטחת: גבירתי, את מתבלבלת. אני מפקד הצבא, את נמצאת כרגע במוצב השליטה של הצבא, ואת לא תיתני הוראות לקצינים במדים. אבל המאבטחת התעקשה. זה היה נראה כאילו קיבלה הוראה מיוחדת למנוע כל סיכוי להכניס לדיון מכשיר הקלטה. מישהו ממש לא רצה שיהיה תיעוד כלשהו מהדיון. הלוי הגיב בכעס עצור. אם תמשיכי, הבהיר, אדאג שיוציאו אותך מהבור, ואם צריך גם מחוץ לחומות הקריה. ואז הוא נכנס לחדר.
האנקדוטה של אירוע נרתיק המשקפיים של הלוי תתברר היא רק כסנונית למה שעתיד לבוא. קצין בכיר במילואים, ששירת בממשק שבין הלשכות, אומר ל"7 ימים" כי ימים אחדים אחרי הטבח הוא חש שחוץ מהמערכה נגד חמאס מתנהלות עוד שתי מלחמות פנימיות, "שתי מלחמות שהן בעצם אחת", כהגדרתו. האחת: להעביר מהדרג המדיני למערכת הביטחון את האחריות לכל כישלון; השנייה, להשיג את השליטה במידע שיאפשר לנצח בראשונה.
הקרב על הנרטיב החל סמוך מאוד ליום הטבח, ונמשך למעשה עד היום. במהלכו נתניהו ואנשיו יעשו כמעט הכל כדי לשלוט בסיפור. זה כולל הפסקת הקלטות שמתעדות את הנאמר בחדר דיונים, חשד לביצוע שינויים בפרוטוקולים, פרסום של חומרים שמסייעים לנרטיב של נתניהו - והסתרת חומרים שפוגעים בו. היו אפילו מילואימניקים שגויסו במיוחד - כן, על חשבון ימי מילואים בעת מלחמה - כדי לנבור בין הררי המסמכים ולסייע בבניית הגרסה של רה"מ - וזו רק רשימה חלקית.
*הכל כדי שהזיכרון הציבורי יהונדס לפי סיפור אחד. הסיפור של נתניהו.*
התחקיר המלא עם @YRubovitch :
www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra14931849
@YediotAhronot @ynetalerts -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇮🇷 🇮🇱 Iran has reportedly handed missile launch authority to commanders in 31 separate districts, each with backups buried in other locations.
Larry Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, says those commanders can fire on their own for the first 10 to 15 minutes of a war without waiting on Tehran, and that Israel badly underestimates what that means:
“It doesn’t matter if you get half of them and they won’t get half of them because they’re all very well camouflaged and very deeply buried.”
Decapitation strikes don’t work against a country that has already wired itself to keep fighting without a head.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post.
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇺🇸 🇮🇷 Strikes on Iran look days away, and every warning sign is flashing at the same time.
A senior US diplomat says strikes “absolutely” could come this weekend, Iraq’s prime minister has reportedly been told they’re coming, and Britain’s prime minister is reportedly calling Trump to talk him out of it.
Iran has threatened the Gulf’s undersea cables, GPS in the UAE is being scrambled again, Israeli jets have flown to Iran’s border twice, and the West Bank is under lockdown.
With this many signs pointing the same way, there’s very little time left to turn it around.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post.
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 America’s top general can legally BYPASS Hegseth and tell Trump to call off the Iran strike... Colin Powell did it twice and won both times, and nobody expects Dan Caine to try
Larry says Goldwater Nichols lets the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs walk past the Pentagon straight into the Oval Office, and Powell did it to Cheney during the 1992 LA riots, with the caveat that a president can still refuse the meeting.
Col. Larry Wilkerson, Powell's former chief of staff, says the law is sitting there unused:
"That's what Caine should do.
If he really feels that this is a terrible decision and it should stop."
He adds the chairman should bring Trump a way to wind it down without losing face, and he doubts the current one has the knowledge or the nerve.
On the other side, Iran has handed 31 district commanders their own missiles and standing orders to fire without waiting for Tehran, with backups in separate locations, so even a strike that kills half of them leaves enough to wreck Haifa and the Tel Aviv complex.
The cleanest off ramp runs through one general's office, and the door is closed.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
A new dynamic in the Middle East is unraveling due to actions that had been taking place under the radar.
I’m not going to talk yet about what I see or how I think this will affect all of us economically, BUT… this is a month that calls for a lot of caution.
There’s a tug-of-war underway and developments should come soon.
I don’t see anything imminent yet.
substack.com/@global21 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ibrahim Hamidi ابراهيم حميدي
@ibrahimhamidi
التوغلات الاسرائيلية جنوب غربي سوريا
- ترجمة ط/إ لخريطة من @ETANA_Syria
Ibrahim Hamidi ابراهيم حميدي
@ibrahimhamidi
مطلع 2025، كان الحديث عن التطبيع مع إسرائيل.
اليوم، يتظاهر السوريون ضدها بسبب سياسات نتنياهو.
هكذا يحوّل نتنياهو شركاء محتملين في السلام إلى خصوم. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🇺🇸 🇮🇷 “The U.S. government has put employees on heightened alert across the Middle East and moved to reduce personnel levels at embassies and consulates because of intelligence showing Iran is in the advanced stages of planning attacks against Americans, U.S. officials said.”
www.nytimes.com/2026/10/23/us/politics/security-warnings-…
via @NYTimes -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
After months of assuring southerners they would not attack South Yemen, the Houthis’ intentions are now clear. Yemen’s Interior Ministry reports three ballistic missiles targeting Coast Guard facilities in Aden. Video reportedly shows the launch from Al-Arayif base in Ibb.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
أحمد مولانا
@amawlana84
يقول جون برينان مدير وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية الأمريكية في عهد أوباما، في مذكراته التي نشرها بعنوان " بلا خوف: معركتي ضد أعداء أمريكا في الداخل والخارج" ما يلي:
(بصفتي مديرًا لوكالة الاستخبارات المركزية، عقدتُ عدة لقاءات مع محمد بن سلمان. وقد بدا لي واسع الاطلاع، وذكيًا، ونشيطًا، ودهِيًّا، ومتمرسًا في السياسة، لكنه كان أيضًا بعيدًا للغاية عن الواقعية فيما يتعلق بقدرة السعودية على التأثير في مجريات الأحداث في المنطقة. التقيتُ محمد بن سلمان بعد فترة وجيزة من تعيينه وزيرًا للدفاع في أوائل عام 2015. وكان آنذاك ينظّم انطلاق تحالف عسكري بقيادة السعودية لمحاربة قوات الحوثيين المتمردة، التي أطاحت بالحكومة المدعومة من السعودية في اليمن. وقال بثقة: "سنقضي على الحوثيين خلال شهرين"، ثم أضاف: "وبعد ذلك سنوجّه اهتمامنا إلى تسوية الأوضاع في الشمال"، في إشارة واضحة على ما يبدو إلى سوريا والعراق. نظرتُ إليه بنظرة جامدة لا تعكس أي تعبير، وتساءلتُ في نفسي عمّا كان يدخّنه) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🧵
🔴 منذ أسابيع، كنت أتابع مدونة أميركية نشرت معلومات وتقييمات استخبارية حساسة بشأن إسرائيل، لكنني كنت متردداً جداً في نشرها، نظراً لحساسية ما ورد فيها وصعوبة التحقق من مصادرها.
🔷 لأتفاجأ اليوم أنّ وزارة العدل الأميركية أعلنت، اعتقال متعاقد مع وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية بتهمة تسريب خمسة تقارير استخبارية سرية إلى شريكته، التي يُشتبه في نشرها معلومات منها عبر منصة «سابستاك». وقد ظهرت مؤشرات على ارتباط هذه القضية بالمدونة التي كنت أتابعها
في ضوء هذه التطورات، سأستعرض لكم التقارير وأبرز ما تضمنته من معلومات وتقييمات استخبارية، قبل حذفها أو سحبها من النشر .
(1) كشف تقرير نُشر في 5 أكتوبر أن فريق «الخلية الحمراء» التابعة لوكالة الاستخبارات المركزية أعدّت في أغسطس تقييماً سرياً، يحذّر من احتمال انزلاق إسرائيل إلى صراع أهلي أو انهيار الدولة. وحدد التقييم عوامل تهدد الاستقرار، أبرزها عودة محاربين مسلحين يعانون صدمات نفسية بعد سنوات من القتال، وتصاعد الغضب من إعفاء المتشددين اليهود من التجنيد، والأزمة الاقتصادية وارتفاع الإنفاق العسكري، وعنف المستوطنين، والصراع السياسي المرتبط بمحاولة نتنياهو الاحتفاظ بالسلطة.
🔷 ونقل مصدر استخباري أميركي أن إسرائيل قد تكون على بُعد شرارة واحدة من صراع داخلي حقيقي. ودرس التقييم سيناريوهات تشمل انسحاب شركات التكنولوجيا والذكاء الاصطناعي الأجنبية وسحب استثماراتها وموظفيها، وإعادة دول المنطقة النظر في جدوى التطبيع، واستغلال حماس أو حزب الله فترة الضعف الإسرائيلي. كما اعتبر تزايد العزلة الدولية عاملاً قد يساهم في انهيار الدولة.
🔷 مع التأكيد أن هذه تقديرات استخبارية للسيناريوهات البديلة عن الاعتقاد السائد، ولا تعني أن الوكالة تتوقع انهيار الدولة بصورة حتمية، لكنها تكشف أن احتمال الصراع الداخلي أصبح موضوعاً لدراسة متخصصة داخل جهاز الاستخبارات الأميركي، وفق رواية المصدرين.
(2) كشف تقرير استخباري أميركي، نُشرت تفاصيله في 28 مايو، أن مسؤولين إسرائيليين ضغطوا سراً على وزارة الدفاع الأميركية لإقناع إدارة ترامب بالتخلي عن المفاوضات مع طهران، واغتيال رئيس البرلمان محمد باقر قاليباف، أحد أبرز المفاوضين الإيرانيين، واستئناف الحرب.
🔷 ووفق المصادر الأميركية، عرضت إسرائيل تصوراً يقوم على شن ضربات واسعة ضد المنشآت النفطية الإيرانية لإحداث انهيار اقتصادي واضطرابات داخلية تؤدي إلى إسقاط النظام. وقلّل المسؤولون الإسرائيليون من التداعيات المحتملة على أسواق الطاقة ومن كلفة الرد الإيراني ضد دول الخليج.
🔷 وتشمل الخطة استهداف مسؤولين من المستويات الدنيا في الحرس الثوري، وتحقيق التفوق الجوي، وتعطيل مواقع الصواريخ الإيرانية. واستبعد التقرير استهداف وزير الخارجية عباس عراقجي، والمرشد مجتبى خامنئي بسبب عدم معرفة الاستخبارات الإسرائيلية بمكان وجوده.
🔷 وأشار التقييم إلى أن إسرائيل ما زالت تراعي قرار واشنطن بسبب اعتمادها على الدعم والتنسيق العسكري الأميركي وحسابات الانتخابات الإسرائيلية. وتتزامن الضغوط مع مخاوف إسرائيلية من تسوية تسمح لإيران بالاحتفاظ بنظامها وتعزيز نفوذها في مضيق هرمز.
(3) كشف تقييم استخباري سري، نُشرت تفاصيله في 29 يوليو، أن المسؤولين الإسرائيليين يدركون تراجع التأييد الشعبي والسياسي لإسرائيل داخل الولايات المتحدة، ويعتقدون أن استمرار الحصول على مليارات الدولارات من المساعدات العسكرية المباشرة لم يعد مضموناً.
🔷 ووفق التقييم، تسعى إسرائيل إلى تعويض المساعدات التقليدية باندماج مؤسسي عميق مع الجيش الأميركي وأجهزة الاستخبارات والصناعات الدفاعية، بحيث يصبح تقليص التعاون مكلفاً عسكرياً وسياسياً للإدارات الأميركية المقبلة.
🔷 وكشف التقييم عن مناقشات لاستضافة قاعدة عسكرية أميركية دائمة في إسرائيل، وتوسيع التعاون الاستخباري، وإدخال التكنولوجيا الإسرائيلية ومنظومات التسليح المشتركة في البنية التشغيلية للقوات الأميركية. كما أشار إلى جهود إسرائيلية لاستمالة شخصيات بارزة في قطاع التكنولوجيا الأميركي لتأمين دعم سياسي ومالي مستدام.
🔷 وترى الوكالة، وفق التقرير، أن اقتراح نتنياهو إنهاء المساعدات العسكرية المباشرة تدريجياً ليس مجرد توجه نحو الاستقلال الدفاعي، وإنما محاولة لاستبدال المساعدات التي يمكن تعليقها بروابط صناعية واستخبارية يصعب تفكيكها أو استخدامها للضغط على إسرائيل.
(4) كشف تقييم سري لوكالة الاستخبارات المركزية، نُشر في 13 مايو، أن واشنطن لا تستطيع الاعتماد على دعم خليجي موحد لاستئناف الحرب ضد إيران. وحدد الإمارات والبحرين باعتبارهما مؤيدتين لاستمرار الضربات الأميركية والإسرائيلية، مقابل تفضيل السعودية وقطر والكويت المفاوضات.
🔷 تعتقد أبوظبي أن بطاريات القبة الحديدية الإسرائيلية والأفراد الإسرائيليين المنتشرين في الإمارات سيساعدون على حمايتها من الرد الإيراني، ما يفسر جانباً من استعدادها لدعم التصعيد رغم تعرض منشآتها لضربات واسعة.
🔷 وكشف التقرير أن السعودية رفضت توفير القواعد والتسهيلات العسكرية وحقوق عبور الأجواء لتنفيذ عملية بحرية أميركية باسم «مشروع الحرية»، لمرافقة السفن التجارية عبر مضيق هرمز. وتمسكت الرياض بالرفض رغم طلب شخصي من ترامب إلى ولي العهد محمد بن سلمان، ما أدى عملياً إلى تعطيل العملية.
🔷 وخلص التقييم إلى أن عُمان تعارض الحصار الأميركي للموانئ الإيرانية والعمل العسكري ضد طهران، وقد تكون منفتحة على إدارة مشتركة لمضيق هرمز مع إيران.
🔷 وأشار التقرير إلى تقييم استخباري منفصل خلص إلى قدرة إيران على تحمل الحصار البحري الأميركي ثلاثة إلى أربعة أشهر على الأقل قبل مواجهة تداعيات اقتصادية شديدة، خلافاً لتصريحات ترامب عن انهيار إيراني وشيك.
(5) كشفت أيدا تشافيز، في 11 مارس، نقلاً عن مصادر داخل مؤسسة الأمن القومي الأميركي، أن البحرين استقدمت قوات أردنية متخصصة في مكافحة الشغب لمساعدة السلطات على مواجهة احتجاجات اندلعت ضد الحرب الأميركية الإسرائيلية على إيران والوجود العسكري الأميركي في المملكة.
🔷 ونقل التقرير عن مسؤول أميركي أن الاحتجاجات تكشف حجم الرفض الشعبي للنظام الإقليمي المدعوم من واشنطن. كما أشار إلى محاولة إيران زيادة الأعباء الأمنية والسياسية على الدول المستضيفة للقواعد الأميركية عبر استهداف منشآتها العسكرية.
سأتوسع في استعراض ما ورد في التقارير في الردود -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
The R4 (Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt), which played a key role in the mediation that led to the Islamabad Memorandum and the temporary halt in the Iran-US war, now faces a delicate balancing act.
- Their Istanbul statement backs the memorandum and calls for diplomacy to prevent renewed escalation. Yet it also demands the reopening of Hormuz and condemns Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.
- There is a tension here. While the R4 supports engagement with Tehran, its positions on Hormuz and Yemen place greater pressure on Iran and its regional allies than on Washington.
- This may be understandable given the different interests within the group, but it also exposes the limits of their common diplomatic position.
- The question is how Tehran will interpret this balance, and whether the R4 can remain an effective channel for mediation while increasingly aligning around Gulf security priorities.
- Much may depend on how these four countries manage that contradiction in the months and years ahead.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Latest moves from Iraq and Pakistan to shut down border crossings and restrict trade with Iran are downstream of US pressure, as the admin seeks to tighten the blockade.
The move will have other repercussions--in Pakistan, which depends on imported Iranian petrochemical products, LPG prices are already surging. www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-is-now-losing-overland… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Iran has cut off LPG exports to Pakistan after Islamabad's border closure with Iran under US pressure, making Pakistan lose more than half its LPG supply, with the price of a 12 kg cooking gas cylinder now up 56% in just days, from 4,500 to 7,000 rupees, and expected to climb further, per Reuters.
Pakistan imported about 7,000 tonnes a day from Iran. Hundreds of LPG tankers are stranded at the Gabd-Rimdan and Taftan crossings, and the Quetta Chamber of Commerce has told members to stop placing new orders with Iran.
"We did not expect this from our Pakistani friends, and did not expect them to come under the influence of American pressure," said an Iranian MP.
Bessent said he is working with Pakistan and Turkey to cut off Iran's land routes. Sealing Iran off is now cutting household fuel to its neighbours. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
One of the many reasons the Houthis are stepping up attacks against Saudi Arabia seeking billions in compensations 👇
In 2014, the Houthis mobilized protests in Sana’a against a 500-rial fuel price increase, using public anger over fuel subsidies to justify their uprising against the Yemeni government.
At the time, a 20-liter container of gasoline reportedly cost 4,000 rials, rising to 4,500. The Houthis portrayed the increase as unacceptable and used it to rally support against the government.
Fast forward to 2026. Just six weeks ago, gasoline prices in Houthi-controlled areas reportedly increased by another 1,000 rials, from 9,500 to 10,500. Now, the latest rumored price is 11,400 rials for gasoline and 13,000 for diesel.
That puts gasoline at nearly three times its reported 2014 price before the Houthis armed takeover of Sana’a. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Peter Germanos بيتر جرمانوس
@GermanosPeter
🦊🇺🇸🇮🇷 الثعلب الختيار توم باراك يكشف أمراً لافتاً في المقاربة الأميركية لإيران!
«الإيراني العادي يختنق اقتصادياً، وكل ما يريده هو أن يستطيع الاستمرار في العيش».
ثم يفجّر مفاجأة تاريخية بقوله: «نحن من ثبّت الشاه، ونحن من ثبّت الخميني عام 1979»!
لكن العبارة الأهم سياسياً: «المطلوب ليس تغيير النظام، بل تغيير سياساته».
تصريح يستحق التوقف عنده: هل تنتقل واشنطن من مشروع إسقاط النظام الإيراني إلى مشروع التفاهم معه وتغيير سلوكه؟ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
🇨🇵 Arnaud Pescheux 🇶🇦
@ArnaudPescheux
State Visit of the President to Qatar: Minister @CaVautrin held talks with her counterpart @SaoudAlthani7 and witnessed the signing by @MOD_Qatar of a Letter of Intent selecting @KNDS_France and John Cockerill Defense for its 8x8 armoured vehicle programme.
France au Qatar
@FranceauQatar
Visite d'État du Président au Qatar : la Ministre @CaVautrin s'est entretenue avec son homologue @SaoudAlthani7 et a assisté à la signature par @MOD_Qatar d'une lettre d'intention sélectionnant @KNDS_France et John Cockerill Defense pour son programme de véhicules blindés 8x8.
France au Qatar
@FranceauQatar
🇫🇷🤝🇶🇦 On the occasion of President @EmmanuelMacron’s State visit to Doha, France and Qatar issued a joint statement reaffirming the strength of their strategic partnership.
Read the full joint statement in the slides below ⬇️
@amiridiwan
@Elysee
@TamimBinHamad -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🚨Scoop: U.S. intelligence finds Iran has "substantially increased" its efforts to target American diplomats & officials in the Middle East and beyond, with lethal plots reaching "advanced stages," per memo to Secretary of State Rubio. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/10/24/iran-war-us-embassies-evacuation… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
In my interview with @CBC News, I warned that another war with Iran seems almost inevitable and could be the most devastating yet.
Iran is unlikely to surrender. Instead, Tehran could target Gulf energy facilities, civilian infrastructure and undersea communications cables, potentially dragging the entire region into a much wider conflict.
As I warned before the previous wars, military force offers no silver bullet. Trump now faces only bad and worse options.
#iranwar
#iran
www.cbc.ca/news/world/united-states-iran-conflict-next-ro… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇸🇦 | L’Arabie saoudite se prépare à produire des missiles balistiques plus puissants
Des images satellites prises entre avril 2025 et septembre 2026 suggèrent que l’Arabie saoudite modernise ses infrastructures de missiles balistiques sur un site situé près d’Al-Duwadimi, à environ 200 km à l’ouest de Riyad, ce qui pourrait ouvrir la voie à la production de missiles plus gros et plus puissants.
Les chercheurs ont identifié un nouveau bâtiment, au moins deux fois plus grand que l’installation existante, qui pourrait selon eux être destiné à la fabrication de moteurs de missiles à propergol solide. Une seconde structure pourrait servir au stockage des composants du propergol ou des éléments de missiles achevés.
Selon les chercheurs du Foreign Policy Research Institute, Sam Lair et Michael Duitsman, cette extension pourrait permettre à l’Arabie saoudite de développer des missiles dotés d’une portée accrue ou capables d’emporter des charges militaires plus lourdes. La production sur ce site pourrait débuter dès la fin de 2026. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: Hezbollah is leveraging several political and informational lines of effort to deter the Lebanese government from prosecuting the group for a recent smuggling operation, which Hezbollah likely fears could establish a precedent for legal action against its illicit activities.
Other Key Takeaways:
Hezbollah’s lines of effort are indicative of the challenges that face the government as it attempts to confront Hezbollah but do not guarantee that Hezbollah will succeed in breaking the government’s will to disarm and prosecute the group in this instance.
Iraq-based Axis of Resistance actors have very likely launched at least four drones targeting Saudi Arabia within the past 20 days. Attacks on Saudi Arabia and other regional countries from Iraq by any Iranian partner or proxy support Iranian objectives to compel the United States to end the war in terms favorable to Iran by imposing increasing costs on US partners and allies in the region.
Saudi Arabia is expanding the scope of its air campaign in Yemen by interdicting Houthi smuggling cargo that could sustain Houthi military activities against the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amberin Zaman
@amberinzaman
The bigger prize for Turkey would be Egyptian approval of the maritime deal — one that Hifter cannot deliver. Hifter’s relations with Egypt nosedived after he engineered the ouster of Cairo’s close ally, Aguila Saleh, as the Libyan parliament’s speaker in an Oct. 6 vote. Saleh was a vocal critic of the maritime agreement, calling it “illegal and invalid.” www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/10/turkeys-libya-mariti…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rahman Ghahremanpour
@RGhahremanpour
قطر پیشنهاد کرده کشورهای منطقه به رهبری پاکستان و ترکیه با ایران وارد گفتگو های راهبردی برای امضای پیمان عدم تجاوز شوند.احتمالا نشست استانبول میان چهار کشور اروپایی ( بریتانیا ، آلمان، فرانسه و ایتالیا)و چهار کشور منطقه( پاکستان، ترکیه، عربستان و مصر) در همین راستا باشد.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
DROP SITE NEWS: Ansarallah has inflicted heavy damage on energy infrastructure in western Saudi Arabia. If the war continues, do you also intend to target energy infrastructure in the region?
GENERAL MOHSEN REZAEI: Iran does not have a policy of attacking civilian energy infrastructure to harm the regional economy. That is not our objective.
But there is another side to this question. If energy infrastructure is used directly to sustain the war against Iran—whether by supporting military operations, replacing supplies lost because of the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, or enabling the economic blockade to continue—then the nature of that infrastructure changes in our strategic calculations.
Vulnerability in the Persian Gulf is not one-sided. Iran’s oil facilities, ports, and shipping cannot be treated as legitimate targets while assuming that the other side’s economic infrastructure supporting this war will remain immune forever.
Our preference is entirely clear: de-escalation. We have offered a political path to end the war. If that path is accepted, there is no reason for the region’s energy infrastructure to become part of a wider battlefield.
But if the U.S. strategy is to prolong the war while using neighboring countries’ energy infrastructure to offset the pressure arising from Hormuz and maintain the blockade of Iran, those governments should not assume they can participate in economic warfare against Iran without putting themselves at risk.
The message is not that Iran wants to destroy the Persian Gulf’s energy system. The message is that there can be no arrangement in which Iran’s economic lifelines come under attack while the economic architecture enabling those attacks is considered untouched and immune.
That is precisely why we tell the countries of the region that the better alternative is a security arrangement in which energy facilities, shipping routes, and civilian infrastructure are mutually kept out of the war. This is possible, but it must work both ways.
🔗 Read our full exclusive interview with Iran’s top security official, Gen. Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, below.
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
⚡️ NEW: Read the full transcript of Drop Site's exclusive interview with Iran's top security official, Gen. Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, on renewed war, new targets, Hormuz, and Iran's terms for talks.
www.dropsitenews.com/i/221540425/full-interview-with-gen-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 نقلت الباحثة التركية غونول تول عن مسؤولين أتراك تقييمهم أن القيادة الإيرانية التي برزت بعد حرب فبراير 2026 تختلف عن القيادة السابقة في حساباتها الأمنية والاستراتيجية. وبحسب تقييمهم، كانت القيادة السابقة أكثر حذراً وتردداً في تجاوز الخطوط الحمراء، خصوصاً بشأن تحويل البرنامج النووي إلى برنامج تسلح، بينما تبدو القيادة الجديدة أكثر اندفاعاً وعدوانية وأعلى استعداداً لتحمّل المخاطر.
🔷 ويعتقد هؤلاء المسؤولون أن احتمال توجه إيران إلى إنتاج سلاح نووي أصبح أكبر مما كان عليه قبل الحرب. وتقول تول إن التقدير داخل أنقرة لا يتوافق مع تقييم بعض الباحثين الأميركيين الذين يستبعدون الاندفاع الإيراني السريع نحو تصنيع القنبلة.
🔷 نقلت تول عن دبلوماسيين ومسؤولين أتراك أن إطلاق صواريخ إيرانية باتجاه تركيا خلال الحرب أحدث صدمة في دوائر صنع القرار بأنقرة، بعدما اعترض حلف شمال الأطلسي هذه الصواريخ.
🔷 كانت الحسابات التركية تفترض أن إيران لن تجازف باستهداف دولة عضو في الحلف الأطلسي، نظراً للتداعيات العسكرية والسياسية المحتملة. لكن الحادثة، التي نفت طهران مسؤوليتها عنها، دفعت مسؤولين أتراك إلى إعادة تقييم استعداد القيادة الإيرانية لتحمّل مخاطر التصعيد.
🔷 وتبرز هنا قناعة تركية جديدة بأن النظام الإيراني، عندما يواجه تهديداً وجودياً، قد يقدم على خطوات كانت أنقرة تعتبرها مستبعدة، بما فيها المجازفة بمواجهة مباشرة مع دولة أطلسية.
🔷 توضح تول أن تركيا، رغم التنافس التاريخي مع إيران، تمتعت بعلاقة أقل صدامية معها مقارنة بعلاقات طهران مع دول الخليج. لكن امتلاك إيران أسلحة نووية سيغيّر هذه المعادلة، ويهدد التوازن الاستراتيجي الإقليمي، وقد يدفع دولاً أخرى إلى سباق تسلح نووي.
🔷 ومع ذلك، كشفت تول عن تمييز أساسي في ترتيب التهديدات; إذا تحدثت إلى الأتراك، ستجد أنهم يشعرون بتهديد من إسرائيل أكبر من التهديد الإيراني.
🔷 وهذا التقييم يختلف عن الترتيب السعودي الذي يحتل فيه التهديد الإيراني موقعاً أكثر تقدماً. وهو اختلاف سيؤثر في قدرة الدول الثلاث، تركيا والسعودية وباكستان، على بناء تحالف دفاعي موحد.
🔷 ترى تول أن حرب إيران عززت تحولاً بدأ قبل سنوات داخل المؤسسة السياسية والأمنية التركية، يقوم على التشكيك في كفاية المظلة النووية الأطلسية، وفي قدرة نظام منع الانتشار النووي على حماية المصالح التركية.
🔷 وعرضت استطلاعاً قالت إن 85% من المشاركين فيه يؤيدون حصول تركيا على أسلحة نووية بعد اندلاع حرب إيران. وأشارت إلى أن النقاش ليس جديداً، إذ كان بعض القادة العسكريين الأتراك قد ناقشوا جدوى امتلاك قدرات نووية منذ مطلع الألفية، خصوصاً إذا اتجهت إيران إلى التسلح النووي.
🔷 لكنها تستبعد إقدام أنقرة على إنتاج قنبلة في المستقبل القريب، وترجح انتقالها إلى استراتيجية «التحوط النووي»، أي امتلاك التكنولوجيا والخبرات والبنية التحتية التي تسمح بإنتاج السلاح مستقبلاً إذا اتُّخذ القرار السياسي بذلك.
🔷 لا تنظر أنقرة إلى البرنامج النووي الإيراني بمعزل عن التطورات الإقليمية الأخرى. فبحسب تول، أثار الاتفاق النووي الأميركي السعودي مخاوف تركية من حصول الرياض على قدرة أكبر على تخصيب اليورانيوم، رغم التقارب السياسي والعسكري بين البلدين.
🔷 وتعتقد أنقرة أن الولايات المتحدة أصبحت أكثر تساهلاً مع الطموحات النووية لبعض حلفائها، بينما تتراجع موثوقية الضمانات الأمنية الأميركية. كما أن استبعاد تركيا من برنامج مقاتلات «إف-35» أضعف دورها المحتمل في ترتيبات الردع النووي الأطلسي.
🔷 وتشير تول إلى أن أنقرة تسعى للحصول على تكنولوجيا نووية كندية تمنحها استقلالية أكبر، إلى جانب مفاوضاتها مع الولايات المتحدة لتطوير مفاعلات إضافية. وتعتبر أن امتلاك القدرات التقنية دون تصنيع القنبلة هو المسار الأكثر احتمالاً. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House MENA
@CH_MENAP
Why has President Sisi said he will step down in 2030?
The Egyptian president’s surprise announcement comes amid deep economic difficulties and includes a plan for a military-approved succession.
Read the new analysis by @AAboudouh ⤵️
www.chathamhouse.org/2026/10/why-has-egypts-president-sis… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ron Skolnik @ronskolnik.bsky.social
@Ron_Skolnik
"I realized at the end of the day that Israel really didn't want peace, but they wanted dominance. And I walked away from it." Intense interview with Netanyahu's former friend/confidant. Hopefully this manages to impact those who are far from being left. www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/2026-10-22/ty-artic…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Economist
@TheEconomist
The Saudi kingdom thought it had influence over Donald Trump. It wooed him by promising to invest implausible sums in America and made tawdry deals with the first family. None of that stopped him from embarking on a disastrous war www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2026/10/19/every…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei: “Our goal is not to hold out until 2029, but to end the war on terms that reduce the likelihood of another conflict. If diplomacy can establish an understanding that taking action against Iran comes at a cost, we prefer diplomacy.”
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elijah J. Magnier 🇪🇺
@ejmalrai
Iran rejected a plan to disarm Hezbollah proposed by Speaker Nabih Berri, as suggested by Turkey and the US administration. Iran wants Hezbollah to become stronger than ever and not to be disarmed.
The communication between Hezbollah and Berri is not optimal when Berri sent a delegation to meet with the Iranian speaker Qalibaf without Hezbollah's knowledge. The Turkish-US proposal consisted of sharing power equally between the Christian, Shia and Sunni, the head of the army to be a Shia and the delivery of all heavy weapons to Iran.
Hezbollah also wanted to withdraw from the government, but Berri refused to pull his ministers and for the Shia to leave the government. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
What kind of deal can Putin offer Iran?
He cannot supply additional defense systems or the aircraft Iran has been seeking for years.
Doing so would antagonize Israel and also the GCC, with whom Putin wants good relations. I don’t believe that will happen.
He cannot give Iran more than he already does, which is political cover.
What cards would he even hold in this negotiation? -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇸🇾| Syrie : les réseaux d’Ahmed al-Charaa à l’assaut du marché de la sécurité privée
Alors que la Syrie s’ouvre aux entreprises internationales de sécurité privée, les nouvelles autorités cherchent à reprendre le contrôle d’un secteur historiquement fragmenté. Au cœur de cette recomposition figure Defense Safe, une société devenue incontournable pour les groupes étrangers souhaitant accéder au marché syrien. Son représentant légal, Nawras Nasser, assure l’interface avec ces entreprises, dans un dispositif étroitement lié aux intérêts économiques du nouveau pouvoir.
Du 25 au 28 octobre, Damas accueillera la première édition de la Syria International Security & Safety Exhibition (Fortix), un salon consacré à la sécurité privée. Les principaux groupes occidentaux intéressés par le marché syrien ont été fortement incités à y participer comme sponsors ou exposants. Plusieurs appels d’offres de plusieurs millions de dollars devraient prochainement être lancés pour assurer la protection des ambassades occidentales, dont celle de l’Union européenne, ainsi que d’organisations internationales comme le Fonds monétaire international.
Dans ce contexte, Defense Safe s’impose comme un interlocuteur privilégié. Les entreprises étrangères devant s’associer à un partenaire local pour opérer en Syrie, elles sont fortement encouragées à passer par cette société. Son représentant légal, Nawras Nasser, juriste diplômé de l’université de Damas, possède un parcours essentiellement administratif et commercial. Ancien professionnel des ressources humaines au sein d’entreprises au Qatar, il a également exercé dans l’arbitrage commercial et occupé des fonctions juridiques auprès d’une antenne du Croissant-Rouge à Lattaquié. Son CV ne fait toutefois état d’aucune expérience dans les forces de sécurité ou le commandement opérationnel.
Derrière cette structure se trouvent surtout les intérêts du nouveau régime. Defense Safe est désormais placée sous le contrôle du Syrian Sovereign Fund (SSF), le fonds souverain créé en 2025 et étroitement lié aux autorités de Damas. Sa direction générale a été confiée à Ibrahim Sukkariyeh, alias Abu Maryam al-Australi, ancien trésorier de Hayat Tahrir al-Cham (HTC), le mouvement dirigé par Ahmed al-Charaa lorsqu’il contrôlait Idlib.
Après la prise du pouvoir, Ibrahim Sukkariyeh a également joué un rôle dans le fonctionnement du comité du pardon. Cet organe, qui ne rend compte qu’au président Ahmed al-Charaa et à son frère aîné Hazem al-Charaa, a examiné les avoirs d’hommes d’affaires enrichis sous Bachar al-Assad et souhaitant revenir dans le pays. L’objectif était de déterminer quels actifs devaient être récupérés par les nouvelles autorités et lesquels pouvaient rester entre les mains de leurs propriétaires historiques, parmi lesquels figuraient des oligarques alaouites et des membres de la bourgeoisie sunnite damascène.
Une partie de ces actifs a été transférée au SSF, notamment des participations dans d’anciennes sociétés de sécurité. Shorouk et Proguard, deux acteurs déjà présents sous les Assad, sont ainsi désormais affiliés au fonds souverain et à Defense Safe.
Cette restructuration illustre la volonté des nouvelles autorités de centraliser le secteur de la sécurité privée tout en s’appuyant sur des entreprises héritées de l’ancien régime. En devenant un passage privilégié pour les prestataires étrangers, Defense Safe se situe à la croisée des intérêts commerciaux internationaux et des réseaux économiques du pouvoir syrien. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
“The Iranian regime does not think it can live with a U.S. presence in the Middle East, so it is willing to go full tilt to get the United States out,” writes Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar.
www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/why-iran-escalates -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jonathan Serero
@sererojonathan
🔴 ISRAEL/ÉLECTIONS 2026: Le PM @netanyahu a rendu visite à la communauté francophone de Netanya.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇮🇱🇮🇷 | L’armée de l’air israélienne a développé une stratégie consistant à faire voler des chasseurs armés depuis Israël au-dessus de la Syrie et de l’Irak en direction de la frontière iranienne, avant de faire demi-tour, afin de préparer une future frappe contre l’Iran.
Cette méthode aurait été utilisée avant l’opération « Rising Lion » (guerre des 12 jours), environ trois mois avant l’attaque surprise de juin 2025.
Un survol similaire aurait eu lieu le 10 octobre 2026, avec des avions de chasse traversant l’espace aérien syrien et irakien avant de faire demi-tour.
L’objectif serait d’entraîner les équipages, de recueillir du renseignement et d’habituer l’Iran au trafic aérien israélien afin de permettre une frappe surprise. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Iran Watcher
@TheIranWatcher
Regime officials spared in the first war to keep negotiations alive may not survive the next, as the United States and Israel could wipe out entire layers of the Islamic Republic’s leadership.
Hamzeh Safavi, the son of former IRGC commander Yahya Rahim Safavi, warns that the next attack could expand from targeting roughly 40 senior officials to eliminating between 1,000 and 1,500 members of the regime.
He calls it the “lawnmower” strategy.
The objective would no longer be limited to removing the Islamic Republic’s highest commanders. The campaign could move systematically through the regime’s provincial IRGC commanders, intelligence officials, Basij leaders and other functionaries responsible for maintaining control across Iran.
Safavi considers this one of the most serious scenarios for the next phase of the war. Its purpose would be to paralyze the regime’s command structure and force it into absolute surrender.
This is not a confirmed American or Israeli plan. It is a warning from a regime-connected figure that reveals how vulnerable the Islamic Republic now believes its entire governing class has become.
Safavi admits that officials were caught off guard during the previous attacks. They did not believe the United States and Israel would locate and eliminate senior figures so quickly, freely and without hesitation.
The next phase he fears would scale that model dramatically.
Precision strikes could target officials as they move, meet and communicate. Cyber operations could disrupt command networks while simultaneous attacks on missile facilities and underground headquarters prevent surviving leaders from coordinating an effective response.
Safavi also warns that missile cities and command centres buried between 60 and 120 metres underground could be targeted. Such an operation would likely require American bunker-busting weapons, sustained intelligence coverage and continued air superiority over Iran.
The political calculation may also be changing.
Earlier in the conflict, some officials were reportedly spared because the United States needed interlocutors capable of negotiating. Figures such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Abbas Araghchi retained value as channels through which a ceasefire or settlement could be reached.
The “lawnmower” scenario assumes that restraint has ended.
Instead of preserving negotiators, the next campaign could dismantle the governing layer that allows the Islamic Republic to repress unrest, mobilize loyalists and rebuild military power after every round of strikes.
Eliminating 1,000–1,500 officials would be vastly more difficult than targeting several dozen senior leaders. The regime can disperse personnel, restrict communications, move officials underground and rapidly appoint replacements. Such an operation would also risk civilian casualties, retaliation and institutional fragmentation rather than an orderly surrender.
But Safavi’s warning exposes the deeper crisis.
The Islamic Republic built its deterrence around the assumption that its leaders, underground facilities and security hierarchy were beyond the enemy’s reach. The previous war shattered that assumption.
Regime insiders are no longer debating whether senior officials can be reached. They are warning that the next campaign could move from leadership decapitation to the systematic destruction of the regime’s entire command structure.
The Islamic Republic spent decades threatening to destroy its enemies. Its own elite is now discussing how much of the regime may survive the next attack.
Masoud Safiri
@safiri94
حمزه رحیم صفوی میگه در حمله بعدی امریکا همه مسئولان چمن زنی می شن!
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇵🇰 | Chantage, proxies et ambiguïté : l’ISI au cœur du grand jeu pakistanais
À Islamabad, l’ISI n’est pas un simple instrument de l’État : il en est l’ossature. Son action repose sur trois leviers, le chantage, les proxies et l’ambiguïté. Chacun rapporte, aucun n’est gratuit.
Sa puissance s’adosse d’abord à celle d’Asim Munir. Adopté le 20 août, le Defence Forces of Pakistan Act prolonge la révision de l’article 243, qui lui garantit une immunité à vie. Il supprime la présidence du comité des chefs d’état-major au profit d’un chef des forces de défense qui commande les armées et leurs services. Munir a nommé Asim Malik à l’ISI sans aval civil ni expérience du renseignement, puis en a fait son conseiller à la sécurité nationale. Faisal Naseer, numéro deux de l’ISI qu’Imran Khan accusait de tentative d’assassinat, a été relégué le 4 septembre à la NACTA. Depuis juillet 2024, l’ISI intercepte légalement les communications du pays. Cette verticalité a pourtant ses limites : les réseaux tribaux et religieux priment souvent sur la hiérarchie, et les antennes de Lahore ou Karachi ignorent parfois le siège.
Le chantage est l’outil le plus visible. L’opération indienne Firewall-2026 a révélé qu’au moins treize marins de l’Indian Navy échangeaient avec deux faux profils féminins pilotés par l’ISI, grâce à des cartes SIM indiennes transitant par Dubaï. Deux suspects auraient renseigné sur Visakhapatnam, base des SNLE de classe Arihant.
Les services occidentaux subissent une pression comparable, selon une gradation éprouvée à travers des avertissements, véhicules sabotés, puis menaces de mort imputées aux djihadistes. Devenu le carrefour de la médiation entre Washington, l’Iran et le Golfe, Islamabad attire les espions mais peine à les retenir. La DGSE a eu du mal à pourvoir son poste cet été, après le rapatriement de son chef de poste et l’expulsion en juin de l’attaché de défense français. Au début des années 2010, un cadre de l’ISI avait frappé le numéro deux de la DGSE, irrité par l’intérêt français pour le programme nucléaire. Paris avait répliqué en expulsant le représentant de l’ISI en France. Londres a perdu un diplomate en 2010 et son attaché de défense en 2005, piégés par des honeytraps. Quant à la CIA, la presse pakistanaise a exposé davantage de ses officiers que la Chine ou l’URSS, dont le chef de station Jonathan Bank en 2010.
Les proxies relèvent de la doctrine. Après la « guerre de mille ans » promise par Bhutto en 1965 et la défaite de 1971, Islamabad choisit de « saigner l’Inde par mille coupures » plutôt que de risquer un affrontement conventionnel sous ombre nucléaire. Mais l’outil se retourne contre lui. Le TTP et la BLA frappent depuis l’Afghanistan, comme à Kohat le 18 septembre. Le 11 octobre, l’état d’urgence est décrété au Khyber Pakhtunkhwa et son gouverneur PTI, Sohail Afridi, est arrêté. Islamabad accuse Ajit Doval d’avoir renoué avec des Talibans avides d’autonomie. Coupé des Haqqani, qu’il a soutenus jusqu’en 2021, l’ISI dépend désormais du MIT turc. Ibrahim Kalin a rencontré Sirajuddin Haqqani mi-septembre, dans le cadre de l’accord de défense conclu en août entre Ankara, Islamabad et Riyad.
L’ambiguïté, enfin, tient lieu de diplomatie. Munir a offert à Trump le crédit d’une paix que Modi contestait, un soutien au Nobel et une commande de drones Powerus. La CIA célèbre la capture en mars 2025 de Mohammad Sharifullah, lié à l’attentat de l’aéroport de Kaboul. En 2011, l’ISI refusait pourtant d’être associé au raid contre Ben Laden, mené à quelques centaines de mètres de son académie militaire. Washington et Islamabad restent opposés sur la prolifération et sur la Chine.
Paris, partenaire militaire de New Delhi, entretient un canal antiterroriste au sommet tout en encaissant les coups sur le terrain. Pékin reçoit du renseignement sur le Parti islamique du Turkestan ouïghour. Mais la Chine doute de la protection de ses intérêts et craint que le retour américain n’expose son industrie de défense. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Why is the board aligned with Putin, Trump, and Iran?
Look at the sequence:
August 25: CIA Director John Ratcliffe travels secretly to Moscow. Besides Ukraine, he brings data saying Russia needs to use its influence to contain Iran in the Middle East. The public story that went around was that Ratcliffe went there to threaten the Russians. That never made sense. You only make a trip like that when you want to ask for something.
September 5: Trump’s people, Witkoff and Kushner, meet Putin in Moscow to sketch the Ukraine peace framework.
October 9: Trump and Putin close a deal for Russian diesel. As I wrote before, 300 thousand tons covers only a few hours of the market and was never about causing shortages in the U.S. The real point was to lift sanctions and give Putin some economic room so he could put more pressure on Iran.
October 10–14: Trump starts heavy public attacks on Zelensky. He says Zelensky is prolonging the war on purpose and that Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries have the “hidden goal” of driving up diesel prices in the U.S. and sabotaging his government. At the same time the White House puts speed limits on Starshield (the military Starlink), which immediately cuts the effectiveness and coordination of Ukrainian drones.
October 15–19: Trump goes further. On Truth Social he says Zelensky “doesn’t want and never wanted peace” and that he is “much harder to deal with than Putin.” With the technical limits the U.S. imposed, European leaders in Brussels start telling Ukraine that aid for the winter could be cut or sharply reduced if Zelensky keeps maximalist demands and refuses to negotiate. They talk about budget problems.
October 19: While the pressure on Kyiv continues, Lavrov arrives in Tehran. Trump publicly backs the move, saying Russia and China have “done very little for Iran,” basically telling Putin to demand Iranian restraint.
October 20: Witkoff meets Zelensky in Oslo under strong pressure from NATO and European leaders for Ukraine to stop hitting Russian infrastructure.
October 21: Witkoff and Kushner meet Putin in St. Petersburg. With Lavrov already in Tehran, Putin offers Russian mediation with Iran in exchange for moving forward the U.S.-Russia-Ukraine summit planned for mid-November in Abu Dhabi.
Where do the Chinese fit?
Trump also pulled the Chinese in and pushed them to do more.
October 14, 2026: Wang Yi meets Lavrov. Beijing aligns a coordinated line, Russia pressures Iran through security channels (which is why Lavrov went to Tehran on the 19th), China uses economic and financial pressure directly on the Iranians.
October 19, 2026: Li Qiang meets Iranian First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref in Dushanbe, on the side of the SCO summit. Li Qiang tells the Iranian government to stop actions that raise tensions in the Middle East and demands an “early return to dialogue and political negotiations.”
The Chinese are answering Trump and applying a modest financial pressure on Iran. But how far does it go? Is just a simulation?
The summit between the U.S., Russia and China that Putin is organizing to November , is it really about Iran, or is it about Trump having to give more concessions to both so they will actually put more effort into pressuring Iran?
I see an understanding between Trump and Putin that involves Ukraine, but I don’t see Putin with the power to persuade Iran, or China. At this point Trump gains an ally, but not the actual resolution of the problem.
No one is going to pull those inflamed thorns out of Trump so easily. Both the Russians and the Chinese will put up obstacles and extract a high political cost.
At the same time Zelensky knows these difficulties and will pretend to cooperate. We are watching multiple acts of theater. If anything moves forward it will be mostly on Trump’s own effort, far more than on any other actor. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
🇨🇵 Arnaud Pescheux 🇶🇦
@ArnaudPescheux
1/7 Back in pictures and video on the historic State Visit of the President of the French Republic to Qatar, 20-21 October. 🇫🇷🇶🇦🧵
@EmmanuelMacron @Elysee @TamimBinHamad @AmiriDiwan @MofaQatar_EN @francediplo -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🚨עשרות מטוסי קרב של חיל האוויר ביצעו ביום שני בלילה גיחה במתווה התקפי, הגיעו עד גבול איראן ושבו לישראל. מקור אמריקני אמר לי כי היתה תחושה שבישראל קיוו שהאיראנים יירו על המטוסים כדי להצדיק תקיפה. הפרטים בכתבה שלי ב-@N12News
www.mako.co.il/news-military/2026_q4/Article-9d90751855f5… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇺🇸🇮🇷🇮🇱 | Plusieurs sources ont révélé que l’administration du président Donald Trump a récemment été « très proche » d’autoriser une frappe contre l’Iran, à au moins une occasion.
Cette information intervient alors que le secrétaire américain à la Défense, Pete Hegseth, effectue une visite non annoncée en Israël. Il y a rencontré le Premier ministre Benjamin Netanyahu sur la base aérienne d’Ovda afin de discuter d’une éventuelle reprise des opérations militaires de grande ampleur contre Téhéran. (i24) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kristin Diwan
@kdiwaniya
Emirati minister of state Lana Nusseibeh expected to enter the race to succeed António Guterres as UN secretary-general.
ft.trib.al/8CQAQAk
Read my recent profile of UAE & Gulf strategies at the United Nations
agsi.org/analysis/gulf-states-double-down-on-a-weak-u-n/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Iran-based analyst Mostafa Najafi reports a unified position across Tehran’s leadership: no nuclear talks or transfer of enriched uranium upfront. He says Washington wants major nuclear concessions in exchange for lifting its blockade & unfreezing some assets, which Iran rejects
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Neri Zilber
@NeriZilber
Exclusive: Bibi Netanyahu nearly initiated a major new offensive against Iran earlier this month, wide-scale airstrikes including on civilian infrastructure. It was only stopped after Trump failed to give a green light. But chances are high still for a joint US-Israel attack in the coming weeks. My story @FT www.ft.com/content/eb4d1101-45ed-4d03-9beb-42f7c87a58ea
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Tactical Report
@TacticalReport
On 18/10/2026, Saudi Minister of Defense Prince Khaled Bin Salman (KBS) visited Abu Dhabi and met with UAE President Sheikh Mohammad Bin Zayed (MBZ), Vice President Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed, and UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Zayed.
Unlock the following note for further insights.
www.tacticalreport.com/reports/64941-uae-saudi-arabia-on-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ahmed Quraishi
@_AhmedQuraishi
#iran gives #pakistan's military chief a "Brother Munir" moment.
Tehran Times: "Brother Munir! The ball is in the US court."
Ahmed Quraishi
@_AhmedQuraishi
Interesting how #iran's national security advisor Mohsen Rezaee announced he rejected the proposal to take enriched uranium out of Iran after the meeting with #pakistan's military chief Field Marshal Asim Munir.
x.com/_AhmedQuraishi/status/2112380071864349015 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🚨🇮🇱🇮🇷Israeli air force conducted on Monday a massive "power projection" operation near Iran's border. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/10/21/israel-military-training-sortie-… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Visite éclair d'Emmanuel Macron en Arabie, chaleureuse en apparence. Attention toutefois aux apparences...
مالك الروقي
@alrougui
سمو ولي العهد
يستقبل رئيس الجمهورية الفرنسية. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alessandro Scipione
@AlexScipione
🇱🇾🇹🇷 Perché il voto di Bengasi sull’accordo marittimo con la #turchia è probabilmente l’evento dell’anno nel Mediterraneo?
🧭 Sul piano libico, Saddam #haftar ha ottenuto in risultato impensabilee fino a pochi anni fa: la Turchia era il principale sponsor militare di Tripoli contro l’offensiva di suo padre. Oggi Ankara parla con le due Libie.
🇪🇬 Per l’#egitto è un brutto colpo: la Cirenaica era considerata una delle aree dove il Cairo esercitava maggiore influenza. Ora Bengasi dimostra di potersi muovere anche contro interessi egiziani.
🇬🇷 Sul mare, il memorandum turco-libico continua a scontrarsi con le rivendicazioni greche, soprattutto a sud di #creta. Ed è proprio lì che Chevron ha concessioni esplorative che dovrebbero portare gas in Europa: se partiranno attività nelle aree contestate, il rischio di tensioni aumenta.
⚡ Poi c’è l’energia. Rafforzare le rivendicazioni turco-libiche significa anche aumentare il peso negoziale di Ankara sulle future rotte energetiche del Mediterraneo orientale verso l’Europa.
🌐 E non è solo #petrolio e #gas: nella regione passano anche cavi strategici come BlueMed di Sparkle.
🇮🇹 Infine c’è l’Italia. Roma ha interessi enormi in #libia e Ankara allarga il proprio raggio d’azione dall’Ovest all’Est. @arturo_varvelli la mette così: “È un bel colpo di Ankara, che gioca su due tavoli”. E sull’Italia aggiunge: “Siamo ancora una volta più relativi più defilati”.
Eppure il peso economico europeo resta enorme: come ha osservato @Geiasou69, Italia, Francia e Grecia assorbono insieme il 41% dell’export libico, contro appena lo 0,01% della Turchia. Il problema forse non è la mancanza di peso, a quanto riusciamo a trasformarlo in influenza politica.
#libya #turkey #greece #egypt #mediterranean #energy
📰👀 #analisi su @agenzia_nova ⤵️
www.agenzianova.com/news/libia-turchia-il-voto-di-bengasi… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Finalement, Emmanuel Macron se rend à Riyad, pour une visite d'une heure chez le prince héritier, à l'issue de sa tournée dans le Golfe, où je l'ai suivi pour Le Figaro.
Emmanuel Macron arrache un accord décisif sur les carburants en Arabie saoudite share.google/ADU4iYgp8ap5A16Sh -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
خلاصه سفر عاصم منیر به ایران
۱-درخواست عاصم منیر خروج ۴۰۰ کیلو اورانیوم غنی شده از تهران بود که ایران به صراحت اعلام کرد این اتفاق نخواهد افتاد. خروج ۴۰۰ کیلو اورانیوم غنی شده ۶۰ درصدی از ایران از مواردی بود که قبل از جنگ ۴۰ روزه مطرح بود ولی بعد از جنگ از دستور کار ایران خارج شد.
۲- از عاصم منیر درباره بسته شدن مرزهای زمینی پاکستان و تمکین اسلام آباد به درخواست بنست سؤال شد که گفت دلیل بسته بودن مرزها در یکی دو روز گذشته مسائل مرزی موقتی و فنی بود و مرز دو کشور از امروز باز شده است.
۳- با یادآوری مذاکرات قبلی با پاکستان به عاصم منیر یادآوری شد که تا اعتمادسازی از سوی آمریکا صورت نگیرد مذاکرهای در کار نخواهد بود و شروع این اعتمادسازی، تحقق شروط ایران است.
اجرای شروط هفت گانه ایران که خلاصه تفاهم اسلام آباد است و در سفر پزشکیان به نیویورک مطرح شد و عراقچی با واسطه قطریها به ویتکاف و کوشنر گفته بود، شرط اصلی ایران برای مذاکره است. بر اساس شروط هفت گانه تنگه هرمز به صورت موقتی و طی ۷ روز بازخواهد شد منوط به رفع محاصره و تحریمها.
ویتکاف و کوشنر مخالفتی با این شروط نداشتند ولی خواهان گنجاندن بحث هستهای در این مذاکرات شدند که عراقچی گفت اختیاری در این حوزه ندارد. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
The Tehran Times’ front-page headline neatly sums up the outcome of Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran.
- Munir may be welcomed as a “brother”, but the message from the Iranian leadership is clear: the ball remains firmly in Washington’s court.
- Tehran appreciates Pakistan’s mediation efforts, but has shown little sign of softening its conditions for renewed negotiations.
#iran #pakistan -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران
@ariel_oseran
Qatari and Pakistani mediators have presented a compromise proposal to the U.S. and Iran that has Washington's approval and earlier consent from Tehran, Qatari-owned Al-Araby Al-Jadeed reports, citing unnamed sources.
The sources said the proposal offers a "partial response" to Iran's demand for its frozen funds: Iran would receive the interest on $6 billion held in Qatari banks. In return, Tehran has agreed to a secret, unannounced visit by the IAEA to Iranian nuclear sites, according to the sources.
Pakistani army chief Asim Munir delivered the proposal to Iranian officials in Tehran today. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Bloomberg
@business
Iranian attacks in the Persian Gulf are striking more ships and causing more severe damage than earlier in the conflict, bringing fresh risks to energy flows from the region www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-20/iran-strikes-m…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Even if Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran appears to have produced little progress in US-Iran negotiations, it would be a mistake to dismiss it as merely symbolic.
- One important development seems to have gone largely unnoticed: Asim Munir himself announced during his visit to Tehran that the problems affecting the Pakistan-Iran border had been resolved and that the border had reopened that very morning.
- During the war, Pakistan opened six land routes to facilitate access to Iran. These routes are not necessarily limited to Pakistani trade. They could also be used by third countries, particularly China.
And this matters enormously for Tehran.
- One of the most strategically important crossings is Gabd-Rimdan, just over 80 km from Gwadar, the Chinese-operated port in southwestern Pakistan. Under normal conditions, goods leaving Gwadar could reach Iranian territory in roughly two hours, provided there are no significant border delays.
- This gives Iran something potentially as valuable as progress at the negotiating table: an alternative supply corridor at a time when Washington is trying to tighten its economic and maritime blockade.
- For China, and potentially other trading partners, the Pakistan-Iran land border could offer a way to keep goods and essential supplies moving into Iran without relying on maritime routes exposed to American pressure.
- Of course, reopening the crossings does not automatically solve the logistical, financial and sanctions-related obstacles. But it gives Tehran another option, and an important one.
- In my view, Munir’s visit may therefore have delivered something more concrete than the diplomatic headlines suggest.
While everyone was watching for signs of a breakthrough between Washington and Tehran, Pakistan may have helped Iran secure a vital economic lifeline.
- And for a country facing a prolonged blockade that is no small achievement.
#iran #pakistan #china -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Iran’s security chief Mohsen Rezaei took a tough line with Pakistan’s Asim Munir today: “Not even a particle of enriched nuclear material will leave Iran.”
He also ruled out talks until the US builds trust by meeting Tehran’s previously stated 7 conditions. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Zachary Cohen
@ZcohenCNN
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth traveled to Israel in an unannounced trip, two sources familiar & a US official tell me & @talshalev1.
Hegseth met Monday evening with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz, per sources.
Representatives from the UAE were at one of the meetings, per Israeli source.
The Pentagon declined to comment when asked about Hegseth's travel to Israel.
Hegseth’s unannounced visit to Israeli comes days before the country holds its elections.
Trump recently gave his endorsement to Netanyahu calling him a “Great Warrior Prime Minister” in a post on social media.
Confirms @BarakRavid -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gulf Times
@GulfTimes_QATAR
Qatar–France ties take centre stage as His Highness the Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani meets French President Emmanuel Macron at Lusail Palace.
HH the Amir will chair official talks to strengthen strategic relations, expand cooperation across various fields, and discuss key regional and international issues of mutual concern — reaffirming Qatar’s pivotal role in global diplomacy and international partnerships.
🎥 Video credit: @QatarTelevision
#qatar #france #qatardiplomacy #lusailpalace #sheikhtamim #emmanuelmacron #qatarfrance #hhtheamirThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
🇹🇷Perde Arkası خلف الستار
@perde_arkasi1
"كيف اكتشفت إسرائيل مخبأ حسن نصر الله واغتالته؟
.
.
"استمعت الى مقابله التي اجراها الصحفي الايراني جواد موغوي مع سفير ايران السابق في لبنان
.
"في الحقيقه الصحفي ابهرني بمدى جرأه الاسئله التي يطرحها على ضيوفه خصوصا في المقابله التي اجراها سابقا مع وزير الخارجيه عراقجي وكيف احرجه بالاسئله
.
"كان من ضمن الاسئله ايضا
هل طلبت ايران من حسن نصرالله عدم اسناد غزه كي لا يدخلوا بمعركه مفتوحه مع إسرائيل
.
" السفير اجاب
انه كانت هناك تقديرات خاطئه لحسن نصرالله حيث كان يعتقد ان حرب إسرائيل على غزه ستستمر شهر او شهرين
ثم تنتهي بصفقة تبادل... لكن نتنياهو لخبط حساباتهم
واطال المعركه بسبب حساباته الاخرى ومنها عدم تعرضه للمحاكمه واطالة امد الحرب
-اما مسالة كيف اغتالت إسرائيل نصرالله
فبحسب السفير
انه في احد الاجتماعات مع نصر الله تم طرح الموضوع
على نصرالله نقلا عن رئيس الموساد
من احد الحاضرين في الاجتماع، حيث قالوا لنصرالله ان رئيس الموساد تحدث انهم يستطيعون اغتياله متى شاءوا
لكن نصرالله ابتسم وغير الموضوع وقال لن يحدث الا مااراد الله
-حسن نصرالله لم يكن يتواجد في المخبأ العميق دوما
واحيانا نقابله في الطابق الرابع والخامس
-المخبأ الذي كان يتواجد به لم يكن عميقا بل كان يحميه فقط من هجوم بسيط وهو عميق لعدة امتار فقط
-كان نصرالله كثير التنقل لتصعيب مهمة الجهه التي تراقبه
والاشخاص الذين كانوا يزورونه لم يكونوا ايرانيين وحدهم او من حزب الله بل كان هناك سياسيين ايضا. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Restitutor Orientis 🇱🇮
@restitutorII
🇸🇦🇹🇷🇵🇰
Turquie: Dans le projet de loi relatif à l’accord de défense commune de La Mecque, le gouvernement turc a finalement dû intégrer le texte du traité et en préciser les différents articles. L’accord établit un cadre de coopération militaire et stratégique entre les pays signataires, articulé autour de six axes principaux:
- Défense mutuelle: selon l’article 2, toute attaque armée extérieure contre l’un des signataires est considérée comme une attaque contre l’ensemble des Parties. Celles-ci doivent apporter une assistance immédiate à la Partie attaquée, la nature et l’étendue de ce soutien étant déterminées en fonction des besoins et des moyens disponibles.
- Souveraineté et intégrité territoriale: les signataires s’engagent à protéger mutuellement leur indépendance, leur souveraineté et leurs frontières internationalement reconnues.
- Coopération militaire: l’accord prévoit le développement des relations entre les forces armées, l’organisation de formations et d’exercices conjoints, ainsi que l’amélioration de leur interopérabilité.
- Industrie de défense: il encourage le partage de technologies, les projets communs de recherche et de développement, la production conjointe d’armements et la formation de spécialistes.
- Renseignement et logistique: les Parties s’engagent à partager des renseignements par des canaux sécurisés et à se fournir mutuellement un soutien logistique, notamment en armes, munitions, carburant, pièces détachées et autres équipements, en temps de paix comme en temps de guerre.
- Coordination stratégique : un Comité politique et stratégique de défense sera créé. Il réunira les ministres des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense ainsi que les chefs d’état-major des pays signataires. Son secrétariat sera établi en Arabie saoudite.
Quels sont les principaux points à retenir?
- L’accord prévoit une assistance militaire mutuelle en cas d’agression extérieure, mais ne précise pas que celle-ci doit obligatoirement prendre la forme d’un déploiement de troupes combattantes.
- Il ne prévoit pas non plus l’envoi automatique de batteries de défense aérienne ou d’autres équipements militaires spécifiques. La nature et l’étendue du soutien doivent être déterminées en fonction des besoins évalués et des capacités disponibles.
- L’accord doit être ratifié conformément aux procédures nationales de chaque pays avant son entrée en vigueur, comme le prévoit l’article 16.
- Il est conclu pour une durée indéterminée. Toutefois, une Partie ne peut s’en retirer qu’après dix ans à compter de son entrée en vigueur, moyennant un préavis écrit d’au moins trois mois.
En définitive, cet accord instaure un mécanisme de défense mutuelle sans définir à l’avance une réponse militaire automatique et uniforme à toute agression comme l’article 5 du traité de l’OTAN, puisque l’article 5 de l’OTAN laisse à chaque allié le choix des mesures qu’il juge nécessaires, y compris, éventuellement, le recours à la force armée.
Restitutor Orientis 🇱🇮
@restitutorII
🇸🇦🇹🇷🇵🇰
Turquie: Le projet de loi concernant l’accord de défense commune de La Mecque, conclu entre la Turquie, l’Arabie saoudite et le Pakistan, a été soumis à la ratification du Parlement turc.
Tout accord international doit être ratifié par le Parlement, conformément aux dispositions de la Constitution. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ragıp Soylu
@ragipsoylu
As we exclusively reported weeks ago, Turkey submitted the text of the Mecca Pact to the parliament in October, today!
And we again exclusively brought to you the full text, below.
Keep following @MiddleEastEye and of course me for reliable news!
Ragıp Soylu
@ragipsoylu
EXCLUSIVE: We obtained the full text of the Mecca defence pact signed by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
- The agreement commits the three countries to mutual defence, also barring withdrawal for the first 10 years
THE FULL TEXT IS BELOW
#breaking
www.middleeasteye.net/news/full-text-mecca-defence-pact-s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 تكشف الإيكونومست أن المقربين من الأمير محمد بن سلمان لا يرون أمام المملكة خيارات جيدة لإنهاء المواجهة مع الحوثيين. فالخيار الأول إرسال قوات برية إلى حرب استنزاف دامية، والثاني مواصلة حملة الضربات الجوية التي يُستبعد أن تحقق نتائج حاسمة، والثالث التوصل إلى تسوية تكرس سيطرة الحوثيين على المناطق الخاضعة لهم. وكانت الرياض تأمل أن تسمح هدنة 2022 باحتواء التهديد، لكن التهدئة بدأت تنهار خلال الصيف بفعل التداعيات الإقليمية للحرب الأميركية على إيران، بالتزامن مع توسع سيطرة الحوثيين داخل اليمن وتصاعد هجماتهم على السعودية. ويضع هذا التطور المملكة أمام احتمال استمرار حرب تعطل مشروعاتها الاقتصادية دون أفق واضح للحسم العسكري.
🔷 تنقل المجلة عن شخصية سعودية واسعة العلاقات تشكيكاً مباشراً في موثوقية ترامب، رغم الاستثمارات والامتيازات التي قدمتها الرياض لتعزيز علاقتها به. فقد سعت المملكة إلى استمالته عبر التعهد باستثمارات ضخمة في الولايات المتحدة، واستضافة ملاعب الغولف المملوكة له بطولات ممولة سعودياً، واستثمار ملياري دولار مع جاريد كوشنر، صهر الرئيس. لكن هذه العلاقات لم تمنع ترامب من شن الحرب على إيران، رغم التداعيات المباشرة على الأمن السعودي. وقال المصدر السعودي إن ترامب «لا يبقى مخلصاً لأحد لفترة طويلة». وتعتبر المجلة أن الرياض بالغت في تقدير قدرتها على التأثير في قراراته، بينما أصبحت تعتمد على قرارات أميركية قد تتعارض مع أولوياتها الأمنية.
🔷 تشير المجلة إلى أن محمد بن سلمان ظل بعيداً إلى حد كبير عن الظهور العلني منذ الهجوم الحوثي على مطار الرياض. ورغم أن الهجمات أثارت قلقاً داخل المجتمع السعودي وعطلت جوانب من الحياة اليومية، تؤكد الإيكونوميست عدم وجود استطلاعات رأي عامة موثوقة تسمح بقياس توجهات السكان بدقة. ومع ذلك، تقدر أن معظم السعوديين لا يزالون يثقون بحكومتهم.
🔷 يستبعد دبلوماسيون غربيون في الرياض أن تمثل الأزمة الحالية تهديداً وجودياً لحكم محمد بن سلمان، رغم إثارة بعض المعلقين الغربيين هذا الاحتمال. وقال دبلوماسي غربي إن وضع ولي العهد قبل سبع أو ثماني سنوات كان أصعب بكثير، عندما كان يحاول تثبيت موقعه وريثاً للحكم، وسط تعثر حرب اليمن، والأزمة مع قطر، والتداعيات الدولية لمقتل جمال خاشقجي داخل القنصلية السعودية في إسطنبول. وترى المجلة أن ولي العهد نجح في إبعاد منافسيه وتركيز السلطة بصورة لم تشهدها المملكة منذ عهد الملك عبدالعزيز، مؤسس الدولة السعودية الحديثة. ورغم وجود معارضين له، لا ترى المجلة أن أياً منهم يمتلك القدرة الواقعية على تنظيم انقلاب ضده.
🔷 أشد المخاوف السعودية يتعلق باحتمال استئناف ترامب الحرب على إيران بعد انتخابات التجديد النصفي الأميركية في 3 نوفمبر، رغم مطالبة محمد بن سلمان بعدم التصعيد. ويخشى مسؤولون سعوديون أن تتعرض المملكة لهجمات متزامنة من الحوثيين جنوباً، والفصائل العراقية شمالاً، وإيران شرقاً. وتبلغ مساحة السعودية نحو أربعة أمثال فرنسا، بينما تعاني نقصاً في صواريخ الاعتراض اللازمة لحماية منشآتها ومدنها. وتؤكد الإيكونوميست أن القرار الأكثر تأثيراً في مستقبل الأزمة بات خارج سيطرة ولي العهد، لأن استئناف الضربات الأميركية قد يفرض على المملكة أعباء دفاعية إضافية لا تستطيع تجنبها بمجرد تعديل سياستها تجاه الحوثيين.
🔷 تفاقمت الضغوط الاقتصادية السعودية قبل الحرب واستمرت خلالها، مع تعليق مشروعات كبرى نتيجة الضغوط على المالية العامة، وعدم مواكبة الأجور للتضخم. ولا يتجاوز الاستثمار الأجنبي المباشر السنوي نحو ثلث الهدف الذي حدده ولي العهد والبالغ 100 مليار دولار. وقبل عام، توقع صندوق النقد الدولي نمو الاقتصاد السعودي بنسبة 4% في 2026، لكنه بات يتوقع انكماشاً بنسبة 3.3%. وترى المجلة أن التعافي في 2027 يعتمد بدرجة كبيرة على عودة الاستقرار الإقليمي، وبالتالي على القرارات الأميركية تجاه إيران. وتربط هذه المؤشرات بين استمرار الحرب وصعوبة تنفيذ برنامج التحول الاقتصادي الذي يتطلب استثمارات أجنبية وتدفقات مالية مستقرة.
🔷 تكشف الإيكونوميست عن تغير في مواقف بعض المنتقدين الأميركيين للحرب السعودية في اليمن. فقد أقر السيناتور الديمقراطي كريس ميرفي، الذي التقى ولي العهد في الرياض خلال أكتوبر، بأن الوضع الحالي مختلف عن عامي 2018 و2020، وأن المملكة تواجه تقدماً حوثياً وهجمات صاروخية تستدعي الاعتراف بطبيعة التهديد الذي تتعرض له. وترى المجلة أن هذه المواقف تعكس تفهماً متزايداً لدى بعض منتقدي الحرب السابقين للأزمة الأمنية السعودية، دون أن تعني موافقة شاملة على الاستراتيجية العسكرية للرياض أو ضمان استعداد واشنطن للانخراط المباشر في المواجهة. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla
@Abdulkhaleq_UAE
لا يوجد حل عسكري لمعضلة اليمن. والحل هو
1 اعتراف خليجي جماعي بدولة الجنوب العربي
كحليف استراتيجي
2 ترك الشمال اليمني لحروبه الداخلية
3 وقف دعم حكومة الشمال العاجزة
4 عدم التعامل مع سلطة الحوثي بصنعاء لا حربا ولا سلما حتى اشعار آخر
5 هذا هو الحل و لا حل سواه
6 مجرد اقتراح ولكم🎤 -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Dans le Golfe, Emmanuel Macron obtient le déblocage de 200.000 tonnes de diesel par mois par les Émirats et Bahreïn share.google/bm4pzfpXDhCQnMfCN
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Eric Brewer
@BrewerEricM
A few thoughts on this FT article about growing calls for the bomb in Iran.
1. This was entirely predictable (and predicted). The U.S. and Israel made an attempt at regime change—an existential war for Iran—and are arguably still gunning for regime collapse. Between that, and killing the person who was likely one of the main impediments to the bomb (Ali Khamenei), it’s not hard to see why arguments for nuclear weapons are gaining steam.
2. But it’s not just the nature of the current war. It’s the failure of Iran’s prior nuclear strategy, which held that having an ability to produce nuclear weapons—vice the bomb itself—could provide an adequate deterrent to major strategic attacks. That failure was arguably there in 2024, and made patently obvious following the 2025 strikes and 2026 war. With that failure, it’s perfectly logical for Iran to undertake some searching for alternatives. An obvious one is actually building nuclear weapons.
3. But let’s be honest: The decision to build nuclear weapons isn’t going to be made by popular vote. That decision, if it occurs, will be made by a very small number of officials. So we should be careful about using this public discourse as an indicator of a near term decision to develop the bomb. That said, growing popularity for nuclear weapons can provide a degree of political top cover for any decision. That public discussion can also strengthen the hand of weapons advocates internally. But at the end of the day, this is an insider game.
www.ft.com/content/1f23e859-5e70-4d99-8f9b-56de3d0ae43e?s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
This is a very important and relevant to today map 👇
Amid the current war, it's important to remember that Iran, like much of the Global South, endured more than a century of colonial domination, marked by devastating territorial losses, humiliating foreign interventions, and deeply unequal concessions imposed by imperialist powers.
This is indeed the broader historical backdrop to the current conflict, and why sovereignty remains such a deeply charged issue for many Iranians. The memory of national humiliation, exploitation, and foreign powers seeking to dictate Iran's fate is not easily erased.
Against this backdrop, Trump's threats and actions toward Iran have been especially striking: openly coveting its oil and territory, threatening its civilization, attacking critical civilian infrastructure, and not so covert efforts to arm ethnic minorities and destabilize the country.
These are not merely familiar instruments of coercive diplomacy. They evoke the methods and ambitions of the imperialist era.
And this is of course hardly confined to Iran. Trump's approach to Venezuela is perhaps the clearest illustration of the broader pattern, and of the kind of outcome he has appeared to seek in Iran.
It bears reminding that after Maduro's kidnapping, Washington this summer secured an extraordinary oil arrangement granting century-long concessions over 17 Venezuelan fields, an unprecedented U.S. government stake in the operator's parent company, and preferential rights to purchase its oil, including a huge amount production at cost regarding of constantly changing oil prices.
The sheer imbalance of these terms evokes the immensely unequal concessions imposed on weaker countries during the colonial era.
That such arrangements are being imposed in the 21st century is extraordinary, and their implications have received nowhere near the scrutiny they deserve.
In Iran, the methods of coercion have in fact been even more aggressive, with military force, threats against the country's very existence, and pressure on its territorial integrity. Whatever one thinks of the Islamic Republic, the historical parallels are difficult to ignore.
For Iranians who know their country's history, the specter of foreign domination is not an abstraction. It is a painful national memory, and one that Trump's conduct has brought forcefully back into the present.
Civixplorer
@Civixplorer
🇮🇷 Iran/Persia's territorial losses since the 19th century.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Timour Azhari
@timourazhari
SCOOP - Qatar would construct two power plants in Lebanon and sign a 20-year liquefied natural gas supply deal under a proposal to revive the ailing Lebanese power sector, a document seen by Reuters showed.
The plan - which still requires approval - includes:
- New combined-cycle plants at Deir Ammar & Zahrani, 825 MW each
- QatarEnergy 20-year LNG supply agreement
- FSRU
- 800 MW solar, 440 MW wind
Lebanon has had many power plans that went nowhere due to political bickering and vested interests of politicians. Will this one be different? -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 هذا مقال مهم للكاتبة الأمريكية، كارين إليوت هاوس، المعروفة بمتابعتها الطويلة للشؤون السعودية وباتصالاتها مع مسؤولين داخل المملكة، وتقدم في المقال قراءة معلوماتية مهمة تستند إلى مقابلات مع مسؤولين سعوديين وغربيين وأميركيين؛
هذا أهم ما ورد فيه
🔷 تخشى الرياض سيناريوهين أميركيين؛ الأول استئناف ترامب الحرب ضد إيران بعد الانتخابات النصفية، وما قد يترتب عليه من ضربات إيرانية جديدة تستهدف المنشآت النفطية السعودية. ولا أحد في الرياض يعرف ما الذي سيقرره ترامب، في وقت تواجه فيه المملكة هجمات من الحوثيين والفصائل العراقية.
🔷 السيناريو الثاني أن يعلن ترامب الانتصار على إيران وينهي العمليات العسكرية، ثم يسمح لطهران باستعادة السيطرة على مضيق هرمز. وهذا قد يمنح إيران القدرة على خنق الصادرات النفطية السعودية عبر الخليج، بالتزامن مع قدرة الحوثيين على تهديد صادرات المملكة عبر البحر الأحمر وباب المندب.
🔷 عقد محمد بن سلمان اجتماعاً طارئاً في الرياض مع تركيا وباكستان، شريكتي السعودية في «ميثاق مكة»، قبل أيام من هجوم 10 أكتوبر على مطار الملك خالد، لبحث التعاون في الدفاع عن المملكة.
🔷 طلبت السعودية مباشرة من الصين وقف مساعدتها لإيران، لكن بكين نفت تقديم تلك المساعدة. وكانت وول ستريت جورنال قد كشفت أن الحوثيين يستخدمون مكونات موردة من الصين في تصنيع صواريخ متوسطة المدى متطورة.
🔷 عرضت إسرائيل مساعدة السعودية في مواجهة الحوثيين، لكن محمد بن سلمان رفض العرض. وبات الحديث عن إقامة علاقات دبلوماسية سعودية إسرائيلية مستبعداً في الظروف الحالية.
🔷 تقدم الولايات المتحدة للسعودية معلومات استخبارية ومشورة بشأن استخدامها، لكنها لا تبدي حتى الآن استعداداً للتدخل عسكرياً ضد الحوثيين. وأكد مسؤول غربي أن السعودية تواجه معضلة القوى المتوسطة؛ إذ تستطيع اعتراض الصواريخ الإيرانية والحوثية، لكن بمساعدة أميركية.
🔷 أبقت السعودية سفيرها في طهران منذ بدء الهجمات الأميركية الإسرائيلية على إيران في فبراير، ولا يزال محمد بن سلمان يأمل في التوصل إلى حل دبلوماسي، رغم استمرار الهجمات على المملكة.
🔷 لا تستطيع السعودية إبرام اتفاق مع إيران بمعزل عن الولايات المتحدة، بسبب الحصار الأميركي لصادرات النفط الإيرانية. ويستخدم ترامب الضغط الاقتصادي لمحاولة تغيير سلوك طهران، ما يجعل قدرة الرياض على التوصل إلى تسوية مرتبطة بالقرارات الأميركية.
🔷 يُرجح تقلص الوجود العسكري الأميركي في الخليج نتيجة الأضرار التي لحقت بالقواعد الأميركية في البحرين وقطر والسعودية، لكن الانسحاب الأميركي الكامل مستبعد، لأن السماح لإيران أو الصين بالهيمنة على أكبر وأغنى دولة عربية خليجية يتعارض مع المصالح الاستراتيجية الأميركية.
🔷 تهدد الهجمات الحوثية مصادر الدخل التقليدية والجديدة للمملكة؛ فالنفط يتعرض لضغوط على الإنتاج والتصدير، بينما تتضرر مشروعات التنويع الاقتصادي، مثل السياحة والتعدين ومراكز البيانات، نتيجة المخاوف الأمنية لدى المستثمرين والزوار. وتواجه السعودية خطر فقدان العائدات النفطية التي تحتاجها لتمويل تحولها الاقتصادي.
🔷 لا يزال محمد بن سلمان مسيطراً على المؤسسة العسكرية، رغم وجود خصوم له داخل الأسرة الحاكمة والمؤسسة الدينية. ويؤكد خبراء أميركيون يعملون مع الجيش السعودي أن الروايات المتعلقة بوجود استياء واسع داخل صفوف العسكريين مبالغ فيها، ما يجعل الحديث عن تراجع قدرته على إدارة المملكة سابقاً لأوانه.
🔷 كشف الأداء العسكري السعودي أوجه ضعف مهمة، رغم امتلاك المملكة ميزانية دفاع تفوق نظيرتيها في إيران وإسرائيل. ويثير العجز عن وقف الهجمات الحوثية تساؤلات بشأن قدرة الإنفاق العسكري الكبير على توفير حماية فعالة للمنشآت والأراضي السعودية.
🔷 قد تكون السعودية الخاسر الأكبر استراتيجياً من الحرب، تليها الولايات المتحدة، التي أظهرت المواجهة محدودية قدرتها على تحقيق الحسم ضد خصوم أقل قوة تقليدياً. كما استنزفت واشنطن مخزونها من الذخائر وأضعفت تحالفات بنتها خلال عقود، بينما تستمر التهديدات ضد حلفائها.
🔷 تُعد الصين المستفيد الاستراتيجي الأبرز من استنزاف الولايات المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط، بما يشمل ذخائرها العسكرية وانشغال حاملات طائراتها وارتفاع التكاليف السياسية للحرب. ويؤثر ذلك في قدرة واشنطن على تركيز مواردها العسكرية واهتمامها الاستراتيجي في منطقة المحيطين الهندي والهادئ، وخصوصاً تجاه تايوان.
🔷 وصف الأمير تركي الفيصل، رئيس الاستخبارات السعودية الأسبق والسفير السابق في واشنطن، الوضع الدولي الحالي بأنه الأكثر غموضاً خلال 81 عاماً من حياته، مؤكداً أن الأزمات السابقة كانت تترافق مع جهود لإيجاد حلول، بينما تؤدي محاولات التسوية اليوم أحياناً إلى نتائج أسوأ. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
🇾🇪 "The Houthis are here to stay. They're not going to be defeated, and they're going to remain in control of a large part of Yemen for the foreseeable future," former MI6 chief Sir John Sawers said Monday at the Global Security Forum in Doha.
Sawers, who led Britain's foreign intelligence service from 2009 to 2014, said Ansarallah has "exposed the limited options that Saudi Arabia has in terms of dealing with" the group.
"The Houthis have got their own national Yemen agenda," he said on a panel on the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, adding that Saudi efforts "to sustain an alternative government have not been successful over the last 10 years."This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Emmanuel Macron dans le Golfe: tournée d'adieu ou pour sécuriser nos approvisionnements énergétiques? Mon analyse au premier jour de la visite du chef de l'Etat à Koweït et aux Emirats, que je suis pour Le Figaro.
#macrongolfe
www.lefigaro.fr/international/emmanuel-macron-prend-le-la… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mahdi Kharratiyan
@MehdiKharratya
لاوروف بر امکان ترکیب طرحهای مسکو، تهران و پکن برای امنیت جمعی خلیج فارس تاکید کرد. شاید این اولین بار باشد که روسها با این تصریح از امکان تاسیس مذاکرات سه جانبه تهران، مسکو و پکن برای تعیین نظم آینده خاورمیانه سخن میگویند، اما پیش از این بارها تلویحا این مساله را بر زبان آورده بودند.
البته بعید نیست که اینبار هم این پالس قدرتمند مسکو مثل انبوه موارد دیگر نادیده گرفته شده و به طاق کوبیده شود. پکن و مسکو در طی چند ماه گذشته هم تمایل خود را برای میانجیگری با آمریکا و هم تمایل خود را برای ترسیم نظم جدید امنیتی خاورمیانه ابراز کرده اند و پاسخ تهران جز همان تعارفات و تعریفهای دیپلماتیک یکبار مصرف و به درد نخور چیز دیگری نبوده است، و دلیل آن روشن است: اساسا قرار نیست چیزی از مسیر پکن و مسکو به نتیجه برسد. باید تمام اقدامات و مناسبات به شکلی پیش برود که مسیر روسیه و چین به "بن بست کامل" برسد و تصویری سیاه و تیره از تعامل با این دو کشور برای مقامات ارشد نظامترسیم شود، چون باید زمان کشته شود تا با افزایش فشار درونی اقتصادی و تصاعد التهابات اجتماعی، زمینه برای فشار به رهبری جهت پذیرش مذاکرات جامع با آمریکا فراهم شود، مذاکرات جامعی که هسته ای، موشکی و منطقه ای را در بر خواهد داشت. اینکه ترامپ قابل اعتماد هست یا نه، یا لابی اسراییل اساسا اجازه انتفاع ایران را از توافق خواهد داد یا نه، ابدا مهم نیست. مهم این است که از منظر برخی حضرات تمام راهها به واشنگتن ختم میشود و صرف مذاکره با آمریکا دستاورد بزرگی است، ولو اینکه مثل ونزوئلا به تاراج منابع ملی کشور منجر شود؛ و باید هر مسیر دیگری به هر قیمتی در نطفه خفه شود.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post.
Mahdi Kharratiyan
@MehdiKharratya
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
The son of Heidi Levin told @kann_news: "My mother is in a hospital bed and cannot get up. They broke 4 vertebrae in her back. Her finger was almost amputated. She is mentally shaken by what happened".
www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02zrgQRGiT…
If you read Hebrew, you will unfortunately see many comments supportive of the terrorists.
Ahead of the elections, Netanyahu is aligning himself more closely to Jewish terrorism, and hence his statement about the incident falsely claimed some conspiracy was afoot & implied Heidi was not harmed but actually helped by the terrorists. x.com/IsraeliPM/status/2111106640099307910
Another statement by Netanyahu on the terrorist attack on European diplomats in the occupied West Bank adopted a similar line. x.com/IsraeliPM/status/2111497338808140140
These statements are incredibly useful. Indeed, Jewish terrorism in the West Bank is gov't-backed and state-financed (who gave them the ATVs, the guns, financed their reserve duty service? Who finances their protection by the IDF?). Netanyahu is so focused on gaining the votes of terrorists and their supporters he's exposing himself and this government.
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
Dozens of settlers spent about 10 minutes beating a 64-year-old journalist for covering their attacks on Palestinians harvesting olives in the occupied West Bank.
Al Arabiya English
@AlArabiya_Eng
Washington Post photojournalist Heidi Levine is injured as masked Israeli settlers attack Palestinians harvesting olives in the occupied West Bank village of Abu Falah, setting olive trees on fire and throwing stones, with gunshots heard in the area.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
Ending the war in Iran will “require painful concessions from both Washington and Riyadh,” write @RichardHaass and @CarolynKissane. “But continuing to fight this war would court economic disaster, and that would be far more painful.”
www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/stalemate-iran-not-sustainable -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ziad Daoud
@ZiadMDaoud
ثماني دول تحيط بمضيق هرمز
لكن حرب إيران لم تؤثر عليها بالدرجة نفسها
نفس الحرب: رفعت إيرادات عمان، وخنقت اقتصاد إيران، واستنزفت مدخرات البحرين، وأضعفت عملة العراق
لماذا؟
1/5 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Israel-Alma
@Israel_Alma_org
On October 15, Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah confirmed that the vehicle carrying hundreds of kilograms of explosives, seized on October 5 at the Dahr al-Baidar checkpoint, belonged to Hezbollah (see the attached video). According to Fadlallah, immediately after the vehicle was seized, Hezbollah contacted the security and judicial authorities, declared its ownership, and demanded the immediate release of the detainees and the return of the vehicle and its contents. Fadlallah claimed that the explosives were intended for use against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, rejected allegations of preparations for domestic assassinations, and warned the authorities of the consequences of measures taken against the organization. The demand for the shipment’s return illustrates Hezbollah’s position: it seeks to retain its ability to transport weapons within Lebanon and continue its independent military activities.
On October 17, Al-Akhbar reported that Lebanese President Aoun had asked Military Intelligence to expand the investigation, after which Prosecutor General Rami al-Hajj issued orders to arrest Hussein Abdullah (also known as Hajj Hussein al-Khalil), currently the head of Hezbollah’s Liaison and Coordination Unit, and his aide, Ali Ayoub, to determine their responsibility for the shipment.
However, Hezbollah MP Ibrahim al-Moussawi and judicial sources quoted by the Lebanese MTV channel denied the report concerning the arrest order. At this stage, we cannot verify the accuracy of the report that an arrest warrant was issued.
As of February 2026, Hussein Abdullah was considered a very close associate of Naim Qassem and served as a political adviser. Ali Ayoub also headed Hezbollah’s Security Committee, an unofficial security body functioning as a quasi-police force, which operates as part of the broader military and intelligence apparatus the organization has built over the years.
The test of Lebanese sovereignty lies in the authorities’ ability to pursue the investigation, uncover the chain of responsibility, and prevent similar transfers of weapons and military equipment throughout Lebanon. Meeting this test also requires tackling the widespread “revolving door” practice, whereby equipment and weapons confiscated from Hezbollah with much fanfare are returned to the organization through discreet coordination...This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Very saddened by the loss of Aziz Alghashian, a young and talented saudi researcher. I met him each time i went to Riyad. May rest in place my dear Aziz.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sami Hamdi سامي الهاشمي الحامدي
@SALHACHIMI
Saudi's Bin Salman and UAE's Bin Zayed are both lobbying Trump against each other's plans for Yemen.
Bin Salman wants support against the Houthis. Bin Zayed wants recognition for partition (which requires Houthis to keep the pressure on Saudi). -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
#إيران تتجه نحو مرحلة جديدة من إعادة بناء قدراتها العسكرية، مع تركيز خاص على القوة الصاروخية.
إن اختيار أخلاقي، بخلفيته الواسعة في مجال إنتاج الصواريخ العاملة بالوقود الصلب، يعكس بوضوح التوجه الاستراتيجي الذي تسير نحوه طهران، والقائم على تعزيز قدراتها الصاروخية وتوسيع نطاق إنتاجها.
وإذا ربطنا هذا التطور بدمج مقر خاتم الأنبياء مع هيئة الأركان العامة للقوات المسلحة تحت قيادة علي عبد اللهي، تتضح ملامح تحول أعمق في العقيدة العسكرية الإيرانية.
فإيران تستعد، على ما يبدو، لحروب مستقبلية أكثر تواتراً، انطلاقاً من إدراكها أن المواجهات العسكرية لم تعد أحداثاً استثنائية، بل أصبحت جزءاً من واقعها الاستراتيجي.
ولهذا، تركز طهران على تسريع إعادة بناء قدراتها العسكرية، وتعزيز أدوات الحرب غير المتكافئة، وتطوير قدراتها الإنتاجية المحلية، بما يضمن لها قدراً أكبر من الاستقلالية في إدارة المواجهات المقبلة.
الخلاصة أن إيران لا تسعى فقط إلى تعويض خسائر الحروب السابقة، بل إلى بناء قوة عسكرية تتلاءم مع واقع إقليمي تتوقع فيه تكرار المواجهات العسكرية.
ابتسام الكتبي
@ekitbi
من هو مهرداد أخلاقي وزير الدفاع الإيراني الجديد؟
مهرداد أخلاقي هو أحد أبرز المسؤولين المخضرمين في الصناعات العسكرية الإيرانية، ولا سيما برامج الصواريخ الباليستية والصناعات الجوية والفضائية. وينتمي إلى النخبة التكنوقراطية العسكرية التي تولت إدارة وتطوير القاعدة الصناعية الدفاعية الإيرانية على مدى عقود.
ويشير تعيين مهرداد أخلاقي إلى انتقال أولوية وزارة الدفاع الإيرانية من إدارة تداعيات الحرب إلى إعادة تكوين القدرة العسكرية التي تتيح لطهران خوض مواجهة أخرى إن وقعت.
والملفت في الأمر أن طهران اختارت لهذه المهمة رجل صناعة عسكرية وصواريخ، وليس قائداً ميدانياً تقليدياً. وهذا يوحي بأن التحدي الذي تواجهه المؤسسة العسكرية الإيرانية لا يتعلق فقط بامتلاك الأسلحة،ولكن بقدرتها على إنتاجها وتعويض استهلاكها بصورة مستدامة تحت العقوبات والضربات العسكرية. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Giorgio Cafiero
@GiorgioCafiero
“The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 deeply radicalized the Houthi movement, like it did many other Arabs…It was a turning point largely unrecognized outside Yemen, another unanticipated consequence of George Bush’s Iraq adventures.” www.brookings.edu/articles/who-are-the-houthis-and-why-ar… @BrookingsInst
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Months ago I wrote about a modernization process Iran was reportedly carrying out on its mini-subs, which would give them significantly greater endurance.
It involved upgrades ranging from batteries and navigation systems to engines. But there’s a catch: even with more range and speed, these submarines still wouldn’t be able to serve as a logistics delivery route to the Houthis, except for small components and on a limited scale.
However, there are Iranian autonomous submarines that could already have been adapted for this kind of delivery. That, yes, would make a lot of sense.
Al Arabiya English
@AlArabiya_Eng
🔴 BREAKING: Iran has resorted to using mini-submarines to transport weapons to the Houthis, The Wall Street Journal reports citing European officials.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
מה אפשר להבין מהחלק האיראני בציוץ של טראמפ?
יש כאן שתי אפשרויות שצריך לבחון:
א. טראמפ מעוניין לתקוף שוב באיראן, אבל אינו רוצה לעשות זאת לבדו. לכן הוא מבקש להבטיח שישראל תצטרף לארצות הברית במערכה נוספת.
ב. נתניהו מעוניין במערכה נוספת מול איראן, ובמקביל זקוק לתמיכתו הפוליטית של טראמפ לקראת הבחירות הגורליות מבחינתו.
אם מחברים את שתי האפשרויות הללו, עולה השאלה האם נתניהו הבטיח לטראמפ שישראל תצטרף למתקפה אמריקאית נוספת נגד איראן בתמורה לתמיכתו הפוליטית.
אם אכן ניתנה התחייבות כזאת, הרי שכל החלטה עתידית על יציאה למערכה נוספת מול איראן תחייב בחינה לא רק של השיקולים הביטחוניים, אלא גם של ההתחייבויות הפוליטיות האפשריות שנתניהו נתן לטראמפ.
אבל דווקא משום שהמחיר של מערכה נוספת מול איראן עלול להיות כבד, השאלה הזאת מחייבת בירור. אסור שהחלטה על מלחמה נוספת עם איראן תתקבל על בסיס שיקולים פוליטים במקום על בסיס צורך ביטחוני אמיתי.
כאמור, מדובר בניתוח נסיבתי של הציוץ של טראמפ, ולא במידע מבוסס על מה שהתרחש מאחורי הקלעים. ועדיין, קשה להתעלם מהאפשרות שזה בדיוק מה שקרה: נתניהו הבטיח לטראמפ שישראל תצטרף למערכה נוספת מול איראן, ובתמורה ביקש להבטיח את תמיכתו הפוליטית לקראת הבחירות.
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🚨🚨טראמפ מביע תמיכה בנתניהו לקראת הבחירות בהודעה ב-Truth Social:
לאנשי ישראל הדגולים: ביבי נתניהו היה ראש ממשלה לוחם דגול, ושותף גדול אף יותר לשלום במאבק נגד הרפובליקה האסלאמית של איראן, עם הסיסמה שלה בת 51 השנים: „מוות לישראל, מוות לאמריקה! נשמיד את השטן הקטן ואת השטן הגדול”. איזו מדינה יכולה לשרוד כאשר מאפשרים להשמיע דברים כאלה, משום שבסופו של דבר, הם תמיד מתגשמים? זו הייתה רק שאלה של זמן עד שאיראן הייתה מוציאה לפועל את הביטוי המאיים הזה, אך הם הושמדו באופן שיטתי, הן מבחינה צבאית והן מבחינה כלכלית, ואם לא ישנו את דרכיהם במהירות, נשלים בקרוב את המלאכה.
אם לישראל יהיה מנהיג לא נכון, כלומר כל אדם שאינו ביבי, אמריקה תצטרך לבצע את העבודה הזאת בעצמה, ואני אינני נוטה לעשות זאת. ביבי נתניהו היה חזק, אמיץ ומבריק לנוכח התנגדות עצומה, לרבות התנגדות שהגיעה אפילו מתוך ישראל עצמה. למרות כל זאת, הוא החזיק מעמד, ולמעשה אף שגשג!
צפיתי בביבי בתקופות הקשות ביותר. גברים או נשים רגילים במצבים כאלה היו קורסים תחת הלחץ - אבל ביבי לא קרס. למעשה, הוא התחזק עוד יותר, והוא שומר על אותה עוצמה גם היום.
זהו סוג השותף שארצות הברית של אמריקה דורשת מישראל, מדינה שהיא עשתה למענה כל כך הרבה.
אנא ראו במכתב זה הבעת תמיכה מלאה ומוחלטת שלי בביבי נתניהו לקראת התמודדותו הקרובה בבחירות לכהונה נוספת כראש ממשלת ישראל.
ביבי נתניהו לעולם לא יאכזב אתכם!
תודה על תשומת לבכם לעניין זה. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 تقرير لشركة الاستخبارات الأميركية «ستراتفور» يستعرض أربعة سيناريوهات أمام السعودية لمواجهة الحوثيين، ويرجح تكثيف الضربات الجوية وإسناد القتال البري إلى القوات اليمنية، محذراً من أن محاولة استعادة صنعاء قد تشعل حرباً إقليمية جديدة مع إيران.
🔷 تعتبر ستراتفور هجوم الحوثيين على مطار الملك خالد بالرياض نقطة تحول، بوصفه الهجوم الأكثر دموية في دولة خليجية منذ اندلاع الحرب مع إيران في 28 فبراير. وردت السعودية بتكثيف غاراتها، بما فيها استهداف منشأة نفطية قرب صنعاء، مع طلب دعم أميركي لعملية أوسع.
🔷 استغل الحوثيون تراجع مخزونات الدفاع الجوي السعودية واتساع أراضي المملكة لضرب مطارات ومنشآت طاقة بأسلحة أقل تطوراً من الإيرانية. وأكملوا تطويق تعز في 12 أكتوبر وإغلاق طريقها إلى عدن رغم الغطاء الجوي السعودي، ما يهدد بخسارة المدينة إذا لم تتغير العمليات البرية.
🔷 تستبعد ستراتفور اجتياحاً سعودياً واسعاً استناداً إلى تجربة 2015، حين حشدت المملكة نحو 150 ألف عسكري، لكنها أدخلت بضعة آلاف فقط إلى اليمن. وتشير إلى أن الجيش السعودي يؤدي وظيفة سياسية واجتماعية ايضا داخل النظام، من خلال توفير الوظائف وتعزيز ارتباط قبائل ومناطق رئيسية بالدولة. وترى أن هذه الوظيفة أسهمت تاريخياً في تفاوت مستويات الكفاءة بين الوحدات، وعززت تحفظ القيادة السعودية على العمليات التي قد تتسبب بخسائر بشرية مرتفعة وتداعيات اجتماعية داخلية.
🔷 ركزت إصلاحات الجيش السعودي منذ صعود الأمير محمد بن سلمان بدرجة أكبر على تنويع مصادر التسليح وتقليل الاعتماد على المورد الأميركي، دون إحداث تحول موازٍ في التكتيكات والعقيدة القتالية لمواجهة حرب العصابات. ولذلك التطور الكبير في التسليح لا يكفي لضمان النجاح في حملة برية جديدة داخل اليمن.
🔷 انتهت الحملة السابقة بتقليص الانتشار السعودي عام 2019 وهدنة غير رسمية عام 2022، بعد انتقادات لسقوط المدنيين والقيود الإنسانية وتصويت الكونغرس لتقييد الدعم. لكن أي حملة جديدة قد تواجه اعتراضات دولية أقل بسبب استهداف الحوثيين المباشر للمنشآت المدنية والطاقة السعودية.
السيناريو الأول والأكثر ترجيحاً: تكثيف الغارات وإسناد الحرب البرية للقوات اليمنية
🔷 تتوقع ستراتفور زيادة الضربات على البنية التحتية الحوثية، بما فيها منشآت الطاقة والمرافق المدنية، للحصول على ردع مقابل استهداف المدن السعودية، مع طلب منظومات دفاع جوي واستخبارات ودعم لوجستي إضافي. وستعتمد الرياض على القوات اليمنية برياً، بمشاركة محدودة للقوات الخاصة والمستشارين والمتعاقدين العسكريين.
🔷 يقلص هذا الخيار الخسائر السعودية، لكنه قد يفشل في ردع الحوثيين بسبب خبرتهم في مواجهة الغارات وبنيتهم العسكرية والصناعية اللامركزية، بينما يهدد ضعف التنسيق بين القوات اليمنية بخسائر إضافية، خصوصاً في تعز. وستعتمد الرياض على باكستان وتركيا ضمن «ميثاق مكة»، إلى جانب الولايات المتحدة وأوروبا، لتعزيز الدفاع والاستخبارات دون افتراض مشاركتهم في القتال.
السيناريو الثاني: تدخل بري محدود لاستعادة مواقع استراتيجية (أقل ترجيحاً)
🔷 قد يحدث إذا تواصلت الهجمات على المدن والطاقة، أو خسرت الحكومة اليمنية أراضي إضافية، أو تدخلت واشنطن عسكرياً. وقد يستهدف إبعاد الحوثيين عن الحدود والتقدم نحو الحديدة أو دعم جبهتي مأرب وتعز، دون محاولة احتلال صنعاء.
🔷 ترجح ستراتفور فاعلية القوات السعودية في سهل تهامة الساحلي أكثر من المرتفعات الجبلية، مع احتمال الاستعانة بشركات عسكرية خاصة والإمارات ومصر. وقد تنخرط أبوظبي مقابل تنازلات سعودية لحلفائها الانفصاليين الجنوبيين.
🔷 الخطر أن التقدم نحو الحديدة قد يستدعي تدخلاً إيرانياً لمنع سقوط الميناء الاستراتيجي، عبر هجمات على السعودية وأهداف أميركية. وكانت معركة الحديدة قد توقفت عام 2018 باتفاق ستوكهولم، لكن فرص تدخل دبلوماسي مماثل تبدو أضعف حالياً.
السيناريو الثالث: حملة متعددة الأطراف لاستعادة صنعاء (أقل ترجيحاً من الثاني)
🔷 قد تلجأ الرياض إليه إذا استأنفت واشنطن عمليات واسعة، أو تصاعدت الخسائر السعودية، أو تجددت الحرب الأميركية–الإيرانية الشاملة. وسيتطلب دعماً أميركياً مباشراً في الاستخبارات والإمداد والتزود بالوقود جواً، وغطاء سياسياً، مع محاولة إشراك الإمارات وباكستان وتركيا وربما مصر.
🔷 تطرح ستراتفور احتمال تولي قوات باكستانية أو تركية حماية منشآت سعودية، بما يسمح باستخدام وحدات سعودية أكثر تدريباً في اليمن، وربما قوات الحرس الوطني المكلفة تقليدياً بحماية مؤسسات الحكم.
🔷 قد تدفع الحملة الحوثيين إلى الانسحاب للمرتفعات والعودة إلى حرب العصابات، مع احتمال تبدل ولاءات قبائل وقوى متحالفة معهم. لكن السيطرة على صنعاء لن تنهي بالضرورة التمرد. والخطر الأكبر تدخل إيران بضربات واسعة على السعودية والقواعد والأهداف الأميركية لمنع هزيمة أبرز حلفائها الإقليميين، وإعادة الحرب إلى مستويات تصعيد الربيع الماضي.
السيناريو الرابع: تسوية تفاوضية وتنازلات للحوثيين
🔷 قد تختاره الرياض إذا تعذر الحصول على دعم عسكري كافٍ أو أصبحت تكاليف الحرب والهجمات غير محتملة. وقد يشمل قبول المكاسب الحوثية الأخيرة، والضغط على الحكومة اليمنية لوقف هجومها، وإعادة فتح المجال الجوي، وتقديم تمويل للمؤسسات الخاضعة للحوثيين. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
RTL France
@RTLFrance
🦆 Le syndrome du canard boiteux ➡️ l.rtl.fr/Ypj
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La timidité de la réaction de Jean-Noël Barrot, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, à l'attaque de colons israéliens contre un maire français à Taybeh en Cisjordanie occupée est incompréhensible, alors que notre consul était sur place avec son collègue belge. Il s'est contenté d'appeler les autorités israéliennes à "arrêter impérativement les responsables de ces actes révoltants" et à les "traduire en justice".
La Belgique a condamné "avec la plus grande fermeté" cette attaque "perpétrée par des colons masqués", précisant qu'un véhicule belge avait été "endommagé".
Même le ministre israélien des Affaires étrangères Gideon Saar a "condamné fermement ces graves actes de violence".
#cisjordanie
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Un silence gêné "no comment" accompagne l'absence de réaction française à la hauteur de l'attaque de Taybeh chez les diplomates français que j'ai joints ce matin.
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Finalement, le Quai d'Orsay réagit plus fermement.
"La France condamne fermement l'agression par des colons violents du maire d'Aulnoye-Aymeries, survenue dans le village palestinien de Taybeh.
Les représentants de plusieurs missions diplomatiques, dont le Consul général de France à Jérusalem et ses homologues belge et polonais, ont également été ciblés et pris à partie lors de cette attaque. La France leur exprime son soutien et sa solidarité et réaffirme son attachement indéfectible à leur mission.
La France appelle les autorités israéliennes à arrêter les auteurs de cette agression gravissime et à les traduire en justice. Au-delà, les autorités israéliennes doivent prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour faire cesser ces actes de terreur et pour garantir la sécurité des populations civiles et des missions diplomatiques, comme elles en ont l'obligation en vertu du droit international.
La France réitère sa condamnation de la politique de colonisation. La colonisation est contraire au droit international. Elle porte une atteinte grave aux droits des Palestiniens, menace la stabilité de la Cisjordanie et compromet la solution à deux Etats".
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Finalement, le Quai d'Orsay réagit. "La France condamne fermement l'agression par des colons violents du maire d'Aulnoye-Aymeries, survenue dans le village palestinien de Taybeh. Les représentants de plusieurs missions diplomatiques, dont le Consul général de France à Jérusalem et ses homologues belge et polonais, ont également été ciblés et pris à partie lors de cette attaque. La France leur exprime son soutien et sa solidarité et réaffirme son attachement indéfectible à leur mission.
La France appelle les autorités israéliennes à arrêter les auteurs de cette agression gravissime et à les traduire en justice. Au-delà, les autorités israéliennes doivent prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour faire cesser ces actes de terreur et pour garantir la sécurité des populations civiles et des missions diplomatiques, comme elles en ont l'obligation en vertu du droit international.
La France réitère sa condamnation de la politique de colonisation. La colonisation est contraire au droit international. Elle porte une atteinte grave aux droits des Palestiniens, menace la stabilité de la Cisjordanie et compromet la solution à deux Etats". -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gadi Eisenkot - גדי איזנקוט
@gadi_eisenkot
מה שקורה ביו״ש זה טרור יהודי בחסות ממשלת ישראל.
פעם נוספת, בתוך יממה אחת בלבד, חוליות של פורעי חוק אלימים תוקפות אזרחים זרים - והפעם דיפלומטים ובעלי תפקידים רשמיים.
מול עינינו מתרחש פיגוע מדיני וביטחוני חסר תקדים. קומץ עבריינים שורף את מעט הלגיטימציה שנותרה למדינת ישראל, מסכן את כוחות הביטחון ופוגע בהתיישבות ביהודה ושומרון ובביטחון הלאומי.
אף אחד בהנהגה לא יוכל לטעון שלא העירו אותו בזמן ושלא התריעו בפניו. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Tom Bike is reporting what I said days ago: there are some kind of talks between the Saudis and the Houthis.
The war keeps happening on the ground, but the infrastructure is being preserved. This happened right after Iran offered to mediate.
Iran is mediating the escalation it itself created and is joining forces to pressure Trump. There is no way this could have happened without the knowledge of the Houthis or Iran.
But in a way, this could benefit Trump in the elections, so either it is already part of an arrangement involving Trump, or the market is right in its skepticism.
Tom Bike
@tom_bike
6 VLCCs and one AFRAMAX spotted YESTERDAY loading crude in Saudi Arabia 🇸🇦 Red Sea Yanbu Teminals👇
That´s 12.7 million barrels! Indicates East-West pipeline is back to full capacity despite Houthi🏴☠️attacks.
Tip: Measure them & know your terminals; some load oil products. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sami Hamdi سامي الهاشمي الحامدي
@SALHACHIMI
“Saudi Crown Prince finds himself in a potentially existential crisis. He has an economic crisis, Vision2030 is failing, he is struggling to rally intl support and public opinion, and Houthis have (so far) convinced Trump not to intervene despite billions Bin Salman spent on him”
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇮🇷Iran-backed militias in the region have been sending money back to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to relieve the economic pressure it's under after nine months of war, U.S. CENTCOM Commander Adm. Brad Cooper said Friday. My report on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/10/16/iran-backed-militias-sending-mon… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Another chapter in the deal being worked out behind the scenes, involving the Saudis, Iranians, Yemenis, and of course Trump as well.
The radical blockade is being kept for domestic consumption while there appears to be an arrangement, as I anticipated days ago.
This does not mean the end of the confrontations, and the main issue remains the tolls and who will pay for Iran’s reconstruction, along with the concessions that seem not to have moved.
substack.com/@global21 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aaron David Miller
@aarondmiller2
The Iran war has put the entire conceit of the "Dubai model" at risk. Investment, data centers; the Gulf as a financial entrepot, culture and sport depends on security and stability. That can no longer be taken for granted, let alone guaranteed. www.nytimes.com/2026/10/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 وافقت الإمارات على العودة إلى الانخراط في الحرب اليمنية، عبر استئناف دفع الأموال لبعض القوات الحكومية التي تقاتل الحوثيين في الجنوب، مقابل موافقة السعودية على توفير غطاء جوي لهذه القوات. ونقلت «الغارديان» الاتفاق عن مصادر يمنية.
🔷 لكن المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي لم يوافق حتى الآن على مشاركة قواته في القتال خارج حدود دولة الجنوب السابقة. ويشترط موافقة سعودية صريحة على إجراء استفتاء لتقرير المصير بما قد يدفع المجلس إلى رفع هذا القيد، ويسمح بتوسيع مشاركته العسكرية ضد الحوثيين. لكن التقرير لا يتحدث عن اتفاق سعودي فعلي على الاستفتاء.
🔷 يمثل التفاهم مع الإمارات أول مؤشر عملي، على بدء تجاوز الخلاف العميق بين الرياض وأبوظبي بشأن مستقبل اليمن. وتربط المصادر التقارب بالقلق المتزايد لدى قيادات الدولتين من المكاسب الميدانية الحوثية واتساع نطاق الضربات على السعودية. ولا يعني الاتفاق، وفق المعلومات المتاحة، تسوية جميع الخلافات السياسية المتعلقة بالجنوب اليمني.
🔷 من التفاصيل العسكرية المهمة أن الدعم الإماراتي سيعيد التمويل إلى قوات جنوبية، أبرزها ألوية العمالقة، التي سبق أن دربتها ومولتها أبوظبي وتعتبرها الصحيفة من أكثر تشكيلات التحالف المناهض للحوثيين فاعلية. وكانت الإمارات قد انسحبت من العمليات داخل اليمن في يناير 2026، وأوقفت التمويل الذي كانت تقدمه لهذه القوات.
🔷 يجرى استئناف التعاون السعودي–الإماراتي بالتزامن مع مطالبة الانفصاليين الجنوبيين بإجراء استفتاء بشأن استقلال جنوب اليمن، بما يعيد حدود الدولتين اللتين كانتا قائمتين بين عامَي 1967 و1990. ولم تعلن السعودية أو الإمارات رداً على هذا المطلب خلال الأسبوع الجاري.
🔷 ما زال الاتصال المباشر مقطوعاً بين المسؤولين السعوديين ورئيس المجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي عيدروس الزبيدي، الموجود في أبوظبي منذ يناير الماضي. وتوضح الصحيفة أن الزبيدي غادر اليمن عقب فشل محاولة المجلس الانتقالي السيطرة على الجنوب والإعلان عن إجراء استفتاء على الانفصال خلال عامين. وردت السعودية آنذاك بقصف شحنات أسلحة إماراتية كانت متجهة إلى قوات المجلس الانتقالي.
🔷 تشير «الغارديان» إلى أن الهجوم المضاد الذي أعلنته الحكومة اليمنية المعترف بها دولياً الأسبوع الماضي بهدف استعادة مناطق الحوثيين وصولاً إلى صنعاء لم يحقق حتى الآن سوى نجاحات محدودة. وتحدد الصحيفة مناطق المكاسب حول مجزر قرب مأرب ومضيق باب المندب، بينما لا يزال الحوثيون يحتفظون بمواقع مهمة ويواصلون التقدم على جبهات أخرى.
🔷 تؤكد الصحيفة أن المسؤولين الإماراتيين يشعرون بقلق كبير من اتجاه الحرب، خصوصاً مع استمرار سعي الحوثيين للسيطرة على تعز ومأرب رغم الخسائر التي تكبدوها. وتصف المدينتين بأنهما من آخر المراكز الرئيسية الواقعة خارج حدود دولة الجنوب السابقة التي لم تخضع لسيطرة الجماعة. وتظل السيطرة عليهما هدفاً حوثياً، وليست نتيجة عسكرية تحققت. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
France Inter
@franceinter
La Russie n’est pas le seul pays à mener des opérations d’ingérence en France, rappelle David Colon, historien et enseignant-chercheur à Sciences Po. VIGINUM, le service de l’État chargé de détecter les ingérences numériques étrangères, a aussi identifié une société israélienne, des acteurs vietnamiens et l’Iran. Et il ajoute : "Je tiens à dire ici que les États-Unis sont un acteur de la menace informationnelle aujourd’hui." Il était dans le 6/9 du samedi 17 octobre.
➡️l.franceinter.fr/N69This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Cradle
@TheCradleMedia
Israeli national known as 'The Banker' detained in Colombia over $16.7 million bank fraud
——
Colombian authorities detained 61-year-old Mikhael Mezrahi, an Israeli national known as "The Banker," at Bogotá's El Dorado International Airport on Thursday after confirming an Interpol Red Notice issued at the request of the United Arab Emirates.
Emirati authorities are seeking him to serve a criminal sentence linked to fraud, money laundering and document forgery in a case involving approximately $16.7 million allegedly defrauded from the Bank of Khartoum.
According to Colombian authorities, the alleged scheme involved a network that posed as investors and representatives of legitimate commercial projects, using forged bank guarantees, contracts and financial documents to deceive the bank.
Investigators allege that funds were transferred to companies linked to Mezrahi, including WYB AG General Trading, and that false transfer orders were used to delay scrutiny while money was moved abroad.
He was placed at the disposal of Colombia's attorney general's office as authorities consider the legal process for his possible extradition to the UAE. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
@academic_la
Israel's ambassadors and former senior diplomats are furious about the attack on European diplomats near Taybeh. Not about whether it happened, but from a PR standpoint, Netanyahu's office has even doubted that it happened despite footage. A story in Ynet included several anonymous quotes by Israeli diplomats showing concern about the repercussions of this PR strategy:
1) Senior Israeli ambassadors around the world said the images circulating in the international media amount to "a genuine strategic and public-diplomacy terror attack." They also said the images make it harder for them to present Israel's positions abroad.
2) The ambassadors warned that the attack hurts the settlement enterprise it claims to serve. European states already sanction settlement products, and more EU members are planning similar steps. One said "Whoever thinks he is protecting the settlements this way is in practice endangering their future and the livelihoods of their residents."
3) They said one violent incident can undo years of relationship-building. "The damage doesn't end with a negative headline. It affects public discourse and the atmosphere in which policy and economic decisions concerning Israel are made." They also warned that pressure on settlement goods could scare off companies and business partners and widen boycott calls.
4) A former senior official blamed the government directly. "Sow the wind, reap the whirlwind. These are the rotten fruits of the Netanyahu-Smotrich-Ben Gvir government. We will all pay a price for this." He said the government "lets these people run wild because it doesn't want to fight with them before the elections and lose their votes." He called the government's silence "irresponsibility and governmental abandonment." He added: "In a normal world all these rioters would be arrested, and the central ones would be placed in administrative detention and removed from the area."
The powerless class of old-school hasbara diplomats knows they cannot spin their way out of this. The whole world sees not only that the settlers are Jewish supremacist terrorists, but also that their government works hand-in-hand with them. Israel now takes pride in its crimes, and diplomats are useless figureheads in this situation. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Giorgio Cafiero
@GiorgioCafiero
“No accurate death toll in the war since August is available, but more than 200,000 people have been displaced, according to the UN, which is placing increasing pressure on Aden-based humanitarian groups.” www.theguardian.com/world/2026/oct/17/uae-yemen-conflict-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
ACLED
@ACLEDINFO
Yemen’s government offensive to retake the country has delivered mixed results this week. IRG forces have failed to advance further on the West Coast, the Houthis have encircled Taiz, & government forces continue to make some gains in Marib. Explore: acleddata.com/all-analysis-middle-east
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
My first @CrisisGroup commentary:
How War is Reshaping #iran’s Axis of Resistance
Three years of hostilities have transformed Tehran’s network of allies in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic is now relying more heavily on itself, while adapting its relationships with partners whose diminished military utility has not necessarily reduced its commitment to their protection.
www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/middle-east-north-africa/iran/how… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Negar Mortazavi
@NegarMortazavi
We discuss the relationship between Iran and Ansar Allah, where their strategic interests converge and differ, and why alignment does not mean taking orders from Tehran.
Aljazeera Debate Hour نقاش الساعةThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Al-Sakani | علي السكني
@Alsakaniali
A senior Iranian official said the Houthi attacks [on Saudi Arabia] were part of a broader strategy by #iran and its allies to reshape the regional balance of power by targeting energy infrastructure and key shipping routes. He said Riyadh could not rely on US protection and must instead pursue negotiations, adding that Houthi attacks would continue unless Saudi restrictions were lifted.
-Reuters -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Fatima Alasrar
@YemeniFatima
The Houthis did not accept de-escalation in July because the escalation was running on Tehran's clock. If they wanted their "airport blockade to be lifted", this would have been a perfect opportunity to discuss it and get a win. They did not.
But at this stage, the Houthis have no incentive to stop, and Tehran's plausible deniability serves it well here should it reach a deal with the Trump administration on Hormuz because it just got another chokepoint as a bonus.
Link to the article in the comments:
"Saudis had reached out and called for a meeting in Oman with the Houthis in July “to resolve outstanding differences and bring an end to this escalation,” but he said the rebels refused to participate." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Enigma
@enigma1931
(Palestine 🇵🇸) : Heidi Levine, journaliste américaine 🇺🇲 travaillant pour le @washingtonpost a été attaquée, frappée par des colons israeliens 🇮🇱 en Cisjordanie. Elle a été hospitalisée.
Cette agression ne fait que confirmer le reportage de @TF1Info.
@alancelin
@Malbrunot
Andrey X
@the_andrey_x
Washington Post journalist Heidi Levine is hospitalised, after being brutally attacked by Israeli settlers this morning
Andrey X
@the_andrey_x
🚨 NOW: Settler terror attack on Abu Falah in the West Bank.
American journalist Heidi Levine was beaten by the settlers, many Palestinian were injured, one shot by the IDF.
The army allowed the settler attack, and tear gassed and assaulted the Palestinians.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
MORE: The Houthis have continued to attack a wide range of targets across Saudi Arabia to impose economic and political costs on the kingdom and compel Saudi Arabia to capitulate. Saudi media and the Saudi Joint Forces Command (JFC) reported that Saudi air defenses intercepted numerous missiles and drones in the vicinity of several major cities, including al Kharj, Khamis Mushait, Riyadh, and Medina, on October 14 and 15. The Houthis denied that they attacked Medina on October 15 in response to the JFC’s report, although the group previously attacked a power station in Medina on September 29.
The geographic scope of these targets indicates that the Houthis continue to attack sites throughout western, southern, central, and eastern Saudi Arabia as part of their expanded strike campaign. The Houthis likely calculate that they can degrade Saudi Arabia’s will to continue striking the Houthis and supporting the Yemeni government by attacking oil facilities, airports, and other civilian infrastructure. The JFC announced on October 15 that the Houthis have attacked King Khalid International Airport 20 times since October 1 as part of this expanded strike campaign, for example.
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: The Houthis attacked Yemeni government-controlled cities with missiles and drones, likely to weaken the Yemeni government’s legitimacy and possibly to disrupt government counteroffensives. The Houthis’ strikes in Aden likely sought to generate an informational effect and undermine Yemen’s already weak, fractured government.
Other Key Takeaways:
The Houthis have demonstrated limited capabilities to target Saudi fighter aircraft in Yemeni airspace, but these capabilities are currently insufficient to significantly disrupt the ongoing Saudi air campaign. Houthi forces fired a surface-to-air missile (SAM) that struck a Saudi-operated fighter jet, but the SAM does not appear to have destroyed the aircraft.
The Houthis have continued their attempts to capture Taiz City by securing positions on advantageous terrain and roadways on the city’s western outskirts.
The Iraqi Parliament voted on October 15 to approve some Iranian-backed Iraqi militia actors to fill three vacant ministerial roles and a deputy prime minister position during its session to complete Iraq’s government formation. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hassan I. Hassan
@hxhassan
If Taiz Falls, Yemen May Never Be the Same
One of Yemen’s finest journalists @mohammedalqadhi explains how this critical southwestern governorate matters to Yemen’s broader conflict and the region’s security, for @newlinesmag. newlinesmag.com/argument/if-taiz-falls-yemen-may-never-be… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Javier Blas
@JavierBlas
In the Middle East, we're seeing the vast difference between having lots of (very expensive) military kit, and actually having military power. www.nytimes.com/2026/10/15/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: The Houthis attacked Yemeni government-controlled cities with missiles and drones, likely to weaken the Yemeni government’s legitimacy and possibly to disrupt government counteroffensives. The Houthis’ strikes in Aden likely sought to generate an informational effect and undermine Yemen’s already weak, fractured government.
Other Key Takeaways:
The Houthis have demonstrated limited capabilities to target Saudi fighter aircraft in Yemeni airspace, but these capabilities are currently insufficient to significantly disrupt the ongoing Saudi air campaign. Houthi forces fired a surface-to-air missile (SAM) that struck a Saudi-operated fighter jet, but the SAM does not appear to have destroyed the aircraft.
The Houthis have continued their attempts to capture Taiz City by securing positions on advantageous terrain and roadways on the city’s western outskirts.
The Iraqi Parliament voted on October 15 to approve some Iranian-backed Iraqi militia actors to fill three vacant ministerial roles and a deputy prime minister position during its session to complete Iraq’s government formation. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 نشرت «بلومبيرغ»، اليوم تقييم عسكري ودفاعي جديد حول المواجهة بين السعودية والحوثيين. وهذا التقرير الثالث بعد ما نشرته «فايننشال تايمز» و«نيويورك تايمز».
يقدم التقرير تفاصيل نوعية عن اتجاه عمل منظومات باتريوت، واعتماد المقاتلات السعودية على المعلومات الأميركية لتحديد الأهداف، وتطور الصناعة الصاروخية الحوثية ومداها، إلى جانب مفهوم «لعنة الحماية الأميركية» وتأثيره في بناء القدرات العسكرية السعودية.
وهذا أبرز ما ورد في التقرير:
🔷 تتراوح مخصصات الدفاع السعودية خلال العام الحالي بين 64 و96 مليار دولار، وفق بيانات «بلومبيرغ إيكونوميكس»، ويتجاوز الحد الأعلى لهذا التقدير ضعف الإنفاق الإسرائيلي، ثاني أكبر إنفاق عسكري في الشرق الأوسط. وتملك المملكة بطاريات باتريوت مزودة بأحدث صواريخ الاعتراض من طراز «باك-3»، ومئات المقاتلات الأميركية من طراز إف-15 المعدلة وفق متطلبات القوات الجوية السعودية. كما أنها الدولة الخليجية الوحيدة التي تمتلك طائرات للتزود بالوقود جواً، ومع ذلك تواجه هجمات تسببت في مقتل 18 شخصاً على الأقل وإغلاق مطار الرياض الدولي الرئيسي.
🔷 تركز بيكا واسر، المسؤولة عن أبحاث الدفاع في «بلومبيرغ إيكونوميكس»، على مشكلة تقنية تتعلق بمنظومات باتريوت، وهي أن بطارياتها تعمل ضمن اتجاهات تغطية محددة، ولا توفر حماية دائرية بزاوية 360 درجة. ولذلك، فإن توجيه الرادارات ومنصات الإطلاق لاعتراض التهديدات الإيرانية قد يجعل التعامل السريع مع الصواريخ الحوثية القادمة من اتجاه مختلف أكثر صعوبة. ويضاف إلى ذلك اتساع مساحة السعودية إلى أكثر من 2.1 مليون كيلومتر مربع، وانتشار المدن والمطارات والقواعد العسكرية والمنشآت النفطية في أنحاء البلاد، ما يعقد توفير دفاع متكامل عنها.
🔷 تشير واسر إلى أن القدرات الجوية والصاروخية السعودية تحسنت خلال برامج التحديث، وأن الطيارين اكتسبوا خبرة عملية مهمة من الحرب الطويلة في اليمن، لكن الطائرات السعودية لا تزال تعتمد بدرجة كبيرة على الولايات المتحدة في الحصول على بيانات تحديد الأهداف. وترى أن الإصلاحات التي بدأها محمد بن سلمان، إلى جانب الخبرة القتالية، حسّنت الوضع، لكن التحديث يسير ببطء ويتركز في جيوب محدودة من الأداء المتقدم، بدلاً من تطوير المهارات والجاهزية على مستوى القوات المسلحة بأكملها.
🔷 يتناول ديفيد روبرتس، الباحث في كلية كينغز لندن، ما يسميه «لعنة الحماية»، موضحاً أن التدخل العسكري الأميركي في المنطقة بعد غزو العراق للكويت عام 1990 دفع دولاً شرق أوسطية إلى الاعتماد على القوة الأميركية بدلاً من تطوير جميع قدراتها العسكرية بصورة مستقلة. ولم تكن السعودية استثناءً من ذلك. ويشير إلى أن إخفاقات الولايات المتحدة في أفغانستان، وهجمات الحوثيين على منشآت بقيق النفطية عام 2019، أضعفت الاعتقاد بأن واشنطن ستكون قادرة دائماً على اكتشاف التهديدات وتوفير الحماية.
🔷 رغم امتلاك الرياض أكثر من 200 مقاتلة إف-15، فإنها لم تتمكن من استخدامها بصورة حاسمة لإنهاء تهديد الحوثيين خلال أكثر من عقد من القصف الجوي. ويؤكد وولف كريستيان بايس، الباحث في المعهد الدولي للدراسات الاستراتيجية، أن المعدات والتمويل لا يكفيان لتحقيق الانتصارات العسكرية، وأن التدريب والدافعية والقيادة عوامل أساسية. ويربط التقرير ذلك بصعوبة القضاء على منصات الإطلاق المتحركة والمخفية، والمنشآت الإنتاجية المدفونة داخل التضاريس اليمنية الوعرة.
🔷 أظهرت الهجمات الحوثية قدرة على التكيف باستخدام المسيّرات الصغيرة وصواريخ كروز الرخيصة منخفضة التحليق والصواريخ الباليستية. ويرى أنكيت باندا، من مؤسسة كارنيغي، أن اعتراض 90% من المقذوفات قد يترك مجالاً لأضرار كبيرة عند إطلاق أعداد ضخمة منها.
🔷 أصبح الحوثيون قادرين على تصنيع مسيّرات وصواريخ باليستية بدقة نسبية، باستخدام مكونات بعضها من شركات صينية. وتتراوح تكلفتها بين آلاف ومئات آلاف الدولارات، مقابل ملايين للصواريخ الاعتراضية، ما يستنزف الذخائر الدفاعية السعودية حتى عند نجاح الاعتراض.
🔷 يمتلك الحوثيون صواريخ أرض–جو إيرانية من طراز «358»، قادرة على التحليق لفترات ومهاجمة الطائرات دون سرعة الصوت، ما يهدد الطائرات المهاجمة ويعقّد تدمير منصات الإطلاق داخل اليمن.
🔷 تشمل الترسانة صواريخ كروز «قدس-1» بمدى 750 كيلومتراً، وصواريخ «بركان-1» بمدى 600 كيلومتر، و«بركان-2» بمدى 850 كيلومتراً، و«بركان-3» بمدى 1200 كيلومتر، ما يتيح استهداف معظم المواقع السعودية.
🔷 نفذت الولايات المتحدة أكثر من ألف ضربة ضد الحوثيين خلال ثلاثة أشهر، قبل انتهاء الحملة بوقف إطلاق نار. وترى أبريل لونغلي آلي أن التجربة أثبتت محدودية الحملات الجوية، وأن التهديد الحوثي لا يمكن إنهاؤه بالأدوات العسكرية وحدها.
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 نشرت صحيفة «نيويورك تايمز»، تقرير جديد يتناول المفارقة بين الإنفاق السعودي الضخم على التسلح، الذي وضع المملكة ضمن أكبر عشر دول إنفاقاً عسكرياً، وبين الصعوبات التي تواجهها في اعتراض الصواريخ والمسيّرات الحوثية.
ويأتي بعد يوم من تقرير نشرته «فايننشال تايمز» عن حدود فعالية الترسانة السعودية. وتتمثل إضافته في التركيز على تصميم منظومة الدفاع واتجاه انتشارها، والقيود التقنية للرادارات، والمشكلات التنظيمية داخل القوات السعودية، إلى جانب طبيعة الخيارات العسكرية والسياسية المتاحة.
هذا أهم ما ورد في التقييم العسكري والدفاعي الذي تقدمه الصحيفة
🔷 ينقل التقرير عن محللين أن جانباً من المشكلة يعود إلى الاستثمار الكبير في أسلحة باهظة ومتطورة، مثل المقاتلات ومنظومات اعتراض الصواريخ، فيما يستخدم الحوثيون مسيّرات زهيدة الكلفة وصواريخ كروز منخفضة التحليق يصعب رصدها والتعامل معها.
🔷 الدفاعات السعودية صُممت على أساس أن الخطر الرئيسي سيأتي من إيران أو العراق، شرقاً أو شمال شرقي المملكة، ولذلك جرى تركيز أكثر شبكات الرادار والصواريخ الاعتراضية تطوراً حول المنطقة الشرقية ومنشآتها النفطية.
🔷أما الهجمات الآتية من اليمن جنوباً وجنوب غرب فتواجهها تغطية أقل ملاءمة. ويشرح كينيث بولاك، مؤلف كتاب «جيوش الرمال»، أن المسيّرات وصواريخ كروز تستطيع التحليق على ارتفاعات منخفضة وتغيير الاتجاه، بينما تعجز الرادارات الأرضية عن الرؤية خلف الأفق. وتزيد جبال اليمن من صعوبة الإنذار المبكر، وقد لا تُكتشف بعض المقذوفات إلا بعد دخولها السعودية، ما يفسر اضطراب التحذيرات الموجهة للمدنيين. ويشير التقرير إلى حاجة المملكة إلى مزيد من الرادارات المحمولة جواً.
🔷 باعت واشنطن للسعودية، منذ عام 2020، ما لا يقل عن 730 صاروخاً اعتراضياً من باتريوت. ويزيد ثمن الصاروخ الواحد على ثلاثة ملايين دولار، مقارنة بمسيّرات تتراوح كلفتها بين 15 ألفاً و25 ألف دولار. ويشير التقرير إلى أن باتريوت مصمم لاعتراض الصواريخ الباليستية، وثاد لاعتراض الصواريخ التي تطير على ارتفاعات أعلى، فيما تتزايد صعوبة التصدي للأهداف المنخفضة، وسط نقص عالمي في الصواريخ الاعتراضية بسبب الحروب في أوكرانيا والشرق الأوسط.
🔷 لا يعزو التقرير هذه الصعوبات إلى افتقار العسكريين السعوديين للخبرة. فبحسب ديفيد دي روش، المسؤول السابق في البنتاغون، اكتسبت قوات الدفاع الجوي خبرة نادرة في تشغيل باتريوت خلال سنوات اعتراض مئات الصواريخ الحوثية منذ حرب 2015. كما تملك السعودية عدة مئات من المقاتلات، معظمها إف-15 ويوروفايتر تايفون، ويمكن استخدامها ضد المسيّرات والصواريخ بشرط توفر الإنذار المبكر ومعلومات المسار. ويستشهد التقرير بالتصدي للهجوم الإيراني على إسرائيل في أبريل 2024، حين أتاحت تغطية رادارية متداخلة مشاركة مقاتلات عدة دول في إسقاط تهديدات صغيرة، بينما اعترضت المنظومات الأرضية الصواريخ الأعلى تحليقاً، دون نجاح كامل في اعتراض جميع المقذوفات.
🔷 الإضافة الأكثر وضوحاً هي تفسير الأثر المستمر لبنية المؤسسة العسكرية. فقد تشكلت قوتان منفصلتان، القوات المسلحة النظامية التي تضم نحو 250 ألف فرد، والحرس الوطني الذي يضم نحو 125 ألفاً ويعتمد تاريخياً على قبائل موالية للأسرة الحاكمة، بهدف تقليص مخاطر الانقلابات. وينقل التقرير عن محللين أن سيطرة الأمراء على المؤسستين، ومركزية القرارات فيهما، تحدان من المبادرة الميدانية. ورغم أن محمد بن سلمان أقال قادة كباراً في 2018 وأنشأ قيادة عمليات مشتركة في الرياض ضمن الإصلاحات المرتبطة برؤية 2030، فإن وتيرة التغيير تُوصف بالبطيئة، ولا تزال صيانة الأسلحة المتطورة تعتمد في حالات كثيرة على متعاقدين غربيين. ويورد التقرير ميزانية دفاع سنوية تتجاوز 82 مليار دولار.
🔷 من التطورات المهمة ما ينقله التقرير عن وثيقة لمجلس الأمن الدولي تفيد بأن الحوثيين باتوا يصنعون بعض الأسلحة وينوعون مصادر الإمداد بعيداً عن الاعتماد على الحرس الثوري الإيراني وحده.
🔷 أما خيارات الرياض، فينقل التقرير أنها لا تتجه، وفق التوقعات، إلى غزو بري واسع لمناطق الحوثيين الجبلية، في ظل الكلفة المتوقعة وانقسام القوى اليمنية المناهضة لهم. ويرى جان لوب سامان، الباحث في جامعة سنغافورة الوطنية، أن حملة جوية جديدة لن تكفي على الأرجح، لأن السعودية جربت معظم الأساليب، ولا يوجد بديل قابل للحياة للحوثيين داخل اليمن. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
.@PeteHegseth is so worried about the findings of the internal investigation into CENTCOM’s killing of at least 123 Iranian children in Minab that he is delaying the release of the final report until after the midterms.
Gift link:
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-15/pentagon-inten… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Iran intensifies attacks on ships in the Strait as Trump appears to buy time
At least 10 commercial vessels were attacked in the space of just three days. Looking at the past two weeks, at least 23 or 24 ships have been hit by projectiles or cargo drones in the region.
Other vessels, including the GFS Giselle, Alfonso and Al-Saadiyat, were also targeted recently.
The sinking of the Singapore-flagged container ship GFS Pride, and the overall situation in the Strait of Hormuz, have reached a critical point. This is no longer what we saw weeks or months ago, with ships drifting or isolated fires. The attacks are now stronger and sending large vessels to the bottom.
The most recent case, the GFS Pride, sank leaving a large number of containers floating adrift in the Strait of Hormuz. The regional hydrographic service issued urgent alerts for all seafarers and merchant ships to heighten vigilance and avoid collisions with the floating cargo.
The standing order appears to be to open fire. While international agencies and Singaporean authorities state that the ship sank after catching fire from the impact of an unidentified projectile, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claims the vessel went down after striking a naval mine, after allegedly using an illegal and dangerous route.
Although further increases have not yet materialised, maritime insurance costs in the region are expected to rise. The GFS Pride had capacity for 2,824 containers. Its loss, together with damage to another Singaporean vessel the same day, the GFS Giselle, is likely to lead more fleets to avoid the passage.
Once again, in response to the sinking and the rise in attacks in the Strait, US military forces have expanded monitoring operations and air coverage in the area. The American government has stated it will not tolerate disruption to global trade, with President Donald Trump indicating that decisions on new strikes against Iranian positions and those of its allies should come very soon.
Tehran authorities, for their part, have adopted an aggressive posture and are threatening to intensify attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz even further.
The Iranian government has openly declared that the naval actions are direct retaliation for the blockade of its ports and the severe economic sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies.
Clearly, the war continues today largely as a financial question. Who pays the bill for Iran’s reconstruction? Iran is obviously negotiating the figures, but the bill sits with the GCC, which is asking what Trump will contribute, given that he and Netanyahu caused the conflict.
Trump’s mentality of wanting only to profit and profit again seems to irritate the region’s monarchies considerably.
Read more:
global21.substack.com/p/iran-intensifies-attacks-on-ships… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
MORE: Recent waves of Iranian attacks on vessels in and near the Strait of Hormuz indicate that Iran retains the ability to effectively target vessels in the strait, which suggests that Iran has either overcome previous operational constraints or is adapting to such constraints through new tactics or capabilities.⬇️
ISW-CTP assessed in early September 2026 that recent US efforts, including airstrikes on Iranian coastal radars, appeared to have some success in disrupting Iran’s ability to attack ships in the strait.
Iran’s employment of suboptimal methods to attempt to maintain Iranian control in the Strait of Hormuz — such as using shore-based rocket launchers instead of fast attack craft (FAC) to deploy mines and using FAC to physically identify vessels — suggested that recent US strikes had degraded Iran’s maritime surveillance and mine-laying capabilities.
A US military official noted to Reuters on October 13 that Iranian naval forces have continued to use small boats with spotters to identify targets and inform the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The US military official said that Iran pursued this method of target identification after the United States “destroyed” a significant part of Iranian radar capabilities. The US military official cited an example from the past seven to fourteen days in which the US military identified Iranian spotters calling in targets from a small vessel in the strait, which suggests that Iran may still be contending with somewhat degraded coastal radar systems.
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: Recent waves of Iranian attacks on vessels in and near the Strait of Hormuz indicate that Iran retains the ability to effectively target vessels in the strait, which suggests that Iran has either overcome previous operational challenges or is adapting to such constraints through new tactics or capabilities.
Other Key Takeaways:
The Houthis are attempting to domestically produce a variant of the Iranian Kheybar Shekan missile with People’s Republic of China (PRC)-manufactured components.
Houthi development and use of Kheybar Shekan variants with maneuverable re-entry vehicles that can change the missile’s trajectory mid-flight present a challenge to Saudi air defenses as the Houthis continue to fire missiles and drones targeting Saudi critical infrastructure. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Incredible piece from @Reuters on the effect of Iran's attacks on regional infrastructure.
These attacks are precise and deliberate, seemingly informed with intimate knowledge of the target--maximum disruption using minimal projectiles.
GCC efforts to control the information environment re: these strikes are continuous and undertaken as a matter of course; any statements from GCC states on the effect of these strikes should be taken with a grain of salt.
We still don't know how bad these attacks have been. We may never know for sure. www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/iran-crisis-i… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
"Avoir la main sur ses troupes "????
RTL France
@RTLFrance
France Inter : "Je ne peux pas m'engager avec une rédaction qui ne tient pas parole et qui n'a pas la main sur ses troupes"
@csapin face à @FogielMarcO dans #rtlmatinThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
This level of assembly is something Yemen has already been doing for some time.
What the report does not demonstrate is precisely the real integration of the critical internal systems.
This includes actuators linked to guidance and control surfaces, which provide maneuverability, precision guidance systems, anti-jamming devices and associated electronics, as well as the fine calibration and flight-control software that keep the missile stable and accurate.
These are the elements of highest technological complexity. A minimal error in integrating these systems and the missile loses balance or precision. Yemen does not independently possess the technical corps or knowledge centers capable of mastering this part.
It remains dependent on Iranian supervision, components, and know-how, even if it can now assemble more of the structure and motor locally, and is seeking certain Chinese components to work around bottlenecks in the Iranian supply chain.
The article shows an advance in assembly capacity and in the diversification of suppliers for structural parts. It does not show full technological independence. This distinction is important.
Obviously, the Iranians control the process and have no intention of transferring the full technology to any ally.
laurence norman
@laurnorman
Here’s the @conflictarm report that we wrote on last night.
www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/houthi-missile-china-parts-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Noga Tarnopolsky נגה טרנופולסקי نوغا ترنوبولسكي
@NTarnopolsky
💥Hair-raising details in ex Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar's lawsuit against Netanyahu. "At a July 9, 2023, cabinet meeting, government reps floated the idea of letting Hamas take control of the West Bank. I was forced to spell out that Hamas is a religious movement committed to Israel's eradication."
דורון קדוש | Doron Kadosh
@Doron_Kadosh
2/ רונן בר: ב-9.7.2023 בישיבת הקבינט, גורמים בממשלה העלו רעיון לאפשר שליטה של חמאס ביהודה ושומרון (!). נדרשתי להבהיר שחמאס היא תנועה דתית שחרטה על דגלה את חיסול ישראל.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
דורון קדוש | Doron Kadosh
@Doron_Kadosh
16/ רונן בר: בביקור שנתניהו ערך בשב״כ עם כניסתו לתפקיד בכהונה הנוכחית בינואר 23׳, הוא הורה על ״ייצור משוואה מול חמאס בדרכים לא אגרסיביות״.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Michael Rubin
@mrubin1971
Tom Barrack, Trump'ın Mirasını Yerle Bir Edecek
Barrack, ABD'nin Doğu Akdeniz ve Orta Doğu Politikasını Neredeyse Tek Başına Türkiye Lehine Yeniden Şekillendirdi
13 Ekim 2026
Michael Rubin
The Washington Examiner
www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/beltway-confidential/4…
Başkan Donald Trump, kariyer diplomatlarından oluşan Dışişleri teşkilatını hiç çekinmeden budayarak yerine kendi seçtiği siyasi atamaları ve özel temsilcileri getirdi. Bu kişilerin pek çoğu uzun yıllardır dostu ve iş ortağı. Bu mutlaka kötü bir şey değil. Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın bazı kariyer mensupları, yakalarını silkip hizmetlerinin her zaman siyasetin üstünde olduğundan dem vururken fazla abartıyor; oysa aynı kişilerin çoğu, kişisel olarak karşı çıktıkları girişimleri baltalamak için düzenli olarak basına bilgi sızdırdı.
Trump'ın Türkiye büyükelçisi ve Suriye, Irak ve zaman zaman Lübnan özel temsilcisi Tom Barrack, en etkili yardımcılarından biri. Barrack'ı eleştirenler bile, onun ABD'nin Doğu Akdeniz ve Orta Doğu politikasını neredeyse tek başına Türkiye lehine yeniden şekillendirdiğini kabul ediyor.
Barrack, Türkiye'ye F-35 Müşterek Taarruz Uçağı satılmasının ve Türkiye'nin Rusya'dan S-400 hava savunma sistemi satın alması nedeniyle yaptırımlardan muaf tutulmasının önde gelen savunucularından biri oldu. Türkiye'nin Suriye'deki etnik temizliğini de Yunanistan'ın egemenliğini ihlal etmesini de önemsizleştirdi. Hem Türkiye'de hem de ABD'de onu eleştirenler, görevini kendini zenginleştirmek için kullandığını iddia ediyor.
Her iki durumda da, politikanın nereden kaynaklandığına dair belirsizlik, Dışişleri Bakanı Hillary Clinton döneminin en kötü yanlarını tekrarlıyor. O dönemde yabancı yetkililer, erişim elde etmek için Clinton Vakfı'na bağış yaparak bedel ödemek gerektiğine inanıyordu. Trump ve Barrack, Clinton'ın etik ihlallerini emsal olarak gösterebilir; ancak Türkiye politikasının kaynağına dair sorular, ABD'nin güvenilirliğini yalnızca Doğu Akdeniz'de değil, tüm dünyada aşındırıyor.
Elbette Barrack, Washington'ın bölgedeki ABD güvenlik çıkarlarını korumak için Ankara'ya bir vekil olarak dayanması gerektiğine samimiyetle inanıyor da olabilir. Bu tutumun sorunu, bugünkü Türkiye'nin Gazze'den Libya'ya en kötü Sünni terör örgütlerinden bazılarını desteklemesi. Barrack, Türkiye ile İsrail arasında kurulacak bölgesel bir dengenin, ABD'nin bölgeden çekilmesine imkân tanıyacak kadar istikrar yaratabileceğine inanıyor gibi görünüyor.
Tanıdık geldi mi? Bu, Başkan Barack Obama'nın, Orta Doğu'da barışın İsrail ile İran arasında bir denge gerektirdiği teorisinin tekrarı. 2015 nükleer anlaşması, yani Kapsamlı Ortak Eylem Planı'nın (KOEP) bütün mantığı, İran'ı dışlanmışlıktan kurtarmanın, karşılıklı garantili imhayı bölgesel düzeyde yeniden yaratarak istikrar sağlayacağı fikrine dayanıyordu.
Obama'nın anlayamadığı şey, istikrarı imkânsız kılanın İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin nefretini besleyen ideoloji olduğuydu. Yaptırımları kaldırmak ve yatırımı teşvik etmek, yalnızca İslam Devrim Muhafızları Ordusu'nun kasasını yeniden doldurmasına, vekâlet savaşlarını körüklemesine ve füze ile insansız hava aracı programlarına hız kazandırmasına yaradı. On yıl içinde bölge büyük bir savaşa sahne oldu.
Barrack'ın Türkiye'yi İsrail'in gücünü dengeleyebilecek tek güce dönüştürme arzusu da büyük olasılıkla aynı yolu izleyecek. Barrack, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ı bir müttefik olarak görebilir; ancak Türk lider, Türkiye'nin askeri sanayisini kurmaya, nükleer enerji geliştirmeye ve İsrail'i yok etmeye, İran'ın merhum dini lideri Ali Hamaney kadar adanmış bir ideolog.
Barrack'ın çıkışları, Türkiye'nin yaptırımları delmesine yardım etme çabaları ve Türkiye'nin emperyal hırslarını tek odaklı biçimde savunması, görünüşe göre Trump'ın desteğini arkasına almış durumda ve Trump'ın bölgesel mirasını gölgede bırakacak. Aklı başında her tarihçinin bugünkü savaşın kökünü Obama'nın ve onun dışişleri bakanlarının kararlarında görmesi gibi, bundan on yıl sonra politika yapıcılar da Orta Doğu'daki gelecekteki çatışmanın köklerinin, Büyükelçi ve Özel Temsilci Tom Barrack'ın Trump adına savunduğu naif ve yanlış yönlü politikalarda yattığını anlayacak. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 تكشف الحلقة الثانية من تحقيق «إنتليجنس أونلاين» عن حرب استخبارية خفية تخوضها الاستخبارات الباكستانية ضد ضباط أجهزة الاستخبارات الغربية العاملين على أراضيها، تشمل كشف الهويات السرية والطرد والاعتداءات الجسدية والفخاخ الجنسية، في إطار صراع طويل مع الأجهزة الفرنسية والأميركية والبريطانية
تقديري أن الاستخبارات الفرنسية تحاول تصفية حساباتها مع الاستخبارات الباكستانية عبر هذه التسريبات التي تحاول فيها الإساءة للباكستانيين.
هذا أهم ما ورد
🔷 استُدعي رئيس محطة الاستخبارات الخارجية الفرنسية في إسلام آباد إلى باريس خلال صيف 2026، واضطر الملحق العسكري الفرنسي إلى مغادرة باكستان في يونيو بطلب من السلطات ضمن الخلافات بين الأجهزة.
🔷 في عام 2010، اعتدى ضابط من الاستخبارات الباكستانية جسدياً على نائب رئيس محطة الاستخبارات الفرنسية احتجاجاً على استمرار محاولات اختراق البرنامج النووي الباكستاني. وردت باريس بعد أسابيع بطرد الممثل الرئيسي للاستخبارات الباكستانية لديها. وتشمل وسائل الضغط على الضباط الغربيين التحذيرات الشفهية وتعطيل السيارات أو تفجيرها والتهديد بالقتل، مع احتمال إسناد الاعتداءات إلى جماعات جهادية محلية.
🔷 واجهت الاستخبارات الفرنسية صعوبات في إيجاد ضباط مستعدين للخدمة في باكستان خلال صيف 2026، رغم ارتفاع أهميتها الاستخبارية بسبب المفاوضات المتعلقة بالحرب مع إيران وأسعار الطاقة. وتستخدم الاستخبارات الباكستانية أيضاً الفخاخ الجنسية ومراقبة الفنادق لاستدراج الضباط والدبلوماسيين، فيما شهد النادي الفرنسي داخل مجمع السفارة إنذارات أمنية متكررة.
🔷 رغم ذلك، حافظ الطرفان على التعاون في مكافحة الإرهاب رغم التنافس على أسرار البرنامج النووي. كما واصلت فرنسا تدريب القوات الخاصة الباكستانية بالتوازي مع تعزيز شراكتها العسكرية مع الهند في المقاتلات والغواصات والتدريب.
🔷 تتمتع الاستخبارات البريطانية «إم آي 6» بعلاقة تاريخية استثنائية مع نظيرتها الباكستانية، تعود إلى مساهمة الجنرال والتر كوثورن في تأسيس الجهاز. ورغم مرور ضباط بريطانيين على باكستان سراً لعقود، لم تتعرض هوياتهم للكشف العلني كما حدث مع الأميركيين. كما نفذت الاستخبارات الباكستانية استجوابات لصالح البريطانيين، شملت مواطنين بريطانيين من أصول باكستانية مشتبهين بالإرهاب، باستخدام أساليب مشددة.
🔷 لم تمنع العلاقة الخاصة استخدام الفخاخ الجنسية ضد البريطانيين؛ إذ استُدرج دبلوماسي بريطاني في إسلام آباد عام 2010 واستدعته لندن سريعاً، وتعرض الملحق العسكري أندرو دوركان لحادثة مماثلة عام 2005.
🔷 تحتفظ الاستخبارات البريطانية بوصول حساس إلى مستويات داخلية في الجهاز الباكستاني، بفضل تدريب مئات عناصره والعلاقات الاجتماعية والمؤسسية بين النخب الأمنية. وتشمل هذه الروابط دراسة أبناء جنرالات باكستانيين في جامعات بريطانية وزيارات كبار الضباط إلى نادي «أورينتال» في لندن. وفي المقابل، استغلت «إم آي 6» الجالية الباكستانية في بريطانيا لإرسال عناصر سراً إلى إسلام آباد وإدارة مصادر رفيعة داخل البرنامج النووي. وتُعد الخدمة في باكستان خبرة مهنية مهمة تؤهل الضباط البريطانيين لمناصب قيادية، بينها مواقع في واشنطن.
🔷 يتزامن التقارب بين مدير الاستخبارات المركزية الأميركية جون راتكليف ورئيس الاستخبارات الباكستانية عاصم مالك مع استمرار الشكوك المتبادلة بشأن الأنشطة الاستخبارية والانتشار النووي والعلاقات الباكستانية–الصينية. ويتركز التعاون الحالي على مكافحة الإرهاب.
🔷 تسببت عملية قتل بن لادن بأزمة عميقة؛ إذ نفذتها واشنطن دون إبلاغ إسلام آباد، ورفضت الاستخبارات الباكستانية ذكر اسمها في البيان الأميركي بسبب المخاطر الأمنية التي قد تطال ضباطها وعائلاتهم نتيجة الظهور بمظهر الحليف الأميركي.
🔷 استخدمت عمليات كشف هويات ضباط الاستخبارات الأميركية وسيلة ضغط متكررة. ففي ديسمبر 2010 كُشفت هوية رئيس محطة وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية في إسلام آباد، جوناثان بانك، ضمن دعوى رفعها المحامي شهزاد أكبر نيابة عن الصحفي كريم خان، الذي اتهم غارة أميركية بمسيّرة بقتل ابنه وشقيقه عام 2009. وحصل المحامي على الاسم من صحفيين محليين مجهولين، واضطرت الوكالة إلى استدعاء بانك بعد تلقيه تهديدات.
🔷 اشتُبه في تدبير الاستخبارات الباكستانية كشف هوية بانك رداً على دعوى أميركية ربطت رئيسها أحمد شجاع باشا بهجمات مومباي عام 2008. وتفاقمت الأزمة الأميركية–الباكستانية عام 2011 عندما قتل المتعاقد مع الوكالة ريموند ديفيس رجلين في لاهور، ما أدى إلى تعليق مؤقت للغارات الأميركية بالمسيّرات داخل باكستان.
🔷 حافظت الاستخبارات الألمانية «بي إن دي» على علاقات أقل توتراً مع نظيرتها الباكستانية بسبب عدم انخراطها في اختراق البرنامج النووي.
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 تفتح "إنتليجنس أونلاين" ملفاً استخبارياً غامضاً، يكشف تورط المخابرات الفرنسية في التجسس على الملف النووي الباكستاني، وتعرض ضباط فرنسيين للإشعاع في باكستان بعد اختراق البرنامج النووي، ومرض رئيس محطة CIA عقب مقتل بن لادن وسط شكوك باستهدافهم من الاستخبارات الباكستانية.
يمثل هذا التحقيق الجزء الأول من سلسلة مكونة من أربعة أجزاء بعنوان «حرب الظل في إسلام آباد». سيتناول الجزء الثاني أساليب أخرى منسوبة إلى الاستخبارات الباكستانية في التعامل مع شركائها الأوروبيين والأميركيين، تشمل الطرد والترحيل والاعتداءات الجسدية والفخاخ. وهذه موضوعات أعلنت الصحيفة نيتها تناولها، وليست وقائع أثبتها الجزء الحالي.
هذا ما ورد في الحلقة الأولى من التحقيق
🔷 اكتشف جهاز الاستخبارات الخارجية الفرنسي عام 2010 تعرض أحد ضباطه العاملين في السفارة الفرنسية بإسلام آباد لجرعة إشعاعية، بعد فترة قصيرة من نجاح الجهاز في تجنيد مصدر مهم داخل القطاع النووي الباكستاني. وأظهرت أداة قياس الجرعات الإشعاعية التي كان يحملها الضابط، تعرضه للإشعاع. وأكدت فحوص لاحقة حدوث تغيرات في كروموسوماته يمكن أن تنتج عن التعرض الإشعاعي، فيما أظهرت أجهزة القياس الخاصة ببعض زملائه مؤشرات تعرض مماثلة.
🔷 اتجهت الشكوك الفرنسية إلى جهاز الاستخبارات الباكستاني «آي إس آي»، الذي كان يقوده آنذاك الجنرال أحمد شجاع باشا، باعتباره الجهة المحتملة وراء تعريض الضباط للإشعاع رداً على اختراق البرنامج النووي. لكن المصادر الأمنية التي تحدثت إليها الصحيفة لم تتفق على هذه الفرضية، ولم تسفر التحقيقات عن دليل حاسم يثبت تنفيذ عملية إشعاعية متعمدة أو مسؤولية الاستخبارات الباكستانية عنها.
🔷 الاستخبارات الفرنسية كانت تقود حملة تجسس واسعة استهدفت أسرار البرنامج النووي. وجاء ذلك وسط مخاوف أميركية وبريطانية وفرنسية من احتمال تسرب مواد انشطارية إلى حركة طالبان باكستان التي كانت تصعّد هجماتها ضد حكومة يوسف رضا جيلاني. ويشير التقرير إلى أن برقيات دبلوماسية أميركية سربها موقع ويكيليكس خلال عامي 2010 و2011 أكدت وجود مخاوف غربية بشأن أمن الترسانة النووية الباكستانية.
🔷 منحت الاستخبارات الفرنسية آنذاك ضباطها حرية واسعة في جمع المعلومات عن البرنامج النووي الباكستاني، رغم استمرار التعاون الأمني مع إسلام آباد بشأن أفغانستان وملاحقة المتشددين الفرنسيين. وشجع رئيس الجهاز آنذاك كالفار ضباطه على العمل الهجومي، مستشهداً بتقاليد الاستخبارات السوفيتية التي كانت تكافئ العملاء المطرودين من الدول الأجنبية بسبب نشاطهم المكثف.
🔷 يكشف التقرير صداماً بين الاستخبارات الفرنسية والجناح السري «إس وينغ» في الاستخبارات الباكستانية. وطردت باكستان ضابطاً فرنسياً يعمل في كراتشي بعد تجنيده مصدراً محلياً، فكثف رجال الجنرال أحمد شجاع باشا مراقبة الفرنسيين.
🔷 حصلت الاستخبارات الفرنسية على مادة مشعة في ظروف غير آمنة ما يطرح احتمال تلوث عناصرها عرضياً، وهو احتمال مضاد لفرضية اغتيال متعمد.
🔷 أقلقت القضية الضباط وعائلاتهم وظهر تعبير «متلازمة إسلام آباد»، تشبيهاً بـ«متلازمة هافانا» المرتبطة بأعراض غامضة لموظفين أميركيين منذ 2016.
🔷 اجتمعت الاستخبارات الفرنسية والأميركية والبريطانية مراراً في باريس لبحث احتمال تعرض الفرنسيين للإشعاع؛ وأبدى الأميركيون والبريطانيون استغرابهم وقلقهم من فرضية تورط الاستخبارات الباكستانية، مع كثافة نشاطها داخل باكستان.
🔷 أصيب رئيس محطة الاستخبارات الأميركية في إسلام آباد مارك كيلتون بآلام بطن حادة بعد مقتل بن لادن في مايو 2011. وبعد مشاركته باحتفالات الوكالة وعودته إلى باكستان ومحاولته مواصلة عمله أياماً، أقنعه الطاقم الطبي في السفارة وزوجته العاملة بالوكالة بالعودة إلى واشنطن صيف 2011 للفحوص والجراحة.
🔷 بحث أطباء الوكالة احتمال تسميم كيلتون باكستانياً، إلى جانب الإجهاد أو العدوى، دون حسم السبب بعد 15 عاماً.
🔷 نفذت واشنطن عملية بن لادن دون إبلاغ إسلام آباد خشية التسريب، رغم قرب الموقع من أكاديمية عسكرية باكستانية، ما أثار غضبها وفاقم الشكوك بين الجهازين.
🔷 ساعد الفرنسيون أميركا سراً في تعقب بن لادن دون إطلاع الاستخبارات الباكستانية، بما يعكس انعدام الثقة بين الطرفين.
🔷 لم تمنع الخلافات التعاون في مكافحة الإرهاب والملف الأفغاني، رغم تجسس الأجهزة على بعضها، خصوصاً في الملف النووي. وأعلنت باكستان قوتها النووية عام 1998 وبلغت رؤوسها نحو مئة عام 2010. وشكلت شبكات عبد القدير خان وصلات كوريا الشمالية النووية دوافع رئيسية للرصد الغربي.
🔷 تخلص «إنتليجنس أونلاين» إلى أن فرضيات التسميم والإشعاع تعكس انعدام الثقة في الجهاز الباكستاني، ذي السمعة الغربية باستخدام أساليب قاسية وخادعة ضد خصومه وشركائه. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 الدبلوماسي القطري علي الذوادي من أكثر الشخصيات غموضا رغم أنه يعمل في أكثر ملفات المنطقة حساسية. برز اسمه اليوم في لقاء سري في نيويورك مع ممثل نتنياهو، لكن دوره أشد تعقيدا من ما يظهر.
سأقدم بعض المعلومات والتفاصيل حول دوره وقصة صعوده بالاعتماد على عدة مصادر.
🔷 انتقل علي عبد الله حمد الرميحي الذوادي خلال عام واحد تقريباً من شخصية قطرية تعمل في الظل إلى أحد أهم الوسطاء القطريين في الملفات الأكثر حساسية؛ غزة ثم إيران، مع صلة مباشرة بمكتب رئيس الوزراء والأجهزة الأمنية القطرية، وشبكة علاقات واسعة في واشنطن وطهران والعواصم الأوروبية.
🔷 خلفيته الأصلية ليست دبلوماسية تقليدية. بدأ داخل البيئة الأمنية القطرية، ثم أصبح منذ 2009 رئيساً لمكتب الشيخ محمد بن حمد آل ثاني، شقيق الأمير تميم، وكان عملياً منفذاً للمهام الحساسة المرتبطة به.
🔷 عائلته مرتبطة مباشرة بمؤسسات الدولة القطرية؛ والده كان سفيراً لقطر في إسبانيا، وهو من قبيلة بني خالد ذات الثقل التاريخي في الخليج. أما شقيقه الأكبر حسن الذوادي فكان الأمين العام للجنة العليا للمشاريع المسؤولة عن تنظيم كأس العالم 2022، وشغل مناصب عديدة في مؤسسات شبه حكومية قطرية.
🔷 الذوادي هو اليوم مستشار/وزير للشؤون الاستراتيجية في مكتب رئيس الوزراء القطري، ويرفع تقاريره مباشرة إلى رئيس الوزراء. الدوحة لم تعلن منصبه رسمياً إلا في يناير 2026، بعدما ظل لسنوات شخصية غير معروفة علناً، حتى إن صورته كانت نادرة جداً قبل نهاية 2025.
🔷 دوره الأهم حالياً هو إدارة المفاوضات الحساسة من الخلف. في ملف إيران، كان يقود أكثر المحادثات حساسية بين الوفود بالتنسيق مع الدبلوماسيين القطريين وجهاز أمن الدولة القطري.
🔷 مصادر غربية شاركت في المفاوضات أشادت بقدرته على التعامل مع أطراف شديدة التباعد مثل الحرس الثوري الإيراني، المحافظون الأميركيون المتشددون، وقادة حماس. واعتبرت أن أبرز نقاط قوته معرفته الدقيقة بالملفات وقدرته على إيجاد أرضية مشتركة مع الأطراف الصعبة.
🔷 الرئيس دونالد ترامب شكره بالاسم في 23 مايو على جهوده لإنهاء حرب إيران، وكان الذوادي من بين عدد قليل جداً من غير رؤساء الحكومات الذين ذكرهم ترامب بالاسم، وهو ما يعكس ارتفاع مكانته لدى واشنطن.
🔷 صعوده في ملف إيران جاء بعد دوره في اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار في غزة. كان الوسيط القطري الأساسي بين تل أبيب وحماس، وتعامل كذلك مع مبعوثين أميركيين وفرنسيين وبريطانيين، وتنقل بين الدوحة والقاهرة وميامي والبيت الأبيض قبل توقيع اتفاق وقف إطلاق النار في شرم الشيخ في 9 أكتوبر.
🔷 في ديسمبر 2025 سافر إلى ميامي مع دبلوماسيين أتراك ومصريين لمناقشة التصور طويل المدى لغزة. وفي يناير عُين عضواً في المجلس التنفيذي لغزة إلى جانب شخصيات من بينها توني بلير ورئيس المخابرات المصرية حسن رشاد.
🔷 قبل اندلاع حرب إيران في 28 فبراير، شارك في جولة وساطة في جنيف إلى جانب العمانيين، وحافظ على علاقات جيدة مع جاريد كوشنر وستيف ويتكوف، وعمل بين الأميركيين والفرنسيين والبريطانيين والإيرانيين في محاولة أخيرة لتجنب الحرب.
🔷 خلال حملة قطر لاستضافة كأس العالم 2022 كان الذوادي عضواً في مجلس لجنة الملف وفي اللجنة التنفيذية لاتحاد كرة القدم القطري، وعمل على استقطاب شركات ومستشارين من قطاع الاستخبارات الخاصة لمساعدة الدوحة في حملتها.
🔷 ظهر اسمه كذلك في قضية السناتور الأميركي السابق بوب مينينديز. وثائق الادعاء الأميركي أظهرت أن الذوادي حضر اجتماعات مرتبطة باستثمار قطري في مشروع عقاري في نيوجيرسي، وعمل بصفته الرجل الأيمن للشيخ سلطان بن جاسم آل ثاني وممثلاً لمصالح قطر. وشجع شريكاً أميركياً على تأمين تصريحات إيجابية عن قطر في الإعلام الأميركي.
🔷 في مايو 2023 قدم للسناتور مينينديز تذاكر لحضور سباق فورمولا واحد في ميامي بعد تصريحات إيجابية عن قطر. الذوادي نفسه لم يُتهم بارتكاب مخالفة في القضية، بينما أُدين مينينديز لاحقاً في قضية الرشوة.
🔷 للذوادي كذلك نشاط تجاري واسع. شارك في ملكية صندوق «فورتا أدفايزرز» في لندن مع الشيخ سلطان، واستثمر الصندوق في التكنولوجيا والترفيه والرياضة، ومن أبرز صفقاته الحصول على حقوق 75 مقعداً لكبار الشخصيات في ملعب كامب نو لمدة 30 عاماً مقابل نحو 30 مليون يورو.
🔷 توسعت استثماراته إلى فرنسا، حيث اشترى حصة في عقار في بوليفار سان جيرمان بباريس ضمن مشاريع فنادق فاخرة بالشراكة مع المستثمر الأميركي نديم آشي.
🔷 مع تزايد ظهوره الإعلامي وتعيينه الحكومي، انسحب في 18 فبراير 2026 من مناصبه في الشركات اللندنية وتخلى عن حصته في «فورتا أدفايزرز». وانتقلت حصته المسيطرة إلى روجر بريو، وهو محامٍ في جزر كايمان مرتبط بمجموعة «هايفرن» التي تدير هياكل استئمانية لعدد من المسؤولين القطريين. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: Iran is attempting to deter renewed US military operations against Iran through back-channel threats against US forces and regional allies while simultaneously conducting drone, missile, and anti-aircraft system tests in preparation for future conflict.
Other Key Takeaways:
Saudi Arabia struck Houthi oil and fuel storage and transport infrastructure in Yemen on October 13, which could exacerbate the Houthis’ economic crisis and constrain Houthi military forces.
The Houthis have continued to threaten and attack Saudi civilian infrastructure following the Saudi strikes on fuel facilities. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Maged Almadhaji ماجد المذحجي
@MAlmadhaji
An airport can be repaired long before airlines, travelers, and investors trust it again. The Houthis have learned to exploit that gap, turning attacks into leverage that outlasts the physical damage.
Years of de-escalation were judged by the decline in violence, while a crucial question went unanswered: was the Houthis’ ability to return to war shrinking—or growing? Iranian support, resilient supply networks, and expanding military expertise helped prepare the group for a more dangerous confrontation.
If the Houthis survive this war with their territorial gains and capacity to threaten their neighbors intact, they will emerge more confident that escalation pays. Governments across the region could increasingly find their security choices, alliances, and economic ambitions constrained by the group’s demands.
The stakes extend well beyond Yemen. This war could determine who shapes the regional security order for the next decade.
My latest for the Sana’a Center: “How Have the Houthis Become So Dangerous?”
@sanaacenter
sanaacenter.org/publications/perspectives-and-analyses/28567 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
"Zubaidi’s intervention is primarily about political leverage," Andreas Krieg, senior security studies lecturer at King's College London, told The New Arab.
"He is telling Riyadh that southern forces are prepared to fight the Houthis, but not simply to restore a Saudi-backed Yemeni state that has spent the past year dismantling their political project. He is effectively presenting southern independence as the price of military cooperation."
www.newarab.com/news/exiled-yemen-stc-leader-calls-mobili… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr. Annelle Rodriguez Sheline
@AnnelleSheline
"Part of why Trump has not given in to the Saudi request to attack Ansar Allah is because the Saudis kicked the Emiratis out of Yemen last January.
The US is closely aligned with the UAE, which is closely aligned with Israel. There's a sense from the administration that the Saudis made their bed and now they need to lie in it.
But that does imply that after the Saudis have been made to suffer, then Trump will get involved more directly."
I told @KelleyBVlahos for @RStatecraft
responsiblestatecraft.org/trump-defend-saudi-houthis/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🇺🇸🇸🇦🇾🇪 Ce soir sur @FRANCE24 à l’émission de @StphAntoine, j’ai débattu avec Georges @Malbrunot et Yasmina Asrarguis des soubresauts de la relation americano-saoudienne, de la guerre au Yémen, des frappes des Houthis contre l’Arabie saoudite, de l’Iran…
👉f24.my/CDj4 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
בדיון מומחים שהתקיים לאחרונה בטהראן לציון 46 שנים לפרוץ מלחמת איראן-עיראק, דנו שלושה חוקרים איראנים בלקחי החלטתו של ח'ומייני לקבל את הפסקת האש ביולי 1988 ובמשמעויותיהם לעימות הנוכחי עם ארצות הברית. הלקח המרכזי הוא שהמשך עימות ללא אסטרטגיית יציאה עלול לאלץ את טהראן להתפשר בעתיד בתנאים קשים יותר. מאמר חדש שלי ב-@INSS_Hebrew
www.inss.org.il/he/publication/iran-researchers/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
⭕️ “Do I control the Strait now?”
Former U.S. energy envoy under President Biden, Amos Hochstein, questioned what American “control” over the Strait of Hormuz actually means.
Oil is getting through, he said, but shipping costs have jumped from $100,000 to $1.4 million a day. “I can say I control it, but it’s costing me a fortune.”
Asked whether a deal allowing Iran to charge $1 million per ship would be unacceptable, he replied: “That would be a discount to where we are right now.”
Hochstein told CNBC that Washington should cut its losses and negotiate, arguing another round of war would not achieve anything that previous rounds could not.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hiba Nasr
@HibaNasr
‼️ for those who missed this:
A very significant statement coming from former Saudi Amb to the US and UK & former intel chief Turki Al Faisal :
China must provide concrete evidence of its neutrality as a mediator between Saudi.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
How to End a War: Iranian Researchers Challenge Tehran’s Strategic Assumptions. Conclusions from a discussion held in Tehran marking 46 years since the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War, in which criticism was voiced against Tehran's war strategy. My recent piece for @INSSIsrael.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
MORE: The Houthis are attempting to capture Taiz City by securing a key roadway into the city. Houthi fighters engaged Yemeni government-aligned forces in heavy combat in the vicinity of al Dhabab, on the southwestern outskirts of Taiz City, on October 12 and 13. The Houthis have attempted to capture the Hangar Checkpoint, on the main road leading into Taiz City from the southwest, although multiple videos of Houthi and Yemeni government-aligned forces at the site on October 12 and 13 suggest that control over the checkpoint remains contested. The Houthis also launched several rounds of heavy artillery fire on Yemeni government-controlled areas within Taiz City on October 12 and 13, according to Yemeni media and a DC-based Yemen analyst. These combined military efforts are consistent with the Houthis’ efforts to geographically isolate Taiz City in recent weeks and are likely intended in part to compel Yemeni government-aligned forces to surrender the city.
The main concentration of Houthi and Yemeni government combat in the immediate vicinity of Taiz City comes amid continued engagements in other areas of central Taiz Governorate and a lack of reports of kinetic activity on the Red Sea coastal plain. ISW-CTP has not observed reports indicating major combat developments or territorial changes on the coastal plain since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff on October 12. Local Yemeni sources purportedly told Iranian media on October 13 that the Houthis are launching an offensive south into Madaribah wa al Arah District in Lahij Governorate, immediately south of Taiz Governorate’s Waziyah District. The Southern Giants Brigades, which are a Yemeni government-aligned military faction, announced on October 12 that their forces have begun to reinforce tribal areas in Madaribah wa al Arah District to prevent Houthi attacks in the vicinity.
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: Iran is attempting to deter renewed US military operations against Iran through back-channel threats against US forces and regional allies while simultaneously conducting drone, missile, and anti-aircraft system tests in preparation for future conflict.
Other Key Takeaways:
Saudi Arabia struck Houthi oil and fuel storage and transport infrastructure in Yemen on October 13, which could exacerbate the Houthis’ economic crisis and constrain Houthi military forces.
The Houthis have continued to threaten and attack Saudi civilian infrastructure following the Saudi strikes on fuel facilities. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Interesting remarks by IRGC Navy Commander Admiral Ali Azmaei on the situation in the Strait of Hormuz (quoted by Iranian channels).
- Iran exercises what he calls “intelligent control” (kontrol-e hushmand) over Hormuz, requiring vessels to obtain Iranian authorization before transiting. Ships travelling to or from Iran may be allowed to pass through Iranian waters.
- The IRGC Navy controls the Strait and the Persian Gulf, while Iran’s regular Navy operates in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.
According to Azmaei, a US aircraft carrier worth $13 billion is staying 700-800 km away from Hormuz for fear of being targeted.
- He claims US F-35s and F-16s are secretly escorting small groups of 3-5 oil tankers through the Strait to circumvent Iranian controls.
He warns that Iran is waiting for US warships to approach or enter the Persian Gulf: “We will sink them.”
- Azmaei also claims that Iranian naval forces are now better equipped than at the beginning of the war, having upgraded their weapons, adapted their tactics and addressed previous vulnerabilities.
- Finally, he argues that Iran and its regional neighbours can guarantee security in the Persian Gulf without a US military presence.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 هذه إحاطة عسكرية مهمة من فايننشال تايمز، تكشف أنّ مشكلة الدفاع السعودية لا تتعلق فقط بحجم الإنفاق العسكري أو امتلاك منظومات دفاع جوي متطورة، بل بتطور تكتيكات الحوثيين، واستنزاف الذخائر الاعتراضية، واتساع نطاق الأهداف المطلوب حمايتها، وصعوبة تحديد منصات الإطلاق المتحركة وتدميرها. وتزيد هذه التحديات مع استمرار تهديدات إيران شرقاً والحوثيين جنوباً.
🔷 استخدم الحوثيون، وفق مصدر أُطلع على تفاصيل الهجمات، مسيّرات بعيدة المدى يُعتقد أنها من طرازي «صماد-2» أو «صماد-3» لاستكشاف نطاقات تغطية منظومات الاعتراض السعودية. ثم استخدموا صواريخ كروز، ربما تكون مشتقة من الصاروخ الإيراني «قدس-4»، تطير على ارتفاعات منخفضة ويمكنها تغيير مسارها، ما يصعّب اكتشافها واعتراضها. ووصف المصدر نتائج هذه العمليات بأنها مزيج من التخطيط والحظ، دون تقديم بيانات فنية تؤكد هوية جميع الأسلحة المستخدمة.
🔷 التقييم العملياتي الأهم قدمه ساشا بروخمان، الباحث في المعهد الدولي للدراسات الاستراتيجية والمقيم في البحرين، الذي يرى أن الحوثيين يعتمدون استراتيجية لاستنزاف التغطية الدفاعية السعودية عبر تشتيت بطاريات الاعتراض. وتقوم هذه الاستراتيجية، بحسب تفسيره، على مهاجمة هدف مهم بصورة متكررة لعدة أيام، حتى تضطر السعودية إلى نقل منظومات دفاعية محدودة العدد نحوه، ثم مراقبة المواقع التي سُحبت منها هذه المنظومات تمهيداً لاستهداف منشآت حيوية أخرى أصبحت أقل حماية.
🔷 يعتبر بروخمان أن الهجمات الحوثية الموزعة جغرافياً تستهدف إضعاف كثافة الدفاعات الجوية السعودية وإجبارها على الحركة المستمرة، وليس مجرد إصابة كل موقع يُطلق نحوه صاروخ أو مسيّرة. ويقدم هذا التقييم تفسيراً للهجمات المتتابعة على المطارات والمنشآت النفطية والمدن، في ظل اضطرار المملكة إلى تأمين شبكة واسعة من الأهداف الاستراتيجية.
🔷 يرى بلال صعب، المدير الإداري البارز في مؤسسة «تريندز» والباحث المشارك في «تشاتام هاوس»، أن الإخفاقات الأخيرة ترتبط قبل كل شيء بتكتيكات الحوثيين ومشكلات التنسيق بين منظومات الدفاع الصاروخي السعودية. ويؤكد أن الدفاع الجوي الكامل غير ممكن، وأن تسرب بعض المقذوفات متوقع حتى مع امتلاك أنظمة متقدمة. لكنه يشدد على ضرورة إدراج المطارات المدنية، وليس منشآت الطاقة وحدها، ضمن الأهداف التي تحظى بأعلى أولويات الحماية.
🔷 يقدم التقرير تقييماً مغايراً لفكرة افتقار القوات السعودية إلى الخبرة أو الكفاءة. فقد قال ديفيد دي روش، الأستاذ في معهد «ثاير مارشال»، الذي سبق أن أشرف على برامج تعليمية لكبار قادة الدفاع الجوي السعودي، إن هؤلاء القادة يتمتعون بكفاءة عالية جداً. ويرى أن المشكلة الأساسية لا تكمن في افتقارهم إلى المعرفة العسكرية، بل في تطور تكتيكات الحوثيين والتحديات الجديدة المرتبطة بوسائل الاختراق والاستنزاف.
🔷 تكشف الصحيفة أن الحوثيين استفادوا من سنوات القتال ضد السعودية وإسرائيل والولايات المتحدة لتطوير فهم أكثر دقة لمواطن القوة والضعف في الرادارات والمنظومات الاعتراضية الغربية.
🔷 يشير التقرير إلى أن الحوثيين استفادوا أيضاً من الدروس التي استخلصتها إيران وحلفاؤها خلال المواجهات العسكرية مع الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل، بما فيها الهجمات الصاروخية على القواعد والمنشآت الحيوية في الخليج.
🔷 المنظومة السعودية لا تقتصر على بطاريات «باتريوت» و«ثاد»، وإنما تشمل صواريخ أرض–جو، ومسيّرات اعتراضية، وشبكات رادار، ومعدات حرب إلكترونية، إضافة إلى منظومة صينية لمكافحة المسيّرات تُسمى «سكاي شيلد»، تستخدم سلاح ليزر مرتبطاً بالألياف الضوئية وفق وصف التقرير. ومع ذلك، لم تمنع هذه الطبقات الدفاعية المتعددة استمرار اختراق المقذوفات الحوثية لبعض الأهداف الحيوية.
🔷 يحدد التقرير نقص الصواريخ الاعتراضية باعتباره أحد أبرز القيود على الدفاعات السعودية. فمنذ فبراير استهلكت دول الخليج أعداداً كبيرة من صواريخ «باتريوت» و«ثاد» في التصدي للهجمات الإيرانية، ما تسبب في ضغوط شديدة على المخزونات الإقليمية.
🔷 يضيف ديفيد دي روش أن السعودية باتت مضطرة إلى الاستعداد لهجمات تأتي من اتجاهين مختلفين: إيران شرقاً والحوثيون جنوباً. واعتبر أن هذه المعادلة تجبر المملكة عملياً على تقسيم قواتها الدفاعية بين الجبهتين، ما يقلل كثافة التغطية المتاحة لأي اتجاه. وتزداد المشكلة تعقيداً بسبب اتساع الأراضي السعودية وتباعد المنشآت النفطية والمطارات والمدن والقواعد العسكرية. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
The WSJ piece is well written, but it rests on a single source for the entire report.
There is no missile manufacturing process in Yemen that is not supervised by Iran, including components and technology that are exclusively provided by Iranian companies, profiting from some Chinese parts or not.
The Houthis are indeed seeking Chinese components, and have been for some time, because Iran’s own internal demand for these parts has started to worry them.
Missile development is an extremely complex process that requires centers of knowledge Yemen simply does not possess today.
Even the assembly, which remains fully supervised by Iran, demands high precision. A minor error and the missile loses balance.
The Houthis remain completely dependent on Iranian missile and drone technology, although they now operate their own assembly lines for some models. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kristin Diwan
@kdiwaniya
.@washingtonpost on how Saudi Arabia is confronting mounting costs of the US war on Iran w/my comments:
“The Saudis are willing to take short-term pain to address a long-term threat. But this puts the entire [economic] project on hold. It’s a dilemma.”
www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/10/13/saudi-arabia-face… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
טראמפ: אני חושב שהלכנו רחוק מדי בחיסול מנהיגי איראן. אנחנו לא מצליחים להבין עם מי לדבר עכשיו
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Told @AJEnglish that Iranian authorities are increasingly prepared to rely more heavily on attacks in and around the Strait of Hormuz if the current diplomatic track fails and the US blockade remains.
This does not necessarily mean that Tehran has already decided to launch a sustained campaign against US warships, but the threshold for doing so appears to have come down considerably.
www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/28/iran-touts-hormuz-attack… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
One of the Houthis’ tactics is ambushing convoys on mined routes, opening fire with machine guns and a rain of mortars to create panic and turn the columns into easier targets.
This has significantly slowed the advance of Saudi-backed troops, who, even with substantial air support, are struggling to consolidate positions.
Clashes continue nonetheless, with casualties on both sides.
The attacks on Saudi infrastructure are obviously worrying their allies in Yemen and lowering troop morale.
But did the Houthis really mine routes in the desert? Who was the crazy one? Rommel did it, and he used ambush tactics very similar to these.
As I said earlier, any real pacification of the region depends on an understanding between Trump and the IRGC, which is unlikely.
Everyone else is a secondary actor.
The Saudis don’t have enough bombs or interceptors for a conflict lasting months. Even if they did, it wouldn’t change much.
The chances of intercepting saturated waves of drones plus more than one type of missile are not high.
But even if the Saudis decided to go all-in against the Houthis, mobilize their own army, add another 250,000 men to the front, and get drawn into a deeper war, what would Saudi Arabia actually gain?
That equation doesn’t add up for me.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amjad M
@AmjadD_Undertkr
Ansarallah has revealed that Iran twice pressed Yemen to agree to a ceasefire with Saudi Arabia, with Foreign Minister Araghchi recently offering to mediate. Yemen rejected every approach.
The unusually direct statement sends a powerful message: Ansarallah is increasingly aware of the danger posed by Iran’s reformist camp and the administration’s growing willingness to sacrifice Yemen’s position in pursuit of regional deals.
Yemen has made its position clear: its resistance is not a bargaining chip for Tehran’s diplomacy. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
Another War with Iran: To What End, and What Comes Next?
The fundamental question is not whether the United States or Israel wants to return to war with Iran, but what exactly another military campaign is supposed to achieve.
Escalation is not a strategy. War is a means to an end, not an end in itself.
Without a major ground operation, it is difficult to see how military force alone could bring down the Iranian regime, establish control over the Strait of Hormuz, or secure Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium.
Striking Iran’s energy infrastructure would almost certainly trigger a severe Iranian response, potentially driving oil prices dramatically higher and inflicting significant economic damage across the region and beyond.
This is precisely why the debate should not focus simply on who is willing to escalate or who has the military capability to strike Iran again. The real question is what strategic objective another war would serve, how that objective could realistically be achieved, and whether the expected benefits justify the enormous risks.
The Middle East has already paid a tremendous price for the previous war. Another confrontation could impose even greater costs, particularly if both sides enter it determined to escalate rapidly and expand the scope of their attacks.
The central strategic question remains unanswered: What could another war realistically accomplish that the previous 4#0-day campaign failed to achieve?
Until there is a convincing answer, the willingness to use military force should not be confused with having a viable strategy for what comes afterward.
#iran
Clash Report
@clashreport
Pete Hegseth and CENTCOM leaders are reportedly the strongest supporters of renewed strikes on Iran.
Source: Axios -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kristin Diwan
@kdiwaniya
.@YemeniFatima argues the Houthis take the Mecca Alliance quite seriously:
"The useful lesson for KSA lies in the effort the Houthis have spent trying to break this alliance. That shows what the Houthis fear–a KSA that no longer has to fight them alone."
agsi.org/analysis/the-houthis-confront-the-mecca-alliance/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
The Next War with Iran Could Escalate Almost Immediately, and Far Beyond the Previous Conflict
One thing has become increasingly clear from Iran’s behavior in recent weeks: if the confrontation returns to full-scale war, escalation is likely to be rapid, dramatic, and potentially far more dangerous than anything we witnessed during the previous conflict.
The red lines that constrained both sides during the last war could collapse almost immediately. We should not assume that another confrontation would begin with gradual escalation, carefully calibrated retaliation, or attempts to signal intentions while avoiding a broader conflict.
Quite the opposite. Once either side decides to return to high-intensity warfare, the conflict could escalate dramatically from the very beginning.
Even if the next war lasts fewer than 39 days, its intensity could be significantly greater from day one, as both sides seek to apply the lessons they believe they learned from the previous confrontation.
From Tehran’s perspective, this could mean expanding the geographical boundaries of the conflict, targeting critical infrastructure, including undersea internet cables, and potentially even considering limited ground operations toward Kuwait.
These are not inevitable outcomes, but they are scenarios that should no longer be dismissed.
The fundamental danger is that the next war may not follow the familiar pattern of action, retaliation, and gradual escalation. Instead, both sides could move almost immediately toward their most aggressive military options, believing that the lessons of the previous war demand precisely that approach.
The next war with Iran may be shorter than the last one. But it could also be far more intense, destructive, and difficult to contain from the very first day.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
التصعيد يلوح في الأفق
لا يبدو أن الحوثيين يعتزمون التراجع عن مطلبهم الأساسي المتمثل في رفع الحصار. وفي المقابل، يبدو أن السعودية اختارت طريق التصعيد، انطلاقًا من قناعة بأن أي مفاوضات مع الحوثيين في هذه المرحلة ستُعدّ بمثابة استسلام، خصوصًا أن الحوثيين لن يقبلوا بأي تسوية مؤقتة لا تتضمن رفع الحصار.
والنتيجة واضحة: الحرب مرشحة لمزيد من التصعيد والاتساع.
وهذا الوضع يشبه إلى حد كبير المواجهة القائمة بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران، حيث يؤدي غياب الرغبة في العودة إلى المسار الدبلوماسي إلى دفع الأطراف نحو مزيد من التصعيد، لا سيما أن الوضع الراهن لم يعد مقبولًا بالنسبة لأيٍّ منها.
الخلاصة: ما لم يحدث تحول جذري في مواقف الأطراف، فإن التصعيد يبدو أقرب بكثير من التهدئة، والحرب مرشحة لأن تصبح أكثر حدة وخطورة خلال المرحلة المقبلة.
ابتسام الكتبي
@ekitbi
كشف محمد البخيتي، عضو المكتب السياسي لجماعة الحوثيين، عن فشل مساعٍ سعودية عبر طهران للتوصل إلى هدنة مؤقتة مع الجماعة.
وبحسب روايته، طرحت السعودية هدنة لمدة شهر، ثم هدنة أقصر لمدة أسبوعين، لكن الحوثيين رفضوا المقترحين.
وبرر البخيتي الرفض بأن صنعاء لا تقبل تسوية مؤقتة تقتصر على وقف العمليات العسكرية، وتطالب باتفاق شامل يتضمن إنهاء الحرب ورفع الحصار.
وأضاف أن الوساطة الإيرانية تعثرت بسبب ما وصفه برفض الرياض الاعتراف بأنها طرف مباشر في الحرب اليمنية.
ونقلت الغارديان عنه أن الجماعة تعتبر ميزان القوى الحالي مختلفاً عن المراحل السابقة، وأن التسوية الممكنة اليوم قد تصبح أصعب مع استمرار التصعيد. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Crisis Group
@CrisisGroup
Some 5,000 foreign fighters who helped topple former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime are still under arms in Syria. The government’s approach has generated a host of anxieties. www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/middle-east-north-africa/syria/st…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
The Saudis are acquiring a substantial American arsenal of bombs and munitions.
Riyadh is set to receive various types of American bombs and anti-drone munitions worth several billion dollars.
This includes a $5 billion package of Joint Direct Attack Munitions as Extended Range (JDAM-ER) approved by the U.S.
State Department in early September: roughly 10,000 guidance kits paired with matching bombs (about 5,000 of the 500-lb BLU-111 and 5,000 of the 2,000-lb BLU-117).
Some of the heavier ones offer meaningful penetration against reinforced targets, though they are not dedicated bunker-busters.
Separately, in July the U.S. cleared a nearly $2 billion sale of up to 20,000 APKWS laser-guided 70 mm rocket kits, half configured for air-to-air use against drones and low-end aerial threats.
The main problem is timing. These are proposed Foreign Military Sales that still require final contracts and production; the JDAM-ER package was notified to Congress on September 4 and remains under the standard review window, with a resolution of disapproval introduced by some senators.
Deliveries of this volume would normally take many months even under normal procedures, and longer if production priorities or capacity intervene, unless the process is somehow accelerated into an emergency transfer.
Even so, I do not see this as a game-changer. It is more about sustaining air capacity over time.
Even with the support Pakistan and Turkey are providing under their recent defense arrangements, Saudi arsenals do not appear to hold enough munitions for a prolonged high-intensity air campaign lasting months. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
נתניהו שוחח עם טראמפ בשבוע שעבר על האפשרות לחדש את המלחמה נגד איראן. בכירים אמריקניים אמרו כי התרשמו שנתניהו מעוניין היה לחדש את התקיפות באיראן לפני הבחירות. כמה ימים אח״כ הודיע טראמפ שלא יתקוף באיראן לפני בחירות אמצע הקדנציה. הפרטים בכתבה ב-@N12News
www.mako.co.il/news-world/2026_q4/Article-c140cb4aa1631a1… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Tactical Report
@TacticalReport
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and UAE President Mohammad bin Zayed (MBZ) prioritize security and defense files, including energy security, navigation security, supply chain security, security of vital facilities such as airports, ports, and strategic warehouses, as well as private security of leaders and officials of both countries.
Unlock the article for full insights.
tacticalreport.com/daily/64908 -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La guerre Arabie-Houthis yéménites. Un expert militaire témoigne: « les Saoudiens ont une faille que l’attaque de samedi a révélée et qu’ils ne peuvent pas combler rapidement. Ils ont négligé depuis six ou sept ans leurs couches en défense aérienne à courte et très courte portée, c’est-à-dire à moins de 2000 mètres d’altitude ». Lire mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
#yémenWar
www.lefigaro.fr/international/l-arabie-saoudite-dans-l-im… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
MORE ⬇️
- Iran appears to be targeting commercial vessels conducting ship-to-ship oil transfers in and near the Strait of Hormuz in order to try to undermine vessels’ ability to move energy through the strait.
- Iran has increased its threats against vessels in the strait, likely to reinforce the Iranian threat to shipping and reestablish control over the waterway by deterring vessels from using non-Iranian-approved routes.
- Iran may be developing its anti-ship missile capabilities to improve its ability to target vessels.
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: The Houthis fully encircled Taiz City on October 12, which will impose multiple dilemmas on Yemeni government-aligned forces. A complete encirclement further restricts Yemeni government-aligned forces’ ability to reinforce and resupply their positions, withdraw forces, and sustain defensive operations in and around Taiz City.
Other Key Takeaways:
The Houthis likely perceive Saudi Arabia’s temporary closure of King Khalid International Airport and reports of Saudi Arabia’s air defense constraints as indicators that the group is successfully mounting pressure on Saudi Arabia. Such a perception would incentivize the Houthis to sustain attacks on Saudi critical infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has not indicated any willingness to agree to Houthi demands at the time of this writing, however.
Iran appears to be targeting commercial vessels conducting ship-to-ship oil transfers in and near the Strait of Hormuz in order to try to undermine vessels’ ability to move energy through the strait.
Iran has increased its threats against vessels in the strait, likely to reinforce the Iranian threat to shipping and reestablish control over the waterway by deterring vessels from using non-Iranian-approved routes.
Iran may be developing its anti-ship missile capabilities to improve its ability to target vessels.
Iran is threatening to attack US-linked digital infrastructure in response to potential future US strikes, likely in order to try to deter the United States from resuming military action against Iran. Iran likely seeks to threaten to expand the potential US targets for Iranian attacks in order to raise the United States’ perceived costs of renewed conflict with Iran. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sana’a Center
@SanaaCenter
Saudi Arabia, in particular, must recognize that its own stability and security are inseparable from Yemen’s. It should avoid repeating mistakes of the past, such as indiscriminate airstrikes, that fueled resentment among Yemenis. Above all, it must not confer legitimacy or tacit recognition on the Houthis, who seek to impose their rule through repression and coercion.
Sana'a Center Editorial: sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/jul-sept-2026/28493 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jasmine El-Gamal
@jasmineelgamal
Saudi Arabia is in a tough spot: It has the right to defend its sovereignty, citizens and economy, but "defeating" the Houthis militarily is not realistic without a sustained ground offensive or massively expanded assistance to the Yemeni government, which will take time 1/4
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
ישראל, סעודיה והחות'ים: האם כניסה ישראלית למערכה בתימן משרתת אינטרס אסטרטגי?
בימים האחרונים אנחנו עדים לבלבול של ממש בדיווחים על אפשרות של כניסה ישראלית למערכה נגד החות'ים בתימן. החל מהטענה שארה"ב ביקשה מישראל לתקוף, אך הרמטכ"ל זמיר הבהיר כי הדבר עלול להוביל לביטול הבחירות בישראל, ועד לדיווחים שלפיהם נתניהו דווקא מעוניין בתקיפה, בעוד שסעודיה מתנגדת לכך.
קשה לדעת מה עומד מאחורי הדיווחים הסותרים הללו, אבל כדאי להפריד בין השאלה אם ישראל מסוגלת להצטרף למערכה לבין השאלה החשובה הרבה יותר: מה היא מבקשת להשיג באמצעות מהלך כזה, והאם התועלת האסטרטגית מצדיקה את המחיר?
כמה נקודות שחשוב להביא בחשבון:
א. אין תקיפה ישראלית בתימן ללא תגובה חות'ית. הניסיון המצטבר שלנו מול החות'ים מלמד עד כמה קשה לבסס מולם משוואת הרתעה יציבה. בניגוד לשחקנים אחרים באזור, החות'ים הוכיחו פעם אחר פעם כי הם מוכנים לספוג פגיעות משמעותיות ולהמשיך במערכה, ולעיתים אף להסלים אותה. לכן, כל תקיפה ישראלית צפויה להוביל לתגובה חות'ית נגד ישראל. המשמעות היא שישראל עלולה למצוא את עצמה במערכה מתמשכת, ללא יכולת ברורה לשלוט בהיקפה או במשכה.
ב. מי שחושב שסיוע ישראלי לסעודיה בתימן יוביל לנורמליזציה מחמיץ את השינוי העמוק שהתחולל בסעודיה מאז 7 באוקטובר. הסוגיה הפלסטינית הפכה למרכיב משמעותי ביותר בשיקוליה של ההנהגה הסעודית, ולא פחות מכך בדעת הקהל הסעודית. המחשבה שסיוע צבאי ישראלי נגד החות'ים יאפשר לריאד להתעלם מהסוגיה הפלסטינית ולהתקדם לנורמליזציה אינה מתיישבת עם האילוצים הפוליטיים והאסטרטגיים שעימם מתמודדת הממלכה כיום. גם אם סעודיה תעריך את התרומה הביטחונית הישראלית, אין פירוש הדבר שהיא תהיה מוכנה לשלם את המחיר הפוליטי של נורמליזציה ללא התקדמות משמעותית בזירה הפלסטינית.
ג. ישראל יכולה לסייע למערכה, אבל יש פער גדול בין היכולת לתקוף בתימן לבין היכולת להשפיע באופן מכריע על המלחמה. ישראל הוכיחה בעבר שהיא מסוגלת לפגוע במטרות בתימן, והיא יכולה לתרום הן בהגנה והן בהתקפה. אבל צריך לזכור שמדובר בזירה מרוחקת ומורכבת, השונה מהותית מלבנון או מסוריה. השתתפות ישראלית משמעותית תחייב השקעת משאבים, מודיעין, יכולות מבצעיות וקשב אסטרטגי בהיקפים לא מבוטלים.
יתרה מכך, מדינה שלא הייתה מוכנה לאפשר למטוס ישראלי להגיע כדי לפנות אזרחים מטיסת פליי דובאי תתקשה מאוד להסכים להצבת כוחות ישראליים על אדמתה. גם שיתוף פעולה מבצעי גלוי בין ישראל לסעודיה עלול להציב את ריאד בפני קשיים פוליטיים משמעותיים.
כל זאת כאשר ישראל נדרשת לשמר מוכנות להסלמה אפשרית מול איראן. השאלה איננה רק אם ישראל יכולה לתקוף בתימן, אלא כמה משאבים היא מוכנה להקצות למערכה נוספת, ומה תהיה התוצאה האסטרטגית של השקעה זו.
ד. אין זבנג וגמרנו בתימן. גם כניסה ישראלית, ואפילו אמריקנית, למערכה לא תפתור את הבעיות המבניות של הכוחות הנלחמים בחות'ים על הקרקע. הכוחות הנתמכים בידי סעודיה מתמודדים עם קשיים מבצעיים משמעותיים, וספק אם סיוע אווירי, מרשים ככל שיהיה, יוכל לבדו לשנות מן היסוד את מאזן הכוחות.
יתרה מכך, הניסיון הישראלי במערכה מול החות'ים מלמד כי גם כאשר מצליחים לפגוע בתשתיות ובמטרות משמעותיות, קשה מאוד לשלול מהארגון את יכולותיו האסטרטגיות. החות'ים בנו לאורך השנים מערך מבוזר, גמיש ובעל יכולת התאוששות, שמאפשר להם להמשיך להילחם גם לאחר שספגו תקיפות קשות.
לכן, השאלה איננה כמה מטרות ישראל תוכל להשמיד, אלא האם התקיפות הללו יוכלו להשפיע על יכולת החות'ים להמשיך במערכה ועל נכונותם לשנות את מדיניותם. עד כה, הניסיון אינו מספק סיבות רבות לאופטימיות.
ה. אסור להתעלם מהזווית האיראנית. כניסה ישראלית למערכה בתימן עלולה להגדיל משמעותית את הסיכון להסלמה ישירה בין ישראל לאיראן. טהראן כבר הוכיחה את נכונותה לסייע לשותפיה האזוריים, ומעורבות ישראלית רחבה נגד החות'ים עלולה להיתפס באיראן כחלק ממערכה אזורית רחבה יותר נגדה.
אין פירוש הדבר שאיראן בהכרח תצטרף למלחמה, אבל הסיכון להרחבת העימות, דווקא בשעה שהמתיחות בין וושינגטון לטהראן ממילא גבוהה, חייב להיות חלק מרכזי בכל דיון על כניסה ישראלית למערכה.
ו. ויש גם את שאלת הבחירות בישראל. אם ישראל תיכנס למערכה והחות'ים יגיבו בתקיפות מתמשכות נגד העורף הישראלי, הדבר עלול להשפיע על לוח הזמנים הפוליטי ואף להוביל לדחיית הבחירות. גם אם זו אינה התוצאה ההכרחית, מדובר בסיכון שאי אפשר להתעלם ממנו, במיוחד כאשר לא ברור מהו ההישג האסטרטגי שישראל מבקשת להשיג.
השורה התחתונה: ישראל בהחלט מסוגלת להצטרף למערכה נגד החות'ים, אבל יכולת צבאית אינה תחליף לאסטרטגיה. כניסה כזו לא תבטיח נורמליזציה עם סעודיה, לא בהכרח תשנה את מאזן הכוחות בתימן, ועלולה לגרור את ישראל למערכה מתמשכת, לחשוף אותה לתקיפות נוספות ולהגדיל את הסיכון להסלמה מול איראן.
לכן, לפחות בשלב הנוכחי, יש היגיון רב יותר בהתמקדות בסיוע מודיעיני, בשיתוף ידע מבצעי ובבחינת הדרכים שבהן ישראל תוכל להשתלב בעתיד בקואליציה אזורית או בינלאומית רחבה נגד האיום החות'י.
השאלה שצריכה להנחות את מקבלי ההחלטות איננה אם ישראל יכולה לתקוף בתימן. השאלה היא מה ישראל תשיג ביום שאחרי התקיפה, והאם ההישג הזה מצדיק פתיחת חזית נוספת.
כל עוד אין תשובה משכנעת לשאלה הזו, קשה לראות את התכלית האסטרטגית בכניסה ישראלית ישירה למערכה.
Liza Rozovsky
@lizarozovsky
⚡⚡ נתניהו מבקש להתערב בסכסוך עם החותים, יורש העצר הסעודי בן סלמאן מתנגד
לפי מקור דיפלומטי ומקור נוסף, ראש הממשלה מנסה לשכנע את סעודיה, בתיווך ארה"ב, שתצטרף למערכה – בתקווה לפתח את מערכת היחסים עם הממלכה ולקדם תהליך של נורמליזציה בין המדינות. לדברי אחד המקורות, בן סלמאן הטיל וטו על המהלך
הפרטים בכתבה שלי כאן:
www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/2026-10-12/ty-article/.pr… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Anna Jacobs Khalaf
@AnnaLeaJacobs
Saudis probe how defense systems failed to stop deadly Houthi attack on Riyadh airport
apnews.com/article/saudi-yemen-houthis-riyadh-airport-40c… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Haaretz.com
@haaretzcom
Netanyahu seeks to join Saudi's fight against Houthis, crown prince opposes move www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2026-10-12/ty-article/.p…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
انتخاب
@Entekhab_News
ولی نصر، مشاور سابق اوباما:
این جنگ، یک نقطه عطف تاریخی برای ایران است
تهران باید تصمیم بگیرد که آیا به نفعش است که در یک منازعه مطلق دائمی با خطر بزرگی به نام امریکا باشد یا راههایی پیدا کند که حداقل آن خطر را کمتر بکند
هر مملکتی بالاخره باید خودش به این نتیجه برسد که آیا توان ادامه راهبردی را که تا به امروز داشته داره یا ندارد
ایران در این جنگ، بردها و پیروزی های اساسی داشته، بنابراین یک سری ضعف ها یا ترس هایی که قبلا داشته را دیگه نداره و باید شاید یک سری ترس ها و ضعف های جدیدی را مد نظرش بگیرد
فیلم کامل گفتوگو در لینک زیر
youtu.be/jhTxFdvAVlc -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
عبدالرحمن الراشد
@aalrashed
مقال أ. علي الشهابي @aliShihabi
لا يمكن لأمريكا أن
تغض الطرف عن الحوثيين
ara.tv/pkiz6
🇺🇸 🇸🇦 🇾🇪
"المشاركة المباشرة للقوات الجوية الأمريكية ستكون مفيدة للغاية، لكنها ليست عنصراً حاسماً لنجاح الحملة؛
فالسعودية تمتلك الطائرات والقدرات الاستخباراتية والموارد اللازمة لدعم الحكومة اليمنية،
في حين تُثبت القوات اليمنية قدرتها على خوض المعارك البرية بنفسها،
ولكن يمكن لواشنطن أن تجعل الحملة أسرع وأكثر فعالية دون أن تتحمل هي مسؤولية الحرب؛ وهذا التمييز مهم.. فللولايات المتحدة مصلحة واضحة في مساعدتهما على تحقيق ذلك النجاح" -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: The Houthis fully encircled Taiz City on October 12, which will impose multiple dilemmas on Yemeni government-aligned forces. A complete encirclement further restricts Yemeni government-aligned forces’ ability to reinforce and resupply their positions, withdraw forces, and sustain defensive operations in and around Taiz City.
Other Key Takeaways:
The Houthis likely perceive Saudi Arabia’s temporary closure of King Khalid International Airport and reports of Saudi Arabia’s air defense constraints as indicators that the group is successfully mounting pressure on Saudi Arabia. Such a perception would incentivize the Houthis to sustain attacks on Saudi critical infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has not indicated any willingness to agree to Houthi demands at the time of this writing, however.
Iran appears to be targeting commercial vessels conducting ship-to-ship oil transfers in and near the Strait of Hormuz in order to try to undermine vessels’ ability to move energy through the strait.
Iran has increased its threats against vessels in the strait, likely to reinforce the Iranian threat to shipping and reestablish control over the waterway by deterring vessels from using non-Iranian-approved routes.
Iran may be developing its anti-ship missile capabilities to improve its ability to target vessels.
Iran is threatening to attack US-linked digital infrastructure in response to potential future US strikes, likely in order to try to deter the United States from resuming military action against Iran. Iran likely seeks to threaten to expand the potential US targets for Iranian attacks in order to raise the United States’ perceived costs of renewed conflict with Iran. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Yasmeen ياسمين
@YEryani
I joined @follybahAJE and @Dr_DaniaThafer on @AJEnglish on the latest Houthi strike on Riyadh’s airport.
🔹 The Houthis have been threatening “blockade for blockade, airport for airport” for a while. This puts escalation on a new level. It's the third strike on Riyadh’s airport and the biggest in terms of damages and casualties, and there have been strikes on other airports.
🔹 The Houthis are trying to exert maximum pressure on Saudi Arabia while mobilizing internal frontlines in an unprecedented way, moving their focus from the west coast into Taiz and more densely populated areas.
🔹 They have built high momentum and will continue to capitalize on it internally and in cross-border attacks, effectively operationalizing the notion of unification of arenas (a deliberate regionalization of the confrontation, linking multiple arenas and using the threat of wider escalation as a deterrent).
🔹 Between Tehran and Sana’a, it’s a unified front by now, with decisions made together towards the same objective.
🔹 What we’re seeing is also a preemptive escalation. Anticipating a new US military operation on Iran down the line, the Iranians are mobilizing and provoking the US on other fronts instead of waiting. Whether the US moves now is unclear, but pressure is rising.
🔹 Raising the cost of escalation to its maximum threshold for everyone may flip the calculation from further escalation to containment.
🔹 One wants to think there's always room for diplomacy, but this is surely making it harder. For Riyadh, Houthi mobilization on the Saudi border is a cause of concern and is testing its patience. The Saudis will eventually take action, but they know any action would need to be effective, and the Houthis have proven difficult to dislodge, leaving them with limited options to deal with this.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ahmed Al Omran
@ahmed
Saudi Vision 2030 wants to transform Riyadh into the region’s main finance and events hub. Houthi attacks on the city’s airport strike at the heart of that plan.
My latest in @FT — www.ft.com/content/bc7302fa-f8e4-43da-aad5-0abbfefca4f8 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Taghvaee - The Crisis Watch
@BabakTaghvaee1
BREAKING: The Saudi government is angry that the U.S. military is not using its air defense systems and fighter jets stationed in Saudi Arabia to protect the country, particularly the airports in Riyadh and Dammam.
The U.S. Army’s Patriot PAC-3 battery in Saudi Arabia protects only Prince Sultan Air Base against Iranian threats—not Riyadh or other Saudi cities against Houthi attacks.
Unlike in previous years, U.S. Air Force and Air National Guard fighter jets stationed at Prince Sultan Air Base are no longer conducting combat air patrols to intercept Houthi drones and cruise missiles over Saudi Arabia. Instead, they are patrolling the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Sea of Oman.
This has angered Saudi Arabia, which is itself unable to use its own Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD air defense systems to protect its air bases. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Daily Mail
@DailyMail
Anthropic admits Houthis used Claude AI instead of weapons engineers to make rockets and ballistic missiles that correct themselves after missing targets www.dailymail.com/news/article-16202851/Anthropic-admits-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Has the West abandoned the Saudis?
The naval coalition assembled by Saudi Arabia weeks ago was completely ignored by the Europeans, who said they were waiting for a signal from Trump.
Requests for Trump to bomb Yemen were also denied more than once.
Has the West abandoned its alliance with the Saudis? No.
But there is nothing the West can do at this moment.
The inability of the world’s greatest power, allied with a modern force like Israel’s, was no match for Iran, which consolidated support for its government and remained standing against the planet’s greatest power, destroying the American bases that were the pillar of the much-revered doctrine of encirclement. It did not survive the first test.
Years ago, a force of 30 ships with air support tried to impose itself in the strait against the Houthis. It experienced moments of panic with attacks, and more attacks, several times a day.
And at that time, the Houthis had nothing close to the arsenal they possess today.
The question is not whether the West has abandoned the Saudis, but what the West can do beyond what has already been done.
Iran is replicating in Yemen, through the Houthis, its massive doctrine of missiles and drones, a domain in which the West is still advancing at a slow pace.
The Houthis are a problem for Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, who bought into this fight several years ago. Just it!
The Emirates, which have become the most interventionist country on the planet, fell out with Bin Salman precisely over Yemen and are trying to avoid a new entry into the conflict in support of the Saudis.
However, they cannot absolve themselves. They were the main financiers and interveners in what Yemen is today.
The Saudis are stunned by the scale of the economic losses this war will bring, but they possess the resources, a force of around 150,000 men, and vast air power to continue the offensive. They simply need to accept the immense economic damage it will cause. They accepted and now are reconsidering.
Do not count on Trump, and even less on the West.
substack.com/@global21 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Le Figaro
@Le_Figaro
Avec les frappes contre l’aéroport de Riyad, on assiste à une inquiétante escalade du conflit entre l’Arabie saoudite et les rebelles yéménites houthistes. L’attaque, qui a tué au moins une dizaine de personnes, a suscité une vague de condamnations internationales.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Mes explications sur l'intensification de la guerre entre les Houthis yemenites et l'Arabie saoudite.
Le Figaro
@Le_Figaro
Avec les frappes contre l’aéroport de Riyad, on assiste à une inquiétante escalade du conflit entre l’Arabie saoudite et les rebelles yéménites houthistes. L’attaque, qui a tué au moins une dizaine de personnes, a suscité une vague de condamnations internationales.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
U.S.–Iran Relations: A Strategic Deadlock on the Road to an Almost Inevitable Escalation
Recent developments in the confrontation between Washington and Tehran point to an increasingly dangerous reality: both sides remain convinced that time is on their side, neither is prepared to compromise on its core demands, and the diplomatic path appears almost completely blocked. Under these circumstances, another round of military escalation is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid.
Several key developments illustrate the depth of the current strategic deadlock:
1. Iran is expanding its campaign against Gulf shipping. Tehran is escalating its attacks on oil tankers in and around the Strait of Hormuz, increasingly targeting vessels even at ports across the Gulf. The Iranian leadership has no intention of accepting a situation in which Iran is prevented from exporting oil while other regional producers continue their exports. From Tehran's perspective, disrupting maritime traffic and keeping oil prices elevated are essential instruments of pressure against Washington. There is little reason to expect this campaign to subside under the current circumstances. On the contrary, further escalation appears increasingly likely.
2. Tehran has no intention of capitulating at the negotiating table. Iran continues to insist on the implementation of the seven demands it has presented to the Trump administration. The Iranian leadership is unwilling to enter meaningful negotiations over its nuclear program before these conditions are addressed. Washington, however, wants to move directly toward a broader nuclear agreement. This fundamental disagreement over the sequencing of negotiations has effectively paralyzed the diplomatic process.
3. Iran believes it can ultimately prevail despite its severe economic difficulties. Tehran's strategic calculations extend far beyond sanctions relief. The Iranian leadership believes the current confrontation offers an opportunity to reshape the security architecture of the Persian Gulf, reduce the American military presence in the region, and establish a new reality in which Iran exercises significantly greater influence over the Strait of Hormuz. From this perspective, American threats, and potentially even additional military strikes, will not fundamentally change Tehran's calculations as long as the current regime remains in power.
4. Iran is rebuilding its conventional military capabilities. Despite the extensive damage sustained during the previous war, Tehran is investing considerable efforts in restoring its missile and drone production capabilities. It would be unrealistic to assume that Iran has already returned to its prewar production capacity. Nevertheless, reports suggesting that missile and UAV manufacturing has resumed, even on a limited scale, indicate that Iran is gradually rebuilding its military capabilities. This process will continue regardless of the immediate diplomatic developments.
5. The nuclear issue remains an additional source of strategic uncertainty. Reports of equipment being transferred to the Pickaxe Mountain facility suggest that Tehran may be preparing the infrastructure required to resume uranium enrichment. This does not necessarily mean that enrichment has already resumed or that a decision to develop nuclear weapons has been made. For now, the Iranian leadership appears focused primarily on its confrontation with Washington in the Gulf. Nevertheless, the possibility of renewed enrichment adds another dangerous dimension to an already volatile situation.
6. Tehran is benefiting significantly from the Saudi-Houthi confrontation. From Iran's perspective, the escalating conflict in Yemen offers a double strategic advantage. First, Saudi Arabia is paying an increasingly significant economic and security price for its military campaign. Second, Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure and regional transportation contribute to instability in global energy markets, reinforcing Tehran's broader objective of maintaining elevated oil prices. Iran can therefore benefit from the confrontation without necessarily becoming directly involved in the fighting.
7. Washington is reinforcing its military posture but has yet to resolve its fundamental strategic dilemma. The Trump administration continues to deploy additional military capabilities to the region while refusing to provide meaningful economic relief outside the framework of nuclear negotiations. American officials emphasize the millions of barrels of oil that continue to leave the Gulf, presenting this as evidence that their strategy is working. Yet the administration's outreach to President Putin suggests that Washington itself recognizes the limitations of the current arrangement. Oil may still be moving, but that does not mean the Strait of Hormuz has returned to normal commercial operations. The current situation is costly, fragile, and difficult to sustain indefinitely.
8. The administration now faces three deeply problematic options. It can accept at least some of Iran's demands and create a diplomatic opening, although this currently appears unlikely. It can continue applying economic pressure in the hope that Tehran eventually changes course, despite little evidence that the Iranian leadership is approaching capitulation or that the regime faces imminent economic collapse. Alternatively, Washington can resume military operations, hoping that additional strikes will force Iranian concessions or produce an outcome that President Trump can present as a victory. The problem is that another military campaign may achieve tactical successes without fundamentally changing Iran's strategic calculations. Moreover, Tehran will respond to any renewed American military strike, and its retaliation is likely to expand the scope of the conflict, both geographically and in terms of the targets it chooses to attack. This could include new categories of critical infrastructure, such as undersea telecommunications cables and other strategic assets that have so far remained largely outside the confrontation. In other words, another American military operation would not simply risk prolonging the war; it could transform it into a much broader regional confrontation, with potentially severe consequences for the global economy and international connectivity.
9. The central problem for Washington is the growing gap between its objectives and the instruments available to achieve them. President Trump wants a major nuclear agreement, but Tehran refuses to negotiate on the nuclear issue before its preliminary demands are met. Economic pressure has not produced the desired Iranian concessions, while military escalation offers no guarantee of a better outcome. Indeed, additional American strikes could trigger a broader regional confrontation, further disrupt energy markets, and still leave the Iranian leadership unwilling to compromise. The United States may once again find itself winning military engagements without achieving its broader strategic objectives.
10. The danger of miscalculation is increasing. As American military forces accumulate in the region and Iranian attacks continue, the possibility of an unintended escalation becomes more serious. Tehran is particularly sensitive to the prospect of being surprised by another American attack. Having already experienced previous strikes, the Iranian leadership may decide that it cannot afford to wait for Washington to act first. Under these circumstances, military preparations intended to strengthen deterrence could instead accelerate the very confrontation both sides claim they would prefer to avoid.
The Bottom Line: A Deadlock That Is Driving Both Sides Toward War
The period leading up to the U.S. midterm elections, and potentially the weeks immediately afterward, before the new Congress convenes, could prove particularly dangerous. The likelihood of further escalation is high, although its precise timing remains uncertain.
The fundamental problem is that Washington and Tehran are operating on mutually incompatible assumptions.
The Trump administration appears to believe that sustained economic and military pressure will eventually force Iran to compromise. Tehran, meanwhile, believes that its ability to disrupt Gulf shipping, maintain pressure on global energy markets, and absorb economic hardship will ultimately force Washington to reconsider its strategy.
Neither side appears prepared to abandon these assumptions. Yet another war would not necessarily resolve the underlying confrontation. Even a successful American military operation would not guarantee Iranian capitulation, while an Iranian military response could further destabilize the Gulf and impose significant costs on the global economy.
This is the central paradox of the current crisis: neither Washington nor Tehran stands to gain strategically from another war, yet neither appears willing to make the concessions necessary to prevent one.
The result is an increasingly dangerous strategic deadlock in which escalation is becoming more likely, not because either side necessarily wants a full-scale war, but because both believe that backing down would be more costly than continuing the confrontation. And that may be the most dangerous assumption of all.
#iranwar
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
@academic_la
Fascintaing column by Nahum Barnea in Ynet today. The veteran journalist describes a deal Netanyahu turned down in July 2024 that would have gotten the hostages released and the coming ICC warrants against him dropped:
1) A hostage deal was agreed. Netanyahu said yes. Sinwar said yes under Qatari and IDF pressure. Philadelphi was solved with sensors and an Egyptian guarantee.
2) The hostage families went to The Hague. Per Barnea, the Forum asked ICC prosecutor Karim Khan to withdraw his warrant applications against Netanyahu and Gallant as part of the deal, with the Hamas applications dropped too. Khan agreed to hear more survivor testimony and the Forum flew survivors in. Note that no warrants existed yet. But everyone knew they were coming.
3) This fell apart over an elleged coalition crisis but it was staged. Barnea reports that Netanyahu's office briefed Smotrich at each stage so he could burst into meetings and threaten to quit. Netanyahu then told the Americans he lacked a majority. Barnea's line: Netanyahu did not obey them, he operated them.
4) Netanyahu let it all die by July 27. His reasons, per Barnea: a deal nine months in would look like the end of the war without "total victory," he would have to explain taking Hague immunity alongside Sinwar, and Biden had just dropped out and Trump had just reconciled with him, so he would not hand Harris a win.
5) The weak link is the Khan motive. Barnea's single Israeli source says Khan believed Israel or Mossad was behind the sexual misconduct complaint against him and that dropping the Israelis would make it vanish. That is one anonymous source describing Khan's state of mind.
6) In October 2025 Netanyahu accepted a deal no better than this one, with no leverage left in Washington. Sinwar, Deif and Haniyeh were dead by then. So were hostages who were alive in July 2024.
Netanyahu was offered the hostages, a pause his generals wanted, a Philadelphi fix he could sell, and a way out of The Hague, all in one package. He refused, and he manufactured the coalition crisis he blamed for refusing. The hostages spent another year in the tunnels so he could continue the carnage in Gaza. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sana’a Center
@SanaaCenter
الحوثيون يراهنون على الضغط العسكري لإجبار السعودية على التراجع، لكنهم قد يدفعونها نحو مواجهة أوسع.
مراد العريفي @AlarefiMurad، المحرر في مركز صنعاء، يرى في تصريح لصحيفة "القدس العربي" أن استهداف المنشآت الحيوية السعودية يهدف إلى رفع كلفة إسناد القوات الحكومية، في حين أن توسيع الرياض لضرباتها الجوية قد يحد من حرية حركة الحوثيين ويخفف الضغط عن القوات الحكومية في الجبهات. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
AMK Mapping 🇳🇿
@AMK_Mapping_
The Wall Street Journal reports that Saudi Arabia is suffering from a shortage of interceptor missiles and other air defence systems due to the recent heavy daily Ansarallah missile and drone attacks on its territory.
Saudi Arabia is reportedly struggling to defend its entire airspace with adequate air defence, and is redeploying air defence batteries around the country to protect key energy facilities, as well as its palaces. Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is reportedly carefully moving between “heavily guarded palaces equipped with bunkers” alongside handpicked security guards.
Yesterday, two Ansarallah cruise missiles managed to breach Saudi airspace for over 800 km, with one being intercepted over King Khalid International Airport and the other impacting. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Anna Jacobs Khalaf
@AnnaLeaJacobs
But very interesting to note that the Saudi foreign ministry statements, and R4 statements, focus their attention solely on the Houthis and are trying to avoid making this about retaliating against Iran.
Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي
@omeisy
The Houthis want to force a calculus where Riyadh is forced to choose between continuing its support for the Yemeni government’s military campaign, and protecting its own economic and civilian infrastructure.
Moreover, though the Houthis pulled the trigger, Tehran’s fingerprints are all over this escalation.
Saudi Arabia is effectively facing attacks from two interconnected threats: Iran and the Houthi militia it arms and supports. The Houthis may have operational autonomy, but it strains credibility to suggest Tehran had no knowledge of, or role in, an escalation of this magnitude.
For Washington and European capitals, the question is no longer whether the Houthis pose a serious threat, but how much further that threat will be allowed to grow. Years of treating Houthi escalation as a manageable regional problem have not produced lasting deterrence.
Ignoring the warning signs now risks allowing a threat that already extends across Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, and vital international shipping lanes to spiral into a much wider crisis, with consequences for global security, trade, and economic stability.
I explain to Salma @CNN hereThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
MORE 🧵(1/3): Saudi Arabia announced on October 10 and 11 that unidentified projectiles struck near King Fahd International Airport in Dammam and a terminal at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, respectively. The attack on King Khalid Airport sparked a fire. The Houthis have targeted these airports repeatedly in recent days, including an October 10 missile attack on King Khalid Airport that killed over 10 people. Saudi Arabia has also intercepted a drone and two missiles, almost certainly launched by the Houthis, since ISW-CTP ‘s last data cutoff.
Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree issued another warning on October 11 against using Saudi airports and airspace, threatening continued Houthi attacks on Saudi airports until the Houthis achieve their objectives. Houthi objectives include ending Saudi support for the Yemeni government counteroffensive, lifting Saudi controls on Houthi-controlled ports and airports, paying war reparations and civil servant salaries, and granting the Houthis control over Yemen’s oil and gas resources. US President Donald Trump told reporters on October 10 that he is considering whether the United States will conduct strikes against the Houthis in response to recent Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia.
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
Iran Update, October 11, 2026: The Houthis have continued to attack Saudi airports as part of the group's campaign to impose increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia via attacks on Saudi critical infrastructure. Saudi Arabia announced on October 10 and 11 that unidentified projectiles struck near King Fahd International Airport in Dammam and a terminal at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, respectively.
More Key Takeaways:
The Houthi-Yemeni government frontlines have remained relatively stable since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff. The Southern Giants Brigades destroyed five Houthi armored vehicles that were traveling toward Yemeni government-held territory near Dhubab Airport on the Red Sea coastal plain on October 11.
Saudi Arabia continued to target Houthi positions and communications infrastructure across Yemen to support Yemeni government-aligned ground forces and degrade the Houthis' ability to attack Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia struck Houthi positions near Jabal Sabr on October 11. Houthi and local Yemeni media reported that Saudi Arabia conducted additional airstrikes on Houthi-controlled territory in Taiz Governorate on October 10 and 11. (1/2) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
IRNA News Agency ☫
@IrnaEnglish
Newly surfaced footage shows Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Hosseini Khamenei at the residence of the late Allameh Mesbah Yazdi.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sana’a Center
@SanaaCenter
Yemen is entering a defining moment. What is at stake is not simply the balance of power, but the future of the Yemeni state, the kind of society Yemenis will live in, and who gets to decide that future.
Sana'a Center Editorial: sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/jul-sept-2026/28493 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Soufan Center
@TheSoufanCenter
#intelbrief: Outside Powers Respond to Instability in the Red Sea
Read more 👇 thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-october-12/
📱Subscribe to our newsletter for daily #intelbriefs: thesoufancenter.us4.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=3fe77a491… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Telegraph
@Telegraph
Five of its board members are linked to a small Israeli arms company which has just landed a US military contract worth up to $150m (£112m). The company makes AI-driven rifle sights and drones that have been battle tested in Gaza.
A second business is involved in financing the building of illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank, and a third is being pursued in the US courts for allegedly helping Hamas conceal its Gaza terror tunnels in the run-up to the Oct 7 attacks.
These are a few of the potential conflicts of interest a Telegraph investigation has uncovered in Donald Trump’s board of peace ⤵️
www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/10/10/conflicts-threa… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aaron David Miller
@aarondmiller2
Smart take @viviannereim An unintended but inevitable result of a US war of choice soon entering its 8th month. We sell Saudis -who can't defend themselves even with our help -- billions in weapons. And yet they're more defenseless than Houthis. www.nytimes.com/2026/10/11/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aaron David Miller
@aarondmiller2
Who is the guy who might become the 15th Prime Minister of Israel?@talschneider @davidhorovitz in a revealing interview provide some insight www.timesofisrael.com/bereaved-by-war-determined-to-heal-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
محسن رضایی
@ir_rezaee
The U.S. has agreed to some of Iran’s seven conditions, but we consider its response INADEQUATE.
Iranian diplomacy has changed and there will be no return to the status quo ante. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Saudi Arabia remains in shock and without a clear response to the Houthis.
Saudi Arabia began organizing a major offensive against the Houthis, rebuilt ties with the Emirates, and mobilized Turkish and Pakistani forces.
Ground operations backed by strong drone and air support managed to seize positions along the coast. The Saudi air force carried out more than 100 strikes a day at times, and there are reports of Pakistani air force involvement as well.
Until then, the Saudis had been dealing with attacks against their petrochemical infrastructure, including refineries, pumping stations, pipelines, and other targets.
But the atmosphere of tension and vulnerability took hold of the kingdom after Saturday’s attack and the new bombardment on Sunday, which struck the economic heart of the country and its civilian infrastructure, shaking the sense of security Saudi Arabia had been trying to project to the world.
Even with billions invested in American air defense systems, the country proved vulnerable to successive attacks. The Houthi tactic of combining cheap attack drones with more sophisticated missiles repeatedly pierced Riyadh’s protective shields.
The Shaybah Complex, one of Aramco’s most important oil and gas facilities in the Eastern Province, was hit by missiles and drones. The Tanajib Facility, another critical energy installation in the same eastern oil region, was also targeted.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s greatest fear is materializing: the economic and reputational impact. These attacks come at a moment of financial pressure, with the government facing deficit projections and budgetary contraction.
Seeing airports closed and smoke over the capital drives away tourism and foreign capital, pillars of the Vision 2030 modernization strategy.
The immediate fear grounded aviation. International airlines are suspending flights, King Khalid International Airport remains closed, and foreign embassies, including the American one, have issued severe alerts restricting the movement of their citizens and staff on Saudi routes.
The Saudi-led coalition promised a decisive response to what it called a war crime.
Yet I reiterate that Saudi options are limited. Entering a prolonged ground war in Yemen would be extremely costly and risky, while relying only on air strikes has not been enough to contain the rebels, who move quickly in small, dispersed units. The Saudi strategy appears focused on attrition, but there is no clear plan for dealing with Houthi tactics.
Even though the kingdom had anticipated the use of missiles against its infrastructure, it is paralyzed, in shock at the Houthis’ audacity and effectiveness.
State television insists on highlighting the advances of allied forces and the destruction of missile platforms in Yemen.
The government also continues to project institutional normality; the media has emphasized that the World Energy Congress, hosted in Riyadh just a few kilometers from the damaged airport, remains confirmed, in an effort to signal stability to international markets.
The panic is real. In several cities in the west and center of the country, residents received official instructions from Civil Defense to seek shelter and stay away from windows due to the risk of new fragments and missiles. The immediate fear altered daily life.
The Saudi Ministry of Education ordered all schools in Riyadh to operate remotely for a week. Residents and travelers report crowded hospitals and the shock of seeing international air traffic completely halted in the capital, while The state media spread the official version of the events.
Riyadh and Dammam have long been seen as fortified strongholds. Watching defenses fail repeatedly against drones and missiles has shaken public confidence.
Read more
global21.substack.com/p/saudi-arabia-remains-in-shock-and… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Anna Jacobs Khalaf
@AnnaLeaJacobs
“Saturday’s Riyadh attack should serve as a turning point in translating shared concern into practical commitments. The measure of a security partnership is its ability to protect lives, prevent renewed aggression and uphold regional stability when those commitments are put to the test.” @AbdulazizOSager
Gulf Research Center - مركز الخليج للأبحاث
@Gulf_Research
Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Founder and Chairman of the Gulf Research Center (GRC), examines the need for a coordinated international security response in his latest opinion article for @arabnews, titled “Riyadh Airport Attack Requires a Shared Security Response.”
Read the full article here: www.arabnews.com/opinion/riyadh-airport-attack-requires-a… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
MORE: Iran continues to attack commercial ships using “unauthorized” routes through the Strait of Hormuz as part of its effort to enforce its control over the strategic waterway. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that unidentified projectiles struck two outbound tankers in the strait on October 10 and 11, causing a fire aboard the first vessel and damaging the second. Supreme National Security Council Secretary Major General Mohsen Rezaei claimed on October 11 that Iranian forces target five or six small vessels each night that transfer oil to larger tankers through Omani waters. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy separately claimed on October 10 that a “rogue” supertanker struck a naval mine while attempting to exit the strait through an “unauthorized” route. The IRGC Navy later claimed on October 11 that three tankers have struck mines and caught fire while using “unauthorized” routes since October 10 and warned that it will treat vessels that turn off their automatic identification systems (AIS) as “hostile.” Trump announced on August 25 that the US Navy had cleared all mines from the strait.
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
Iran Update, October 11, 2026: The Houthis have continued to attack Saudi airports as part of the group's campaign to impose increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia via attacks on Saudi critical infrastructure. Saudi Arabia announced on October 10 and 11 that unidentified projectiles struck near King Fahd International Airport in Dammam and a terminal at King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, respectively.
More Key Takeaways:
The Houthi-Yemeni government frontlines have remained relatively stable since ISW-CTP's last data cutoff. The Southern Giants Brigades destroyed five Houthi armored vehicles that were traveling toward Yemeni government-held territory near Dhubab Airport on the Red Sea coastal plain on October 11.
Saudi Arabia continued to target Houthi positions and communications infrastructure across Yemen to support Yemeni government-aligned ground forces and degrade the Houthis' ability to attack Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia struck Houthi positions near Jabal Sabr on October 11. Houthi and local Yemeni media reported that Saudi Arabia conducted additional airstrikes on Houthi-controlled territory in Taiz Governorate on October 10 and 11. (1/2) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Andrew Leber
@AndrewMLeber
Per Qatari diplomat Al Thawadi, "a [plausible] deal... would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, provide Iran with significant sanctions relief... and might include some small commitments to constrain their nuclear program" @ChrisMurphyCT on his visit to the Gulf
www.chrismurphyct.com/p/behind-the-scenes-my-visit-to-the… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Laura Rozen
@lrozen
FT: “Trump’s approval rating on Iran has fallen by more than seven percentage points since May, with less than one-quarter of registered voters now approving of his handling of the conflict. Nearly two-thirds of registered voters said the US should prioritise reaching an agreement as soon as possible, rather than continuing the conflict until it secures more favourable terms.”
www.ft.com/content/f6d29414-412d-4422-a5f4-cb3338f73d3a -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
UnXeptable
@UnxeptableD
💥 The general who woke Netanyahu on the morning of Oct. 7 just broke his silence.
He says:
⚠️ Netanyahu was warned of war 3 months earlier
⚠️ Logs from Oct 7 have been tampered
⚠️ Hostages “could have come back earlier”
🎥 @N12News @LimorYoav @DanyCushmaroThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 كشفت مصادر التقت القيادة السعودية مؤخراً إن الأمير محمد بن سلمان مصمم على استعادة الأراضي التي خسرها حلفاؤه أمام الحوثيين خلال الشهر الماضي. لكن مسؤولاً غربياً قال إنه لا يعرف ما إذا كانت القيادة السعودية تمتلك أهدافاً واضحة تتجاوز استعادة تلك المناطق، ما يعكس عدم وضوح الغاية النهائية للحملة العسكرية في نظر المصدر.
🔷 تكشف مجلة «الإيكونوميست» أن السعودية تواجه أزمة أمنية وعسكرية متفاقمة بعد تعرض مطار الملك خالد الدولي بالرياض لهجمات صاروخية متكررة، وسط تعثر الهجوم المضاد للقوات الحكومية اليمنية وعجز الخيارات العسكرية والدبلوماسية المتاحة عن تقديم حل واضح للتهديد الحوثي. وترى المجلة أن ولي العهد محمد بن سلمان يواجه معضلة تتمثل في ضرورة استعادة الأراضي التي سيطر عليها الحوثيون، مع تجنب حرب استنزاف طويلة تهدد مشروعات التحول الاقتصادي وجذب الاستثمارات الأجنبية.
🔷 تشير المجلة إلى أن أسباب إخفاق الدفاعات الجوية السعودية في اعتراض الصواريخ التي أصابت المطار لا تزال غير واضحة، رغم امتلاك المملكة منظومات أميركية متقدمة من طرازي «ثاد» و«باتريوت». وتكشف أن السعودية، على غرار دول أخرى في المنطقة، تشعر بالقلق من تناقص مخزونات الصواريخ الاعتراضية.
🔷 تثير المجلة تساؤلات بشأن قرار السلطات السعودية إبقاء مطار الرياض مفتوحاً رغم استمرار الهجمات طوال ثلاثة أسابيع وتصاعد قوتها. فقد أسفرت ضربة 8 أكتوبر عن مقتل ثلاثة أشخاص، بينما ألغت شركات أجنبية مئات الرحلات. وتقول المجلة إن قرار إبقاء المطار قيد التشغيل بات يُنظر إليه في العاصمة باعتباره مجازفة غير محسوبة.
🔷 تكشف «الإيكونوميست» أن الهجوم المضاد الذي بدأته السعودية وحلفاؤها اليمنيون هذا الشهر حقق تقدماً محدوداً على الساحل الغربي، لكنه تعثر قرب بلدة ذباب، على مسافة 40 كيلومتراً جنوب ميناء المخا الذي سيطر عليه الحوثيون الشهر الماضي. وتوضح أن القوات الحكومية استعادت شريطاً ساحلياً، لكنها لم تتمكن حتى الآن من استعادة المخا، في مؤشر على عودة الجمود الميداني بعد التقدم الأولي.
🔷 تؤكد المجلة أن الحوثيين يواصلون محاولاتهم لتطويق مدينة تعز، ثالث أكبر مدن اليمن وأحد أبرز معاقل المقاومة المناهضة للجماعة. ويتزامن هذا الضغط البري مع استئناف الهجمات الصاروخية والمسيّرة على منشآت داخل السعودية، تشمل مصافي النفط والقواعد العسكرية والمطارات المدنية.
🔷 تقدم المجلة تقييماً بأن الدعم العسكري الخارجي الحالي، بما يشمل القوات الباكستانية والمساعدة البريطانية والفرنسية واحتمال المشاركة الأميركية، لا يبدو كافياً لتحقيق حسم عسكري ضد الحوثيين. وتستند في ذلك إلى تجربة الحرب المستمرة منذ عام 2015، التي لم تنجح خلالها القوات السعودية وحلفاؤها في إنهاء سيطرة الجماعة على مناطق واسعة من اليمن.
🔷 اقتصادياً، تكشف المجلة أن منظمي مؤتمر «مبادرة مستقبل الاستثمار» أعلنوا، قبل ساعات من هجوم السبت، استمرار الاستعدادات لعقد المؤتمر في 26 أكتوبر. ويشكل المؤتمر أحد أهم الأحداث الدولية التي يستخدمها محمد بن سلمان لاستقطاب كبار المستثمرين والمؤسسات المالية، لكن الهجمات تثير تساؤلات حول قدرة المشاركين على الوصول إلى الرياض واستعدادهم للحضور.
🔷 تمتد المخاطر الجوية إلى خارج العاصمة، إذ استهدف الحوثيون أيضاً مطار الدمام، الواقع على مسافة نحو أربع ساعات بالسيارة شرق الرياض. وتشير المجلة إلى أن استخدام مدن سعودية أخرى للوصول إلى المؤتمر قد لا يوفر بديلاً آمناً إذا استمرت الهجمات على المطارات المختلفة.
🔷 ترى «الإيكونوميست» أن الحوثيين يمتلكون قدرة أكبر على تحمل حرب طويلة مقارنة بالسعودية، لأنهم يحكمون مناطق تعاني أصلاً انهياراً اقتصادياً وبنية تحتية مدمرة، ويمولون أنشطتهم العسكرية بضرائب ورسوم مرتفعة مفروضة على السكان. أما السعودية فتواجه مخاطر مباشرة على استثماراتها ومطاراتها وقطاع الطاقة، وعلى خططها لتحويل الاقتصاد إلى مركز إقليمي للسياحة والأعمال.
🔷 تحدد المجلة الخيار البديل في التفاوض مع الحوثيين، لكنها تتوقع أن تطالب الجماعة بثمن سياسي واقتصادي مرتفع مقابل وقف الهجمات. وتشمل المطالب المحتملة الحصول على منافع اقتصادية، وإنهاء القيود السعودية على المجال الجوي اليمني، وتقديم تنازلات أخرى. وترى المجلة أن الاستجابة لهذه المطالب بعد استهداف منشآت مدنية قد تشجع الحوثيين على اعتبار تلك الهجمات وسيلة فعالة لانتزاع التنازلات.
🔷 تخلص المجلة أن السعودية تفتقر حالياً إلى خيار منخفض التكلفة لإنهاء تهديد الحوثيين. فاستمرار الحرب يهدد الاقتصاد والاستثمار، وتوسيع العمليات العسكرية لا يضمن الحسم، بينما قد يتطلب التفاوض تقديم تنازلات كبيرة لجماعة أثبتت قدرتها على مواصلة القتال رغم سنوات من الضربات الجوية. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amberin Zaman
@amberinzaman
Saudi Arabia's escalation against the Houthis is unlikely to deliver victory. @citrinowicz explains why diplomacy is the only way out of the current and growing mess. www.al-monitor.com/podcasts/saudi-arabias-escalation-agai… via @AlMonitor
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
There are upsides to the growing entanglement between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, but they are “outweighed by the fact that integration of the two regions is occurring substantially through proxy warfare and arms,” writes @alanboswell.
www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/new-red-sea-wars -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Thomas Juneau
@thomasjuneau
Saudi Arabia faces no good options with the Houthis. Military escalation was inevitable and is likely to continue - but it will hurt Saudi Arabia more than the Houthis. Negotiations are inevitable too - though not in the short term. The Houthis hold stronger cards, and they know it; their goal will be to extract maximal concessions from Saudi Arabia, which remains reluctant to pay this very high price.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ahmed Al Omran
@ahmed
Houthis could now manufacture their own attack drones largely independently, using locally produced fibreglass and components from China, @BashaReport says. More sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles remain heavily dependent on Iranian components and technology.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Maged Almadhaji ماجد المذحجي
@MAlmadhaji
تكرار استهداف الحوثيين مطار الرياض وسقوط هذا العدد الكبير من الضحايا يحمل، في تقديري، رسالة متعمدة: رفع كلفة القرار السعودي عبر تهديد حياة المدنيين وحركة الاقتصاد والثقة بالأمان.
هذه الخطورة صنعتها تكنولوجيا خفّضت كلفة الهجوم، وخبرات وإمدادات إيرانية، وقبضة أمنية وأيديولوجية تتيح للجماعة حشد الموارد للحرب وتحميل المجتمع كلفتها. ويتصرف الحوثي بجرأة مقامر يعرف أن خصمه لديه الكثير مما يريد حمايته.
وقد تعلّم أن رغبة الآخرين في تجنّب التصعيد تمنحه وقتاً لإعادة بناء قوته، ثم العودة بمطالب أكبر وأدوات أشد إيذاءً. بهذا المعنى، قد تتحول كلفة الهدوء المؤقت إلى تهديد يتضاعف لاحقاً.
الخطر أن يؤسس نجاح هذا الابتزاز الآن لسلوك متكرر: استهداف المطارات والمدنيين كلما احتاج الحوثي إلى تعديل شروط السياسة. وإذا اقتنع بأن خوف خصومه على مصالحهم يقيّد ردهم، فسيصبح أكثر جرأة على استهدافها. وكل ما يحرصون على حمايته سيغدو، في حساباته، وسيلة إضافية للتحكم بقراراتهم. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Guerre entre l'Arabie et les Houthis. Pourquoi les insurgés yéménites basculent dans l'escalade? Mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
#yémenWar
www.lefigaro.fr/international/avec-les-frappes-contre-l-a… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Yemenis and Iranians escalate, and Trump will have to make a decision.
The third devastating attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh this Saturday immediately created chaos in air infrastructure, international panic, and a string of urgent security responses.
A missile hit the domestic terminal complex of the Saudi capital’s airport, killing 12 people and injuring more than 300. Another projectile fell near Dammam airport in the east of the country.
The Civil Aviation Authority identified that among the dead are four Saudis, two Bangladeshis, one American, one Egyptian, one Jordanian, one Syrian, one Palestinian, and one Sudanese.
The attack exposed serious security failures, Saudi Arabia’s early-warning system issued no alert before the impact.
Major international airlines, including Kuwait Airways, Etihad Airways, Qatar Airways, Lufthansa, Air India, FlyDubai, and Pakistan International Airlines, interrupted and canceled their routes to the country, some suspending operations until next Monday.
This is exactly the Houthis’ goal: squeeze the Saudi economy hard enough to put Trump in a position where he eases blockades and sanctions on Iran. We’re talking here about cross-pressures from the Saudis on Trump.
Despite the strong retaliation rhetoric and the military escalation in Yemen and the Red Sea intensifying, analysts note that the Saudi government’s immediate official reaction on internal state channels took a cautious tone, focusing on technical assessment of the damage before launching another massive wave of counter-attacks.
Is the ferocity of the Yemeni attacks making the Saudis rethink their actions? I don’t think so. When the Saudis decided to escalate against the Houthis, they were obviously already factoring in missile strikes on petrochemical, port, and airport infrastructure.
But how long can the country go without exporting and without flights at its main airport?
Another point: with the deaths, what position will neighbors like Turkey and Pakistan take?
The Yemeni threats are already on the table today. Houthi military spokesmen publicly declared that any foreign force landing on Saudi soil to support the kingdom will be considered a hostile force and a legitimate target for their ballistic missiles and drones.
Iran also escalated its attacks and expanded them geographically, hitting commercial ships and oil tankers beyond the Strait of Hormuz, reaching the Gulf of Oman and waters near Qatar. This has raised new fears of global fuel shortages and put U.S. and allied fleets back on alert. With this, Iran is solidifying control over the port zone of the Emirates and also Oman, showing it will not accept any land bypass of its exclusion zone in Hormuz.
Today’s attack triggered an immediate reaction in Washington. President Donald Trump publicly said he is evaluating whether the U.S. will join the Saudi attacks against the Houthis in Yemen directly. Trump stated the White House will make a decision and is moving very quickly.
In the last 48 hours, the Saudi Air Force carried out large-scale operations with more than 59 airstrikes and bombed more than 130 Houthi military targets in Yemen, including positions in Sanaa, Saada, Hodeidah, Al-Jawf, and Marib. According to the Saudis, the destroyed targets include missile depots, launch platforms, and command centers.
Read more:
global21.substack.com/p/yemenis-and-iranians-escalate-and… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ramazan Bursa
@RBursa
İran Eski Dışişleri Bakanı Cevad Zarif'in sansürsüz yaptığı konuşmada anlattıkları, tartışmalara neden oldu:
"Şimdi ben sabaha kadar burada durup geçmiş hakkında sızlanıp şikayet mi edeyim? Ben sabaha kadar burada durup geçmiş hakkında sızlansam Kasım (Süleymani) dirilecek mi? Seyyid Hasan (Nasrullah) dirilecek mi? Elimize ne geçecek?
Gelin bir gerçeği kabul edelim; Mao'nun Çin için yaptığını biz de yapalım. Sayın doktor dedi ki: Çinliler her zaman dünyanın büyük ekonomilerinden biriydi ancak yüz yıl boyunca aşağılandılar.
Mao geldi ne yaptı? Mao geldi ve bu yüz yıllık aşağılanmaya son verdi. Nasıl son verdi? 'Kendime inanıyorum ki ABD'nin karşısına oturup onunla müzakere edebilirim' dedi.
Çin, 1976 yılından ve Mao'nun ölümünden sonra ilerlemedi; 1970-1971 yıllarından sonra, yani Mao kendisinde 'dünyayla iletişim kurabilirim' inancını bulduktan sonra ilerledi.
Bugün Çin'de Mao'nun heykeline tapıyorlar/saygı gösteriyorlar. Ancak onu Kültür Devrimi ile Çin halkını sefil eden biri olarak değil; kimse Mao'yu bunun sorumlusu olarak anmıyor. Mao'yu ne olarak anıyorlar? Çin'in yüz yıllık aşağılanmasına son veren ve Çin'in bu fırsatı kullanarak öne doğru atılım yapmasına izin veren kişi olarak anıyorlar.
Her şeyi bir tehdit olarak görüyoruz. Başörtüsünü (hicabı) bir siper, bir mevzi gibi görüyoruz.
Peki nasıl oluyor da sosyal bir mesele askeri bir konuya dönüşüyor? Çünkü biz her şeyi tehdit olarak görüyoruz.
Bu yüzden benim söylemek istediğim şudur: Bu sorundan kurtulabilmemiz için bakış açımızı değiştirmemiz gerekiyor. Tehdit odaklı bakış açımızı fırsat odaklı bir bakış açısına dönüştürmeliyiz.
Eğer bölgeye bakışımız tehdit odaklı olursa, büyükelçimizin Kudüs Gücü temsilcisi olması gerekir. Ama bakışımız fırsat odaklı olursa, büyükelçimizin bir tüccar veya diplomat olması gerekir.
Neden bizim bölgedeki; Afganistan’daki, Suriye’deki, Irak’taki temsilcilerimiz ve büyükelçilerimiz Kudüs Gücü temsilcisi? Çünkü biz oraları tehdit olarak görüyoruz. Eğer tehdit olarak görmezsek, işte o zaman fırsatlar için bir zemin oluşur.
Başka bir hususu daha belirteyim: Bu bakış açıları birbirini besler ve güçlendirir. Yani biz Suudi Arabistan’ı bir tehdit olarak görürsek, Suudi Arabistan için de tehdit haline geliriz. Suudi Arabistan bizi tehdit olarak gördüğünde, biz de Suudi Arabistan için bir tehdit oluruz.
Düşmanlığa dayalı bu bakış açısına alıştığımız için sürekli geçmişi yeniden inşa edip duruyoruz. İmam Hüseyin döneminden bugüne kadar olan geçmişi...
Bakın, ne zaman birisi gelip şiir okusa —o Sayın Mutii mi nedir, kimse artık— Suudi Arabistan hakkında şiir okurken iki yıl sonrasını hiç düşünmüyor. Ben onlara diyordum ki: Bu JCPOA'yı (Nükleer Anlaşma'yı) —kusura bakmayın, ağır bir benzetme olacak ama— bazı olumsuz durumların üzerini örtmek için tuvalet kağıdı gibi kullanıyorsunuz; ama yarın bir gün gelip aynı şeyle burnunuzu temizlemek zorunda kalacağınızı hesaba katmıyorsunuz.
Cuma namazında Suudi Arabistan aleyhine o şiirleri okuyan kişi bilmeliydi ki; yarın öbür gün Yüce Lider (Hamanei), Suudi Arabistan Savunma Bakanı'nın yanında oturmak durumunda kalacaktır..." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
חיסול חמינאי: טעות אסטרטגית שאת מחירה אנחנו עדיין משלמים
כפי שטענתי מהרגע הראשון, חיסולו של עלי חמינאי היה טעות אסטרטגית חמורה. לא משום שחמינאי היה מנהיג מתון או משום שלא היה ראוי לפעול נגד המשטר האיראני, אלא משום שההחלטה לחסלו התבססה על הבנה שגויה של המשטר, של תהליכי קבלת ההחלטות בטהראן ושל ההשלכות האפשריות של סילוקו.
א. חיזוק הקיצונים ומשמרות המהפכה: חיסול חמינאי הוביל לעלייתה של הנהגה קיצונית יותר ולחיזוק דרמטי של משמרות המהפכה, שהעמיקו את אחיזתם במוקדי הכוח ובתהליכי קבלת ההחלטות בטהראן. במקום להחליש את המשטר, החיסול תרם להתגבשותה של הנהגה שמוכנה לקחת סיכונים גדולים יותר בעימות עם ישראל וארצות הברית.
ב. חמינאי כבלם בתוכנית הגרעין: בניגוד לתפיסה שהשתרשה בישראל, חמינאי עצמו היה במשך שנים אחד החסמים המרכזיים בפני ההחלטה לפתח נשק גרעיני. הוא אפשר לאיראן להתקדם מבחינה טכנולוגית, אך נמנע ממתן האישור הפוליטי לחציית הסף לנשק גרעיני. הטענות של ההנהגה הישראלית כאילו איראן כבר החזיקה בנשק גרעיני, או שהמלחמה מנעה ממנה להציב נשק גרעיני על טיל ולשגרו לעבר ישראל, שייכות יותר לעולמות המדע הבדיוני מאשר להערכה מודיעינית מבוססת.
ג. אידיאולוג קיצוני, אך מנהיג זהיר: חמינאי לא היה ציוני, לא היה פציפיסט ובוודאי שלא היה ידיד ישראל. הוא היה אידיאולוג אסלאמיסטי שמרן, שראה בישראל אויב שיש להיאבק בו. אולם לצד תפיסת עולמו הקיצונית, הוא היה גם מנהיג זהיר מאוד בכל הנוגע להפעלת כוח צבאי איראני ישיר, ובמיוחד מול ישראל וארצות הברית. החשש שלו ממלחמה שתסכן את שרידות המשטר היה מרכיב מרכזי בתהליך קבלת ההחלטות שלו. ההתעלמות מההבחנה בין קיצוניות אידיאולוגית לבין נכונות לקחת סיכונים צבאיים הייתה טעות יסודית.
ד. זריקת מרץ למשטר שהיה במשבר: חמור מכך, חיסול חמינאי העניק לרפובליקה האסלאמית, שהייתה במשבר עמוק בעקבות גלי המחאה הקשים בתולדותיה, הזדמנות להתלכד מחדש סביב תחושת איום חיצוני. במקום להאיץ את קריסת המשטר, החיסול סיפק לו זריקת מרץ פוליטית ואידיאולוגית, במיוחד בקרב בסיס התמיכה הנאמן שלו. מי שהניח שחיסול המנהיג יוביל להתפוררות המערכת השלטונית לא הבין את עומקם של המוסדות והמנגנונים שעליהם נשענת הרפובליקה האסלאמית.
ה. הישג צבאי משמעותי, אך סכנה גרעינית ארוכת טווח: אין ספק שבמבצע עם כלביא הושג הישג משמעותי בפגיעה בתשתיות הגרעין האיראניות, במיוחד בעקבות התקיפה האמריקנית בפורדו. ראוי להזכיר שכאשר ישראל יצאה למלחמה, כלל לא היה ברור שהממשל האמריקני יסכים לתקוף את המתקן. אולם ההישג המבצעי אינו מבטל את השאלה האסטרטגית. העובדה שאיראן אינה מעשירה כיום אורניום אינה מלמדת בהכרח על כוונותיה בעתיד. להפך, בהיעדרו של חמינאי והבלמים שהציב, ועל רקע הלקחים שההנהגה האיראנית מפיקה מהמלחמה, עלולה להתחזק בטהראן ההבנה שנשק גרעיני הוא תעודת הביטוח האולטימטיבית מפני תקיפה נוספת. פגיעה ביכולת אינה שקולה לפגיעה במוטיבציה, ולעיתים היא אף מחזקת אותה.
ו. הסכנה שלא למדנו דבר: והמדאיג מכל הוא שנדמה כי בישראל עדיין לא הפיקו את הלקחים הנדרשים. במקום לבחון באופן ביקורתי את ההנחות שהובילו למלחמה ואת הפער שבין ההישגים הצבאיים לבין התוצאות האסטרטגיות, נראה שיש מי שמבקשים לשכנע מחדש את הציבור הישראלי בנחיצותה של מלחמת מנע נוספת נגד איראן, אולי עוד לפני הבחירות. זאת, מבלי שהוצגה תשובה משכנעת לשאלה הבסיסית ביותר: מה אמורה מלחמה נוספת להשיג שלא הושג בקודמתה, ומדוע שהתוצאה הפעם תהיה שונה?
השורה התחתונה: אפשר לחסל מנהיג, להשמיד מתקנים ולפגוע קשות ביכולות צבאיות, ועדיין להחמיר את מצבה האסטרטגי של ישראל. חיסול חמינאי ממחיש את הפער המסוכן שבין הצלחה מבצעית לבין הצלחה אסטרטגית. במקום איראן חלשה, מרוסנת ומורתעת יותר, ישראל ניצבת מול הנהגה קיצונית יותר, משמרות מהפכה חזקים יותר, ומוטיבציה שעלולה להיות גבוהה יותר להשגת נשק גרעיני.
הטרגדיה האמיתית תהיה אם לאחר כל אלה נבחר לחזור בדיוק על אותה טעות, מתוך אמונה שעוד סבב של הפעלת כוח יפתור בעיות שהשימוש בכוח עצמו תרם להחרפתן.
@YairGolan1
www.srugim.co.il/1299027
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
ניתוח מדויק של יאיר גולן לגבי ההבדל בין מלחמת 12 הימים לבין המלחמה הנוכחית נגד איראן
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Philippe Murer 🇫🇷
@PhilippeMurer
L'Allemagne quitte le projet de char franco-allemand après avoir quitté le projet d'avion SCAF.
La France a perdu 10 ans de développement du successeur du char Leclerc.
✅Pire, nous sommes en train de perdre le contrôle de Nexter, notre fabricant de char et du canon Cesar. KNDS était détenu à 50% par l'Etat français. Un nouveau schéma accepté par l'Elysée projette de descendre la part de la France dans KNDS à 40%. La France pourrait ainsi perdre le contrôle de Nexter.
La trahison des Macronistes est absolue.
La coopération en matière de défense entre la France et l'Allemagne est une catastrophe qui se fait à nos dépens.
La France doit récupérer la propriété complète de Nexter et demander la dissolution de la société commune KNDS.
OpexNews
@OpexNews
🇫🇷🇩🇪 "Malheureusement, les Allemands ont décidé de quitter le projet #mgcs."
Dix ans, des sommets, des communiqués, et au final la découverte que Paris et Berlin ne voulaient pas le même char.
Pendant ce temps, le Leclerc vieillit, le Leopard 3 avance, et nos deux pays, qui se juraient une défense européenne, n'auront finalement coopéré que sur les photos.
Dix ans pour constater que l'amitié franco-allemande s'arrête là où commencent les parts de marché.
Que de temps perdu. Et le temps, en matière de guerre, ne se rattrape jamais : il se paie.
- Propos du @CEMA_FR Fabien Mandon ce 8 octobre 2026.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Movahedian
@ultra_ehsan
امتیاز تازه باکو به اسراییل بر ضد ترکیه: شرکت ترکیهای تولیدکننده سامانههای ضدپهپاد در باکو منحل شد
پس از افزایش تنشها بین علیف و ترکیه شعبه شرکت صنایع دفاعی «Boğaziçi Savunma» ترکیه در باکو منحل شد. اعلام انحلال این شرکت تنها چند روز پس از آن منتشر شده است که این شرکت در نمایشگاه «ADEX-2026» در باکو با طرف باکویی درباره تولید داخلی و همکاری به توافق رسیده بود.
اطلاعیه مربوط به انحلال شعبه «Boğaziçi Savunma Teknolojileri Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi» در این کشور، روز ۴ اکتبر در روزنامه «Vergilər» (مالیاتها) وابسته به اداره خدمات دولتی مالیات وزارت اقتصاد منتشر شده است. در این اطلاعیه آمده است که طلبکاران میتوانند اسناد مطالبات خود را ظرف مدت دو ماه به نشانی: باکو، منطقه نسیمی، خیابان صمد ورغون، پلاک ۳۴ ارائه کنند.
شعبه این شرکت در باکو در سال ۲۰۲۴ به ثبت مالیاتی رسیده و مدیریت این شعبه بر عهده آنار محمدوف بوده است. شرکت «Boğaziçi Savunma Teknolojileri» مستقر در آنکارا، عمدتاً در زمینه توسعه سامانههای ضدپهپاد تخصص دارد. بر اساس اطلاعات این شرکت، سامانههای تولیدشده توسط آن برای شناسایی، تعیین موقعیت، رهگیری و خنثیسازی پهپادها طراحی شدهاند. در این سامانهها از فناوریهای راداری، شناسایی فرکانس رادیویی، اپتیک-الکترونیک و جنگ الکترونیک استفاده میشود. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
« Le prix Nobel de la paix à la juriste Navi Pillay est un message adressé à Israël et à Donald Trump », se félicite un de ses anciens collaborateurs à l’ONU. « Les Israéliens bien sûr ne vont pas être contents, ajoute-t-il. C’est aussi une façon d’encourager le multilatéralisme au moment où celui-ci est remis en cause ».
Selon cet ancien collaborateur, « Mme Pillay avait officiellement démissionné en raison de son âge en juillet 2025 de son poste de présidente de la Commission d'enquête internationale indépendante des Nations Unies sur le territoire palestinien occupé et Israël, mais elle l’a fait en réalité sous la pression », ajoute cette source, qui la connaît bien.
Entre 2021 et 2025, la juriste sud-africaine avait présidé une commission d'enquête de trois membres, créée par le Conseil des droits de l'homme de l'ONU pour examiner les causes profondes du conflit entre Israël et les Palestiniens. Cette commission d'enquête, qui ne s'exprime pas au nom de l'ONU, avait établi qu'Israël commettait un génocide à Gaza depuis le début de la guerre déclenchée par l'attaque sans précédent du Hamas du 7-Octobre. Israël avait "rejeté catégoriquement" ce "rapport biaisé et mensonger". Dans la foulée de sa distinction, l’Etat hébreu a estimé que ce prix Nobel légitime « la haine d’Israël ».
#nobeldelapaix -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇩🇿🇦🇪🇲🇦 | Algérie-Émirats : la rupture place le Maroc au cœur du bras de fer
La rupture entre Alger et Abou Dhabi dépasse largement le cadre bilatéral et touche directement l’équilibre régional dans lequel s’inscrit le Maroc.
Le 10 septembre, Alger a rompu ses relations diplomatiques en invoquant des agissements hostiles sans les détailler. L’ambassadeur émirati a reçu 48 heures pour partir, et l’espace aérien algérien a été fermé aux appareils émiratis, hors vols commerciaux maintenus jusqu’à fin 2026. Abou Dhabi conteste les accusations d’ingérence et espère une décision temporaire.
Les Émirats sont l’un des principaux partenaires arabes de Rabat : consulat à Laâyoune depuis novembre 2020, investissements dans l’eau, l’énergie et les infrastructures, coopération de défense, projection africaine. Maroc, Émirats et Israël sont liés depuis les accords d’Abraham, alors qu’Alger refuse la normalisation.
Le contentieux se joue aussi dans l’espace sahélo-saharien. En Libye, Abou Dhabi mise sur l’Est et sur Haftar, partenaire qui lui sert de point d’appui vers le Sahel et la Corne de l’Afrique et de rempart contre les forces proches des Frères musulmans. Un éventuel pouvoir consolidé autour de la faction Haftar ferait de lui un levier et un partenaire stratégique de premier plan pour les Émirats arabes unis.
Alger cherche avant tout à éviter la fragmentation de la Libye, qui expose sa frontière sud-est, et refuse un acteur dont les parrains ne sont pas alignés sur ses intérêts, comme il l’a signalé lorsque Haftar s’approchait de Tripoli. Plus au sud, l’influence émiratie au Soudan et au Mali érode sa profondeur stratégique du fait que cela fragilise les États tampons qui protègent sa frontière et installe des réseaux d’influence concurrents dans son arrière-cour sahélienne. Le grief sur le MAK touche à ce qu’elle considère comme un intérêt vital, l’intégrité de son territoire, et déplace la menace de l’extérieur vers l’intérieur même si, faute de preuve, cela correspond davantage à une accusation politique visant à renforcer sa cohésion sociale en façonnant un « ennemi nécessaire » qui serait Abu Dhabi, aligné sur le Maroc, permettant ainsi à la junte la mobilisation et le soutien interne.
Abou Dhabi projette sa puissance par d’autres leviers : capitaux, ports, corridors logistiques et alliances locales, qui lui ouvrent l’accès à la mer Rouge, aux routes de l’or et aux relais sahéliens. Cette projection se heurte à Riyad, notamment au Soudan, où les deux capitales privilégient des camps opposés pour contrôler la façade de la mer Rouge. Néanmoins, même si on pourrait considérer une prolongation de la rivalité saoudo-émiratie au Maghreb, Rabat reste dans un délicat équilibre diplomatique avec les deux, même si la pression exercée par Riyad pour s’aligner sur lui se perçoit par le fait qu’il active le levier algérien, un constat observable à travers son rapprochement approfondi récemment en ayant aidé l’Algérie à sortir de son isolement, notamment avec la récente visite à Alger du ministre saoudien de l’Intérieur, dépêché par MBS, en janvier 2026
Les Émirats contestent les accusations et gardent une posture conciliante, car la rupture place sous incertitude leurs actifs en Algérie, notamment portuaires et industriels.
Pour Rabat, l’enjeu est donc de préserver et renforcer son partenariat avec Abou Dhabi sans éroder ses liens diplomatiques avec Riyad tout en évoluant dans un environnement régional où la rivalité algéro-émiratie pourrait désormais reconfigurer les rapports de force au Maghreb et au Sahel. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🚨 Something strange is happening in the Strait of Hormuz.
Middle Eastern oil exports are recovering toward pre-war levels, yet Brent is still trading around $100 a barrel.
Kpler's Michelle Brohard suspects there's another cost nobody is openly discussing: Gulf producers may be quietly paying Iran to let their tankers through.
“I suspect there is a toll that’s being paid, which is giving these ships safe passage.”
She suggests those payments could amount to 10% or even 20% of a cargo's value.
That's a remarkable possibility. Countries relying on American military escorts to protect their oil shipments could simultaneously be paying Tehran to guarantee their passage.
There is no independent confirmation that these arrangements exist.
But the broader economics are revealing. Oil is moving again, yet the combination of expensive shipping, tanker shortages, military escorts and complicated transfers is keeping prices elevated.
Kpler estimates September exports averaged 16.5 million barrels per day, with several days exceeding pre-war levels.
If Brohard's suspicions are correct, Iran may have found a way to extract revenue from the very oil trade its adversaries are trying to protect.
And consumers could be paying for it at the pump.
Source: OILPRICE, CIG on TG / Writer: Oliver -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
OpexNews
@OpexNews
🇫🇷🇩🇪 "Malheureusement, les Allemands ont décidé de quitter le projet #mgcs."
Dix ans, des sommets, des communiqués, et au final la découverte que Paris et Berlin ne voulaient pas le même char.
Pendant ce temps, le Leclerc vieillit, le Leopard 3 avance, et nos deux pays, qui se juraient une défense européenne, n'auront finalement coopéré que sur les photos.
Dix ans pour constater que l'amitié franco-allemande s'arrête là où commencent les parts de marché.
Que de temps perdu. Et le temps, en matière de guerre, ne se rattrape jamais : il se paie.
- Propos du @CEMA_FR Fabien Mandon ce 8 octobre 2026.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
The retreat of American forces from bases in Persian Gulf first to Jordan and Israel and then Britain and now retreating from Britain is a setback before an effective Iranian strategy, but it will have much broader unintended consequences for US military presence and effectiveness in other areas of the world www.nytimes.com/2026/10/07/us/politics/trump-iran-retreat…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
David Sanger
@SangerNYT
It is hard to remember the last time the US has been forced out of this many bases, this quickly. Maybe it’s temporary. Maybe not.
Trump’s Retreat: From the Gulf to Britain, American Forces Pull Back www.nytimes.com/2026/10/07/us/politics/trump-iran-retreat… via @NYTimes -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Extraordinary account from Bloomberg of what it now takes to move oil through Hormuz.
One tanker captain describes sailing at night with no navigational lights, phones or AIS, hugging the Omani coast under U.S. military protection, and maneuvering around a vessel that had just been attacked. His own ship was later targeted.
The risks are so high that crews are being paid multiples of their normal salaries, with one shipowner reportedly offering six months of extra pay for Hormuz shuttle duty.
More oil may be getting through, but at very high risk and cost.
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-01/getting-oil-an… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Au Yémen, les combattants pro-Saoudiens vont-ils réussir à reprendre le détroit de Bab el-Mandeb à leurs adversaires Houthis? Mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
#yemenwar
www.lefigaro.fr/international/au-yemen-les-loyalistes-lan… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Abdul Ghani Al-iryani
@AbdulGhani1959
مقابلتي مع المحاوره القديره الدكتوره رباب المهدي
youtu.be/0NxK-hk_r0U -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House
@ChathamHouse
"Yemen remains one of the least understood countries in the region. When the war broke out in 2015, there were only a handful of international journalists in Sana'a.
Between 2001 and 2008, the international conversation was about what Yemen meant to Al-Qaeda. Then it became about Yemen and Iran, and then Yemen and Saudi Arabia – but never a conversation about Yemen itself."
@almuslimi (@CH_MENAP) discusses his encounters with the Houthis in Yemen during the Arab Spring, and his experience covering Yemen as an analyst. Read the full interview in the autumn issue of @TheWorldToday, the international affairs magazine of @ChathamHouse.
Article | www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2026-09… | -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
An interesting appointment to watch: Iran has named Hamidreza Dehghani-Poudeh as its new ambassador to the UAE.
- Dehghani is not a lightweight diplomat. He previously served as ambassador to Qatar, headed the Middle East and North Africa department at the Foreign Ministry, and represented Iran at the OIC in Jeddah.
- The timing is perhaps the most interesting part.
- Over the past weeks, Iranian rhetoric towards Abu Dhabi has hardened considerably, with the UAE increasingly portrayed in Iranian media and security-oriented circles not simply as a difficult Gulf neighbour, but as part of a wider Israeli-US security architecture in the Persian Gulf.
- And yet, precisely at this moment, Tehran is sending to Abu Dhabi an experienced Arab world diplomat with strong Gulf credentials.
- Of course I would not read this as a sign of detente. But it does suggest that, even as the security narrative surrounding the UAE becomes considerably harsher, Tehran still sees value in keeping a serious political channel with Abu Dhabi open.
#iran #uae -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vivian Nereim
@viviannereim
We spent weeks interviewing soldiers & officials to reconstruct how the Houthis won a perch on the Bab al-Mandab Strait — setting in motion a chain of events that has plunged Yemen back into war.
What we found imparts dark lessons for the battles to come:
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/10/06/world/middleeast/y… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Tehran Sees Growing Risk of a New War with the United States
🔹There are growing signs that Tehran views a new war as inevitable – and potentially imminent.
🔹Fars News Agency, affiliated with the IRGC, reports that, on several occasions in recent days, the United States appeared prepared to launch renewed attacks against Iran, with U.S. fighter jets taking off over the southern Persian Gulf, although no attack ultimately took place.
🔹According to the agency, reports emerged on September 25 of a high level of U.S. military activity, including the presence of a reconnaissance aircraft near Qeshm Island.
🔹Fars believes that “the enemy’s objective in pursuing this pattern is to normalize such activities so that it can carry out the main operation at a moment when it is least expected” – in other words, to restore the element of surprise.
🔹At the same time, the IRGC has issued an official statement warning that “any miscalculation or attempt to launch a new war or aggression against Islamic Iran will bring a painful and devastating response against the aggressor.”
🔹This follows a series of assessments and warnings by Islamic Republic officials in recent days. Last Tuesday, for example, Mohammad Akraminia, spokesperson for the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, said that “the Americans are repositioning forces and undertaking various activities in the region,” adding that Iran’s military forces are prepared for another confrontation.
🔹More importantly, however, he stated: “If we conclude that the enemy is preparing an imminent attack, we will certainly engage in preemptive warfare or conduct a preemptive operation.”
🔹The emphasis on “preemption” has increasingly entered the vocabulary of Iranian military officials since the 40-day war. In fact, regardless of whether U.S. military movements in the region genuinely represent preparations for a new war, the evolution of Iranian military thinking and the emergence of a “preemptive” element could lead Tehran to take military action in an effort to prevent what it perceives as an imminent attack – potentially igniting a new war.
🔹At the same time, confirmed reports indicate that Iran has once again intensified its attacks on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz over the past week.
🔹With diplomatic progress stalled and no indication that either side is willing to compromise on its core demands, the risk of a return to war is increasing with each passing day. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
“If Syria’s new government cannot provide for ordinary Syrians, it risks unrest that could derail the country’s post-Assad transition,” writes @AbuJamajem.
www.foreignaffairs.com/syria/syrias-imperiled-transition -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
AGSI
@GulfStatesInst
The sharp deterioration in July in the fragile coexistence between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, which began after a Houthi delegation traveled to Iran to attend the funeral of late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, changed the regional security dynamic facing the kingdom. @Dr_Ulrichsen agsi.org/analysis/a-saudi-uae-thaw/
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
sebastian usher
@sebusher
Twelve years of conflict have transformed the Houthis’ fight from a Yemeni struggle for power into a geopolitical problem centered on one of the world’s most important maritime choke points. @mohammedalqadhi breaks it down for @newlinesmag. newlinesmag.com/argument/how-geography-has-changed-the-wa…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Israel-Alma
@Israel_Alma_org
Three Years Since October 7: Did Hamas Achieve in the International Arena What It Failed to Achieve on the Battlefield?
Sinwar sought to ignite a multi-front campaign that would lead to Israel’s collapse. That plan failed. But three years after the massacre, it is difficult to ignore another outcome: the shift in international discourse surrounding Israel and the Palestinian issue, and, in parts of that discourse, a move from criticism of Israeli policy to questioning Israel’s very legitimacy.
This is where the comparison to bin Laden’s strategy after 9/11 becomes relevant: a terrorist attack is not measured solely by what it achieves on the day it takes place. It is precisely the response it provokes and the prolonged campaign that follows that can become part of its strategic effect.
When the civilian cost of war generates international pressure on the state under attack, it also strengthens the incentive for terrorist organizations to continue using civilians as human shields and as a tool in the information war.
Read the full article >> israel-alma.org/from-an-islamic-awakening-to-the-battle-f… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🧵
🔴 صدر اليوم كتاب بريت ماكغورك، وقرأت الفصل الأول منه. ويكشف تفاصيل مهمة تكشف لأول مرة حول المسار الإقليمي قبل 7 أكتوبر. ويشرح بوضوح ما قيل في الفيديو الذي ترجمته قبل يومين.
🔷 يقدم رواية من داخل الإدارة الأميركية لكيفية تشكل المسار منذ أول أيام إدارة بايدن حتى مساء 6 أكتوبر 2023.
التفاصيل الجديدة لا تكشف أن التطبيع كان متقدماً فحسب، بل كيف بدأ منذ يناير 2021، ولماذا تأخر، وكيف أعادت أوكرانيا والنفط واليمن فتح الباب، وكيف أصبح المسار الفلسطيني جزءاً بنيوياً من الصفقة لا مجرد ملحق دعائي.
🔷 أثقل معلومة في البداية أنّ الأمير محمد بن سلمان، بحسب ماكغورك، طرح من تلقاء نفسه في 26 يناير 2021 إمكانية تطبيع العلاقات مع إسرائيل ضمن مسار إقليمي، أي في اليوم الرابع تقريباً من إدارة بايدن، وفي لقاء كان يفترض أصلاً أن يكون شديد التوتر بسبب خاشقجي، ووقف بعض الأسلحة، وإزالة الحوثيين من قائمة الإرهاب. قال ولي العهد إنه خلال عامين يمكن الوصول إلى سلام في اليمن، تهدئة مع إيران، وعلاقات كاملة بين السعودية وإسرائيل.
🔷 محمد بن سلمان ربط التطبيع منذ البداية بثلاثة عناصر أساسية؛ تحالف دفاعي شبيه بالناتو مع الولايات المتحدة، فوائد ملموسة للفلسطينيين تتضمن مساراً نحو دولة مستقبلية، وعدم منح القيادة الفلسطينية حق النقض على القرار السعودي. وقال لماكغورك إن تطبيع السعودية سيقود، في تقديره، معظم الدول الإسلامية إلى أن تحذو حذوها.
🔷 ماكغورك يعترف صراحة بأن إدارة بايدن أهدرت عاماً كاملاً تقريباً. كان تركيزها على أفغانستان ثم اقتراب الغزو الروسي لأوكرانيا، بينما عومل الشرق الأوسط كملف ثانوي. ويصف ذلك بأنه خطأ.
🔷 في المقابل، كانت العلاقة مع الرياض تتدهور بسرعة. الإدارة أوقفت تسليم أسلحة هجومية بمليارات الدولارات، ودفع الموقف الأميركي بعض الحلفاء أيضاً إلى وقف عقود مكونات مرتبطة بها، بينما ـ وفق روايته ـ كانت إيران تزيد دعم الحوثيين بالسلاح والتهريب ونقل التكنولوجيا بما سمح لهم بتطوير قدرات تصنيع محلية.
🔷 الأميرة ريما بنت بندر قدمت لماكغورك مطلع 2022 رسماً بيانياً أظهر، بحسب الرسالة السعودية، أن هجمات الحوثيين على المملكة خلال السنة الأولى لبايدن ارتفعت 78% بالطائرات المسيّرة و62% بالصواريخ الباليستية.
🔷 وفي الوقت نفسه، كان البنتاغون قد بدأ سحب أكثر منظومات الدفاع الصاروخي الأميركية تقدماً من السعودية ضمن إعادة تموضع باتجاه الصين والمحيط الهادئ. بالنسبة لماكغورك، هذا التزامن بين خفض الأسلحة الأميركية، سحب الدفاعات، وزيادة الهجمات الحوثية جعل السعوديين يعتقدون أن واشنطن تتخلى عنهم.
🔷 النفط كان العامل الذي أعاد السعودية إلى مركز الحسابات الأميركية. مع اقتراب الغزو الروسي لأوكرانيا، خافت إدارة بايدن من فقدان إمدادات روسية وارتفاع برنت فوق 120 أو حتى 130 دولاراً. وماكغورك يقول بوضوح إن السعودية كانت الدولة الوحيدة القادرة على زيادة الإنتاج بكميات كبيرة وبسرعة كافية لتخفيف الصدمة.
🔷 لذلك يلخص المعادلة بجملة شديدة الوضوح: لحل مشكلة النفط، كان عليهم أولاً حل المشكلة مع محمد بن سلمان.
🔷 في اجتماع فبراير 2022، ذهب ماكغورك مع آموس هوكستين إلى ولي العهد وعرضا إعادة بناء العلاقة ضمن حزمة مترابطة: وقف النار في اليمن، المساعدة في استقرار أسواق النفط، والتقدم نحو الاعتراف بإسرائيل. كما طرحا مجدداً اتفاق الدفاع والتعاون النووي المدني.
🔷 محمد بن سلمان، بعد عرض وزير الطاقة السعودي رؤيته للسوق، وافق للمرة الأولى على العمل مع واشنطن للحفاظ على استقرار الأسعار. ثم رُبطت زيارة بايدن المحتملة إلى المملكة بشرط الوصول إلى وقف إطلاق نار في اليمن.
🔷 ماكغورك يقول إن إدارة بايدن توصلت في أبريل 2022 إلى أول هدنة مستدامة في حرب اليمن، وإن هذا كان شرطاً عملياً مهماً قبل زيارة بايدن. كما يقول إن السعوديين رأوا زيارة بايدن نفسها أداة قد تقوي موقفهم التفاوضي مع الحوثيين وتساعدهم في الوصول إلى اتفاق يمكن الدفاع عنه.
🔷 جزيرتا تيران وصنافير كانتا أداة بناء ثقة مركزية. الولايات المتحدة ساعدت في التوصل إلى ترتيب يسمح بخروج القوات متعددة الجنسيات من تيران واستبدالها بأجهزة استشعار، بما يسمح للسعودية بتطوير الجزر، مقابل أن تفتح المملكة أجواءها أمام جميع الطائرات المدنية الإسرائيلية بغض النظر عن الوجهة.
🔷 ماكغورك يقدم هذه الخطوة باعتبارها أول لبنة علنية في مسار التطبيع الفعلي، لا مجرد إجراء طيران منفصل.
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
يكشف الدبلوماسي الأمريكي الأهم في إدارة بايدن بريت ماكغورك أن السفيرة السعودية ريما بنت بندر كانت في مكتبه يوم 6 أكتوبر 2023، قبل يوم واحد من هجوم حماس. وأن الطرفين كانا قد وضعا إطارًا لحزمة تشمل التطبيع السعودي–الإسرائيلي، اتفاقًا نوويًا مدنيًا مع الرياض ومسارًا فلسطينيًا. وقال إنهما اتفقا على هدف إنجاز هذه الحزمة بنهاية 2023 تمهيدًا لإطلاقها في الربع الأول من 2024. السلطة الفلسطينية كانت تعمل مع واشنطن على الترتيبات، كما بدأت زيارات مسؤولين إسرائيليين إلى السعودية.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr. Annelle Rodriguez Sheline
@AnnelleSheline
💢 The Saudis could decide to make a deal with the Houthis and withdraw from Yemen.
💢 In this scenario, the Houthis, southern separatists, and other local actors would be left to determine the balance of power within Yemen.
💢 Without the excuse of a foreign aggressor, the Houthis would have no one to blame for their inability to provide for the Yemeni people.
💢 But if foreign powers continue to pour fuel onto Yemen’s conflict, it will continue to rage.
My latest, @ArabCenterDC
arabcenterdc.org/resource/why-saudi-arabia-has-returned-t… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Le Figaro TV
@LeFigaroTV
«Il y a une crise de l'idéal sioniste notamment due à cette politique israélienne menée dans les territoires palestiniens. Et chez certains, en particulier les jeunes ou des personnes éduquées, il y a ce sentiment de dire que ce n'est plus l'Israël qu'ils ont connu», explique @Malbrunot dans Le Club Le Figaro International présenté par @geliefig.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
I reporter on that, Qatar and UAE
Shibley Telhami
@ShibleyTelhami
A senior Kpler analyst offers this explanation for the rise in oil exports at high prices: Gulf countries may be paying Iran to allow their oil through – potentially handing Tehran a significant portion of the value of the cargo. www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/5/is-iran-charging-a-toll-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Adam Baron
@adammbaron
Yemen overnight update:
-Houthi/AA hit back at Riyadh
-Houthi/AA continue gains in Taiz interior
-Reports of government takeover of Mokha prove--as suspected--greatly exaggerated
-KSA naval ops against Hudayda
In short: signs continue to point to a mutual war of attrition. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
“Unconfirmed reports say Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has offered to help Gulf states in a wider campaign against the Houthis. But @andreas_krieg argued that "the Israeli intelligence networks in Yemen are very poor", with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi far better placed.
"That is not something the Israelis can deliver," he said, adding that Israeli involvement could further fracture the anti-Houthi camp and fuel Houthi propaganda, while Tel Aviv may use its assistance as a card to play in its push for normalisation.
www.newarab.com/analysis/can-yemens-divided-coalition-tur… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
loki loptr
@lokiloptr154668
Ismail Qaani: On October 7 afternoon I went to Beirut & met Sayyid Hassan. After the Maghrib prayer we decided to join the war on Sunday night, when people return from South Lebanon. Neither I nor Sayyid or Haniyeh knew about Al-Aqsa Flood but decided to join as a religious duty.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Of course Iranian actors have agency, and U.S. policy is hardly the only variable shaping Iranian politics. But acknowledging that agency does not mean denying or discounting the impact of the world’s most powerful country on the internal politics of a country it has subjected to years of broad, collectively punishing economic warfare and, over the past year, multiple military wars.
For decades, one of the central arguments within the Islamic Republic has been over what kind of relationship with the United States is actually possible. A powerful political current, stretching from Rafsanjani and Khatami to Rouhani and the reformists, argued that the hostility was not immutable: Iran could negotiate with Washington, make concessions, reduce tensions with the West and gain economically and strategically in return.
At times, figures from this camp openly criticized Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and regional policies, and challenged political rivals, particularly influential within the security establishment, who argued that Washington was fundamentally hostile to the Islamic Republic and that concessions would therefore produce greater vulnerability rather than accommodation.
And this was not some politically irrelevant minority. These arguments helped elect presidents, shaped major newspapers and public debate, influenced parts of the foreign-policy and national-security establishment, and ultimately produced the JCPOA.
Even after the U.S. withdrawal from that agreement, maximum pressure and now war, advocates of diplomacy have remained influential enough that their opponents still have to fight these arguments out publicly.
You can see it in Iranian political and media debates today: whether negotiations were a mistake, whether another agreement with Washington is possible, whether Iran gave up too much, and whether greater deterrent power or renewed diplomacy offers the better path to security.
That is precisely why U.S. policy matters so much to Iran’s internal politics. Since 2018 especially, Washington has repeatedly handed one side of this debate evidence for its case.
The United States withdrew from the JCPOA after Iran had accepted major restrictions on its nuclear program, restored and expanded sanctions, pursued maximum pressure, and ultimately went to war.
Each of those events made it harder for advocates of accommodation to answer the most basic question their opponents could put to them: what, exactly, did Iran gain from restraint?
This is not a story in which Washington mechanically “creates” Iranian hardliners or deprives Iranians of agency. It is about how political arguments gain and lose credibility.
When one faction says compromise can produce security and economic dividends, while another says Washington will pocket Iranian concessions and continue escalating anyway, what the United States actually does inevitably affects which argument is easier to make.
The remarkable thing is that the pro-diplomacy current has survived politically despite how much has happened since 2018. Its opponents have had to fight tooth and nail to discredit it even now.
But U.S. policy has made their job considerably easier. To treat that as somehow separate from Iranian domestic politics is to miss one of the most important ways external pressure actually operates inside Iran.
On this broader question of how U.S. policy has shaped Iran’s internal politics and empowered the forces most hostile to accommodation, this recent piece by @NickKristof is well worth reading:
www.nytimes.com/2026/10/03/opinion/trump-empowers-iranian…
Eric Brewer
@BrewerEricM
Respectfully, the notion that the U.S. is responsible for the trajectory of Iranian domestic politics is overly simplistic at best. It ignores the agency of Iranian actors and in this case specifically Khamenei’s decades-long efforts to empower hardliners and weaken moderates and reformists.
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
.@NickKristof asks the essential question in his latest column:
“How is it that for three-quarters of a century, we Americans have so bungled our foreign policy that we have systematically empowered Iranian extremists?”
Gift link:
www.nytimes.com/2026/10/03/opinion/trump-empowers-iranian… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House
@ChathamHouse
If the US-Iran ends through negotiation, Tehran will likely emerge as more influential in region. With its axis of resistance weakened, Tehran will seek to restructure the axis while reshaping its relationships with the Gulf countries, strengthening the Houthis to gain strategic depth on the Arabian Peninsula, pressuring Saudi Arabia and extending its maritime leverage to the Bab al-Mandab.
At the same time, Tehran will press for a regional security framework while improving relations with Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar and monitoring the policies of the other Gulf monarchies.
Read @milanimohsen's latest analysis on the US-Iran war for the autumn issue of @TheWorldToday, the international affairs magazine of Chatham House.
Article | www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2026-09… | -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Critical Threats
@criticalthreats
NEW | The Yemeni government, backed by Saudi air power and international coalition military support, launched an offensive to capture Mokha city and secure the coastline along the Bab al Mandeb Strait on October 4.
This offensive will likely succeed in capturing Mokha in the short term. Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government likely launched the offensive to accomplish the limited objective of securing the Bab al Mandeb.
Yemeni government-aligned forces will likely stop offensive operations within the next seven to 14 days to rest, resupply, and consolidate their positions to prevent a Houthi counteroffensive.
The Yemeni government will need to secure its own defensible line before its offensive culminates in order to ensure it can repel Houthi attacks combining drones and ground forces, which the Houthis employed in early September.
Allied air and intelligence support almost certainly made this offensive possible. Over 100 Saudi aircraft provided air support to Yemeni government-aligned forces during the initial assault, and US intelligence is reportedly supporting the air campaign.
Saudi’s allies in the Mecca Pact are providing military aid to Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia announced on October 5 that Pakistan and Turkey are taking “practical measures” to defend Saudi Arabia pursuant to the Mecca Pact requirements. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jonathan Panikoff
@jpanikoff
I've spent the last week in the Gulf, first in the UAE (Abu Dhabi and Dubai) and then in Kuwait. As I head back to DC this evening, here's a bit of what I heard, learned, confirmed, and changed my view on:
Heard: Lumping the Gulf states together is almost always a mistake that undermines analysis and policy, but it keeps happening. Many of us who work on the region will view this as obvious. But I was taken aback by how intensely, and how often, I heard frustration that policymakers (not just American ones), media, and academics, strategize about the region as a whole rather than as individual states with their own requirements and preferences. This point cuts against the notion of a more integrated Gulf. As I heard a few times, the Gulf countries aren't looking for the GCC to function like ASEAN, let alone the EU -- they're okay with a looser and sometimes non-cohesive intra-GCC relationship.
Learned: While many in the West debate base, best, and worst case scenarios for the impasse that is the Iran war, I hadn't fully appreciated the extent to which Gulf states have already accepted the situation as their new normal. The West remains focused on Iranian leverage over the Strait. Gulf allies, unsurprisingly, are more focused on the fact that Iran has permanently shattered the taboo of attacking them directly (including civilian targets), and indirectly through Iraqi militias and the Houthis. That won't go away whenever/if the conflict is resolved in the coming months or years. It's already altering how states in the region think about investment, security, technology, commercial, and geopolitical roles.
Confirmed: Frustration remains high that the U.S. didn't consult before President Trump took action, leaving the Gulf states to pay the consequences. But frustration with Europe is growing too. Individual European countries are heralded for their in-country military support during the war, and both the UAE and Kuwait are looking to Europe to diversify procurement of systems. But Europe's unwillingness to put the UK-French-led maritime force into the region — even to ensure its own energy and commodity flows — has raised concerns that, like the U.S., Europe's shifting political winds will limit how far partnerships can expand and grow between the regions.
Changed my view: The language they use may be different, but both the UAE and Kuwait are looking past the idea of hedging and strategic autonomy. They see balancing between the U.S. and China as a construct the west relies on to make sense of a region that has moved beyond that binary. The prevailing sentiment is that it isn't the responsibility of regional states to balance between Beijing and DC, and they're not trying to. They'll choose, sector by sector, whatever best serves their national interests. Many of us have heard that line and seen it play out these last years. What's different is that they're now doing it outside what they view as a dated Western framework. @AtlanticCouncil @ACMideast -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House
@ChathamHouse
A Pew survey published in April found that 60 per cent of American adults hold an unfavourable view of Israel. Since 2022, favourable views of Israel have fallen by roughly 20 percentage points. Among Democrats, they are close to 80 per cent. Even among Republicans, 41 per cent now report unfavourable views of Israel.
British public opinion is even worse. Half of Britons believe that what Israel has done in Gaza amounts to genocide, while a poll taken in August found that nearly half of the public would like to see fewer or even no further Israeli immigrants allowed into the UK.
Read @yaakovkatz's (@Jerusalem_Post) latest analysis for @TheWorldToday on Israel's upcoming election and the impact of Israel's growing international isolation.
Article | www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2026-09… | -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: The Yemeni government, backed by Saudi air power and international coalition military support, launched an offensive to capture Mokha city and secure the coastline along the Bab al Mandeb Strait on October 4. This offensive will likely succeed in capturing Mokha in the short term. Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government likely launched the offensive to accomplish the limited objective of securing the Bab al Mandeb. (1/2)
Other Key Takeaways:
Yemeni government-aligned forces will likely stop offensive operations within the next seven to 14 days to rest, resupply, and consolidate their positions to prevent a Houthi counteroffensive.
The Yemeni government will need to secure its own defensible line before its offensive culminates in order to ensure it can repel Houthi attacks combining drones and ground forces, which the Houthis employed in early September.
Allied air and intelligence support almost certainly made this offensive possible. Over 100 Saudi aircraft provided air support to Yemeni government-aligned forces during the initial assault, and US intelligence is reportedly supporting the air campaign.
Saudi allies in the Mecca Pact are providing military aid to Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Arabia announced on October 5 that Pakistan and Turkey are taking “practical measures” to defend Saudi Arabia pursuant to the Mecca Pact requirements.
The Iranian regime appears increasingly concerned that mounting economic pressure could threaten internal stability and is combining its attempts to manage its wartime economy with expanded efforts to deter and prepare to suppress possible unrest.
Iran is likely reconstituting and enhancing its ability to target distant US regional military targets and commercial shipping through improvements in missile accuracy, range, speed, and targeting capabilities.
Iran is likely aiming to increase its ability to deter US airstrikes targeting Iranian assets, impose costs on the United States, and preserve strategic initiative in the conflict by prioritizing improvements to its missile capabilities. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
The Saudi offensive is only just beginning.
Today, hundreds of drones, dozens of helicopters and a large combat aviation force were used against Houthi positions, which lost ground in open terrain along the coast.
Anyone expecting the Saudis to act as they did in the Yemeni civil war, where they were defeated, is mistaken. This will be an extremely hard war for the Houthis, who will retaliate against the Saudi and Emirati oil industries.
The central question comes down to two points:
1How far are the Saudi and Emirati industries willing to overlook the economic damage? Yes, the bill will reach the Emirates as well before long, since their proxies are already fully engaged and moving into the front lines.
2Inevitably, Iran will have to act more decisively. Once the Saudis and Emiratis are ignoring the damage to their own economies, in a not-so-distant scenario Trump could resume the war and likewise overlook Iranian retaliation against the GCC’s industry.
That is the picture taking shape if the war in Yemen continues to escalate.
A more brutal resumption of Yemen’s civil war will be far more consequential than it was years ago.
There is a bet that Iran, in its current economic situation, has limited capacity to finance the Houthis, and that this is therefore a golden opportunity.
The problem is that the Yemenis still hold an arsenal that will certainly last for months of fighting, even with the massive support of Saudi allies.
This conflict will quickly evolve into one fought mainly with drones and 4x4s on the front, with missiles flying from both sides aimed at the economy and logistics.
substack.com/@global21 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
UnXeptable
@UnxeptableD
Debating whether Netanyahu's, Ben Gvir, Smotrich government serves Israel? Hear it from Benny Begin, son of PM Menachem Begin and a lifelong right-winger: "The result is disastrous, both internally and diplomatically."
@RavivDrucker
@AvinadavBegin -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Becky Anderson
@BeckyCNN
Yemen’s recent gains against the Houthis in Bab al-Mandeb will mean little unless the government can hold the territory, argues @omeisy , as he analyzes the latest military operations.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Corentin Sellin
@CorentinSellin
Les 4 scenarios possibles pour les #midterms US à un mois de l'échéance.
Précis et factuel @washingtonpost (et c'est offert par la maison).
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/10/05/four-ways-midt… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Omer Carmi
@CarmiOmer
Who is making the calls on Iran's nuclear file?
Over the past week, new signals have shed more light on a six-member committee that decides on the negotiations and consults Mojtaba Khamenei.
Earlier today, the Foreign Ministry spokesman confirmed it sits under the SNSC and steers the negotiations file, with the foreign minister on it.
The setup itself has precedent. Iran has always had regime organs that consulted with the Supreme Leader on nuclear decisions and helped make them. Rouhani ran the file as SNSC secretary in 2003-2005 with a complex committee structure under the SNSC, and separately, after the JCPOA, a supervisory board oversaw its implementation.
The current body has its own history. In July, Araghchi described it in a long interview on the Majaray-e Jang podcast. He explained it was formed after the June 2025 war as a nuclear committee headed by Shamkhani, became the negotiation committee under Larijani, and during the Iran-US talks made decisions "on the spot, because it was difficult to communicate with the top [Mojtaba]." He named the president, Ghalibaf, the SNSC secretary and himself among the six.
Who is on the committee?
Last week, Pezeshkian told CBS that a six-member team drawn from the security institutions, parliament and the government advances decisions on the negotiations alongside him. Sazandegi newspaper picked it up and ran "The Six-Member Committee" across its front page, with a roster of possible members: Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf, Araghchi, Rezaee, Vahidi, Ali Abdollahi and possibly the Intelligence Ministry.
That is more names than seats, but some are clear. SNSC secretary Mohsen Rezaee said he met with Araghchi and Pezeshkian on the issue before Araghchi left for New York, which puts all three in the room. Araghchi said in July that Ghalibaf is on it as well. That leaves two seats open. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
“The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran shows that the age of precise mass is here,” writes @mchorowitz. “Tehran has demonstrated how less powerful countries can stymie more powerful ones in the modern battlefield.”
www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/how-iran-changed-war-united-s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Edwy Plenel
@edwyplenel
France Télévisions allait confier des données sur les préférences politiques de ses téléspectateurs à une entreprise israélienne dont le PDG développe des outils de ciblage politique en ligne. Informé de l’enquête de Mediapart le groupe public s’est ravisé
www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/051026/ingerence-e… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇺🇸🇸🇦🇾🇪 | Plus de 200 analystes américains du renseignement et militaires travaillent au sein des centres de commandement saoudiens, contribuant à analyser et sélectionner les cibles pour les forces yéménites soutenues par l’Arabie saoudite dans leur offensive récemment lancée contre les Houthis, rapporte le NYT.
Washington fournit également le ravitaillement en vol des avions de combat saoudiens effectuant des patrouilles aériennes. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ziad Daoud
@ZiadMDaoud
Why is oil at $100 despite rising flows from Hormuz?
5 reasons, according to this article:
1. Traders expect military escalation
2. High transit costs
3. Depleted inventories
4. Shortages of refined products
5. Buying oil as a hedge against inflation
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-10-04/why-is-oil-sti… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
NEW: IRGC intelligence has long viewed US-based Iranian artists as undesirables. But in a shift that reflects changing winds in Tehran, the IRGC is now offering some of those same artists a path back home.
Several things stand out about this emerging trend.
First, the symbiosis between diaspora regime-changers and hardliners inside Iran is on full display: both appear to want the heads of artists who have returned to Iran in recent weeks and months.
Second, whenever previous governments sought to open a path for dual nationals to return, Taeb was personally an obstacle, making a career out of targeting Iranian-Americans and other hyphenates. The reason promises of safe return are now being taken seriously is that Taeb appears to be the one making the pledge. But why?
Third, it will be interesting to see how social liberalization inside Iran is “explained” to Arab allies in the region. During the Assad/Soleimani era, I recall criticism in Tehran over why the Quds Force was fighting so hard to keep nightclubs in Damascus open while the IRGC was imposing hijab on women and girls in Iran. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House
@ChathamHouse
Gulf Arab states increasingly view Israel as the main obstacle to progress on the Gaza peace plan – and may hope for an opening after Israel's October elections.
Read @KseniaSvetlova's (@CH_MENAP) latest analysis for Chatham House.
www.chathamhouse.org/2026/09/can-gulf-arab-countries-help… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aron Lund
@aronlund
U.S. sanctions notice indicates that Iran still collects protection money for Hormuz passage, which, in turn, suggests that one reason for the increased oil flow out of the Gulf could be that some transfers take place on Iranian terms. home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0632/ via @BrettErickson28
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jerome Drevon
@jeromedrev
New paper: how did al-Sharaa Syria build a national army out of dozens of rebel factions without a power-sharing deal? Short answer: by opposing political negotiations and make it something administrative. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=7552745 (thread) (1)
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Levent Kemal
@leventkemaI
In the last 3 hours, Yemen's west coast front:
Mocha: Government forces said they took the city with air support after heavy fighting, captured Houthi fighters, and took Wahijah to the south. Witnesses said Houthi fighters had left some positions; the Houthis deny any advance.
Bab el-Mandeb and Dhubab: Government forces say they hold the strait and Dhubab airport; a TV crew entered the area. The Houthis fired two missiles there. Pro-Houthi channels claim Ras Murad was retaken (unconfirmed).
Taiz, Jabal Habashi: Government sources say more than 50 Houthi vehicles pulled back from Al Burayhah and Bani Bakari toward Al Kadahah, and that army positions were retaken; a Houthi attack was repelled at Al Aqrud.
Taiz South (Al Ma'afir, Al Mawasit): The Houthis say they drove government forces out of both districts and now hold more than 2,000 km² in the province, including Rashad al-Alimi’s house.
Government Statements: Spokesman Majed al-Nuzaili said a “strategic offensive” on Sanaa has begun. The assistant defense minister said phase one targets Bab el-Mandeb and Mocha. Presidential Council head Rashad al-Alimi said the operation will continue until Sanaa is retaken.
Houthi Statements: Houthi defense officials said strikes will become “more searing and more expansive.” The Houthi aviation center said Saudi airspace is unsafe for civilian flights except over Mecca and Medina.
United States: Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Saudi Arabia has the right to defend itself. A U.S. official said about 200 American advisers support Saudi planning but are not participating in combat. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
"@andreas_krieg expected Pakistan to be cautious about the distinction between defending Saudi territory and conducting offensive operations inside Yemen.
“That distinction is politically useful to everybody,” he said.
Britain and France are adopting “essentially the same principle” but in different ways to enhance Saudi Arabia’s resilience, according to Krieg"
www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3369645/saudi-ara… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Told @nytimes that #iran’s grip on the strait of Hormuz may be loosening, but its overall strategy — to keep oil prices high enough that the world, and particularly the U.S., feels it — is still working.
www.nytimes.com/2026/10/04/world/strait-hormuz-oil-yemen-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي
@omeisy
I don’t mean to be that guy, but was just on @AJEnglish again and now is as good a moment as any for a reality check—and for managing expectations.
The Yemeni government’s announcement of a military offensive to retake Houthi-controlled territory is significant, but for now, it remains an announcement.
The real test is whether it is followed by concrete political and military steps capable of shifting the balance on the ground. And that starts with the anti-Houthi coalition getting its own house in order: unifying command, coordinating forces, resolving competing agendas, and agreeing on what comes after any territorial gains.
Without that, even substantial military momentum could prove difficult to sustain.
Declarations may signal intent. Cohesion, coordination, and execution will determine whether this actually changes the trajectory of the war.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël. L'Union européenne et ses États membres doivent "agir" face à un vaste projet décrié de colonisation israélienne en Cisjordanie occupée, demandent lundi dans une tribune quelque 500 anciens diplomates, ministres ou responsables européens.
Parmi eux figurent les anciens Premiers ministres et ministres des Affaires étrangères français Dominique de Villepin et Alain Juppé, les anciens Premiers ministres italien, Massimo D'Alema, belge, Yves Leterme, ou suédois, Stefan Löfven, ainsi que deux anciens présidents du Parlement européen, Josep Borrell et Enrique Baron Crespo.
Le gouvernement israélien doit bientôt attribuer les "contrats pour la première tranche du projet de colonisation illégal E1", rappellent les diplomates dans cette tribune publiée dans le quotidien français Libération. Ce projet prévoit la construction de plus de 1.200 logements près de Jérusalem.
Ce plan, approuvé par Israël l'an dernier après plusieurs décennies de gel, notamment sous la pressions des administrations américaines successives, isolerait davantage Jérusalem-Est, occupée puis annexée par Israël, du reste de la Cisjordanie, mettant encore plus en péril la possibilité d'un futur État palestinien.
La justice israélienne a ordonné le 27 septembre le report d'un mois de l'ouverture de l'appel d'offres pour le projet, afin que le sujet ne perturbe pas les législatives prévues fin octobre.
"Malgré les conséquences considérables de cette nouvelle annexion de terres, l'Union européenne n'a pris aucune mesure pour dissuader la réalisation du projet E1 ni, plus généralement, n'a respecté ses obligations, découlant des traités européens, d'agir face aux violations du droit international", dénoncent les signataires.
Ils saluent "le fait que certains États membres de l'UE ont pris des mesures nationales à l'encontre des colonies illégales", mais dénoncent les positions d'autres États "notamment l'Allemagne et l'Italie" qui "continuent systématiquement de bloquer l'adoption de mesures au niveau européen, devenant ainsi de facto complices de l'affaiblissement des valeurs de l'UE et de la solution à deux États".
Ils demandent à la Commission européenne de présenter "immédiatement des propositions législatives" pour "sanctionner toutes les institutions financières et autres prestataires de services participant à la mise en oeuvre du projet E1 et d'autres colonies illégales" et à "empêcher tout commerce de l'UE avec les colonies illégales".
Ils appellent également l'UE à "mettre en oeuvre les propositions" visant à "suspendre les dispositions commerciales de l'accord d'association entre l'UE et Israël".
Ces mesures doivent être prises "lors de la prochaine réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'UE, le 12 octobre", exhortent encore les diplomates.
Israël occupe la Cisjordanie depuis 1967. La colonisation s'y est poursuivie depuis, mais a explosé ces dernières années.
Plus de 500.000 Israéliens vivent dans des colonies en Cisjordanie occupée, aux côtés de quelque trois millions de Palestiniens.
#colonisation -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Interesting development in Iran-UAE relations:
- 17 Iranian citizens, 14 men and 3 women, have been transferred from UAE prisons back to Iran.
Tehran says procedures are underway for the transfer of additional Iranian prisoners.
- Worth noting that Iran’s Foreign Ministry had recently presented the release-transfer of Iranian nationals in the UAE as one of the concrete outcomes of recent Iran-Persian Gulf diplomatic consultations.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Preparation: The major Saudi offensive will give Trump what he wants
Saudi Arabia is planning a large-scale operation against the Houthis in Yemen, to contain the attacks and the naval blockade the group imposed in the Red Sea.
The Saudi leadership has already approved the operational plans, under study for weeks. What forced Riyadh to move was the escalation.
The Houthis stepped up strikes directly on the Saudi capital, hit Aramco complexes in Riyadh, the port of Yanbu and other strategic targets, and cut Saudi exports. The kingdom had to answer.
The Saudi-led coalition intensified bombings in Sanaa, Saada and Taiz. It is still carrying a humiliating defeat from weeks ago, when the Houthis took almost the entire Red Sea coast in less than 72 hours.
The Saudis have been meeting the Turks and the Pakistanis and sketching a way to deal with the Houthis. The real shift was the rapprochement with the Emirates, built for this operation.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE will put the anti-Houthi factions and local militias they trained back into the field. The ground push stands or falls on those forces.
The advance on the ground, with the armored vehicles, will be done by the anti-Houthi Yemeni militias, the official government forces and the southern separatists. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi supplied the weapons and the light armor so that more than 100,000 Yemeni fighters do the physical advance.
Saudi Arabia will use its fighters and missiles heavily for the opening strikes and fire support. Drones are already over Yemen, watching and striking.
The Saudis and advisers from the Mecca pact want a limited coastal assault, stuck to the littoral, to retake Bab el-Mandeb, at the same time as ground attacks through Al-Bayda, Marib, Taiz and Al-Jawf, pushing the Houthis on several fronts at once.
The STC forces were politically beaten by the Saudis months ago, but those militias still answer to Abu Dhabi’s money. Riyadh needs the Emirati go-ahead for these Yemeni fighters to march north and take the front line against the Houthis. We are talking about tens of thousands of men.
The ports and islands are the other point where the UAE is indispensable. They built and hold the military infrastructure along the islands and ports of southern Yemen, on the Gulf of Aden. Without those bases and runways, the coalition cannot resupply the armor or run the coastal assault on Bab el-Mandeb.
A ground campaign on this scale burns billions in fuel, ammunition, armor maintenance and militia pay. Emirati money takes part of that off Riyadh.
The Saudis will try to hold the air and the sea. F-15s, Typhoons and missile systems do the bombing of Houthi positions, while regular Saudi troops stay on the border and inside the kingdom, intercepting missiles and drones and covering the critical sites.
Nothing new there. It is what they have already been doing, without much result. I expect serious losses in the Saudi asset park in this round.
Read more:
global21.substack.com/p/preparation-the-major-saudi-offen… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
Saudi Arabia’s High-Stakes Gamble in Yemen
The announcement of a Saudi-backed Yemeni counteroffensive comes at a particularly dangerous moment.
The Houthis are not only continuing their attacks on strategic infrastructure in the Saudi capital; their forces are also advancing from Taiz and threatening the routes leading toward Aden.
It increasingly appears that Riyadh has concluded that the diplomatic track has reached its limits, or, more precisely, that continuing down that path would require concessions the Saudis are unwilling to make.
Saudi Arabia is therefore making a major strategic gamble: betting on an advance by its Yemeni partners, backed by a significant air campaign, American intelligence support, and European assistance in protecting critical Saudi infrastructure.
This could become a turning point in the war. A successful counteroffensive could significantly alter the military balance and put the Houthis under pressure they have not faced in years.
But the risks are equally significant. Given the weaknesses and fragmentation of the Saudi-aligned forces in Yemen, a failed offensive could produce the opposite result: a military collapse that threatens the remaining strongholds of Saudi influence in the country.
Yemen may therefore be entering a decisive phase. What happens in the coming weeks could reshape not only the battlefield, but the Saudi-Houthi confrontation for years to come. Riyadh is taking an enormous gamble, and the consequences of failure could be as significant as the potential rewards of success.
#iranwar
#yemen
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇾🇪🇸🇦Yemeni and Saudi forces launch counteroffensive against the Houthis. My report on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/10/04/yemen-saudi-houthis-counteroffen… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Axios
@axios
Yemeni and Saudi forces launch counteroffensive against the Houthis www.axios.com/2026/10/04/yemen-saudi-houthis-counteroffen…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ahmed Quraishi
@_AhmedQuraishi
Saudi news magazine Al-Majalla publishes new details about Hamam Al-Hammami, the 29 year old Omani-Syrian copilot accused of attempting to crash Flydubai FZ1073. He lived in the #uae, #oman, #syria, and #morocco before joining Flydubai.
His time in Syria under #assad regime is emerging as the most problematic and could hold the key to unlocking the missing link: how he was radicalized and the group/country that recruited him, if any.
Here's a timeline to Saudi Al Majalla:
- 1996-1997: Born in the UAE
Hamam was born to an Omani father and a Syrian mother and holds Omani nationality. He is currently 29 years old, meaning he was most likely born in 1996 or 1997.
- 2011-2017: The Syria gap in his biography. Security sources say he spent time in Syria and that Omani authorities later believed he had been influenced by extremist ideas during his stay there. But no documented information establishing when he arrived in Syria, where he lived, or how long he stayed.
The period between 2011 and 2017 appears to be the broadest possible window for his time in Syria because it precedes the beginning of his known aviation career with Oman Air.
- February 2018: Oman Air.
Al-Hammami began working for Oman Air in February 2018, when he was roughly 21 or 22 years old.
He remained with the airline for about seven years, until Feb 2025.
- 2020-2023: University studies.
Alongside his work at Oman Air, he studied Aviation Management at Buckinghamshire New University. The program was conducted remotely over three years, and he graduated in 2023. His enrollment at a British university therefore does not mean he was living in Britain during that period.
- January 2022: Copilot.
According to his professional record, he began serving as a copilot on Boeing 737 aircraft with Oman Air in January 2022.
- 2024: Security concerns emerge
This year marked the most significant turning point in his career. According to security and intelligence sources, concerns emerged about Al-Hammami's views, and material considered extremist was reportedly found in his possession. He was removed from flying duties and transferred to an administrative role within the company.
Sources say Omani authorities linked their concerns about him to an earlier period he had spent in Syria, where they believed he had been exposed to extremist ideas. However, no specific group to which he may have been linked has been identified, and there is no public information proving that he belonged to any particular organization.
- February 2025: Leaves Oman Air.
Al-Hammami left Oman Air in February 2025 after approximately seven years with the airline.
- June 2025: Moves to Morocco
Joined Royal Air Maroc, where he remained for around seven months.
- January 2026: Leaves Royal Air Maroc.
- Around Feb 2026: Joins Flydubai, working as a copilot for eight months until 30 Sept. when he tried to down FZ 1073.
- 30 Sept. Flight FZ1073. According to UAE authorities, AL-Hammami assaulted the captain and attempted to take control of the aircraft.
People on board managed to intervene before another pilot took control of the aircraft, which then made an emergency landing in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.
المجلة
@AlMajallaAR
📌 من هو همام الهمامي الذي حاول إسقاط "فلاي دبي"؟
♦️ بدأت تتكشف تفاصيل جديدة عن همام الهمامي، مساعد الطيار العُماني البالغ من العمر 29 عاماً، والمتهم بالاعتداء على قائد طائرة "فلاي دبي" المتجهة من #دبي إلى #تل_أبيب في 30 سبتمبر/أيلول 2026 ومحاولة السيطرة على الطائرة، قبل هبوطها اضطرارياً في #تبوك بـ #السعودية.
♦️ تكشف المعلومات المتاحة عن مسار حياة تنقل فيه الحمامي بين #الإمارات و #عُمان و #سوريا و #المغرب، قبل انتقاله إلى "فلاي دبي".
♦️ لكن تبقى في سيرته فجوات مهمة، أبرزها الفترة التي أمضاها في سوريا وتوقيت وجوده هناك.
📌 1996-1997: الولادة في الإمارات
♦️ ولد همام في #الإمارات العربية المتحدة لأب عُماني وأم سورية، ويحمل الجنسية العُمانية. ويبلغ حالياً 29 عاماً، ما يعني أنه ولد على الأرجح عام 1996 أو 1997.
📌 2011-2017: الحلقة السورية المحتملة
♦️ هذه الفترة هي الأكثر غموضاً في حياته. كان عمره خلالها بين نحو 14 و21 عاماً.
♦️ وتقول مصادر أمنية إنه أمضى وقتاً في سوريا، وإن السلطات العُمانية اعتقدت لاحقاً أنه تأثر بأفكار متطرفة خلال وجوده هناك.
♦️ لكن لا تتوفر حتى الآن معلومات موثقة تحدد متى وصل إلى سوريا، أو أين عاش فيها، أو المدة التي أمضاها هناك.
♦️ وتبدو الفترة بين 2011 و2017 النافذة الزمنية الأوسع المحتملة لوجوده في سوريا، لأنها تسبق بداية مساره المهني المعروف في الطيران العُماني. إلا أن ذلك يبقى استنتاجاً من التسلسل الزمني وليس معلومة مثبتة.
📌 فبراير 2018: الطيران العُماني
♦️ بدأ الهمامي العمل لدى الطيران العُماني في فبراير 2018، عندما كان في الحادية والعشرين أو الثانية والعشرين من عمره تقريباً.
♦️ وبقي في الشركة نحو سبع سنوات، حتى فبراير 2025.
📌 2020-2023: الدراسة الجامعية
♦️ بالتوازي مع عمله في الطيران العُماني، درس إدارة الطيران في جامعة باكينغهامشير نيو البريطانية.
♦️ كانت الدراسة عن بُعد واستمرت ثلاث سنوات، وتخرج عام 2023. وبالتالي فإن دراسته في جامعة بريطانية لا تعني أنه كان مقيماً في بريطانيا خلال تلك الفترة.
📌 يناير 2022: مساعد طيار
♦️ بحسب سيرته المهنية، بدأ العمل مساعد طيار على طائرات "بوينغ 737" في الطيران العُماني اعتباراً من يناير 2022.
📌2024: ظهور المخاوف الأمنية
♦️ تمثل هذه السنة نقطة التحول الأبرز في مسيرته.
♦️ بحسب مصادر أمنية واستخباراتية، ظهرت مخاوف بشأن أفكار الهمامي، وعثر بحوزته على مواد اعتبرت متطرفة.
♦️ وأبعد عن مهام الطيران ونقل إلى عمل إداري داخل الشركة.
♦️ وتقول المصادر إن السلطات العُمانية ربطت مخاوفها بشأنه بفترة سابقة أمضاها في سوريا، حيث يعتقد أنه تعرض لأفكار متطرفة.
♦️ لكن لم يكشف حتى الآن عن اسم جماعة محددة ارتبط بها، ولا توجد معلومات علنية تثبت انتماءه إلى تنظيم بعينه.
📌 فبراير 2025: مغادرة الطيران العُماني
♦️ غادر الهمامي الطيران العُماني في فبراير 2025 بعد نحو سبع سنوات من العمل في الشركة.
📌 يونيو 2025: الانتقال إلى المغرب
♦️ بعد نحو أربعة أشهر، انتقل إلى الخطوط الملكية المغربية، وبقي هناك نحو سبعة أشهر.
📌 يناير 2026: مغادرة الخطوط الملكية المغربية
♦️ غادر الهمامي الشركة المغربية في يناير 2026.
♦️ نحو فبراير 2026: الانتقال إلى "فلاي دبي"
♦️ انتقل بعد ذلك إلى "فلاي دبي"، وعمل مساعد طيار لديها لنحو ثمانية أشهر قبل الحادث.
📌 30 سبتمبر 2026: حادث الرحلة إلى تل أبيب
♦️ كان الهمامي مساعد الطيار على رحلة "فلاي دبي" المتجهة من دبي إلى تل أبيب.
♦️ وبحسب السلطات الإماراتية، اعتدى على قائد الطائرة وحاول السيطرة عليها.
♦️ وتمكن أفراد على متن الطائرة من التدخل، قبل أن يتولى طيار آخر السيطرة عليها وتهبط اضطرارياً في تبوك بالسعودية.
📌 أكتوبر 2026: التحقيق في خلفيته
♦️ بعد الحادث، توسع التحقيق ليشمل خلفية الهمامي ومسيرته المهنية واتصالاته ونشاطه الإلكتروني، إضافة إلى أسباب انتقاله بين شركات الطيران المختلفة.
♦️ وتبقى سوريا الحلقة الأكثر غموضاً في سيرته.
♦️ فهو ابن لأم سورية، وتقول مصادر أمنية إنه أمضى فترة من حياته في سوريا وإن مخاوف لاحقة بشأن أفكاره ارتبطت بتلك المرحلة.
♦️ لكن لم يتضح حتى الآن أين كان في سوريا أو متى أقام فيها تحديداً.
♦️ وبحسب عمره وتسلسل حياته المعروف، تبدو الفترة بين 2011 و2017، عندما كان عمره بين 14 و21 عاماً، النافذة الزمنية الأوضح المحتملة لوجوده هناك.
#المجلة -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Stanly Johny
@johnstanly
It's important to understand the Saudi perspective about the conflict. Here, listen to Turki bin Faisal, the son of King Faisal. He was also the head of Saudi intel and the Saudi ambassador to the US. He maintains close ties with MBS. I found two things he said very interesting. One he says the Saudi military intervention in Yemen in 2015 arrested the Houthi expansion; two, MBS had advised trump against attacking #iran in Feb (this contradicts the May NYT report which said the Saudis had backed the war). He calls #israel a malignant force, and says both Israel and Iran are threats to the region. He's not optimistic about American withdrawal from the region, and is slightly critical of #china because he believes China is not doing enough to restrain Iran.
youtu.be/NLdG3UDZ8nM -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
AL-MONITOR
@AlMonitor
ANALYSIS | Russia’s double game in Yemen: Backing Saudi Arabia while courting Houthis
Despite public ties to Riyadh, Moscow allegedly aided Houthi Red Sea strikes via Iran to pressure the West beyond Ukraine. Via @anton_mardasov
www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/russias-double-game-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Face The Nation
@FaceTheNation
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suggested striking Iran's nuclear facilities in December 2024 in the midst of negotiations over the release of hostages, former top national security official Brett McGurk said.
McGurk acknowledged U.S. concerns after the 2024 election that Iran might "make a dash" toward a nuclear bomb, and recalled a meeting of top national security officials where the question was posed: "What would we do if we see that?"
"And as I recall, unanimity on — we would do the strike in Fordow," McGurk continued. "We didn't see that. We sent a message to Iran: 'Don't even think about it.' But yet Netanyahu was clearly contemplating that in December of 2024."This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Hélas si, sur la coalition internationale anti-Hamas, un fiasco retentissant.
Radio RCJ
@RCJRADIO
🔴 Récit du dîner à l'Élysée lors duquel Bernard-Henri Lévy s'est prononcé contre la reconnaissance unilatérale par la France d'un Etat palestinien, et Alain Finkielkraut en faveur.
"Sur l'Ukraine, j'ai le sentiment que j'ai été entendu [par Emmanuel Macron]. Et puis il y a un énorme sujet sur lequel je n'ai pas été entendu, c'est Israël..."
@BHL
En intégralité sur : radiorcj.info/diffusions/episode-3-bernard-henri-levy-pou…This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇫🇷🇹🇷 | La France et la Turquie ont signé une feuille de route visant à renforcer leur coopération en matière de défense, ainsi que leur dialogue stratégique bilatéral.
Cette nouvelle étape doit permettre d’approfondir les échanges entre Paris et Ankara, de renforcer leur coopération industrielle et militaire et de donner un nouvel élan au partenariat franco-turc dans le domaine de la défense.
Paris cherche ainsi à arrimer Ankara à l’architecture de défense européenne que Macron bâtit, avant qu’elle ne s’ancre ailleurs. À Ankara, il a défendu l’idée que le réarmement européen doit profiter à l’industrie européenne, cité le SAMP/T, et annoncé après son entretien avec Erdoğan un suivi confié aux ministres. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 تقرير موسع ومهم أعدته «الغارديان»، عن الشيخ طحنون بن زايد؛ تجمع فيه مقابلات مباشرة، وشهادات لمسؤولين وباحثين وشخصيات تعاملت معه، إلى جانب تتبع تحقيقات ووثائق سابقة.
🔷 يرسم التقرير شبكة مترابطة للمال والاستخبارات والذكاء الاصطناعي والنفوذ السياسي الإماراتي عالمياً.
🔷 يدير الشيخ طحنون بن زايد، وفق التقرير، منظومة مالية واستثمارية يقدّر حجمها بنحو 1.5 تريليون دولار، تشمل «رويال غروب» بأصول تقارب 300 مليار دولار، وأكبر صندوق سيادي إماراتي، وبنك أبوظبي الأول، وصندوق «ألتيرا»، إضافة إلى استثمارات واسعة في الصحة والعقارات والطاقة والمرافق والتكنولوجيا. التقرير يقول إن الحدود بين ثروة طحنون الشخصية وثروة آل نهيان والأصول السيادية لأبوظبي ليست واضحة دائماً، وينقل عن باحثة إماراتية أن رجال أعمال محليين يشتكون سراً من مزاحمة الشركات والصناديق المرتبطة به للقطاع الخاص، خصوصاً في الرعاية الصحية. الوصول إليه يمر عبر شبكة ضيقة من الوسطاء؛ يذكر التقرير سعد الحريري وميليسا مونكادا، ويستعيد شهادة توم باراك الذي احتاج إلى استمالة طويلة قبل لقائه، شملت هدايا نادرة ورحلة دراجات في المغرب قبل اجتماع على يخت طحنون البالغة قيمته نحو 250 مليون دولار. ويكشف التقرير جانباً من تكوينه الشخصي: تدرب في التسعينيات على الجوجيتسو في الولايات المتحدة باسم «بن»، موّل لاحقاً تطوير الحاسوب «هيدرا» للشطرنج، واستعان بأحد مطوري لعبة «عصر الإمبراطوريات» لتدريبه كي يتفوق على إخوته.
🔷 أمنياً، يربط التقرير صعود طحنون بتوسع الإمارات في الاستخبارات بعد 11 سبتمبر. «مشروع رافن»، الذي ساعد المسؤول الأميركي السابق لمكافحة الإرهاب ريتشارد كلارك في تأسيسه، ضم موظفين سابقين في وكالة الأمن القومي ومتعاقدين وخبرات أمنية أميركية، وبدأ تحت عنوان مكافحة الإرهاب قبل أن تتوسع أنشطته إلى مراقبة ناشطين ومعارضين وصحفيين ومحامين وسياسيين. بعد 2011، يقول التقرير إن أبوظبي شكلت قوة شبه عسكرية من نحو 800 عنصر كولومبي وجنوب أفريقي في ظل مخاوف من اضطرابات داخلية. لاحقاً انتقلت عمليات إلكترونية إلى «دارك ماتر»، ثم ظهرت استمرارية بشرية مباشرة مع «جي 42»: بنغ شياو، الذي قاد وحدة مهمة في «دارك ماتر»، أصبح الرئيس التنفيذي لـ«جي 42»، وكريم صباح، الرئيس السابق لـ«دارك ماتر»، أصبح يدير إحدى شركاتها التابعة.
🔷 في الذكاء الاصطناعي، تمكنت «جي 42» من دخول قلب البنية التكنولوجية الأميركية: مايكروسوفت استثمرت 1.5 مليار دولار فيها، وانضم نائب رئيسها براد سميث إلى مجلس إدارتها، فيما ترتبط «جي 42» وصندوقها الاستثماري بشراكات أو استثمارات مع «أوبن إيه آي» و«أنثروبيك» و«إكس إيه آي»، ويصف سام ألتمان طحنون بأنه «صديق شخصي عزيز». المجمع الإماراتي الجديد للذكاء الاصطناعي مخطط له أن يصل إلى قدرة كهربائية تبلغ 5 غيغاواط، ويقول التقرير إن ذلك قد يعادل حتى 250 ضعف أكبر مراكز البيانات فائقة النطاق الحالية. كما تشارك «جي 42» في تمويل مشروع بقيمة 500 مليار دولار لبناء مراكز بيانات داخل الولايات المتحدة، واشترت شركات إنشاء تعمل في هذه المشاريع، وأسست مع مايكروسوفت مؤسسة مقرها أبوظبي معنية بتطوير «الذكاء الاصطناعي المسؤول».
🔷 في المقابل، كان مجلس الاستخبارات الوطني الأميركي قد حذر في تقرير سري عام 2022 من محاولات إماراتية قانونية وغير قانونية للتأثير في السياسة الخارجية الأميركية. ويضع التقرير بجانب ذلك استثمار أداة مرتبطة بطحنون ملياري دولار في عملة صادرة عن «وورلد ليبرتي» المرتبطة بعائلة ترامب، وشراء طحنون نفسه حصة 49% من الشركة قبل أقل من شهر من تنصيب ترامب الثاني، ثم قرار إدارة ترامب رفع القيود عن تصدير الرقائق المتقدمة إلى الإمارات؛ البيت الأبيض والشركة ينفيان أي علاقة بين الاستثمارات وقرار الرقائق.
🔷 خلال الحرب مع إيران انتقلت هذه المنظومة من الاقتصاد والتكنولوجيا إلى الأمن الإقليمي المباشر. في 27 فبراير، وفي اليوم الذي ترأس فيه طحنون اجتماعاً لصندوق الاستثمار في الذكاء الاصطناعي التابع لـ«جي 42»، بدأت الضربات الأميركية والإسرائيلية على إيران، وردت طهران باستهداف مركزين للبيانات في الإمارات، ثم نشرت قائمة بأهداف قالت إنها مشروعة عسكرياً شملت مكاتب إماراتية لشركات أميركية مثل أمازون وغوغل ومايكروسوفت. بعد ذلك تحرك طحنون في مسار دبلوماسي سري؛ وينقل التقرير عن رويترز أن مسؤولين كباراً في الحرس الثوري الإيراني استُضيفوا في دار ضيافة تابعة له في أبوظبي. وبحلول منتصف يونيو، يقول التقرير إن ترتيباً جرى التوصل إليه وفر مليارات الدولارات للحكومة الإيرانية وأدى إلى توقف الضربات الإيرانية على الإمارات. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Faisal J. Abbas | فيصل عبّاس
@FaisalJAbbas
I sit down with Prince Turki Al-Faisal to hear his #arabviews on Iran, Yemen and Israel.
Full episode: youtu.be/NLdG3UDZ8nM -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Où va Israël, trois semaines avant les élections législatives? Un chiffre souligne un malaise : 268 000 Israéliens ont quitté l'Etat hébreu depuis 3 ans. Ils sont plus nombreux que les nouveau arrivants. Ma chronique sur RTL.
www.rtl.fr/programmes/les-secrets-de-l-actu-international… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Faisal J. Abbas | فيصل عبّاس
@FaisalJAbbas
Missed the podcast? Read Prince Turki Al-Faisal’s #arabviews on the conflict in Yemen, Iran and the future of war/peace in the region 👇 | Via @arabnews
www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/arab-views-saudi-restraint-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Would like to share an analysis I have just read on some Iranian channels close to the security establishment about some of the regional dynamics currently taking shape around Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
- What I found interesting is that the analysis goes well beyond the usual question of whether Saudi Arabia will eventually join the Abraham Accords.
The argument is that Netanyahu and MBZ may be trying to shape a new regional security architecture before Riyadh can shape it on its own terms.
- Iran, the Houthis and the broader question of Persian Gulf security would all fit into this framework, with Israel offering military and intelligence capabilities and Abu Dhabi trying to position itself as the political bridge between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
- But there is another layer which, in my view, is even more interesting: the competition between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. If MBZ succeeds in making the UAE the indispensable intermediary between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the analysis goes, Abu Dhabi’s regional weight would increase considerably. Yet this could produce exactly the opposite effect in Riyadh, reinforcing Saudi suspicions about Emirati ambitions, especially given their already visible differences over Yemen and their broader competition for influence in the region.
- There is also something else worth considering. Riyadh has already begun building a regional framework of its own. The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Pakistan and Turkey has created a collective security mechanism outside the Israeli orbit, while Saudi Arabia is also part of the R4 with Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt, which has backed the Islamabad diplomatic track between Iran and the United States.
- In the Iranian reading, therefore, Israeli and Emirati pressure on Riyadh is not only about normalisation. It is also about trying to disrupt, or at least reshape, these emerging regional arrangements: on one side the Makkah security architecture, and on the other the diplomatic channel that has developed around Islamabad and dialogue with Tehran.
- From Tehran’s perspective, weakening both would ultimately serve Israeli strategic interests.
- This is, of course, an Iranian interpretation rather than an established fact. But it offers an interesting way of reading the current regional manoeuvring.
- In this picture, MBS is not simply being asked to normalise relations with Israel. He is being pulled between different ideas of what the future regional order should look like, and Riyadh may increasingly prefer to build one on its own terms rather than join one designed elsewhere.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Interesting details from conservative Iranian daily Khorasan on what was happening behind the scenes during the war.
- According to Khorasan, Ali Larijani and Kamal Kharrazi were working together, during some of the most difficult days of the conflict, on a plan to bring the war to a rapid end and formulate a peace initiative, partly to limit its growing impact on the Iranian population.
- The report comes after Vladimir Putin described Larijani’s assassination as “a very big mistake,” saying that he was prepared to seek mutually acceptable solutions based on Iran’s national interests and could have played a role in restoring peace to the Persian Gulf.
- Khorasan goes a step further, portraying Larijani and Kharrazi as figures capable of international engagement and linking their assassination to Israeli efforts to remove potential advocates of a negotiated settlement.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kristin Diwan
@kdiwaniya
The meeting betw UAE's Mansour bin Zayed & KSA's Khalid bin Salman reflects an easing of UAE-Saudi tension esp on Yemen file.
@Dr_Ulrichsen examines their historic coordination & split over Yemen & what improved ties might mean in combatting the Houthis.
agsi.org/analysis/a-saudi-uae-thaw/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House MENA
@CH_MENAP
‘The [Iranian] regime will manage to endure until the negotiating terms are more favorable. What they won’t do is bend the knee to Donald Trump.’
@SanamVakil tells @IChotiner in a @NewYorker interview why another round of military conflict is inevitable⤵️
www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-the-war-in-iran-is-lik… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Quentin M.
@MllerQuentin
"Les Saoudiens envisagent deux options pour cet assaut, ont indiqué les responsables du Golfe et du Yémen : soit une attaque ciblée sur la zone entourant Bab el-Mandeb, soit une offensive plus vaste incluant d'autres attaques synchronisées sur plusieurs fronts au Yémen, dans les gouvernorats d'Al-Bayda, de Marib, de Taïz et d'Al-Jawf"
www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudis-plan-assault-ho… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
“Although there is Palestinian opposition to a two-state solution, a growing proportion—now a majority—wants it, and yearns for more capable and responsible leadership that addresses their needs and provides security,” write Michael Robbins, @AmaneyJamal, and Mark Tessler.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kenneth Roth
@KenRoth
A bad bet: Saudi Arabia’s biggest long-term problem may be that its longtime security guarantor, the United States, is unable to put out the region’s fire that Trump set, and Trump doesn’t seem especially interested in trying. foreignpolicy.com/2026/09/24/iran-trump-saudi-war-mbs-bad…
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
You had 150 000 foreign troups unable to stabilize Irak. You need three times more in Iran. Who wants to join Us?
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Yossi Melman
@yossi_melman
The failure by the Shin Bet and the Transportation Ministry, which allowed an Omani pilot to fly to Israel without background checks, is becoming more serious. The WSJ reports that Oman had banned him from working for its airlines because of the Islamic radicalization process he had undergone. It is unclear whether Oman passed this information on to flydubai. If so, this would constitute an intelligence coordination failure and negligence on the scale of 9/11.
In any case, the Israeli failure is glaring. Omani pilots had also flown passenger aircraft to Israel in the past. Israel failed to enforce its own guidelines requiring background checks for pilots from countries with which it has no diplomatic relations. Shin Bet chief Zini and MoT minister Regev are now blaming each other.
As far as the investigation is concerned, it should proceed on the assumption that the aircraft crashed and that a mass-casualty disaster occurred. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇸🇦🇾🇪🇺🇸Saudis plan major offensive against the Houthis, but U.S. won't join for now. My report on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/10/02/saudis-yemen-houthis-bab-al-mand… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Inacceptable en effet. Les sociétés des journalistes (SDJ) de près de quarante rédactions ont dénoncé vendredi les "menaces de mort" du Rassemblement national contre Mediapart, après les déclarations de Marine Le Pen recommandant à ses journalistes de porter "un costard en kevlar", la matière des gilets pare-balles (AFP).
"Nous, journalistes travaillant dans des rédactions aux lignes éditoriales différentes, dénonçons ensemble et sans réserve les menaces de mort proférées par le Rassemblement national à l'encontre de nos confrères de Mediapart et les nombreuses attaques de l'extrême droite contre les journalistes sur l'ensemble du territoire", ont cosigné ces sociétés de journalistes et de personnels, dont celles de M6, BFMTV, Arte, l'Agence France-Presse, Libération, du Figaro, du Monde ou encore de France Télévisions notamment.
Les SDJ de Sud-Ouest, du Télégramme, de L'Equipe ou de La Tribune font aussi partie des signataires.
"En suggérant à Mediapart d'enfiler +son costard en Kevlar+ (un gilet pare-balles, donc), Marine Le Pen met une cible dans le dos des journalistes", souligne le texte.
"Ces violentes tentatives d'intimidation sont la marque de fabrique des régimes autoritaires à travers le monde et sont particulièrement inquiétantes pour le droit à l'information auquel peut prétendre la population d'un pays démocratique", ont ajouté les SDJ.
Les déclarations de Marine Le Pen contre Mediapart, après ses révélations sur des écrits antisémites attribués au président du parti Jordan Bardella en 2013, avaient déjà suscité l'indignation de Charlie Hebdo et de Reporters sans frontières (RSF).
Mardi, la candidate du parti d'extrême droite en tête des sondages pour la présidentielle de 2027 avait déclaré que Jordan Bardella et elle avaient tous deux "enfilé (leurs) costards en Kevlar parce que, là, c'est du lourd qui tombe".
Elle avait ensuite prévenu que le RN n'allait pas "se laisser faire". "Donc maintenant, c'est à Mediapart, je crois, qu'il va falloir dire d'enfiler son costard en Kevlar parce qu'il y aura évidemment une réponse à la manière dont ils se comportent", avait-elle ajouté.
#bardellaantisémite -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aaron Y. Zelin
@azelin
New jihadi group Saraya Nuzza’ al-Qaba'il announced to confront Israel’s incursions in southern Syria
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arta Moeini PhD
@ArtaMoeini
The most significant factor handicapping Iranian strategy in Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf isn't the US or Israel. It's the UAE—a state that has the biggest lobby within Iran having accumulated tremendous leverage as the primary financial node for Iranian trustees and private brokers.
Dubai serves as Tehran's main financial clearinghouse and import/re-export hub, providing essential access to Western currencies, consumer goods, and critical industrial supplies that a USD-sanctioned Iran can't directly procure.
The events of the past few weeks demonstrate that the single most important thing Iran could do to bolster its national security at this juncture is to veer away from the UAE-supplied heroin, breaking its longterm dependency on Dubai clearinghouses.
Tehran can achieve this by establishing or expanding direct, state-level clearing mechanisms with its actual trading partners—China, Russia, and India—bypassing third-party commercial hubs entirely.
This shift requires Tehran to nationalize and strictly regulate its trade-clearing processes, replacing private brokers and corrupt profiteers with audited state agencies. Eliminating these middlemen along with the mafias formed by the financial rentier class will curb their extortionate fees and prevent massive capital flights, while protecting the value of the Iranian Rial.
Such an economic reorganization is politically contentious to say the least, but remains a strategic necessity given the existential and attritional nature of Iran's conflict with the United States.
Beyond finance, the UAE is also a critical logistics node used for Iranian imports. Iran could mitigate this risk by diversifying its trading hubs and establishing alternative regional trade corridors through Iraq, Oman, Pakistan, and Armenia.
Ultimately, Iran remains dangerously dependent on the UAE as its main commercial lifeline. Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, has weaponized this over-reliance—leveraging the self-interest of select Iranian financial networks to subvert Iranian national interests.
This structural vulnerability, if left unaddressed, risks undermining Iran's leverage and recent strategic success. Realism thus dictates that Iran must do all it can to decouple from Dubai and diversify its financial and commercial ties—decentering its adversaries while prioritizing major non-Western powers (China, India, Russia) and neutral neighboring countries (Oman and Iraq).
Time will tell if Iranian strategists and "security-first" officials can actually execute this vital economic realignment—or if the Iranian trustee networks and their foreign backers will succeed in defanging Iran's defenses by threatening to manipulate the rial and destabilize the Iranian economy. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jack Prandelli
@jackprandelli
The Gulf's oil is coming back.
🇮🇷Iran's isn't.
🇸🇦Saudi exports are running near 5.2M b/d so far in September, up from about 2.9M in August.
🇮🇶Iraq has climbed back to about 2.5M b/d, from almost nothing in April and May.
🇮🇷Iran fell to roughly 0.1M b/d in August. There's no September data for it at all.
Before the war, Saudi shipped about 7M b/d and Iraq about 3.6M. Both are still well short.
Saudi's rebound lines up with its East-West pipeline running again, sending crude to Red Sea ports and bypassing Hormuz.
The blockade is doing two jobs at once: starving Tehran and handing its old customers to Riyadh and Baghdad. 🇨🇳Chinese teapots were already bidding for Basrah crude in August.
themerchantsnews.substack.com/p/can-washington-have-it-al…
source:Bloomberg -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Steven A. Cook
@stevenacook
My latest @ForeignPolicy
Is Egypt’s Diplomacy Clever or Clumsy? - Regional wars have required Cairo to maneuver between competing demands.
foreignpolicy.com/2026/09/29/egypt-iran-diplomacy-uae-gaz… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aaron Rupar
@atrupar
Trump says Netanyahu told him that an Israeli plumber took over the controls and saved the Flydubai plane from crashing, but admits "I don't know if it's true, but that's the story I got from Bibi"
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Important point 👇
Arta Moeini PhD
@ArtaMoeini
To anyone who thinks Iran has lost its Hormuz leverage based on the Kpler report: a short-term influx of crude achieved at massive cost is neither sustainable nor enough to change the macro picture as the global economy nears a tipping point.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
My press comments published by @nabihbulos for the @latimes: For their part, the Houthis insist they have no plans to attack shipping on the Red Sea and that their blockade applies only to Saudi Arabia — a move calculated to prevent the rise of an international effort to dislodge them. “They don’t want to attract international military operations,” said Mohammad al-Basha, founder of the Basha Report, a U.S.-based risk advisory. “They realize that when you do things in the Red Sea, you create panic in the world. In the meantime, the Houthis have been consolidating their gains on Yemen’s coast, Basha said, setting up checkpoints and bringing loyalists to administer the regions now under their control. Government forces have since overcome their initial disarray and stopped further Houthi advances. But Basha warned any attempt to push out the Houthis from the coast will be difficult, especially with the group’s advances in manufacturing and fielding drones and ballistic missiles, not to mention the divisions and competing loyalties plaguing Yemeni government forces. “It’s an uphill battle,” he said. “You have a divided command-and-control; a divided Yemen; a divided society; a divided geography; and these divisions empower the Houthis.”
www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2026-09-27/new-flash-p… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
The UAE national security advisor Tahnoon bin Zayed arrives in Oman a day after Mansour has been in Saudi Arabia suggesting movement on Hormuz and the Yemen file where Muscat is the mediator
Especially with the Houthis Saudi and the UAE need to understand what the terms for a deal are before doubling down on military coercion
وكالة الأنباء العمانية
@OmanNewsAgency
#عاجل
جلالةُ السُّلطان المُعظّم /حفظهُ اللهُ ورعاهُ/ يستقبل بقصر البركة العامر، سمو الشيخ نائب حاكم إمارة أبوظبي مستشار الأمن الوطني بدولة #الإمارات العربية المتحدة الشقيقة. جرى خلال المقابلة بحث عددٍ من الموضوعات التي تهمّ البلدين الشقيقين على مختلف الأصعدة، بما يخدم المصالح والتطلعات المشتركة، علاوةً على تبادل الآراء حول التطورات المتسارعة في المنطقة، وسبل تحقيق التهدئة وخفض التوترات عبر الطرق الدبلوماسية المتوازنة وتكثيف التنسيق والتشاور؛ بما يكفل حماية مصالح الدول وأمنها.
#العُمانية -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 ينشر الكاتب والصحافي الاستقصائي كريستوفر ليونارد في مجلة «ذا أتلانتيك» تحقيقه «وهم ثاد»، الذي يبدأ من طلب محمد بن زايد عام 2007 بناء درع صاروخي يحمي الإمارات من إيران، وينتهي عند أزمة استنزاف الصواريخ الأميركية في حرب 2026.
هذا أهم ما ورد في التحقيق
🔷 مشكلة «ثاد» ليست فشلاً تقنياً؛ النظام أثبت قدرة عالية على اعتراض الصواريخ الباليستية، لكن الولايات المتحدة استخدمته في مهمة أوسع بكثير من المهمة التي صُمم لها.
🔷 «ثاد» بُني أساساً لحماية قوات ومواقع عالية القيمة من الضربة الأولى إلى أن تبدأ الطائرات والسفن الأميركية بتدمير مصادر النيران، لا لحماية دول ومدن وبنى تحتية طوال حرب استنزاف مفتوحة.
🔷 حرب إيران كشفت ثلاثة اختلالات مترابطة؛ مخزون صغير من صواريخ الاعتراض، إنتاج بطيء لا يمكن زيادته سريعاً، وتهديد إيراني يقوم على «الكتلة الدقيقة»؛ أي مزج الصواريخ الباليستية المكلفة نسبياً بأعداد ضخمة من المسيّرات الرخيصة. بهذا الأسلوب تستطيع إيران إجبار الدفاع الأميركي على استهلاك ذخائر بملايين الدولارات بوتيرة أسرع كثيراً من قدرة الصناعة على تعويضها.
🔷 النتيجة الاستراتيجية تتجاوز «ثاد»؛ فالولايات المتحدة استهلكت خلال نحو عشرة أشهر مخزوناً احتاج قرابة تسع سنوات لبنائه، فيما يقدَّر أن نحو 80% من مخزون «ثاد» الأميركي السابق قد استُنزف. إعادة رفع الإنتاج بصورة جوهرية تحتاج سنوات، لا أشهراً.
🔷 الدلالة الأهم للخليج هي أن شراء منظومات أميركية متقدمة لا يساوي ضمان حماية مستدامة. لذلك بدأت دول وحلفاء أميركيون يبحثون عن دفاعات أرخص، ومصادر أوروبية أو أوكرانية، وحلول مضادة للمسيّرات، بدلاً من الاعتماد الكامل على الصواريخ الاعتراضية الأميركية المكلفة.
🔷 يكشف التقرير أن الشيخ محمد بن زايد طلب منذ فبراير 2007 إقامة درع صاروخي متعدد الطبقات قبل صيف 2009 لحماية الإمارات من رد إيراني محتمل إذا تعاونت أبوظبي مع واشنطن ضد البرنامج النووي الإيراني. ونقل عنه قوله لقائد القوات الجوية الأميركية مايكل موزلي إن الإمارات «تعيش في حي خطير»، وإن تأخير امتلاك إيران سلاحاً نووياً يجب أن يتم «بكل الوسائل المتاحة». برقية أميركية عام 2009 وصفت إيران بأنها «هاجس وجودي» لدى الإمارات.
🔷 المهمة الأصلية لـ«ثاد»، وفق اللواء المتقاعد جون فيراري الذي أشرف على البرنامج، كانت «النجاة من الرشقة الأولى» وحماية الانتشار العسكري والموانئ حتى تتمكن القوات الأميركية من تدمير مصادر الهجوم. المشكلة أن واشنطن باعت النظام لاحقاً للدول باعتباره مظلة دفاع طويلة الأمد، من دون تعديل المخزون أو الإنتاج بما يتناسب مع هذا الاستخدام.
🔷 وفق وثائق البنتاغون، لم يكن لدى الولايات المتحدة في 2024 أكثر من 534 صاروخ اعتراض «ثاد»، بينما امتلكت الإمارات ما بين 190 و290. ويقول التقرير، استناداً إلى تقديرات حديثة، إن نحو 80% من المخزون الأميركي جرى استهلاكه خلال عشرة أشهر من القتال. يُقدّر أن المخزون الحالي قد يكون في حدود 250 صاروخ فقط.
🔷 خلال حرب الاثني عشر يوماً عام 2025 استُخدم أكثر من 150 صاروخ «ثاد»، ثم استُخدم ما بين 190 و290 خلال العملية الأميركية في 2026. الصاروخ الاعتراضي الواحد يكلف نحو 12 مليون دولار، بينما يقدَّر ثمن صاروخ «قدر» الإيراني بنحو 5 ملايين دولار، والمسيّرة «شاهد» بنحو 20 إلى 50 ألف دولار.
🔷 المسؤولون الإماراتيون قالوا إن عشرات المسيّرات وصاروخاً باليستياً واحداً فقط اخترقت الدفاعات، لكن الحجم الهائل للهجوم استنزف شبكة «ثاد» و«باتريوت».
🔷 دراسة داخلية للبنتاغون توصلت إلى أن رفع إنتاج بعض الصواريخ بنسبة 60% أو مضاعفته يحتاج عشرات المليارات، وقد يستغرق بين ثلاث سنوات وست سنوات ونصف. أحد أسباب الهشاشة أن شركتين فقط تحصلان على 97% من الإنفاق الأميركي على الصواريخ، وأن بعض المكونات الحرجة تعتمد على مورد أميركي واحد.
🔷 الأثر بدأ يظهر لدى الحلفاء؛ سويسرا أُبلغت بتأخير تسليم «باتريوت» أربعاً إلى خمس سنوات، بولندا رفضت إرسال صواريخها الاعتراضية للشرق الأوسط، والدنمارك تخلت عن صفقة «باتريوت» بقيمة 8.5 مليارات دولار لصالح منظومة أوروبية أسرع تسليماً. السعودية، من جهتها، أعلنت اتفاقاً أمنياً مع أوكرانيا للوصول إلى وسائل أرخص لمكافحة المسيّرات.
🔷 أهم منقول استراتيجي في التقرير يأتي من ستيفن ويرثيم؛ استنزاف الذخائر يعني أن الولايات المتحدة تدخل فترة ستكون فيها «أقل قدرة دفاعياً على المستوى العالمي»، بينما بدأت دول الشرق الأوسط تعيد تقييم فكرة أن القواعد الأميركية والأسلحة الأميركية تمثل ضمانة حماية مطلقة. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
🇦🇪🇸🇦 | L’ennemi commun peut-il ressouder Riyad et Abou Dhabi ?
Le rapprochement saoudo-émirati n’est pas une réconciliation, mais un alignement tactique. Ce n’est pas la convergence des intérêts qui rapproche Riyad et Abou Dhabi, c’est l’intensité de la menace houthie.
La rupture de l’hiver dernier a été la plus grave entre les deux monarchies. En décembre 2025, le STC, soutenu par Abou Dhabi, a pris le Hadramaout et le Mahra, frontaliers du royaume ; Riyad a frappé une cargaison émiratie à Moukalla et exigé le retrait des Émirats sous 24 heures. Abou Dhabi a annoncé son départ complet du Yémen.
Le différend est d’abord systémique. Au Soudan, MBS a sollicité une pression américaine accrue sur les Émirats, et la reconnaissance du Somaliland par Israël a étendu la rivalité à la Corne de l’Afrique. Deux conceptions de l’ordre régional s’opposent : l’État central pour Riyad, les relais non étatiques pour Abou Dhabi.
Les Houthis ont converti cette fragmentation en avantage opérationnel. Ils ont pris la côte de la mer Rouge aux forces soutenues par Riyad et frappent tankers, infrastructures pétrolières, aéroports et la capitale.
Le 29 septembre signale une inflexion. MBS a reçu Mansour ben Zayed, aux côtés de Khalid ben Salmane, lors du premier face-à-face depuis la rupture.
Plusieurs pistes s’ouvrent , la première option pour Riyad : réintégrer Abou Dhabi. Les Émirats apportent une capacité éprouvée de génération de forces locales, mais au prix d’un retour de leur influence dans le Sud que le royaume vient de neutraliser.
Seconde option : diversifier ses soutiens. Les chefs d’état-major saoudien, turc et pakistanais coordonnent déjà leur appui au royaume, mais ces partenaires n’ont ni réseaux ni ancrage sur le sol yéménite.
L’arbitrage saoudien porte donc sur le coût acceptable : concéder le Sud aux Émirats pour reprendre l’initiative au Nord.
La menace houthie a produit ce que la diplomatie n’avait pas obtenu : un alignement. Sa durée dépendra de celle de la menace, mais aussi de la capacité des deux capitales à mesurer ce que leur coûterait de différer encore le règlement diplomatique de leurs divergences stratégiques dans une région en profonde recomposition. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joseph Daher
@JosephDaher19
An article co-written with Erwin Van Veen assessing the state of Syria’s transition in mid-2026.
www.clingendael.org/publication/syrias-transition-mid-202… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Bloomberg
@business
Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled's $300 billion wealth fund is a key player in the UAE's “Zero Hormuz” strategy — spending heavily on ports and infrastructure to redraw trade routes in the Gulf. Read more: www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-09-29/uae-s-sheikh-k…
📷: Haruna Furuhashi/Pool/Getty Images -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mukhtar
@I_amMukhtar
The Prime Minister of Qatar said that Hamas wanted to hand over all the civilian hostages on the first day of the war, but the Israelis rejected the proposal and refused to even “entertain the idea.”
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Une page de l'histoire irakienne se referme. Les soldats américains quittent le pays. "L'Iran est la gagnante et Daech pourrait ressurgir", met en garde Alia Brahimi, experte à Oxford, dans mon analyse à lire dans Le Figaro.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/domination-de-l-iran-resurg… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
Ali Shihabi, a Saudi commentator familiar with Riyadh’s thinking, said Prince Khalid’s invitation to Sheikh Mansour was “a big gesture and it shows there’s more co-ordination, particularly on Yemen”.
“I don’t think they [the UAE] will come back into the war, but Riyadh wants them to manage the southern factions so they don’t undermine the anti-Houthi front,” Shihabi said.
www.ft.com/content/87bfd2b4-aab6-4dcb-9c77-3d2606185578?s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
Under the terms of the deal, which mediators hope will revive talks on a final settlement to end the war, Iran would allow the free flow of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and the US would lift its blockade on Iranian ports in response.
One of the officials said there had been progress but that the parties continued to haggle over the sequencing of the next phases of the agreement.
These would include the US reinstating an oil waiver to allow Iran to sell oil, enabling Tehran to access some of its assets frozen overseas, and elements related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including allowing International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to return to the republic, the officials said.
On Monday Qatari mediators met Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi in New York and the US officials in Washington, where they discussed an amended version of the Iranian proposal. Araghchi later told state television he expected to receive the US response on Tuesday.
www.ft.com/content/2e2c868b-9510-4f0c-bbeb-ca17e7a18cc1?s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
האירוע חמור אפילו יותר: אנחנו משחקים באש של מיסקלקולציה.
מאז המלחמה איראן שינתה באופן משמעותי את תפיסתה הצבאית. במקום להסתפק ב"הגנה קדמית" ובהמתנה לתקיפה כדי להגיב, בטהראן מדברים כיום בגלוי על תפיסה התקפית יותר, ובכלל זה אפשרות לפעול באופן מקדים אם ההנהגה תשתכנע שישראל או ארה"ב עומדות לתקוף אותה.
וזו בדיוק הסיבה שהרטוריקה בישראל מסוכנת כל כך. כאשר בישראל מדברים על אפשרות שאיראן מתכננת מתקפה שעשויה להצדיק פעולה מקדימה, ובמקביל בכירים ממהרים לקשור את איראן לאירועים שעדיין לא ברור מי עומד מאחוריהם, אנחנו עלולים ליצור בדיוק את הדינמיקה שממנה צריך להיזהר: הנהגת איראן משתכנעת שישראל מתכוננת לתקוף; היא מחליטה שלא להמתין ומפעילה את תפיסת המנע החדשה שלה; ישראל מפרשת את המהלך כהוכחה לכך שהערכתה המקורית הייתה נכונה, והדרך למלחמה נוספת מתקצרת במהירות.
זהו תרחיש קלאסי של מיסקלקולציה. ייתכן שיש בישראל מי שסבורים שמתקפה איראנית דווקא תספק את הלגיטימציה לפתוח מחדש במערכה רחבה נגד איראן. אבל דווקא משום שהדוקטרינה האיראנית נעשתה התקפית ורגישה יותר לסימנים של מתקפה מתקרבת, כל אמירה וכל איום מקבלים כיום משמעות גדולה יותר.
אפשר וצריך להיערך לכל תרחיש. אבל יש הבדל עצום בין היערכות לבין יצירת תחושה אצל הצד השני שהמלחמה הבאה כבר בדרך. במציאות הנוכחית, דיבורים חסרי אחריות אינם רק רטוריקה. הם עלולים להפוך לנבואה שמגשימה את עצמה.
זה משחק באש — תרתי משמע.
מיכאל האוזר טוב
@HauserTov
עדיין לא ברור מה קרה עם טיסת פליידובאי. יש חשד לאירוע טרור, אבל אין בשלב הזה שום מידע פוזיטיבי שמאשר את זה.
מה עושה חבר הקבינט בצלאל סמוטריץ׳? מקושש מנדטים ואבו-עלי. מכריז מלחמה, לא חשוב על מי.
זה כל כך אבסורדי ומטומטם, שזה פשוט משחק לידי האיראנים! שימו לב מה הנרטיב שמהדהדים עכשיו בסוכנות הידיעות האיראנית פארס: ״ישראל מתכננת לבצע לכאורה ׳פיגוע דגל כוזב באזור', כדי להטיל את האחריות על איראן״.
אתם מבינים? וסמוטריץ׳ מחזק את הנרטיב כי זה טוב לו לבחירות. אנחנו מוחזקים בידיים הכי חסרות אחריות שהיו כאן אי פעם. נתניהו מפזר הפחדות, סמוטריץ׳ מכריז מלחמות - ובסוף הכי הרבה יהודים נהרגים במשמרת שלהם.
איפה האופוזיציה?????? השער ריק -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
During a meeting with Azerbaijan’s Deputy Prime Minister Shahin Mustafayev, SNSC Secretary Mohsen Rezaei made a number of remarks on the confrontation with the United States.
- One passage in particular is worth noting. Rezaei said that “Iran’s conditions have been communicated to the United States, but Trump is unable to make a decision.”
He also argued that Trump is now caught in a situation where he can “neither negotiate nor wage war,” adding that Washington has moved from direct military confrontation to what he called an “air blockade.”
- Perhaps the more interesting point is what this says about Tehran’s perception of Trump. Rezaei seems to suggest that the problem is no longer simply the distance between the US and Iranian positions, but Trump’s ability, or inability, to overcome the constraints standing in the way of an agreement.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 تكشف الغارديان أن البيت الأبيض يضغط سراً على السعودية والإمارات لتجاوز خلافاتهما والسماح بإنشاء قيادة عسكرية موحدة تضم ألوية العمالقة الجنوبية لمواجهة التقدم الحوثي.
🔷 هناك أيضاً اقتراح إضافي قيد التداول، وفق التقرير، يقوم على استخدام الاستخبارات الإسرائيلية والتعاقد مع شركات أمن خاصة إسرائيلية. ويقول التقرير إن الإمارات استخدمت شركات من هذا النوع سابقاً في اليمن، ويصف بعض نتائج ذلك بأنها كانت شديدة القسوة.
🔷 السعودية، بحسب التقرير، ظلت مترددة في الظهور بمظهر المتعاون مع إسرائيل، كما عارضت تاريخياً تقوية الانفصاليين الجنوبيين لأن تقسيم اليمن قد يؤدي، من وجهة نظر الرياض، إلى ترسيخ حكم الحوثيين في الشمال مباشرة على حدودها.
🔷 نوقش مستقبل الدور الإماراتي في اليمن، خلال اجتماع أبوظبي يوم الأحد الذي شارك فيه بنيامين نتنياهو ومحمد بن زايد وممثلون عن دول عربية أخرى، بينهم ممثلون سعوديون.
🔷 التقرير يقول إن نتنياهو عرض، بحسب ما نُقل، مساعدة السعودية في هزيمة الحوثيين، لكنه يقدّر أن الرياض ستجد قبول هذا العرض بالغ الصعوبة سياسياً، حتى في ظل عدم استجابة دونالد ترامب لطلب سعودي بالحصول على دعم أميركي مباشر في اليمن. هذا تقدير للصحيفة، وليس موقفاً سعودياً معلناً.
🔷 بعد ذلك عُقد اجتماع آخر في الرياض يوم الثلاثاء بين وزير الدفاع السعودي الأمير خالد بن سلمان ونائب رئيس الإمارات الشيخ منصور بن زايد، وجرى خلاله بحث ملف اليمن. ويضع التقرير اللقاء ضمن مجموعة مؤشرات على أن الطرفين يبحثان عن طريق للمصالحة، ولو بصورة محدودة في البداية.
🔷 الحوثيون، بعد وصولهم إلى باب المندب، يحاولون الآن تثبيت سيطرتهم والتقدم نحو تعز. بَرَاء شيبان، المتخصص في الخليج واليمن في المعهد الملكي للخدمات المتحدة، قال بعد قضائه أسبوعاً في تعز إن الحوثيين ينفذون موجات هجوم متزامنة على المدينة لاستنزاف قوات محور تعز، ويعودون يومياً من جبهة مختلفة بعد صدهم.
🔷 شيبان قال إن جهوداً تُبذل لإنهاء الخلاف السعودي-الإماراتي، وقد تظهر إجراءات لبناء الثقة، لكنه يرى أن عودة الإمارات عسكرياً إلى اليمن غير مرجحة لأن أبوظبي مرتبطة بالمجلس الانتقالي الجنوبي، وهو ما قد يعيد الخلاف نفسه مع الرياض. ووصف الموقفين السعودي والإماراتي بأنهما متعارضان جوهرياً في القضية الجنوبية.
🔷 خالد اليماني، وزير الخارجية اليمني السابق والمؤيد للمجلس الانتقالي، قال إن السعودية قد تضطر إلى إعادة النظر في مقاربتها السياسية للقضية الجنوبية لأن ألوية العمالقة الجنوبية، التي دربتها الإمارات وكانت مرتبطة سابقاً بالمجلس الانتقالي، تعد من أكثر القوات موثوقية وتجهيزاً على الأرض لوقف التقدم الحوثي.
🔷 في المقابل، دعا المجلس الانتقالي ألوية العمالقة إلى مقاومة دمجها في قوات الحكومة اليمنية، باعتبار أن ذلك يضر بالقضية الانفصالية. اليماني قال إن القوى الجنوبية لا يمكن مطالبتها بخوض حروب في الشمال ضد الحوثيين من دون أفق واضح لاستقلال الجنوب.
🔷 اليماني انتقد أيضاً الحكومة اليمنية المعترف بها دولياً، الموجودة في المنفى بالرياض، قائلاً إنها تطالب الجنوبيين باستعادة صنعاء نيابة عنها من دون تقديم أي وعد بحق الجنوب في تقرير المصير. وأضاف أن استمرار اعتماد شرعية الحكومة على التمويل السعودي، لا على القاعدة الشعبية داخل اليمن، لا يحقق بالضرورة هدف السعودية المعلن في تأمين حدودها الجنوبية. هذا موقف سياسي من اليماني وليس حقيقة مستقلة يتبناها التقرير. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
According to some readings emerging from Iran, Netanyahu’s recent visit to the UAE may have also focused on Yemen.
- The argument is that Netanyahu sought to persuade Mohammed bin Zayed to bring Abu Dhabi back into a more active role against the Houthis, particularly through operational and intelligence support for Saudi Arabia.
- In return, Riyadh would be expected to accommodate, or at least acknowledge, the UAE’s interests and established sphere of influence in southern Yemen, one of the issues that has complicated Saudi-Emirati coordination there for years.
- Seen from this angle,the subsequent visit of Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan to Riyadh becomes particularly interesting. The same accounts suggest that he may have carried a message from Netanyahu to Mohammed bin Salman, potentially exploring whether Yemen could once again become an area of closer Saudi-Emirati coordination, with Israel acting as a facilitator rather than the main actor.
- It is an interesting reading, especially because it adds a Yemen dimension to Netanyahu’s UAE visit and points to the internal balance of interests within the Persian Gulf.
- An important caveat, however: this remains an unverified reconstruction and, so far, lacks independent confirmation.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joyce Karam
@Joyce_Karam
⚡️SCOOP: Netanyahu’s visit to #uae was initially scheduled during week of Sept. 14. UAE canceled that trip one hour before takeoff from Israel, saying MBZ was leaving town…but then MBZ never left. Details here on Bibi’s pressure campaign to make the trip: www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/inside-netanyahus-re…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
Someone sent me this analysis and asked me what I think…
Yes, there is more oil flowing through the strait—with the exception of Iranian oil. But people misunderstand the issue of control of the Strait of Hormuz and overstate its importance in the positioning of Iran, the Gulf, and the U.S. as the war drags on. Specifically, this analysis on oil export volumes and its impact on negotiation positions overlooks two more important factors.
First, Iran may not be able to disrupt energy flows as effectively as in the early stage of the war, but it retains undiminished capabilities to destroy stocks, by which I mean the underlying production infrastructure, whether upstream or downstream.
Second, the assessment fails to consider that Iran can still choose to escalate by hitting these production targets if it determines that Trump isn’t feeling enough pain to take the diplomatic off-ramps being put in front of him. Importantly, we know what happens when Iran is exporting no oil and there is no realistic pathway for diplomacy—we saw it in the Abqaiq and Khurrais attacks on Aramco facilities in 2019.
So while the risk premium around oil flows may seem tolerable for Trump, the threats to energy production infrastructure the Gulf remain significant, which is exactly why regional countries are still trying to mediate a return to a durable ceasefire and diplomatic agreement. Trump too, is erratic, and could give cause to Iran to escalate in this way through his own fixation on “winning” the war. Markets are able to price this, especially not when traders are so fixated on short-term price action.
In this respect, the strait isn’t really Iran’s principle source of leverage. It never was! The attacks on U.S. bases and Gulf cities and infrastructure were far more consequential, but these dimensions of the conflict were downplayed because of what it would mean to acknowledge that Iran has such dangerous capabilities that the U.S. was unable to mitigate or degrade during the entirety of the fighting.
Sure, the U.S. navy can escort vessels (at great cost) and keep oil flowing. But the more fundamental issue of the failure of U.S. security guarantees over the entirety of the Gulf remains unresolved, and this is what provides Iran leverage in the negotiations.
Iran did not wage a scorched earth campaign—but it may yet do so if the current situation persists for too long. That is what everyone who actually follows this region and its dynamics is worried about. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
Informative post about the massive CENTCOM-protected operation to get crude out of the Strait of Hormuz. Despite poor planning for the Hormuz closure contingency, at the end of the day, the severe imbalance in military and economic power between Iran & the US and allies was bound to show its effects.
Alexander Stahel 🌻
@BurggrabenH
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 تقول شركة الاستخبارات الفرنسية، انتليجنس أونلاين" أن رفض الرئيس الأميركي ترامب التدخل مباشرة لصالح السعودية، كان يهدف لدفع ولي العهد محمد بن سلمان إلى طلب مساعدة رسمية من الحكومة الإسرائيلية.
🔷 في الوقت نفسه، يقول التقرير إن إسرائيل تقدم بالفعل قدراً كبيراً من المعلومات الاستخبارية عبر مركز عمليات مشترك تابع للقيادة المركزية الأميركية، يشارك فيه أيضاً الجيش السعودي.
🔷 يكشف التقرير أن السعودية بدأت تحركاً واسعاً ومتعدد المسارات لمواجهة التقدم الحوثي، شمل طلب مساعدة من الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا وفرنسا، وإعادة تسليح الحكومة اليمنية المعترف بها دولياً، ومحاولة إحياء شبكة مقاتلين أجانب من أميركا الجنوبية.
🔷 بحسب معلومات «إنتليجنس أونلاين»، بدأت جهات سعودية التواصل مجدداً مع مستشارين سبق أن شاركوا في تجنيد مقاتلين خاصين لتعزيز القوات المساندة للجيش السعودي، بهدف استقدام مرتزقة من كولومبيا ومناطق مجاورة لتنفيذ مهام دفاعية على الحدود وربما إرسال بعضهم لتعزيز القوات اليمنية التابعة للحكومة المعترف بها.
🔷 بعض المصادر التي ينقل عنها التقرير تقول إن عملية التجنيد تمتد أيضاً إلى مقاتلين سوريين سابقين.
🔷 التقرير يشدد على أن حملة التجنيد ما تزال في بدايتها، ويضعها ضمن سلسلة تحركات عاجلة جاءت بعد ما يصفه بـ«الهلع العسكري» الذي أصاب الرياض إثر سيطرة الحوثيين على مضيق باب المندب وكسر الهدنة، بالتزامن مع حملة ضربات استهدفت منشآت النفط السعودية. تعبير «الهلع العسكري» هو توصيف التقرير.
🔷 الحكومة اليمنية المعترف بها دولياً لم تبدأ بعد هجوماً برياً مضاداً. ووفق التقرير، تحاول الرياض كسب الوقت قبل أن تستبعد نهائياً إمكان العودة إلى مفاوضات سلام مع الحوثيين.
🔷 رئيس مجلس القيادة الرئاسي رشاد العليمي طلب مساعدة مباشرة من الولايات المتحدة، لكن واشنطن رفضت طلبه، وفق مصادر التقرير. في المقابل، تواصل السعودية تزويد القوات الحكومية اليمنية بمعدات جديدة.
🔷 الدعم السعودي لا يقتصر على الأسلحة التقليدية؛ إذ يشمل أيضاً مسيّرات استطلاع صينية الصنع ومسيّرات هجومية انتحارية. ويقول التقرير إن شحنات هذه الأنظمة بدأت قبل الحملة الحوثية الحالية.
🔷 شركة «واكب» الدفاعية التابعة لعائلة المنيفي تُعد، وفق التقرير، من أبرز الجهات المشغلة والمنخرطة في هذه الشحنات. الشركة مرتبطة بعدة مصنعين صينيين، بينهم «زيان تكنولوجي»، لكنها رفضت التعليق عندما تواصلت معها «إنتليجنس أونلاين».
🔷 خلال أيام قليلة، توجهت الرياض إلى جميع شركائها الاستراتيجيين تقريباً — بريطانيا وفرنسا والولايات المتحدة وباكستان وتركيا — بقائمة عاجلة من الاحتياجات تشمل أنظمة دفاع جوي جديدة، ومنظومات لمكافحة المسيّرات، إضافة إلى طلبات للحصول على دعم جوي.
🔷 في محادثات جرت خلال الأيام الماضية بين الحوثيين ومبعوثين أميركيين، أوضح الحوثيون، وفق التقرير، أن هدفهم الأساسي هو معاقبة الرياض على ما يعتبرونه خرقاً لاتفاق وقف إطلاق النار، خصوصاً في ما يتعلق بتقاسم عائدات النفط والحصار المفروض على مطار صنعاء الخاضع لسيطرتهم. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
It took a little longer than expected (8 months vs. a few days) but the US has finally erected a system for moving oil out of Hormuz in the face of the Iranian blockade.
Moving average for regional flows is now (conservatively) 15-16m bpd, and still rising. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
Tell me you’re nervous without telling me you’re nervous. 😬
Houthi security and intelligence services carried out a major and highly visible show of force in Sana’a this weekend around the anniversary of Yemen’s September 26 Revolution, which toppled the Zaydi Imamate in 1962. The deployment included the Interior Ministry’s police intelligence apparatus, the Security and Intelligence Service, and rapid deployment forces, with convoys circulating around the capital day and night in tinted black SUVs, Chevyss, Toyota Land Cruisers, Technicals, and armored vehicles. The Houthis have long viewed September 26 as a potential rallying point for public mobilization against their rule, and this year the security presence came with its own social media production. Houthi-aligned accounts posted and amplified dramatic footage of the convoys, remixing the videos with Houthi war zamels and music associated with Iraqi armed groups for added dramatic effect. The message appeared aimed as much at deterrence as security. The security apparatus was everywhere, it wanted people to see it, and it was signaling that any attempt at organized street mobilization would face a rapid and forceful response.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
داود الشريان
@alshiriandawood
يكشف تقرير في صحيفة " العربي الجديد " ، نقلا عن مسؤولين عراقيين، مسار الهجوم على خط النفط السعودي #شرق_غرب، دخل المنفذون من إيران إلى العراق، وأطلقوا أكثر من 15 مسيرة من ميسان بمساعدة محلية، ثم عادوا إلى إيران. التحقيق يربط المجموعة بالحرس الثوري و #الحوثيين . بغداد أبلغت طهران بما توصلت إليه . المطلوب من العراق الآن ملاحقة من سهلوا الهجوم ومنع تكراره من أراضيه.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Xumas
@xumas_iq
Former Qatari PM Hamad bin Jassim:
In every meeting, the Israelis insisted they needed Assad in powerThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joyce Karam
@Joyce_Karam
NEWS: #israel’s Netanyahu secret visit to UAE has been in works for weeks. He pushed Abu Dhabi to host him ~ 2 weeks ago, Emiratis pushed back…then had to do Sunday’s visit. Details @AlMonitor www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/secret-uae-visit-net…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
מאמר המערכת של "הארץ" היום בעקבות התחקיר שלי קורא לסיום הכיבוש של דרום סוריה והגעה להסכם ביטחוני עם דמשק (לינק מתנה)
www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/editorial-articles/2026-09-28/…
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
תחקיר מעמיק שלי ל"הארץ" על השליטה הצבאית הישראלית בדרום סוריה מנקודת מבטם של התושבים המקומיים וחיילים ששירתו שם. על סמך שיחותיי במשך יותר מעשור עם תושבים באיזורים האלו, אני מסבירה איך היחס של רבים מהם כלפי ישראל השתנה: מהכרת תודה על הסיוע הצבאי וההומניטרי בתקופת "שכנות טובה" (עד 2018) לעוינות גוברת בשל הפגיעה בחייהם, פרנסתם וחירותם של תושבי האיזורים האלו. www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/2026-09-23/ty-article-magazine… (לינק מתנה)
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
➡️ @France24_fr Pour les Houthis, "la priorité immédiate semble être de sécuriser le flanc oriental de Bab el-Mandeb", pour consolider leur contrôle sur ce passage maritime stratégique, qui relie l'Asie à l'Europe via le canal de Suez, et empêcher une contre-offensive des forces gouvernementales, explique Mohammed Albasha, du cabinet de conseil en gestion des risques Basha Report. Selon Mohammed Albasha, les Houthis ont tenté une médiation avec les tribus et autres interlocuteurs locales pour obtenir une rédition négociée, "mais rien n'indique pour l’heure que les autorités de Marib soient disposées à l'accepter". www.france24.com/fr/info-en-continu/20260928-frappes-saou…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
“People now are discovering that [the Gulf] is very much interconnected with everything else,” says @AnwarGargash. “It has an effect on inflation, it has an effect on energy, it has an effect on food prices.”
www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/caught-middle-iran-war -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
If there is one scenario that should particularly concern Saudi Arabia, it is a U.S.–Iran agreement over the Strait of Hormuz that leaves the Houthi issue outside the deal.
This remains an unlikely scenario for now, but Riyadh cannot afford to ignore it. A separate understanding between Washington and Tehran could significantly reduce the urgency with which the United States views the broader Middle East, including the Saudi confrontation with the Houthis, and could eventually reopen questions about the scale and purpose of the U.S. military presence in the region.
From Riyadh’s perspective, the worst possible outcome would be for Washington to resolve its immediate problem with Iran while Saudi Arabia remains exposed to a continuing Houthi threat.
That is why the Saudis have a strong incentive to ensure that any progress on the U.S.–Iran track is connected, directly or indirectly, to the Houthi file. Riyadh will not want Hormuz stabilized at the price of being left alone to deal with Yemen.
#iranwar
#yemen
Hiba Nasr
@HibaNasr
‼️ Saudi readout of the meeting between @SecRubio & @FaisalbinFarhan :
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan met with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington today.
During the meeting, the two sides reviewed the strategic relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States and discussed ways to strengthen and further develop cooperation across various fields in support of the two countries’ shared interests.
They also discussed key regional and international developments, particularly the security and political situation in the region, developments in Yemen, and ongoing efforts to address them.
The meeting also addressed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and freedom of navigation through international waterways, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, in order to contribute to regional stability and ensure the continued flow of global trade and supply chains.
The two sides also stressed the importance of maintaining coordination and consultations between Saudi Arabia and the United States on issues of mutual interest and supporting diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing regional crises and promoting security, peace, and stability.
The meeting was attended by Princess Reema bint Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Ambassador to the United States; Prince Yazid bin Mohammed Al Farhan, Advisor to the Foreign Minister for Lebanese Affairs; Prince Musab bin Mohammed Al Farhan, Advisor to the Foreign Minister for Political Affairs; and Manal Radwan, Advisor and Special Envoy to the Foreign Minister for Negotiations and Peace Efforts. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joshua Landis
@joshua_landis
Syria's Al Shara seems to promise that Syria will have elections in three years and that he may run but then states that he may simply "stay there" (in power) "if I believe that I need to remain in power."
"Mr Al-Shara said he had three years left in office and was focused on governing.
“I haven’t thought about being elected,” he said. “Right now, we are focusing on serving people.” But if remaining in office was necessary to complete that work, he said, “I will nominate myself".
Mr Al Shara said he would prefer to return to a normal life because governing was “really tiresome”. “If I believe that I need to remain in power, I will stay there," he said."
Article by @Adlamassoud for @TheNationalNews
www.thenationalnews.com/news/us/2026/09/23/syrias-al-shar… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 هآرتس تكشف مزيد من المعلومات حول زيارة نتنياهو للإمارات؛ وتربطها بصورة مباشرة بالتسريبات حوّل ٧ أكتوبر. وذلك بالاعتماد على مصادر إماراتية تحدثت للصحيفة. هذا يزيد حرج نتنياهو سياسيا ولا يخدمه إطلاقا.
هذا أهم ما ورد في التقرير
🔷 سافر بنيامين نتنياهو أمس الأحد إلى الإمارات والتقى الرئيس محمد بن زايد، في زيارة لم يُعلن عنها مسبقاً، وجرت بعد نحو ستة أشهر من زيارته السابقة لأبوظبي.
🔷 بحسب مصادر مطلعة على التفاصيل، وصل نتنياهو إلى الإمارات عبر طائرتان لرجال أعمال إسرائيليين، فيما قالت مصادر إماراتية لـ«هآرتس» إن اللقاء بين نتنياهو ومحمد بن زايد عُقد في المطار.
🔷 كشفت المصادر الإمارتية أنّ نتنياهو طلب خلال اللقاء من محمد بن زايد نفي التقارير المتعلقة بالمكالمة التي جرت بينهما قبل هجوم 7 أكتوبر، وكذلك نفي أي تفاصيل متصلة بأحداث 7 أكتوبر قد تسبب له إحراجاً سياسياً.
🔷 المصادر نفسها قالت إن نتنياهو طلب من محمد بن زايد ما وُصف بـ«الدعم المعنوي».
🔷 الزيارة تأتي مباشرة بعد تجدد الجدل حول تحذير نُسب إلى محمد بن زايد قبل نحو أسبوع ونصف من هجوم 7 أكتوبر، وهو التحذير الذي كانت «هآرتس» قد كشفت عنه هذا الشهر.
🔷 بحسب تحقيق «هآرتس»، اتصل محمد بن زايد بنتنياهو قبل الهجوم بنحو أسبوع ونصف، واستمرت المكالمة قرابة 45 دقيقة.
🔷 الرواية المنشورة تقول إن الرئيس الإماراتي حذر نتنياهو صراحة من أن يحيى السنوار يخطط لـ«تحرك كبير» ضد إسرائيل.
🔷 فوجئ محمد بن زايد بهدوء نتنياهو النسبي تجاه التحذير؛ إذ قال نتنياهو، وفق التقرير، إنه يعتقد أن حماس تنوي التحرك في الضفة الغربية، وطمأنه بأن إسرائيل مستعدة لكل السيناريوهات.
🔷 «هآرتس» تقول إن نتنياهو لم يُطلع رؤساء المؤسسة الأمنية الإسرائيلية على هذه المكالمة. نتنياهو نفى هذه الرواية.
🔷 التطور الجديد الذي يضيف وزناً إلى الرواية أن مصدرين أكدا السبت الماضي لصحيفة «نيويورك تايمز» جوهر التسريب الذي نشرته «هآرتس».
🔷 التقرير يضيف عنصراً مهماً من محضر اجتماع عقده نتنياهو في مطلع أكتوبر 2023؛ المحضر الذي وصل إلى وسائل الإعلام يظهر أن نتنياهو قال لكبار مسؤولي الأمن إن أي تحرك إسرائيلي في غزة قد يضر بفرص إقامة علاقات دبلوماسية بين السعودية وإسرائيل.
🔷 بحسب المحضر، كان نتنياهو يعتقد في ذلك الوقت أن مسار التطبيع مع السعودية قريب من التحقق، ولذلك كان يرى أن التصعيد في غزة يمكن أن يعطل هذا المسار. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mairav Zonszein מרב זונשיין
@MairavZ
Majority of Israelis polled support disqualification of all Palestinian parties from running in Israeli election.
Another reminder that it’s not just Netanyahu, or Ben Gvir or Smotrich. It’s a large chunk of Israeli body politic. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سامح عسكر
@sameh_asker
النهاردة حصل حاجات مهمة..
الأولى: زيارة نتنياهو لأبو ظبي في دولة الإمارات لأول مرة بعد اتفاق التطبيع ، والزيارة كانت سرية نقلها موقع إكسيوس الأمريكي.
الثانية: بعد الإمارات قطر تقرر الانضمام والانحياز للحكومة الأثيوبية وأبي أحمد ضد قوات المعارضة..
الخبرين مهمين ومرتبطين ببعض، لأننا بنشوف عمليا تحالف وتعاون بين دول خليجية وإسرائيل هذه الفترة والأيام الجاية..
قطر من ناحيتها شايفة علاقتها بأثيوبيا أهم من مصر
والإمارات من ناحيتها شايفة علاقتها بأثيوبيا برضه أهم من مصر
ليه؟
الإمارات عاوزة تستحوذ على ميناء بربرة الصومالي، وباستثماراتها في أثيوبيا هتعمل طريق تجاري يمتد من أثيوبيا لميناء بربرة كجزء من النفوذ الإماراتي السنوات الجاية، واللي هتعمل من خلاله على تطويق مصر والمملكة جنوبا والسيطرة بشكل كبير على بعض سواحل البحر الأحمر وامتداده في خليج عدن والقرن الأفريقي.
وهذا هو سر اعتراف الإمارات بصومالي لاند، وأثيوبيا وإسرائيل نفس الكلام، لأن أثيوبيا عاوزة ميناء بربرة ينهي وضعيتها كدولة حبيسة، وفي ذات الوقت إسرائيل عاوزة صومالي لاند لنفس الأهداف الإماراتية وهي تطويق مصر والسعودية من الجنوب، وإيجاد تحالف ثلاثي ( إسرائيل وإثيوبيا والإمارات) اللي بدأت تظهر معالمه..
باختصار هنا : الإمارات شايفة في إثيوبيا شريكا اقتصاديا واستراتيجيا يخدم توسّعها وما عندها أي تهديد مائي مباشر، فمصلحتها تبقى مع الطرف اللي بيدخلها المنطقة وهو نظام أبي أحمد، لأن المعارضة هتوقف كل مشاريع الهيمنة دي..
زيارة نتنياهو لأبو ظبي مرتبطة بهذا التطور،فهي من ناحية بتكسر الجليد العربي الإسرائيلي اللي اتعمل بفعل طوفان الأٌقصى، وبتأسس للتحالف الثلاثي القادم اللي هيكون غالبا ضد التحالف الثلاثي الآخر ممثلا في تركيا وباكستان والسعودية، وصراع التحالفات دي غالبا هيكون إعلامي واقتصادي مش هيتطور عسكريا لموانع كثيرة..
أما بالنسبة لقطر فهي لعبت قبل كدا دور الوسيط بين إريتريا وجيبوتي، وعندها علاقات دبلوماسية قوية مع أديس أبابا من أيام الحصار الرباعي العربي ضدها سنة 2017 اللي يومها توطدت علاقات قطر مع أثيوبيا وإيران بشكل مضاعف باعتبارهم بدائل..
فالقطريين باختصار مش شايفين مصر صديق ولا حليف علشان يخافوا على مياة النيل، هما ليهم مصلحتهم الاقتصادية والسياسية مع أثيوبيا ولاحتمالات تطبيع قطر في المستقبل اللي بتزداد حاليا بفعل الصراع الإيراني الأمريكي..
حاجة كمان إن كلا من قطر والإمارات بيستوردوا أكثر من 95% من أكلهم، والأراضي الخصبة في إثيوبيا بالنسبة لهم مخزن أمن غذائي استراتيجي في حال التوتر بمضيقي هرمز وباب المندب..
استثمارات إماراتية في إثيوبيا مثلا وصلت لمليارات الدولارات، زراعة، طاقة شمسية، عقارات، بنية تحتية. وحتى في أزمة العملة قدمت الإمارات حزمة دعم بـ 3 مليارات دولار لإنقاذ اقتصاد أديس أبابا، يعني: لو حصل أي توتّر مع إثيوبيا، الإمارات هتخسر استثمارات ونفوذ وبوابة تجارية فمصلحتها تقفّ جنب الحكومة اللي حافظة لها هذه المصالح.
دا غير الدعم العسكري الإماراتي لأثيوبيا ضد قوات تيجراي في الحرب السابقة، واللي الأخبار بتنقل دلوقتي عن طيران شحن إماراتي مكثف للأراضي الأثيوبية في محاولة لدعم أبي أحمد بالسلاح زي ما دعموا قوات حميدتي..
واحد هيقول ..يعني الخلاصة إيه ياأستاذ سامح من "الهري" دا؟
قلت: اللعب بقى ع المكشوف ياصاحبي..!
Image Made With Ai -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Levant24
@Levant_24_
Syria's Muslim Brotherhood says it will remain a national organisation independent in its decision-making, its Shura Council said in a statement after its fifth session, the group's formal answer to calls for it to dissolve, made last year by al-Sharaa's media adviser Ahmad Muwaffaq Zaidan. It also demanded a constitution put to referendum.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 توجه اليوم نتنياهو إلى الإمارات في زيارة سرية استمرّت 4 ساعات، لم يعلن بعد أي من الطرفين عن الزيارة قد يكون ذلك مُتفهم أمنياً في الساعات الأولى لكن عدم الإعلان لاحقا سيكون رسالة سياسية من الإمارات.
ماذا حصل في الأيام الماضية؟
🔷 نتنياهو طلب من ديوان الرئاسة الإماراتي إصدار نفي رسمي حول مكالمة التحذير من 7 اكتوبر.
🔷 لم تستجب الإمارات لكنها نشرت عبر "the national” تصريح لمصدر رسمي إماراتي نفى فيه مناقشة قادة بلاده مع إسرائيل أي "تفاصيل أمنية" بشأن هجوم 7 أكتوبر/ تشرين الأول 2023.
🔷 وهو نفي يحمل عدة وجوه لأن تحذير بن زايد كان سياسي أكثر منه أمني.
🔷 هذا النفي لم يغير الأمر كثيرا لأن نيويورك تايمز نشرت قبل يومين تحقيق موسع أكدت فيه المكالمة. وتعززت السردية مع تحقيق أتلانتك حول تحذير عباس كامل.
🔷 يجب أنّ لا ننسى بأنّ نتنياهو أفشل جهود الإمارات للحصول على دور سياسي داخل غزة عبر منعه دخول لجنة التكنوقراط.
لقاء اليوم سيحدد اتجاه العلاقة بين الطرفين. وسيظهر ملامح ذلك في الإعلان رسميا عن الزيارة او تجنب ذلك.
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 تحدثت قبل أسابيع عن جهود إماراتية - قد تكون بالتنسيق مع الولايات المتحدة - للضغط باتجاه إضعاف فرص نتنياهو في الانتخابات الإسرائيلية المقبلة.
🔷 بدأ الأمر بتسريب معلومات حول مكالمة الشيخ محمد بن زايد، بعد أيام سربت the New Yorker تقرير موسع حول علاقة نتنياهو بالقطريين، واليوم سربت The Atlantic تقرير تفصيلي حول تحذير عباس كامل لنتنياهو قبل 7 أكتوبر بأيام.
🔷 هذه التسريبات تضرب نتنياهو عن قوس واحدة ومصادرها إقليمية ودولية.
🔷 إذا أضفنا لها رفض ترامب الاجتماع مع نتنياهو في نيويورك. والعقوبات البريطانية والفرنسية والأوروبية على حكومته.
🔷 سنخرج بخلاصة واحدة أنّ هناك توجه إقليمي ودولي عميق للتخلص من نتنياهو قدر المستطاع.
ترقبوا مزيد من التسريبات والمعلومات في الأيام القادمة. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Same feeling
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
That Trump has rejected Iran’s seven day proposal is not a surprise. The proposal was a demand that U.S. return to the MoU but with implementation terms favorable to Iran. Some analysts in Iran call it Islamabad Plus.
In effect Iran is expecting war and thinks U.S. is preparing for it. The proposal got hyped as something new, and did the job Tehran had in mind giving the impression that Iran tried diplomacy once more and US rejected it before next round of escalation. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Anne-Claire Legendre
@AClaireLegendre
Un immense merci à @ArnaudPescheux et la formidable équipe de @FranceauQatar pour cette première visite au #qatar depuis ma nomination
🇨🇵 Arnaud Pescheux 🇶🇦
@ArnaudPescheux
It was my pleasure to welcome @AClaireLegendre, President of @imarabe, during her visit in Doha.
Sharing a common vision with our local partners that culture is a key factor for peace and prosperity.
The cultural cooperation between 🇫🇷 and 🇶🇦 will continue to grow stronger. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Emmanuel Macron montre que, contrairement à Donald Trump, Paris est un partenaire fiable. Mais Riyad renverra-t-il l'ascenseur? Le passé ne nous incline pas à l'optimisme. Ma chronique ce matin sur RTL.
RTL France
@RTLFrance
"Un signal plus politique que militaire" : pourquoi Emmanuel Macron vole-t-il au secours de l'Arabie saoudite ? ➡️ l.rtl.fr/uuL
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sara Massoumi
@SaraMassoumi
🧵نگاهی به جزئیات پیشنهاد به روز شده ایران به آمریکا برای خاتمه جنگ؛ سرعت اجرا، تفاوت طرح جدید با یادداشت تفاهم اسلامآباد
بر اساس جزئیاتی که در گزارشها از اظهارات وزیر خارجه ایران منتشر شده، طرح جدید ایران شامل مجموعهای از اقدامات متقابل است:
Sara Massoumi
@SaraMassoumi
#از_دیپلماسی_چه_خبر
🎥درباره شروط ایران برای احیای مذاکرات چه میدانیم؟
🔹جزئیات شروط هفتگانه ایران با متن یادداشت تفاهم اسلام آباد که در ۱۴ بند در تاریخ دوشنبه۲۵ خرداد به امضای روسای جمهور ایران و آمریکا رسید، تفاوت محتوایی چندانی ندارد:This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Polytechnique: Pourquoi une soudaine hausse des candidatures d'étudiants pakistanais? "80% des candidats étrangers au master de Polytechnique étaient Pakistanais l'an dernier", constate un responsable de la prestigieuse école. A l'issue des épreuves d'entrée, trois seulement ont été admis à Polytechnique. Les difficultés pour se rendre aux Etats-Unis participent à cette hausse soudaine, sans l'expliquer à elles seules.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
Ending the war in Iran will “require painful concessions from both Washington and Riyadh,” write @RichardHaass and @CarolynKissane. “But continuing to fight this war would court economic disaster, and that would be far more painful.”
www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/stalemate-iran-not-sustainable -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Johann Soufi
@jsoufi
Ça aura pris du temps, mais cela fait du bien d’entendre enfin, dans un débat télévisé, une discussion sur Gaza et la qualification de génocide véritablement ancrée dans le droit international.
Un échange sérieux et argumenté. C’est suffisamment rare pour être souligné.
Kunta van den Kinté
@denkinte_2
Ce débat aura au moins eu le mérite de permettre à 𝐎𝐥𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐞𝐫 𝐅𝐚𝐮𝐫𝐞 d’expliquer à 𝐉𝐞́𝐫𝐨̂𝐦𝐞 𝐆𝐮𝐞𝐝𝐣 et 𝐑𝐚𝐩𝐡𝐚𝐞̈𝐥 𝐆𝐥𝐮𝐜𝐤𝐬𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐧 pourquoi il faut nommer les choses et parler de « 𝐠é𝐧𝐨𝐜𝐢𝐝𝐞 » à Gaza, un terme avec lequel ils ont du mal. 🇵🇸
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
תחקיר מעמיק שלי ל"הארץ" על השליטה הצבאית הישראלית בדרום סוריה מנקודת מבטם של התושבים המקומיים וחיילים ששירתו שם. על סמך שיחותיי במשך יותר מעשור עם תושבים באיזורים האלו, אני מסבירה איך היחס של רבים מהם כלפי ישראל השתנה: מהכרת תודה על הסיוע הצבאי וההומניטרי בתקופת "שכנות טובה" (עד 2018) לעוינות גוברת בשל הפגיעה בחייהם, פרנסתם וחירותם של תושבי האיזורים האלו. www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/2026-09-23/ty-article-magazine… (לינק מתנה)
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
The depth of Israel's international isolation is difficult to fathom if you're just watching mainstream media.
But these images do not lie. Look at all these delegates leaving the General Assembly in protest as soon as Netanyahu takes the podium...This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
“Continuing to fight or pressure Iran economically is unlikely to yield a better outcome than negotiating,” argue @RichardHaass and @CarolynKissane.
www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/stalemate-iran-not-sustainable -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Asharq Bloomberg الشرق بلومبرغ
@AsharqBusiness
🇶🇦 حرب إيران تمحو 98% من إيرادات قطر من النفط والغاز
📍تعتمد قطر على مضيق هرمز لتصدير الغاز الطبيعي المسال، أكبر مصادر إيراداتها التصديرية
📍انهارت إيرادات البلاد من تصدير النفط والغاز إلى 200 مليون دولار في الربع الثاني من 2026، نزولا من 9 مليارات دولار في الربع الأول
📍قطر تملك "وسائد مالية" تشمل صندوق ثروة سيادي بقيمة 580 مليار دولار، واحتياطيات من النقد الأجنبي تتجاوز 70 مليار دولار، ومع ذلك من المتوقع أن ينكمش اقتصادها بنسبة 12.1% في 2026، بحسب استطلاع أجرته "بلومبرغ" لآراء اقتصاديين -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Cradle
@TheCradleMedia
Regional sources told Reuters that Gulf states discussed a Qatari proposal for a joint security framework involving Iran and the Arab Gulf states during their meeting with US President Donald Trump at the UN General Assembly, with one source saying Tehran is reviewing the proposal. Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani said the framework would aim to provide security guarantees to Gulf states while expanding economic interdependence with Iran.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
TankerTrackers.com, Inc.
@TankerTrackers
The numbers have doubled in less than a month.
The total crude oil egress via the USN-BL is now 13 Mbpd, with estimated SoH transits at 10.35 Mbpd given that Fujairah and Mina al-Fahal together account for around 2.65 Mbpd on average.
This is partly attributed to Saudi Arabia having to swing back its exports eastwards due to pipeline disruption, but also due to daytime transits via the SoH under additional CENTCOM protection.
TankerTrackers.com, Inc.
@TankerTrackers
Here's an infographic we shared with clients a couple of days ago for folks to understand. The maths are quite simple.
Our method is to count the daily average of what departs the US Navy blockade line. We then substract from that what we know comes out of Oman and Fujairah. The rest is traffic deriving via the Strait of Hormuz.
Equation: USN - Oman - Fuj= SoH. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Cédric Labrousse
@CdricLabrousse
Deuxième soirée de manifestation à Hama, ce soir, pour exiger la libération de Muhammad Yaghmour. D'une quinzaine hier, ce sont désormais des centaines qui ont pris la rue en soutien au juriste arrêté, sans motifs, il y a quelques jours.
Contexte donné dans le thread.
Cédric Labrousse
@CdricLabrousse
En Syrie, l'arrestation du juriste et prédicateur Muhammad Sulayman Yaghmour rappelle que la répression des voix de l'islam sunnite rigoriste et critique, anciennes ou récentes, du pouvoir de Sharaa se poursuit.
C'est un élément peu connu du grand public. Faisons le point. 1/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House MENA
@CH_MENAP
📢 Upcoming event: Is the Middle East entering a new era of regional security with the Mecca Pact?
Join @GalipDalay, Hina Rabbani Khar, Prince Turki Al Faisal, @gideonrachman & @SanamVakil for a virtual discussion.
📅 28/9
🕐 14.00 BST
📍 Zoom
Register ⤵️
www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/standard-event/middle-eas… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 عائلة الخياط السورية/القطرية أصبحت طرفاً في عدد متزايد من المشاريع المرتبطة بشخصيات قريبة من إدارة ترامب وعائلته، وتظهر الآن بجانب الشيخ طحنون بن زايد ضمن الائتلاف المنافس على شراء الأصول الدولية لشركة «لوك أويل» الروسية.
🔷 شركة «يو سي سي» التابعة لعائلة الخياط حصلت أخيراً على امتياز لحقل نفطي في ليبيا من دون مناقصة مفتوحة، كما تدخل بحصة أقلية في حقل غاز فنزويلي تديره شركة «بي بي».
🔷 رامز ومعتز الخياط يملكان حصة في مشروع تطوير عقاري في ألبانيا تشارك فيه إيفانكا ترامب وجاريد كوشنر.
🔷 كما أن العائلة تعمل أيضاً على مشروع محتمل لإعادة بناء شبكة خطوط الأنابيب السورية ضمن مشروع يرتبط بتوم باراك، المبعوث الأميركي الخاص إلى سوريا وأحد المقربين منذ فترة طويلة من دونالد ترامب.
🔷 عائلة الخياط ستشارك بحصة أصغر في الائتلاف الذي يقوده الملياردير الأميركي تود بوهلي لشراء الأصول الدولية لـ«لوك أويل».
🔷 الشيخ طحنون بن زايد يدخل الصفقة عبر شركة «القابضة الدولية»، التي يُتوقع أن تقود الائتلاف إلى جانب شركة «ألايد إنفستمنت بارتنرز» الإماراتية.
🔷 بوهلي ومؤسسة تمويل التنمية الدولية الأميركية سيحصلان، وفق الترتيبات المطروحة، على أغلبية مقاعد مجلس إدارة الشركة الجديدة.
🔷 مؤسسة تمويل التنمية الدولية الأميركية، وهي جهة تابعة للحكومة الفيدرالية، يُتوقع أن تحصل على حصة تتراوح في حدود منتصف العشرات بالمئة من الشركة الجديدة.
🔷 الائتلاف يهدف إلى إزاحة مجموعة «كارلايل» الأميركية، التي توصلت في يناير إلى اتفاق لشراء أعمال «لوك أويل» الدولية، لكن الصفقة ما زالت معلقة في واشنطن بانتظار الموافقة الأميركية النهائية.
🔷 تقرير «فايننشال تايمز» يقول إن عرض بوهلي أصبح في مرحلة متقدمة، لكن الاتفاق النهائي مع «لوك أويل» لم يُحسم بعد.
🔷 بعض المستثمرين الآخرين الذين سبق أن أبدوا اهتماماً بشراء كل الأصول أو أجزاء منها انسحبوا من العملية.
🔷 أصول «لوك أويل» الدولية قُيّمت بنحو 20 مليار دولار، وتشمل حقول نفط وغاز من آسيا الوسطى إلى المكسيك، وآلاف محطات الوقود، ومحفظة واسعة من المصافي الأوروبية.
🔷 الأصول تضم أكثر من ثلاثة مليارات برميل من الاحتياطيات المؤكدة والمحتملة، إضافة إلى بعض أكبر المصافي في بلغاريا ورومانيا.
🔷 الحكومة الأميركية سبق أن رفضت محاولة شركة «غنفور» الاستحواذ على أعمال «لوك أويل»، كما أن بيع أصول أخرى للشركة الروسية في كازاخستان ما زال يحتاج إلى موافقة وزارة الخزانة الأميركية.
🔁 تقييمي أن التقرير يكشف تداخلاً واضحاً بين رأس المال الخليجي ودائرة ترامب في صفقة طاقة استراتيجية كبيرة؛ عائلة الخياط ترتبط بمشاريع مع إيفانكا ترامب وجاريد كوشنر وتوم باراك، بينما يدخل طحنون بن زايد من موقع قيادي في الائتلاف. وفي الوقت نفسه تصبح الحكومة الأميركية نفسها شريكاً مالياً في عرض يحتاج في النهاية إلى موافقات أميركية رسمية، وهو ما يضع صفقة «لوك أويل» في تقاطع مباشر بين الاستثمار والنفوذ السياسي وآليات القرار داخل واشنطن. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Crisis Group
@CrisisGroup
Some 5,000 foreign fighters who helped topple former President Bashar al-Assad’s regime are still under arms in Syria. The government’s approach has generated a host of anxieties. www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/middle-east-north-africa/syria/st…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Cédric Labrousse
@CdricLabrousse
En Syrie, l'arrestation du juriste et prédicateur Muhammad Sulayman Yaghmour rappelle que la répression des voix de l'islam sunnite rigoriste et critique, anciennes ou récentes, du pouvoir de Sharaa se poursuit.
C'est un élément peu connu du grand public. Faisons le point. 1/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران
@ariel_oseran
Many Lebanese are furious at President Trump for snubbing Prime Minister Nawaf Salam as he greeted Arab leaders and representatives at last night's joint meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post.
jamal cheaib | جمال شعيب
@JamalCheaib
عيب والله عيب، لازم رئاسة الحكومة تنزل بيان تستنكر فيه طريقة تعامل #ترامب مع #نواف_سلام، تجاهل وتجاوز رئيس وزراء #لبنان بهذه الطريقة هو إهانة موصوفة ومقصودة
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
One important element in King Abdullah’s warnings is Syria.
For Jordan, the stakes in Syria are immediate. Amman wants a sovereign, unified and functioning Syrian state capable of controlling its borders, preventing drug and weapons smuggling, containing sectarian conflict and denying extremist groups the space to rebuild. Jordan has consequently invested heavily in its relationship with President Ahmed al-Sharaa and has repeatedly emphasized its support for Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and the restoration of effective state authority.
Israel increasingly sees the Syrian arena differently. Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Israeli forces have moved beyond the previous separation lines and established a continuing military presence inside Syrian territory. Israel says these deployments are defensive and denies having territorial ambitions in Syria. But Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has also said that Israeli forces will remain in the Syrian security zone for as long as Israel considers it necessary.
From Amman, those policies look deeply destabilizing. Jordan has repeatedly condemned Israeli incursions and strikes and has explicitly called for Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory. At the same time, Jordan has worked with Damascus and Washington on stabilizing southern Syria, including a roadmap intended to resolve the crisis in Suwayda while preserving Syrian sovereignty and eventually restoring the area to effective Syrian state authority.
This exposes another fundamental divergence between Jordan and Israel. Jordan does not want an autonomous Druze enclave in southern Syria or a permanently fragmented Syrian state on its northern border. Its strategic interest lies in a government in Damascus strong enough to control Syrian territory but constrained enough to protect minorities and prevent another authoritarian or jihadist order from emerging.
That makes Israeli efforts to weaken al-Sharaa, or policies that could contribute to the fragmentation of Syria, particularly troubling from Jordan’s perspective.
There is also a danger for Israel itself. As I argued before, Israel should be asking whether its Syria policy is producing precisely the outcome it is intended to prevent. Al-Sharaa’s government has expressed interest in reaching a security agreement with Israel. A stable Syrian government capable of controlling its territory could help prevent the return of Iranian influence and radical Islamist organizations. Yet continued Israeli military operations, territorial entrenchment and confrontation with Turkey risk weakening that government and strengthening the forces arguing that Damascus cannot protect Syrian sovereignty.
In that sense, Syria is becoming a second major fault line in the Israeli-Jordanian relationship, alongside the Palestinian issue.
Jordan regards a stable Syria and a viable Palestinian political horizon as components of its own national security. Israeli policies in both arenas increasingly collide with those interests. The result is a strategic contradiction: Israel continues to depend on Jordan as a critical security partner while pursuing policies that Amman believes undermine the regional order on which Jordanian stability depends.
That should concern Washington as much as Amman. Jordan is central to the American security architecture in the Middle East, and weakening the Israeli-Jordanian relationship, or the stability of the kingdom itself, would ultimately undermine Israeli and American interests as well.
If the stability of #jordan’s Hashemite monarchy were seriously undermined, Israel’s security challenges in the Middle East could multiply dramatically.
The stability of King Abdullah’s government is not merely a Jordanian interest. It is a vital Israeli national security interest.
The last thing Israel needs is instability along its longest border, particularly at a moment of profound regional upheaval. A weakened Jordanian state could create opportunities for armed groups, extremist movements, weapons smuggling and outside powers to exploit territory immediately to Israel’s east.
For decades, the Hashemite monarchy has been one of the principal barriers against precisely that scenario. Jordan has maintained its peace treaty with Israel, cooperated closely on security and intelligence, protected a strategically critical border and served as a central partner of the United States in the region.
Israel should therefore think about Jordan not simply as a diplomatic relationship to be managed, but as a strategic asset that must not be taken for granted.
A stable Jordan provides Israel with strategic depth and a relatively secure eastern frontier. Serious instability in Jordan could replace that advantage with another active security front.
For Israel, protecting the relationship with Amman is therefore not an act of generosity toward King Abdullah. It is an investment in Israel’s own security.
#syria
www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/israels-dangerous-overreach…
Clash Report
@clashreport
Jordan’s King Abdullah II:
The question here is, if Israel continues its antagonistic approach in southern Syria, will the international community stand by and let that happen? -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Fared Al Mahlool | فريد المحلول
@FARED_ALHOR
Women’s Police and the Syrian Diplomatic Security Forces during the graduation ceremony of the first class from the Women’s Police Institute in Damascus, Syria.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ragıp Soylu
@ragipsoylu
Rare but welcome:
Syrian President and Iraqi PM shake hands -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
שאלתי הלילה את נשיא סוריה אחמד אל-שרע האם הוא מבין את החששות של הישראלים בעקבות ה-7 באוקטובר. צפו בתשובה שלו כאן:
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
IRGC-linked Javan, in a lengthy analysis, looks at the prospects for renewed dialogue between Tehran and Washington from a particularly interesting angle. Rather than suggesting that Iran is softening its position, it argues that Tehran may be open to discussing a new diplomatic framework while keeping its conditions essentially unchanged.
- Javan pushes back against parts of the Reuters reconstruction, particularly the claim that the Iranian delegation in New York has been given “full authority” to negotiate. It says this has not been confirmed inside Iran. But the more interesting part comes immediately afterwards.
- Citing informed Iranian sources, Javan says Tehran may be ready to discuss a new plan, while stressing that Iran’s conditions have not changed. I guess that distinction matters.
- In Javan’s reconstruction, the sequence is basically this: Washington must move first. The US should fulfil its commitments, release Iranian assets, lift the blockade and reduce military pressure. Only after concrete American steps could negotiations begin. One source is quite explicit: under the present circumstances, there will “certainly” be no nuclear negotiations.
- So this is not Javan saying that diplomacy is off the table. Quite the opposite. It seems to be describing the terms under which Tehran believes diplomacy can restart: basically the framework may change, the channels may change, even the proposed plan can change, but Iran does not want to be seen as negotiating under military and economic pressure.
- This also helps make some sense of the otherwise rather confusing stream of reports we have seen over the past few days: Qatar’s mediation, the Iranian proposal reportedly transmitted on 16 September, talk of reopening Hormuz, the repeated references to Iran’s “seven conditions”, and now the reports of direct US - Iranian contacts in New York.
- And there is another reason I find the analysis significant. This interpretation is not coming from a reformist newspaper trying to create political space for negotiations. It is coming from Javan, which is closely associated with the IRGC. Ahmad Vahidi himself recently described Javan as a genuine voice of the Islamic Revolution.
- That does not mean an agreement is around the corner. It does suggest, however, that at least part of the conservative/IRGC media ecosystem is preparing its audience for the idea that diplomacy is possible, provided it can be presented not as an Iranian retreat, but as the result of Washington first changing the conditions under which negotiations take place.
Analytic confidence: Moderate (forgive me for this, but it’s funny).
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
حمد بن جاسم بن جبر
@hamadjjalthani
بات من الواضح أن الأمور تتجه كما في السابق نحو حلول مؤقتة بين امريكا وايران لأزمة مضيق هرمز والخليج عموما. وأنا اعتقد أن الحلول المؤقتة ستؤول إلى ما آلت إليه الهدن المؤقتة وهو التمديد لفترات محددة من دون التوصل إلى حلول دائمة. والسبب في ذلك يعود إلى أن إيران ترى أن الانتظار والصبر رغم الضيق الذي تعاني منه سيوفر لها مساحة وفرصة لتحقيق مكاسب سواء في مسألة فتح مضيق هرمز أو في مسألة الموضوع النووي. وفي رأيي أيضا والحال هذه أنه يجب علينا في دول مجلس التعاون أن نتحمل بعض الألم كذلك ونصر على التوصل إلى حل قانوني ودائم وواضح لمسألة مضيق هرمز والمرور الآمن فيه حسب ما تنص عليه المواثيق والقوانين الدولية، فالمضيق ممر دولي يخدم العالم بأسره وليس دول الخليج لوحدها.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
My press comments published by @AJEnglish's @caomag11: “This is not an easy battle ... the fighting is taking place across some of Yemen’s most unforgiving terrain where control of a single hilltop or mountain peak can come at a heavy cost.” www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/22/why-are-the-houthis-figh…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Financial Times
@FT
‘MBS will not forget’: Trump’s reluctance to fight Houthis rattles Saudi Arabia ft.trib.al/0HfvnUY
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clash Report
@clashreport
Jordan’s King Abdullah II:
For decades, I’ve stood before this assembly and warned of the dangers of leaving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict unresolved.
The international community chose to manage the conflict, not confront it.
Every new Israeli violation was treated as temporary, diverting attention from the reality being created on the ground.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Mon entretien avec Le Figaro Live sur la situation dans le Golfe au centre des débats de l'assemblée générale des Nations unies.
youtu.be/rX-3t1Nlxds -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
May be wrong but the pieces seem to be gradually falling into place for a possible US-Iran meeting in New York.
- Reuters reported earlier today that the Iranian delegation has “full authority” to revive diplomacy with Washington. Now Secretary of State Marco Rubio says the US is open to meeting the Iranian side at the UN, although no meeting has yet been scheduled.
- Meanwhile, Mehdi Karroubi has publicly urged Pezeshkian to seize the opportunity and, if conditions allow, meet Trump in the national interest, without being deterred by what he described as a vocal minority opposed to such a step.
- Nothing is decided yet. But the signals coming from both sides are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
So @SecScottBessent is stating that he will "shut down" all Iranian airlines on September 23. What he hasn't explained is how this advances U.S. national security.
What we know is that this is an attack on Iranian healthcare supply chains.
Over 60% of Iranian medical imports arrive by air. Of this total, around one-third are “medicaments containing hormones,” a category which includes insulin for treatment of diabetes and certain cancer treatments. Just over 10% are vaccines, both for human and veterinarian use. Another 6% includes blood products used to treat infections or support clotting.
Bessent's move threatens the health of ordinary Iranians. To what end?
www.bourseandbazaar-substack.org/p/trumps-new-aviation-sa… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joyce Karam
@Joyce_Karam
NEW: #uae's Gargash sees prolonged Iran conflict, calls for Iran-Gulf security talks
• War with different tempos
• Iranian society active, unpredictable
• Arab-Iran security strategic talks necessary
• Need Yemeni-Yemeni talks +more on Saudi rift here www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/uaes-gargash-expects… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Benjamin Fève
@BenjaminFeve
In Qamishli, AFP reports that alcohol shops are running out of stock and prices have nearly doubled since Damascus took over the Semalka crossing.
Damascus's rules arrived in the northeast overnight, with no time for traders to adjust and, as a result, what used to come through Semalka is now blocked or taxed so heavily that it's smuggled in instead, at higher prices.
This reminds me of the Raqqa story I covered last month, when second-hand clothing traders protested outside the customs building after being fined for stock they had imported legally under the AANES. Local products are supposed to fill the gap, but traders say they can't compete on price or quality. The people paying the price are low-income families and small shopkeepers.
In both cases, the rules aren't even clear... alcohol isn't officially banned, and used clothing sits on a "negative list" in the new tariff that nobody has defined.
I wrote about the used-clothing ban for the August Syria Monthly Economic Digest: www.syriadispatch.com/p/second-hand-clothing-ban-decree-110
AFP on alcohol: www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260906-sobering-reality-c… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
In this new @BourseBazaarFdn analysis, my colleague Josefine Petrick and I examine the Trump administration’s new Iran aviation sanctions and their likely impact on the country’s medical supply chains.
Concerningly, imports of pharmaceutical products are declining more quickly than Iran’s overall imports. Since the start of Trump’s “maximum pressure” sanctions in the Spring 2018, total pharmaceutical imports have fallen around 35%. In the same period, overall imports actually grew around 15%. Given that medicines constitute essential goods where demand should be most robust, this is the opposite of the expected trend.
The decline in medical goods imports reflects the cumulative impact of tightening sanctions on underlying supply chains.
Read more: www.bourseandbazaar-substack.org/p/trumps-new-aviation-sa… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Voici le commentaire d'un ancien responsable aux affaires sur l'alerte du président de la République à propos de la menace hybride russe.
"Avec Emmanuel Macron, il faut évidemment faire le partage entre la gesticulation et la réalité.
Il y a 2 crises (Ukraine, Moyen-Orient ) et 2 problèmes (approvisionnement en pétrole, menaces russes sur notre sécurité).
Un point commun : nous n’avons aucune influence sur le cours des choses.
Sur le Moyen-Orient et le pétrole, il suffit de lire les journaux pour se faire une opinion : la situation n’est pas bonne et n’évolue pas vers le mieux. Donc, sur ce point, le DGSE a probablement dû se contenter d’un briefing descriptif, que nous aurions pu rédiger nous-mêmes.
Sur la Russie, c’est différent, puisqu’il ne s’agit pas seulement de pompes à essence. On nous dit que la Russie multiplie les attaques hybrides contre nous et que celles-ci vont s'aggraver. Il faut avoir les informations pour juger.
Les Services les ont-ils ? Sans doute, doivent-ils être bien au courant des actions déjà menées. Mais quid des intentions et des projets ? Ont-ils des accès de première main au Kremlin ? Et surtout sont-ils entrés dans la tête de Poutine ?
Des réponses à ces questions, dépend la distance séparant la communication de la réalité.
Néanmoins, il ne faut pas trop ricaner. Nous nous sommes déjà trompés en 2022.
Poutine - c’est une certitude - cherche à influencer gouvernements et opinions européens, pour qu’ils limitent, voire interrompent, leur aide à l’Ukraine.
Il dispose d’une infinité de moyens pour ce faire, dans des sociétés hautement vulnérables, car très dépendantes de leurs réseaux et maladivement émotionnelles". -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A lire l'ouvrage de Caroline Roussy, directrice de recherche à l'Iris: "La mauvaise réputation. Essai sur les frontières africaines" aux éditions Riveneuve, collections Pépites jaunes, au moment où les groupes armés menacent l'intégrité territoriale des Etats et des zones régionales comme le Sahel.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arab Intelligence
@Arab_Intel
Doctrine Nixon, version 2026 : Washington arme Riyad et délègue au Caire
La visite de John Ratcliffe au Caire, le 20 septembre, ne traduit pas tant un besoin américain de canal vers Téhéran qu’un choix stratégique à travers lequel Washington privilégie la délégation à ses partenaires régionaux plutôt que l’engagement militaire direct.
Le contexte est lisible. Les Houthis ont pris la côte yéménite et menacent Bab el-Mandeb, la guerre avec l’Iran maintient Ormuz fermé, et Riyad a demandé des frappes américaines contre les Houthis. Washington a refusé.
À la place, les États-Unis ont autorisé une vente de 48 F-35 à l’Arabie saoudite, encore soumise au Congrès, et envoyé le chef de la CIA en Égypte, chez le seul acteur qui traite à la fois Gaza, la mer Rouge, le Soudan et dossier iranien.
Le message est clair : armer les alliés et déléguer la médiation plutôt qu’intervenir. C’est la doctrine Nixon où c’est aux alliés de porter le fardeau en assumant les coûts et à Washington de fournir les armes. En 1969, les deux piliers s’appelaient Riyad et Téhéran ; en 2026, ce sont Riyad, Le Caire et Ankara.
L’intervention directe aurait un coût évident avec l’ouverture d’un second front, alors que Téhéran conditionne tout retour à la négociation et que le baril dépasse déjà les 100 dollars. Toute frappe américaine au Yémen serait lue par l’Iran comme un élargissement du théâtre d’opérations, d’autant que l’offensive houthie sur la côte semble désormais coordonnée avec l’effort de guerre iranien, au détriment de l’autonomie que le mouvement revendiquait jusqu’ici.
La délégation comporte un coût moins visible : elle rend Washington dépendant d’intermédiaires qui poursuivent leurs propres agendas. Le Caire soutient la recherche d’un accord avec l’Iran, mais le fait en rappelant ses priorités, de la mise en œuvre complète de la phase deux du plan Gaza à sa ligne sur le Soudan. Riyad, de son côté, obtient des avions de combat plutôt que les frappes qu’il réclamait. Ce décalage devrait accélérer sa diversification stratégique et conforter, au sein de l’establishment saoudien, la logique de localisation de l’industrie de défense portée par GAMI et SAMI, au détriment d’une dépendance historique à l’égard des fournisseurs extérieurs. Paradoxalement à court terme l’achat de F-35 renforce en réalité la dépendance à Washington à court terme car la maintenance passe par le réseau logistique mondial du programme, les pièces détachées circulent dans une chaîne d’approvisionnement contrôlée par les États-Unis, et les fichiers de données de mission, qui permettent à l’avion d’identifier menaces et cibles, sont élaborés dans des laboratoires américains.
Pour l’Égypte, le moment est ambivalent. Son poids diplomatique n’a jamais été aussi élevé, mais la mainmise houthie sur Bab el-Mandeb menace directement Suez, dont les revenus ont déjà fondu de moitié depuis 2023.
Le Caire soutient donc Riyad en mer, au sein de la coalition maritime lancée en août, mais refuse de s’engager au Yémen, où le souvenir de l’enlisement de Nasser dans les années 1960 pèse encore. Il ménage aussi Abou Dhabi, son premier investisseur, dont les intérêts divergent de ceux de Riyad.
Sissi a besoin que la mer Rouge reste ouverte autant que Washington, mais sans en payer le prix militaire. Chaque partenaire des USA protège logiquement ses propres intérêts en priorité. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Le Grand Continent
@Grand_Continent
L’Europe peut-elle réellement se défendre seule ?
Face au désengagement américain, la question n’est plus théorique. Elle oblige à mesurer ce que les Européens peuvent déjà faire, ce qui leur manque encore et à quel prix.
Le diagnostic de l’ancien Major général des armées -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Cédric Labrousse
@CdricLabrousse
C'est peut être très abstrait et complexe, mais on a quand même le sheikh al-Rifa'i, grand mufti de Syrie, qui est obligé d'intervenir officiellement suite à une montée de tension et de débats, parfois très durs, entre différents écoles et différents courants de l'islam en Syrie.
بدر الدين
@D1mashqi
بيان صادر عن فضيلة العلامة الشيخ أسامة الرفاعي مفتي الجمهورية
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alan Eyre
@AlanEyre1
Makes sense to me.
Al Jazeera Breaking News
@AJENews
Qatar’s Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani tells Bloomberg, the Gulf won't be the same as before the war, unless there's a security framework ensuring no one is a threat to each other.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Bassam Barabandi بسام بربندي
@BASSAMVA
السفير الأمريكي السابق في اسرائيل
@DanielBShapiro
يقول أن فوز المعارضة في إسرائيل لن يحل كل المشاكل، لكنه قد يؤدي إلى تغييرات مهمة:
• تحرك جدي ضد عنف المتطرفين اليهود في الضفة الغربية.
• تعاون أكبر مع السلطة الفلسطينية بدلاً من إضعافها.
• جهود أكثر جدية لتحسين الوضع الإنساني في غزة.
• الحد من التوسع الاستيطاني الإسرائيلي.
• زيادة فرص التوصل إلى اتفاق أمني بين سوريا وإسرائيل.
• تعامل أكثر إيجابية مع خطة ترامب لغزة: نزع سلاح حماس، انسحاب إسرائيلي كامل، عدم تهجير الفلسطينيين، إعادة إعمار واسعة، وفتح مسار موثوق نحو دولة فلسطينية.
لكن الخلافات الأساسية ستبقى، بحسب الكاتب:
• لا يُتوقع أن تؤيد أي حكومة إسرائيلية حالياً قيام دولة فلسطينية.
• إزالة المستوطنات لن تحدث في المرحلة الأولى.
• ستستمر عقلية ما بعد 7 أكتوبر القائمة على ضرب التهديدات خارج الحدود قبل تطورها، بما في ذلك احتمال التحرك ضد حزب الله إذا عجزت الحكومة اللبنانية عن نزع سلاحه.
• احتمال التصعيد مع إيران سيبقى قائماً.
• المعارضة الأميركية للمساعدات العسكرية لإسرائيل ستستمر.
وخلاصة موقف الكاتب: إخراج نتنياهو وبن غفير وسموتريتش من المشهد سيكون بالنسبة له مجرد مرحلة انتقالية وليس حلاً نهائياً؛ إذ ستبقى ملفات غزة والفلسطينيين والسياسة الإسرائيلية واستقرار المنطقة والعلاقة الأميركية–الإسرائيلية بحاجة إلى معالجة طويلة."
Dan Shapiro
@DanielBShapiro
The decline in Israel's standing in the United States -- in both parties, across all demographics -- is undeniable, as this post shows. And given many events of the past three years -- far too many civilian casualties in Gaza, even as Israel fought a necessary war against Hamas after 10/7; multiple conflicts on multiple fronts, without any prospect of an endgame; an unpopular and unsuccessful war with Iran that Israel advocated for -- it's hardly surprising.
If Israelis care about their country's standing in the United States, and how that affects their national security, they may want to internalize this fact: There is no way to reverse this decline without a change of leadership in Israel.
Israelis will decide who they choose to vote for, and on what basis. Americans have no say in that decision. But that is a fact they may want to keep in mind as they head to the polls on October 27.
Netanyahu is simply too connected to all the pain points in this relationship to be part of reversing this dynamic. Whether it is the fight with Obama over the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, or the seeming disregard for civilian casualties in Gaza, or the current misguided Iran war, or the wave of Jewish terror against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank that his government, with its extremist ministers, refuses to shut down, he is associated with all of it.
Here's something that those who care about a positive US-Israel relationship need to understand: It's not healthy for the prime minister of Israel to be a main character in American politics. Netanyahu is so present in our politics, in our media, in our social media feeds, in our water cooler conversations that it keeps these issues burning at absurd levels of attention.
Israel-Palestine is an important issue. It, and the U.S. role and policy in the issue, deserve to be debated. But it has come to dominate political discourse in the United States at absurd levels. Different Israeli leadership is one step that would help return the issue to its normal proportions in American politics -- an important issue, about which some people feel passionately, but about which the majority may hold views (often negative views), but don't necessarily define their politics around it.
And it would help keep the debate centered on how we work with a partner whose cooperation we benefit from even as we sometimes disagree, and on how to reach outcomes in which both Israelis and Palestinians enjoy security, dignity, and self-determination in their own states, instead of where some are trying to pull it -- should the United States adopt a policy of opposing the existence of Israel as a Jewish state at all.
For the purposes of stabilizing the US-Israel relationship, the best thing about a new government in Israel is that 95+% of the American people would have no idea of the name of the prime minister of Israel. Much healthier, and a much better environment for both better foreign policy outcomes and a better U.S. political debate.
An opposition victory in Israel would not solve everything, not by a long shot. I'd expect some important positive changes: a serious law-enforcement effort to shut down extremist Jewish violence in the West Bank; more efforts to cooperate with, rather than weaken, the Palestinian Authority; more serious efforts to improve humanitarian conditions in Gaza; reduced expansion of Israeli settlements; a greater chance of an Israel-Syria security agreement; and a better attitude toward implementing Trump's Gaza plan, which calls for disarming Hamas, full withdrawal of Israeli forces, no displacement of the Palestinian population, extensive reconstruction, and establishing a credible pathway to a Palestinian state.
But there would still be important points of difference: no Israeli government will endorse a Palestinian state at this point; removing settlements will not happen in an early phase; Israel will still have a post-10/7 mindset of acting beyond its borders to preempt threats before they materialize, including by seeking to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon if the Lebanese government cannot do it; escalations with Iran will remain possible. These can all continue cause tension and disapproval by many Americans (even as the reality of enemies and terrorist organizations still sworn to Israel's destruction should not be ignored). Opposition to military aid to Israel, which is now baked in and on its way to becoming policy, will not change.
But when you are in a hole, the first rule is to stop digging. Removing Netanyahu from the stage, along with the extremists in his supporting cast, Ben Gvir and Smotrich, is the "stop digging" phase. There will still be much work to do to improve conditions on the ground in the region, seek adjustments to Israeli policy, work to ensure Palestinians and Arab states are doing their part, and stabilize the US-Israel relationship so it is a source of mutual benefit, not a constant cause of discord.
Changing the Israeli leadership is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to even begin this process. Something for Israelis to bear in mind, if it is important to them.
The Tennessee Holler
@TheTNHoller
CNN: “Israel’s favorability all negative — not just with Dems, the general electorate has turned against Israel… not just a left issue, an American issue… a SIXTY-SEVEN POINT SHIFT AGAINST ISRAEL…”
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
It is impossible to analyze the geography of this crisis without confronting a basic military reality: the ability to reliably neutralize Iranian and Houthi threats to the region’s strategic waterways is extremely limited.
But the problem goes well beyond the straits themselves. The alternative routes and infrastructure designed to bypass maritime chokepoints, from Fujairah to Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, are also vulnerable to Iranian and Houthi attacks. In other words, building a bypass does not necessarily solve the problem; it can simply create a new set of targets.
That means the discussion cannot focus only on alternative pipelines and export terminals. It also has to address how this infrastructure is protected: greater use of underground facilities, stronger active defenses, redundancy, and much better protection of critical nodes and bottlenecks.
There is another constraint that is sometimes overlooked in Washington. Even if Gulf producers can move more oil westward, their largest customers are in Asia. Routes through the Red Sea and Suez, or alternative pipelines toward the Mediterranean, can provide additional flexibility, but they are only partial substitutes for efficient eastbound exports.
And it does not take a complete blockade to create a serious economic shock. Even if the United States and its partners spend billions to keep oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz, the market still has to contend with LNG disruptions, sharply higher insurance costs, tanker shortages, security premiums, and delays. Those effects alone can keep energy prices elevated.
The strategic problem, therefore, is not simply how to reopen or bypass one chokepoint. It is how to maintain a resilient regional energy system when the waterways, pipelines, terminals, and ships themselves can all become targets.
There is no silver bullet, and you can't beat geography. Most importantly, Iran does not need to physically close the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt it. A single missile or UAV attack, or even a credible threat of one, can be enough to shake confidence in safe passage, drive up insurance premiums, deter commercial shipping, and disrupt tanker traffic.
That asymmetry is the heart of the problem: keeping Hormuz open requires a sustained and extremely costly security effort, while disrupting normal commercial traffic can require only a small number of relatively inexpensive attacks. The economic impact can therefore be far greater than the physical damage itself.
#iranwar
Bachar EL-Halabi | بشار الحلبي
@Bacharelhalabi
NEW🇶🇦🛢️: #qatar’s energy minister Saad al-Kaabi pushing back on the idea that #hormuz will become “worthless” within two years, has its merits.
His comments reconfirm what many of us have argued since the start of the war, in that the Mideast Gulf’s exposure to #hormuz is highly uneven.
• Qatar, Kuwait (& Bahrain) remain the most structurally constrained. #kuwait may eventually be able to deepen routing options through #saudiarabia, but for Qatar the alternatives are far more difficult, particularly given the technical and commercial complexity of trying to pipe LNG across the kingdom.
• #iraq has the #türkiye/Ceyhan outlet, but Baghdad first needs to materially ramp northern exports before talking seriously about replacing Mideast Gulf outlets with the Mediterranean. Hence why, I remain skeptical about the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline. Washington may be pushing it now, but if it does not materially advance within the next two years, its political momentum could fade after President Trump leaves office.
• The #uae, geographically, is in the strongest position to pursue something close to a “zero dependency on Hormuz” strategy.
• Saudi Arabia has #redsea optionality, but Hormuz still matters because of proximity and economics for Asian buyers. And even the Red Sea route ultimately depends on a more stable #yemen/Bab el-Mandeb environment.
So the real argument is whether individual Mideast Gulf producers can reduce their dependence on Hormuz, and if it makes sense to them to do so. #oott -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregg Carlstrom
@glcarlstrom
Didn't take long for Saudi to start redirecting oil through Hormuz rather than Yanbu (in fact, it was already underway before the pipeline hit):
"A total of 18 tankers, mostly VLCCs carrying 34m barrels of crude, exited Hormuz in the week of September 13. Saudi accounted for half the exports."
"Saudi oil moving through Hormuz averaged 2.9m bpd over the past six days, up from just 700,000 bpd in August." www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/vessels-trickle-through… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Portrait d'un des hommes les plus puissants du Moyen-Orient, et les plus controversés aussi.
RTL France
@RTLFrance
🇸🇦 Qui est vraiment Mohammed ben Salmane ?
🎧 Portrait en 3 épisodes du prince héritier d'Arabie saoudite, avec @Malbrunot s.rtl.fr/2B9qC -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Mon intervention sur LCI. La France en fait elle trop sur la menace hybride russe contre notre territoire?
#ukraineguerre
wetransfer.com/previews/6138568fc4a3311c771c7d0a6845c7592… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
من المهم قراءة هذه التصريحات القطرية بعناية لفهم ما يجري خلف الكواليس. يبدو أن قنوات الوساطة لا تزال نشطة، وأن هناك أفكاراً ومقترحات تتحرك بين طهران وواشنطن في محاولة لإيجاد مخرج دبلوماسي. 👇
#iran
قناة الجزيرة
@AJArabic
الخارجية القطرية:
◼️ نتبادل منذ أسبوعين تقريبا أفكارا مختلفة بشأن استئناف محادثات إيران
◼️ نعمل عبر فريق الوساطة لدينا مع طهران وواشنطن لمعرفة إمكانية استئناف المحادثات
◼️ وسطاؤنا يتنقلون حاليا بين عواصم مختلفة على أمل إحراز تقدم في هذا المسار
◼️ سمعنا تأكيدات من مسؤولين بالإدارة الأمريكية بأن واشنطن تريد التوصل لاتفاق
◼️ نحن بحاجة لحل إقليمي يحقق الاستقرار وتفاهم دولي يحمي الممرات المائية مثل هرمز
◼️ إخضاع الممرات المائية لسيادة دولة بعينها واستخدامها سلاحا سابقة خطيرة لنا جميعا -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Glula_Aduma
@GlulaAduma
הניויורקר בכתבת עומק על הכרעה מבפנים במעגל של נתניהו - קטארגייט.
רק שבכתבה הזו ממסגרים את קטארגייט באופן שמעולם לא העזו בתקשורת הישראלית - האם נתניהו סחרו בהשפעה ישירה על נתניהו?
כלומר האם נתניהו הופעל על ידי קטאר ולא רק הסוכנים הקואריים אוריך ואיינהורן?
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2026/09/28/israels-qatargate-s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Report
@HormuzReport
BREAKING: Yemen’s Houthis appear to have struck three separate important energy infrastructures across Saudi Arabia — the YASREF refinery in Yanbu, Aramco’s Abha bulk plant and an area in Dammam — with major fires reported at all three sites.
In Yanbu, footage shows a large fire at the 400,000-barrel-per-day YASREF refinery, with thick black smoke and workers reportedly evacuated. NASA FIRMS has detected two heat anomalies inside the facility, including one at high confidence.
Abha, in southwestern Saudi Arabia, was also hit, with footage showing major fires at an Aramco bulk plant following reported Houthi drone and missile attacks.
In eastern Saudi Arabia, additional footage shows a large fire in Dammam, marking another reported incident hundreds of kilometers from Yanbu and Abha.
Three locations. Three regions.
Saudi Arabia’s energy infrastructure is now being pressured from the Red Sea coast to the southwest and deep into the east.
This is no longer one strike.
It is a nationwide test of Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure.
1. YASREF refinery in Yanbu.
3. Aramco’s Abha bulk plant.
4. Dammam -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Samuel Ramani
@SamRamani2
I was in Saudi Arabia this week and my firm Pangea Geopolitical Risk is closely monitoring the Yemen developments
Some key points to consider
1) This is more than a Saudi-Houthi conflict, Yemen is a deepened state of hot civil war: the Houthis are gaining ground at the expense of Saudi-aligned government forces and the south Yemeni movement is taking steps to reconstitute and warning that the December 2025 attacks on them worsened security. 100,000 Yemenis are displaced in the latest fighting and the 2022 truce is over. Saudi airstrikes are unlikely to be as sustained as they were after 2015 but will continue as will Houthi cross-border attacks. Riyadh has been targeted by the Houthis for the first time since 2017-18 and the King Khalid Airport incident is a symbolic throwback to those times.
2) Pakistan will continue threading the needle on intervention: Pakistan has vowed solidarity with Saudi Arabia and is rhetorically giving the Mecca Agreement teeth. This means more air defence cover training and the utilization of the thousands of Pakistani security trained forces in Saudi Arabia for collective defence. It does not likely mean Pakistani jets striking Houthi targets or Pakistani boots on the ground. Pakistan's 2015 non-intervention logic partially holds and its backchannel role with Iran is not fully extinguished.
3) Confidence in US Leadership will be shaken further: Trump's first term in 2019 witnessed two successive events that shook confidence in the US within GCC countries: the passive abandonment of the Kurds in Turkey's Syria Operation Peace Spring offensive and the non-response to Abqaiq attack. Trump's refusal to assist Saudi Arabia in this crisis will compound those concerns. Europe-GCC cooperation will grow, as trust in Russia and China as backchannels has been strained by their Iran ties, but does it have substance? EDGE in UAE is making major European plays and both the GCC/Europe are modernizing at the same time.
4) Egypt is the country to watch- Egypt's parlous macroeconomic situation has been further affected by the latest escalations, it sees the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb Strait as economically integrated. Calls for an Arab solution to the Red Sea security crisis are intensifying and Sisi's meeting with MBS is likely to fuel greater Egypt-Saudi Arabia security cooperation. Egypt is happy to continue contributing to maritime security in the Red Sea. The trauma of the 1960s and capacity constraints impede frontal involvement in Yemen. Egyptian officials see military intervention in Yemen as a trap. Possibility of formal Mecca Agreement inclusion grows modestly from last month but not a certainty. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Levent Kemal
@leventkemaI
My latest:
Exclusive: Saudi Arabia recently tried to recruit Syrian fighters for Yemen, but Damascus refused, saying it was focused on reorganizing its military and had no intention of entering the conflict as a third party. www.turkiyetoday.com/region/exclusivesyria-refuses-saudi-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ragıp Soylu
@ragipsoylu
Erdogan is bringing some gifts to Trump regarding Iran before their meeting in New York:
• Sanctioned Golden Global Bank is seized by the Turkish banking authority
• Mahan Air flights to Turkey suspended effective September 21
• Iranian bank Mellat’s licence is revoked -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
AL-MONITOR
@AlMonitor
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is busy with secret, last-ditch efforts to normalize ties with Saudi Arabia, two senior Israeli political sources told Al-Monitor, hoping the achievement could help his reelection prospects. www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/how-netanyahu-levera…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Najafi
@Mostafa_Najafii
طبق گزارشها، احتمالا یکی از مقامات ارشد پاکستانی در روزهای آینده به تهران سفر میکند تا پیام یا بسته پیشنهادی جدیدی از سوی واشنگتن را منتقل کند. پیشنهادی که به مواضع اخیر ترامپ و نیاز او به دستیابی به یک توافق در آستانه انتخابات مرتبط است.
به نظر میرسد این پیشنهاد برای یک پنجره زمانی محدود، حدود ۴۰ تا ۵۰ روز، طراحی شده و واشنگتن درصدد یک توافق فوری و در عین حال جامع است؛ توافقی که از همان ابتدا، علاوه بر وضعیت تنگه هرمز، پرونده هستهای را نیز دربرگیرد(برخلاف اسلامآباد).
در واقع، ترامپ به دنبال توافقی سریع و چندمحوری است که علاوه بر کارکرد امنیتی، برای او در آستانه انتخابات کارکرد سیاسی و انتخاباتی نیز داشته باشد. پاسخ ایران به چنین بستهای به احتمال زیاد منفی است. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'Iran a fait part de ses conditions aux médiateurs en vue de la reprise des négociations visant à mettre fin à la guerre avec les États-Unis, a déclaré Mohsen Rezaei, chef du Conseil suprême de la sécurité iranienne, dans une interview accordée samedi à Al Jazeera.
Ces conditions comprennent la fin de la guerre sur tous les fronts, le déblocage des fonds iraniens et la levée du blocus naval, a précisé M. Rezaei, ajoutant que les consultations se poursuivaient avec les médiateurs qatariens et pakistanais et que Téhéran attendait une réponse du président américain Donald Trump.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Michael Young
@BeirutCalling
In an article on the Iraqi government's efforts to disarm Iraqi militias, Ali al-Mawlawi (@aalmawlawi) argues that the first stage on the path toward disarmament is to reform the Popular Mobilization Forces, which the militias are supposed to integrate, at Diwan:
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le scepticisme d’un agent du renseignement français après l’alerte d’Emmanuel Macron devant les chefs de partis. « La menace hybride russe existe, mais Emmanuel Macron la surestime. Il n’y a pas eu au cours des dernières semaines d’épisodes nouveaux détectés par les services, dit-il. Pourquoi sort-il alors soudainement du chapeau cette affaire ? Sauf si c’est une stratégie de communication pour orienter les choix des Français avant la présidentielle, en visant Marie Le Pen et Jean-Luc Mélenchon les deux extrêmes qui sont indulgents à l’égard de la Russie ».
Et d'ajouter que « rien n’a changé militairement dernièrement, sauf une chose : Poutine est acculé, il perd trop de monde dans sa guerre contre l’Ukraine. La Russie a reçu encore des renforts nord-coréens et en Afrique, les Russes n’y arrivent pas, ils perdent aussi beaucoup de monde, ils n’arrivent pas à avoir les supports logistiques – avions, hélicoptères – que les Américains ont. Poutine est contraint de mettre le bordel en Pologne ou dans les pays Baltes, plus que chez nous d'ailleurs. Plutôt que de faire de grands discours publics, on ferait mieux de leur pourrir leurs installations télécom ou de leur perturber l’approvisionnement via des pays tiers en pièces détachées d’avions ».
Selon lui, cette stratégie est étayée par une offensive de nos services de renseignements en direction des médias afin d’appuyer la communication élyséenne.
#menacerusse -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Six djihadistes franco maghrébins, jugés demain dimanche à Bagdad par la justice irakienne, risquent la peine de mort. Ma chronique sur RTL.
RTL France
@RTLFrance
Etat islamique : ce procès en Irak qui inquiète la France
"Les secrets de l'actu internationale" avec Georges @Malbrunot, tous les samedis à partir de 8h15 dans #rtl Matin Week-endThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
RTL France
@RTLFrance
Etat islamique : ce procès en Irak qui inquiète la France
"Les secrets de l'actu internationale" avec Georges @Malbrunot, tous les samedis à partir de 8h15 dans #rtl Matin Week-endThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'armée américaine a failli arraisonner un navire chinois au Moyen-Orient cette année sur la base d'un rapport de renseignement erroné, élaboré à l'aide de l'intelligence artificielle (IA), a rapporté vendredi CNN (AFP).
Les services de renseignement américains avaient indiqué que le navire transportait des composants liés à des armes nucléaires, poussant les forces américaines à préparer son interception, selon le média, qui cite quatre sources anonymes au fait de l'incident.
L'opération avait été annulée après qu'il est apparu qu'un agent conversationnel d'IA utilisé par un analyste avait mal identifié le matériel transporté par le navire.
L'une des sources citées par CNN affirme que le rapport de renseignement était "entièrement faux" mais "a failli déclencher une guerre".
La chaîne n'a pas précisé ce que transportait le navire ni quelle était sa destination.
Interrogée par l'AFP au sujet de cet incident, l'armée américaine n'a pas immédiatement répondu.
Cette information de CNN intervient alors que les mises en garde se multiplient depuis une semaine sur les risques liés à l'IA.
Donald Trump et plusieurs membres de la majorité présidentielle ont toutefois réitéré leur souhait de ne pas réguler le secteur, officiellement par crainte de voir la Chine prendre l'ascendant.
Le média Politico a révélé vendredi un autre incident impliquant la Chine: des pièces d'avions de combat furtifs F-35, dont une verrière de cockpit, ont été détournées vers Hong Kong et sont désormais introuvables, faisant craindre que Pékin ait pu accéder à des technologies militaires américaines sensibles.
Les pièces avaient été expédiées depuis l'Australie vers les États-Unis pour y être réparées lorsque le détournement s'est produit, selon le média, qui précise que les raisons de ce changement d'itinéraire et la localisation actuelle des pièces sont inconnues.
#intelligenceartificielle -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A lire cette analyse sur la recomposition du Moyen-Orient rédigée par Denis Bauchard, ancien diplomate et expert de cette région, publiée dans la revue Politique étrangère.
file:///C:/Users/Georges/Downloads/PE3-2026_Bauchard.pdf -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
זהבה גלאון
@zehavagalon
ישעייהו לייבוביץ' שנפטר לפני 32 שנה ראה את הנולד והזהיר אותנו מראש:
"תוך זמן קצר יינתקו הקשרים הרוחניים והנפשיים בינה (ישראל) ובין העם היהודי, וכן הקשרים הרוחניים והנפשיים בינה ובין התכנים של ההיסטוריה של עם ישראל ושל היהדות", כתב. ואכן, במקום יהדות, קיבלנו מחוות ריקות של יהדות. קיבלנו כיפה על ראש של כהניסט ומגן דוד מלובן שסוהרים מטביעים על פרצוף של אסיר. "כל התוכן של המפלצת הקרויה 'א"י השלמה' לא יהיה אלא קיום המנגנון השלטוני־מינהלי שלה", המשיך ליבוביץ, "המדינה השלטת על אוכלוסייה עוינת של 1.4–2 מיליון זרים תהיה בהכרח מדינת ש.ב., עם כל מה שמתחייב מזה כהשלכות על רוח החינוך, על חופש הדיבור והמחשבה ועל המשטר הדמוקרטי". הפיכה משטרית? זרעיה נטמנו כבר אז. שחיתות? ובכן: "השחיתות האופיינית לכל משטר קולוניאלי תדבק גם במדינת ישראל. המינהל יצטרך לעסוק בדיכוי תנועת מרי ערבית... יש חשש שגם צה"ל — שהיה עד עכשיו צבא עממי — יתנוון על ידי הפיכתו לצבא כיבוש, ומפקדיו, שיהיו למושלים צבאיים, יהיו כעמיתיהם באומות אחרות". -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
𝕋om 𝕆'ℂonnor
@ShaolinTom
My latest: Will Yemen become Saudi Arabia's Vietnam?
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is keen to avoid the fate of Egypt in the 1960s as he weighs tough choices on how to address the rising Ansar Allah threat. His decision may have global ramifications.
www.newsweek.com/will-yemen-become-saudi-arabias-vietnam-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
Iraqi PM Al-Zaidi’s security advisor, Qasim al-Araji:
We wish to clarify to the public that recent reports circulating on social media regarding the setting of a timeframe for the work of the committee tasked with bringing weapons under state control are entirely incorrect; there is no specific deadline for consolidating weapons in the hands of the state. - Sabereen -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
independentpersian
@indypersian
صادق خرازی، سفیر و معاون نماینده دائم اسبق جمهوری اسلامی در سازمان ملل، سفیر اسبق ایران در فرانسه و برادر همسر مسعود خامنهای، در گفتگو با خبرآنلاین گفت روابط ایران و آمریکا «ماجرای آب و روغن» است و به نظر او این تقابل بهسادگی از میان نمیرود.
خرازی در پاسخ به پرسشی درباره امکان صلح پایدار میان ایران و آمریکا گفت: «ماجرای ایران و آمریکا، ماجرای آب و روغنه؛ ماجرای روغن و روغن، و آب و آب نیست. خیلیا فکر میکنند ماجرای ایران و آمریکا یه روزی قابل هضمه، یا در آمریکا یا در ایران. به نظر من یه مقداری اگر صادقانه صحبت کنیم، تا این انقلاب هست و این مردم هستند و این خونها هست و این وقایع هست، تصور نمیکنم که اتفاقی بیفته.» -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Les Iraniennes ont gagné. On ne le dit pas assez.
Ghoncheh Habibiazad | غنچه
@GhonchehAzad
Video shows women taking part in a 10km run in Tehran, Iran today with some not wearing the mandatory hijab.
Running events across the country have previously been cancelled or faced backlash amid authorities’ enforcement of the country’s mandatory hijab law. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shibley Telhami
@ShibleyTelhami
Changing tone: Dialogue with Iran key to 'turning page' on crisis, says Anwar Gargash, adviser to the UAE president www.thenationalnews.com/news/uae/2026/09/17/attacks-on-sa…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barbara Slavin
@barbaraslavin1
. @YemeniFatima writes @StimsonMEP that the #saudi decision, with US political support, to target Sanaa airport in June sparked the latest #houthi advances. read: www.stimson.org/2026/why-the-houthi-capture-of-mocha-matt…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Javier Blas
@JavierBlas
Saudí Arabia is rapidly laying a bypass around the pumping station that was heavily damaged on its East-West pipeline. The latest picture is from yesterday (Sep 16), suggesting works are going fast (one new pipe is already welded and buried, the second one is under construction)
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
"@andreas_krieg says Saudi-Egyptian military cooperation is likely to entail intelligence sharing, maritime surveillance, protection of commercial shipping and greater coordination around the Red Sea.
But there is a “very hard ceiling” on how far Egypt will involve itself inside Yemen, he said. “The Egyptian preference will be to defend the maritime system without becoming responsible for Yemen.”
Historical memory likely plays a role in that preference. In the 1960s, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser sent tens of thousands of Egyptian soldiers to participate in the North Yemen Civil War, a long and costly endeavour that yielded few results and many casualties.
“Yemen taught Egypt that an apparently limited intervention can become a strategic trap very quickly,” Krieg said.
www.aljazeera.com/news-analysis/2026/9/17/how-far-will-eg… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ibrahim Jalal | إبراهيم جلال
@IbrahimJalalYE
The Houthis reaching Bab al-Mandab is the beginning of the next phase: consolidate gains, constrict Taiz, attack Marib, stretch YAF, manipulate the west, expand Iran’s leverage and isolate & intensify pressure on Saudi Arabia.
My latest for @AlMajallaEN
en.majalla.com/node/333085/politics/houthis-seek-expansio… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clash Report
@clashreport
Iran rapidly rebuilding the Taleghan 2 facility at the Parchin military complex — a former nuclear weapons program site 30km southeast of Tehran.
Iran has draped a large tarp over the site to hide work from satellites, with heavy construction underneath: dump trucks, bulldozers, concrete pumps, cranes, and new blast-reinforcement walls.
This is the third rebuild cycle. Israel struck the original building in October 2024.
Iran rebuilt it with a new high-explosive containment vessel buried under a concrete sarcophagus.
Israel hit it again in March 2026 with bunker-busters, punching three holes into the chamber and destroying the internal structure.
Iran started repairs by June 2026 and is now accelerating under concealment.
ISIS (Institute for Science and International Security) calls the repeated rebuilding of a former AMAD nuclear weapons program high-explosives test site "deeply concerning." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🇮🇱 ‘Jewish terrorism' poses existential risk to Israel, leading think tank warns
www.newarab.com/news/jewish-terrorism-poses-existential-r…
“Israel's Institute for National Security Studies @INSSIsrael has issued a rare warning that institutions are at risk of collapse due to settler terrorism.”
via @The_NewArab -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
My new report for the @QuincyInst is out today 👇
The central argument is simple: Washington is making a serious mistake if it assumes it is still dealing with the Iran of the prewar period.
The wars of 2025 and 2026 have accelerated a profound shift in Iranian strategic thinking.
For years, influential elements of Iran’s leadership favored calibrated restraint: absorb pressure, preserve diplomatic offramps, avoid an uncontrolled escalation spiral, and gradually accumulate leverage.
The lesson many Iranian security elites now believe they learned is almost exactly the opposite: restraint without a credible willingness to impose painful costs was interpreted as weakness and ultimately invited war.
That is giving rise to what I call “persistent counter-escalation.”
The idea is not to match overwhelming US firepower. It is to deny Washington control of the escalation ladder by ensuring that pressure on Iran generates escalating costs elsewhere: against US bases, regional infrastructure, maritime commerce, energy flows, and through Iran’s regional partners.
Iranian strategists increasingly speak openly in these terms. One described a “pain index”: if the adversary imposes one unit of pain, Iran should impose two or three. Parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf recently put it even more bluntly: “the era of proportionate responses is over.”
The Strait of Hormuz is central to this emerging doctrine. So are Iran’s missiles and drones, its regional alliance network, economic coercion, and increasingly, a debate over whether these capabilities are sufficient without a nuclear deterrent.
This is ultimately about more than how Iran fights. Tehran is trying to convert wartime leverage into a different regional order, one in which Iran cannot be attacked or economically isolated while US bases, neighboring states, energy infrastructure, and maritime commerce remain insulated from the consequences.
There is a dangerous paradox here. This strategy may strengthen Iran’s ability to impose costs, but it also creates far more pathways for every confrontation to become a regional conflagration.
That leaves Washington with a question military superiority alone cannot answer: Does imposing still greater damage on Iran restore deterrence, or reinforce Tehran’s conclusion that only greater capacity to impose costs on everyone else can keep it secure?
Breaking that cycle is essential if Washington wants to escape this strategic quagmire rather than deepen it through more rounds of escalation
Read the full report here:
quincyinst.org/research/from-strategic-patience-to-persis… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House MENA
@CH_MENAP
📢 Upcoming event: Is the Middle East entering a new era of regional security with the Mecca Pact?
Join @GalipDalay, Hina Rabbani Khar, Prince Turki Al Faisal and @SanamVakil for a virtual discussion.
📅 28/9
🕐 14.00 BST
📍 Zoom
Register now⤵️
www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/standard-event/middle-eas… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
בצוק העתים, הסעודים פונים לפקיסטן ולסין בתקווה שאלו ילחצו על איראן, כדי שטהראן, בתורה, תלחץ על החות'ים לעצור את המערכה.
אלא שכאן נמצאת הבעיה המרכזית: איראן אינה יכולה לספק בשם החות'ים את מה שהם עצמם אינם מוכנים לתת. ואם לשפוט לפי נאומו של עבד אל-מלכ אל-חות'י היום, אין כרגע סימן לכך שהחות'ים מתכוונים להפסיק את התקיפות נגד סעודיה כל עוד המצור נמשך.
במקביל, החות'ים מנהלים מהלך מדיני מתוחכם: הם מנסים להציג את עצמם כגורם רציונלי, עצמאי ופרגמטי שאפשר לדבר איתו, כפי שניתן לראות גם במגעים האחרונים במסקט עם הממשל האמריקני. מבחינת הממשל אמריקני שאינו מעוניין כרגע להיגרר מחדש למערכה צבאית בתימן, יש היגיון בניסיון לאמץ מסר זה.
וכאן בדיוק מתחדדת המלכודת הסעודית. ריאד מחפשת מנופי לחץ חיצוניים, אבל בעלות בריתה אינן ממהרות להיכנס למערכה במקומה, ואיראן אינה מחזיקה בכפתור שבאמצעותו היא יכולה פשוט להורות לחות'ים לעצור.
לכן, ככל שהמערכה תימשך והמחיר לסעודיה יעלה, הלחץ על ריאד לחזור למסלול של משא ומתן והפסקת אש רק יגבר. אלא שאם התנאי החות'י להפסקת הלחימה יישאר הסרת המצור ללא ויתורים משמעותיים מצדם, הסכם כזה עלול להיתפס בריאד פחות כפשרה ויותר כהסכם שנכפה עליה בתנאים חות'יים.
וזו הדילמה הסעודית האמיתית: להמשיך במלחמה שהיא מתקשה לסיים בכוח, או לעצור אותה במחיר שעלול לחזק משמעותית את החות'ים ולהמחיש את מגבלות כוחה של סעודיה.
#iranwar
#yemen
roi kais • روعي كايس • רועי קייס
@kaisos1987
מקורות ממשלתיים בפקיסטן אומרים כי רמטכ"ל צבא פקיסטן עאסים מוניר דחק באיראן, שישכנעו את המורדים החות'ים שלא לתקוף מתקני אנרגיה בסעודיה. הפנייה הזו נעשתה במסגרת שיחץ טלפון של מוניר עם שר החוץ האיראני עראקצ'י, בזמן שהאחרון ביקר בסין @OmerShahar123
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Iran declares the Strait of Hormuz will stay closed until Trump and Netanyahu are removed from power, setting a new condition for reopening the Strait, per Zolqadr, advisor to the Supreme Leader.
"Our fighters will not open the Strait of Hormuz until the criminal Trump and the bloodthirsty Netanyahu are pulled down from the throne of power," Zolqadr says, calling it "the first stage of the Iranian people's revenge."
In August a senior adviser to Iran's chief negotiator said Iran would keep Hormuz closed until Trump's term ends on January 20, 2029. The condition has now moved from a date to Trump's removal from office. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Israel-Alma
@Israel_Alma_org
On September 15, 2026, Syrian state television released video footage of the Russian airbase at Hmeimim, located approximately four kilometers from the city of Jableh and 16 kilometers south of the port city of Latakia. According to Syrian television, this was the first footage of the base released since Syria and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding on August 9 regulating the Russian military presence at the Hmeimim and Tartous bases.
Following the arrival of Russian forces in Syria in August 2015, Hmeimim became Russia’s main military base in the country. It housed approximately 1,500 troops and contained all types of weapon systems deployed and operated by the Russian military in Syria: dozens of aircraft, including fighter jets, bombers, light and heavy transport aircraft, refueling aircraft, and intelligence aircraft; dozens of combat and transport helicopters; UAVs; air-defense systems, including the S-400; weapons depots; tanks; and numerous armored vehicles.
As can be seen in the accompanying video, in which we incorporated the Syrian television footage (assuming that it is indeed recent footage from the past few weeks) the Russians have withdrawn most of their air assets from the base, a process that began with the fall of the Assad regime. In fact, only a few aircraft remain: an Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft, an Antonov An-72 transport aircraft, an Antonov An-26 transport aircraft, and four Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets inside hangars.
Under the memorandum of understanding, the Russian military facilities are to be converted into joint training centers by November 2026. The Syrian Civil Aviation Authority has already assumed control from Russia of the Latakia International Airport complex, located within the Hmeimim site, and has begun working to restore it for civilian flights.
Russia is shifting from an independent military presence based on facilities under its exclusive control to a model of security partnership with the host state, enabling it to retain physical access in Syria. From Israel’s perspective, this points to a possible reduction in the risk of direct friction with Russian forces.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
My press comments published in @The_NewArab Mohammed al-Basha, founder of the risk advisory firm Basha Report, said that “the situation on Yemen’s West Coast remains fluid”. The coalition, he told The New Arab, “appears to have resumed limited airstrikes against Houthi positions,” while the Southern Giants Brigades and National Shield Forces “have stabilised a new defensive line south of the strait,” with units withdrawn from the coast regrouping elsewhere. Houthi casualties from the offensive that ended 9 September are “heavy,” though unconfirmed. www.newarab.com/analysis/crisis-two-fronts-saudi-arabias-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
My press comments published in @jacobin: Ansar Allah sees its domestic political enemies as weak. “The fundamental problem is that the Yemeni National Resistance Forces (@nrfyemen) and the wider anti-Houthi coalition are a hodgepodge of groups with different religious, ideological, political, and regional backgrounds,” Mohammed Al-Basha, a Washington, DC–based risk adviser and founder of the Basha Report, told Jacobin. “Some were former adversaries . . . and they are not united around a common long-term political vision for Yemen,” he added. Much of the media has characterized the attack against Tareq Saleh as a sudden seizure, but it seems to have been more a product of a longer campaign. Al-Basha has documented a monthlong Houthi program of disrupting supply lines and softening targets with drones and missiles in advance of their invasion.
jacobin.com/2026/09/yemen-ansar-allah-civil-war-saudis-iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
benoit faucon
@benoitfaucon
After the U.S. blockade, Iran vowed to push trade overland. But on the ground, hundreds of truckers are stuck at Iran’s land borders with its neighbors, throttling its economy. www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/irans-attempts-to-get-aroun… via @WSJ @benoitfaucon and Hamraz Bayan
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Commentaire d'un connaisseur des relations internationales. "Ghalibaf, Président du Parlement, et ( théoriquement ) l’un des deux négociateurs iraniens, est un troll de première catégorie. Il connaît l’Occident comme sa poche et s’en sert pour s’en moquer, à très bon niveau".
محمدباقر قالیباف | MB Ghalibaf
@mb_ghalibaf
Straits Taylor Rule:
i = r* + π* + 1.5(π−π*) + 0.5(y−y*) + α(SOH−SOH*) + β(BEM−BEM*), α,β > 0
Let’s see if a hike could open SOH or produce a single barrel :)
You can’t 25bp a chokepoint and r* isn’t neutral. It’s SOH risk premium, and We set it.
Stay unanchored ! -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: The Houthis are pursuing diplomatic efforts that are likely intended to prevent the United States or its partners from supporting or joining the Saudi offensive campaign against the Houthis by claiming that the group currently has no intention to target international shipping. Allowing the Houthis to consolidate their recent advances near the Bab al Mandeb Strait would enable the group to disrupt shipping at any time and for any reason in the future, even if the Houthis have no immediate plans to attack international shipping.
Other Key Takeaways:
The Houthis announced on September 16 that Houthi forces conducted ballistic missile and drone attacks targeting military and oil infrastructure sites in western Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have attacked Saudi oil infrastructure since July 2026 to maximize the political and economic costs of the Saudi campaign to compel Saudi Arabia to surrender to Houthi demands, which include ending Saudi military activity and support for anti-Houthi forces in Yemen and lifting the Saudi blockade on Houthi-controlled territory.
The Shia Coordination Framework, which includes some Iranian-backed Shia parties, reportedly negotiated a three-phase disarmament agreement with some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that would enable the militias to keep their weapons and fail to meet US expectations for militia disarmament. The reported agreement also appears to meet Iranian-backed Iraqi militias’ demand for the expulsion of Turkish forces from Iraq as a condition for their disarmament. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Important
Omid Memarian
@Omid_M
U.S. service members want Americans to see what this war is really doing. They sent CBS photos of destruction from Iranian missile and drone attacks.
CBS: “They want Americans to see just how destructive Iranian capabilities can be, the limits of American defense capabilities, and also the danger that Iran can still present.” More than six months into the war, the warning is coming from the troops themselves.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
Here's my 30-minute podcast interview with @prestonstew_ , where we discuss the situation in Yemen. The situation is not good, and there's a lot to unpack.
Watch the full interview here.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=bvmqHLrOVNc -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'humiliation a été double pour l'Arabie au Yémen. Non seulement, Donald Trump a refusé d'intervenir militairement auprès des Saoudiens contre les Houthis, mais les Etats-Unis ont dans la foulée de ce refus conclu un accord avec les Houthis lors d’une réunion secrète à Oman, leur promettant de ne pas frapper les territoires qu'ils contrôlent ou de soutenir l’Arabie saoudite et les forces pro-Riyad sous quelque forme que ce soit, en échange de quoi les Houthis pro-Iran maintiendront la mer Rouge ouverte à la navigation, à l’exception des navires saoudiens, selon Reuters.
#yémen -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
יסמין 📖☕️🐈⬛🌿
@molpodnok
רותם קפלן:
זו כבר לא סטיית תקן. זו מגמה.
נכון ששיעור הצבעה גבוה במיוחד יכול אולי לשנות קצת את התמונה, אבל כדאי להפסיק לקוות לנס ולהתחיל לדבר על המציאות.
המציאות היא שהדור שהצמיח פה נתניהו בכל שנות שלטונו הארורות ובפרט ב-4 שנות הסיוט האחרונות, מתחיל לתת את משקלו.
הדור הזה רוצה דת, עליונות יהודית, מלחמת נצח בערבים ובשמאלנים ומדינה פשיסטית באופן מוחלט ומוצהר.
זה מה שרוצה כל יהודי שני בישראל כיום, לכל הפחות
זה 3 שנים אחרי 7.10 וכאשר הכל פתוח וגלוי. בניגוד לבחירות הקודמות, כולם יודעים עבור מה הם מצביעים. כיום כל יהודי שני בישראל מרוצה מהמצב הנוכחי בו נמצאת המדינה ורוצה עוד מזה.
בקצב הזה בן גביר, סמוטריץ' ווינטר אשכרה יכולים לדרוש מנתניהו רוטציה.
מספיק אנשים מבינים שנתניהו כבר זקן וחולה ורוצים שהם יהיו שליטי המדינה באופן טוטאלי.
בהשוואה לאימפריה הרומית, אם נתניהו הוא קליגולה, הם נירון.
אם יש משהו יותר מסוכן מנתניהו, אלה האנשים הללו.
ככל שיותר צעירים שגדלו פה בשנים האחרונות יגיעו לגיל ההצבעה, המגמה הזאת תלך ותתחזק.
מה זה אומר?
שכנראה לישראל נותרו רק שתי אופציות: או ערבים או פשיזם.
ממשלה 100% יהודית שאינה פשיסטית, לא תהיה.
המספרים כבר לא יסתדרו.
כל אחד צריך לחשוב עם עצמו ולהחליט ממה הוא מפחד יותר: שלטון שנתמך בערביי ישראל או שלטון פשיסטי מלא וסוף הפרק הדמוקרטי בארץ שבין הירדן לים.
תוציאו לכם מהראש שקיימת אופציה שלישית. אין כזאת.
כדאי מאוד שגם ראשי מה שמתקרא "גוש השינוי" יבינו את זה כבר מעכשיו, יתחברו למציאות ויחליטו מה הם רוצים לעשות. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Conflict Armament Research
@conflictarm
Houthi advances in recent weeks have changed the shape of the battlefield in Yemen. CAR has tracked the evolution of Houthi capabilities for over a decade through its field investigations.
A quick overview of CAR’s findings 🧵 #yemen #houthis (1/7) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Told @WPReview that a consensus already exists within #iran on restoring the previous memorandum of understanding, provided the U.S. is willing to do the same.
The main obstacles lie in the details: how to manage the Strait of Hormuz, the nuclear file, and regional security issues, all against the backdrop of a severe trust deficit between the two sides.
One possible way forward would be to use the existing memorandum as a baseline that both sides could accept, while leaving the specifics to be negotiated separately.
www.worldpoliticsreview.com/iran-war-hormuz-phased-diplom… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Over the past weeks in Iran the issue of a possible withdrawal from the NPT, and more broadly a change in the country’s nuclear doctrine, has moved into the public sphere.
- What until recently remained largely a taboo subject is now being discussed quite openly on television, in newspapers and across social media, and has even found its way into Friday sermons (i.e. last friday) with some prayer imams openly discussing the issue of whether Iran should reconsider its nuclear posture.
- The proliferation of the debate has led some Iranian commentators to wonder whether the ground is gradually being prepared from above for a possible shift, that is actually my personal assessment too.
- Yet, examining the issue in depth, the discussion appears more complex than that, because even within the conservative camp, where there appears to be growing support for reconsidering at least some elements of the nuclear doctrine, there are significant differences over what Iran should actually do, when and how.
- A particularly interesting example comes from the conservative daily Khorasan, which, in one interesting analysis, has strongly challenged recent calls by Paydari MPs and Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari for Iran to withdraw from the NPT.
- Khorasan does not argue that Iran should simply preserve the status quo. Its argument is presented as a strategic: withdrawing now, under pressure from Washington, Israel and the IAEA, would allow the US and Israel to use Iran’s own decision to strengthen the political case for future attacks, while, at the same time, undermining an important part of the diplomatic argument on which Russian and Chinese support for Tehran rests.
- The paper also argues that Iran has already obtained much of what it might practically gain from leaving the treaty without paying the political and diplomatic cost of formally doing so.
An argument also mentioned by Gharibabadi recently.
- Withdrawal would not, in itself, provide any legal justification for a nuclear attack on Iran, Khorasan notes, but international politics is not governed by legal texts alone, and Tehran would be unnecessarily giving its adversaries an additional political argument against it.
- To be noted, however, that Khorasan does not reject withdrawal from the NPT in principle. On the contrary it argues that the moment to leave would be when Iran had already built and tested a nuclear weapon; doing so before that point would mean paying the price without obtaining the benefit.
- In other words deterrence is not necessarily strengthened by making ever more explicit threats: silence, ambiguity and keeping the timing of a possible decision hidden may ultimately be more radical and more effective, than announcing it in advance.
- This is why I would be cautious about reading the current debate simply as a confrontation between “moderates” and “hardliners”. What seems to be emerging is also a debate within the conservative camp itself over the best route towards stronger deterrence: whether Iran should openly cross political and legal thresholds now, or preserve ambiguity and keep its adversaries guessing about how far, and how rapidly, it may ultimately be prepared to go.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia is running out of missile interceptors and asking four countries for help because America has none to spare...
Two regional officials say Riyadh has gone to France, Britain, Pakistan and Egypt for air-defense support, an appeal made because its main supplier burned through its own stockpile fighting Iran.
The kingdom has to cover military bases, government sites and oil facilities spread across a country the size of Western Europe, which one official called a very difficult position.
Britain confirms a close defense partnership and will say nothing further.
Turkey and Pakistan told AP they never received a request under the defense pact all three signed last month.
Nobody in that group has interceptors to spare either, with European stocks rated critical months ago and Ukraine already competing for the same missiles off the same lines.
Which leaves the door Oman and Egypt are holding open, and Washington walked through it last weekend when American representatives met Houthi officials in Muscat.
Any settlement built there starts from the map as it stands, with the Houthis holding Bab al-Mandeb and the islands, because there is no force assembling anywhere to take them back.
Source: Associated Press / Writer: Daniel -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🧵
🔴 تابعت ندوة برنارد هيكل بالأمس في معهد AGSIW، ويُعرف هيكل في الصحافة الغربية بقربه من ولي العهد السعودي الأمير محمد بن سلمان
سأستعرض في هذا الثريد أهم ما ورد، وأنصح بالاطلاع عليه لما فيه من اراء ومعلومات لافتة
🔷 يخلص إلى أن الضعف البنيوي للسعودية في مواجهة إيران والحوثيين قد يدفعها في نهاية المطاف، رغم رفضها الحالي، إلى تقديم مقابل لكليهما من أجل وقف الهجمات أو خفضها.
🔷 يتوقع هيكل أن أي ترتيبات مالية مع إيران بشأن هرمز لن تسمى رسمياً «رسوماً» أو «إتاوة»، بل قد تُصاغ في شكل استثمارات مشتركة أو ترتيبات اقتصادية تمنح طهران منفعة مالية.
🔷 ويعتقد هيكل أن إنهاء التهديد الحوثي لا يمكن إلا من خلال مسارين أساسيين؛ إما هزيمة الحوثيين عسكرياً بشكل شامل، وهو أمر لا يراه ممكناً من دون قوات برية، وإما التوصل إلى ترتيبات مالية وسياسية معهم.
🔷 وهو يميل إلى الاعتقاد بأن الخيار الثاني سيكون في النهاية الأكثر احتمالاً.
🔷 لا سيما أن الوضع السعودي الراهن بالغ الخطورة، مع تعطل جزء كبير من القدرة على تصدير النفط عبر خط الشرق–الغرب والحاجة إلى وقت لإصلاحه.
🔷 ويشير إلى أن صعوبة خروج السفن السعودية عبر باب المندب واضطرارها إلى مسارات أطول ترفع زمن النقل إلى الأسواق الآسيوية بصورة كبيرة، بما يجعل النفط السعودي أقل تنافسية ويجبر الرياض على تقديم خصومات أكبر للمشترين، ولا سيما المصافي الصينية. ولذلك يرى أن الضرر الحوثي لا يقتصر على الجانب الأمني، بل يضرب السعودية مالياً وتجاريًا بصورة مباشرة. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Not good for Israël
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
@academic_la
For the first time in many months, right before the elections, the Netanyahu bloc is ahead in the polls 54-52. The new extremist right wing forces, the Ofer Winter party and the union between Moshe Feiglin and Bezalel Smotrich have created this lead, as has a panic around Eisenkot potentially bringing the Palestinian parties into the coalition.
It looks increasingly likely that either Netanyahu forms the next government with defectors or there is a hung Knesset and Netanyahu remains in charge as a caretaker as another election takes place.
His ability to remain in power is incredible, and the next government could end up being even more extreme than the current one if Winter and Feiglin are involved. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kristin Diwan
@kdiwaniya
ICYMI
Prof Bernard Haykel and former US Amb to KSA Michael Ratney are blunt in assessing Saudi Arabia's worsening situation with Ansarallah and Iran and the lack of answers from the Trump Administration
agsi.org/events/saudi-arabias-strategic-recalibration/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Xavier Frère
@xavier_frere
🔴 IRAK/FRANCE/DJIHAD
1. Les ressortissants européens,dont 29 Français, détenus à la prison d'al-Khark, pourraient être jugés à partir de ce dimanche à Bagdad, ont appris ce jeudi @bagardmatthieu et @dose_marie. La Direction des Français de l'étranger a confirmé l'information👇 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Vaez
@AliVaez
New poll:
— 43% think Iran is more likely to get a bomb now than a year ago, even though stopping one is the top reason people give for continuing the war (40%).
— More Americans blame the US (33%) or Israel (22%) than Iran (27%). 52% say attacking was a mistake.
— GOP strong approval down from 49% to 34% since April.
instituteforglobalaffairs.org/2026/09/war-president-iran-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Report
@HormuzReport
BREAKING: The Trump administration made a deal with the Houthis — reportedly promising not to strike Houthi-held territory or support Saudi-backed forces, in exchange for keeping the Bab el-Mandeb open to shipping, per Reuters.
It came just days after Donald Trump rejected the Saudi Crown Prince's request for U.S. strikes on the Houthis. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman called Trump twice asking for American firepower. Trump refused both times.
The meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy in Muscat. The Houthi delegation included senior official Mohammad Abdulsalam, who is under U.S. sanctions. The Houthis told U.S. officials they had no intention of attacking American vessels and were committed to the 2025 ceasefire — except those belonging to Saudi Arabia.
The meeting also came just days after the Houthis captured Yemen's entire Red Sea coastline and Perim Island in the Bab el-Mandeb, routing Saudi-backed forces. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
נדב איל Nadav Eyal
@Nadav_Eyal
יש שלוש מפלגות ימין קיצוני שעוברות את אחוז החסימה כבר כמה סקרים. זה לא באמת מפתיע; הציבור זז ימינה. יש ימין קיצוני המוני לטיקטוק, ימין קיצוני למשיחיים של איו"ש, וימין קיצוני דנדש למילואימניקים תמימים שקונים את עופר וינטר והגיוס. הן מקבלות לפי סקר אחד יותר מהליכוד. ובאמת, למה להצביע לליכוד, שהפכה להיות כה קיצונית, אם אפשר להצביע לימין קיצוני מקורי?
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Contrary to those who said it wouldn’t happen, Ansarullah, commonly known as the Houthis, has fully entered the war and rapidly climbed the escalation ladder in a consequential way, after largely sitting out both the initial 40-day war and the 13-day US-Iran fight over Hormuz.
Meanwhile, Iraqi groups and Hezbollah have been engaged from the start.
Iran’s “unity of fronts” has taken shape: distinct actors pursuing their own interests, but collectively widening pressure to maximize leverage for a favorable settlement.
That includes, per their statements, ending the US-Saudi blockades and regional war, durable sanctions relief, US military withdrawal & full, upfront implementation of the June MOU. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le 17 juillet 2018, Le Figaro publiait un entretien que j'avais réalisé par courriel avec le chef des Houthis au Yémen. Abdel Malek al-Houthi se disait prêt à "cesser les attaques à la roquette contre l'Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis, s'ils arrêtent de bombarder notre pays ». Je la publie de nouveau ci-dessous, alors que la guerre a repris entre les insurgés soutenus par l'Iran et leurs voisins saoudiens.
#yémen
www.lefigaro.fr/international/2018/07/17/01003-20180717AR… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Après avoir rencontré, il y a plusieurs mois, des dirigeants du Hamas palestinien, des responsables américains ont rencontré des représentants des Houthis du Yémen à Oman ce week-end, révèle l'agence Reuters, citant cinq sources proches du dossier.
Lors de cette réunion, qui, selon une source, a eu lieu dimanche, les Houthis ont déclaré aux responsables américains qu’ils n’avaient aucune intention d’attaquer des navires américains et qu’ils s’engageaient à respecter le cessez-le-feu de 2025 conclu avec les États-Unis, ont indiqué deux sources.
L’une de ces sources, un Yéménite, a précisé que la milice avait également affirmé qu’elle n’attaquerait pas
les navires israéliens ni aucun navire commercial, à l’exception de ceux appartenant à l’Arabie saoudite.
Cette rencontre, qui n’a pas été rendue publique, s’est tenue à l’ambassade des États-Unis à Mascate, ont indiqué trois de ces sources sous couvert d’anonymat. Deux d’entre elles ont précisé que le gouvernement omanais, médiateur régional de longue date, avait contribué à l’organisation de cette rencontre.
L’administration Trump a désigné les Houthis comme « organisation terroriste étrangère » en mars 2025, érigeant ainsi en infraction pénale tout soutien apporté à ce groupe. Mais Washington a depuis négocié avec eux, parvenant à un cessez-le-feu en mai dernier après avoir bombardé le groupe pendant deux mois afin de mettre un terme à une campagne d’attaques contre le trafic maritime en mer Rouge.
Le président Donald Trump a déclaré samedi que les Houthis avaient contacté son administration par téléphone pour demander aux États-Unis de ne pas s’immiscer dans la guerre au Yémen. Le vice-président JD Vance a déclaré lundi que les États-Unis étaient en contact direct avec le groupe, sans donner plus de détails.
L’une de ces sources a indiqué que la délégation houthiste comprenait un haut responsable basé à Mascate et soumis à des sanctions américaines, Mohammad Abdulsalam.
Une autre source a confirmé la présence d’Abdulsalam ainsi que celle d’un autre haut responsable houthiste, Abdelmalik al-Ajiri.
Interrogé sur la question de savoir si les États-Unis avaient rencontré les Houthis à Oman, un porte-parole du Département d’État n’a pas confirmé cette rencontre, mais a déclaré que la sauvegarde de la liberté de navigation en mer Rouge et la prévention de l’exportation du terrorisme depuis le Moyen-Orient constituaient des intérêts fondamentaux des États-Unis.
#houthis -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Saudi Aramco has cancelled all of its September European crude oil allocations and is scrapping every cargo slated for late-September loading onward, with a European lifter saying no Saudi oil cargoes at all until November, per initial reports citing oil trading firm Onyx and market sources.
That takes the world's largest exporter out of the European market for the rest of September and all of October, a de facto force majeure on Saudi crude to Europe from the 3rd largest energy producer in the world. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kristin Diwan
@kdiwaniya
In @GulfStatesInst webinar today, Bernard Haykel argued that Saudi Arabia cannot adequately confront Iran & proxies long term without fielding an army of citizens willing to fight to defend the country
agsi.org/events/saudi-arabias-strategic-recalibration/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
“The great fuel crisis has arrived ?”www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/oil-executives-say-the-gr…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🧵
🔴 هذا أهم تحقيق قرأته منذ فترة طويلة حول دور كوشنر في السياسة الخليجية؛ ويكشف معلومات سرية حول ما كان يحدث خلف الكواليس لسنوات عديدة، ورغم معرفتي شخصيا بالمعلومات الواردة؛ إلا أن الكثير منها يطرح للجمهور المرة الأولى.
🔷 رغم استثمار مليارات الدولارات معه، شعرت دول الخليج بخيبة أمل من كوشنر بعد اندلاع حرب إيران. ينقل الكاتب عن مسؤول أميركي كبير سابق أن الخليجيين اعتقدوا أن الأموال التي استثمروها معه ستمنحهم قدراً من النفوذ يساعد على حمايتهم من التصعيد، لكن النتيجة كانت عكس ذلك. ويختصر المصدر المشكلة بقوله إن نموذج الخليج الاقتصادي كان قائماً على الاستقرار، ثم اختفى هذا الاستقرار.
أنصح كل مهتم بالسياسة الخليجية بقراءته بتمعن؛ سأستعرض أهم ما جاء فيه؛
🔷 السعودية كانت المدخل الأساسي لكوشنر إلى الخليج. مع بداية ولاية ترامب الأولى كُلّف بإعادة بناء العلاقة مع الرياض بعد الفتور في عهد أوباما. وسرعان ما ركّز على الأمير محمد بن سلمان، ورتّب له غداءً مع ترامب في البيت الأبيض، وساعد في إقناع ترامب بأن تكون السعودية محطة أول زيارة خارجية له.
🔷 خلال زيارة الرياض أُعلن اتفاق أسلحة بقيمة 110 مليارات دولار، ويقول التقرير إن كوشنر تدخل شخصياً باتصال مع الرئيس التنفيذي لـLockheed Martin للمساعدة في إنجاز الصفقة.
🔷 تطورت علاقة كوشنر بمحمد بن سلمان من علاقة عمل إلى علاقة شخصية وثيقة. كانا يتحدثان باستمرار هاتفياً، ودُعي كوشنر للإبحار معه في البحر الأحمر على يخت Serene.
🔷 ويقدم التقرير الاثنين باعتبارهما رأيا نفسيهما جيلاً شاباً من القادة ورجال الأعمال القادرين على تجاوز المؤسسات والبيروقراطية التقليدية.
🔷 يورد التقرير ادعاءً أكثر حساسية يتعلق بصعود محمد بن سلمان داخل الأسرة الحاكمة. فبحسب مسؤول استخباري إقليمي سابق قال إنه اطلع على نص مكالمة مسجلة، أبلغ كوشنر محمد بن سلمان، أثناء تحركه لإقصاء محمد بن نايف، بأن الجميع في الحكومة الأميركية باستثناء أجهزة الاستخبارات يقفون خلفه، ووصف المصدر ذلك بأنه «ضوء أخضر». المتحدث باسم كوشنر نفى هذه الرواية.
🔷 بعد قمة الرياض عام 2017 بأسبوعين، بدأت السعودية والإمارات حصار قطر. وينقل التقرير عن مسؤول أميركي سابق أن كوشنر كان يعلم بما سيحدث ولم يتدخل لمنعه، وأنه «وافق ضمنياً». ويشير التقرير إلى أن الأزمة أوصلت الخليج إلى حافة مواجهة مسلحة.
🔷 يربط التقرير هذه الحلقة بخلفية مالية حساسة. ففي أبريل/نيسان 2017، قبيل الحصار، عرض تشارلز كوشنر على مسؤولين في صندوق الثروة السيادي القطري الاستثمار في العقار المتعثر 666 Fifth Avenue الذي كانت عائلة كوشنر تملكه.
🔷 القطريون رفضوا لأنهم لم يروا أن الاستثمار مجدٍ اقتصادياً. وينقل التقرير عن محلل قريب من الصندوق رأياً مفاده أن الاستثمار ربما كان سيخلق رصيداً من حسن النية تجاه عائلة كوشنر.
🔷 شارك كوشنر لاحقاً مع وزيري الخارجية والدفاع ريكس تيلرسون وجيم ماتيس في جهود احتواء أزمة حصار قطر، على الرغم من الاتهامات السابقة بأنه لم يعترض على إطلاقها.
🔷 يقول التقرير إن مسؤولين سابقين أكدوا أن كوشنر دافع عن ولي العهد داخل البيت الأبيض بعد مقتل خاشقجي. وكان تفسير كوشنر العلني لأهمية السعودية أنها حليف قوي في مواجهة النفوذ الإيراني.
🔷 ويرى التقرير أن كوشنر تعامل مع سلوك الرياض الداخلي والخارجي من زاوية تحقيق الأهداف الأميركية الإقليمية أكثر من ملفات حقوق الإنسان.
🔷 كان كوشنر أيضاً قريباً من الإمارات. يصف التقرير السفير الإماراتي في واشنطن يوسف العتيبة بأنه من المقربين إليه. وكانت هذه العلاقة، إلى جانب علاقته القديمة بنتنياهو ودعم ترامب الكامل له، عاملاً مهماً في التوصل إلى اتفاقات أبراهام.
🔷 بدأت الصفقة بالمقايضة بين وقف خطط ضم أجزاء من الضفة الغربية وتطبيع الإمارات مع إسرائيل، ثم انضمت البحرين، ولاحقاً السودان والمغرب. السعودية رفضت الانضمام، مع تمسكها آنذاك بمطلب إقامة دولة فلسطينية.
🔷 النتيجة الأهم مالياً جاءت بعد مغادرة كوشنر البيت الأبيض. أسس صندوق Affinity Partners وسعى مباشرة إلى أموال الصناديق السيادية في السعودية والإمارات وقطر. ويقول التقرير إن هذه الدول الثلاث كانت بين الوجهات الرئيسية التي زارها لجمع رأس المال.
🔷 في السعودية، طلب كوشنر ملياري دولار من صندوق الاستثمارات العامة. اللجنة الاستثمارية المختصة عارضت الاستثمار، مستندة، وفق محضر اجتماع نقل عنه التقرير، إلى غياب سجل استثماري قابل للقياس، وتحمل السعودية معظم المخاطر، وارتفاع الرسوم، ونتائج فحص وصفت عمليات الشركة بأنها غير مرضية. لكن الأمير محمد بن سلمان، بصفته رئيس مجلس إدارة الصندوق، تجاوز اعتراض اللجنة وتم الاستثمار. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
JD Vance has entered the talks with the Yemenis. What everyone already knew would happen has happened: the war in Yemen has sent oil prices soaring.
But there is nothing Vance can do, because this is a situation that can only be resolved in Tehran.
Talks between Riyadh and Tehran began yesterday to deal with the problem.
And why did the Trump administration allow the situation to get this far? Because it calculated that the GCC would fear a drawn-out conflict and accept a deal with Iran in which it picked up the bill for the war. (Now it’s all about who pays the bills.)
That did not happen, and the administration now fears that oil prices will weigh even more heavily on Trump’s already eroded popularity.
There is no problem to be solved in the Middle East today that was not created by the war itself. No one talks anymore about those original war aims. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Yémen: les ressorts de la victoire éclair des rebelles Houthis, soutenus par l'Iran, face aux loyalistes pro-saoudiens. Mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
#yémen
www.lefigaro.fr/international/nouvelles-alliances-armemen… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Emmanuelle Elbaz-Phelps
@manuelbaz
אני מקווה שנוכל לצפות ב"נז"א" בקרוב בארץ ולקיים אז דיון רציני על תוכנו ובכלל, על המלחמה בעזה. בינתיים, דחוף שנקיים דיון על החברה שהפכנו להיות. חברה ושלטון שמאיימים על אזרחיה והעיתונאים @yuval_abraham ורחל שור בגלל סרט, קשה ככל שיהיה, ואפילו אם יופרכו חלק מהעדויות. התחרפנו לגמרי
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Stéphanie Antoine
@StphAntoine
f24.my/C9zP
Le Débat: Mer Rouge : le détroit s’embrase-t-il? @PALLEMON @Malbrunot @AdelBakawan et JP Perrin. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Guerre US en Iran: 50 000 hommes engagés. Son coût 33,4 milliards de dollars. Inventaire des dégâts: quatre F-15 détruits, un F-35 endommagé, sept avions ravitailleurs KC-135 endommagés ou détruits, et "jusqu'à 30" drones d'attaque MQ-9 Reaper détruits, entre autres. Pour un bilan très maigre.
Le ministère américain de la Défense a reconnu, dans un rapport publié lundi, une "pénurie" de munitions liée à la guerre en Iran, un constat que l'administration Trump avait pourtant largement refusé de confirmer ces derniers mois (AFP).
Le rapport de l'Inspecteur général du Pentagone estime qu'entre le 28 février et le 30 juin, l'opération "Fureur épique" contre l'Iran a coûté environ 33,4 milliards de dollars, dont 22,3 milliards dépensés uniquement en munitions tirées.
"Les dépenses en munitions lors de l'opération Fureur épique a provoqué une pénurie sur les inventaires stratégiques et révélé des goulots d'étranglement au sein des industries pour le renouvellement des munitions," relève le document.
Le rapport souligne toutefois les mesures prises par le ministère pour accélérer la production.
Quand, en juin, des informations de presse avaient rapporté que les Etats-Unis rationnaient l'utilisation de leurs missiles, notamment ceux de type intercepteurs, le gouvernement avait démenti, le président Donald Trump affirmant lui-même que le pays disposait "de quantités énormes de munitions".
Début septembre, M. Trump écrivait encore que les Etats-Unis disposaient de "quantités pratiquement illimitées de munitions".
Selon la presse, ce manque de munitions a pourtant poussé le président à ne pas renouveler les attaques à grande échelle contre Téhéran durant l'été.
Malgré le recours massif aux intercepteurs, "les frappes iraniennes ont endommagé et détruit des centaines de bâtiments et d'installations sur des bases américaines au Koweït, à Bahreïn, au Qatar, aux Emirats arabes unis, en Arabie saoudite, en Irak, à Oman et en Jordanie", note le rapport du Pentagone,
Le document, qui couvre les mois d'avril à juin 2026, liste les dégâts sur la flotte d'appareils: quatre F-15 détruits, un F-35 endommagé, sept avions ravitailleurs KC-135 endommagés ou détruits, et "jusqu'à 30" drones d'attaque MQ-9 Reaper détruits, entre autres.
Le document estime à "plus de 50.000" le nombre de militaires américains impliqués dans la guerre dans le Golfe, déclenchée le 28 février par des frappes israélo-américaines contre l'Iran.
Les ripostes de l'Iran et de ses alliés ont endommagé les bâtiments diplomatiques dans quatre pays (Irak, Koweït, Arabie Saoudite, Emirats arabes Unis), précise le rapport.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Report
@HormuzReport
BREAKING: Saudi Arabia is completely frustrated with the Trump administration after Washington rejected Riyadh's request for direct U.S. military action against the Houthis — and is now facing its worst-case scenario, per NYT.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman reportedly asked Trump for U.S. strikes. Trump declined. Within days, the Houthis seized key territory around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, Saudi-backed forces were routed, and the East-West oil pipeline was shut down following attacks.
Former U.S. ambassador Michael Ratney described Riyadh's position as "their worst-case scenario."
Riyadh asked its most powerful ally for help. Washington offered intelligence instead. Now Saudi Arabia is facing threats to both its security and its oil lifeline — alone.
The message is unmistakable: America's Gulf partners are learning the hard way that Washington's security guarantees come with limits. And the limits have been reached. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House MENA
@CH_MENAP
'Tehran’s approach is shifting from predominantly reactive restraint to calculated strategic unpredictability. Iran now seeks to show that it is willing to impose costs and take risks it previously avoided, while calibrating its actions', writes Faezeh Foroutan for Kalam.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 طلبت السعودية بشكل رسمي دعماً عملياتياً بريطانياً لوقف التقدم الحوثي وحماية منشآتها النفطية، ووافق رئيس الوزراء على إرسال مستشارين عسكريين.
🔷 الأخطر اقتصادياً؛ التقدير البريطاني بأن خط الشرق-الغرب قد يبقى خارج الخدمة حتى ستة أسابيع؛ فإذا تحقق ذلك، يصبح الضغط على لندن أكبر لأن أزمة باب المندب ستتحول بسرعة من ملف أمني سعودي إلى مشكلة تضخم وفائدة وموازنة داخل بريطانيا نفسها.
هذا التقرير مهم من بلومبرغ وهذا أهم ما ورد فيه
🔷 تقدمت السعودية إلى بريطانيا بطلبات تشمل دعماً دبلوماسياً وعسكرياً مباشراً لمواجهة التصعيد الحوثي، وليس مجرد مساندة سياسية عامة.
🔷 بحسب أشخاص مطلعين على المناقشات، الطلبات السعودية تشمل دعماً عملياتياً للجيش السعودي لوقف التقدم الحوثي على الساحل الغربي لليمن باتجاه باب المندب، إضافة إلى مساعدة بريطانيا في الدفاع عن البنية التحتية النفطية السعودية من الهجمات.
🔷 لم يُحسم بعد ما إذا كان رئيس الوزراء آندي برنهام سيوافق على كامل الطلبات، والحكومة البريطانية لم تعلن مضمونها رسمياً.
🔷 لكن التقرير يكشف أن برنهام وافق بالفعل على إرسال مستشارين عسكريين بريطانيين إلى السعودية لدعم جهود المملكة. وهذه هي الخطوة العملية المؤكدة حتى الآن، بينما تبقى المشاركة العملياتية الأوسع قيد الدراسة.
🔷 مسؤولون بريطانيون حذروا برنهام من أن سيطرة الحوثيين على باب المندب ستكون لها تداعيات «كارثية» على الشحن الدولي والاقتصاد العالمي، عبر ارتفاع جديد في أسعار النفط والتضخم.
🔷 المعلومة الاقتصادية الأكثر أهمية هي أن مسؤولين بريطانيين يخشون أن يحتاج خط الشرق-الغرب السعودي إلى ما يصل إلى ستة أسابيع قبل العودة إلى الخدمة.
🔷 إذا صح تقدير الأسابيع الستة، فإنه يعني أن أهم مسار سعودي لتجاوز هرمز سيبقى معطلاً في مرحلة شديدة الحساسية، بينما يزداد الضغط الحوثي على طريق البحر الأحمر نفسه.
🔷 بريطانيا تنظر إلى الأزمة باعتبارها مشكلة اقتصادية داخلية أيضاً. ارتفاع برنت باتجاه 110 دولارات للبرميل زاد المخاوف من موجة تضخم جديدة قبل أول موازنة لحكومة برنهام.
🔷 أسواق المال رفعت توقعاتها لأسعار الفائدة البريطانية، وبات المتعاملون يسعرون بصورة كاملة خمس زيادات بمقدار ربع نقطة مئوية حتى نهاية 2027، بسبب مخاطر التضخم الناتجة عن أسعار الطاقة.
🔷 هذا يهدد مباشرة أحد التعهدات الرئيسية للحكومة الجديدة، وهو تخفيض كلفة المعيشة، ويزيد الضغوط على المالية العامة بسبب ارتفاع تكاليف الاقتراض الحكومي.
🔷 وزارة الخزانة البريطانية قلقة بصورة خاصة لأن التصعيد يأتي بالتزامن مع إعداد مكتب مسؤولية الموازنة OBR توقعاته الاقتصادية والمالية لموازنة 28 أكتوبر. كان وزير الخزانة جون هيلي يأمل في تراجع مخاوف التضخم خلال فترة التقييم، لكن حركة الأسواق تسير في الاتجاه المعاكس.
🔷 نتيجة ذلك، تخشى الحكومة أن تتقلص أكثر المساحة المتاحة أمام وزير الخزانة للإنفاق أو خفض الضرائب ضمن القواعد المالية التي التزم بها.
🔷 التقرير يقول إن بريطانيا مصممة في الوقت نفسه على عدم الانجرار إلى حرب شرق أوسطية جديدة، خصوصاً أنها لم تؤيد الحرب التي بدأها ترامب ضد إيران. ومن هنا يأتي التردد في الانتقال من الدعم والاستشارات إلى المشاركة القتالية.
🔷 الطلب السعودي من بريطانيا يأتي بالتوازي مع طلب الرياض مساعدة أميركية أوسع. التقرير يعيد الإشارة إلى أن محمد بن سلمان طلب من ترامب ضرب الحوثيين، بينما اقتصرت المشاركة الأميركية حتى الآن على المستشارين والمعلومات والاستهداف.
🔷 هناك أساس عسكري بريطاني قائم بالفعل داخل السعودية يمكن البناء عليه. «بلومبيرغ» تذكر أن حكومة ستارمر السابقة نشرت أصولاً عسكرية بريطانية في المملكة، وأن منظومة الدفاع الجوي البريطانية Sky Sabre دُمجت في السعودية خلال مارس.
🔷 هذا الانتشار شمل، بحسب التقرير، رادارات وعقدة قيادة وسيطرة وقاذفات صواريخ، أي أن الدعم البريطاني الحالي لا يبدأ من الصفر، بل توجد بالفعل بنية دفاع جوي بريطانية متكاملة جزئياً مع الدفاعات السعودية.
🔷 التقرير يستعيد أيضاً سابقة 2024، حين نفذت بريطانيا في عهد ريشي سوناك ضربات عسكرية على مواقع حوثية في اليمن رداً على الهجمات في البحر الأحمر. لذلك فهناك سابقة عملياتية قانونية وسياسية تستطيع الحكومة الحالية الرجوع إليها إذا قررت التصعيد، رغم أن موقفها الحالي أكثر تحفظاً. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Anne Applebaum
@anneapplebaum
Extraordinary journalism from @NewYorker, on Jared Kushner's catastrophic diplomacy, conflicts of interest, arrogance. He represents "a new kind of Washington figure, for whom public office serves as a means to extraordinary wealth"
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2026/09/21/jared-kushners-doll… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Taghvaee - The Crisis Watch
@BabakTaghvaee1
BREAKING: For the first time in history, the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force (RSSMF) has used one of its Chinese-made DF-15A short range ballistic missiles in combat against the Houthis in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia procured these ballistic missiles from China in the 1990s, and they have been in service with the RSSMF for more than two decades. Despite their long service, they had never previously been used in combat.
Their first known combat use, however, was unsuccessful. The DF-15A apparently malfunctioned during its flight and crashed in the desert. Houthi forces subsequently recovered wreckage from the missile, including the fairing of its booster, as can be seen in these videos. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barbara Slavin
@barbaraslavin1
The US military’s next significant challenge: Hiding www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/09/11/the-u…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 هذا المقال لأهم كُتاب فايننشال تايمز، يحلل فيه التطورات الإقليمية، وأنصح بقراءته باهتمام.
🔷 الفكرة المركزية لدى جدعون راتشمان هي أن المواجهة تحولت خلال أسبوع من حالة «لا حرب ولا سلام» إلى صراع إقليمي أوسع، في وقت تعثرت فيه الدبلوماسية.
🔷 تقدم الحوثيين، وضرب منشآت الطاقة السعودية، وتعطيل خط شرق–غرب من جهة العراق، ثم تأجيل محادثات هرمز، جعلت السعودية في قلب المواجهة بدل بقائها على هامشها النسبي.
🔷 يقسم راتشمان الحرب إلى ثلاثة ميادين مترابطة؛ عسكري واقتصادي وسردي، ويرى أنها تتحرك حاليًا ضد الولايات المتحدة. القيمة التحليلية للمقال تكمن في هذا الربط؛ فالتقدم الميداني الحوثي يعطل الاستراتيجية الاقتصادية الأميركية، ثم يغير الانطباع السياسي بشأن الطرف الذي يمتلك زمام المبادرة.
🔷 في الميدان العسكري، تبددت فرضية الحرب القصيرة التي قامت عليها الضربات الأميركية–الإسرائيلية في 28 فبراير. تمكنت إيران من امتصاص الهجوم الأول، ثم تقييد الملاحة في هرمز وضرب دول الخليج، بينما أثبت الحوثيون قدرتهم على البقاء رغم مواجهتهم السعودية والإمارات والولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل خلال سنوات.
🔷 في الميدان الاقتصادي، كانت واشنطن تراهن على معادلة تقوم على خنق صادرات إيران مع إبقاء كمية كافية من النفط في السوق لمنع تجاوز الأسعار مستوى 100 دولار. وساعدت الحماية الأميركية للسفن، إلى جانب خطوط الأنابيب الخليجية البديلة، على منح البيت الأبيض انطباعًا بأنه بدأ يتفوق في حرب الاستنزاف الاقتصادي.
🔷 يقدّر المقال أن المرافقة الأميركية أعادت صادرات النفط عبر هرمز إلى نحو ثلث مستويات ما قبل الحرب.
🔷 غيّر الحوثيون هذه المعادلة عبر تهديد الطريق الذي اعتمدته السعودية لتجاوز هرمز. فإذا تكررت الهجمات على خط شرق–غرب أو على السفن في باب المندب، فقد تصبح إمدادات الطاقة الخليجية إلى الأسواق الغربية أكثر اختناقًا، لأن الضغط سيطاول الممر الأصلي وطريق الالتفاف معًا.
🔷 يضع راتشمان عامل التوقيت في صلب الخطر الاقتصادي؛ تتعرض الإمدادات السعودية للضغط بينما تتجه أوروبا والولايات المتحدة إلى فصل الشتاء. وهذا يزيد حساسية أسعار الوقود والتدفئة والتضخم، ويهدد خطط ولي العهد محمد بن سلمان التنموية التي تعتمد على استقرار الإيرادات وقدرة المملكة على تصدير النفط.
🔷 يرى الكاتب أن الضرر الاقتصادي داخل إيران لا يضمن نجاح الاستراتيجية الأميركية. التضخم يرتفع والعملة الإيرانية تتراجع، لكن النظام السلطوي قادر على امتصاص الألم وقمع الاحتجاجات بدرجة لا تملكها الحكومات الخاضعة للانتخابات. وبذلك قد تكون إيران اقتصاديًا أكثر تضررًا، لكنها سياسيًا أقل حساسية من إدارة ترامب لارتفاع أسعار الوقود.
🔷 المفارقة التي يحددها المقال هي أن الانتخابات النصفية الأميركية تمنح طهران ورقة ضغط زمنية. ارتفاع أسعار البنزين يهدد الجمهوريين مباشرة، بينما تستطيع القيادة الإيرانية تحمل معاناة اقتصادية أكبر من دون مواجهة آلية انتخابية مماثلة. لذلك لا يكفي قياس النجاح بحجم الخسائر الاقتصادية؛ بل بقدرة كل طرف على تحويل خسائر خصمه إلى تنازل سياسي.
🔷 دول الخليج تمثل نقطة هشاشة إضافية في الاستراتيجية الأميركية لأنها ليست معتادة على ضغوط اقتصادية طويلة أو تهديد متكرر لبنيتها التحتية. ويجعل استهداف خط الأنابيب السعودي بقية المنشآت والموانئ ومحطات الضخ جزءًا من معادلة الردع، مع احتمال انعكاس ذلك على خطط الاستثمار والتحول الاقتصادي، وليس على صادرات الخام وحدها.
🔷 في معركة السردية، أضعفت التطورات ادعاء واشنطن بأنها تستعيد السيطرة تدريجيًا. السيطرة الحوثية المتوسعة وارتفاع النفط وتأجيل المحادثات تمنح إيران صورة الطرف القادر على نقل الضغط إلى ساحات جديدة. ويرى راتشمان أن خسارة هذه المعركة قد تؤدي إلى خسارة المبادرة السياسية والدبلوماسية، حتى إذا ظل التفوق العسكري الأميركي قائمًا.
🔷 يقرأ الكاتب رفض ترامب طلب محمد بن سلمان شن ضربات فورية على الحوثيين بوصفه اعترافًا متزايدًا بحدود القوة العسكرية.
🔷 يشبه راتشمان الحوثيين بحركة طالبان من زاوية القدرة على الصمود أمام خصم متفوق تسليحيًا بفضل الدافع والمعرفة المحلية وطول الخبرة القتالية.
🔷 الخيار الذي يضعه راتشمان أمام ترامب هو بين فتح مواجهة إضافية مع الحوثيين إلى جانب إيران، أو قبول تسوية تقلص الأهداف الأميركية وتوقف الخسائر. يستحضر اتفاق ترامب مع طالبان والانسحاب الأميركي من كابل للتنبيه إلى احتمال تكرار نمط الاعتراف باستحالة الحسم، لكنه يقدمه كتشبيه تحذيري، لا كتوقع مؤكد أو دليل على أن قرار الانسحاب والتسوية قد اتُّخذ. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Majakovsk
@Majakovsk73
1\#yemen Fronte di Taiz: Come ormai tutti sanno, gli Houthi hanno, ad inizio settimana scorsa, lanciato una offensiva che ha travolto le linee delle fazioni filo-saudite PLC. Le milizie pro-saleh avevano inizialmente avuto qualche successo in questa zona, ma poi sono state travolte. Motivo del successo Houthi, il sottodimensionamento delle brigate sul terreno, che erano brigate solo a livello nominale e formale, ma risultavano "piene" solo intorno al 20%, ed il ritardo nel supporto aereo da parte saudita. Questo ha permesso una rapida e travolgende avanzata, mentre le forze filo-saudite si ritiravano verso Lahij. Catturate in sequenza le città di Hays, Al Khawkhah, Mokha, Dhubab e Murad, più le isole Hannish e Mayyun, dando agli Houthi un controllo (ancora piuttosto lasco) dello stretto di Bab Al Mandab
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Yaakov Katz
@yaakovkatz
Israel is more isolated internationally than at any point in decades. Support is eroding in the US, relations with Europe are deteriorating and even parts of the American right are turning against Israel. Yet with an election just six weeks away, it is strangely not the main campaign issue.
My latest in @ChathamHouse.
www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2026-09… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vivian Nereim
@viviannereim
Saudi Arabia Faces ‘Worst-Case Scenario’ After Being Rebuffed by Trump
www.nytimes.com/2026/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-iran-tr… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Yemen: Saudis escalate with ballistic missiles and the war turns serious
The Saudis are escalating the war against the Houthis and showing they are prepared to defend their positions even if that means putting their oil infrastructure at risk.
A booster from a Chinese DF-15A ballistic missile, whose motor was reportedly optimized to stretch its range toward 900 km, has been located in a Yemeni city, in Marib. The Saudis are the only operators of DF missiles in the region, including through their missile program in partnership with China.
In parallel with these launches, the Saudi Air Force carried out a heavy campaign of more than 120 strikes in less than 48 hours, punishing key Houthi-controlled provinces such as Sanaa, Marib, Taiz and Hodeidah.
The Yemeni side of the escalation is just as severe. The Houthi rebels launched massive attacks with salvos of ballistic missiles and drones directly against King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait and against Aramco refineries, leaving dozens wounded in Saudi Arabia. This is a regression. It takes us years backward.
The backdrop to this frantic escalation is the Houthi advance on the ground. They recently captured strategic port cities and islands along the Bab el-Mandeb shipping corridor. Saudi Arabia and Yemeni government forces are racing against time to contain that advance, which I am certain is inevitable.
I will go further: if Houthi deals with some tribes go forward and open the way, they will keep retaking territory.
This can get much more serious if Houthi attacks start targeting the capital. That, it seems to me, is what Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree meant when he declared publicly that the group will answer the current Saudi bombing campaign with larger operations inside Saudi territory.
Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, vital infrastructure that crosses the Arabian Peninsula precisely to divert oil away from the Strait of Hormuz, was severely hit days ago in a coordinated attack. The strike caused fires and forced a temporary shutdown of the line in the Riyadh and Medina regions.
Riyadh attributes that specific drone launch to allied militias in Iraq. The episode only proves that the capital is already in the line of fire of the regional pro-Iran architecture, which goes far beyond the Yemenis.
As we reported in a previous article, the Houthis’ arsenal of ballistic missiles and long-range drones is far more sophisticated than in earlier years of the war.
The group has already demonstrated the technical capacity to reach targets well beyond 1,000 km and operates several drone and missile assembly lines inside the country.
The use of the DF-15A by the Saudis may also show that China kept a public discourse of restrictions on missile exports while practicing something else.
The main arrangement governing the proliferation of these weapons is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). China never signed it.
Beijing made a voluntary political pledge in 1992 to follow the group’s guidelines, which prohibit the export of missiles with a range above 300 km and a payload above 500 kg, but it has no legally binding obligations under the MTCR.
That is precisely the pledge the DF-15A booster exposes.
Read more
global21.substack.com/p/yemen-saudis-escalate-with-ballis… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
𝐌𝐢𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐞𝐥 𝐀𝐫𝐢𝐳𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐢
@ColdBrief
Two things happened today, and together they are the first real sign that the argument I have been making all week is landing.
Bloomberg reports that Andy Burnham is weighing military and diplomatic support for Saudi Arabia. The Saudi requests are specific: operational support to repel the Houthi push along Yemen's Red Sea coast toward Bab al-Mandeb, and help defending Saudi oil infrastructure from attack.
Operational support to stop the coastal advance. That is not escort duty. That is the thing the kill box actually needs!
And tomorrow Mohammed bin Salman arrives in Cairo for an official working visit. A one-on-one with Sisi, then expanded talks between both delegations.
I have spent a couple of weeks arguing for exactly those two things! That Egypt cannot keep treating this as somebody else's war while losing $800 million a month at Suez. And that Europe, which already works with Riyadh on everything from the two-state track to trade, should be working with Riyadh on the Houthis as well.
Riyadh is now doing both pieces of that itself. Asking London for operational help, and going to Cairo in person.
That is what leadership looks like, and it is worth noting who is not doing it. Washington was asked twice and said no.
So let me be clear about what good news this is, and what it is not yet.
Burnham is considering. Britain has a Defence Envoy to Saudi Arabia in Air Chief Marshal Sir Harv Smyth, and the Franco-British naval mission agreed by dozens of nations for Hormuz is still waiting on a durable ceasefire before it can deploy on a defensive basis. Defensive, once hostilities stop. That is the European reflex, and it is not sufficient when an Iranian proxy is taking ports.
The UK also has its own reasons here, and there is no shame in that. British households are paying for this war in energy bills. A closed Bab al-Mandeb is a British economic problem, not a favour to the Gulf.
That is the healthiest possible basis for cooperation. Not charity. Shared interest.
And Cairo has the same interest, multiplied. Suez revenue fell from $10.3 billion in 2023 to $4 billion in 2024. Transits halved. Egypt signed the Riyadh maritime declaration in July and has yet to visibly resource it. Tomorrow's meeting is where that could change, and MBS showing up in person rather than sending a foreign minister tells you how seriously the kingdom is taking it.
Terrorism is a global problem. The security of the Red Sea is a global problem. The Houthis are both.
So yes, I want Europe and the Arab world working together against them. Britain's intelligence and operational capability. Egypt's navy in its own sea. European escorts that do more than escort.
But on one condition, and it is not negotiable.
Saudi Arabia and Yemen in charge. The coalition headquarters is already in Riyadh. The ground forces are Yemeni, and they are the ones who will take the coast back, as they took al-Labnat and as they took Mocha in 2017. Outside powers should be supporting a war the region is leading, not conducting one of their own with Yemenis as extras.
That distinction is the whole difference between 2015 and what could work now.
The Houthis have overextended onto open ground. Riyadh is building the coalition. London is considering the operational piece. Cairo gets the conversation tomorrow.
For the first time in this war, the pieces are moving toward the same place at the same moment.
Now somebody has to finish it! -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Cameron Hudson
@_hudsonc
I highly recommend this useful analysis of the evolving Turkish-Egyptian alliance (or at least, convergence) happening across the Arab world and Horn of Africa/Red Sea in particular. They are increasingly capable of shaping outcomes in Washington's absence.manassa.news/en/stories/33717
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ragıp Soylu
@ragipsoylu
NEW: Why the Mecca defence pact hasn’t triggered action against the Houthis
• Turkish official argues new alliance with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan needs time to become operational
• The pact isn’t ratified yet by any of the allies
www.middleeasteye.net/news/why-mecca-defence-pact-hasnt-t… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
מוג'תבא ח'אמנהאי ירש את אביו לאחר חיסולו בפברואר האחרון, אך מאז לא הופיע בציבור. כיצד פועלים באיראן כדי לשמור על הלגיטימציה של המנהיג העליון, ואיך עלולה הימשכות היעדרותו להשפיע על יציבות המשטר? מאמר חדש שלי ב-@INSS_Hebrew
www.inss.org.il/he/publication/mujtaba/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Some reports today, including Iranian sources, suggest, although this has not been independently confirmed, that Saudi Arabia has used Chinese-made DF-15 ballistic missiles against the Houthis in Yemen, apparently for the first time.
- If confirmed, there is also a broader point here: this is a useful reminder of the limits of Iranian expectations regarding China.
- Beijing is not in the Middle East simply to back Iran. It has its own interests and partnerships across the region, including deep strategic ties with Saudi Arabia.
- So the point is: Chinese and Iranian interests may often overlap, but they do not necessarily coincide.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
There are some very good ideas in this essay from @JZarif, which includes calls to further institutionalize regional cooperation in West Asia, including in the domain of nuclear technology.
Such ideas were once unthinkable, now they are imperative.
magazine.zenith.me/en/politics/irans-former-foreign-minis… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Roberto Iannuzzi
@riannuzziGPC
Un paio di riflessioni sugli ultimi sviluppi nello Yemen. La disfatta delle forze filosaudite, e la conquista dell’intera costa sul Mar Rosso, incluso lo Stretto di Bab el-Mandeb, da parte di Ansar Allah (gli Houthi), rappresentano un colpo durissimo per USA e sauditi.
1/4 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: New high-resolution satellite imagery shows the pumping station on Saudi Arabia's East-West oil pipeline burned out end to end, with the entire process area blackened and crude oil that escaped the site pooled across the desert beyond the perimeter, per Vantor imagery.
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Repairs to Saudi Arabia's East-West oil pipeline will take far longer than a month due to a lack of spare parts, with the pumping infrastructure catastrophically damaged and at least 8 locations on the pipe hit, per initial reports citing sources inside Saudi Arabia.
That leaves Saudi Arabia set to run out of crude oil stocks for export within five to seven days, taking around 4 million barrels per day, ~4% of global supply, off the market, per three industry sources to Reuters.
Some repaired points were struck again, using up the spares and undoing the work. Yanbu has about a week of stocks left on the kingdom's only export route that does not pass through Hormuz. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Omid Memarian
@Omid_M
This @60Minutes interview is a colossal PR disaster. After months of claiming U.S. air superiority and that Iran’s air defenses had completely been destroyed, they have now put on national television the story of an F-15 being hit by an Iranian surface-to-air missile and its two crew members being forced to eject over Iran.
One of them fell at an estimated 70–100 mph because his parachute was damaged, and he survived….
There are so many unanswered questions in the way this story is presented that it feels like an insult to the audience’s intelligence.
And as propaganda, this is an extraordinary gift to Tehran: the Pentagon has broadcast dramatic evidence that Iran was still capable of bringing down one of America’s most advanced fighter jets despite repeated claims of overwhelming U.S. air superiority.
Definitely not the image of a superior military force the admin has been trying to portray for months.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
What do the Houthi want?
One of the Houthis’ key political objectives is to gain recognition as Yemen’s legitimate government, a line that, so far, only Iran has crossed. A telling example is their recent attempt to establish direct official contacts with Egypt over navigation in the Bab al-Mandab and Red Sea. According to @alaraby_ar, the Houthis sought coordination with Egyptian authorities through the International Chamber of Shipping in London, presenting themselves as the de facto authority on the Yemeni side of the strait.
Egypt rejected the request precisely because of its political implications. An Egyptian source said Suez Canal Authority @SuezAuthorityEG Chairman Osama Rabie refused to give an internationally unrecognized party an opportunity to obtain even implicit recognition simply through an official response. Cairo instead routed the matter through security channels [code word for General Intelligence Service (GIS), a.k.a Mukhabarat], allowing practical communication over maritime security without granting the Houthis formal standing.
This distinction is important. The Houthis appear to be trying to translate territorial and military gains into political legitimacy, particularly by seeking direct engagement with governments and international maritime bodies. Egypt’s response shows that regional states remain wary of allowing operational coordination to become de facto diplomatic recognition.
العربي الجديد
@alaraby_ar
علمت "العربي الجديد" أن السلطات المصرية رفضت مقترحاً من جماعة الحوثيين في اليمن، وصل إليها عبر غرفة الملاحة البحرية الدولية في لندن (ICS)، بشأن إمكانية إجراء اتصالات مباشرة مع ممثلين رسميين للجماعة بهدف التنسيق مع هيئة قناة السويس والموانئ البحرية بشأن تنظيم الملاحة البحرية في باب المندب والبحر الأحمر. وبحسب معلومات "العربي الجديد"، تولى مسؤول حوثي نقل الطلب إلى غرفة لندن في وقت سابق.
التفاصيل: edgs.co/c4xgo -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Dans une tribune au Figaro, à l'occasion de sa visite officielle en France, le Premier ministre irakien, Ali al-Zaidi, affirme que l'Irak "ne permettra pas que son territoire devienne une base de lancement pour des menaces contre les Etats voisins", quelques jours après des frappes par des milices irakiennes pro-Iran contre l'Arabie saoudite.
#irak
www.lefigaro.fr/vox/monde/ali-al-zaidi-premier-ministre-i… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Kobeissi Letter
@KobeissiLetter
It seems most people don't understand how severe the energy situation is right now in the Middle East.
As of Friday, Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline has officially been shut down after recent attacks, putting -4 million barrels of daily oil exports at risk.
Meanwhile, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is now at risk of being shut down, threatening up to -9 million barrels of daily oil supply.
All while the Strait of Hormuz is operating at ~20% of its pre-Iran War capacity, removing -15 million barrels of daily oil flows.
Combined, this represents nearly ~30 MILLION barrels per day of oil flows that are either offline or at risk.
Even after accounting for some overlap between these routes, the scale of the potential disruption is enormous relative to the ~100 million barrel per day global oil market.
This is one of the most severe energy supply situations in modern history. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ahmed Quraishi
@_AhmedQuraishi
An important signal in the Saudi Foreign Ministry statement following call between UAE FM @ABZayed and Saudi FM @FaisalbinFarhan is the emphasis on "unifying positions and strengthening consultations between the two brotherly countries, in a manner that supports the framework of joint Gulf action, safeguards the security of its states, and protects their national assets."
This is particularly significant after the Houthi militia reached Bab al-Mandab, making it a threat comparable to that posed by the IRGC in the Strait of Hormuz.
Foreign Ministry 🇸🇦
@KSAmofaEN
🇸🇦📞🇦🇪 | Foreign Minister HH Prince @FaisalbinFarhan received a phone call from UAE Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister HH Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
UPDATE: Saudi Arabia has requested that Oman postpone the Iran-Iraq-GCC slated to be held in the Sultanate tomorrow.
The states reason is the attack on the East-West pipeline from Iraqi territory.
Yesterday, Bahrain pulled out, but UAE was anticipated to show up.
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
NEW: More details on the upcoming Iran-Iraq-GCC meeting in Oman on Monday:
- Session was Omani idea, and among primary aims is to formally present Iran-Oman deal on new Hormuz arrangement
- New scheme will be middle route TSS as temporary fix, to be followed by negotiations on permanent solution including service charges. Iranians insist that Hormuz arrangement is Iran-Oman business but the issue will be discussed on Monday nonetheless.
- Iraq FM to also participate together with senior reps from Iran and GCC: per senior Iranian source late response from UAE which downgraded participation from FM to minister of state. Level of Bahrain and Kuwait participation not 💯 but assumed to be FM.
- Senior Iranian political source emphasizes the meeting does NOT mean Strait of Hormuz has been reopened.
- Parallel Qatari and Saudi dialogue with Iran are not competitive vs Omani channel; Qataris have been in Tehran 2x in past week and been encouraging re: the session in Oman
- Bigger picture: GCC states caught in someone else's war adopt realpolitik to get out of mess of Trump's making -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
Further support for our assessment comes from recent posts by members of the Houthi politburo. They said they toured several locations along the west coast, including Dhubab, Al Khawkha, and Mocha, but made no mention of visiting Bab al-Mandab. Given that Bab al-Mandab is only minutes away, its omission is significant. If it were under their control, we would likely have expected it to be included in the visit.
x.com/hezamalasad/status/2099188869023314206
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
With high confidence, Houthi forces are no longer able to exercise effective control over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and have withdrawn most of their forces from the area. Government forces have not yet fully secured the territory, but sustained close air support has effectively denied the area to Houthi forces. At this time, Bab el-Mandeb and Mayun (Perimeter) Island, are assessed to be no longer under effective Houthi control. Further details to follow.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
“I don’t think this conflict is going to end anytime soon.”
Vali Nasr tells Drop Site that Trump currently has neither a military nor a diplomatic path to victory.
“Trump wants a different MOU. Iranians want the same MOU.” Israel still seeks Iran’s destruction and heavily influences U.S. decisions, Nasr added.
He sees a possible compromise that halts the fighting without resolving the underlying confrontation: a “frozen conflict” rather than an ongoing “hot war.”
🔗 Watch the full interview with @vali_nasr and Rob Malley on YouTube: youtu.be/qmhG8DLrJmsThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🚨A Gulf Official tells me Saudi Arabia submitted amendments to the Omani-Iranian proposal regarding Hormuz because it had concerns that the proposed language could effectively establish a new status quo in the strait that would not be acceptable to it or the other GCC states
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alex Vatanka
@AlexVatanka
Worth watching the shift in Iran’s nuclear debate.
Former IRGC commander Hossein Kanani-Moghaddam says that, with the Supreme Leader’s approval, Iran could move to a tactical nuclear weapon within 24 hours. He also talks openly about obtaining nuclear fuzes from North Korea.
Importantly, he frames this in deterrence terms: Iran, he says, must be prepared for the possibility of a nuclear attack and raise its own level of nuclear deterrence amid the conflict with the U.S. and Israel.
The technical claims are unverified. The more important point is political: figures from Iran’s security establishment are increasingly discussing the weapons option publicly - and presenting it as a potential response to future external attack. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
Iran's blackouts frequently make headlines, but the country's power sector is poorly understood.
In this new article for @BourseBazaarFdn, Arya Kia unpacks the "capacity paradox" at the heart of Iran's persistent electricity shortages.
www.bourseandbazaar-substack.org/p/behind-irans-persisten… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Najafi
@Mostafa_Najafii
لغو یا تعویق نشست مهم عمان -که پس از حدود پنج دهه میتوانست به نقطه عطفی در آغاز روندی برای شکلدهی به نظم سیاسی و امنیتی جدید خلیجفارس تبدیل شود- نشانهای از اختلافات و فشارهای پشتپرده است.
این نشست قرار بود توافق ایران و عمان را از سطح دوجانبه به یک چارچوب با اجماع منطقهای ارتقا دهد و وارد فاز اجرایی کند؛ اما این روند مخالفانی جدی دارد.
آمریکا و امارات به هیچ وجه از این ابتکار خشنود نیستند. عربستان نیز چندان با آن موافق نیست، هرچند فعلاً ترجیح میدهد آشکارا در برابر آن نایستد. قطر هم اگرچه همراهی کاملی ندارد، اما در صف مخالفان قرار نگرفته است.
با این حال، به نظر میرسد واشنگتن تنها در یک صورت بتواند با این روند کنار بیاید؛ اینکه توافق عمان به سنگبنای توافق بزرگتری میان تهران و واشنگتن تبدیل شود؛ توافقی که در آن، موضوع بازگشایی تنگه هرمز نیز متناسب با انتظارات آمریکا تعریف شود.
نبرد بر سر این است که چه کسی معماری امنیتی جدید خلیجفارس را طراحی و قواعد آن را تعیین کند. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A la veille de la réunion à Oman entre les pays du Golfe et l'Iran, mon décryptage sur les difficultés des monarchies arabes, prises en étau entre Téhéran et un allié américain, défaillant. A lire dans Le Figaro.
#yémen
www.lefigaro.fr/international/face-a-la-poussee-des-houth… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joyce Karam
@Joyce_Karam
ANALYSIS: How Houthi gains near Bab al-Mandeb raise threat to Saudi oil flows, add to Hormuz strain. By @sam_wendel www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/09/how-houthi-gains-nea…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alex Vatanka
@AlexVatanka
Iran probably hopes the Houthi advance at Bab al-Mandab might strengthens its argument that a durable US-Iran peace cannot be built around Hormuz or the nuclear file alone.
The June MoU already envisioned ending hostilities on all fronts; Yemen now makes that logic harder to ignore.
Perhaps Yemen is becoming the strongest case for a region-wide US-Iran settlement.
The Trump team have to expect that the Houthi gains in Yemen will be seen in Tehran as a stronger case for reviving the June MoU’s basic premise: peace has to mean an end to fighting across the regional fronts, otherwise pressure simply shifts from one theater and chokepoint to another.
In June, MoU was criticized as too broad and open-ended to survive. Turned out to be true. The argument was that it is better to focus on Hormuz and then go forward file by file in a diplomatic process.
Now, events in Yemen might make the case for a broader approach as MoU of June suggested. But that requires massive political flexibility that neither Tehran nor Washington is showing as of now. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
🇮🇶 Security source: The closure of border crossings with Iran includes a complete and definitive shutdown of Shalamcheh (Basra) and Al-Shib (Maysan), prohibiting the movement of individuals and goods from tonight until further notice; meanwhile, the Zurbatiyah (Wasit) and Al-Munthiriya (Diyala) crossings continue to operate normally - NAYA
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
The Iraqi government has closed the Al-Shib border crossing with Iran for unknown reasons - Sabereen
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Robert Ford
@fordrs58
Here is a vivid demonstration -- and there are others -- of failure of earlier Demcratic Party foreign policymaking, and thus need for Dems to put forward a new approach on national security policy and a whole new set, a new generation, of national security policy leaders.
Harrison Mann
@Harrison_J_Mann
Biden advisor Jon Finer: We should've used arms transfers as leverage but unfortunately our lawyers couldn't determine if Israel was doing war crimes
@PeterBeinart: But didn't the Biden admin pressure lawyers not to make any determination?
Finer: Well *I* never pressured anyoneThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Ma chronique hebdomadaire ce matin sur RTL consacrée à la conquête du détroit de Bab el-Mandeb au Yémen par les rebelles pro-iraniens. Quelles conséquences?
www.rtl.fr/programmes/les-secrets-de-l-actu-international… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Javier Blas
@JavierBlas
The top diplomats of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and Oman) are weighing a face-to-face meeting with their Iranian counterpart next week to discuss the Strait of Hormuz. The last GCC-Iran meeting took place in 2024.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
This meeting is, above all, a reflection of the profound disappointment across the Gulf with Washington and with U.S. policy in the region.
No Gulf government has any illusions about the nature of the Iranian regime. They know exactly who they are dealing with. But their choice today is not between Iran and the United States. It is between an open-ended confrontation with no clear political endgame, one that is destabilizing the region and inflicting enormous economic costs, and an accommodation that can restore a degree of stability.
And increasingly, they are choosing stability. The willingness to pursue an arrangement in the Strait of Hormuz, even one that could entail accepting a greater Iranian role there, is perhaps the clearest indication of how badly confidence in Washington has eroded. From the Gulf perspective, American policy is generating unprecedented economic damage without offering a credible path toward ending the crisis.
President Trump’s reluctance to become deeply involved in the confrontation with the Houthis only reinforces the conclusion in Gulf capitals that they cannot simply outsource their security to Washington. They need direct channels with Tehran, and they need an arrangement that can reopen the straits and protect their economies.
Anyone who expected the war with Iran to push the Gulf states toward isolating Tehran is once again being confronted with the opposite reality.
This is not because they trust Iran. They do not. It is because, from their perspective, an imperfect accommodation with Tehran may be preferable to an endless conflict whose strategic objective remains unclear and whose economic consequences are becoming increasingly severe.
If the Gulf states reach an understanding with Iran that allows maritime traffic to resume, the next step is predictable: they will intensify pressure on Washington to ease or remove the maritime blockade.
Tehran will welcome this development. It would allow Iran to turn military and economic pressure into diplomatic leverage, while widening the gap between Washington and its traditional Gulf partners.
That is the uncomfortable reality facing U.S. policymakers today, and there is little reason to believe it will change anytime soon.
#iranwar
Arab News
@arabnews
🔴 BREAKING: Iran and Gulf states to meet in push for Hormuz deal www.arabnews.com/tag/war-in-iran - FT
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clash Report
@clashreport
The UAE is redesigning parts of its planned 5GW Abu Dhabi AI campus after Iranian drone and missile attacks exposed the vulnerability of Gulf data centers.
Officials are considering dedicated air defenses around the compute clusters and underground or hardened facilities for critical servers, power and cooling infrastructure.
The attacks damaged AWS facilities and other UAE infrastructure, while Iran’s IRGC later identified G42’s planned campus among potential targets.
Construction has not stopped. The first 200MW phase is reportedly nearing completion, with executives saying work “never stopped.”
OpenAI’s planned 1GW Stargate UAE cluster remains part of the larger project. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
The Friday Prayer Imam of Qazvin says Iran’s continued membership in the NPT should be reviewed by the Supreme National Security Council.
- Worth noting the Friday sermons in Iran are not simply local affairs. The network of Friday Prayer Imams is coordinated through a council whose leadership is appointed by the Supreme Leader, and the main political messages tend to reflect signals coming from the top.
- So I would not read this simply as one cleric in Qazvin speaking his mind. More likely, the NPT issue is now being pushed into the public debate from above, with the same message gradually making its way through the Friday prayer network.
- Time will tell.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ahmed Rasheed
@Ahmed_Rasheed_R
BREAKING: Iraq PM Ali Zaidi has sacked the Misan Operations military commander and ordered an investigation after attacks targeting Saudi Arabia East-West pipeline were found to have originated from a site in the southern Iraqi province - military statement
#iraq #saudi #oott -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joyce Karam
@Joyce_Karam
Precarious situation for #saudi Arabia as Houthis advance
- Taking fire from Houthis, Iraqi militias, and in few cases IRGC
- At odds with STC in Yemen
- Rivalry still ongoing with UAE
- US not reliable as security guarantor
- Mecca pact w Turkey, Pakistan proving ineffective -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alex Vatanka
@AlexVatanka
Iranian media frame the possible Salalah meeting said to happen next week as more than a shipping discussion: it is a test of whether Iran and the Gulf states can build a regional mechanism around Hormuz.
Tehran’s message is that Gulf stability requires dealing with Iran, not bypassing it.
Iran hopes GCC backing for an interim Hormuz arrangement can increase pressure on Washington to ease the blockade and restore some oil and financial access.
Tehran is insisting that full reopening of Hormuz cannot be separated from the wider US-Iran conflict.
Iranian coverage also pushes the idea that Iran and the Arab Gulf states should shape the rules of the waterway themselves.
With both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb under pressure, Gulf governments have a strong incentive to de-escalate.
In summary: Iran sees the meeting as a chance to turn Gulf anxiety into diplomatic leverage over the United States. Let's see if the meeting happens. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Javier Blas
@JavierBlas
CNN is now reporting the most detailed satellite pictures I have seen so far of damage to the crucial East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia.
It quotes a US official as saying it was attacked by drones originating from Iraq.
The full report is here: edition.cnn.com/2026/09/11/politics/saudi-arabian-oil-pip… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Some interesting signals are coming from Tehran tonight suggesting that the door to dialogue with Washington may not be entirely closed, although the message being conveyed is that any return to negotiations would have to take place from what Iran considers a position of strength, rather than under military pressure.
- MFA spokesman Baghaei argued that diplomacy remains possible, but only once Washington understands that it cannot use force to extract concessions from Iran. Perhaps even more significantly, Hossein Taeb, a former IRGC intelligence chief, used very similar language, saying that Iran should not negotiate out of fear or weakness, but that if the US seeks talks, Tehran should be prepared to engage “from a position of strength” and with the aim of securing its rights.
- Meanwhile Al-Mayadeen is quoting an unnamed senior Iranian political-security official as saying that, despite his public rhetoric, Trump is actually seeking a return to negotiations with Iran and that Washington has begun to understand the limits of military pressure.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Que vont faire l'Iran et leurs alliés yéménites, les Houthis, après la prise de contrôle par ces derniers du détroit de Bab el-Mandeb et de ses abords, signant une cinglante défaite pour l'Arabie saoudite, lâchée par Donald Trump ? Mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
#yémen -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Told @KianSharifi @RFERL that the Houthi advances could boost morale among supporters of the Islamic republic inside #iran as well as across its regional network. They could also help offset the broader weakening of Iran’s network of influence in the region.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
Forces that withdrew from Yemen’s West Coast are selling their weapons at low prices at the Khor Amira rest stop, east of Bab al-Mandab.
maps.app.goo.gl/v8gsB7Zpp377eVmp7?g_st=ic -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Yémen. Je m'étais rendu il y a cinq ans au détroit de Bab el-Mandab, conquis aujourd'hui par les rebelles Houthis soutenus par l'Iran, après l'avoir traversé quelques années avant à bord d'un navire de guerre français. Voici mon reportage publié alors dans Le Figaro sur ce coin de terre inhabité, mais stratégique, caressé par une eau turquoise.
#yémen
www.lefigaro.fr/international/bab-al-mandab-porte-des-lam… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Critical Threats
@criticalthreats
NEW | The Houthi offensive to capture territory near the Bab al Mandeb advances Iranian objectives under the current regional campaign that Iran is waging against the United States and its allies. Iran has recently pursued the following lines of effort under this regional campaign: Targeting US naval forces; Attacking US forces across the region; Disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
Important: Houthis Used @claudeai @AnthropicAI for Missile Programming
Excerpt from the Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026
GTG-87001: Disrupting a Yemen-based guided weapons engineering cell using Claude to develop guidance software
Summary
We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen running three weapons development programs: a guided rocket that used a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing guidance; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant missile (referred to as the “R2000” set) that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant.
The actors used Claude Code in place of human software engineers to develop the guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) software that steers and stabilizes a flying vehicle. For example, they used Claude to integrate an open-source autopilot onto a phone-class flight computer, writing the control and position estimation software, tuning the control settings, running a firmware build pipeline, and performing a flight simulation. The actors managed several Claude instances at once, assigning each one a role, much as a lead would delegate work on a small engineering team: the actors tasked one instance with writing the code, another with research, and a third with reviewing the code the first instance produced.
Our safeguards blocked many of their requests, but not all of them. The actors used a variety of tactics to evade our safeguards, including hiding their goals and the products the software was meant for, and they split their work across multiple sessions so no single session revealed their full intent.
These actors carried out a sustained effort to develop guided weapons, including using Claude to design guidance software. We do not have evidence the actors succeeded in fielding an operational device; but they did test-fire a guided rocket. This field test appears to have failed: within hours, the actors returned to Claude to work out why it failed.
We identified this activity as part of our internal investigations into suspected weapons development. We banned accounts associated with the actors and shared threat information with public- and private-sector partners to mitigate risks posed by the actors. Nevertheless, we have evidence that the actors had already built an offline simulation toolkit that does not rely on Claude or other engineering computing environments such as MATLAB.
www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shibley Telhami
@ShibleyTelhami
Good one from @stephenWalt: Israel Can’t Be a Hegemon - The Israeli government is making a bid for regional dominance that’s unlikely to succeed. foreignpolicy.com/2025/06/16/israel-iran-war-middle-east-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
גידי וייץ מפרסם: "באפריל 2024 פתח ג'יי פוטליק, איש עסקים אמריקאי ולוביסט של קטאר, קבוצת ווטסאפ. הוא צירף אליה את איש העסקים גיל בירגר, ואת אלי פלדשטיין, אחד מדובריו של נתניהו. הקבוצה לימדה כיצד פעלה מכונת תעמולה בחשאי, מתוככי הכוורת של ראש הממשלה, בשירות המדינה שמימנה את חמאס"
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
OSINTdefender
@sentdefender
We are now seeing some movement on the diplomatic front with Yemen, with a flurry of trilateral Saudi-Pakistani-Iranian communications here in the last hour. Iran’s foreign minister held phone calls with both his Saudi and Pakistani counterparts, following reports in the last couple days that Saudi Arabia may be looking to invoke the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, possibly bringing Pakistan into the conflict against the Houthis. Per reporting from yesterday, Saudi Arabia relayed messages to Iran, via Pakistan, urging them to pressure Houthi deescalation. This, as the Houthis make notable gains in the Mocha, Yemen axis of advance, while in the north/northeast Yemeni government forces have made gains in Marib and Al Jawf.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 كتبت أكثر من مرة أن حملة الخنق الاقتصادي الأمريكية لن يكتب لها النجاح الكامل، لأن الصين لا تزال شريان حياة للاقتصاد الإيراني.
اليوم رويترز كشفت معلومات جديدة عن أداة اقتصادية ذكية لتجاوز العقوبات.
سأشرح الآلية بشكل مبسط هنا
🔷 أبقت إيران السلع الصينية تتدفق إليها بتحويل عائدات نفطها إلى أرصدة تُستخدم لدفع ثمن مشترياتها داخل الصين، بدلاً من تلقي الأموال ثم تحويلها إلى الموردين عبر القنوات المصرفية الدولية.
🔷 وبحسب المصادر، مرّ عبر الآلية المخصصة لشراء السلع ما بين ملياري دولار و2.5 مليار دولار خلال العام الماضي. هكذا استطاعت طهران استخدام النفط لتمويل وارداتها رغم القيود المفروضة على تعاملاتها المالية.
🔷 الفكرة أقرب إلى «النفط مقابل السلع»، لكنها لا تقوم على مبادلة مباشرة بين ناقلة نفط وشحنة بضائع. يشتري الطرف الصيني النفط الإيراني ويودع مقابله المالي لدى جهة داخل الصين، فتتكون أرصدة لصالح إيران.
🔷 وعندما يجيز البنك المركزي الإيراني لأحد المستوردين استخدامها، يُدفع منها للمورد الصيني. وبذلك يحصل البائع على أمواله من داخل الصين، من دون أن يحتاج المستورد الإيراني إلى إرسال حوالة دولية مباشرة إليه، وهي الحلقة التي تجعلها العقوبات شديدة الصعوبة.
🔷 قامت هذه الترتيبات على فصل تجارة النفط الإيراني عن الشركات التي تنتج السلع المصدّرة إليه، عبر وسطاء وحسابات غير واضحة للعلن. فالمصنّعون، وفق التقرير، لم يكونوا يتعاملون مباشرة مع إيران، ولا توجد إشارة إلى أنهم خالفوا العقوبات.
🔷 وتقول المصادر إن هذا الفصل ساعد على حماية البنوك والشركات الصينية من التدقيق أو العقوبات، مع استمرار التجارة.
🔷 استُخدمت الآلية منذ عام 2021 على الأقل، وبدأت بتوفير الأدوية ولقاحات كورونا، ثم موّلت مشتريات تشمل المركبات ومعدات الاتصالات.
🔷 وتقول المصادر إنها استُخدمت أيضاً مرة واحدة على الأقل خلال العام الماضي في صلة بعقود لتزويد إيران بمعدات دفاع جوي بملايين الدولارات.
🔷 ولم تقتصر الاستفادة من عائدات النفط على السلع. فبحسب المصادر، يُخصص نحو 70% من الأموال النفطية التي تتعامل معها الجهة المالية المذكورة في التحقيق لمشاريع بنية تحتية في إيران، بينما يذهب الباقي إلى الآلية المخصصة لدفع أثمان الواردات. وعليه، فإن رقم ملياري دولار إلى 2.5 مليار دولار يتعلق بما مرّ خلال سنة عبر آلية شراء السلع، وليس بإجمالي عائدات النفط الإيراني أو مجمل التجارة مع الصين.
🔷 نجاح الترتيب اعتمد على وجود مشترٍ كبير مستعد لمواصلة شراء النفط الإيراني. فقد استحوذت الصين عام 2025 على أكثر من 80% من صادرات إيران النفطية المنقولة بحراً، بمتوسط 1.4 مليون برميل يومياً. حصلت الصين على نفط مخفّض السعر، وحصلت إيران على وسيلة لتحويل مبيعاته إلى احتياجات فعلية لاقتصادها.
🔷 سياسياً، يصف الباحث الذي استشهد به التقرير هذا النهج بأنه محاولة صينية لمقاومة الضغط الأميركي مع الحفاظ على إمكانية نفي الارتباط المباشر بالترتيبات الحساسة؛ فبكين لا تريد إخراج بنوكها وشركاتها من النظام المالي الدولي. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Farouk Ahmed 🇦🇪
@fm10m
رويترز : باكستان أبلغت السعودية أنها لن تنضم في أي هجمات عدائية ضد الحوثيين.
باكستان أوضحت موقفها بأن ما يحدث في اليمن هو إمتداد لحرب سبقت اتفاقية الشراكة الدفاعية كما أنه لا يمس جوهر الإتفاقية و أن على الرياض أن تظهر قدراتها الوطنية في الدفاع عن شعبها ومقدراتها.
إسلام أباد اوضحت أن جوهر الإتفاقية يخص فقط الاعتداءات من دول في الإقليم معرفة كدول ذات سيادة و أن الحوثيين لا ينطبق عليهم هذا التعريف.
#باكستان #السعودية -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Report
@HormuzReport
BREAKING: YEMEN’S HOUTHIS HAVE COMPLETELY CAPTURED THE BAB EL-MANDEB COASTLINE — seizing MOCHA, taking DHUBAB and capturing the strategic ZUQAR ISLAND in a series of rapid gains that now put the entire chokepoint under COMPLETE HOUTHI CONTROL, per AFP and Reuters sources.
MOCHA gives them a critical foothold on the mainland. DHUBAB sits directly beside the strait. ZUQAR gives them a strategic island position overlooking the wider maritime approaches.
Now, the situation is escalating further: HOUTHIS ARE REPORTEDLY ATTEMPTING A LANDING OPERATION ON PERIM ISLAND — a strategically positioned island inside the Bab el-Mandeb Strait that also hosts an EMIRATI AIR BASE, which Israel had reportedly been granted access to in the past.
Houthi leadership previously discussed a TRANSIT FEE (Toll) SYSTEM modeled on Iran’s approach to the Strait of Hormuz. Regional sources say the issue was discussed during a Tehran visit earlier this year, with CHINESE VESSELS reportedly exempt under the proposal. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
OSINTdefender
@sentdefender
CNN reports that the U.S. has expanded intelligence and targeting support specifically for Saudi Arabia’s military campaign against the Iranian backed Houthis in Yemen. More than 100 U.S. military personnel are reportedly dedicated to that effort, with one U.S. official putting the number at roughly 200, operating as part of a newly established joint forces command.
The U.S. is providing intelligence sharing and geospatial targeting support, including a battlefield tool that gives Saudi officers a near real time picture of the battlespace. However, U.S. personnel are not directly participating in Saudi strikes, refueling Saudi aircraft or providing other operational support. Sources characterized the effort as an extension of existing U.S.-Saudi cooperation and training.
The expanded support comes as Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia intensify, with U.S. officials saying Iran is providing substantial support to the group. CNN reports that U.S. officials believe hundreds of IRGC personnel are currently in Yemen and are helping the Houthis develop the capability to threaten the Bab el-Mandab Strait.
Source: www.cnn.com/2026/09/10/politics/us-military-support-saudi… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🚨🇾🇪 The Houthis have reportedly taken Perim Island, handing them the entire Yemeni side of Bab al-Mandeb
Mayun, as Yemenis call it, sits at the narrowest point of the strait, 12 miles from Africa.
With Murad village alongside it, the Houthis would now reportedly hold every mile of Yemen's west coast.
CNN stood on that island this week with the government garrison that was supposed to keep it.
What the Yemeni official there said now reads as a forecast. If the Houthis took Perim, they would stop needing long-range missiles and simply mine the strait, the way Iran mined Hormuz.
His vice president warned it would take a massive international force and multiple navies to dig them out.
Washington has 20 warships locked on Hormuz and nothing spare.
Both of the world's oil chokepoints are now held by Tehran and its closest ally.
Source: @TabzLIVE on TG/ Writer: Daniel -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
Breaking Houthi forces have reportedly begun arriving on the strategic Red Sea islands of Jabal Zuqar and Greater and Lesser Hanish. The move follows weeks of Houthi operations aimed at cutting supply lines to the islands, including reported strikes on piers and attacks on supply vessels.
The islands are strategically important because of their position near the southern Red Sea shipping corridor and Bab al-Mandab. Their capture would mark another significant shift in control following the Houthi advances along Yemen’s West Coast.
maps.app.goo.gl/EpypKaT6soZWEsdV8?g_st=ic -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 قرار الجزائر قطع العلاقات الدبلوماسية مع الإمارات، كان متوقعا منذ فترة، وذلك بسبب خلافات جيوسياسية تفاقمت خلال السنوات الماضية.
سأشرح أوجه الخلاف في هذا التقرير بالاعتماد على عدة مصادر منها لوموند. مع ضرورة الاشارة أن الإمارات كانت مادة للانتقاد في الصحافة الجزائرية بصورة دائمة خاصة خلال الحرائق الأخيرة هناك.
🔷 يعد الخلاف الجزائري الإماراتي صراعاً على النفوذ والأمن في المحيط الجنوبي للجزائر. فالجزائر ترى أن الإمارات توسّع حضورها وتدعم قوى في ليبيا والساحل على نحو يضعف نفوذها التقليدي ويزيد الضغط على حدودها، وتقرأ هذا التحرك في ضوء علاقة أبوظبي الوثيقة بالمغرب وتقاربهما مع إسرائيل.
🔷 المشكلة بالنسبة إلى الجزائر أن التمدد الإماراتي يجري في مناطق تعدّها مرتبطة مباشرة بأمنها الداخلي. للجزائر حدود بطول نحو 1,300 كيلومتر مع مالي، و950 كيلومتراً مع النيجر، و980 كيلومتراً مع ليبيا.
🔷 وقد اعتمدت طويلاً على الوساطات والعلاقات مع المجتمعات والقوى المحلية لضبط النزاعات في هذه المناطق ومنع انتقالها إلى أراضيها.
🔷 لذلك، فإن ظهور أطراف خارجية تدعم قوى عسكرية وسياسية تتحرك بمعزل عن الجزائر، أو تتحدى مصالحها، يضعف قدرتها على التأثير في ما يحدث بمحاذاة حدودها.
🔷 يأتي ذلك في ظل تمدد الحضور الإماراتي في عدة ساحات متصلة جغرافياً؛ دعم «حميدتي» في السودان، ودعم خليفة حفتر في شرق ليبيا، وتقديم قرض بقيمة 460 مليون يورو لتشاد، إضافة إلى حضور بدرجة أقل في مالي والنيجر وموريتانيا.
🔷 وما يقلق الجزائر، هو تزامن هذا النشاط في عدة مناطق مرة واحدة.
🔷 ليبيا هي المثال الأكثر وضوحاً على اقتراب النفوذ المدعوم إماراتياً من المصالح الأمنية الجزائرية.
🔷 خاصة أنّ إعادة هيكلة أجهزة الاستخبارات الجزائرية أضعفت شبكاتها في الجوار، خصوصاً لدى جماعات الطوارق «كل آجر» القريبة من الحدود الليبية.
🔷 وفي المقابل، بات فصيل مهم من هؤلاء الطوارق يخضع لسلطة حفتر، ومنهم عناصر جرى تجنيدهم في «اللواء 128» العامل في فزان جنوب غربي ليبيا. وبالنسبة إلى الجزائر، يعني ذلك تراجع نفوذها داخل بيئة حدودية حساسة لمصلحة قائد عسكري قريب من الإمارات وتنظر إليه بريبة شديدة.
🔷 كما أن العلاقة الإماراتية المغربية تضاعف الحساسية الجزائرية تجاه هذه التحركات. فالمغرب ينافس الجزائر في الساحل، ويتقرب من السلطات العسكرية في مالي والنيجر وبوركينا فاسو، وعرض عام 2023 إتاحة منفذ أطلسي لاقتصاداتها الحبيسة، وإن كان المشروع لا يزال نظرياً إلى حد كبير.
🔷 ومن المنظور الجزائري يمكن للنفوذ الإماراتي أن يخدم الرباط في هذه المنافسة. وقد عبّرت صحيفة «لوسوار دالجيري» عن هذه القراءة في ديسمبر 2023، متهمة الإمارات بأداء دور مضر بمصالح الجزائر لمصلحة المغرب.
🔷 ويضاف إلى ذلك البعد الإسرائيلي؛ تطبيع المغرب مع إسرائيل أواخر 2020 رفع العداء الجزائري المغربي إلى مستوى حاد، وربطت الصحافة الجزائرية التحركات الإماراتية بخدمة مصالح إسرائيل أيضاً، بالنظر إلى ارتباط أبوظبي والرباط باتفاقات أبراهام.
🔷 وهكذا، يُقرأ الحضور الإماراتي في الجزائر ضمن تقارب بين أطراف تعتبرها مصدر تهديد.
🔷 لكن يجب عدم إغفال أن الإمارات وجدت مجالاً أوسع للتحرك لأن بعض دول الساحل نفسها أصبحت تسعى إلى التحرر من النفوذ الجزائري.
🔷 فبعد خروج القوات الفرنسية، لم تعد الأنظمة العسكرية الجديدة تكتفي برفض نفوذ باريس؛ بل بدأت تعترض أيضاً احيانا على دور الجزائر.
🔷 وألغت مالي اتفاق الجزائر للسلام الموقّع عام 2015، ففقدت الجزائر إحدى أهم أدوات حضورها الدبلوماسي. وفي هذه البيئة، أخذت الإمارات وتركيا والمغرب تتقرب من السلطات العسكرية الباحثة عن داعمين جدد.
🔷 مقابل هذه التحركات، شددت الجزائر حماية الحدود ومحاولة استعادة العلاقات الإقليمية. فقد ارتفعت مخصصات الجيش لعام 2025 إلى ما يعادل 23.8 مليار يورو، أي نحو ضعفين ونصف مستواها في 2022، وأصبحت تستحوذ على 20% من الميزانية الوطنية.
🔷 وبالتوازي، سعت الجزائر إلى تحسين علاقاتها مع النيجر وموريتانيا وإصلاح صلاتها بموسكو، التي أثار دعمها لحفتر والسلطات المالية استياء الجزائر. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rula Jebreal
@rulajebreal
L'ex capo della CIA William Burns: «Il problema fondamentale era che Hamas cercava una “fine definitiva del conflitto”, e la squadra di Biden ha fatto finta che Hamas fosse l’ostacolo, per aiutare Israele a porre fine definitivamente a Gaza come società e ai palestinesi come popolo.
Nell’ottobre 2023, il primo ministro del Qatar Mohammed al-Thani afferma che Hamas ha accettato di liberare gli ostaggi senza condizioni.
Un alto ufficiale militare israeliano ha ora dichiarato a *Haaretz* che, quando l’offerta di Hamas è giunta all’esercito, è stata ignorata: «Ad essere onesti, la questione degli ostaggi non era ancora all’ordine del giorno in quella fase, e nessuno, né a livello militare né politico, era disposto a discutere la proposta».
L’ex ministro degli Esteri americano Antony Blinken è stato informato direttamente dell’offerta di Hamas e l’ha respinta a sua volta. «Israele è ancora sotto attacco e non c’è nessuno con cui parlare», ha detto al primo ministro del Qatar. Si tratta dello stesso Blinken che di lì a poco avrebbe affermato che, se Hamas avesse liberato gli ostaggi, «tutto questo potrebbe finire domani». -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Saudi Arabia's East-West crude oil pipeline has suffered catastrophic damage in at least 8 locations, per initial reports citing diplomatic channels.
This comes after satellite data showed a fire burning along the pipeline route southeast of Medina with a black smoke plume +100 km long, and consistent with the multiple heat anomalies NASA FIRMS recorded along the same stretch. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Reuters
@Reuters
Pakistan says no military response discussed under Mecca pact over Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pakistan-says-no-milita… www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/pakistan-says-no-milita…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Robert Malley
@Rob_Malley
A few thoughts on where the US/Iran confrontation now stands:
1. Trump had a long-term plan, which was to asphyxiate Iran economically while increasing non-Iranian oil traffic through the strait.
The problem is that a long-term plan has to survive the short term, and the odds were zero that Iran was going to sit still and accept this new normal. Its escalation was predictable, designed to make the US pay a heavy price for its economic warfare.
So too was the Houthis’, driven both by local ambitions in Yemen and a desire to help the Islamic Republic tighten the squeeze on the oil market.
2. Trump has, in this sense, run into his own version of a catastrophic success: the more the blockade & sanctions strangled Iran’s economy, the greater Tehran’s incentive to escalate and the less it had to lose.
3. Trump essentially has three options:
- To try to manage the conflict through calibrated retaliation and hope to establish a sustainable equilibrium that both hurts and deters Iran and avoids an uncontrolled military escalation. But Iran is unlikely to cooperate, and in any event, it would do little to bring down the price of oil.
- To escalate -- against nuclear sites, civilian infrastructure or leadership targets -- in hopes of forcing Iran to back down. But this would further strain US military resources, be more likely to trigger greater counter-escalation, and thus send oil prices higher still.
- Or to seek a negotiated solution, by far the better option. But for Iran to agree, any deal would probably have to resemble the earlier MOU, only with greater clarity about its control over the Strait of Hormuz. That may be the price to pay to end this unlawful, misbegotten war. Yet there is no indication Trump is prepared to go down that road, at least prior to the midterms… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
🚨Ansarallah rapidly advances across the western Yemeni coast, claiming over 1,000 square kilometers in just a day.
Here is how the Saudi-backed forces collapsed, triggering a spike in oil prices:
Hodeidah Governorate: Overnight Ansarallah forces broke through the city of Hays after days of fighting with the Saudi-backed forces of Yemen's internationally recognized government. The loss of Hays triggered a widescale collapse that began with a retreat towards the port city of Al-Khawkhah, but then progressed to a full scale retreat from Hodeidah Governorate towards Al Mokha to the south.
Taiz Governorate: After the withdrawal from Hays and Al-Khawkah, the coalition forces of the internationally recognized government regrouped 50km south in the vital port city of Al Mokha. Shortly afterwards, the Giants Brigade – which was originally formed by the UAE, but now sides with the Saudi-linked forces – pulled out of Al Mokha to head for Aden and the collapse continued. After a few hours of encircling the port city, Ansarallah was seen driving through the city center without any clear indication of fighting.
Currently, Ansarallah is pressing further south to take the coastal town of Dhubab, which sits at the opening to the Bab Al Mandab, a key chokepoint for tanker traffic. Taking Dhubab would grant Ansarallah control over the entire western Yemeni coast down to the center of the Bab Al Mandab.
There are also reports from Yemeni analysts that Ansar forces launched an amphibious assault on the strategic island archipelago of Jabal Zuqar and Greater and Lesser Hanish that sit in the middle of the Southern Red Sea shipping corridor.
Brent crude oil prices surged above $105 before retreating slightly. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
How Tehran Reads Escalating U.S. Pressure
🔹An interesting debate is emerging within #iran’s strategic community over the latest U.S. attacks on Iranian oil tankers. Some see them not simply as retaliation for Iranian strikes on U.S. naval forces, but as part of Washington’s response to mounting operational and economic pressure.
🔹The argument is that Iran’s continued attacks on U.S. forces and bases, combined with the growing involvement of American allies – especially Saudi Arabia in its confrontation with the Houthis – are stretching U.S. military resources, particularly air defense interceptors such as Patriot missiles. At the same time, instability around Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab is keeping pressure on global energy markets.
🔹From this perspective, Trump’s combination of escalation and diplomatic signaling is not contradictory. Washington wants an agreement sooner rather than later, but first wants to restore deterrence and avoid negotiating from a weakened position.
🔹The important point, however, is how this is being interpreted in Tehran. Some Iranian strategists increasingly assume that the United States needs an agreement more than Iran does. Escalation by the U.S. is therefore seen not necessarily as a sign of strength, but as evidence that Iran’s strategy of attrition is creating pressure.
🔹This may help explain why Iran is adding new conditions rather than lowering its demands. Yesterday, the IRGC spokesperson called for the return to the MoU while also raising additional demands, including incorporating the Houthi front into any settlement and keeping Iran’s missile and nuclear programs outside the scope of U.S. intervention. The message is that Tehran believes it still has leverage.
🔹The tanker attacks are being interpreted through the same logic. Another argument is that Trump wants to constrain Iran’s postwar recovery but has limited options for increasing pressure without causing another major spike in oil prices. Targeting tankers rather than oil infrastructure therefore offers a lower-cost alternative, as it can disrupt Iranian exports and logistics without immediately removing significant production from global markets.
🔹But this leads to a dangerous conclusion in Tehran. If Iran responds cautiously, attacks on its tankers could gradually become normalized as a relatively low-cost instrument of U.S. pressure. Those making this argument therefore advocate escalation to prevent a new operational norm from taking shape.
🔹The bigger problem is that both sides increasingly appear to share the same assumption, that additional pressure now can lead to a better deal later. That may explain why diplomacy and escalation are proceeding simultaneously – and why the path toward an agreement remains so unstable. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
Scoop: Saudi Crown Prince MBS called President Trump twice Thursday, urging him to launch strikes against the Houthis as the Iran-backed group closed in on a vital Red Sea chokepoint. Trump declined for now, U.S. officials said. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/09/11/houthis-yemen-saudi-trump-mbs-st… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clash Report
@clashreport
BIG: Yemen’s Houthis have captured Mokha and swept roughly 2,600 km² of western Yemen in a rapid coastal offensive.
The advance targeted the western Taiz and southern Al-Hudaydah governorates, cutting through multiple districts in what's being described as one of the fastest territorial shifts in the war in years.
Government and National Resistance Forces (Tariq Saleh's units) withdrew or collapsed across a broad front, reportedly falling back toward Aden.
Named locations taken include Hays, Al-Khawkhah, Al-Wazi'iyah, Mawza, and the strategically important Khalid ibn al-Walid military camp.
The offensive culminated in seizing Mokha (Al-Makha), the main government-held port city on that stretch of the Red Sea coast.
Why this is significant?
Mokha sits roughly 60–75 km north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, one of the world's most critical shipping chokepoints.
The city had been in government/coalition hands since early 2017 and served as a key hub for Tariq Saleh's National Resistance Forces.
Houthi control there puts them physically closer to the strait and international shipping lanes they've already been disrupting.
It also removes the main government military and logistical anchor on the western coast. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joe Kent
@joekent16jan19
The Houthis’ rapid advance is just the beginning of the blowback effects we are now going to face as a result of our counterproductive policies in the Middle East & because of this senseless war in Iran.
The Houthi’s ability to capture key terrain and strategic ports along the Red Sea coast speaks to not just their military capabilities but also to their ability to gain support from tribes far from the traditional Houthi strongholds in northern Yemen.
This is very significant—these tribes are predominantly Sunni, while the Houthis are Zaydi Shias.
Yemen is a tribal region—deals among rivals are frequently cut before or during battles, and even then those alliances can be murky.
Now, however, the Houthis are fighting alongside the IRGC as a member of the axis of resistance against the Saudis, the U.S., and Israel. This has given them far more popular support than a standard tribal deal or a military victory ever could—not because Yemenis support or particularly care about the Iranians, but because especially during times of conflict, we go tribal. It’s human nature.
The Yemenis have witnessed what the U.S.-backed Saudis have done to their people and what the U.S. backed Israelis have done to the people of Gaza, & see how the Iranians are fighting back after the U.S. & Israel attacked them. Now, they’re uniting against their common enemy to fight back.
The U.S.’s war in Iran & simultaneous backing of the Saudis’ war in Yemen, along with our government’s support for Israel’s genocide in Gaza, have given the Iranian Islamic revolution a massive boost that has reached far beyond Iran.
As our war against Iran drags on we will see more of this, especially in Iraq, Lebanon & potentially Bahrain.
Our own policies and interventions abroad are encouraging radicalization, which will in turn inspire blowback terrorism here in the U.S. This is a destructive self-licking ice cream cone and it’s going to get more people killed.
President Trump and his advisors know better, and know that ending our foreign entanglements now is in the best interest of the American people. The question is whether they have the moral courage to do it.
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
Breaking | #houthis capture the Red Sea Port of Mocha | Update ⚠️ 12 PM local Yemen time. Video shows a Houthi technical entering Main Street in Mocha, in front of Taizi Mall, as some locals can be heard chanting the Houthi slogan. @GeoConfirmed 13.3216146, 43.2567378
The footage comes as @aljoumhouriyatv and @alsahilnet, official outlets affiliated with the National Resistance Forces @nrfyemen, report that Houthi forces have broken through several fronts following intense fighting.
The outlets report that Vice Chairman of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council Tariq Saleh @tarikyemen has ordered forces on the western coast to regroup. The Joint Forces have established an alternative command center south of Mocha following the reported breakthroughs.
According to the National Resistance’s military media, Tariq Saleh said National Resistance, Southern Giants Brigades @alamalikah, National Shield Forces @diralwatan, and units from the Taiz Axis @axistaiz had suffered significant casualties during days of fighting against the Houthi offensive.
Saleh said he had ordered the establishment of a new command center in a secure location to regroup the forces in consultation with the Saudi-led Coalition leadership and the Presidential Leadership Council.
www.alsahil.net/news45996.html -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Les monarchies du Golfe face à l'Iran. « Les Émirats et le Qatar ont versé sous une forme ou sous une autre de l’argent à l’Iran pour ne pas être exposés à des frappes iraniennes après la signature de l’accord de principe, mi-juin, entre Téhéran et les États-Unis », confient au Figaro trois sources diplomatiques et industrielles en France et dans le Golfe. Lire mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
#iranwar
www.lefigaro.fr/international/les-pays-du-golfe-cherchent…
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Les autorités qatariennes démentent avoir versé de l'argent à l'Iran pour faire cesser ses attaques contre l'émirat.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Daniel Gerlach
@DanielGerlach1
In his op-ed for zenith Magazine, former Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif proposes the establishment of a joint regional framework for nuclear research and control in the Middle East
magazine.zenith.me/en/politics/irans-former-foreign-minis… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران
@ariel_oseran
WHAT HAPPENED IN YEMEN OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS?
On Wednesday, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces announced they had made significant achievements on the ground in the north and central desert areas and appeared to have broken through Houthi lines.
But in reality, the Houthis simply repositioned their forces, giving up the open areas so they could take over the more important western coastline. By Thursday early morning, the Iranian-backed militia seized the strategic coastline and port city of Mocha, after government forces retreated en masse.
And so, rather than an overwhelming blitz by the Saudi-backed forces, the sides essentially swapped territories, with the Houthis gaining the strategic coastline along the Red Sea. This will allow them to pose a more direct threat to shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, thus increasing the threat to Saudi Arabia.
A former Yemeni Military official tells me that the boasting by Yemeni government forces yesterday was actually a cover for their losses on the coastline. "It's really bad," he says.
The only way to turn the tide, he says, is for Saudi Arabia to get more involved and activate the Mecca Accord, throwing Turkey and Pakistan into the mix.
Personally, I'm doubtful this will materialize, but time will tell. Stay tuned.
Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران
@ariel_oseran
BREAKING: The Houthis have taken control of the Red Sea city of Mocha, marking a significant achievement for the Iranian-backed militia. Houthi forces have shared footage claiming they have entered Mocha.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
The Houthis are advancing toward Perim Island creating a potential stranglehold on the Bab El Mandab as their partners in the IRGC have created in Hormuz
The fall of Mokkah shows how disorganised the Yemeni government forces and local partners are
In early 2025 the UAE started a massive lobbying campaign to advocate in London and Washington for the support Tariq Saleh’s forces to retake the west coast of Yemen and Hodeidah - completely overestimating what they were capable of as they are now in retreat
The Emirati divide-and-rule policy in Yemen empowering the STC over Saudi aligned forces has polarized the anti-Houthi camp and strengthened the Houthis -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Baraa Shiban براء شيبان
@BShtwtr
My full analysis on the current situation & what’s next for Yemen
See the breakdown of events in the thread attached & check my interview with DW
youtu.be/xkM6HY5gdkY
Baraa Shiban براء شيبان
@BShtwtr
Breakdown and full analysis into the current events in Yemen
13-19 Jul 26
The current events starts with Mahan Air flight controversy: a Houthi delegation travels to Tehran for Khamenei's funeral, triggering the first direct strikes since 2022
1. 13 Jul Sanaa airport strikes:
Government/coalition strikes block the Mahan Air flight from landing.
2. 13 Jul Abha airport hit:
Houthi missiles and drones strike Abha airport in Saudi Arabia in retaliation.
3. 13 Jul Flight diverted to Hodeidah:
The Houthi delegation flight reroutes and lands in Houthi-held Hodeidah instead. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
CSIS
@CSIS
"The Middle East is now in the throes of disequilibrium, wrought by the collapse of its prevailing order and a yet-to-be-born new order...yet from the ashes of the region’s burning conflicts, there will also be the chance for rebirth and renewal,” argues @myacoubian.
More: -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🚨🇵🇰🇮🇷 Pakistan warned Iran to rein in the Houthis, and Iran said it doesn't control them
Islamabad delivered the Saudi message within the past 24 hours, and Tehran's answer was that the Houthis act on their own.
Two Iranian sources tell Reuters the opposite: that Tehran ordered the attacks on Saudi Arabia last week, promised additional funding and weapons, and sent IRGC commanders to Yemen to help coordinate them. Pakistan's Defense Minister Khawaja Asif says aggression against one of the three pact members is aggression against all, with no ambiguity, and that spillover into the kingdom makes the agreement operational.
Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad have agreed no troops enter Yemen and any response launches from Saudi soil.
Tehran wanted Gulf security shaken enough to force Washington off the blockade.
What it produced instead is Pakistani and Turkish officers sitting in Riyadh coordinating a joint response, a defense pact moving from paper to planning, and a regional diplomat warning Iran is pushing the exact states it wanted divided into each other's arms.
The Mecca pact was signed a month ago and nobody knew if it meant anything. Iran just found out for everyone.
Source: Reuters / Writer: Daniel -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: Iran has launched a concerted effort in recent days to more aggressively target US naval forces, likely to degrade the United States’ willingness and ability to continue enforcing the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.
Other Key Takeaways:
US officials warned that Iran may be using “more sophisticated weapons” to target US vessels in recent days.
Iran may be relying upon targeting assistance from Russia or the People’s Republic of China to support Iranian attacks on US warships and vessels. US officials raised their concerns to the Wall Street Journal that Russian or PRC targeting assistance enabled Iran’s recent attacks against US vessels.
Iran appears to be targeting anchored and docked commercial vessels in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, likely to deter the United States from conducting further strikes on Iranian oil tankers.
Iranian targeting constraints may be contributing to Iran’s decision to target stationary vessels. ISW-CTP recently assessed on September 4 that Iran is struggling to fix moving commercial-vessel targets, given that Iran has not increased attacks on moving civilian vessels in the Strait of Hormuz despite the reported increase in the flow of traffic through the waterway.
The Iranian regime is framing its retaliation against vessels that do not comply with Iranian policies in the Strait of Hormuz as its own Iranian enforcement of a “sanctions regime” in order to legitimize illegal Iranian activities against commercial vessels.
Iran used cluster munition ballistic missiles in an attack on US forces in Jordan on September 9, which indicates that Iran sought to inflict greater damage or casualties to impose further human and political costs on the United States. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇾🇪 Saudi-backed forces are reportedly pulling out of Hays under Houthi missile fire, with the road to Mocha opening behind them
Large numbers of government troops are reported withdrawing from the town in southern Hodeidah, the last major city on the coast road to al-Khawkha, after hours of Houthi ballistic missile and drone strikes on troop concentrations around it.
Hays has not been captured, per the latest reports, but the men holding it are reportedly leaving.
Farther south the Giants Brigades are fighting Houthi advances at al-Wazi'iyah on the Mocha axis, with clashes over Jabal al-Rawa.
None of it is confirmed by either side.
Source: @officialrnintel , Middle East Spectator on TG, DD Geopolitics on TG / Writer: Daniel -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Noga Tarnopolsky נגה טרנופולסקי نوغا ترنوبولسكي
@NTarnopolsky
💥@SuleimanMas1 reports that "in the UAE, they are very frustrated with Israel, with the government and with the prime minister. The Emiratis are using expressions like 'a low point in relations' between Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi. They no longer hide it and tell anyone willing to listen. Not for nothing they didn't deny the report in Haaretz."
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Levent Kemal
@leventkemaI
Pakistan is likely to carry out airstrikes against Houthi forces in Yemen at Saudi Arabia's request, according to Pakistani sources speaking to Türkiye Today.
Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said on Wednesday that any attack on Saudi Arabia could activate the Mecca pact, warning that aggression against one member would be viewed as an attack on all signatories.
www.turkiyetoday.com/region/exclusivepakistan-considers-h… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
@academic_la
The new reports on a warning from the UAE President complete a damning picture of endless warnings which Netanyahu and the IDF received of October 7. Here is a list just of what we know publicly:
1) 2017 : Netanyahu presented the Knesset State Control Committee with the threat of a Hamas invasion along the lines of October 7
2) 2018: etanyahu received intelligence on a Hamas plan for an "initiated offensive maneuver with a broad order of battle."
3) April 2022: Israeli intelligence obtained a roughly 40-page Hamas attack plan more than a year before, including the opening rocket barrage, drones disabling border cameras and automated weapons, and gunmen crossing by paraglider, foot and motorcycle.
4) 2022–2023: Over the year before, female observers in Nahal Oz reported suspicious Hamas activity near the fence including efforts to knock out cameras, use of drones, vans and motorcycles, and tank-shelling practice. It fit perfectly with plans Israel knew Hamas had.
5) 2023: A Shin Bet probe credited its analysts with multiple warnings in 2023 that deterrence was crashing, stated it "did not define Hamas as being in a state of being deterred."
6) March 20, 2023: Defense minister Gallant met Netanyahu and warned that Hezbollah and Hamas had identified weakness because of the judicial overhaul rift and an attack was more likely as a result.
7) March–July 2023: Four Military Intelligence letters: the IDF confirmed via a Hatzlacha FOI request that Netanyahu received four warning letters cautioning that deterrence was weakening due to internal division; the July letter warned of "grave new security implications" and adversaries seeing a "historic opportunity to change the strategic balance."
8) July 2023; A unit 8200 NCO warned that a recent Hamas exercise "closely followed the Jericho Wall plan," issued further warnings over the following weeks, and the Gaza Division subsequently prepared a document warning Hamas planned a large-scale invasion with up to 250 hostages. She sent another warning days before October 7 urging preparations.
9) July 23–24, 2023; Shin Bet head Bar called Netanyahu at Sheba on a secure line and said "I am giving you a strategic warning of war," urging him to stop the legislation of judicial overhaul; Halevi sent a letter that IDF readiness "is being rapidly hurt and recovering slowly. This is dangerous." Bar said "I can't give you a day or an hour, but this is the alert."
10) August 21, 2023: Opposition head Yair Lapid cited a joint briefing in which military secretary Avi Gil told Netanyahu and Lapid that Iran and groups in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza "all identified weakness, an internal divide, tensions, and a loss of preparedness in the army, alongside an emerging crisis with the Americans" all making an attack more likely.
11) Early September 2023: Sinwar cut off all contact with the Shin Bet back-channel that Netanyahu had approved and stalled; a senior Shin Bet official described him as vanishing from the radar.
12) September 15, 2023: Bar phoned Netanyahu with Sinwar's earthquake threat relayed via the Fatah intermediary and MBZ's adviser
13) September 17, 2023: security discussion with Gallant and Military Intelligence, then a PMO meeting with Mossad and NSC; Bar recommended a preemptive strike or reinforced defenses since an attack was imminent; no decisions made.
14) Mid-to-late September 2023: The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee were exposed to material that was "unequivocal: Israeli deterrence has eroded dramatically; our enemies think they have a rare opportunity to harm us."
15) September 19, 2023: The Gaza Division circulated a document from Unit 8200 setting out plans to attack bases and communities and take up to 250 hostages, apparently ignored by senior officers
16) Late September 2023: The head of Military Intelligence's "Ipcha Mistabra" unit (devils advocate unit) issued four warnings in the three weeks before October 7 that Hamas would soon launch a confrontation, and claimed two of his written assessments were widely distributed among decision-makers.
17) Late September 2023: Abbas Kamel, head of Egyptian intelligence, called Netanyahu ten days before the attack warning of "something unusual, a terrible operation," and Netanyahu said the military was "submerged" in the West Bank.
18) Late September 2023: MBZ, leader of UAE held a the 45-minute call from Abu Dhabi, and told Netanyahu that Hamas's leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, was planning a major move against Israel. He said he feared the event would bring not only bloodshed but would shake the entire region and damage the Abraham Accords.
19) October 1, 2023: Lapid says Bar recommended preparing for escalation scenarios in Gaza, Halevi advised an operational plan, urgent intelligence warnings existed on Hamas combat preparations, and Netanyahu told them not to strike. Eldar and Yuval add Bar again recommended targeted killings including Sinwar and Netanyahu said "prepare plans and I'll consider"
20) Night of October 6–7: the IDF probe found five anomalous signs including activation of Israeli SIM cards held by Nukhba operatives; not one officer read them as imminent
21) Pre-dawn October 7: The NSC and police were told of unusual Hamas activity and took no action, allowing Nova dance festival to proceed
22) Roughly 5:50 AM: Harel's "6:29" reports warning signs appearing in observation systems and radar about 40 minutes before the attack.
Please explain to me, how did it take 8 hours for the IDF to respond properly to the October 7th attack? That would be far too long even without warning. But with this kind of intense warning of an imminent attack? This was intentional.
Clash Report
@clashreport
UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed gave Netanyahu a direct warning about a week and a half before October 7, 2023, saying that Yahya Sinwar was preparing a major Hamas operation against Israel.
Netanyahu responded that he believed Hamas was focused on the West Bank and said Israel was prepared for any scenario.
The warning came after earlier signs of a possible escalation. In September, intermediaries relayed messages from Sinwar referring to an approaching “earthquake,” prompting discussions among Israeli security officials.
Netanyahu is accused of not informing the heads of the Shin Bet, Mossad, or IDF about the later warning from bin Zayed.
Some senior security officials said that knowing about it could have changed their assessment of Hamas’s intentions.
Netanyahu’s office denies that he received any warning from the UAE president and called the claim an “absolute lie.”
Source: Haaretz -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamzé Attar
@hamzattar
Not only have the UAE and Egypt warned Netanyahu that an imminent attack by Hamas was in the making, but Israeli intelligence also did so in the Gates of Jericho.
www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hisham Al-Omeisy هشام العميسي
@omeisy
For Yemen watchers, yes the government is in a better position today but I would caution against getting overly excited and urge management of expectations. The balance of power has not yet decisively shifted, as the Houthis retain control of Sana'a and much of northern and western Yemen.
The current escalation also has a regional dimension with Houthis eyeing control of Bab al-Mandeb to exert pressure on one side of the Arabian Peninsula with Iran doing same on other side in the Strait of Hormuz - simultaneously threatening both maritime flanks.
However, if government forces consolidate gains in Hays and Al-Barah while sustaining pressure across Al-Jawf, Marib and Al-Bayda, the escalation could become strategically significant by forcing the Houthis to defend multiple fronts.
The key question is whether this remains a temporary counteroffensive or develops into a coordinated campaign capable of changing Yemen’s territorial balance. My 2 cents for @AJEnglishThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Bloomberg
@business
Qatar posted its widest quarterly budget deficit in almost a decade, as natural gas revenue all but evaporated with the between the US and Iran effectively shutting the Strait of Hormuz www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-09-08/qatar-has-wide…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
War in #yemen #sitrep | Government Narrative | Fighting has intensified across several fronts in Yemen, with anti-Houthi forces reporting advances in Al Jawf, Al Bayda, Taiz, and the western coast.
Most battlefield details below come from @Yem_army_media, @SouthArmed, @axistaiz, @diralwatan, @alfrqt7357, @MCAzal102S @nrfyemen, @yementvyem, @alamalikah and should be treated as operational claims by anti-Houthi forces.
In Al Jawf, government-aligned forces say they captured the Al Yatmah area in Khabb wa Al Sha'af district and are continuing their advance. Field sources also claim Houthi positions are weakening along the route toward Al Hazm, the provincial capital. The military issued warnings to civilians and drivers to avoid several roads connecting Al Jawf, Marib, Nihm, Sirwah, and surrounding areas because of ongoing operations.
In Al Bayda, Southern Giants Brigades announced a new offensive and reported the capture of several forward positions. Their media claimed at least 23 Houthi fighters were killed and dozens wounded. Yemeni military officials also said forces were advancing toward Dhi Na'im.
In Taiz, government aircraft reportedly carried out strikes against Houthi positions and reinforcements around the Hamir, Al-Kadha, and Al-Barh fronts. Ground clashes were also reported east of Taiz city and along the western front. Military media said joint forces captured a Houthi field commander known as Abu Ali Al-Adhri along with several fighters after clashes near Al-Barh.
The situation around Maqbanah and Jabal Habashi is also deteriorating for civilians. Local and West Coast sources accuse Houthi forces of raids, arrests, forced displacement, checkpoints, and restrictions on movement. One report claims around 322 people, including women and children, were detained in Jabal Habashi. These figures have not been independently verified.
In Marib, local authorities reported that a ballistic missile strike hit a displaced persons shelter in Raghwan district, killing two children and injuring 15 people, including eight children. Other reports accused Houthi forces of missile attacks against populated areas in Al Jawf and near the 2 December Hospital in Mokha.
Authorities in Al-Turbah, Taiz governorate, announced a nighttime curfew for cars and motorcycles from 9 p.m. to 6 a.m. as security conditions worsen.
Political and military leaders aligned with Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council have publicly framed the current fighting as an effort to regain territory and restore government control. Rashad Al-Alimi praised recent battlefield gains, while Tariq Saleh said the objective remains the defeat of Houthi forces and the eventual recovery of Sana'a.2 media couldn't be displayed. See them on the original post.
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
War in #yemen #sitrep | For now, Houthi advances appear to have been halted across several fronts, while some recent gains have been rolled back by government-aligned forces. But the fighting is far from over. Both sides are repositioning, reinforcing contested sectors, and continuing artillery, drone, and missile operations.
Three senior commanders from Yemen's anti-Houthi forces remain at the center of the current operations. They are Lt. Gen. @tarikyemen, commander of the National Resistance Forces @nrfyemen, Maj. Gen. Abdulrahman al-Lahji, commander of the National Shield Forces @diralwatan, and Maj. Gen. Hamdi Shukri, commander of the 4th Military Region.
A video message from Maj. Gen. Shukri has circulated widely on Yemeni social media. Shukri said his forces would continue the battle "until Yemen is cleansed of Iranian influence." He also claimed that Houthi forces were in a state of collapse and that government-aligned forces had achieved major battlefield successes. His comments reflect his assessment of the fighting and should not be treated as independent confirmation of a wider Houthi collapse.
The rural western Ta'izz front is quieter for now as both sides reorganize and bring in reinforcements following the recent fighting. Artillery fire, drone activity, and localized clashes nevertheless continue across several sectors.
In western Ta'izz, National Resistance forces reported heavy clashes with Houthi forces in the Al-Kadhah sector. Pro-government media also reported artillery strikes against Houthi positions and troop concentrations around Al-Barh, Saqm, and other parts of the western coastal front.
Local sources reported Houthi artillery fire on villages around Ash-Shurajah in Jabal Habashi District, with the main road reportedly cut and the movement of displaced civilians disrupted. Another report said a woman and one of her relatives were killed when a bus carrying displaced civilians was struck in Jabal Habashi.
The fighting has also extended toward Al-Ashruh in Jabal Habashi, as Houthi forces shelled the outskirts of Al-Ashruh in western Ta'izz with artillery.
Farther south along the Red Sea coast, Houthi mortar fire against Al-Haymah village in southern Hudaydah, with several displaced civilians reportedly wounded. In Mawza District, western Ta'izz, a child was killed by a missile strike on Al-Murakh village.
The National Resistance also claimed that bodies recovered following fighting on the western coast included members of Somalia's al-Shabaab who had fought alongside Houthi forces. Its military media said documents and personal belongings found with the bodies supported the identification. The claim remains unverified. From the published material alone, it is not possible to establish whether the dead were Somali fighters, African Yemenis, or individuals of another background.
Fighting has also been reported beyond western Ta'izz. In southern Marib, pro-government forces released footage showing artillery and drone strikes against Houthi positions, artillery sites, vehicles, and sniper positions.
In Al-Bayda, local sources reported airstrikes against Houthi positions around Jabal Sawda Ghurab in Al-Zahir District. Houthi forces were also reported to have shelled a tribal gathering in the Aynat Al Barman area.
In Al-Jawf, forces belonging to Yemen's internationally recognized government said they struck Houthi personnel and military capabilities at Al-Labnat camp. A military spokesman described the attack as a response to recent Houthi escalation and said newly introduced capabilities were used.
The current picture is therefore one of a Houthi offensive that has lost momentum in several areas, with some advances reversed, but not a concluded battle. Front lines remain active, reinforcements continue to move, and further attempts by either side to regain the initiative should be expected.3 media couldn't be displayed. See them on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 هذا تقرير يكشف المزيد عن الاستراتيجية الأمريكية العسكرية الجديدة في الشرق الأوسط.
أهم ما ورد فيه أن هناك تفكير أمريكي يقايض بقاء بعض القواعد العسكرية باستعداد دول الخليج لدفع تكاليف إنشاءها وترميمها مرة أخرى.
هذا أهم ما أوردته CNN
🔷 كشفت ستة مصادر عن مناقشات غير معلنة داخل الجيش والاستخبارات الأميركية لتقليص الوجود الدائم في الشرق الأوسط إذا انتهت الحرب مع إيران.
🔷 يتوقع مسؤولو البنتاغون الاحتفاظ ببعض القواعد الكبرى والدائمة، لكن إعادة بنائها قد تعتمد على استعداد الدول المضيفة للمساهمة في تكاليف يُرجَّح أن تبلغ مليارات الدولارات، بحسب أحد المصادر. لم يُعلن قرار بشأن منشآت محددة.
🔷 مسؤولون كبار في البنتاغون أبدوا سرًا رغبتهم في تقليص القوات داخل عدة دول خليجية وتحميل الشركاء الإقليميين حصة أكبر من مسؤولية الدفاع. تؤكد ثلاثة مصادر مطلعة وجود هذا التوجه.
🔷 الجيش أعد عدة خيارات لتغيير تشكيل وانتشار قواته في المنطقة، يمكن تنفيذها ابتداءً من العام المقبل. يقول مصدران إن التخلي عن المواقع الاستراتيجية المستخدمة لإطلاق الطائرات لا يبدو منطقيًا أثناء استمرار القتال. وهذا يربط إمكان تنفيذ بعض الخيارات بانتهاء الحرب أو تغير متطلباتها، بدل اعتبار 2027 موعدًا مقررًا للانسحاب.
🔷 ضباط من وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية أُعيدوا إلى المنطقة بعد إجلائهم خلال أشد مراحل القتال. نقلت الشبكة ذلك عن أحد مصادرها، بينما لا يزال نحو 50 ألف عسكري أميركي منتشرين في الشرق الأوسط، إلى جانب حاملتي طائرات وأكثر من اثنتي عشرة مدمرة مزودة بصواريخ موجهة. هذه العودة توضح أن التفكير في تقليص الوجود مستقبلًا يجري بالتزامن مع استمرار الاحتياجات العملياتية الحالية.
🔷 تشمل أفكار اعادة الانتشار خفض أعداد الأفراد والمنشآت، لكن المصادر تؤكد عدم وجود أمر رئاسي مباشر أو مراجعة رسمية لانتشار القوات. بعض المسؤولين يحاولون استباق ما قد يطلبه ترامب، الذي لم يحدد، وفقهم، استراتيجية واضحة لما بعد الحرب.
🔷 مقر وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية في الرياض دُمّر فعليًا بهجوم إيراني، بحسب مسؤول أميركي وضابط استخبارات سابق. وتقول مصادر للشبكة إن الأضرار التي لحقت بالمنشآت العسكرية الأميركية في البحرين وقطر والسعودية والكويت كبيرة أيضًا، رغم محاولات مسؤولي البنتاغون التقليل من أثرها.
🔷 واشنطن قد تتخلى عن إعادة بناء بعض المنشآت التي دُمرت أو تضررت بشدة. نقلت الشبكة هذا الاحتمال عن مسؤول ومصدرين مطلعين على المناقشات، موضحة أن الكلفة أحد الاعتبارات.
🔷 أحد البدائل المطروحة للاستخبارات والعمليات الخاصة هو تنفيذ المهمات من دون تمركز دائم في المنطقة. بحسب مسؤولين أميركيين، يجري بحث إبقاء الأفراد والمعدات في الولايات المتحدة، وإرسالهم إلى الشرق الأوسط لمهمات محددة ثم إعادتهم.
🔷 تجري دراسة نقل بعض المنشآت إلى تحت الأرض لحماية القوات التي ستبقى. يقول مصدران إن الفكرة قديمة داخل البنتاغون، لكنها اكتسبت إلحاحًا بعد الأسابيع الأولى للحرب، حين كشفت الهجمات الإيرانية هشاشة المواقع أمام الصواريخ والمسيّرات. وبحسب مسؤول أميركي، كانت مواطن الضعف معروفة، لكن معالجتها لم تُعامل سابقًا بالاستعجال المطلوب.
🔷 لا يوجد جدول واضح لنجاح استراتيجية الضغط الاقتصادي، وهو ما يبقي القوات عرضة لهجمات إضافية. تستعيد المادة تقريرًا سابقًا للشبكة عن تحذير كبار القادة العسكريين ترامب من أن خيارات التصعيد القتالي لا يُرجَّح أن تحقق أهدافه المعلنة، واتجاهه بدلًا من ذلك إلى تشديد الضغط الاقتصادي. لكن تقديرات المحللين الواردة ترى أن القيادة الإيرانية قد تتحمل شهورًا من الضائقة دون استسلام قريب.
🔷 رئيس العمليات البحرية الأميركية يستبعد عودة الأفراد إلى البحرين قريبًا. قال الأميرال داريل كودل الأسبوع الماضي إن العودة إلى المقر التقليدي للأسطول الخامس لن تحصل «في أي وقت قريب». يتسق ذلك مع مناقشات تغيير الانتشار، لكنه لا يمثل إعلانًا بإغلاق المقر نهائيًا أو تحديد بديل دائم له. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Tomer Almagor
@almagor_tomer
פרטים חדשים על הצעדים של ישראל נגד בריטניה
בעוד סער נואם - 3 אגרות מתקבלות על ידי הבריטים:
1. בתוך 30 יום הקונסלייה הבריטית בירושלים סוגרת את שעריה והדיפלומטים מאבדים אקרדיטציה. מהלך חסר תקדים ברמה המדינית.
2. איגרת נוספת לדיפלומטים הבריטים בקריית גת - עליהם לעזוב את הארץ תוך 7 ימים.
3. איגרת שלישית לדיפלומטים בריטים ברמאללה - עליהם לעזוב תוך 7 ימים
ההיגיון המסדר של הצעדים הישראלים: הבריטים מגבירים את המעורבות שלהם בסוגייה הפלסטינית - וישראל פוגעת בהם בדיוק בסוגייה הזו. הקונסולייה והדיפלומטים ברמאללה שנוגעים בגדה המערבית, הדיפלומטים בקריית גת שנוגעים בעזה -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gadi Eisenkot - גדי איזנקוט
@gadi_eisenkot
הודעה משותפת לראשי מחנה השינוי בתגובה לחשיפה הבוקר:
לציבור בישראל מגיע לדעת מה קרה לפני, במהלך ולאחר טבח השבעה באוקטובר. ועדת חקירה ממלכתית תקום מיידית בממשלה הבאה.
זוהי חובת ההנהגה לאזרחיה. נתניהו, די לשקרים; הציבור הישראלי זכאי לדעת: מה ידעת, ומתי ידעת?
החשיפה המטלטלת הבוקר מחייבת חקירה מידית ומעמיקה. היא מצטרפת לשורת החשיפות אודות כשלי נתניהו וחוסר תפקודו והיא מחדדת פעם נוספת מדוע נתניהו נמצא בקרב חייו - סיכול הקמתה של ועדת חקירה ממלכתית וחשיפת האמת בפני הציבור הישראלי.
בזמן שנתניהו ואנשיו מפיצים תיאוריות קונספירציה שקריות ומנסים להטיל את האחריות על מערכת הביטחון, מתברר שוב כי התרעות חמורות הגיעו ישירות אליו והוא התעלם מהן.
זוהי זחיחות ומעילה באמון שאזרחי ישראל נתנו בו ובממשלתו וזוהי גם התרשלות קיצונית בתפקיד ותיפקוד ראש הממשלה.
הציבור הישראלי זכאי לדעת: מה ידע נתניהו, מתי ידע, מדוע לא עדכן את מערכת הביטחון ומדוע לא פעל כדי להגן על אזרחי ישראל?
אין עוד מקום לתירוצים, להכחשות ולהסתרות.
אנו מתחייבים לאזרחי ישראל: מיד עם הקמת הממשלה השלושים ושמונה בהובלתנו נקים ועדת חקירה ממלכתית, שתחקור את הכשלים שהובילו למחדל השבעה באוקטובר, תגיע לחקר האמת ותבטיח שהאסון הזה לא ישנה.
נתניהו ושותפיו לממשלת השבעה באוקטובר אינם כשירים להמשיך בתפקיד. נעבוד בתיאום ובאחריות הנדרשים על מנת למנוע מהם להוביל לאסון נוסף.
___________
גדי איזנקוט, יו׳׳ר מפלגת ישר! עם איזנקוט
נפתלי בנט, יו׳׳ר מפלגת ביחד
אביגדור ליברמן, יו׳׳ר מפלגת ישראל ביתנו
יאיר גולן, יו׳׳ר מפלגת הדמוקרטים -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Hashem علي هاشم
@Alihashem
My latest for @ForeignPolicy, how the war has changed Iran’s deterrence policy?
For decades Tehran's first line of defense was the "axis of resistance," arming allies to keep war away from Iran's own borders. Oct. 7 ended that logic.
What replaces it starts inside Iran's own borders.
foreignpolicy.com/2026/09/08/irans-proxy-strategy-hezboll… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
S. Rifai
@THE_47th
Syrian "transitional" gov just announced gender segregation in the Laïque School of Damascus. Laïque was 1 of Syria’s most prestigious schools, founded 1932 by the French Mission Laïque as a rare private institution that valued secularism. Another episode of Islamization in #syria.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jassem Alhussein
@JassemAlhussein
سوريا أخرجت العراق من أزمته المالية ...
واليوم بلومبيرغ تكشف الدليل.
العراق،
الذي باع نحو 70 مليون برميل في أغسطس،
لا يجد اليوم مشترين لنفط الجنوب.
السبب؟
العراق باع نفط الجنوب في أغسطس
بأسعار منخفضة جداً.
وعندما قرر رفع سعر البرميل قليلاً
لتخفيف أزمته المالية،
توقف المشترون عن إرسال السفن.
لكن ...
طريق سوريا بقي مفتوحاً،
وأصبح الشريان الاقتصادي والمالي للعراق.
إيران خنقت العراق اقتصادياً...
وسوريا فتحت له الطريق إلى العالم.
ولهذا...
سوريا ليست مجرد ممر للعراق.
إنها رئته الاقتصادية. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
יאיר לפיד - Yair Lapid
@yairlapid
ב-20 לספטמבר 2023, שלושה שבועות לפני הטבח, הזהרתי את ראש הממשלה במסיבת עתונאים שזה מה שהולך לקרות.
לא הייתי היחיד. היום פורסם ששליט האמירויות הזהיר אותו. למרות כל ההכחשות, המצרים אומרים שהזהירו אותו. הרמטכ"ל, ראש השב"כ, ראש אמ"ן, כולם הזהירו אותו.
התגובה היחידה שלו היתה שהוא הלך לערוץ 14 להגיד שאין מה לדאוג. אם הוא היה ממלא את תפקידו, הטבח היה נמנע. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arash Reisinezhad
@arashreisi
Last month, I argued that Yemen would be the first real test of the Mecca Pact.
That test may now be unfolding.
The effort to push the Houthis back from Hodeidah matters beyond Yemen itself. Hodeidah sits on the Red Sea, adjacent to Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
Reducing Houthi control and military reach around Hodeidah mitigates the risk of a #chokepoint_war in Bab el-Mandeb. In doing so, it reduces Iran and its allies' leverage over one of the world's vital chokepoints, curbing their ability to maintain dual leverage across two critical regional chokepoints simultaneously.
But there is a broader strategic implication.
If the Mecca Pact can coordinate to constrain an Iran-linked actor at a critical chokepoint, it could begin to demonstrate precisely the kind of regional security cooperation that the pact is capable of producing.
And in the event of a wider confrontation with Iran, a less vulnerable Bab el-Mandeb would be strategically valuable for Saudi Arabia.
Arash Reisinezhad
@arashreisi
The Mecca Pact is already being called an “Islamic NATO”. This label is tempting, yet misleading.
This is not, at least for now, an anti-Iran or anti-Israel alliance. Its immediate logic is more pragmatic: Yemen and the growing realization in Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad that they can no longer take American security guarantees for granted.
But the pact could matter far beyond those two issues.
It gives Turkey a new platform for strategic autonomy: a way to diversify its security options without abandoning NATO, while positioning Ankara as a security broker in the Muslim world.
It also has a Syrian dimension, where Ankara and Riyadh share an interest in shaping the post-Assad order and preventing renewed Iranian-linked networks.
Then comes geography. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sit across an interconnected chain of corridors and chokepoints, from the Mediterranean and Middle Corridor to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Arabian Sea. The pact could therefore evolve into an infrastructure-security network as much as a military one.
There is also an emerging Saudi-Turkish incentive to prevent the Israel-UAE axis from becoming the uncontested center of regional security. This does not make Mecca an anti-Israeli bloc; rather, it gives Riyadh and Ankara another center of gravity.
And then there is Iran. The real question is whether Iran will be incorporated into the emerging regional security architecture, or whether that architecture will increasingly be built around Iran, rather than with Iran.
That may ultimately be the most consequential question raised in Mecca! -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Najafi
@Mostafa_Najafii
آمریکا با هدف قرار دادن نفتکشها در سواحل ایران و مشخصا خارک، علاوه بر اینکه میخواهد بازدارندگی معتبر در برابر رویکرد تهاجمی اخیر ایران در حمله به ناوگان دریایی آمریکا ایجاد کند، ممکن است گام تازهای در راهبرد محاصره نیز باشد که براساس آن، قصد دارد حلقه فشار را از مسیرهای انتقال نفت به مبدأ حرکت نفتکشها منتقل کند و صادرات انرژی ایران را از نقطه آغاز با اختلال جدی مواجه کند.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
It seems that #iran and the United States are taking yet another step up the escalation ladder.
The United States has once again targeted Iranian oil tankers close to Khark and Jask, but unlike two days ago, this time the attacks do not seem to be a response to any Iranian strike on U.S. naval forces in the region. Rather, they appear to be part of the increasing economic pressure campaign against Iran.
The Iranian armed forces had threatened to target U.S. bases in response to any attack on its oil tankers. But in a new statement, they say they have warned the crews of oil tankers off the shores of Kuwait and Bahrain to evacuate because their tankers will be targeted.
This would be the first time Iran attacks tankers stationed at ports in the region, rather than those attempting to pass through the Strait.
The Iranians have apparently concluded that attacks on U.S. bases are not having a deterrent effect, and they now want to establish a new equation. The scope and extent of any Iranian strike, as well as the U.S. response, will determine the next phase of the war. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Basha باشا
@BashaReport
This is the battle to watch, @BashaReport Commentary:
Based on our assessment, the most important ground battle at this stage of the Yemen war is unfolding along the Al-Barah-Kadha-Al Wazi'yah, Yemen front.
Both sides are fighting hard for control of this sector. On one side, the National Resistance Forces @nrfyemen, Southern Giants Brigades @alamalikah, National Shield Forces @diralwatan, and @AxisTaiz Popular Resistance fighters are pushing to recapture territory lost in Kadha and al-Barah.
On the other, Houthi Al Sammad, Reserves, and 4th Military Region Command (MRC) brigades, special forces, and loyalists tribes are holding the surrounding high ground, reinforcing their positions with waves of fighters while using missile and drone attacks to support their defenses and push back against the offensive.
The importance of Al-Barah-Kadha-Al Wazi'yah, Yemen goes well beyond the immediate front line. This sector sits along a critical approach connecting rural western Taiz with Mocha and the wider Red Sea coastline near Bab al-Mandab.
Control of the high ground and routes through this area could shape what comes next on the western front. For now, Al-Barah-Kadha is the key ground battle to watch.
Map: www.google.com/maps/dir/مصنع+اسمنت+البرح،+FPXG%2BXMV,+Yem…2 media couldn't be displayed. See them on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ayman Abdel Nour
@aabnour
وزع تحالف سوري بأميركا قريب من الإدارة السورية النص المهم أدناه:
أصدقائي:
باعتبار الجميع هنا مهتم ببناء علاقة متينة بين الولايات المتحدة و سوريا علينا ان ننتبه لما يكتب في الصحف الأمريكية عن سورية بالأخص في صحف مهمة متل NewYork Times و WallStreet Journal و Washington Post.
على سبيل المثال في هذا المقال الذي كتبه ايلان بيرمان في الواشنطن بوست الشهر الماضي ، و هو نائب رئيس المجلس الأمريكي للسياسة الخارجية الأمريكية (مركز دراسات ذو ميول محافظة و منحاز لاسرائيل) يذكر الكاتب ان سقوط نطام الأسد كان فرصة لإخراج سوريا من كنف ايران لكنه يحذر بنفس الوقت الحكومة الأمريكية من النزعة الأصولية الذي يقول انها موجودة ضمن بنية الحكومة السورية الحالية المركبة من العناصر السابقة لهيئة تحرير الشام ، و هو يستشهد على ذلك بأمرين :
الأول: هو شبكة مدارس "دار الوحي الشريف" التي تأسست في ادلب عام ٢٠١٨ و انتشرت اليوم ضمن محافظات حلب و حماه و دمشق و اللاذقية و درعا ، و يقول الكاتب انها ذات توجهات أصولية ، تضع اسم فلسطين على الخارطة و تتجاهل اسرائيل ، و تدعو ، حسب ما يدعيه الكاتب، إلى اعتبار اصحاب الديانات الأخرى أعداء ينبغي الجهاد ضدهم .
الثاني : وجود 5 الاف مقاتل من المجاهدين الأجانب الذين لهم تاريخ في العنف الطائفي ضد الأقليات و القتل خارج القانون و هو ما يثير حفيظة دول مجاورة مثل اسرائيل و لبنان و يثير أسئلة من قبل المجتمع الدولي، حسب ما يقول الكاتب، عن تركيبة جهاز الأمن ضمن الدولة السورية الجديدة . و هو يوجّه اللوم للحكومة الأمريكية الحالية لعدم تعاطيها الحازم في هذه القضية قبل ازالة قانون قيصر.
لذلك يدعو ايلان بيرمان الحكومة الأمريكية إلى الضغط على الحكومة السورية لحل تلك الملفات باستخدام أوراق ضغط مثل المساعدة المالية و الدعم الدبلوماسي و التعاون في مجال الدفاع و غيره .
اعتقد ان مثل هذه المقالات تلقى آذاناً صاغية ضمن سياسي الحزب الجمهوري ، و هي بلا شك احدى أدوات اللوبي الاسرائيلي في الولايات المتحدة للتأثير في سياسة الولايات المتحدة تجاه سورية.
أنا أقترح شيئين يمكننا فعله كمجموعةأو مجموعات عمل سياسي سورية امريكية للتعامل مع هذه المقالات :
١.نشر مقالات ضمن الصحف الأمريكية تستهدف إبراز الجانب المعتدل الذي عملت عليه الحكومة السورية مثل احترام الأقليات و محاسبة الجناة في انتهاكات العام الماضي، ايضاً السماح بحرية المعتقد و الفكر و اللباس ، الخ...
٢.تشكيل مجموعة عمل تهدف إلى رصد المقالات التي تنشر ضمن الصحافة الأمريكية و تنبيه الحكومة السورية إلى قضايا يجب معالجتها قبل ان يتم استغلالها من جهات معادية لتشويه صورة الحكومة السورية ضمن الأوساط السياسية في الحكومة الأمريكية.
The U.S. acts as though it can’t see this Islamist
movement-in-waiting
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/08/13/syria-still-sh… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
New poll in Palestine by the Jerusalem Media & Communications Center (JMCC) & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung showing:
* 55.8% support peaceful negotiations as the "best method to achieve the Palestinian people's goals of ending the occupation". 13.3% support armed resistance. 17.8% support non-violent resistance.
* If elections were held today, 27.5% would vote Fatah, only 7.6% would vote Hamas, 40.2% won't vote.
* 50.1% of Palestinians believe that the Oct 7 attacks harmed Palestinians national interests, 15.7% believe it served them
* Which political factions you trust? 55% trust no one, 22.3% trust Fatah, 6.7% trust Hamas.
www.jmcc.org/en/File/29187y168327Y29187/Poll-NO105-Markin… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
In this new @ForeignAffairs essay, I argue that US officials are being too triumphant about Iran’s economic downturn.
Iran’s leaders are using inflation to engage in financial repression. Counterintuitively, reduced economic activity is helping the state stave off a deeper crisis and persevere during the war.
Read here: www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/why-america-cant-strangle-iran -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Colonies israéliennes en Cisjordanie: Allez encore un effort M. les Européens! Douze pays, dont la France, le Royaume-Uni et le Canada, ont annoncé mardi leur intention de sanctionner le commerce avec les colonies israéliennes. Il y a trente ans, presque jour pour jour, Hubert Védrine, ministre des Affaires étran- gères, confiait à une poignée de journalistes à Jérusalem: "Lorsqu'on évoque des sanctions contre Israël entre les 15 ministres des Affaires étrangères européens, deux mains se lèvent pour s'y opposer: l'Allemand et le Néerlandais". Trente ans pour prendre des mesures contre la colonisation, alors qu'on prétend préserver la solution à deux Etats!
Dans une déclaration conjointe, la France, Royaume-Uni, Canada, Danemark, Espagne, Finlande, Irlande, Islande, Norvège, Pologne, Portugal, Suède "confirment leur intention d'imposer des restrictions nationales au commerce de biens avec des colonies illégales au regard du droit international et/ou de soutenir des restrictions européennes en ce sens, ou qu'elles envisagent sérieusement d'adopter de telles restrictions ou d'autres mesures conformément à leurs procédures nationales".
#colonies -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Mon décryptage sur la situation au Yémen où les rebelles Houhis pro-iraniens ont lancé une offensive en direction du détroit stratégique d'Ormuz.
#yémen
www.lefigaro.fr/international/au-yemen-les-houthistes-pro… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clash Report
@clashreport
NEW: Saudi Aramco's Jizan refinery was hit again on Monday, the latest in a series of Houthi strikes that have kept the 400,000 barrel-per-day plant offline for weeks.
Houthis claimed dozens of ballistic missiles and drones targeted the site on September 6, calling it retaliation for Saudi drone incursions over Yemen.
The refinery hasn't fully operated since late July, when earlier strikes damaged the tank farm and power complex.
Diesel shipments from the site dropped to zero in August.
Saudi Arabia has been rerouting crude exports via the Red Sea and East-West Pipeline but losing refining capacity is harder to replace than rerouting barrels.
Source: FT -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
عبدالله السحيم
@abdullahassahem
هناك تغيرات في شكل الحرب في اليمن....
ماذا يحدث الآن في اليمن... ومن يمسك زمام المعركة؟!
انظر...
الخريطة خلال الساعات الأخيرة أصبحت أوضح قليلا...المخا ما تزال بيد الحكومة وآمنة عسكريا حتى الآن، وحيس أصبحت تحت السيطرة الحكومية، بل تحولت إلى نقطة ارتكاز للضغط شمالا باتجاه الجراحي وشرقا باتجاه جبل رأس.
لكن في الكدحة القصة مختلفة تماما...
الحوثيون نجحوا مؤقتا في الوصول إلى طريق تعز–المخا وقطعه، ثم بدأت القوات الحكومية هجوما مضادا واستعادت مفرق الكدحة ونقاطا أخرى، لكن الطريق ومحيطه لم يُحسما بالكامل حتى الآن.
وفي البرح اشتعلت المعركة بقوة... هجوم حكومي من ثلاثة محاور، وقصف مدفعي وغارات، لكن دون حسم نهائي حتى الآن.
وفوق ذلك كله...
المعركة لم تعد محصورة بالساحل؛ الطيران الحكومي ضرب اليوم مواقع حوثية في مأرب والبيضاء والضالع والجوف، بينها منصة صواريخ وغرفة قيادة ومنظومة استشعار حرارية بحسب الرواية الحكومية.
ماذا يعني هذا؟
يعني ان الكفة ما تزال تميل للحكومة....لكن الساعات الأخيرة كانت بالدرجة الأولى تثبيت مكاسب حيس، استعادة المبادرة في الكدحة، فتح الضغط على البرح، وتوسيع الضربات الجوية إلى جبهات أخرى.
لذلك المهم الآن راقب الكدحة والبرح والجراحي.
إذا ثبتت الحكومة طريق تعز–المخا، ثم نقلت الضغط من حيس شمالا نحو الجراحي ... عندها تبدأ فعليا معركة جنوب الحديدة، ويتغير شكل الحرب بالكامل.
****
ملحوظة ١ : من لديه معلومات مؤكدة من الميدان عما يحدث من انتصارات للجيش اليمني في الجوف يرسلها عبر الخاص...نعم شاهدت فيديوهات لكن لا يوجد اعلان رسمي...
ملاحظة ٢ : جميع المعلومات الواردة في المقال مؤكدة رسميا...
اللهم انصر الشعب اليمني. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
A few takeaways from #iran's SNSC Secretary Mohsen Rezaei’s interview last night:
🔹Rezaei effectively acknowledged that maritime traffic through Hormuz has not stopped. He said 7–8 ships are passing daily, while also admitting that the U.S. is helping some vessels transit through the southern route.
More importantly, he claimed Iran is not targeting all oil tankers. He attributed this to environmental concerns, but operational constraints and degraded Iranian surveillance/targeting capabilities are likely part of the calculation as well.
🔹Tehran also appears to be expanding its maritime pressure beyond the Strait of Hormuz.
Rezaei said Iran will soon announce a new “forbidden zone” extending into other parts of the Persian Gulf. Interestingly, he spoke of “sanctioning” vessels entering the area.
That could mean interdiction, confiscation, or selective targeting under the framework already introduced by the “Persian Gulf Strait Authority.” In any case, Iran is trying to increase the costs for those relying on the U.S. to transit through the strait.
🔹Rezaei also confirmed that Iran fired an anti-ship missile toward U.S. naval forces because Washington “did not take previous Iranian threats seriously.”
The logic is important here. Tehran is using limited military action to make its red lines credible. The U.S., in turn, is responding by targeting Iranian oil tankers.
In other words, both sides are now trying to establish the boundaries of acceptable confrontation/escalation through force.
🔹Perhaps more significant, Rezaei suggested that Iran’s previous “restraint” regarding U.S. casualties has changed.
He said Iran had identified specific U.S. targets in Jordan and Erbil in the past but deliberately avoided striking them. According to him, that calculation no longer applies.
Whether Iran has actually inflicted U.S. casualties is another question. But at the policy level, this is a considerable shift.
🔹On the domestic front, Rezaei said Tehran expects the U.S. and Israel to try to combine renewed internal unrest with another round of military attacks.
This appears to be a central concern within the Iranian security establishment now; that economic pressure, information operations, armed unrest, and external attacks could converge.
Recent reports of weapons seizures and clashes with armed networks in Kurdistan and Sistan-Baluchistan should also be understood in that context.
🔹Finally, on Lebanon, what Rezaei did not say was perhaps more important than what he did.
He acknowledged Israeli advances and predicted a future Lebanese response, but made no Iranian commitment to intervene directly or establish a new red line.
As such, Tehran appears focused on maintaining pressure on the U.S. while avoiding a new direct escalation with Israel over Lebanon. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Rezaee today in an interview for state media:
-Hormuz is closed...a maximum of 7-8 ships pass through the strait, of which 5-6 are importing essential goods for us.
-Sometimes the Americans escort 5-6 ships from the coast connected to Oman.
-We are still exporting oil and earning money.
-An agreement on joint management of the strait will be signed in coming days (note: they've said this many times over the last month). -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Israel-Alma
@Israel_Alma_org
The battle for the Ali al-Taher Ridge is over – the struggle with #hezbollah is not.
The #idf has completed the clearing of the two strategic underground infrastructures on the ridge and achieved operational control of the area, both above and below ground. Hezbollah has lost a significant asset in its “Land of Tunnels,” whose importance was also demonstrated by the organization’s efforts to maintain its hold on the area.
At this stage, however, Hezbollah is not responding with a broad escalation. Over the weekend, it continued its attempts to target IDF forces using explosive UAVs, while its senior officials sought to downplay the significance of losing the ridge.
Our assessment: Hezbollah is currently attempting to contain the blow, adapt to the new operational reality, and continue its struggle through more limited and dispersed patterns of activity, while preserving the option to escalate later, depending on its calculations and Iranian guidance.
At the same time, Hezbollah is increasing pressure on the Lebanese government to stop Israeli military activity against it, while refusing to relinquish its own independent military power.
Ali al-Taher represents a significant operational achievement for Israel. The next question is how much additional pressure Hezbollah will be willing to absorb and when it may decide to change its modus operandi.
Read more. israel-alma.org/the-loss-of-the-ali-al-taher-ridge-hezbol…
#lebanon #iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aron Lund
@aronlund
Must-read if you’re interested in Syria or transnational jihadism: a deeply researched, nuanced @azelin piece on how to handle Syria’s foreign volunteer contingent, which makes some interesting historical comparisons with the Bosnia situation. ctc.westpoint.edu/managing-the-muhajirin-the-future-of-sy…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Najafi
@Mostafa_Najafii
تحول مهمی در شلیک ایران به سمت ناوهای آمریکایی رخ داده است که احتمالا به زودی وارد فاز جدیدی میشود. همچنین، در روزهای گذشته ایران نقاطی را هدف قرار داده که تا پیش از این یا امکانپذیر نبود یا بنا به ملاحظاتی در دستورکار نبود.
تحولات و اتفاقات مهمی درباره تنگه هرمز و مقابله با محاصره دریایی آمریکا در پیش است.
Siavash Ardalan
@BBCArdalan
امروز برای اولین بار ایران بسمت ناوهای آمریکا موشک بالستیک شلیک کرد. قبلا از این کار خودداری میکرد که مبادا سطح تنش از کنترلش خارج بشه. ولی امروز و حالا، ایران از این استانه عبور کرد. آمریکا میگه موشکها اصابت نکردند ولی در واکنش سه نفتکش ایران رو زد. امربکا اینبار جلوی اصابت موشکهای ایران به ناوش رو گرفت. ولی اگر ایران به این کار ادامه بده، احتمال اصابت به ناو و تلفات آمریکایی بالاست که این میتونه تصویر جنگ رو از آنچه امروز هست تغییر بده. فعلا نه آمریکا موفق شد بازدارندگی ایجاد کنه، نه ایران موفق شد حصر دریایی آمریکا رو بشکنه.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Another phone call worth adding to the diplomatic activity I highlighted this morning (below the previous tweet).
- Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan held separate calls with Pakistan’s Ishaq Dar and Iran’s Abbas Araghchi, discussing ongoing efforts to preserve regional security and stability.
- This adds another piece to the increasingly dense pattern of contacts between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Iran as tensions around the Strait of Hormuz continue.
- It is also worth recalling that yesterday Araghchi spoke with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, with the two discussing “comprehensively” the latest developments in the ongoing Iran-U.S. negotiations.
- Taken together, these contacts suggest that regional diplomacy around both Hormuz and the negotiations is becoming increasingly active.
- Also worth noting: Reuters reported today that mediators and Iran are discussing a “new formula” to resolve the current standoff, although its terms remain unclear.
- Time will tell if something is moving.
- As the saying goes, a pessimist is just a well-informed optimist (forgive me for this).
#iran
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Worth noting these phone calls among regional leaders at a moment when tensions in Hormuz are increasing.
Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi held separate calls with Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan and Turkish FM Hakan Fidan, discussing the latest diplomatic efforts aimed at restoring regional stability and addressing insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz.
- Separately, the Egyptian and Pakistani foreign ministers discussed the need to resume implementation of the Islamabad Memorandum between Iran and the United States and work toward a broader agreement to end the war and prevent further regional escalation.
- Still too early to read this as a diplomatic breakthrough, but the intensification of regional contacts is worth watching.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Najafi
@Mostafa_Najafii
اظهارات امشب سرلشکر رضایی دبیر شعام درباره تنگه هرمز و محاصره را میتوان در یک راهبرد سهلایه خلاصه کرد:
۱) کریدور میانی ایران–عمان برای مدیریت تردد در هرمز
۲) ورود تقابل با ناوگان آمریکا به فاز تهاجمی
۳) ایجاد منطقه ممنوعه/تحریمی از خط محاصره تا هرمز و تحمیل هزینه به کشتیهای متخلف.
یعنی تهران بهجای بستن یا بازکردن صرف هرمز، در حال تعریف یک معادله جدید برای کنترل تردد، بازدارندگی و جنگ اقتصادی است. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
منبع موثق
@validsource20
روحانی:
به مردم بگوییم قرار ما این است با قدرتهای بزرگ بیست سال دیگر بجنگیم. اگر مردم قبول کردند برویم ادامه بدهیم.
اما اگر مردم نپذیرفتند و راه دیگری نشان دادند نمیخواهیم بپذیریم؟
او که پیغمبر بود مشورت میکرد.
در این کشور هیچکس از جانب خدا حاکم نیست؛
همه با رای مردم بوده.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
The United States has targeted an Iranian oil tanker close to Kharg Island. This seems to be part of a new equation that the United States is said to be implementing — a tanker for a tanker — under which Washington targets an Iranian oil tanker if #iran targets ships in the Strait.
The significant difference is that, in the past, Iranian tankers were targeted close to or around the blockade line in the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean. Now, the geography of these attacks has shifted toward Iran’s internal waters, which represents a considerable escalation.
At the same time, this does not appear to be deterring Iran. The problem now is that even if Iran has operational oil tankers, it cannot ship the oil beyond the blockade line. That is the main challenge.
Iran can therefore be expected to double down on its targeting of ships in the Strait to impose its own equation of not alllwing oil to pass while Iranian oil is blocked from the market.
At the same time, it is difficult to understand the precise logic behind this decision by the United States, because it could prove counterproductive if the Trump administration’s objective is to keep energy prices under control. These sorts of attacks could produce the opposite outcome by further destabilizing energy markets. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
כאן חדשות
@kann_news
אחרי שהושמדו המנהרות ברכס עלי טהאר: בצה"ל נערכים לצמצם כוחות ולמתוח קו ביטחון חדש בלבנון, קרוב יותר לגבול | @ItayBlumental עם הפרטים
#חדשותהשבת עם @AyalaHasson -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
According to some Iranian channels, Iran may have used an anti-ship ballistic missile, possibly the advanced Khalij-e-Fars ASBM, against a US aircraft carrier for the first time.
- Tehran had so far avoided using this kind of ballistic missile, allegedly because of the risk of escalation.
- Meanwhile, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Central Command says attacks against US Navy vessels will increase if the naval blockade continues.
- It seems Tehran is now taking the possibility of a further escalation at sea much more seriously.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
Astonishing read in @Newyorker The twisted logic of turning a blind eye to the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza as a strategy to contain Iran? 👉 "Iran had been central to Biden’s thinking about the Middle East, several top advisers said. He’d feared that any public pressure the U.S. put on Israel—any “daylight” between the allies—could invite attacks by Iran or its Lebanese client, Hezbollah. The U.S. would then be compelled to defend Israel in a regional conflagration. Brett McGurk, Biden’s White House coördinator for the Middle East and probably his most influential adviser, championed this position" www.newyorker.com/magazine/2026/07/27/how-biden-emboldene…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
מה שהיה הוא שיהיה
הקונספציה הייתה ברורה: צריך להחליש את הרשות הפלסטינית. רשות פלסטינית חזקה פירושה כתובת מדינית וכתובת מדינית פירושה לחץ על ישראל לחזור למשא ומתן. מנגד, חמאס חזק בעזה היה התירוץ האולטימטיבי להסביר מדוע אין עם מי לדבר, ובמקביל גם הערובה לכך שהרשות הפלסטינית לא תחזור לשלוט ברצועה.
זו הייתה אחת מאבני היסוד של המדיניות הישראלית כלפי עזה במשך שנות נתניהו: לא להפיל את חמאס, לא להחזיר את הרשות, אלא לנהל את הפיצול הפלסטיני ולשמר אותו.
אבל צריך לומר ביושר: זו לא הייתה רק מדיניות נתניהו. גם "ממשלת השינוי" לא שינתה אותה באופן מהותי. היא המשיכה במדיניות שבפועל אפשרה לחמאס להתחזק, וגם בתוך המערכת המדינית והביטחונית כמעט שלא נשמע ערעור עמוק על עצם הקונספציה. לכולם היה נוח יותר לטמון את הראש בחול ולהתמקד באיראן שהיא אויב מוכר, מדינתי, רחוק, ובעיקר כזה שמולו ישראל נהנתה מתחושה עמוקה של עליונות מודיעינית ומבצעית.
אבל השאלה החשובה באמת היא אחרת: האם 7 באוקטובר גרם לישראל לשנות את הקונספציה? התשובה, למרבה הצער, היא לא.
ישראל ממשיכה להחליש את הרשות הפלסטינית מבחינה מדינית וכלכלית ומתנגדת באופן קטגורי לחזרתה לרצועת עזה. במקביל, המדיניות הישראלית בעזה — לרבות מנגנוני הכנסת הסיוע והיעדר חלופה שלטונית מוסכמת, תורמת בפועל להמשך יכולתו של חמאס לשמר את אחיזתו ברצועה.
כלומר, אותה תפיסה אסטרטגית שהתקיימה לפני 7 באוקטובר עדיין מלווה אותנו: רשות פלסטינית חלשה, התנגדות לחזרתה לעזה, היעדר אופק מדיני, ובמקביל הימנעות מבניית חלופה פלסטינית אפקטיבית לחמאס.
וזו מביאה לשאלה המטרידה מכולן: האם מי שמתיימרים להחליף את נתניהו מציעים תפיסה אחרת?
נכון לעכשיו, התשובה היא לא. אפשר לשמוע הבדלים בסגנון, בטון ובזהות המנהיג אבל קשה למצוא אצל המועמדים המרכזיים תפיסה אסטרטגית חלופית ביחס לרשות הפלסטינית, לעזה ולשאלה המדינית.
אם לא תשתנה הקונספציה, החלפת ראש הממשלה לבדה לא תשנה את המציאות.
מה שהיה הוא שיהיה.
איציק אלרוב | Itzik Elrov 🇮🇱
@itzikelrov
סרטון מטורף ומטורלל ברמות:
שנת 2018: נתניהו תוקף את אבו מאזן בגלל שהאחרון עצר את העברות הכספים לחמאס - ונתניהו מסביר שצריך להעביר כסף לחמאס כי בלי זה הם ירו על ישראל.
אבי הקונספציה. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Just read an interesting analysis published by IRGC-linked Javan, titled “The Opportunities of Standing with the East”.
Main points:
- It argues that the war may have produced a strategic shift in Iran’s foreign-policy debate.
- According to Javan, “Looking East” is no longer seen simply as a tactical card to pressure the West, but a structural necessity.
- This is the perception now spreading even among parts of Iran’s traditionally West-oriented elite.
- The argument rests mainly on China, Iran’s largest economic partner. A key buyer of its oil, supplier of goods and industrial machinery, and a key hub for alternative trade and transport corridors.
- BRICS and the SCO are also presented as elements of an emerging architecture less dependent on the dollar and Western institutions.
- Interestingly, Javan does acknowledge the limits: China will not abandon its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Russia can also be a competitor, and neither Beijing nor Moscow is likely to fight directly for Iran.
- The conclusion: Iran should pursue a “smart Eastern diplomacy”,using the emerging multipolar order and US-China competition to strengthen its strategic position.
- As the analysis is published on Javan this represents how IRGC system see the changing multipolar world in the coming years and what are the strategic choices for Teheran after the war.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joyce Karam
@Joyce_Karam
Interesting move by UAE’s MBZ, pardoning Egyptian-Turkish poet Abdul Rahman Qardawi
- Son of Yousef Qardawi, Godfather of Muslim Brotherhood, historically at odds w UAE
- Next move will be telling: hand to Egypt where he is wanted (UAE closes case), OR to Turkey (olive branch)? -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🇱🇧 🦷 In Lebanon, even dentistry has been infected by the sectarian mind virus.
Apparently before filling a cavity, we must first determine whether it is Maronite, Sunni, Shiite or Orthodox.
Un sunnite s’impose à la tête de l’ordre des dentistes du Liban, une première depuis 1975 www.lorientlejour.com/article/1486023/un-sunnite-simpose-…
“Les partis chrétiens (Forces libanaises, Kataëb, Courant patriotique libre) se sont officiellement retirés de la course, sur fond de refus catégorique de céder la présidence à un musulman et aussi du refus de l’USJ de faire de la course à la présidence de l’ordre une confrontation entre chrétiens et musulmans.” -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of the hardline Kayhan, is calling on Iran’s Armed Forces to consider a new lever in the confrontation with the US: disrupting -or even cutting-the undersea fibre optic cables running through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
- Shariatmadari argues that these cables are part of the backbone of global digital connectivity, carrying internet traffic, banking transactions, cloud services, military communications and AI/data centre traffic.
- He explicitly addresses the Army and IRGC, asking why Iran should not use this vulnerability as leverage against the US and its allies.
- Worth remembering: Shariatmadari was also among the earliest and most persistent advocates of closing the Strait of Hormuz. If I remember correctly, as far back as December 2011 he argued in Kayhan that preventing hostile countries’ tankers from using the Strait should be considered a legitimate Iranian response to attempts to block its oil exports.
- At the time, the proposal was widely dismissed-including inside Iran-as an extreme and unrealistic idea.
More than a decade later, what once sounded like one of Shariatmadari’s provocations eventually became part of Iran’s actual coercive strategy in Hormuz.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
מיכאל שמש Michael Shemesh
@shemeshmicha
סקר המנדטים של חדשות 13 הערב:
ישר! בראשות איזנקוט - 22
הליכוד - 21
ביחד בראשות בנט - 12
הציונות הדתית + פייגלין - 6
וינטר - 4
תיקו בין הגושים: 53–53. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamdi Malik, Ph.D.
@HamdiAMalik
Please follow our daily Militia Digest. Every day, our trained AI reads thousands of messages posted across Iraqi militia channels, analyses and sorts them and publishes dozens of militia signals. These signals are then used to produce a digest laying out the most important developments in the world of Iraqi militias. iraqmonitor.com/share/x/2026-09-03/daily/militia/s9-20260…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
“This kind of a hybrid approach — the combination of military force, blockade and economic pressure — that is the only option that seems to be available to the United States at this moment,” said Hamidreza Azizi, senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group.
Still, he said, “it’s been for a long time, but now maybe more than ever, a battle of endurance between the two sides.”
apnews.com/article/trump-iran-war-rubio-bessent-strikes-s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
🇴🇲 As President Trump boasts of having ended eight wars, Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi writes today in the Financial Times that “there have been no lasting resolutions to any of the dangerous global conflicts that directly threaten lives in Palestine, Iran, Yemen, Sudan, Lebanon, Israel and Ukraine, and which inflict serious damage upon regional neighbours and the global economy.”
🔹 In his guest column, Albusaidi blames the impasse on contempt for international law and leaders who sideline diplomats, then resort to “gunboat diplomacy” or “using economic power to bully entire populations into submission” in pursuit of regime change and compliant proxy governments.
🔹 He argues that smaller states must defend international law and champions Oman’s “constructive neutrality”: persistent diplomacy that protects sovereignty, upholds international law and helps smaller states constrain powerful countries acting with impunity.
🔹Oman is still seeking a Hormuz agreement to protect its territorial waters, restore navigation, and shield vulnerable populations from the economic damage, he said. “A solution has not yet been reached. But we are not walking away.” -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
انتخاب
@Entekhab_News
اظهارات مهم ولی نصر:
اگر توافقی منعقد شود که ایران همه چیز را در دست بگیرد و امریکا چیزی دستش نیاید، واشنگتن انگیزهای برای عمل به آن توافق ندارد و همینطور بالعکس
توافق ایران و آمریکا وقتی پایدار میشود که خواستههای دو طرف تا حدی در آن آمده باشد تا دیگر انگیزهای برای زیر آن زدن نداشته باشند
اگر هر کشوری حس کند که با به هم زدن توافق، بیشتر گیرش میاد تا با ماندن در آن، زیرش خواهد زد
در پایان جنگ اول جهانی، محتوای توافق ورسای به آلمان انگیزه میداد که زیر آن بزند، چون چیز مثبتی به آلمان نمیرسید
بعد از جنگ جهانی دوم، سعی همه این شد که شرایطی ایجاد کنند که آلمان و فرانسه انگیزهای برای زدن زیر توافق نداشته باشند
فیلم کامل گفتوگو در لینک زیر
youtu.be/jhTxFdvAVlc -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Middle East Eye
@MiddleEastEye
Behind Israel's taunting Britain over the Falkland Islands lies a story of covert conflict between the two countries, which have generally historically been close allies.
Largely forgotten today, Israel armed Argentina against Britain during the Falklands War in the 1980s and caused the death of dozens of British soldiers -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Craig Mokhiber
@CraigMokhiber
Rumors are circulating in New York that Nickolay Mladenov, a loyal senior apparatchik in Trump’s criminal “Board of Peace,” is being considered as a compromise candidate for UN Secretary-General, as P5 states have been unable to agree on any of the current candidates. Such an appointment would cement control of the UN by the US-Israel Axis, further buttress impunity for their crimes, shelve the organization’s legal norms and standards in favor of raw state power, and significantly expedite the slide of the UN into oblivion. This is an existential moment for the UN. Either it will defend international law in opposition to the ravages of empire, or it will become a mere extension of that empire, at which point it could best advance peace, human rights, and development by dismantling itself.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
History shows wars are often decided by logistics. Iran has attacked that vulnerability: the US Navy lost access to its regional logistics hubs and now sends supply ships 2,200 miles to Diego Garcia, while warships resupply at sea every 5-6 days. As the NYT notes, “this is not sustainable.” The strain, if anything, is mounting.
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/09/02/us/iran-war-us-nav… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
a. Israel has been operating in Ali al-Taher for several weeks. At this stage, there is no indication that Iran intends to respond to this activity.
b. Iran has demonstrated over the past week a willingness to escalate its attacks in response to U.S. strikes in southern Iran. At the same time, even the Iranian response to this week’s unusual U.S. strike did not go beyond what Iran had done on previous occasions. This may indicate that, at this stage, Iran is not interested in further escalation, certainly not vis-à-vis Israel, since such escalation would not serve Tehran’s interests, particularly at the present time.
c. There is no indication of the presence of “dozens of IRGC members,” let alone two senior Iranian officers, in Ali al-Taher. Israel, which in fact has an interest in demonstrating Iranian involvement in Hezbollah’s fighting, has denied that Iranian fighters are present there.
d. There has been no unusual statement by senior Iranian officials indicating an intention to respond to Israeli activity in Ali al-Taher. Mohsen Rezaei, who was interviewed this week by Al-Manar, stressed that, from Iran’s perspective, Beirut and the Dahiyeh are red lines. He said nothing about Israeli activity in Ali al-Taher.
Bottom line: It is clear that someone has an interest in constraining continued Israeli activity that threatens Hezbollah’s continued presence in Ali al-Taher and perhaps even in trying to pressure Iran to step up pressure over Israeli activity on the ridge. But I would treat the credibility of this report with considerable skepticism.
The Jerusalem Post
@Jerusalem_Post
Iran warns the US of major retaliation if Israel attacks Hezbollah positions on the strategic Ali al-Taher ridge.
www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-907409 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
Iran can adapt to sanctions in various ways, but it does not have great options to sustain oil exports because China is its only customer.
You can't deliver oil to China in tanker trucks, but you can transport oil by rail. This is something Iran is doing, but it obviously can't move much volume.
The better option for Iran is to consume crude at home and export refined products and plastics to regional markets. But the vulnerability of downstream infrastructure and persistent domestic demand constrain how much that adaptation can compensate for the drop in oil revenue.
Rosemary Kelanic
@RKelanic
Iraq is now exporting ~5,000 tanker trucks of oil daily overland to Syria, which equals roughly ~1 mb/day.
Not economical if oil is $60/barrel, but it works at $80/barrel.
Guess what: Iran can do this, too.
Market adaptation giveth and taketh away.
www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/09/02/syria-eyeing-role… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rosemary Kelanic
@RKelanic
Iraq is now exporting ~5,000 tanker trucks of oil daily overland to Syria, which equals roughly ~1 mb/day.
Not economical if oil is $60/barrel, but it works at $80/barrel.
Guess what: Iran can do this, too.
Market adaptation giveth and taketh away.
www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/09/02/syria-eyeing-role… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
What's next: The Trump administration is working to set up an interagency task force to coordinate the implementation and enforcement of the economic pressure campaign against Iran, a U.S. official said
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇦🇪🇮🇷New: White House envoy Steve Witkoff met last weekend with the powerful UAE national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Zayed in the Mediterranean island of Sardinia and discussed next steps on Iran. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/09/02/witkoff-uae-iran-war-trump-bessent -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
انتخاب
@Entekhab_News
♦️ حسن روحانی:
🔹 فرقی نمیکند چه کسانی مسئول مذاکرات باشند، همه باید پشت سر آنها باشیم
🔹 تنگه هرمز باید پر رونق باشد؛ تنگه بدون کشتی به چه درد میخورد؟ ما که نمیخواهیم تجارت جهانی را بیرونق کنیم؛ ایران عبور بیضرر را میپذیرد
🔹 ما نباید به مردمی که این همه کار عظیم انجام دادند، احترام کنیم؟ یعنی صداوسیما باید گروهکی باقی بماند؟
🔹 رئیسجمهور میگوید صداوسیما را نگاه نمیکند، اصلاً چه کسی اعصاب دارد که نگاه کند؟ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gulf Research Center - مركز الخليج للأبحاث
@Gulf_Research
Dr Abdulaziz Sager, Founder & Chairman of the Gulf Research Center contributed to
@orsamorgtr publication on the Mecca Joint Defence Pact.
Dr. Abdulaziz Sager argues that the Mecca Pact strengthens #saudiarabia’s deterrence, defence capabilities and strategic autonomy by deepening cooperation with #türkiye and #pakistan. Rather than replacing existing U.S. or GCC partnerships, it adds another layer to the Kingdom’s increasingly diversified security architecture.
Read his contribution here:shortlink.grc.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/MeccaJointDe…
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement reflects an important evolution in #saudiarabia’s security strategy, strengthening deterrence, expanding strategic depth, and building greater national defence capacity.
In his latest contribution, GRC Chairman Dr. Abdulaziz Sager argues that the pact with Türkiye and Pakistan should be understood not as a strategic realignment, but as part of a broader Saudi approach to diversifying security partnerships while maintaining the United States and the GCC as central pillars of the Kingdom’s security architecture.
The agreement’s long-term significance may lie as much in what it helps Saudi Arabia build as in its collective defence commitment: deeper military coordination, stronger air and missile defence, counter-drone and maritime capabilities, technology transfer, defence industrialisation, and greater preparedness for an increasingly complex regional threat environment.
Ultimately, the Mecca Pact points to greater Saudi strategic agency—an approach in which Riyadh is not simply participating in regional security arrangements, but increasingly developing the capabilities and partnerships needed to shape them.
The Mecca Pact should not be viewed as an alternative to the GCC security framework, but rather as an additional layer within it.
Gulf security remains structurally interconnected across its airspace, maritime routes, energy infrastructure, and critical supply chains. This makes the #gcc an indispensable element of Saudi Arabia’s regional security calculations. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 يكشف تحقيق من نيويورك تايمز أن مشكلة البحرية الأميركية في الشرق الأوسط لم تعد فقط في مخزون الصواريخ المتبقي أو خطر الهجمات الإيرانية، بل في القدرة على إبقاء نحو 20 سفينة و20 ألف بحار ومارينز في المنطقة من دون شبكة إمداد قريبة وآمنة.
🔷 تدمير القاعدة اللوجستية في البحرين وإغلاق الموانئ القريبة دفع البحرية إلى الاعتماد على دييغو غارسيا وسنغافورة وإلى عمليات تموين بحرية متكررة. ومع وجود 11 حاملة فقط، واستخدام أربع منها في الحرب، وعملية انتشار وصلت إلى تسعة أشهر بلا عمليات رسو منتظمة في الموانئ، وبذلك أصبحت استدامة هذا الوجود البحري أحد القيود الاستراتيجية الأساسية على استمرار الحرب بهذا الحجم.
هذا أهم ما ورد في التحقيق
🔷 تحتاج القوة البحرية الأمريكية المنتشرة في المنطقة كل أسبوع إلى أكثر من 420 ألف وجبة ونحو ثمانية ملايين غالون من الوقود. وتستهلك طائرات ومروحيات كل حاملة نحو مليوني غالون أسبوعياً، رغم أن الحاملات نفسها تعمل بالطاقة النووية.
🔷 إيران لم تكتف بضرب منشآت عسكرية، بل دمرت في اليوم الأول للحرب، 28 فبراير، قاعدة لوجستية حيوية للبحرية الأميركية في البحرين، كانت تمثل مركزاً قريباً لتخزين ونقل الوقود والغذاء وقطع الغيار والإمدادات.
🔷 أصبحت الموانئ الإقليمية الأخرى القادرة على استقبال حاملات الطائرات أو سفن الإمداد غير متاحة أيضاً؛ لأنها تقع داخل مدى الصواريخ الباليستية والمسيّرات الإيرانية. وبذلك فقدت البحرية عملياً شبكة الإمداد القريبة التي بنتها خلال عقود من العمل في الخليج.
🔷 اضطرت سفن الإمداد إلى التوجه نحو دييغو غارسيا في المحيط الهندي، في رحلة تقارب 2,200 ميل في اتجاه واحد، لتحميل الوقود والغذاء وقطع الغيار، ثم العودة إلى السفن المنتشرة في بحر العرب وخليج عُمان.
🔷 البديل التالي هو سنغافورة، على مسافة تقارب 3,700 ميل، مع ضرورة المرور عبر مضيق ملقا المزدحم تجارياً. وهذا يعني أن فقدان البحرين نقل عمق الإمداد الأميركي من الخليج إلى وسط المحيط الهندي أو جنوب شرقي آسيا.
🔷 نتيجة غياب الموانئ القريبة، أصبحت البحرية مضطرة إلى إجراء عمليات تموين في البحر كل خمسة أو ستة أيام، وليس بصورة عرضية أو طارئة.
🔷 أثناء التموين، تسير السفينة الحربية وسفينة الإمداد جنباً إلى جنب لساعات وعلى مسافة تقارب 150 قدماً فقط، مع ضرورة المحافظة على سرعة ومسار متطابقين رغم الأمواج والتيارات والرياح.
🔷 يطلق البحارة حبلاً أولياً بين السفينتين باستخدام البنادق، ثم تُمد كابلات فولاذية وخراطيم الوقود، وتُنقل فوقها منصات الغذاء والذخائر وقطع الغيار. وفي الوقت نفسه، تنقل المروحيات الشحنات والبريد في شبكات معلقة تحتها.
🔷 هذه العملية تعرّض سفينتين في وقت واحد للخطر، وتفرض عليهما حركة متوقعة ومقيدة لساعات. ولذلك أصبحت عملية الإمداد نفسها نقطة ضعف يمكن مراقبتها أو استهدافها، لا مجرد عبء مالي إضافي.
🔷 أمضت الحاملة أبراهام لينكولن معظم فترة انتشارها، التي بلغت تسعة أشهر، من دون زيارات للموانئ. وفي الظروف الطبيعية تزور الحاملة ميناءً مرة كل شهر تقريباً لمنح الطاقم فترة راحة.
🔷 لم تبدأ لينكولن العودة إلى قاعدتها في سان دييغو إلا بعد أن حلت محلها جورج واشنطن في 20 أغسطس. وكان مقرراً أن تتوقف في تايلاند لبضعة أيام، في أول استراحة فعلية تقريباً بعد الانتشار الطويل.
🔷 بقاء السفن مفتوح المدة يعني أنها لن تعود وفق دورة انتشار مقررة، بل فقط عندما يقرر الرئيس ووزير الدفاع سحبها أو استبدالها. وهذا يربط دورة صيانة الأسطول وراحة الأطقم مباشرة بالقرار السياسي في الحرب.
طبيعة هذا الانتشار
🔷 تحتفظ البحرية الأميركية حالياً بنحو 20 سفينة حربية و20 ألف بحار ومشاة بحرية في الشرق الأوسط، في انتشار مفتوح المدة مرتبط بحصار الموانئ الإيرانية.
🔷 يتكوّن الانتشار الأساسي من حاملتي الطائرات يو إس إس جورج بوش ويو إس إس جورج واشنطن، ترافقهما 12 مدمرة، إضافة إلى مجموعة برمائية من ثلاث سفن تحمل قوة اقتحام من مشاة البحرية.
الخلاصة التي يثبتها التقرير
🔷 حققت إيران أثراً استراتيجياً كبيراً من خلال ضرب عقدة البحرين اللوجستية، فهي لم تُخرج حاملات الطائرات والمدمرات الأميركية من المعركة، لكنها رفعت كلفة إبقائها فيها، ومددت خطوط إمدادها آلاف الأميال، وأجبرتها على تنفيذ عمليات تموين بحرية متكررة ومعقدة.
🔷 الأزمة ليست أن السفن نفد منها الوقود أو الغذاء، بل أن الحفاظ على جاهزيتها أصبح يعتمد على سلسلة إمداد طويلة وهشة، وعلى عدد محدود من سفن التموين، في وقت تستنزف فيه الحرب الحاملات والأطقم ودورات الصيانة. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregg Carlstrom
@glcarlstrom
At Jebel Ali, the largest port in the Middle East: "Volumes plunged more than 90% in the early weeks of the conflict, according to DP World executives, and have barely recovered since."
A data point to keep in mind when people in Washington claim America is wrenching the strait back open. Those claims are narrowly focused on oil. An enormous range of other goods still isn't getting through Hormuz. www.ft.com/content/daab8d53-7c4f-479b-be84-d073ba32897e?s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
Dans son dernier livre, "Comme un étranger dans mon propre pays", Nir Avishai Cohen raconte de l’intérieur une transformation profonde de la société et de l’armée israéliennes.
J’ai le livre en hébreu, mais je viens de découvrir qu’il est paru discrètement cet été, début août, en français aux éditions L’Harmattan. Je remercie vivement cette maison d’édition de contribuer à faire connaître ce genre de livres et d’auteurs, dont la voix me paraît particulièrement importante aujourd’hui.
Nir Avishai Cohen @NirACohen77 est un homme assez rare. Officier de réserve dans l’armée israélienne, il n’a pas hésité, après le 7 octobre, à retourner servir, convaincu alors qu’il s’agissait d’une guerre de défense d’Israël. Mais après trois mois passés sur le terrain, son regard a profondément changé. Il refusera ensuite d’y retourner.
Car Nir aime son pays, mais il n’est pas aveugle.
Israélien laïque et moderne, âgé de 45 ans, ancien porte-parole de Breaking the Silence et militant de longue date pour la paix, il est également l’auteur de deux livres profondément engagés que je conseille à tous ceux qui cherchent à comprendre les transformations actuelles de la société israélienne.
Dans "Comme un étranger dans mon propre pays", il décrit avec beaucoup de force la manière dont l’armée israélienne a, selon lui, changé en profondeur.
Il explique qu’après environ trois mois de guerre à Gaza, les principaux objectifs militaires de Tsahal avaient été atteints et que, selon lui, la guerre aurait alors dû s’arrêter, permettant de ramener les otages. Mais le gouvernement israélien ne voulait pas mettre fin aux opérations, estime-t-il, notamment parce qu’il aurait alors fallu faire face à l’échec sécuritaire du 7 octobre et à ses responsabilités politiques.
Et puis, il y a le fanatisme religieux.
Il raconte un épisode particulièrement révélateur.
Un officier militaire lui aurait proposé un poste plus important, à une condition : qu’il présente des excuses pour un article dans lequel il comparait l’influence de la religion et du fanatisme religieux au sein du Hamas avec celle des courants religieux et messianiques qui prennent, selon lui, de plus en plus de place dans la société israélienne et dans l’armée.
Il lui aurait été demandé de s’excuser devant un haut responsable militaire proche du courant du sionisme religieux, qui s’était senti offensé par ses propos.
Bien sûr, Nir refusera.
Mais pour lui, cet épisode est révélateur d’une évolution beaucoup plus profonde : celle d’une armée dans laquelle l’influence des courants religieux et messianiques est devenue de plus en plus importante.
Il dénonce ainsi une guerre qu’il considère comme de plus en plus violente, alimentée par une minorité de fanatiques religieux, aussi bien du côté du Hamas que dans certains courants du sionisme religieux israélien — et dont les peuples israélien et palestinien seraient devenus les otages.
« Le peuple palestinien n’est pas notre ennemi », affirme-t-il.
Il raconte aussi combien il lui est devenu difficile de ne pas remarquer, au sein de l’armée, la présence croissante de soldats portant la kippa et défendant une vision religieuse de l’État et de la guerre.
Pour Nir, Tsahal n’est plus aujourd’hui uniquement « une armée de défense ». Et s’il lui arrive encore de défendre quelqu’un, estime-t-il, ce sont désormais les colons de Judée-Samarie.
Ce qui rend son témoignage particulièrement précieux, c’est justement qu’il ne vient pas d’un observateur extérieur. Il vient d’un homme qui a servi dans cette armée, qui aime profondément son pays, qui a voulu le défendre après le 7 octobre, puis qui a changé de regard en découvrant de l’intérieur ce qu’elle était devenue.
Beaucoup de ses amis ont quitté Israël. Lui a choisi de rester.
Il reste profondément attaché à la langue hébraïque, à la culture israélienne et à son pays, avec l’espoir de pouvoir encore contribuer à influencer le cours des événements. En attendant, il se sent « comme un étranger dans son propre pays ».
Je vous conseille vraiment de lire ce livre. Il est rempli d’histoires étonnantes, parfois poignantes, et apporte un regard rare, lucide et plein de sagesse sur les transformations qui traversent aujourd’hui Israël.
Et surtout : achetez des livres comme celui-ci.
Ils permettent à des voix différentes de se faire entendre.
Découvrir le livre « Comme un étranger dans mon propre pays » aux éditions L’Harmattan.
www.editions-harmattan.fr/catalogue/livre/comme-un-etrang… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Axios reported that a U.S. official said the strikes on launchers in Hormuz have degraded Iran’s ability to target ships attempting to break the blockade.
The intention may be genuine, and Iran has lost some launchers. But when the full arc of launchers on land and at sea is taken into account, we are looking at many hundreds of launchers that were not destroyed in 40 days of intense war and months of attacks.
Whatever the American strikes hit, they are still far from compromising Iran’s ability to strike ships in Hormuz.
That capacity has not been compromised, but the attacks clearly bothered the Iranians, who retaliated on several fronts.
That is because Iranian forces are working hard to rebuild their monitoring structure in the Strait, far more than the launchers themselves. In that respect, the American strikes against this land-based monitoring network along the Strait make complete sense.
But again, to degrade that Iranian capability it would be necessary, beyond the launchers, to suppress smaller radars on land and aboard ships, and above all the drones operating in the Strait that guide those missiles. That is why this mission is not easy. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Told @AP that neither #iran nor the U.S. can continue indefinitely in this zone between full-scale war and a truce. At some point, one of the sides may see a need to escalate in order to break this cycle, and that could bring the two sides to a point that they have been trying to avoid until now, which is a full-scale war.
apnews.com/article/iran-us-strikes-hormuz-trump-september… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
According to the narrative emerging from the main commentaries in media close to the Iranian establishment, when Trump says he does not need to negotiate with Iran in reality is not displaying strength, but rather trying to conceal the fact that Washington no longer has sufficient leverage to impose negotiations on Tehran on American terms.
- In other words, Trump would not be rejecting negotiations as such; rather, he would be rejecting negotiations in which the United States can no longer dictate the terms.
- According to this line of argument, it follows that any new negotiations would now have to take place on the basis of conditions and frameworks on which Tehran insists.
For Trump, accepting a different outcome would amount to a political admission that coercion has failed.
- There is also a message directed at Iran’s domestic audience: keep resisting, because Washington is supposedly entering a phase in which the economic costs of the war-oil prices, inflation, energy costs and the electoral impact in the United States -are beginning to work in Iran’s favour.
- Whether accurate or not, one can say that perceptions shape behaviour.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Very smart piece from @nahaltoosi, closely aligns with how I explain this dynamic to clients.
There are debates within the leadership over tactics, but not strategy. There is bickering (some of it driven more by personality and ambition, rather than ideology or policy) but not fracturing.
It's not clear the administration recognizes or understands this nuance.
www.politico.com/news/magazine/2026/09/02/does-trump-know… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Hashem علي هاشم
@Alihashem
Yesterday’s exchange confirms that Washington isn’t seeking a prolonged war with Iran. Trump wants a controlled siege, enough pressure to erode Iran’s leverage over the Strait without a full-blown campaign. The longer Iran stays locked in reaction mode, the weaker its bargaining chips become.
Expect more rounds like this. Washington’s goal isn’t just safe passage through Hormuz, it’s normalising the wider regional order, for the Gulf states and beyond. As long as Iran plays by Washington’s rules of engagement, its options stay narrow.
This is a no-war-no-peace equilibrium. It could easily outlast the midterms, and run into next year. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
محمود علوش - Mahmoud Allouch
@mahmoudallouch
رغم أن سوريا بحاجة إلى إبرام اتفاق أمني مع إسرائيل، إلا أن الظروف والوقت لم يعودا ضاغطين عليها كما كانا سابقا. فمن جهة، تُدرك دمشق أن نتنياهو لم يُرد منذ البداية اتفاقا أمنيا، وبالتالي، أصبحت العملية التفاوضية أداة للشرع لكسب الوقت من أجل ترتيب أوضاعه الداخلية وحسم الجزء الأكبر من التحديات الداخلية لتعزيز الموقف في التعامل مع التحدي الإسرائيلي. ومن جانب آخر، لم يكن إبرام اتفاق مع إسرائيل بأي ثمن عقبة أمام الكثير من المبادرات الأمريكية المهمة تجاه سوريا، مثل رفع الغطاء عن قسد، ورفع العقوبات وإزالتها من قوائم الدول الراعية للإرهاب. وهذا كان عُنصرًا مفاجئا نسبيًا في السياسة الأمريكية. هنا تحوّل الوقت من أداة مفيدة لنتنياهو إلى أداة مفيدة للشرع. هذا الوضع يضع إسرائيل في مأزق كبير في فرض شروطها على سوريا، وقد يدفع نتنياهو إلى محاولة إرباك المشهد السوري من خلال التصعيد للخروج من هذا المأزق. وما قد يُحفزه على ذلك أكثر هو الحاجة الداخلية مع قرب الانتخابات. هذه فترة صعبة لا يُمكن التنبؤ فيها بسلوك نتنياهو، لكنه يواجه مأزقا كبيرا في الداخل وفي سوريا.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇦🇪🇮🇷New: White House envoy Steve Witkoff met last weekend with the powerful UAE national security adviser Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Zayed in the Mediterranean island of Sardinia and discussed next steps on Iran. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/09/02/witkoff-uae-iran-war-trump-bessent -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷U.S. strikes two Iranian government oil tankers under new "tanker for tanker" policy. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/09/02/iran-tankers-hormuz-attacks-oil -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Meshal Hamad AlThani
@Amb_AlThani
It is deeply disappointing to see America’s senior-most representative to Israel @USAmbIsrael speak so disparagingly—and inaccurately—about Qatar, a Major Non-NATO Ally and key strategic partner of the United States.
For the record, once again: Qatar has nothing to do with antisemitism or anti-Israel sentiment on American college campuses. These allegations have been examined repeatedly and have not been substantiated at all. I and many others have addressed this point, repeatedly. Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, then Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines made clear there was no evidence linking Qatar to the campus protests in question.
The overwhelming majority of Qatar’s funding to these institutions supports the operation of their campuses in Qatar. These are large, fully functioning universities educating students in Qatar and across the region through American academic institutions and American educational standards. Because these are American universities, the funds generally flow through and are reported by their U.S.-based institutions. But that does not mean the money is being spent to influence students or political discourse on campuses in the United States. Once the costs associated with operating these campuses in Qatar are separated from the headline figures, Qatar’s direct philanthropic giving to universities inside the United States is comparatively limited.
@StateDept_NEA -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Najafi
@Mostafa_Najafii
تابآوری بدون بازدارندگی منجر به پایان تجاوز دشمن نمیشود!
جنگ میان ایران و آمریکا هفتههاست وارد بازی تابآوری شده است. ایران در بازی تابآوری به دنبال حفظ بقا و ایجاد بازدارندگی از طریق انکار موفقیت دشمن است. آمریکا نیز به دنبال آن است که با فشار چندلایه این تابآوری را بشکند. در تابآوری، فشار در درون جذب، مدیریت و مهار میشود؛ هدف، حفظ بقا، تداوم عملکرد و صیانت از ظرفیتهای ملی در برابر ضربه است.
اما در بازدارندگی، مسئله فراتر از تحمل فشار است و باید محاسبات دشمن درباره مطلوبیت و امکان موفقیت در توسل به زور تغییر کند؛ بهگونهای که اقدام خصمانه برای او پرهزینه، پرریسک یا کمفایده شود.
از این منظر، تابآوری بخشی از بازی بزرگتر جنگ است و کارکرد آن صرفاً تحمل ضربه نیست. کشوری که بتواند پس از ضربه، ظرفیتهای حیاتی خود را حفظ کند، عملکرد خود را ادامه دهد و سریعتر بازیابی و انطباق پیدا کند، میتواند احتمال موفقیت دشمن را کاهش دهد. بنابراین، تابآوری میتواند یکی از پایههای بازدارندگی مبتنی بر انکار باشد؛ زیرا به دشمن نشان میدهد که واردکردن ضربه لزوماً به دستیابی به هدف منجر نخواهد شد.
با این حال، تابآوری بهتنهایی همه مسئله بازدارندگی را حل نمیکند. بازدارندگی میتواند علاوه بر انکار، بر مجازات نیز استوار باشد؛ یعنی دشمن بداند که اقدام او با هزینهای جدی و قابلتحمل برای خودش مواجه خواهد شد. در این سطح، مسئله دیگر صرفاً نتوانستن دشمن در دستیابی به هدف نیست، بلکه نامطلوبشدنو پرهزینه شدن اقدام برای دشمن است.
از این رو، اگر بازدارندگی نتواند محاسبه هزینه ـ فایده طرف مقابل را تغییر دهد، اتکای صرف به تابآوری ممکن است کشور را در معرض چرخهای از ضربه و فرسایش قرار دهد. تابآوری میتواند تضمین کند که ضربه به فروپاشی منجر نمیشود، اما لزوماً تضمین نمیکند که دشمن از واردکردن ضربه منصرف شود.
در نتیجه، تابآوری باید مکمل بازدارندگی باشد. تابآوری با حفظ ظرفیتهای حیاتی، تداوم عملکرد و کاهش احتمال موفقیت دشمن، پایه بازدارندگی مبتنی بر انکار را تقویت میکند؛ در حالی که توان پاسخ و تحمیل هزینه، بازدارندگی مبتنی بر مجازات را تقویت میکند.
زمانی میتوان به پایان یافتن جنگ امیدوار بود که کشور هم توان ایستادن پس از ضربه را داشته باشد و هم بتواند دشمن را از واردکردن آن ضربه منصرف کند و قدرت راهبردی زمانی کاملتر میشود که هر دو گزاره برای دشمن باورپذیر باشند. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Iran’s General Staff and Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters issue a direct warning to regional states hosting US forces:
- Tehran says it will no longer tolerate attacks launched from any foreign territory, airspace or coastline, and that both the IRGC and the regular army will strike “the origin of any aggression.”
- it adds if US operations against Iran are launched from bases in third countries, those bases themselves may be treated as legitimate targets.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
درخواست عاصم منیر برای لغو بند ۱۳ توافق ایران و آمریکا
مهمترین خواسته عاصم منیر در سفر به تهران درخواست عبور از پیششرطهای مندرج در بند ۱۳ تفاهمنامه اسلامآباد و ورود مستقیم به مرحله جدید مذاکرات بوده است.
این درخواست به صراحت از سوی ایران رد شد. بند ۱۳، آغاز مذاکرات برای توافق نهایی را صریحاً مشروط به اجرای بندهای ۱، ۴، ۵، ۱۰ و ۱۱ کرده است.
این پنج بند، یک بسته بههمپیوسته امنیتی ـ اقتصادی را تشکیل میدهند: «بند ۱» خاتمه جنگ و توقف عملیات نظامی در تمام جبهه ها از جمله لبنان؛ «بند ۴» رفع محاصره و بازگشایی مسیرهای دریایی؛ «بند ۵» تضمین امنیت تردد کشتیهای تجاری؛ «بند ۱۰» صدور معافیتهای لازم برای صادرات نفت و خدمات مرتبط؛ و «بند ۱۱» آزادسازی داراییهای مسدودشده ایران را شامل میشود.
از منظر امنیت ملی، پذیرش کنار گذاشتن بند ۱۳ برای ایران به معنای ورود دوباره به مذاکرات بدون دریافت تضمینهای عملی و پیشینی بود. تجربه ماههای گذشته نیز نشان داده که توقف درگیری، امنیت دریانوردی و کاهش فشار اقتصادی، متغیرهایی مستقل از یکدیگر نیستند؛ بلکه اجزای یک معامله امنیتی واحدند.
بنابر درخواست عاصم منیر -که البته رد شد- ایران با عبور از بند ۱۳، اهرمهای خود را پیش از اجرای تعهدات آمریکا واگذار میکند و بار دیگر با الگویی مواجه شود که در آن تهران وارد مذاکرات جدید میشود، اما اجرای تعهدات طرف مقابل به آینده نامعلوم موکول میگردد.
در این چارچوب، اصرار ایران بر بند ۱۳ بیش از آنکه یک موضع شکلی باشد، تلاشی برای حفظ «ترتیب امنیتی اجرای توافق» و جلوگیری از تبدیل مذاکره به جایگزین اجرای تعهدات است. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
ABBAS عباس شريفة
@abbas_sharifeh
بحسب هآرتس تلقت إسرائيل أربع ضربات كبيرة في سوريا .
1. اندماج قسد في الدولة السورية أنهى مشروع التقسيم
2 رفع سوريا عن ثوائم الدول الداعمة للإرهاب أسقط سردية السلطة الإرهابية .
3. تراجع شعبية الهجري في السويداء جعل ورقة السويداء غير فاعلة
4. تدفق الاستثمارات إلى سوريا سيزيل عنها وصف الدولة القاشلة .
كما أن هناك مشاريع كبيرة انتقلت من إسرائيل إلى سوريا مثل مشروع مد الألياف الضوئية.
والضربة الخامسة قادمة على الطرق .
وهي تتعلق بقرار الولايات المتحدة فتح السفارة الأمريكية في دمشق قريبا . -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
In the latest blog in the @Clingendaelorg series Iran in Transition, @jafariysaeid analyzes how the war has reshaped #iran’s nuclear debate.
He argues that, even if policy remains unchanged, the strategic debate among Iran’s ruling elites over the need for weaponization to restore deterrence has shifted significantly.
www.clingendael.org/publication/diplomacy-deterrence-how-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le magnifique porche de Montaiguet....
Ferrier Jean Michel
@JM_Ferrier
En passant par les chemins de Montaiguet en Forez ...@Allierdpt @PAC1515 @Hadrien6321 @Malbrunot
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Vaez
@AliVaez
Six months since the start of Operation Epic Fury/Roaring Lion - and also a month since the last recorded U.S. strike on Iranian soil. After a period of major hostilities, then ceasefire(ish), then diplomacy(ish), Washington & Tehran are now in their own war between the wars. 1/
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
Sources tell Rudaw that the Iranian-backed militias in Iraq offered to freeze their activities for 2 years rather than disarming (as the US is pushing for). The US rejected the offer. I tend to believe the report, as the militias hope that once Trump leaves power, they'll be in the clear, and just need to survive his remaining time in office. www.rudaw.net/english/categories/iraq/1079012
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Naser al-Tamimi | ناصر التميمي
@nasertamimi
🇪🇬🌍
لماذا تتردد مصر في الانضمام إلى اتفاق مكة؟
في مذكرة بحثية نشرتها اليوم بي إم آي (BMI)، وهي شركة أبحاث عالمية متخصصة تابعة لـفيتش سوليوشنز (Fitch Solutions) ضمن مجموعة فيتش للتصنيف الائتماني، رجّحت الشركة أن تبقى مصر خارج اتفاق مكة خلال المدى القريب، أي خلال 12–18 شهراً. ولا يبدو أن هذا التردد يعكس رفضاً لمبدأ التعاون الدفاعي بقدر ما يعكس حسابات أكثر تعقيداً تتعلق بكلفة الاصطفاف وحدود الالتزام. فالقاهرة تفضّل الحفاظ على حرية الحركة، وتتجنب الدخول في ترتيبات دفاعية ملزمة أو غامضة قد تقيّد قرارها السياسي والعسكري، خصوصاً مع عدم وضوح طبيعة الالتزامات التي قد يرتبها الاتفاق.
العامل الأثقل في حسابات القاهرة هو شبكة العلاقات التي نسجتها مع أطراف قد تتعارض مصالحها جزئياً مع بعض الدول المنخرطة في الاتفاق. فالإمارات، على سبيل المثال، تمثل شريكاً اقتصادياً واستثمارياً بالغ الأهمية لمصر؛ إذ استحوذت على نحو 26% من صافي تدفقات الاستثمار الأجنبي منذ يوليو/تموز 2021، وترتفع حصتها إلى نحو 55% إذا احتُسبت الصفقات العقارية الاستثنائية. وهذا يمنح أبوظبي ثقلاً لا تستطيع القاهرة تجاهله عند حساب كلفة أي اصطفاف إقليمي جديد.
وفي الاتجاه نفسه، يظل التقارب المصري مع تركيا محكوماً بسقف تفرضه علاقات القاهرة مع الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل واليونان وقبرص. فواشنطن تبقى الشريك الدفاعي الأهم لمصر، فيما يزداد اعتمادها على الغاز الإسرائيلي، الذي قد يغطي نحو ربع استهلاكها بحلول 2030. كما أن شراكات مصر مع اليونان وقبرص في شرق المتوسط تضيف طبقة أخرى من التعقيد إلى أي تقارب دفاعي أوسع مع أنقرة.
أما العامل الباكستاني، فيضيف حساسية مختلفة. فتعميق الالتزامات الدفاعية مع إسلام آباد قد يزيد التدقيق الأميركي في التعاون المصري-الصيني، كما قد يعقّد علاقة القاهرة المتنامية مع الهند، الشريك الاقتصادي والاستراتيجي المهم لمصر.
الخلاصة: مشكلة مصر ليست في مبدأ التعاون الدفاعي، بل في أن اتفاقاً كهذا قد يتحول من مظلة أمنية إلى قيد استراتيجي. لذلك ستواصل القاهرة على الأرجح سياسة الموازنة بين شركائها، ما لم تتدهور البيئة الأمنية بدرجة تجعل فوائد الردع أعلى من كلفة الاصطفاف. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammed A. Salih
@MohammedASalih
We still have to wait for official confirmation from the US side.
But if true, this would bring an end to a chapter in the history of US-Kurdish cooperation. And perhaps not the most prudent move, even from the perspective of US interests.
That said, there is — and will likely continue to be — room and opportunities for further mutual cooperation in the future.
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
The US Department of Defense has told leaders of Iraq's semiautonomous Kurdistan region in recent meetings that the administration is not planning to renew an expiring agreement which provides security assistance to the Peshmerga, the Kurdish security forces.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
My latest for @TIME:
Trump is betting economic pressure will weaken #iran without another war. But Tehran may conclude that waiting only leaves it weaker, making escalation paradoxically more likely.
time.com/article/2026/08/29/iran-escalation-trump-economi… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Grand plaisir de retrouver les auditeurs de RTL chaque samedi matin.
RTL Matin Weekend
@RTLmatinweekend
Nouvelle chronique dans la matinale.
Le samedi @Malbrunot a 8h15 décrypte les dessous de la politique internationale. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
Two Takeaways Instead of a Six-Month War Summary
First, the Iran-U.S. confrontation is not a zero-sum game. The fact that the United States and Israel have so far failed to achieve their strategic objectives in the war, namely regime change, dismantling Iran’s nuclear program, and neutralizing its missile capabilities, did not make Iran the winner. Despite its achievements, foremost among them the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its demonstration of an ability to inflict severe damage on its neighbors and the global economy, Iran emerged from the phase of high-intensity fighting with significant economic damage, badly damaged industries, a new leader struggling to consolidate his rule, and growing challenges to its ability to employ its proxies in the face of mounting pressure on them, for example in Lebanon and Iraq.
By the same token, the fact that Iran now appears to be losing momentum, that the United States is succeeding in partially reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and that the naval blockade is exacting an increasingly heavy toll on Iran does not mean that the United States is winning. Even if U.S. military achievements ultimately make it possible to restore the status quo that prevailed in the Strait of Hormuz before the war, and even that remains far from certain, this does not change the fact that the war’s original strategic objectives have not been achieved, at least so far.
Second, even if the phase of high-intensity warfare appears to be behind us, and that is by no means certain, it is still too early to sum up the war. Iran retains the ability to escalate the crisis in ways that could impose heavy costs on the United States, its neighbors, and the global economy. It is not clear why Iran is currently refraining from further escalation, whether this reflects operational constraints, a preference to give diplomacy another chance, or an assessment in Tehran that time is still on its side. Either way, Iran’s calculus could change quickly, and with it, the dynamics of the confrontation.
Two conclusions follow.
The first is that all of us need a considerable degree of analytical humility. Developments over the past several months demonstrate just how quickly the balance of achievements and setbacks on both sides can shift. We should therefore be prepared to reassess our previous judgments and avoid, as much as possible, simplistic, binary portrayals of “winners” and “losers.”
The second is the need to guard against triumphalism and against overestimating the significance of temporary gains. Until recently, the Iranian leadership appeared to have fallen in love with its own victory narrative and with the belief that time was on its side. Now that the trend appears less favorable from Tehran’s perspective, Washington should be careful not to fall into the same trap. Recent U.S. achievements do not guarantee that Iran will capitulate to American demands, much less that the regime will collapse.
In a conflict that has yet to be decided, what at one point appears to be a dramatic shift in the balance of power in favor of one side may ultimately prove to have been only a temporary advantage. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
AL-MONITOR
@AlMonitor
Iraq reinforces Saudi border security amid militia tensions: What to know
Iraq is sending the reinforcements in response to Iran-backed militia attacks and as it looks to build security ties with Riyadh. www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/08/iraq-reinforces-saud… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇦🇪 The “spy sheikh” is now a major backer of the Trump family’s new crypto bank.
Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed, UAE national security adviser and brother of the country’s president, sits behind a 49% stake in the holding company for World Liberty’s planned U.S. bank. A Trump-family entity holds another 38%.
That same circle that put $500 million into World Liberty around inauguration is now attached to a federally chartered trust bank meant to issue and hold their dollar stablecoin.
Source: WSJ / Writer: Lynn -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Middle East Eye
@MiddleEastEye
"They’re so disgusting."
Former US diplomat Hala Rharrit, who resigned in 2024 over Gaza, responds to the Biden officials who’ve recently claimed they should have done more on Gaza.
Watch early by joining MEE's YouTube membership ➡ youtu.be/UEJdz49l2WEThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Ahmadi
@AliR_Ahmadi
US Navy is running out of money because of the Iran War: Leaked Pentagon memo says the Navy has “shortfalls in payroll” accounts due to DoD “raiding” them to fund the war. www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/aug/27/trump-iran-war-na…
I also suspect this is the real reason why US-South Korea drills were cut back. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Institute for the Study of War
@TheStudyofWar
NEW: The Iranian officials currently dominating regime decision-making appear to retain their anti-concessions stance vis-à-vis the United States despite compounding US economic pressure and a worsening domestic fuel crisis. Western media has recently reported long lines at gas stations and gas station closures as a result of fuel shortages across Iran.
Other Key Takeaways:
Key decision-makers in Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s inner circle continue to threaten to respond to US economic pressure and do not appear to have softened their position on core regime demands.
Some senior Pezeshkian administration officials are trying to downplay the situation and reassure the public, likely to try to mitigate the risk of social unrest during this economic crisis.
The Iranian regime appears to be considering several courses of action to address the fuel crisis, including potentially raising gasoline prices. Raising fuel prices has previously caused widespread protests in Iran.
Some peripheral elements of the Iranian regime are more openly advocating for the development of nuclear weapons.
These parliamentarians and commentators’ support for nuclear weapons development reflects a public debate over how Iran should restore deterrence after the recent US-Israel-Iran War, similar to debates that followed the June 2025 Israel-Iran War.
The recent public discussions about nuclear weapons among peripheral elements of the regime may reflect decreased control over the information space by the Supreme Leader, as opposed to an actual increase in discussions about nuclear weapons. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
28 minutes
@28minutes
🔍 Iran : nouvelles sanctions américaines
👉 Guillaume Lagane, enseignant à @sciencespo, spé. des questions de défense
👉 Agnès Levallois, présidente de @IiReMMO, spé. du Proche-Orient
👉 @Malbrunot, grand reporter au @Le_Figaro, spé. du Moyen-Orient
🔗www.arte.tv/fr/videos/115078-130-A/28-minutes/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Charles Lister
@Charles_Lister
#syria’s first @Visa payment, conducted last night by President al-Sharaa in a #damascus hotel alongside Central Bank Governor @SafwatRaslan.
The #trump admin’s removal of the SST was instrumental.
Step by step… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
In this fascinating new piece, my colleague @frencio_schiavi argues that trucking is transforming the Middle East not just through new trade corridors, but also by creating new cultural encounters as truckers crisscross a once disintegrated region.
www.bourseandbazaar-substack.org/p/as-maritime-trade-stru… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴تمثل الرسالة الشخصية التي بعث بها الشيخ محمد بن زايد إلى الملك سلمان محاولة لتجاوز ولي العهد الأمير محمد بن سلمان والتواصل مباشرة مع رأس الدولة السعودية، وليست مجرد دعوة بروتوكولية إلى مؤتمر دولي للمياه. وفق ما قاله دبلوماسيون أميركيون وعرب.
تقرير بالغ الحساسية والأهمية من ميديل ايست اي. هذا أهم ما جاء فيه
🔷 تحمل رسالة محمد بن زايد، في قراءة التقرير، دلالة إضافية تتمثل في تجاوز قناة الوساطة التي سبق أن اقترحها محمد بن سلمان عبر طحنون بن زايد وخالد بن سلمان.
🔷 كان محمد بن سلمان قد أرسل في وقت سابق رسالة إلى مستشار الأمن الوطني الإماراتي طحنون بن زايد، عرض فيها مخاوف الرياض من الأنشطة الإماراتية في اليمن والسودان.
🔷 اقترحت رسالة ولي العهد السعودي إنشاء قناة رسمية لمعالجة الخلافات، يكون طرفها السعودي شقيقه ووزير الدفاع خالد بن سلمان، في مقابل طحنون بن زايد من الجانب الإماراتي.
🔷 يشير انتقال محمد بن زايد إلى مخاطبة الملك سلمان مباشرة إلى أن القيادة الإماراتية لم تعتمد القناة المقترحة أو لم ترَ أنها قادرة على معالجة الأزمة؛ لكن هذه خلاصة استدلالية للتقرير وليست موقفاً إماراتياً معلناً.
🔷 قال مسؤول غربي مطلع على المسألة إن الإماراتيين شعروا بأنه «لم يعد أمامهم خيار سوى التوجه مباشرة إلى قمة السلطة»، مضيفاً أن محمد بن سلمان «لن يكون سعيداً بهذا الأسلوب».
🔷 عرضت الولايات المتحدة التوسط بين السعودية والإمارات، وكان متوقعاً أن يزور مسؤول أميركي رفيع أبوظبي خلال هذا الأسبوع، لكن الزيارة لم تتم، وفق مصدر أميركي.
🔷 كان ستيف ويتكوف، مبعوث ترامب الخاص للسلام، يعتزم زيارة الإمارات في وقت سابق من أغسطس، إلا أن الرحلة أُلغيت أيضاً، وفق معلومات خاصة حصل عليها موقع «ميدل إيست آي».
🔷 أفاد التقرير بأن السعودية، بعد فترة قصيرة من التنسيق مع الإمارات خلال الحرب على إيران، اتجهت إلى دعم مسار وساطة تقوده باكستان، وأن أبوظبي حاولت منع هذا التحول السعودي.
🔷 المحصلة أن الخلاف تجاوز التنافس الإقليمي حول اليمن والسودان والتحالفات الأمنية، وأصبح يتصل أيضاً بمن يدير الاتصال السياسي بين القيادتين وعلى أي مستوى، مع احتمال أن تنظر الرياض إلى رسالة الملك سلمان باعتبارها التفافاً على السلطة الفعلية لمحمد بن سلمان. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Saudi Gazette
@Saudi_Gazette
#opinion: Iran must conduct itself as a nation-state rather than as an international revolutionary movement, Prince Turki AlFaisal writes
saudigazette.com.sa/article/664099/opinion/strait-diploma… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Doktora Amy Austin Holmes
@AmyAustinHolmes
Damascus fought to bring the SDF under its control. Fewer than half have joined the new Syrian army — even as foreign jihadists get folded in. I traveled 1,000+ km across #syria to see how integration is playing out on the ground. The picture isn't reassuring. I found:
→Kurdish security officers disarmed by their Arab counterparts in Afrin, despite being "integrated" in the same General Security force
→The YPJ barred from the MoD based on religious doctrine
→An Arab commander, one of many, excluded from integration for staying loyal to the #sdf instead of HTS.
Not isolated grievances. The same failure, recurring.
My new piece for @DefensePost
thedefensepost.com/2026/08/26/syria-sdf-sidelined/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
My colleague @MehranHaghirian has written a brilliant examination of the Makkah Agreement and what it portends for the new security architecture in the Middle East.
The future is what he calls "concentric arrangements."
www.bourseandbazaar-substack.org/p/new-concentric-arrange… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
There are signs the Trump administration could be moving back towards compliance with the MOU, which remains the clear Iranian demand for ending this war.
There were three major U.S. failures in the implementation of the MOU. First, the US did not change its offensive force posture after signing the agreement. Second, the U.S. did not respect Article 5, which stipulated that Iran and Oman would jointly determine the plan to reopen the strait. Third, the US failed to release Iranian assets held in Qatar in a timely fashion and then backtracked on interim sanctions relief.
Encouragingly, the Trump administration seems to be taking military escalation is off the table. It seems likely that during his visit to Tehran, Munir communicated that the U.S. would be taking steps to reduce the military threat it poses to Iran, thereby heading off a new round of Iranian escalation and reopening space for negotiations. U.S. diplomats are set to return to regional embassies and Trump administration officials are emphasizing a shift towards economic warfare.
Moreover, it looks like the U.S. is prepared to comply with Article 5 of the MOU following @badralbusaidi's visit to Tehran and the announcement of the new TSS. This could not have happened without U.S. consent.
Now @MBA_AlThani_ is slated to travel to Tehran. If he can give the Iranians assurances on asset releases and sanctions relief, cutting through the bombast of Bessent's recent announcement, the elements might be in place for the MOU to be revived.
We should have low expectations that any resumption in talks within the MOU framework will lead to a comprehensive agreement. But we might still get a second chance for diplomacy because of Iranian consistency on the viability of the MOU and the tireless efforts of regional mediators. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La paix américano-israélienne encalminée au Moyen-Orient, après six mois de guerre Etats-Unis/Iran. L’échec d’un renversement du régime iranien a entraîné une perte d’influence de l’Amérique, la formation de nouvelles alliances, et un isolement croissant d’Israël, face à un pouvoir iranien, enhardi. Zoom sur une région en reconfiguration dans Le Figaro.
#iranwar
www.lefigaro.fr/international/nouvelles-alliances-trahiso… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Vraie annonce ou coup de com de l'Elysée ? Avec mon confrère Thibaut Déléaz, je vous explique pourquoi la construction d'un parc d'attraction financé par l'Arabie saoudite en banlieue parisienne est encore loin d'être acquise.
"Les Saoudiens ne souhaitaient pas qu’Emmanuel Macron annonce le chiffre de 6 milliards d’euros d’investissement dans ce projet», selon une de nos sources.
www.lefigaro.fr/societes/dans-les-coulisses-des-negociati… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ibrahim Hamidi ابراهيم حميدي
@ibrahimhamidi
Exclusive: Terms of the Agreement Ahead of the Dissolution of the #sdf
1- Mazloum Abdi @MazloumAbdi to be appointed as a presidential adviser.
2- Elham Ahmad @ElhamAhmadSDC to be appointed as a deputy in parliament, with a portfolio related to foreign affairs or constitutional matters.
3- Kurdish to be recognized as an official language, with theoretical subjects taught in Kurdish.
4- The Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) to join the Ministry of Interior as part of an internal security and counterterrorism force.
5- SDF units to be deployed along the borders.
6- Mazloum Abdi and Elham Ahmad to travel to Turkey to meet Abdullah Öcalan.
7- The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (#pkk) to sever its ties with the Kurdish units.
8- 🇹🇷 to remove Mazloum Abdi’s name from its terrorism list, as it did with #sdf commander Sipan Hamo (Samir Oso).
Al Majalla
@AlMajallaEN
Exclusive to Al Majalla:
Terms of the Agreement with Mazloum Abdi Before the Dissolution of the SDF
♦️Syrian and Western sources have told Al Majalla the main principles agreed upon ahead of Mazloum Abdi’s expected announcement from the presidential palace on Tuesday evening dissolving the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
♦️The understandings include President Ahmed al-Sharaa appointing Abdi as a presidential adviser and Ilham Ahmed as a deputy in the People’s Assembly, Syria’s parliament.
♦️In a sign of the shift in relations, senior officials in #damascus have begun referring to Abdi as “Mr Mazloum” rather than “General Mazloum”.
The main steps are as follows:
1. Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani held two working sessions in Damascus with Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed on Monday and Tuesday. It was agreed that they would meet President Ahmed al-Sharaa at the presidential palace on Tuesday evening, after which Abdi would announce at a press conference the dissolution of all military and civilian institutions, including the SDF and the Autonomous Administration.
2. Mazloum Abdi is to be appointed a presidential adviser. One proposal under discussion is for his portfolio to cover #syria’s communities or Kurdish affairs, with the final mandate to be set out in a presidential decree.
3. Ilham Ahmed is to be appointed as a deputy in the People’s Assembly as part of the “President’s List”. Proposals under discussion include assigning her a role related to drafting the constitution or serving on the Foreign Affairs Committee. The final arrangement is expected to be announced later.
4. During Abdi and Ahmed’s recent meetings in Damascus, the possibility of Ahmed assuming a post at the Foreign Ministry was also raised. Options discussed included deputy foreign minister, assistant foreign minister or senior adviser.
5. During the Monday and Tuesday meetings, agreement was also reached to incorporate the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), which number around 1,500 women, into the Internal Security Forces under the Interior Ministry. They would form part of counter-terrorism forces and be deployed in northeastern Syria.
6. Damascus pledged to examine, at a later stage, the integration of members of the Women’s Protection Units into the Syrian army.
7. The integration of SDF personnel into four brigades within the Syrian army is to be completed. Each brigade currently consists of around 1,300 fighters, while a number of personnel are still awaiting formal approval. The process is continuing for them as well as for around 1,700 additional fighters. Agreement was also reached on deploying Kurdish units along the border.
8. An official Syrian decision is to be issued recognising Kurdish as an official language, with theoretical subjects such as history and geography, among others, to be taught in Kurdish in schools.
9. Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed are expected to visit Turkey to meet Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). According to the sources, the visit could contribute to efforts leading to his release from prison and secure his support for the integration process. The visit is still awaiting an official Turkish decision.
10. #turkey is considering removing Mazloum Abdi’s name from its terrorism list, similar to its earlier decision to remove Samir Oso (Sipan Hamo) from its blacklist.
#almajalla -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Amargi
@the_amargi
The YPJ, comprising approximately 1,500 women, will be integrated into the Internal Security Forces under the Ministry of the Interior to combat terrorism in north-eastern Syria. Damascus has also pledged to explore integrating the YPJ into the army later on.
A meeting will take place today between the Syrian Transitional Government and a delegation from the Women's Protection Units (YPJ), including Newroz Ahmed and other command members, to discuss the future of the women-only forces, according to local sources speaking to The Amargi. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Amargi
@the_amargi
Ilham Ahmed tells The Amargi that she and Mazloum Abdi have taken on new positions within the Syrian state.
SDF commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi has been appointed as Presidential advisor for Kurdish affairs in Syria, while former Autonomous Administration External Relations co-chair Ahmed has been appointed to the administration of the People's Assembly in Syria, where she is expected to have responsibilities regarding managing the Kurdish issue within the Syrian parliament. The appointments have still not been officially announced by the Syrian Transitional Government. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
The same day the Trump administration unveiled an economic offensive intended to sever Iran’s remaining ties with the outside world, Tehran was receiving a remarkable procession of senior regional officials.
Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir arrived after speaking with Trump, Oman’s foreign minister came for negotiations over Hormuz, and Iraq’s top judicial official was also in Tehran.
Whatever the ultimate impact of Washington’s pressure campaign, Iran hardly looked like a country already standing alone.
Munir’s talks, in particular, focused on reviving negotiations and ending the war.
The Oman talks produced something potentially significant. In a joint statement, Tehran and Muscat said they were working toward a temporary maritime corridor through Hormuz , followed by negotiations over a permanent corridor and the strait’s future management.
In other words, Iran is discussing reopening Hormuz, but not simply restoring the prewar status quo. It continues to seek a negotiated role in the legal architecture governing the strait.
And Iranian leaders today are not talking as though intensifying economic pressure is changing their fundamental position.
Ghalibaf says the US failed militarily and politically and will also fail in its “economic war,” while arguing that Iran and Iraq can help shape a new regional order.
Pezeshkian has defended the previous agreement as a collective national-security decision made from “wisdom, dignity and expediency,” explicitly rejecting the idea that diplomacy reflected fear or submission.
First Vice President Aref was similarly blunt: Iran does not seek war, but “fights well” when attacked and has prepared for further conflict.
The picture is therefore much more complicated than Washington’s “Economic Outcast” narrative suggests.
Iran is under serious and mounting economic pressure yet wants a deal on favorable terms. And it still retains significant leverage over Hormuz and is simultaneously preparing for a prolonged economic confrontation. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 Rubio is telling foreign counterparts the strikes are off until after the midterms...
-Axios reports he told several counterparts the U.S. does not plan new strikes on Iran for the time being
-Pressure runs through the naval blockade and the new sanctions campaign instead
-Strikes remain on the table if Iran attacks first
-The posture is expected to hold at least until after the November elections, when another campaign could be considered
Every capital Rubio briefed now knows the shooting stops until November 3.
Tehran has spent this month telling anyone listening that it can outlast an American political clock, and a timeline just got handed to it through diplomatic channels.
Support for the war sits at 31% with gas a dollar higher, which explains the date better than anything happening in the Gulf.
Source: Axios / Writer: Daniel -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Russian officials have briefed Iran that the CIA Director Ratcliffe's Moscow visit delivered a message with the US asking Moscow to press Iran into reopening the Strait of Hormuz, warning that Russian entities would otherwise face designations under Operation Economic Outcast. Russia declined, and told Iran the threatened measures were of limited consequence, according to two senior Iranian sources with knowledge of the briefing.
The message also warned that Russian banks, traders and shipping entities tied to Iranian oil, gold and aviation will be sanctioned under the operation unless Moscow moves to close those channels. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amberin Zaman
@amberinzaman
I am waiting to hear what the SDF has secured in concrete terms in exchange for today’s compromise. What powers if any will @MazloumAbdi & İlham
Ahmed exercise? Is @MazloumAbdi in a stronger position now than the deputy minister Sipan Hemo? Has he abandoned the idea of forming a party? Sharaa was opposed to this as we reported yesterday, but the consensus was that @MazloumAbdi would push for more before ceding ground. How much of his own initiative was at play? So many questions. So few answers. Hayırlı olsun. Too early to pass final judgement. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Robert Malley
@Rob_Malley
Powerful piece by @NateSwanson83:
"The irony of Trump’s failed war on Iran—and his stop-start negotiations to try to end it—is that it has so severely weakened Washington’s ability to exert pressure on Tehran that no future administration will ever be able to revert to the traditional U.S. playbook. But that could also be the only upside of a war that has already exacted a heavy toll on U.S. munitions and the global economy. The war could—and should—force a broader reckoning with 47 years of failed strategy and change Washington’s approach for good."
www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/maximum-pressure-ira… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Gharibabadi in TV says the Iran-Oman understanding does not mean the Strait of Hormuz will simply reopen tomorrow.
- He argues that for the past 58 years shipping has largely followed routes through Omani waters-an arrangement Tehran says it never really accepted and which, in its view, created serious security vulnerabilities for Iran.
- Under the temporary plan, entry into the Gulf would shift to the Iranian side, while outbound traffic would use Omani territorial waters, creating a roughly 7-mile two-way corridor.
- The bigger point is what comes next: Iran and Oman are supposed to negotiate a permanent new navigation scheme within 30-60 days.
- So Tehran is not just talking about reopening Hormuz. It is trying to use the crisis to overturn a 58-year-old maritime traffic arrangement and replace it with one that gives Iran a much larger operational role in the Strait.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Farnaz Fassihi
@farnazfassihi
Excellent analysis: U.S. Attempt to Strangle Iran’s Economy Depends on China’s Cooperation U.S. has spent 20 years promising ‘crippling sanctions’ on Iran, this time after military action failed to accomplish President Trump’s goals. @SangerNYT
www.nytimes.com/2026/08/24/us/politics/trump-bessent-iran… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jean-françois Corty
@JfCorty
Comment Israël mène la guerre de l’information, entre « incrimination rétrospective », censure et financement de contenus destinés à influencer les IA www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2026/08/25/comment-i…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amwaj.media
@amwajmedia
NEW: Iran is assessing the fallout from the UAE's announcement that all trade, commercial exchanges and financial transactions will be halted.
The development has ignited a diverse array of reactions in Tehran.
@amwajmedia has the details👇 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
Leaders of the Coordination Framework in Baghdad, in the presence of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, received Mohsen Qomi, the special representative of Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. During the meeting, held at the office of Humam Hamoudi, they discussed a number of issues.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Exactly
Qutaiba Idlbi قتيبة ادلبي
@Qidlbi
🧵 At the heart of Israel’s strategic outlook toward Syria and the region is a troubling assumption: that a recovering, sovereign and capable Syrian state is itself a future security risk.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷 Trump's own intelligence director told him before the war exactly how it would go, and every prediction landed...
-Tulsi Gabbard warned in the Oval Office that killing Iran's supreme leader would likely produce a MORE hardline regime open to acquiring nuclear weapons
-She said Tehran would rush to close the Strait of Hormuz and destabilize global energy markets
-She said Iran would strike U.S. forces and partners across the region
-Military leaders separately warned of casualties, munitions shortages and readiness problems for an overstretched force
-Trump DISMISSED the concerns in those meetings, and Hegseth and Caine said repeatedly they would navigate any complications...
-The tally at the 6 months: an estimated 3,000 Iranians and 18 American servicemembers dead, 756 U.S. troops wounded, damaged bases, drained oil reserves and shrunken stockpiles
-Bessent announced the goal is to collapse the regime under a campaign named Operation Economic Outcast
Go down that list line by line.
The IRGC now runs Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei sits above it with hardliners in every security post, parliament is drafting NPT withdrawal legislation, and the strait carries a fifth of its prewar traffic.
That is literally Gabbard's briefing, delivered in order, and right on schedule.
Vance argued for the other path, telling Trump that Iran might trade away its nuclear program at the table and that failure there would only strengthen the case for striking later.
He lost the argument to a Pentagon promising "decisive options."
Asked in June why he took a temporary deal, Trump pointed to internal polling showing nearly 80% of Americans wanted the war over REGARDLESS of terms.
Six weeks later, support sits at 31%, gas is a dollar higher, and the strategy is still unclear, seemingly fluctuating between Truth Social tantrums and confused aides leaking contradictory reports, with no real end in sight.
Source: The Wall Street Journal / Writer: Daniel -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
CNN adds crucial details missing from Axios: chartered ships go dark at night under US escort, then transfer oil ship-to-ship outside Hormuz, shifting insurance & physical risk from commercial shippers to governments & producers. A "costly, dangerous" gambit that helps buy time.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
Link to the CNN report: www.cnn.com/2026/08/22/business/oil-strait-of-hormuz-iran
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
Wow! This is where we are now.
AIPAC is such a burden for candidates, even traditional republican ones such as Mike Rogers that his allies "have asked AIPAC not to advertise on his behalf"!!!
AIPAC's era is coming to an undignified end.
www.axios.com/2026/08/22/mike-rogers-aipac-michigan-senate -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Iran invited to the Mecca Pact: What does it mean?
Iran confirmed it was invited to join the Mecca Pact, the defensive military alliance between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
Although no word has been said by the 3 founding members, the secrecy is strategic. Officially confirming Iran’s entry before the terms regarding militias are negotiated would trigger immediate, harsh diplomatic retaliation from Israel and the United States.
This invitation directly involves what I addressed yesterday: who pays the bill for peace in the Gulf, and how. In geopolitical conflicts, imposing military agreements usually serve as a facade to solve urgent economic and logistical bottlenecks.
The inclusion or rapprochement of Iran in the Mecca Pact is, fundamentally, a diplomatic gambit to end Tehran’s economic suffocation and secure the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, within that regional economic arrangement I mentioned yesterday.
Saudi Arabia and its neighbors saw their ports and refineries become targets, and their economies faltered under the blockade of the strait.
They need to reopen the maritime route at all costs to salvage their development plans, but such a move is impossible without looking like a military victory for Trump. Amidst all this, Iran signaled it accepts negotiating the management of the Strait of Hormuz and easing the blockade.
The invitation to the pact operates as a bargaining chip and a security guarantee that Arab neighbors will not support attacks on Iranian soil if the route is cleared.
But more than that, by accepting dialogue or entering the Mecca Pact, Iran shatters the US and Israeli strategy of complete isolation. Sitting at the table with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan grants Tehran the status of a legitimate and indispensable political actor for stability.
For the GCC, financing the neighbor’s reconstruction is not an act of charity, but a security strategy. It must be consolidated within a regional bloc that also encompasses defense aspects.
Significant progress has already been made.
The sovereign wealth funds of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait would inject billions into the Iranian economy, but the disbursements would be tied to the gradual dismantling of armed militia financing, and this remains a hurdle.
What Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan are offering Iran is a political space for Tehran to control its militias without looking like it surrendered to the West.
With adherence to the pact, these issues would be discussed internally, holding Iran accountable, which will continue to control its militias. The goal is not to achieve a perfect peace, but to create game rules restrictive enough to make Iran think twice before triggering its regional satellites.
It looks like an arrangement that could work, not by itself, but because there is now a clear desire to resolve the bottlenecks that were halting the dialogue. Trump knows this and wants the same bottlenecks resolved, but without further damage to his image.
And where does Israel stand in this?
Read more:
global21.substack.com/p/iran-invited-to-the-mecca-pact-wh… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
That’s right. I did a study of #iran’s nuclear narrative up to and in the immediate aftermath of the 40-day war. Interestingly, between the 12-day war of June 2025 and the 40-day war, there was almost no mention of potential change of nuclear doctrine or weaponization in official debates. Even in the media and among the expert community, there appeared to be some pressure for caution.
This was in contrast to the period before June 2025, when threats of potential change of doctrine - or at least NPT withdrawal - in response to possible U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities were on the rise and had reached the level of Kamal Kharrazi, the former senior adviser to Ali Khamenei. The reason for the silence between June and February was probably to avoid giving Israel and the United States any pretext for another round of war.
The same approach also seemed to define Iranian policy toward the debate until the collapse of the MOU. During this period, people like Araghchi emphasized that there had been no new fatwa by the new supreme leader that would permit the construction of nuclear weapons.
But after the collapse of the MOU, and as concerns about a potential infrastructural war by Trump Iran‘s lack of proper deterrence have resurfaced, we are seeing the reemergence of the weaponization narrative. It has now reached unprecedented levels, as shown by Rezaei’s comments yesterday. It is still unclear whether this shift will translate into policy, but the change in the narrative itself is significant.
laurence norman
@laurnorman
Many thanks for sharing this.
It’s as close as you’ll get of a senior Iranian official publicly setting out the case for having nukes albeit constructed in a way that sets out what OTHER countries will conclude.
Still, unthinkable language a year ago.
من علی گرایلیمه، شما مره نشناسنی
@hr7362489
The full transcript of Rezaei’s interview, specifically the part where he talks about the NPT
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
laurence norman
@laurnorman
Many thanks for sharing this.
It’s as close as you’ll get of a senior Iranian official publicly setting out the case for having nukes albeit constructed in a way that sets out what OTHER countries will conclude.
Still, unthinkable language a year ago.
من علی گرایلیمه، شما مره نشناسنی
@hr7362489
The full transcript of Rezaei’s interview, specifically the part where he talks about the NPT
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Iraq’s state-run INA, quoting National Security Adviser Qassem al-Araji on Al-Iraqiya TV, says Baghdad has proposed creating a joint security coordination council with Iran and Saudi Arabia.
- There has been no official Iranian reaction so far. The proposal emerges just days after Ghalibaf’s visit to Baghdad and at a particularly sensitive moment for Iraq: September 30 marks the end of the US-led coalition’s military mission in Iraq, as Baghdad simultaneously pushes to bring all weapons under state authority.
- The proposed mechanism would also add another layer to the emerging regional security architecture following the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan.
- Unlike the Mecca pact, which is centred on collective defence, Baghdad’s proposal, if confirmed, would bring Riyadh and Tehran themselves into a permanent security coordination framework-potentially making the two arrangements complementary rather than competing.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Mohsen Rezaei’s appointment as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council is receiving support not only from the security establishment, but also from parts of Qom’s clerical establishment.
- IRNA reports that senior seminary figures have sent messages backing him, with language focused on resistance, deterrence, loyalty to the leadership and internal unity.
- That does not mean Qom is speaking with one voice. But it does suggest that Rezaei’s return is gaining legitimacy beyond the IRGC and should not be seen simply as a military turn detached from the religious core of the system.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amberin Zaman
@amberinzaman
Another game changer, cheap drone interceptors produced in UAE and elsewhere to counter Iran's Shahed's among others. Bottom line, war is good business for some. www.nytimes.com/2026/08/23/business/powerus-counter-drone…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
🚢🇸🇦 Six Saudi-owned oil tankers are now returning toward the Gulf after taking a roughly month-long detour around Africa, according to vessel tracking shared by MenchOsint.
The tankers, Burqan, Dilam, Ghinah, Hazm and Salam, had headed south around the Cape of Good Hope rather than transiting Bab el-Mandeb after Ansarallah announced a naval blockade targeting Saudi shipping on July 20.
The rerouting underscores the growing pressure on Saudi exports, with the country, according to Kpler, exporting about 2.03 million barrels per day, down:
▪️2.57 million bpd from July, when exports were roughly 4.60 million bpd
▪️3.64 million bpd from August 2025, when they were roughly 5.67 million bpd
MenchOsint
@MenchOsint
Saudi Oil Tankers returning to their port of origin with a 1-month detour due to Yemen's Ansarallah blockade.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Observers and analysts close to the IRGC are increasingly reading Asim Munir’s visit to Tehran through a very specific lens: Washington may ultimately have little choice but to return to the Islamabad MoU framework.
- But, in their view, not on the same terms.
- Their argument is that the US first failed to implement the original understanding, then escalated the confrontation and incurred significant political and economic costs. This, they argue, has weakened Washington’s leverage while increasing the urgency of finding a way out of the current impasse.
- From this perspective, the original Islamabad framework was already highly favorable to Iran: it included the release of frozen funds, oil-related waivers and major reconstruction commitments, while the most sensitive issues, including the nuclear and missile files, were largely deferred. The expectation in this camp is therefore that Tehran would now demand even more: larger, more immediate and more credible concessions upfront before agreeing to revive the same framework.
- Munir’s mission is consequently being portrayed as potentially more than simple mediation. It could also be an attempt to sound out what Tehran would now require, and whether there is still a path back to an understanding that Washington previously failed to implement.
- There is also a broader political calculation behind this reading. Continued pressure around Hormuz, higher energy costs, inflation and the domestic economic burden are seen as increasing the pressure on Trump, especially with the US midterms approaching. Some Iranian analysts even frame this through the old Carter analogy: a prolonged Iran crisis could become politically damaging at home.
- The broader message from this camp is therefore clear: a return to the MoU would not be presented as an Iranian climbdown. It would be framed as evidence that Washington had been forced back to the original framework under less favorable conditions, with fewer effective levers and at a higher price.
- Whether Tehran will actually get those terms is another question.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
RTL France
@RTLFrance
Le prince héritier d'Arabie Saoudite, Mohammed ben Salmane, est reçu dimanche et lundi par Emmanuel Macron dans le cadre d'une visite officielle en France. Il sera présent ce soir aux côtés du président lors de la clôture de l’E-Sport World Cup, organisée à Paris
Les explications de @Malbrunot, invité de @ACavaille_Roux sur #rtlThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
MBS, le prince héritier saoudien, en France pour clôturer ce soir la Coupe du monde des jeux vidéo, sa passion, pas forcément partagée par son hôte, Emmanuel Macron. Le chef de l'Etat avait "halluciné lorsque, en pénétrant dans l’antre de MBS à Riyad, en décembre 2024, il avait découvert une gigantesque salle de jeux vidéo avec des écrans partout », confie un de ses anciens conseillers. Mon analyse dans Le Figaro.
#mbs
www.lefigaro.fr/international/emmanuel-macron-recevra-le-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
إياد الحمود
@Eyaaaad
لماذا هدأت الحرب بين أمريكا وإيران؟
لماذا قال الرئيس الإيراني بيزشكيان: يجب على إيران إنهاء الحرب الآن.
تقرير من CNN:
تشير الأدلة إلى أن الولايات المتحدة بدأت تكسب بشكل ثابت القوة في مضيق هرمز، بينما تخسر إيران الكثير من سيطرتها على الممر المائي الحرج.
خلال الأسبوعين الماضيين، مرّت أكثر من 80% من الشحنات عبر المضيق دون مشاكل وفقًا لبيانات شركة كبلر التي تتعقّب السفن عبر أجهزة الإرسال والبيانات الفضائية.
رغم إعلان إيران أن المضيق تحت سيطرتها إلا أنها بدأت تفقد السيطرة بشكل ملحوظ وبدأت معظم السفن تتجاهل إيران والعبور دون وجود عوائق.
قال همايون فلكشاي، رئيس تحليل نفط الخام في كبلر:
يبدو بشكل متزايد أن إيران فقدت السيطرة على المضيق.
يُفترض نظريًا أن يُسمح لإيران باستئناف تحصيل الرسوم من السفن التي تحمل الشحنات لكنها لم تنجح وفشلت خطتها بسبب الحصار الأمريكي، وفق كبلر.
وقال دان بيكرينغ، المؤسس وكبير مسؤولي الاستثمار في Pickering Energy Partners:
طلب إيران تحصيل رسوم هو أمر لا يريده معظم أهل المنطقة ولم يفعلوه.
ناقلات النفط العملاقة أغلقت أجهزة الإرسال (Transponder) ما خلق حركة «مظلمة» يصعب رصدها بوسائل التتبّع التقليدية الإيرانية.
في المقابل، تملك الولايات المتحدة، بقوتها العسكرية الكبيرة في المياه والفضاء، رؤية شاملة للسفن العابرة للمضيق، وأبلغت عن أرقام شحن نفطي أعلى بكثير مما كانت تقترحه معظم التقديرات التقليدية.
إن إجمالي النفط الذي عبر المضيق الآن بلغ نحو 15 مليون برميل يوميًا خلال أسبوع، وهو رقم قريب مما كان قبل الحرب (20 مليون برميل). بات من الواضح التخبط الإيراني بعد خسارتهم الكثير من العتاد والبارجات ويظهر ذلك جليًا في فقدان السيطرة البحرية ومرور السفن.
وبسبب خروج الأمور عن سيطرة إيران وضعف قدرتها على التحكم بالمضيق والمشاكل الاقتصادية الضخمة والخوف من الانهيار فمن المرجح أن هذا ما دفع الرئيس الإيراني بيزشكيان أن يقول بأن على إيران إنهاء الحرب. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
This Is Beirut
@ThisIsBeirut_
🗣️ Hezbollah official Haj Mahmoud Qamati’s interview on Al-Manar TV:
- The resistance has decided to exercise patience and give the current political process a chance, with the aim of achieving full liberation and an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory.
- The resistance remains strong and capable; not responding to every attack does not mean weakness or inability.
- Regarding Ali al-Taher, the resistance’s current approach is to stand firm and confront threats while considering all options concerning the site.
- He categorically denied the presence of any Iranian fighters among the resistance in southern Lebanon.
- Hezbollah is not completely closing the door on the possibility of direct communication with the Americans; any decision would be made based on its interests and the appropriate circumstances.
- He said the option of popular mobilization and taking to the streets has not been ruled out, but would depend on the appropriate timing and specific political and security circumstances.
- He revealed that Yemen’s Ansar Allah had expressed readiness to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait if the resistance and its people in Lebanon were placed under a complete siege. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
What a opening paragraph from Marc Lynch!
“The American Middle East is finished. The regional order that has prevailed since 1991 has been one of the many casualties of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. The American and Israeli failure to dislodge the regime in Tehran has proved the bankruptcy of decades of sanctions and violence.”
www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/end-american-middle-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
BBC NEWS فارسی
@bbcpersian
محسن رضایی، دبیر شورای عالی امنیت ملی ایران، در اظهاراتی کمسابقه درباره برنامه هستهای جمهوری اسلامی پرسیده است که اگر پایبندی به مقررات بینالمللی مانع حمله به یک کشور نمیشود، «چرا ما نرویم دنبال بمب اتم.»
www.bbc.com/persian/live/cmj4krgj4xj1t?post=asset%3A330f1… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
🇶🇦 Qatar is slashing spending at home and abroad as the six-month U.S.-Israel war with Iran takes a severe toll on one of the world’s richest states, the Financial Times reports.
➤ Government departments have had budgets reduced by as much as 30%, while funding for overseas aid has been cut by about 85%.
➤ Qatar has halted LNG production, its main source of export revenue, after Iranian strikes damaged the Ras Laffan complex and war disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
➤ The IMF expects Qatar’s economy to contract 8.6% this year, the steepest decline among the six Gulf states.
➤ Goldman Sachs estimates lost energy exports are costing Qatar and Kuwait $1.5–2 billion a week.
Qatar is leaning on its roughly $500 billion sovereign wealth fund to absorb the shock, but officials are considering deeper cuts if the crisis continues into the fourth quarter.
Financial Times
@FT
Qatar cuts state spending at home and abroad as war shrinks economy ft.trib.al/wptEeiW
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
#iran’s Growing Debate Over How to End the War
🔹The differences within Iran’s leadership over how to proceed with the war are becoming increasingly visible.
🔹Today, both President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf made unusually direct comments about the need to end the war and the economic costs of continuing it.
🔹Ghalibaf said that regardless of how much military power Iran possesses, “if people are hungry” and there is no economic growth, the country cannot endure. Security, he argued, cannot be sustained without a functioning economy. He then added that, as someone with a military background, “we know the value of peace better than those who talk about peace.”
🔹That last point is important. Ghalibaf has increasingly positioned himself alongside Pezeshkian in arguing for a diplomatic way out, while pushing back against hardliners who portray such an approach as capitulation.
🔹Pezeshkian was even more direct: “The war must end at some point.” His argument was that Iran should end it now, while Tehran still believes it is negotiating from a position of strength, rather than wait until its economic situation deteriorates further. He also lashed out at critics of his administration, saying those sitting “outside the ring” have little understanding of the pressures the government is actually facing.
🔹These comments come amid increasingly open acknowledgments of Iran’s economic problems. Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati recently admitted on state television that Iran cannot sell its oil because of the blockade. Trump’s new economic pressure campaign is making the situation even more difficult.
🔹There is also a growing concern about Hormuz. Before the latest two weeks of fighting, Ghalibaf had already warned that the Strait has strategic value only as long as ships continue to use it. If traffic remains disrupted, other countries will inevitably search for alternatives.
🔹That appears to be happening. Reports that millions of barrels of oil are already being moved through alternative routes are now being cited by the more pragmatic camp as evidence that Iran cannot rely indefinitely on disruption in Hormuz as its main source of leverage. This is consistent with the broader problem I discussed earlier: Iran can impose substantial costs through Hormuz, but it cannot remain in a permanent state of confrontation with the U.S. and the GCC states.
🔹The problem is that the hardliners also have a point. According to them, even if Tehran is prepared to return to diplomacy, there is little indication that Trump wants to return to the previous terms. His new economic campaign suggests that Washington may instead use Iran’s growing difficulties to demand more.
🔹This is creating a vicious circle. The longer the confrontation continues, the stronger the economic case for diplomacy becomes. But the more Washington increases pressure, the harder it becomes for Iranian leaders to make concessions without appearing to capitulate.
🔹What is becoming clearer, however, is that an important part of Iran’s leadership now believes that the current situation is not sustainable and that the military leverage accumulated during the war needs to be translated into a diplomatic outcome sooner rather than later. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
A significant editorial in Ettela’at, an establishment-aligned conservative newspaper, argues that Iran cannot reduce national security to military strength alone.
- It says maishat-people’s livelihood-is not simply “having a piece of bread and fighting barefoot.” If society becomes exhausted and impoverished, the country becomes vulnerable from within.
- The paper explicitly backs the recent warnings by Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf on the economy, criticizes those who denounce diplomacy without offering an alternative, and argues that Iran cannot indefinitely sustain the current situation.
- Its prescription: maintain military and geopolitical leverage, but bring experienced diplomats and major mediators-including China-into a serious negotiating effort.
- What makes this especially noteworthy is that the argument is not coming from the reformist camp, but from a conservative, system-aligned newspaper.
- The underlying message is clear: economic pressure is turning social resilience into a national-security issue, and diplomacy can no longer simply be dismissed.
#iran
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Iran survived the 40-day war without the state fracturing.
-The next test may be harder: inflation, gasoline, sanctions, social cohesion and the risk of over-securitizing society.
- My latest analysis on Iran’s post-war vulnerabilities and resilience.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
#iran’s Emerging “Offensive Doctrine” is Becoming Clearer
🔹Over the past day, several senior Iranian military and security officials elaborated on what the shift from a defensive to an offensive military strategy actually means.
🔹Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military adviser to the Supreme Leader, said Iran’s response to threats must be “preemptive and calculated” in order to deter the enemy from even contemplating aggression.
🔹There’s an important logic here. After the failure of Iran’s previous deterrence model to prevent repeated U.S. and Israeli attacks, Tehran appears to be trying to establish deterrence at an earlier stage, by signaling that even preparations for an attack could trigger an Iranian response.
🔹Army spokesman Mohammad Akraminia added another dimension. He explicitly described Iran’s July 17 attack on a U.S. base in Jordan as an example of a “preemptive operation” under the new offensive doctrine.
🔹But he also said that any actual aggression would be met immediately, and that Iran’s response could be broader than the original attack.
🔹So, there appear to be two distinct elements to the emerging doctrine: preemption, aimed at preventing a perceived threat from materializing; and disproportionate retaliation, aimed at raising the cost of any attack that does occur.
🔹The terminology is, in itself, important. Iranian officials have traditionally avoided formally describing widely-used concepts such as “forward defense” as formal military doctrines. Yet in recent weeks, Chief of Staff Ali Abdollahi and now other senior officials have repeatedly and explicitly referred to an “offensive doctrine.”
🔹This suggests the shift is increasingly being presented not simply as a wartime adjustment, but as a more lasting change in Iranian military thinking.
🔹Mohsen Rezaei, the new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, has now extended this logic beyond direct military threats. He warned that additional U.S. forces deployed to regional bases could become targets, as could certain U.S. activities around the Strait of Hormuz and contacts with Iranian separatist groups.
🔹More importantly, Rezaei warned Iran’s neighbors against participating in Trump’s economic warfare. If they do, he said, “not even a drop of oil” would leave the Persian Gulf, including through alternative export routes outside Hormuz.
🔹That is essentially an ultimatum to the Gulf states, that participation in U.S. economic pressure could increasingly be treated by Tehran as part of the broader confrontation.
🔹There is also a nuclear dimension. Rezaei argued that U.S. attacks have demonstrated that NPT membership and IAEA safeguards provide no protection against military action, asking why countries should refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons if abiding by international rules does not protect them.
🔹Meanwhile, a hardline MP from the Paydari camp says parliament is working on legislation for Iran to withdraw from the NPT, apparently with Rezaei’s support.
🔹None of this necessarily means Iran has decided to build nuclear weapons. But it shows how military, economic, and nuclear deterrence debates are increasingly converging around the same conclusion, that the previous framework failed to protect Iran and therefore needs to change.
🔹Recent statements also show that, as I mentioned before, Iranian officials are reacting differently to the increasing U.S. pressure and Trump’s economic warfare. While the heads of the executive and legislative branches still appear to favor diplomacy as the way forward, the military-security establishment is increasingly preparing for another round of escalation. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Je serai à 8h40 sur RTL pour parler de la visite officielle de MBS, le prince héritier saoudien Mohamed Ben Salman.
#mbs -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Under a new law passed by the Iranian parliament, “the transfer of money abroad, the provision of goods, services, or financial facilities, and any other form of economic, commercial, or financial interaction must be registered in the designated system and receive authorization.”
Interestingly, hardliners in #iran’s parliament are effectively complementing the Trump administration’s efforts to maximize economic pressure on Iran and isolate the country from the global economy.
انتخاب
@Entekhab_News
جزئیات نسخه تازه مصوبه مجلس:
🔹 نقل و انتقال پول به خارج، ارائه کالا یا خدمات یا تسهیلات مالی و هر قسم تعامل اقتصادی، تجاری یا مالی دیگر باید در سامانه ثبت و کسب مجوز شود / انتخاب -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Iran survived the 40-day war without the state fracturing.
-The next test may be harder: inflation, gasoline, sanctions, social cohesion and the risk of over-securitizing society.
- My latest analysis on Iran’s post-war vulnerabilities and resilience.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Il faut lire cet appel d'anciens ambassadeurs français et britanniques, publiée dans Le Monde, pour "faire respecter le droit international en Palestine".
www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2026/08/22/la-france-et-le-r… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
Significant statements from Tehran today point to a growing recognition among the Iranian leadership of the severity of the economic situation and the erosion of Iran’s ability to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in light of U.S. military gains in opening a corridor through the strait.
President Pezeshkian stressed that the government does not deny the shortages and that it would be better to end the war now, while Iran is in a position of strength and dignity and the entire world recognizes its victory. Majles Speaker Qalibaf stated that no matter how much military power Iran possesses, if the people are hungry, it will not be able to endure.
Nevertheless, at this stage, there is still no indication that Iran is prepared to show flexibility and return to the MOU without preconditions, apart from its original demand for the lifting of the naval blockade and some sanctions relief. Tehran still appears to assess that, despite recent developments, it retains the ability to inflict significantly greater damage on the global economy and its Gulf neighbors, and that the price of a possible escalation (even to the point of renewed hostilities) is lower than the cost of yielding to U.S. demands and reopening Hormuz unconditionally in return for a temporary ceasefire that does not guarantee an end to the war and that, from Tehran’s perspective, could be terminated after the November midterm elections.
Moreover, the ambiguous messages coming from the United States, including Treasury Secretary Bessent’s statement yesterday, in which he once again spoke about the collapse of the Iranian regime, could reinforce opposition in Tehran to any possible agreement. It is not clear that Tehran understands what the United States is prepared to offer Iran at this stage, particularly when President Trump himself appears confident that economic pressure can achieve what military pressure failed to accomplish.
The bottom line, therefore, is that even if there is a growing recognition in Tehran that the current situation is not working in Iran’s favor, it is far from certain that this will be enough to build the necessary consensus—including among Ahmad Vahidi, Mohsen Rezaei, and more importantly Mojtaba Khamenei—to allow a change of course. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hassan I. Hassan
@hxhassan
Mohammed Dahlan, the long-ousted strongman of Gaza, has emerged as an internationally influential figure with the ear of the powerful. Is he positioning himself for a new political role?
New details by @lisang in @newlinesmag. newlinesmag.com/spotlight/will-dahlan-take-over-gaza/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
NEW: There's a potentially huge story in Iran that has gone completely under the radar in foreign media.
For more than four decades, Iran's intelligence ministry has been headed by clerics. Thanks to Israel's assassination campaign, that may now change.
Following the killing of the previous intelligence minister, President Pezeshkian must formally introduce a successor to the parliament. It looks like it may not end up as a routine confirmation.
Iran is instead considering scrapping a legal requirement that its intelligence minister be qualified in Islamic jurisprudence. The possible removal of the requirement could open up a key security position to non-clerical candidates.
Iranian commentators are already connecting this to non-clerical appointments in the judiciary as a potential turning point for the Islamic Republic. As former VP Abtahi (a cleric himself) put it: "Given the changes in the judiciary, one question arises: Why were clerical figures appointed from the very beginning to judiciary positions that do not require ijtihad?"
Abtahi added that In judicial matters that deal directly with the public and their problems, “The fewer clerics there are, the better the dignity of the clergy is preserved.” -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
בתמונות מיקומים של בסיסים צבאיים של תורכיה בצפון סוריה, חלקם שקיימים שם מאז 2017. ובמפה הגדולה, לצד מיקומי הבסיסים, סימנתי בנקודה שחורה את בסיס אבו א-ט'הור שאותו הפציצה ישראל. התמונות מלפני נפילתו של אסד, ומאז עשרות מהבסיסים התורכיים פורקו בשל סיום העימותים עם משטר אסד והכורדים.
למה בסיס נוסף בצפון סוריה ובו נוכחות תורכית מצדיק תקיפה ישראלית ופגיעה ביחסים עם ארה"ב והגברת המתיחות עם תורכיה? איפה האיום הגדול?
ניתוח הצילומים ברובו של @AKMcKeever
מקורות stj-sy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Housing-Land-and-Pr…
jusoor.co/storage/posts/خريطة-المواقع-العسكرية-للقوى-الخا… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
This is an excellent piece from @NaderHabibi2 that tries to piece together the puzzle of why Iran's leaders haven't shifted to true rationing and price controls in the face of wartime economic pressure and mounting inflation.
www.bourseandbazaar-substack.org/p/irans-leaders-eschew-w… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
"The Pentagon is evaluating its military footprint in the Middle East in an early sign of the Iran war’s potential to transform the U.S. presence in the region, according to eight people, including officials and others familiar with the matter."
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/08/18/penta… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
אהוד ברק
@barak_ehud
לא על כל הפרטים ניתן לדבר. אולם העלאת המתח היזומה של נתניהו מול טורקיה היא מופקרת ומטומטמת, קשה להחליט מה מהן יותר. עם ריח חזק של כוונה פוליטית להגיע לבחירות עם שורת מתחים בטחוניים מעוררי חרדה בציבור.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amberin Zaman
@amberinzaman
An excellent review of @AlizaMarcus newly published book on the PKK’s evolution in the wake of Ocalan’s capture in 1999. Impossible to understand the dynamics of the Kurds’
experiment with autonomy in northeast Syria without this essential context: foreignpolicy.com/2026/08/17/turkey-kurds-ocalan-erdogan-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Baxtiyar Goran ☀️
@BaxtiyarGoran
Nujaba militias welcomed their head of intelligence with an AK-47 handed to him after his brief detention by the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service.
Hours later, an Iraqi court issued a full clearance of the charges against him.
The footage underscores the militias’ refusal to allow the Iraqi state to exercise control over their weapons. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Beaux mots écrits par Ghassan. J'étais pas loin ce jour-là. Quelle tragédie.
Ghassan Salame
@GhassanSalame
استذكر اليوم زملائي الذين قتلوا او جرحوا في الهجوم الارهابي على مقر الامم المتحدة في بغداد. كانوا اوفياء لاهداف المنظمة يعملون بجد على مساعدة بلدٍ انهكته الحروب وابتلي بالاحتلال. الرحمة لمن فارقنا في ذلك اليوم العصيب والقدرة لمن ما زال يحمل في جسده اثار ذاك الاعتداء.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Robert Malley
@Rob_Malley
« Yemen is back at war. The question now is what kind of war it will turn out to be. »
@CrisisGroup’s Ahmed Nagi on Yemen’s perilous slide back to conflict
www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/middle-east-north-africa/yemen-sa… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
A change of government in Israel would not necessarily mean a change in Israeli foreign policy.
That is one of the lessons of the Bennett-Lapid government, the coalition that briefly replaced Benjamin Netanyahu before his return to power. Israel may eventually have a new prime minister, but the strategic assumptions that have defined the Netanyahu era could survive him.
For years, Israeli policy has rested on the assumption that military pressure, covert operations, economic isolation and the credible threat of force can prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. But the record deserves much closer scrutiny.
Since President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the 2015 nuclear agreement, with strong encouragement from Netanyahu, Iran has dramatically expanded its nuclear capabilities. Whatever one thinks of the original agreement, the strategy that replaced it did not produce a stronger deal or a less capable Iran. Tehran moved closer, not farther, to the nuclear threshold.
That should force Israeli policymakers to confront an uncomfortable possibility: pressure intended to stop an Iranian bomb may ultimately strengthen Tehran's incentive to acquire one.
There is a similar problem with the recurring hope that outside pressure can produce regime change in Iran. Military strikes, cyber operations, covert action and information campaigns can weaken an adversary. They cannot manufacture a viable political alternative inside another country.
There is also a practical question that receives far too little attention in Israel: What is the endgame? Israel may be prepared to sustain a prolonged confrontation with Iran. It should not assume that future American administrations will be equally willing.
The American public has little appetite for another open-ended Middle Eastern war. Washington is simultaneously managing competition with China, Russia, commitments in Europe and challenges elsewhere. An Israeli strategy that ultimately depends on indefinite American military participation is therefore not much of an independent strategy at all.
The same problem applies to Israel's long-standing concept of "striking the head of the octopus" retaliating against Iran itself for attacks carried out by Tehran's regional partners.
Suppose Hezbollah launches another major attack on Israel. Would striking Iran deter Hezbollah and end the confrontation? Or could it transform another war in Lebanon into a broader regional conflict involving Iran and multiple armed groups?
Israel undoubtedly possesses the military capability to inflict enormous damage on Iran. But capability is not strategy. The relevant question is what happens afterward.
Is Israel prepared for months or years of attrition with Iran and its regional network if the United States declines to participate directly? And could repeated attacks on Iran ultimately persuade its leadership that acquiring a nuclear deterrent is necessary for the regime's survival?
The next Israeli government should therefore conduct a genuine reassessment of Iran policy rather than simply inherit Netanyahu's assumptions.
Diplomacy should be part of that reassessment. The nuclear agreement was deeply imperfect, but it demonstrated something military pressure has so far failed to demonstrate: that verifiable restrictions can place meaningful limits on Iran's nuclear program. A future diplomatic framework may look very different from the 2015 agreement. But dismissing diplomacy as weakness while treating perpetual military escalation as strategy is not a serious long-term policy.
Yet Iran may not even be the most consequential foreign-policy challenge facing Israel's next government. That distinction belongs to the Palestinian issue.
For Israeli leaders, focusing on Iran has always had a political advantage: it allows Israel to present itself to Washington and the West primarily as a strategic ally confronting a common external enemy. But Israel's international standing is increasingly shaped by Gaza, the West Bank and the absence of any credible political horizon for the Palestinians.
No Israeli government can indefinitely separate those issues from the country's relationship with the United States. Israel's standing among younger Americans and parts of the Democratic coalition has already become considerably more complicated. European governments face growing domestic pressure over their relationships with Israel. Investors and multinational companies also pay attention to political instability, prolonged warfare and international isolation.
That matters especially for any future Israeli leader who promises economic growth, foreign investment and deeper integration with Western markets.
You cannot indefinitely pursue regional escalation abroad, permanent conflict with the Palestinians at home and deeper international integration at the same time. Eventually those objectives collide.
The next Israeli government therefore needs something more ambitious than a different prime minister. It needs a foreign-policy review.
It should ask whether the assumptions that guided Israel over the past decade actually produced the outcomes they promised: Is Iran farther from a nuclear weapon? Are Iran's regional partners less dangerous? Is Israel's international position stronger? Is its relationship with the United States more sustainable? And is Israel closer to resolving, rather than merely managing, the Palestinian conflict?
If the answers are uncomfortable, changing the person in the prime minister's office will not be enough. Israel could enter the post-Netanyahu era while continuing to practice Netanyahu's foreign policy.
#iran
Clash Report
@clashreport
Former Israeli PM Naftali Bennett on Iran:
We need to make sure that the Iranian regime falls before it obtains nuclear weapons.
Therefore, with one hand, we will prevent Iran from breaking out to a nuclear weapon.
With the other hand, we will act to accelerate the collapse of the ayatollah regime using all the tools at our disposal.
Not only bombs—mainly not bombs.
The Soviets fell without a bomb being dropped on Moscow. America never bombed Moscow.
But it put pressure on the system. And understand this: the Iranian regime is rotten and hollow from within. It will collapse. Our job is to accelerate it.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Miad Maleki
@miadmaleki
The UAE and China are Iran's two economic bloodlines. If UAE is serious about its economic embargo against Iran, then it'll close the one the U.S. Navy couldn't touch.
~80% of Iran's import FX is procured through Dubai's dirham market. ~40% of essential-goods FX settles inside the UAE, at a 5–20% premium.
The UAE has been Iran's No. 1 import supplier for five consecutive years, 30–31% of all Iran's imports (this does not include smuggled cargos that would double this number if added). In 2025: $21.9B in imports from the UAE, $7.2B in non-oil exports back; a record ~$29B two-way. The exposure is in essentials: the UAE supplied 36.3% of Iran's essential-goods imports (smartphones (~$2.8B), meat ($2B), soybeans and industrial machinery (~$1B each)). Even in the war year, with everything collapsing, the UAE stayed No. 1 at ~30% of imports. (1/2) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
נדב איל Nadav Eyal
@Nadav_Eyal
הידיעה דרמטית לא בגלל תוכנה, אלא התזמון: זה לא ייאמן שהמשכנו למכור לקטאר ייצוא בטחוני אחרי 7 באוקטובר. אחרי שנודע שהם הפעילו פה תשתית לקמפיין השפעה/סוכנים נרחב. אחרי ותוך כדי תמיכתם בחמאס. מי תיווך, מי הרוויח, מי עבד עבורם. נבדוק.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
The Syrian government prevented a group of Salafis from distributing niqabs at a well-known mall in Damascus.
This follows other steps by Damascus to reduce the influence of radicals, such as attempting to enforce a unified standard for Friday sermons in mosques to ban incitement against minorities and Sunni schools of jurisprudence rejected by Salafis.
أبو دُجانة بن غياث
@abudogana03
توقعت وزارة الثقافة او وزارة السياحة هي من منعت حملة الذهاب لتوزيع الحجاب من توزيع الحجاب في مول الشام سيتي سنتر (بعد ان وافق المركز التجاري نفسه), ولكن ان يكون الرفض والتهديد صادر من وزارة الاوقاف فهذه مصيبة بصراحة
1/4 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
I don't believe there has been a change in UAE policy towards Iran, at least not overnight. Iranian flights are landing at DXB, vessel traffic is unchanged, and the underlying logic of renewed economic engagement remains sound.
There is a lot of confusion about yesterday's ballistic missile incident and the subsequent MFA statement refuting economic engagement with Iran. The UAE MOD first assessed that two ballistic missiles fired from Iran were heading towards the UAE. It later revised its assessment, stating that the missiles were targeting vessels in the Gulf. For its part, Iran has now denied targeting the UAE.
In any case, the MFA statement was not linked to the missile attacks. It was simply issued on the same day. The statement does not mention the missiles and instead states that in light of "regional escalations... all trade, commercial exchanges, and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice." This is not actually a description of a shift policy because the UAE *never formally announced* it was resuming trade ties with Iran.
Instead, through the statement, the MFA statement rejected "all allegations regarding the status of the economic relationship between the United Arab Emirates and the Islamic Republic of Iran." In other words, the MFA was restating the policy adopted at the outset of the war, pushing back on the recent media reporting that the UAE and Iran have resumed economic relations as part of a narrow détente.
Why issue this statement now?
The UAE has been under pressure from the US in light of the Trump administration's plan to rely on economic pressure to undermine Iran. The Trump administration is likely to announce new sanctions measures and the MFA statement preempts any such move by Treasury, publicly signaling that there is no daylight between the US and UAE positions. This is important considering that the Trump administration has previously threatened the UAE with tariffs for its continued economic engagement with Iran.
In reality, the UAE will maintain this public stance, but will continue to protects its interests by insisting on its own economic sovereignty. Importantly, the UAE is one of the few countries that is able to modulate its compliance with US sanctions as a function of government policy. If Trump's "maximum pressure" sanctions on Iran cause blowback that makes the UAE less secure and less prosperous, the UAE will take steps to mitigate those harms. In the area of economic diplomacy, the UAE has more agency than just about any country in the world. Washington does not actually call the shots for Abu Dhabi.
It is possible that the UAE-Iran détente will fall apart in further rounds of escalation. But that is not what happened yesterday. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Yémen. Nouveauté dans la guerre, qui s'intensifie, entre les Houthis et l'Arabie: l'appui russe en renseignement géospatial fourni aux insurgés pro Iran. Lire mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/au-yemen-les-houthistes-pro…
#yémen -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
Israeli Actions in Syria Are Bringing It Closer to a Military Confrontation with Turkey
A. Israel–Turkey relations have deteriorated dramatically since October 7. The Turkish government’s support for Hamas and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s harsh criticism of Israel have deepened the crisis and brought bilateral relations to one of their lowest points in decades.
B. But contrary to claims increasingly heard from some Israeli politicians, Turkey is not Iran. It continues to allow Azerbaijani oil to reach Israel, has not completely closed its airspace to Israeli aircraft, and maintains diplomatic representation in Israel. Moreover, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın are well known to their Israeli counterparts. The relationship is deeply troubled, but channels of communication have not disappeared.
C. Israel’s strategic challenge, therefore, is to prevent Turkey from moving from a rival to an outright enemy. Turkey is a NATO member, Erdoğan maintains a close relationship with President Trump, and its military capabilities exceed those of any state adversary Israel has confronted in recent decades. A direct confrontation with Ankara would represent an entirely different level of strategic risk.
D. Israeli military activity in Syria is putting this already fragile relationship at greater risk, particularly in the absence of an effective mechanism to manage tensions and prevent military incidents. Rather than relying primarily on threats and strikes near areas of Turkish interest, Israel should establish a direct channel with Ankara aimed at reaching understandings over the rules of the game in Syria. It is also important to recognize that, contrary to a common perception in Israel, Ahmed al-Sharaa is not simply a Turkish proxy. He depends heavily on Ankara’s support, but there are also significant differences and tensions between the two sides.
E. Continued threats and military operations in Syria risk becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. Israeli fears of hostile Turkish entrenchment could produce actions that lead Ankara itself to increasingly view Israel as a threat and deepen its military involvement. This does not mean Israel should accommodate every Turkish demand or compromise vital security interests. Restoring bilateral relations will be a long process and will depend significantly on the future of Israeli policy in Gaza. But military action without a parallel diplomatic track could unnecessarily accelerate the confrontation.
F. When the choice is between striking a handful of aircraft with limited operational value and seeking understandings with Turkey over the nature of its involvement in Syria, relying exclusively on military power risks undermining Israel’s own interests. Turkey is not going to disappear from Syria. If Ankara decides to arm al-Sharaa’s forces, it has the ability to do so whether Israel approves or not. The more important question is whether Turkish involvement develops within an understood framework and established red lines, or through an escalating cycle in which each side interprets the other’s actions as preparation for confrontation.
G. Contrary to another increasingly common argument in Israel, Turkey is not necessarily constructing a new “Sunni axis” designed to replace the Iranian-led Shiite axis. Ankara has substantial regional ambitions of its own, some of which clearly conflict with Israeli interests. But Israel and Turkey also share an important strategic interest: neither wants to see the return of a powerful, regionally dominant Iran. Israeli policy should recognize not only the areas of competition with Ankara but also the interests the two countries continue to share.
The bottom line is the need to think before acting. Precisely because Turkey is a major regional power, Israel needs to combine military deterrence with diplomacy and effective deconfliction mechanisms. In Syria, the distance between demonstrating strength and stumbling into a confrontation that neither country actually wants may be dangerously short.
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
Syrian military official blames Israel for the bombing of the Abu al-Dhuhur Airbase in northern Syria, an unprovoked act of aggression.
The US should send a permanent Bibi-sitter until the Israeli elections. The moment the US takes its eye off the ball, he starts setting fires.
الإخبارية السورية
@AlekhbariahSY
مراسل الإخبارية عن مصدر عسكري:
📌طيران الاحتلال الإسرائيلي استهدف فجر اليوم مدرج مطار أبو الظهور العسكري بريف إدلب الشرقي بـ 8 غارات
📌الاعتداء أسفر عن أضرار مادية في بنية المطار دون وقوع إصابات
#الإخبارية_السورية -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Randa Slim
@rmslim
A MUST READ piece by Marc Lynch: “Before the #iran war began at the end of February, Riyadh had started to mobilize a coalition that included Egypt, Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey to counter the U.S.-backed Emirati-Israeli alliance. This contest will resume after the fighting simmers down, likely destabilizing already beleaguered states, stretching across the wider region, and generating endless new crises that a distracted Washington will struggle to navigate.” The End of the American Middle East www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/end-american-middle-… via @ForeignAffairs
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Tammuz Intel
@Tammuz_Intel
Earlier today, the ICTS arrested Abbas al-Yaqoubi, the head of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Unit of the Iran-backed Nujaba militia, in Dhi Qar Governorate, southern Iraq. Later, after threats by Iran-backed militias, the terrorist was handed over to PMF security.
#iraq -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
🟡 🇮🇶 Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah warned Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi that its “patience is running out” over raids targeting the families of resistance fighters, martyrs and the wounded, threatening retaliation if what it described as U.S.-supervised operations continue.
Security official Abu Mujahid al-Assaf said the group would discuss regulating its weapons only after all U.S. forces leave Iraqi territory and airspace with guarantees they will not return, U.S. control over Iraqi decision-making ends, Turkish troops withdraw from northern Iraq and the Peshmerga is dissolved.
The warning comes ahead of Baghdad’s September 30 deadline for armed groups outside state forces to surrender their weapons or face prosecution under Iraq’s anti-terrorism law.
english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/iraqi-hezbollah-warn… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🚨🇮🇱🇺🇸 Some more info on what was discussed at Kushner's meeting with Netanyahu earlier today...
According to N12, it was a "very long meeting" and the two sides reached a number of understandings:
-No "rehabilitation" in the Gaza Strip without the complete disarmament of Hamas from its weapons.
-Hamas will hand over all weapons for destruction under the supervision of General Jeffries, both heavy and light weapons.
-IDF "will not retreat" from the red line or from "freedom of action," including targeted "killings of comfort."
-There is also agreement to carry out sanitation operations in Gaza to prevent the spread of epidemics.
Kushner reportedly agreed that "There's nothing to rehabilitate before the Strip is disarmed."
Source: @yaronavraham / Writer: Michael -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🇱🇧 🇧🇪 Mon interview avec @lalibrebe : “Nous sommes entrés dans une phase où Israël cherche à convertir sa supériorité militaire en faits accomplis territoriaux et en concessions politiques avant les élections israéliennes et au moment où le protocole d'accord américano-iranien se délite.”
www.lalibre.be/international/2026/08/17/dans-le-sud-du-li…
“La colline d'Ali Taher, au nord du feuve Litani, est devenue un véritable point de fixation. Pilonnée quasi sans interruption par l'armée israélienne depuis plusieurs jours, cette position stratégique domine une large partie de la région de Nabatiyeh et constitue un important "point d'observation et de contrôle" , explique le politologue Karim Bitar.
Sa localisation lui confère également une portée politique : "une opération israélienne durable aussi loin vers le nord élargit de facto la notion de "zone de sécurité"" , souligne-t-il. Le Hezbollah y dispose d'importantes infrastructures souterraines dans lesquelles seraient encore retranchés des combattants libanais mais aussi iraniens, selon des médias locaux.”
La colline de tous les enjeux
"Des sources israéliennes disent même explicitement que Benjamin Netanyahou espère obtenir la reddition des combattants encerclés et en faire un symbole de victoire sur le Hezbollah" , ajoute l'expert.
Une victoire qui serait bienvenue pour le Premier ministre israélien,en difficulté sur le plan intérieur à l'approche des législatives prévues le 27 octobre prochain.
"Ali Taher condense tous les enjeux : un Hezbollah repoussé, des tunnels détruits, un territoire contrôlé, des combattants capturés ou contraints à la reddition. Cela lui permet en même temps de se protéger sur sa droite contre Itamar Ben-Gvir et d'autres qui réclament une action encore plus dure", résume Karim Bitar.”
par @JennyFrLb -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Xi Jinping’s expected visit to Washington in late September could, in my view, shape the timing and scope of Trump’s next economic moves against Iran.
- The logic is straightforward: further “maximum pressure” on Tehran increasingly means targeting the Chinese side of the equation: independent refineries buying Iranian crude, trading networks, payment channels and potentially financial institutions facilitating that trade.
- Washington can continue tightening sanctions on Iranian networks in the coming weeks. But a major escalation against Chinese entities would directly complicate the broader US-China agenda just before Trump meets Xi.
- That creates an interesting possibility: some of the most powerful sanctions tools available against Chinese entities facilitating Iran’s trade may be more useful to Trump as negotiating leverage before the summit than if deployed immediately.
- Iran and Hormuz could therefore become part of a much wider US-China bargain: pressure on Tehran and maritime stability on one side, trade, sanctions and economic concessions on the other.
- Something worth watching as September approaches.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Cameron Hudson
@_hudsonc
🎯"Pakistan’s dilemma is that its strategic value to Saudi Arabia increases if it becomes useful beyond South Asia. But the more deeply it enters the rivalries of the Red Sea and Horn of Africa, the greater the risk that it becomes entangled in conflicts that are not its own."
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
Israel's coercive iron-fist approach in the region has not just isolated itself but risks isolating its few remaining partners - principally India and the UAE - as Saudi is buiding an alternative third pillar
India's strategic culture isn't compatible with Israel's in the long-run -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Nicole Grajewski
@NicoleGrajewski
“Russia is shipping drone components, ammunition and TNT to Iran through the Caspian Sea, helping Tehran replenish stockpiles damaged in U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, according to a European government document obtained by NBC News and verified by a Western official.” @dandeluce
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Council on Foreign Relations
@CFR_org
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement on August 7. Reports indicate that the 3 countries have in essence agreed to a NATO Article 5-like clause—an attack on one signatory would be considered an attack on all of them.
The agreement "reflects a change underway in the Middle East's regional order—one that reduces the United States' decades long leadership role," writes expert @stevenacook.
The U.S.-aligned order could now become a Middle East with two blocs: the countries that remained committed to the Abraham Accords—the 2020 normalization agreements between Israel and Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE—and its alternative, the Mecca Agreement, he argues.
"Previously, regional rivalries and disputes were contained because leaders prioritized their relations with the United States, which was the tie that bound the regional order. Now, with the Pakistanis, Saudis, and Turks moving forward with a vision that competes directly with the Abraham Accords, that no longer seems to be the case," he writes.
Read the full analysis: www.cfr.org/articles/the-u-s-led-middle-east-order-is-ove… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Iran gives the US an ultimatum of "3-4 weeks" to meet all of its demands or it will "severely escalate in the Strait of Hormuz" and launch its planned preemptive strike on US-backed Gulf infrastructure, and US & Israeli assets, a senior Iranian source in Tehran familiar with the matter says.
Iran's demands include:
1. $300 billion in reconstruction funds
2. Full release of Iran's frozen assets of up to $120 billion
3. Lifting of the U.S. naval blockade
4. End to the war across all fronts, including Gaza and Lebanon
5. Accepting Iran's permanent control of the Strait of Hormuz, including up to 7% of transit fees
6. The lifting of all US sanctions on Iranian oil, petrochemical products, and gas -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
👇Excellent reporting from @ErikaSolomon on Iran’s new security leadership. I’m quoted arguing Iran remains open to diplomacy, but is prepared for a long conflict rather than accept another temporary deal that leaves it vulnerable.
www.nytimes.com/2026/08/17/world/middleeast/iran-khamenei… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Middle East Eye
@MiddleEastEye
A prominent Emirati businessman who championed normalisation with Israel has questioned whether regional peace can be achieved while Israeli ministers openly demand the mass killing of Palestinians
More here ⤵️
middleeasteye.pulse.ly/ywmzpwp91n -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Armin Arefi
@arminarefi
ÉCOUTEZ le ministre israélien des Affaires de la diaspora, Amichai Chikli (Likud), parler mardi 11 août 2026 de l’alliance nouée par le gouvernement Netanyahu avec l’extrême droite française ⬇️.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Farnaz Fassihi
@farnazfassihi
Iran is bracing for conflict abroad and at home
Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment of hard-line loyalists to top jobs suggests he is prepared to keep the country on a war footing and to quash domestic dissent.
@ErikaSolomon
www.nytimes.com/2026/08/17/world/middleeast/iran-khamenei… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Israel Elects
@israel_elects
With Hamas and the Gaza War likely to play a major role in the upcoming Israeli elections, the latest PCPSR survey of Palestinian public opinion is particularly relevant. Here are the main findings🧵
1/n -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
הדרך הקלה ביותר להסביר מדוע לא הושג הסכם עם איראן היא לתלות זאת בחילוקי הדעות בתוך ההנהגה האיראנית. אלא שהאירוע הזה מלמד שגם אם קיימות מחלוקות בטהרן, יש קונצנזוס רחב למדי באשר למדיניות שיש לאמץ במשא ומתן מול הממשל האמריקני.
בכל מקרה, ברור שאיראן אינה מעוניינת במלחמת נצח. היא מבקשת להגיע לפתרון מדיני, אך כזה שישמר את ההישגים שצברה במערכה ולא יחייב אותה לוותר על עקרונות יסוד בתפיסתה האידאולוגית והאסטרטגית. אם לא יוצע לה הסכם שיענה על התנאים הללו, נראה שהאיראנים יהיו מוכנים להסתכן בחזרה לעימות עם ארצות הברית.
לכן הקושי אינו נעוץ רק בעמדה האיראנית, אלא גם בכך שהממשל האמריקני טרם הכריע בין החלופות העומדות בפניו: האם הוא מוכן להתפשר על חלק מדרישותיו כדי להגיע להסכם, או לחלופין להסלים את העימות בניסיון לכפות על איראן תנאים נוחים יותר.
כרגע נראה שהממשל בוחר בדרך ביניים של המשך הלחץ הכלכלי. אלא שלחץ כזה עשוי להכביד על איראן ולשפר את עמדת המיקוח האמריקנית, אך כשלעצמו הוא אינו צפוי להביא לכניעה איראנית.
הדברים הללו, ובפרט השיח עם מפקד משמרות המהפכה, מלמדים כי הממשל מבין היטב שבנקודת הזמן הנוכחית אין דרך מעשית לשנות את המשטר האיראני, ולכן עליו לפעול מול ההנהגה הקיימת, גם כאשר מדובר בגורמים שעברם בעייתי ביותר מבחינת ארצות הברית.
בכל מקרה, הדיווח הזה ממחיש מדוע יש להתייחס בהסתייגות הראויה לדיווחים החוזרים על קרע עמוק בצמרת האיראנית. מחלוקות פנימיות בהחלט קיימות, אך אין להסיק מהן בהכרח שההנהגה האיראנית מפוצלת בכל הנוגע לעקרונות המנחים את מדיניותה מול וושינגטון.
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🚨🇺🇸🇮🇷באמצע חודש מאי ממשל טראמפ ייסד ערוץ קשר חשאי עם משמרות המהפכה באמצעות נשיא חבל כורדיסטן בעיראק נצ'ירוואן ברזאני, כך לפי שלושה מקורות שמעורים בפרטים
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
As I wrote just last week, #iran is changing the security doctrine adopted under Ali Khamenei.
That doctrine was built around keeping threats away from Iranian territory, relying heavily on proxies, and pursuing a policy of containment designed to avoid drawing Iran itself into direct wars.
What appears to be emerging instead is a more offensive, proactive, and strategically deceptive doctrine, one aimed at inflicting severe damage on the enemy rather than waiting for an attack to reach Iranian soil.
This latest report only reinforces that assessment.
#iranwar
x.com/citrinowicz/status/2087899128676118621
Hiba Nasr
@HibaNasr
‼️ WSJ: Arab intelligence officials have picked up evidence of a strategic shift inside the country’s hard-line leadership to get their forces ready to widen the war … Iran’s leaders are increasingly talking about offensive operations on enemy territory. www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-plan-escalate-war-cc65…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Bassam Barabandi بسام بربندي
@BASSAMVA
What is happening today is not a series of separate events, but rather the signs of a new phase in the confrontation with Iran.
Amid the political stalemate, each side is trying to raise the cost of the war for the other. The fundamental question has become: Who can bear this cost longer, and who will be forced to change their calculations first?
Economically, the equation does not appear to favor Tehran.
Oil prices are hovering around $90, while Iran’s oil exports, which had been close to two million barrels per day, have fallen to near-standstill levels.
But the mistake is to view Iran through the logic of conventional states.
The Iranian regime is an authoritarian ideological regime, and its priority is not the economy or the living standards of Iranians, but the survival of the regime and the preservation of the structure of Velayat-e Faqih.
It can therefore impose significant economic and human costs on society, making economic pressure less influential on its decision-making in the short term, until that pressure begins to threaten the regime’s own ability to finance its institutions and its military and security apparatuses.
This is where we can understand Tehran’s current strategy: If it cannot ease the pressure on itself, it will try to distribute its cost across the region.
Mohammad Reza Naqdi’s statements about revenge and expanding Basij operations outside Iran, the continued Houthi attacks and focus on the port of Mocha, followed by the escalation with Qatar and Kuwait, all fit within this logic.
Raising the issue of the pilots with Qatar after more than five months raises a question about the timing more than about the issue itself. Iran had been in continuous contact with Doha throughout this period and did not turn the matter into a public crisis, but it is doing so now, as understandings with Washington have stalled and the issue of frozen Iranian funds remains unresolved.
The same applies to raising the case of four Iranians with Kuwait at this particular time.
What matters here is not Qatar or Kuwait individually, but the emergence of a broader Iranian pattern: using bilateral issues and political and security pressure to raise the cost of the confrontation for the Gulf states and push them, directly or indirectly, to pressure Washington in turn.
This is where the Gulf dilemma becomes greater. The Gulf states do not want Iran to prevail, but neither do they want their ports and economies to become arenas for a prolonged U.S.-Iranian war of attrition.
At the same time, there is a recurring bet within Iran and its axis on the U.S. midterm elections, and on the idea that Republicans losing their majority in the House of Representatives would mark a turning point in Tehran’s favor.
But the experience of Trump’s first term tells a different story.
Republicans lost the House of Representatives in the 2018 elections, and Trump did not retreat from his policy toward Iran.
What followed instead was the designation of the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, tighter sanctions and an effort to drive Iranian oil exports to zero, followed by the killing of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.
Therefore, losing the majority may complicate Trump’s domestic agenda, but it does not necessarily mean a change in his policy toward Iran.
Washington, meanwhile, faces a different problem: Economic and military pressure can weaken Iran, but by itself it does not guarantee a change in the decisions of a regime prepared to impose a heavy cost on its own society in order to survive.
Any negotiated way out also requires identifying who actually holds decision-making power in Tehran and finding a mediator trusted by both sides.
1/2
. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Middle East Eye
@MiddleEastEye
The Mecca defence pact is being seen by analysts as a counter to the UAE-Israel military cooperation, which remains unpopular outside Israeli and American circles
mee.s.gy/CTEdzv -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Najafi
@Mostafa_Najafii
تغییرات اخیر در رأس نهادهای امنیتی و نظامی کشور، حکایت از تحول در دکترین نظامی کشور و عبور تدریجی از راهبرد «دفاع همهجانبه» به سمت «بازدارندگی تهاجمی» دارد. به نظر میرسد در آینده نزدیک، نشانههای عینیتر این تغییر را در راهبردها، آرایش نیروها و الگوی بهکارگیری توان نظامی ایران شاهد باشیم.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alex Vatanka
@AlexVatanka
This is less a new war cabinet than the old guard recalled for another war - at home and abroad.
en.majalla.com/node/332549/politics/irans-new-war-cabinet… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clash Report
@clashreport
Saudi Arabia removed the sentence "Muslims will never give up Jerusalem" from its Grade 11 Arabic textbook.
It's part of a broader curriculum moderation trend under Vision 2030, which has also replaced "Zionist enemy" with "Israeli occupation".
Source: IMPACT-se -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🚨שליחו של הנשיא טראמפ, ג'ארד קושנר, נפגש ביום ראשון עם בכירי חמאס במצרים ולחץ עליהם להתחיל ליישם את התחייבותם להתפרק מנשקם, כך לפי שני מקורות המעורים בתכני הפגישה
🚨למה זה חשוב: זו הייתה הפגישה הראשונה בין קושנר לבכירי חמאס מאז חתימת ההסכם לסיום המלחמה בעזה באוקטובר האחרון
🚨הפגישה החריגה התקיימה בזמן שהבית הלבן ומועצת השלום של הנשיא טראמפ לעזה לוחצים הן על חמאס והן על ישראל להתקדם לשלב הבא בתוכנית 20 הנקודות של ארה״ב
🚨קושנר צפוי להגיע לישראל ביום שני ולהיפגש עם ראש הממשלה נתניהו כדי לדון ב"צעדים מקבילים" שישראל צריכה לנקוט, כך לפי מקור שמעורה בפרטים
🚨מאחורי הקלעים: הנציג העליון של מועצת השלום, ניקולאי מלאדנוב, וראש ממשלת בריטניה לשעבר טוני בלייר, החבר במועצת השלום, הצטרפו לקושנר בפגישה באל-עלמיין
🚨ראש הלשכה המדינית של חמאס ח'ליל אל־חיה השתתף בפגישה לצד ראש המודיעין המצרי, הגנרל חסן רשאד, השר הקטארי עלי אל־ת'וואדי ובכיר טורקי
🚨מקור המעורה בפגישה אמר כי מטרתה הייתה "לתרגם" את ההתחייבויות שחמאס קיבל על עצמו במסגרת ההסכם לפירוז עזה "לצעדים קונקרטיים שניתן לאמת את יישומם"
🚨התמקדות: המקור אמר כי הצעדים הללו כוללים שמירה על הפסקת האש בעזה, התחלת העברת כל סמכויות השלטון לממשלה הפלסטינית הטכנוקרטית והבטחה שלחמאס לא יהיה כל תפקיד בממשל העתידי של עזה
🚨לדברי המקור, מועצת השלום רוצה שחמאס יתחיל בתהליך פירוק אמצעי הלחימה והתשתיות הצבאיות, יאפשר את פריסתו של כוח הייצוב הבינלאומי ויסייע לקדם את שיקומה ובנייתה מחדש של עזה, ללא גניבה של חומרים או הפחדה של פלסטינים המשתתפים במאמצים הללו
🚨מועצת השלום רוצה גם שישראל תבצע "נסיגות מקבילות" בעזה אם חמאס יתחיל להתפרק מנשקו, וכן תאיץ את הכנסת הסיוע ההומניטרי לרצועה
🚨"לא יכולה להיות כל עמימות: חמאס חייב לוותר על סמכויות השלטון ועל כל אמצעי הלחימה והתשתיות הצבאיות שלו. ועזה לעולם לא תוכל לשוב ולהיות מקור לטרור נגד ישראל", אמר המקור -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇮🇷Scoop: The Trump administration established in mid-May a secret backchannel to Iran's Revolutionary Guard commander Ahmad Vahidi through Nechirvan Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan region in Iraq. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/08/16/iran-backchannel-trump-gabbard-b… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Yemen front.
- The situation in Yemen is deteriorating quickly, with fighting and pressure building along several axes. Houthi forces are increasing activity around Marib, Taiz and the western coast around Mokha, while tensions are also rising toward Hadramawt and the Saudi border. In parallel, Ansar Allah has resumed direct pressure on Saudi Arabia, including the claimed drone attack against the Aramco refinery in Jizan, while missile strikes around Mokha have caused civilian casualties. At sea, the Houthis are again signaling that Bab el-Mandeb and Saudi-linked shipping could become part of the confrontation.
- This is no longer simply a contained Yemeni battlefield. The risk is that the internal front, Saudi territory and the Red Sea gradually merge into a single escalation cycle.
My view on the Iranian angle.
- Tehran probably has an interest in controlled escalation, not in a full Saudi-Houthi war. A hotter Yemeni front gives Iran additional leverage at a moment when it is already using Hormuz as a strategic bargaining tool. The Houthis can generate pressure at the other major regional chokepoint, Bab el-Mandeb, while reminding Riyadh that any deeper involvement in an anti-Iran military strategy carries direct costs for Saudi territory and energy infrastructure.
- There is also a negotiating dimension. The more Hormuz, Lebanon, Gaza and Yemen remain interconnected and unresolved, the harder it becomes for Washington to isolate the Iranian file from the broader regional balance. From Tehran’s perspective, that creates leverage.
But in my view there is an important limit.
Iran has little interest in pushing Riyadh into a new full-scale war, destroying the political capital built through Saudi-Iranian normalization, or accelerating a tighter Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani military alignment against it.
- One detail is particularly important: even while escalating militarily, the Houthis continue to say that the door to negotiations with Saudi Arabia remains open. That suggests coercive bargaining more than a deliberate march toward total war. Pressure is being increased, but the diplomatic exit is still being preserved, and Tehran also has an interest in preserving that diplomatic off-ramp.
- So Tehran’s preference is likely for a front that remains hot enough to create pressure, but controlled enough to keep diplomacy alive. In that sense, Yemen is becoming less a separate conflict and more another bargaining front in the wider regional confrontation.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
מוחמד מג'אדלה محمد مجادلة
@mmagadli
פרסום ראשון: יו"ר הכנסת לשעבר, אברהם בורג, מצטרף למפלגה הערבית-יהודית החדשה "מקום לכולנו" וירוץ ברשימתה לבחירות הכנסת הקרובות. הערב המפלגה תתכנס לאשר את הצטרפותו ולהכריז רשמית על המהלך
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
IISS News
@IISS_org
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye’s new defence pact is emblematic of the shifts in defence cooperation in the region. It raises questions on how far the agreement will be upheld and on how it will affect relations within the Gulf and beyond.
Read the latest analysis by Dr Hasan Alhasan (@HTAlhasan) and Asna Waji:
➡️ www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/08/paki… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
محمد الحمادي 🇦🇪
@MEalhammadi
#بالمنطق …خمسة أسباب جعلت "اتفاق مكة" مثيراً للتساولات
من ناحية المبدأ يجب ان نقر بأن جميع دول مجلس التعاون لديها ترتيبات دفاعية خارجية بدرجات مختلفة.
🇦🇪 الإمارات لديها اتفاقيات تعاون دفاعي مع الولايات المتحدة وفرنسا، وتستضيف قوات ومنشآت عسكرية فرنسية.
🇰🇼 الكويت ترتبط باتفاقية تعاون دفاعي مع الولايات المتحدة منذ عام 1991، وصُنفت حليفاً رئيسياً من خارج حلف الناتو.
🇧🇭 البحرين تستضيف الأسطول الخامس الأميركي، ولديها ترتيبات دفاعية مع بريطانيا، كما وقعت مع واشنطن عام 2023 «اتفاقية التكامل الأمني والازدهار الشامل».
🇶🇦 قطر تستضيف قاعدة العديد، وترتبط باتفاقيات دفاعية مع الولايات المتحدة ودول أخرى، إضافة إلى وجود عسكري تركي على أراضيها.
🇴🇲 عُمان ترتبط باتفاقية الدفاع المشترك مع بريطانيا لعام 2019، كما وقّعت مع الولايات المتحدة الاتفاق الإطاري لعام 2019، الذي وسّع اتفاق التسهيلات العسكرية القائم منذ 1980.
إذاً، الاستعانة بشريك خارجي ليست حدثاً جديداً، ودول الخليج بنت أمنها، منذ عقود، على دوائر متداخلة: قدرات وطنية، وتعاون خليجي، واتفاقيات ثنائية مع قوى دولية، وشراكات عسكرية متخصصة. ومن الخطأ وضع هذه الدوائر في علاقة تناقض دائم؛ فقد تكون الاتفاقيات الخارجية مكملة للأمن الخليجي وليست بديلاً عنه.
🇸🇦 🇵🇰 🇹🇷 فلماذا أثارت اتفاقية مكة كل هذا الجدل؟
السبب الأول هو طبيعة الالتزام المعلن.
معظم الاتفاقيات الخليجية الخارجية تنظم التدريب والتسليح وتبادل المعلومات واستخدام القواعد والوصول العسكري والتشاور عند وقوع خطر.
أما اتفاقية مكة فتستخدم صياغة دفاع جماعي واضحة: الهجوم على إحدى الدول الثلاث يُعد هجوماً عليها جميعاً، هذه الصياغة ترفع الاتفاق من مستوى التعاون الدفاعي إلى مستوى الالتزام السياسي المتبادل، حتى لو بقيت آليات تنفيذه غير معلنة بالكامل.
السبب الثاني يتعلق بهوية الأطراف.
نحن لا نتحدث عن اتفاق ثنائي بين دولة خليجية وقوة دولية توفر قاعدة أو منظومة سلاح، بل عن إطار ثلاثي يجمع السعودية، أكبر دولة خليجية وعربية من حيث الثقل السياسي والاقتصادي، وتركيا، العضو في الناتو وصاحبة المشروع الإقليمي والصناعة الدفاعية المتنامية، وباكستان، القوة النووية الإسلامية الوحيدة. اجتماع هذه العناصر يمنح الاتفاق دلالة استراتيجية تتجاوز نصه المنشور.
السبب الثالث هو التوقيت.
الاتفاق جاء وسط حروب إقليمية، وتهديدات صاروخية ومسيّرة، وتصاعد الشكوك في استدامة الضمانات الأميركية، لذلك قُرئ بوصفه محاولة لبناء ردع إقليمي أكثر استقلالاً، وليس مجرد برنامج للتدريب أو شراء السلاح، وفي التحليل الاستراتيجي، قد تكون الرسالة التي يبعث بها الاتفاق في لحظة معينة أهم من مواده القانونية.
السبب الرابع أن السعودية ليست مجرد دولة خليجية أبرمت اتفاقاً ثنائياً.
موقعها يجعل أي تحول في سياستها الأمنية مرشحاً للتأثير في بنية مجلس التعاون وفي مفهوم الأمن العربي، ولهذا يصبح السؤال عن موقع بقية دول الخليج مشروعاً، لا اعتراضاً على حق الرياض في حماية أمنها، بل بحثاً في مدى ارتباط الترتيب الجديد بالمؤسسات القائمة.
السبب الخامس هو غموض تعريف التهديد.
السعودية وتركيا وباكستان لا تتطابق أولوياتها الأمنية، لكل دولة خصومها وجغرافيتها وحساباتها. وعندما يعلن اتفاق أن الهجوم على طرف هجوم على الجميع، يصبح من المشروع السؤال: ما نوع الهجوم المقصود؟ وأي الجبهات تدخل ضمن الالتزام؟ وهل يشمل النزاعات القائمة أم الاعتداءات الجديدة فقط؟ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House MENA
@CH_MENAP
'Pressure on Hamas has been necessary & fully warranted. It remains so – both for Gaza’s stability & Israel’s security. But it must now be met with pressure on Israel too, if there is to be any chance of progress towards a sustainable future for Gaza,' writes @DrJulieNorman2.
www.chathamhouse.org/2026/08/agreeing-disarm-hamas-trying… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Middle East Eye
@MiddleEastEye
"How a pragmatic axis could reshape the Middle East The Mecca agreement could do more to determine the region's trajectory than anything decided in Washington, Tel Aviv or Tehran" ✍️ Opinion by Marco Carnelos
mee.s.gy/K8bIG1 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr. Ali BAKIR (علي باكير)
@AliBakeer
Israeli media, particularly The Times of Israel, reported #mecca_pact factually while noting that the three signatories are wary of both Iran and Israel.
In a previous statement, Netanyahu vowed to prevent the realization of such a pact –calling it an emerging radical Sunni axis and introduced the “Hexagon Alliance,” comprised of Israel, India, Greece, Greek Cyprus and some member states of the Abraham Accords, as a way to counter it.
Recently, Netanyahu has been putting Israel’s weight behind lobbying efforts in Washington to prevent Ankara from receiving its F-35s or even rejoining the program.
Dr. Ali BAKIR (علي باكير)
@AliBakeer
🇹🇷🇸🇦🇵🇰|🇮🇷🇮🇱🇮🇳🇦🇪 My latest on the regional reactions to #mecca_pact:
How Mecca Pact is viewed by #iran, #israel, #india, and the #uae
turkiyetoday.com/opinion/how-mecca-pact-is-viewed-by-iran…
#turkiye #saudi_arabia #pakistan -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Fared Al Mahlool | فريد المحلول
@FARED_ALHOR
BIG — Israel reportedly asked U.S. President Donald Trump for approval to launch an airstrike targeting sites in Syria, but he rejected the request.
According to the channel, the move reflects growing coordination and closer ties between the Trump administration and both the Turkish president and Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa.
13tv.co.il/item/news/politics/state-policy/vvr0n-905312011/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
🇸🇦Abdulsalam Saleh
@abdulslam2017
🚨🇹🇷🇸🇦تركيا والسعودية: من التعاون إلى.التوطين الاستراتيجي
كشف مدير عام شركة MKE التركية 🇹🇷 (إلهامي كليتش) عن تفاصيل المرحلة الجديدة من التعاون العسكري مع الرياض 🇸🇦 : بالنسبة لمدفع BORAN المحمول جواً (105 ملم): المفاوضات في مراحلها النهائية، مع اتفاق على توطين جزء من إنتاجه داخل السعودية.
وأما بشأن منظومة TOLGA للدفاع الجوي القريب: يوجد اتفاقية رسمية موقعة للإنتاج والتصنيع المشترك داخل المملكة لردع التهديدات الجوية المنخفضة والمسيّرات.
هذه هي المعادلة الجديدة للردع في المنطقة. 🦅🇸🇦🇹🇷 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
IRGC commander Ahmad Vahidi marks six months of war with an unusually ideological message, claiming Iran has “brought the most heavily armed military in history to its knees.”
- Beyond the triumphalist rhetoric, the political signal is clear: Vahidi explicitly credits the campaign to the “wise leadership” of Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei. The war narrative is increasingly being used not only to project deterrence abroad, but also to consolidate the new Leader’s legitimacy at home.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Middle East Eye
@MiddleEastEye
"The UAE-Israel alliance is a political pact, but in reality, it’s the military and intelligence elements that define it”
- Ayham Kamel, geopolitical analyst
How the Mecca pact stacks up against the UAE-Israel alliance ⤵️
middleeasteye.pulse.ly/ygwmpitdfx -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ronen Bergman
@ronenbergman
בחודש האחרון מישהו משתדל מאוד מאוד להפחיד אותנו, להגיד שאנחנו על סף כליה, מוקפים אוייבים ערמומיים ונחושים.
בין 12 ביולי ל12 באוגוסט הופצו בתקשורת הישראלית לא פחות מ15 סיפורי איום שכאלה. ברובם דפוס שחזר על עצמו באופן בולט: מקור ביטחוני עלום, תרחיש מאיים מאוד, כמעט שום נתון שיאפשר לצופה להבין את ממדי האיום, ולרוב - שום קול מסייג בתוך הידיעה המקורית. חמישה מהסיפורים יצאו בתוך 48 שעות בלבד, בין 9 ל-11 באוגוסט.
חלק מהסיפורים הוכחו כבר כפייק, כמו למשל ה"הודאה" של מפקד משמרות המהפיכה שאיראן ש"רק כשארצות הברית וישראל יתפרקו מהנשק הגרעיני שלהם, גם אנחנו נתפרק משלנו", ציטוט שלא היה ולא נברא, אבל מצא את עצמו תוך שעות מפרופילים מפוקפקים בהודו, לקידום בידי יאיר נתניהו, למרכז נאומו של ראש הממשלה, לראש החדשות בארצות הברית ולקידום בידי פקידי ממשל בכירים.
הדיווח כאילו הסורים "האיצו באופן משמעותי" את שיקום חיל האוויר שלהם היה תלוש במיוחד. גולת הכותרת הייתה "תרגיל ראשון" של מטוסי סוחוי. שיקום חיל האוויר הסורי, נאמר, מדאיג מאוד את צה"ל ועלול לפגוע בחופש הפעולה של חיל האוויר הישראלי (זאת אחרי שבדצמבר 2024 ראשי צה"ל וראש הממשלה הצהירו כי ישראל השמידה את שאריות הצבא הסורי ולא הותירה מחיל האוויר שלו אלא אבק.)
אלא שהידיעה שודרה שוב ושוב. אחד מהערוצים המרכזיים שידר אותה לא פחות מ-16 פעמים. הנתון שלא פורט בה היה כמה מטוסים כשירים יש כיום לסוריה.
ובכן, יצאנו לבדוק. מתברר כי הנושא הוא אכן מוקד לויכוח מר בתוך קהילת המודיעין: חלק סבורים שיש לסורים שני מטוסי סוחוי כשירים. הרוב בטוחים שרק אחד.* בנתיים רוסיה "לא סיפקה להם אפילו צמיג" וגם אם כן- מדובר על תהליך של 5-10 שנים לפחות.
אין מה לומר- כוח שמאיים על חיל האוויר הישראלי.
אבל בתוך פחות מיממה כבר שמע הצופה באולפן אחר על מאות אלפי ג'יהאדיסטים שמתחמשים, ועל כך שמנהיג סוריה "הקים מחדש את חיל האוויר שלו".
בדל מידע נכנס מצד אחד. חיל אוויר חדש יוצא מן הצד השני.
www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra14864339 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
عبدالله السحيم
@abdullahassahem
نُشر قبل قليل لقاءً جديدًا للسفير التركي في سوريا نوح يلماز على «سوريا الآن»... وأعتقد أن هذا اللقاء من أهم واخطر اللقاءات التي تكشف كيف تنظر أنقرة إلى سوريا خلال السنوات القادمة.
لأننا نتحدث عن رجل أمضى نحو عشر سنوات داخل الاستخبارات التركية... ثم أصبح كبير مستشاري هاكان فيدان... ثم رئيس مركز الدراسات الاستراتيجية في الخارجية... ثم نائبًا لوزير الخارجية... قبل أن ترسله أنقرة كأول سفير لها في دمشق بعد أكثر من 13 عامًا.
والأهم...
أنه قال إن الملفات التي يديرها اليوم في دمشق أكثر من الملفات التي كان يديرها عندما كان نائبًا للوزير...وإن السفارة التركية في سوريا أصبحت أكبر سفارات تركيا من حيث عدد الدبلوماسيين.
يعني انظر جيدًا...
هذه ليست سفارة تقليدية فقط... بل يبدو أنها تتحول إلى ما يشبه غرفة إدارة للمشروع التركي في سوريا.
ومن خلال حديث يلماز تستطيع تقريبًا رسم الاستراتيجية كاملة...
أولًا... بناء الدولة قبل كل شيء.
تركيا تريد حكومة واحدة... جيشًا واحدًا... أجهزة أمنية واحدة... حدودًا ومعابر بيد دمشق... وإنهاء السلاح المستقل واقتصاد الحرب والتهريب.
بل تحدث عن نقل الخبرة التركية إلى السوريين في الجيش والأمن والمالية والجمارك والزراعة والتعليم وبناء الوزارات والمؤسسات.
أي أن أنقرة لا تنظر إلى سوريا كملف مساعدات... بل كعملية إعادة بناء دولة.
ثانيًا... قسد.
هنا الاستراتيجية التركية واضحة جدًا...تركيا تفرق بين الأكراد السوريين وبين قسد وحزب العمال... وتريد في النهاية المعابر والنفط والموارد والمؤسسات والحدود تحت سلطة دمشق... ثم دمج العناصر السوريين داخل مؤسسات الدولة وإنهاء القيادة العسكرية المستقلة.
والأذكى أن تركيا تريد أن تفعل دمشق ذلك قدر الإمكان...
لأن إنهاء هذه الحالة بواسطة الدولة السورية أفضل لأنقرة من الدخول بنفسها في حرب طويلة.
ثالثًا... الجيش السوري.
السفير يتحدث عن تدريب وإعادة هيكلة وبناء لوجستي وتطوير للصيانة والصناعة العسكرية والبحرية... ومشاركة الجيش السوري في مناورات «إيفس» جاءت أصلًا لكي يرى الضباط السوريون نموذج العمليات التركية ويحددوا احتياجات جيشهم الجديد.
وهنا تبدأ إسرائيل بالنظر إلى ما هو أبعد من اليوم...
فالمشكلة بالنسبة لها ماذا سيكون شكل الجيش السوري بعد خمس أو عشر سنوات إذا أصبحت خلفه تركيا؟
ثم انظر إلى البحر...
تركيا أرسلت أسطولًا إلى اللاذقية... وتعرض تدريب البحرية السورية والمساعدة في بناء السفن... بما يعني إعادة الساحل السوري تدريجيًا إلى معادلة شرق المتوسط....وهذه نقلة نوعية وخطيرة ومهمة جداً...
لكن في المقابل...أنقرة لا تريد جر سوريا الآن إلى حرب كبرى مع إسرائيل أو لبنان أو أي طرف آخر.
الاستراتيجية تبدو كالتالي:
اهدأ الآن... ابنِ الدولة والاقتصاد والجيش... ثم تتغير موازين القوة وحدها.
فكل سنة تمر بلا حرب تعني آلاف الجنود الذين يمكن تدريبهم... مؤسسات أقوى... استثمارات أكثر... واقتصادًا أكبر.
ثم يأتي الجزء الذي أراه أخطر من السلاح نفسه...
الاقتصاد.
اتفاق تجارة حرة... فتح المعابر... ميناء جاف... مناطق صناعية مشتركة... استثمارات... ربط طرق وجمارك... طاقة وزراعة ونسيج... والهدف الوصول بالتجارة إلى عشرة مليارات دولار ثم تجاوزها.
وبعدها تتحول سوريا إلى ممر...
تركيا ← سوريا ← الأردن ← السعودية والخليج...
وممر آخر نحو العراق... وآخر نحو لبنان والمتوسط.
وهنا نفهم لماذا سوريا مهمة جدًا في المشروع الإقليمي التركي...
تركيا لا تريد سوريا تابعة لها... تريد سوريا قوية ولكن مصالحها الأمنية والعسكرية والاقتصادية مرتبطة بأنقرة بحيث يصبح استقرار دمشق جزءًا من الأمن القومي التركي.
والأبعد من ذلك أن السفير يتحدث بعقلية خمسين عامًا...
ملايين السوريين عاشوا في تركيا... مئات الآلاف حصلوا على جنسيتها... أطفال تعلموا هناك... رجال أعمال... لغة... مدارس... عائلات ومصاهرات...
أي أن أنقرة تحاول بناء علاقة بين جيل تركي وجيل سوري كامل.
وهنا تحديدًا أفهم القلق الإسرائيلي...إسرائيل لا تقرأ سوريا كما هي في 2026 فقط...بل تحاول أن تتخيل سوريا في 2036:
دولة موحدة... بلا ميليشيات مستقلة... جيش مركزي تدعمه تركيا... اقتصاد مرتبط بالأناضول والخليج... موانئ وسكك ومصانع... وعلاقة استراتيجية مع واحدة من أكبر القوى العسكرية في المنطقة.
لذلك عندما تسمع التهديدات الإسرائيلية المتكررة لسوريا...لا تنظر فقط إلى سوريا الضعيفة الخارجة من حرب طويلة...انظر إلى سوريا التي يخشون أن تولد بعد عشر سنوات.
ويبدو أن أنقرة أرسلت إلى دمشق رجلًا من مدرسة هاكان فيدان لكي يشارك في هندسة هذه المرحلة منذ بدايتها...وهذا ربما يفسر لماذا تراقب إسرائيل كل خطوة تركية في سوريا ليل نهار...وتشتكي لترامب باستمرار...!!!
فالخطر بالنسبة لها ليس ما تملكه دمشق اليوم... بل ما يجري بناؤه بهدوء للمستقبل.....ومن هذه الزاوية يجب ان نطرب لصياح الاحتلال ... 😅
لذلك يا صديقي الجميل لتفهم اكثر الملفات تعقيدا ً في العالم ادعوك لمتابعة قناتي الصغيرة على اليوتيوب والتي ستكبر بك ان شاء الله : www.youtube.com/@abdullahalsahaim -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Globe Letter
@GlobeLetter
BREAKING: Donals Trump is reportedly thinking of abandoning Netanyahu as the Israeli PM stands on the verge of electoral defeat — the U.S. president has refused to give the public backing Netanyahu was counting on, as the Iran war has become a political liability for both leaders, per Axios.
Polls show Netanyahu will not win Israel's election. Trump and his advisers are aware of this. In the early weeks of the Iran war, Trump's closest aides believed he would support Netanyahu. But as the conflict dragged on, their interests diverged.
Netanyahu needs a victory to survive politically. Trump needs a deal to survive the midterms. Those two goals are now incompatible.
The public support Netanyahu was promised has not come. Trump has grown frustrated with Israel's influence operations in the U.S. and Netanyahu's relentless push for escalation. The alliance that defined the war is fracturing — and Netanyahu may now face his voters alone.
Netanyahu's political survival is fading. Trump is already looking past him. The war is no longer a shared project — it's a liability for both. And Netanyahu is being left behind. The question is what he will do when he realizes the U.S. is no longer backing him. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Agence France-Presse
@afpfr
🇮🇱🇵🇸 Israël a envoyé jeudi des troupes dans un village de Cisjordanie occupée, où des colons ont assiégé des maisons palestiniennes, l'ambassadeur américain dénonçant "un acte de terreur" dans une très inhabituelle condamnation ⤵️
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arabie Saoudite en France
@KSAembassyFRA
Son Excellence l’Ambassadeur Dr Faisal Al-Mejfel remettre copie de ses lettres de créance en qualité d’Ambassadeur du Royaume d’Arabie Saoudite en France à M. Mathieu Carmona, Directeur adjoint du Protocole d’État.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
Ex-Mossad chief Yossi Cohen downplays the significance posed by Iran's HEU stockpile, saying, "60% enriched uranium still has a long way to go before a bomb."
Is this a public acknowledgement that there was no imminent nuclear threat? If yes, was Trump played? -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amwaj.media
@amwajmedia
🇮🇶 Tired of being a spectator in its own skies, Baghdad is playing the field to reclaim its air sovereignty.
From French Rafales to Pakistani JF-17s, Iraq is diversifying its arsenal to end the era of unchecked foreign overflights.
✍️@pauliddon for @amwajmedia 👇 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
It’s always a pleasure to join @amberinzaman on her @AlMonitor podcast. This time, we discussed #iran’s view of the Mecca Defense Pact, the Iranian leadership’s broader approach toward the region, and internal dynamics within the Islamic Republic.
www.al-monitor.com/podcasts/iran-sees-threats-opportuniti… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
I agree in principle, but the way I frame it is that being “pragmatic” does not necessarily mean being “moderate” in the standard sense of the term.
What we are seeing at the moment is the effective sidelining of the so-called "moderate-reformist" camp. Within the current collective security leadership, however, there are elements that are more inclined toward cost-benefit calculations and others that are more ideologically driven.
So, although categories such as “hardline” versus “pragmatist” have always been somewhat lazy formulations, I think they still serve an analytical purpose in the absence of a better categorization.
Barbara Slavin
@barbaraslavin1
issue of 'hardliners' vs 'pragmatists' in #iran is overdone. Decisions are collective among individuals who are also jostling for top jobs. #rezaie and @Qalibaf are cases in point. Both have flirted w/the US in the past & would again if it served the regime's and their interests
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
"With once-dominant U.S. influence giving way to a more fractured geopolitical environment in the region, "what is emerging is a highly competitive multipolar system in which states hedge, cooperate tactically and compete simultaneously," argued @andreas_krieg, senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, Royal College of Defense Studies, and fellow at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies.
"The war has accelerated several preexisting trends: the erosion of state sovereignty, the fragmentation of Arab states, the declining credibility of American protection, and the growing importance of indirect power," Krieg told Newsweek.
www.newsweek.com/map-iran-israel-saudi-arabia-allies-new-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
A couple of weeks ago, Iran brought its first geothermal power plant online.
The Sabalan Geothermal Power Plant has a capacity of just 5.4 MW and took decades to complete. But it still offers hope for Iran's delayed push to decarbonize its energy system.
www.bourseandbazaar-substack.org/p/irans-first-geothermal… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
“The U.S. relationship with Israel exemplifies how deep security relationships, combined with permanent basing, can produce disastrous results,” writes @mikehfuchs.
www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-must-let-go-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammed A. Salih
@MohammedASalih
From my column for @thenewregion this week on the recent trilateral Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish defense pact:
“The agreement has been touted as a NATO-style pact that would entail the mutual defense of any of the three countries should they come under attack. This might be an exaggeration, particularly given a number of reasons. First, this is mainly a pact to defend Saudi Arabia. It’s hard to see the Saudis and Turks defending Pakistan against India, or the Saudis joining a military response against Israel, say, should Turkey and Israel come to clash in or over Syria. Second, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have had a similar agreement since September 2025, but Islamabad has not defended Saudi Arabia in any meaningful sense against Iranian attacks during the two rounds of conflict between Iran and the United States this year. Third, it is hard to fathom that Turkey would intervene on Saudi Arabia's behalf to respond in kind to Iranian attacks. Ankara would risk a confrontation with Tehran and its proxies should it actually join forces with Riyadh to respond to such aggression. A first major test of this alliance has now come with the August 9 Yemeni Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Aramco oil facilities. We will have to wait and see whether the alliance responds and in what ways.”
The New Region
@thenewregion
OPINION: The recent signing of a trilateral Saudi-Turkey-Pakistan defense agreement marks a new development in the Middle East's security architecture, as Riyadh finds itself increasingly embroiled in conflict with Iran-aligned actors
✍️: @MohammedASalih
thenewregion.com/posts/6178 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
New Appointments in Iran's Top Leadership Following Lessons Learned in Tehran
www.inss.org.il/social_media/new-appointments-in-irans-to… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Washington Institute
@WashInstitute
“Many differences continue to separate Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, from economic competition to their approaches to Israel. Still, both now find themselves caught between an increasingly erratic, yet essential, U.S. ally on one hand and a battered but emboldened Iran on the other,” write Allison Minor and April Longley Alley in @ForeignPolicy . foreignpolicy.com/2026/08/03/saudi-arabia-emirates-iran-i…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
OSINTdefender
@sentdefender
Iran is adapting its tactics to wear down U.S. air defenses, and exploit dwindling interceptor stocks, according to new reporting from The New York Times.
During five days of attacks on U.S. bases in Jordan last month, Iran combined drones with maneuvering ballistic missiles to overwhelm defensive systems. On July 17, one missile penetrated the defenses at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, killing 3 U.S. soldiers and wounding more than 100.
The scale of the expenditure is becoming increasingly important: the U.S. has fired more than 1,500 Patriot interceptors during the war and reportedly has fewer than 1,700 remaining, while producing only about 600 Patriots in all of 2025. On one day during the Jordan attacks, U.S. forces reportedly fired around 50 Patriots, at roughly $4 million each.
Iran has also demonstrated other adaptations, including using drones to provide targeting data that helped shoot down a U.S. F-15E in April and expanding attacks through partners such as the Houthis to force U.S. forces to defend against threats from multiple directions.
The Pentagon continues to publicly deny that the U.S. has a munitions shortage. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 يقول مسؤولون خليجيون أن دول المنطقة غير معجبة بالاتفاق الجاري بحثه لفتح المضيق جزئياً، لكنها تعتبره أفضل من استئناف المواجهة العسكرية بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران، لما يحمله ذلك من مخاطر مباشرة على منشآت الطاقة الخليجية.
🔷 وبات المنتجون الخليجيون للطاقة مقتنعين أن سيطرة إيران على مضيق هرمز قد تصبح دائمة، بما يعني استمرار اضطراب صادرات النفط والغاز وإمدادات الطاقة العالمية لفترة طويلة.
وينقل التقرير عن مسؤولين خليجيين أنهم باتوا مستسلمين لاحتمال أن أي اتفاق مع إيران سيترك برنامجها الصاروخي ودعمها للجماعات المسلحة الحليفة على حالهما، رغم اعتبارهما من أبرز مصادر التهديد لأمن دول الخليج.
🔷 كما يقول هؤلاء المسؤولون إن الخطر الأكبر بالنسبة إليهم هو عودة التصعيد وتحول الحرب إلى نزاع طويل يغلق مزيداً من تدفقات الطاقة ويبعد المستثمرين والسياح.
🔷 ويتزايد الإحباط في الخليج من ما يراه المسؤولون غياب استراتيجية أميركية واضحة مع استمرار الحرب، بما يهدد الأمن الوطني والاقتصادات الخليجية.
🔷 بحسب وسطاء، تعثرت المفاوضات في الأيام الأخيرة بسبب مطالبة إيران بتخفيف مالي وبمنع السفن الحربية الأميركية والإسرائيلية من المرور في المضيق، في حين ترفض واشنطن أي اتفاق يسمح لطهران بفرض عوائق على الملاحة.
🔷 ومن أهم الأرقام التشغيلية أن صادرات النفط الخام عبر هرمز هبطت إلى نحو 2.2 مليون برميل يومياً الأسبوع الماضي، مقابل نحو 8.5 ملايين برميل يومياً قبل شهر، وفق Kpler. كما انخفضت الصادرات الإيرانية إلى نحو 47 ألف برميل يومياً، أي قرابة النصف خلال أسبوع. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
Everyone should read this excellent post and then ask themselves: How many times in the past 25 years do you think this Israeli misinformation operation has been at work to slowly but surely push the US into war with Iran?
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
@academic_la
An incredible expose by Ronen Bergman shows how Israel invents quotes from Iranian officials in order to manufacture "evidence" that Iran is building nuclear weapons. This event took place on August 5th, when it was reported globally that Ahmad Vahidi, commander of the IRGC had admitted that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. The only problem? It wasn't true:
1) Netanyahu's pet network in Israel, Channel 14 spent months building Vahedi up as "the strongest man in Iran," priming audiences to treat any dramatic quote from him as coming from Iran itself. In reality, he is one power player among several.
2) An Indian Hindu nationalist account posts an earlier fabricated quote from Vahedi that says that nuclear weapons are a "necessity" for Iran. It does not get much traction.
3) The same account publishes a quote saying that Vahedi stated that Vahedi said that Iran will keep developing nuclear weapons as long as the US and Israel have them. There was no source.
4) The Mossad Commentary account, a large account with no affiliation to the actual Mossad posted the quote in English.
5) Channel 14, a mere 33 minutes later, covers this and claims that this is "the first time" an Iranian official directly admitted to building a nuclear bomb.
6) Three minutes later Yair Netanyahu, son of the Prime Minister, retweets Mossad Commentary, then three minutes later retweets Channel 14 English, followed later by Israel War Room.
7) Two hours later, Netanyahu senior cites the fabricated quote in an official speech at Mount Herzl, now the made up Tweet had become state policy.
8) The Tweet makes it to the US, US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz shares it saying that Iran is "finally admitting what was clear for years," then deletes it without explanation.
9) Mark Levine shares it and then Fox News reports it as fact, including an on-screen headline.
10) Channel 14 now reports this again with FOX and Netanyahu as the source. Mossad Commentary, the original source of the English version, now cites Channel 14 as its source, completing a circular citation loop.
11) Israel's Foreign Ministry spreads Netanyahu's remarks to Persian-speaking audiences.
12) Indian news agency ANI reports the story back in India, attributing it to "Israeli media," completing the round trip.
This is a well oiled machine of disinformation emanating from Netanyahu and his circle designed to create a false narrative which will destroy negotiations with Iran and renew the war. Similar frauds have been perpetrated in the past like the Jewish Chronicle/Bild affair, when a made up journalist planted stories in the press to justify blowing up a hostage deal with Hamas. But this time he is dragging the entire world into endless war and not just Israel. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
@academic_la
An incredible expose by Ronen Bergman shows how Israel invents quotes from Iranian officials in order to manufacture "evidence" that Iran is building nuclear weapons. This event took place on August 5th, when it was reported globally that Ahmad Vahidi, commander of the IRGC had admitted that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. The only problem? It wasn't true:
1) Netanyahu's pet network in Israel, Channel 14 spent months building Vahedi up as "the strongest man in Iran," priming audiences to treat any dramatic quote from him as coming from Iran itself. In reality, he is one power player among several.
2) An Indian Hindu nationalist account posts an earlier fabricated quote from Vahedi that says that nuclear weapons are a "necessity" for Iran. It does not get much traction.
3) The same account publishes a quote saying that Vahedi stated that Vahedi said that Iran will keep developing nuclear weapons as long as the US and Israel have them. There was no source.
4) The Mossad Commentary account, a large account with no affiliation to the actual Mossad posted the quote in English.
5) Channel 14, a mere 33 minutes later, covers this and claims that this is "the first time" an Iranian official directly admitted to building a nuclear bomb.
6) Three minutes later Yair Netanyahu, son of the Prime Minister, retweets Mossad Commentary, then three minutes later retweets Channel 14 English, followed later by Israel War Room.
7) Two hours later, Netanyahu senior cites the fabricated quote in an official speech at Mount Herzl, now the made up Tweet had become state policy.
8) The Tweet makes it to the US, US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz shares it saying that Iran is "finally admitting what was clear for years," then deletes it without explanation.
9) Mark Levine shares it and then Fox News reports it as fact, including an on-screen headline.
10) Channel 14 now reports this again with FOX and Netanyahu as the source. Mossad Commentary, the original source of the English version, now cites Channel 14 as its source, completing a circular citation loop.
11) Israel's Foreign Ministry spreads Netanyahu's remarks to Persian-speaking audiences.
12) Indian news agency ANI reports the story back in India, attributing it to "Israeli media," completing the round trip.
This is a well oiled machine of disinformation emanating from Netanyahu and his circle designed to create a false narrative which will destroy negotiations with Iran and renew the war. Similar frauds have been perpetrated in the past like the Jewish Chronicle/Bild affair, when a made up journalist planted stories in the press to justify blowing up a hostage deal with Hamas. But this time he is dragging the entire world into endless war and not just Israel. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Alfoneh علی آلفونه
@Alfoneh
Yours truly: "The Islamic Republic Returns to Offense" @GulfStatesInst Blog Post August 11, 2026. agsi.org/analysis/the-islamic-republic-returns-to-offense/
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rosemary Kelanic
@RKelanic
Washington is already drawing the wrong lessons from the Iran fiasco.🤦🏼♀️
The answer isn’t just “build more interceptors.”
The U.S. needs to DO LESS WAR.
News coverage over the past week is focusing on how the U.S. needs to rebuild stockpiles quickly after Trump squandered them — without explaining what interceptors do and why stockpiles were modest to begin with.
Interceptors were designed to be used for point defense of highly valuable targets, not area defense over vast stretches.
That’s because interceptors are always cost-inefficient compared to the munitions they are knocking down. Each interceptor costs more individually — up to $5 million per Patriot and $15 million per THAAD, compared to Iranian missiles that cost $1-2 million, or heaven forbid, drones that cost $7,000, if the interceptors are used so foolishly.
The U.S. also typically fires 2-3 interceptors per target to ensure a kill.
That makes the cost-exchange math inescapably brutal for the tactical defense.
Many of the people advocating to build more interceptors are the folks who want to take the U.S. into unnecessary wars and not suffer any casualties from them. They are the same people who lobbied the U.S. government to attack Iran to begin with.
Building a boatload of new interceptors without strategic reflection just enables new forever wars.
Yes, the U.S. should replenish its interceptor magazines, but it must also come to grips with the inherent strategic limitations of missile defense.
Interceptors are just highly inefficient for bulk shielding and will never make sense for that strategy. The U.S. needs other options for that — namely, the strategic pragmatism not to start extracurricular wars in the first place.
The reason the Trump administration depleted such a large portion of the stockpile wasn’t that the stocks were insufficient for reasonable contingencies — it’s that Trump used them for a purpose they weren’t meant for: defending large civilian areas from sustained retaliation, as opposed to defending the most valuable U.S. military targets for a SHORT period until a specific tactical objective is achieved.
The bottom line is that Trump used U.S. missile interceptors irresponsibly.
If the U.S. repeats Trump’s game of indefinitely hiding behind air defenses to avoid admitting defeat, it will face a world of hurt in future conflicts.
The true answer to avoiding stockpile depletion is to start wars only as a last-resort option, with full awareness of the potential consequences, and only when urgent security threats require it. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Miad Maleki
@miadmaleki
The U.S. naval blockade is crushing Iran's economy far worse than outright war.
Head of Iran's Chamber of Commerce with China, says war caused less economic damage than the ongoing blockade; "During the 40-day war, we didn't face economic problems and shortages like we have during these blockade days."
The U.S. naval blockade of Iran costs $9,000 extra per container versus sea shipping ($12,000 land vs. $3,000 sea), totaling roughly $18 billion in added annual costs on ~2 million containers imported through southern ports .
Iran's $50 billion non-oil exports yield only about $10 billion in profit, meaning land-route costs would erase export viability entirely.
With total foreign trade at $100 billion/year, a $20 billion blockade surcharge "will shut down the entire process.” -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
Quoted @cnni
A. This new group of leaders is more willing to use “Iran’s own military capabilities directly, and challenge adversaries without the same level of restraint”
B. This shift should be especially concerning when it comes to the nuclear issue. A significant number of voices inside Iran believe that Ali Khamenei’s strategy of maintaining a strategic ‘limbo’ – avoiding both escalation and resolution, ultimately weakened Iran more than it protected it
.
Sina Azodi
@ProfSAzodi
Spoke to CNN about the appointment of Mohsen Rezaei as the new SNSC secretariat.
Along with friends @HamidRezaAz and @citrinowicz
www.cnn.com/2026/08/11/middleeast/iran-military-leadershi… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Liam Karr
@liam_karr
Egypt not formally joining the "Quad" w/ Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey highlights two important things:
1. This alliance isn't really about the Houthis or Iran, it's about Israel and the UAE.
2. Egypt exemplifies the growing preference for more fluid partnerships that protect core strategic interests without sacrificing flexibility.
Egypt had no problem joining a Saudi-led initiative with its new Red Sea maritime alliance and will continue to align/work with Saudi Arabia and Turkey on issues in the Horn of Africa (Sudan and Somalia/Somaliland).
But it doesn't want some binding agreement that could negatively impact its bilateral relationships with the UAE and Israel over less existential Gulf or Turkey-Israel issues.
Mada Masr مدى مصر
@MadaMasr
The leaders of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey gathered in Mecca on Friday to sign a new defense pact, the capstone of months of diplomatic coordination. Notably absent, however, was Egypt, the fourth member of the Quad that has worked to de-escalate the Iran war. Why? Mada Masr spoke to regional and Egyptian sources about the political aims the pact is looking to advance and why Egypt declined to join.
storage.googleapis.com/madamasr/en/2026/08/09/feature/pol… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
عبدالرضا داوری
@davari1352
با انتصابات دیروز «آقا مجتبی»، دو مدیر ارشد در دولت محمود احمدینژاد در راس ساختار نظامی و دفاعی جمهوری اسلامی قرار گرفتند.
سرلشکر علی عبداللهی که دیروز بعنوان رییس جدید ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح منصوب شد، از سال ۱۳۸۴ تا ۱۳۸۸ بعنوان استاندار گیلان و سمنان در دولت نهم فعالیت میکرد و در دولت دهم، همزمان با وقایع ۱۳۸۸ تا ۱۳۹۲, سکاندار معاونت امنیتی و انتظامی وزارت کشور بود.
سرلشکر وحید شاهچراغی(احمد وحیدی) هم که دیروز بعنوان فرمانده کل سپاه پاسداران منصوب شد، در دولت نهم از ۱۳۸۴ تا ۱۳۸۸ به عنوان قائممقام وزیر دفاع و در دولت دهم نیز از ۱۳۸۸ تا ۱۳۹۲ به عنوان وزیر دفاع حضور داشته است. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla
@Abdulkhaleq_UAE
صحيفة FT: كيف استطاعت الإمارات كسب احترام وتقدير امريكا واصبحت في اقل من 20 سنة اهم شركائها في المنطقة حيث يحظى رئيسها بالتقدير كمحارب ونموذجها المستقر بالإعجاب؟ الجواب
1 التواصل مع مراكز الفكر
2 السفير الإماراتي النشط
3 الاتفاق الإبراهيمي
4 الاستثمار الذكي في الذكاء الاصطناعي -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ahmad Tibi
@Ahmad_tibi
כרופא לפני יותר מ30 שנים ניגשתי לטפל באישה דתייה בהריוןבהדסה הר הצופים שהיתה. היא סירבה שערבי יטפל בה.היום,הגיעה הבת שלה(אחרי ראיון שלי עם רוני קובן) ואמרה בדמעות: ״אני מורה , מחנכת את תלמידיי נגד גזענות ובעד אחווה ושלום. אני מתנצלת בפניך״. זה יצא מהלב ונכנס ללב. מרגש. תודה💛
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران
@ariel_oseran
Iranian IRGC officers are overseeing the escalating military operations by the Houthis in Yemen, with Iran's envoy to Yemen, Ali Mohammad Rezaei, personally supervising an operations room managing military and security affairs in Houthi-controlled areas, Yemeni security sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.
Additionally, Houthi leaders and commanders have moved their centers of operation to major hotels in Sana'a, Hodeidah, Saada and other cities, converting them into temporary headquarters for security, intelligence and civilian institutions.
Security and intelligence officials, ministers and heads of government bodies were instructed to relocate to and operate from hotels, a move intended to shelter leaders among civilians and guests to avoid being targeted. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amberin Zaman
@amberinzaman
A day after Turkey's parliament passed an amnesty package for PKK fighters & others charged with PKK related charges following the latter's decision to disarm, demobilize & end its armed fight against Turkey, its Iranian wing signals that it is alive and kicking ⬇️⬇️
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
PJAK’s armed wing today claimed responsibility for the assassination of Kurdish IRGC member Omar Dehqan on August 5, saying he had cooperated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and played a role in the killing of four PJAK fighters on June 28 in the Sharstin heights between Mahabad and Piranshahr.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Among all the latest appointments in Iran, Hossein Taeb’s return may be the most significant.
- First, because Taeb had largely remained in the shadows. He was known to be one of the figures closest to Mojtaba Khamenei, and there had been persistent speculation that he was again playing some role around the IRGC Intelligence Organization-the institution he headed for more than a decade.
- That would have been particularly important given the extraordinary security failures Iran has suffered in recent years, dramatically exposed and amplified during the war.
- Yet Mojtaba Khamenei has now formally brought Taeb back not to IRGC Intelligence, but to the leadership of the Basij. And the wording of his appointment decree says a great deal about what his new mission may actually be.
- Taeb is instructed to strengthen a “popular intelligence network,” expand training and skills, make use of new technologies and develop a “people-based” response to enemy threats. The decree also calls for greater mobilization of Basij networks among different social groups and in neighborhoods, while explicitly placing the mosque at the center of their local activity.
- Taken together, this looks like considerably more than the traditional role of the Basij as a mass mobilization or reserve force.
- In my view what appears to be emerging is an attempt to make intelligence and internal security much more granular: pushing collection, detection and early warning deeper into neighborhoods, local social networks and mosques, and connecting these grassroots structures more closely with the formal security apparatus.
- In simple terms, the idea seems to be to shorten the distance between the street and the intelligence services.
- This reading is also emerging among Iranian commentators: Taeb is unusually well suited to such a mission because he sits at the intersection of three worlds, the Basij, intelligence and the Supreme Leader’s inner circle.
- He has already commanded the Basij. He then spent more than a decade running IRGC Intelligence. And his longstanding personal relationship with Mojtaba Khamenei has been widely documented.
- That combination matters after a war in which penetration, covert networks, sabotage and intelligence failures became one of the Islamic Republic’s most serious vulnerabilities.
- Rather than relying only on intelligence agencies operating from the top down, Tehran may now be trying to build something more distributed: mosque, neighborhood, Basij network, technology and professional intelligence feeding into the same security ecosystem.
- As Iranian observers note, this approach echoes an older idea promoted by Ayatollah Khomeini: that ordinary citizens themselves should participate in safeguarding the system, effectively becoming part of a broad, society-wide intelligence network.
There is also an unresolved question.
- Taeb may now formally head the Basij, but this does not necessarily tell us the full extent of his security role. It cannot be excluded that he continues to exercise an informal influence over the Intelligence Organization he once ran, particularly given his relationship with the new Supreme Leader.
- If so, his appointment becomes even more interesting.
- Taeb would effectively sit at the junction between Iran’s formal intelligence machinery and one of the country’s deepest grassroots networks-linking the street to the state, and the neighborhood to the security center.
That may ultimately be the real significance of his return.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
The United States “can no longer fall back on political pressure, sanctions, and military strikes” to weaken the so-called axis of resistance, write @peterjsalisbury, @Wolf_Paes, and Henry Thompson. Instead, Washington should consider “striking deals with Iran and its most powerful nonstate allies.” www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/how-axis-resistance-recovered
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sana’a Center
@SanaaCenter
Israeli strikes have exposed more than gaps in Houthi security. The movement still relies on a shrinking circle of Sa’ada Wars veterans, with no clear path for a younger generation to lead.
Our Senior Researchers Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen examines what Ali Hussein al-Houthi’s rise really means:
sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/april-june-2026/28082 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Iran is forcing Trump back into the MOU--and intends to use the strait as a way to guarantee he abides by it. From @StevenErlanger www.nytimes.com/2026/08/09/world/europe/iran-strait-hormu…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 تلقت مصر عرضاً للانضمام إلى اتفاق مكة الدفاعي لكنها رفضته، ولم يكن ذلك بسبب استبعاد القاهرة، بل كان قراراً مصرياً متعمداً. وهذه الأسباب؛
🔷 1/ تنظر القاهرة إلى الاتفاق باعتباره إطاراً سياسياً أكثر منه تحالفاً دفاعياً عملياً.
🔷 2/ تعتبر الانضمام إليه قد يضعها داخل محور سياسي تقوده السعودية، وهو ما قد يحد من قدرتها على المناورة في الإقليم، رغم احتفاظها بعلاقات ثنائية قوية مع معظم الدول المشاركة.
🔷 3/ تنطلق جهات مصرية في موقفها من تقييم مفاده أن دول الخليج، مهما بلغ استياؤها من واشنطن، لا تستطيع الاستغناء عن المظلة الأمنية الأميركية. وفق هذا التقييم، فإن أي تعاون دفاعي مع تركيا أو باكستان أو مصر سيظل مكملاً وليس بديلاً عن الولايات المتحدة، التي تبقى، بحسب هذه المصادر، الضامن الأمني الرئيسي للخليج قبل الحرب مع إيران وبعدها.
🔷 4/ في وقت جرت نقاشات ثنائية بين مصر وقطر حول أفكار أولية تتعلق بالدور المصري في أي ترتيبات أمنية مستقبلية في المنطقة، وفق مسؤول مصري مطلع. لكنه يميز بين هذا الدور وبين الانضمام إلى منظومة أمنية غير عربية تضم تركيا وباكستان، مؤكداً أن القاهرة لا تؤيد، بحسب المصدر، الانخراط في إطار أمني من هذا النوع.
🔷 5/ ترى القاهرة أنه إذا احتاجت السعودية دعماً عسكرياً عربياً، فإن اتفاقية الدفاع العربي المشترك توفر بالفعل الإطار القانوني المناسب، وبالتالي لا توجد ضرورة لإنشاء التزام جديد يضم أطرافاً غير عربية.
🔷 6/ القاهرة لا ترغب في الدخول في اتفاق دفاعي مع تركيا في ظل علاقاتها المعقدة مع اليونان وقبرص، كما أنها لا تريد اتفاقاً دفاعياً مع باكستان في وقت تعمل فيه على تطوير علاقاتها الاقتصادية مع الهند.
🔷 7/ تتجنب مصر الانحياز في التنافس الإقليمي بين السعودية والإمارات، لأنها تحتاج إلى التنسيق السياسي مع الرياض في ملفات مثل السودان والصومال، وفي الوقت نفسه تعتمد بدرجة كبيرة على الاستثمارات الإماراتية، وهو ما يجعلها حريصة على عدم الانحياز الكامل لأي من الطرفين.
(مدى مصر) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Eric Brewer
@BrewerEricM
The problem with this theory is that Iran gets a vote. The notion that Iran just sits there quietly and implodes is fanciful.
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇮🇷New: President Trump tells me he is "low keying it" on Iran and signals he's prepared to allow economic pressure on Iran to mount. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/08/09/trump-iran-interview -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohamad Ali Abtahi
@abtahi_m
گزارش خودمانی از جلسه با رییس جمهور
امروز جلسه دبیران کل احزاب و چهرههای سیاسی در وزارت کشور، با حضور رئیسجمهور برگزار شد. من کنار دوست عزیزم محمد صدوقی بودم که از تأثیرگذاران پنهان کشور است و هوش بالایی دارد.
چنانکه افتد و دانی، غرض وحدت بود و انسجام. هرکسی نقطهنظرات خودش و یا حزبش را گفت. برای سخن گفتن قرعهکشی کرده بودند. چند نفری هم حقالماره وزارت کشور بودند؛ مثل آقای حداد عادل و پورمحمدی و بهزاد نبوی و زیدآبادی.
به من وقت نرسید.
چند خط در مورد غیبت رهبری نوشته بودم. به دوتا از بزرگان اصلاحات و اصولگرایی که وقت داشتند دادم، قبول نکردند بگویند.
جلسه خوبی بود. ترکیب متفاوت و مهمی از اصلاحطلبان و اصولگرایان بود. کمتر این ترکیب را دیده بودم.
اما واقعیت این است که همه ما هم نماینده ده صددرصد افکار عمومی نبودیم.
روابط عمومی جلسه خیلی پراودایی و کمونیستی بود و نمیدانم چرا. فقط دوربین خودشان، فقط خبری که خودشان میدهند. کاش تغییر سیاست بدهند.
چند بار جلسه نیمهمتشنج شد.
بعد از حرفهای همه سخنرانان، آقای پزشکیان اصرار داشت که هرکسی طرحی دارد، بیاید خودش انجام دهد. به آقای حاجمیرزایی گفتم، ولی یک سد بزرگ بوروکراسی برای همکاری مقاومت میکند.
یکی گفت: «از ملاقات دیروز بگویید.»
گفت: «کدام جلسه؟»
گفتند: «جلسه دیروز با رهبری.»
خنده بامزهای کرد و گفت: «دیروز که نبود، فلان روز بود.»
ادامه داد که در سلامت کامل هستند و از ۴ صبح تا یک بعدازظهر با ایشان بوده و صبحانه خوبی هم داده بودند. ولی از محتوا چیزی لو نداد.
قرار شد جلسات ادامه پیدا کند.
آقای حداد را ندیده بودم. رفتم خدمتشان تسلیت گفتم.
تیکهپرانیهای سیاسی آخر جلسه هم بامزه بود.
از وزیر کشور و اقای زینی وند هم تشکر میکنم که بانی دلسوزی برای این جلسات هستند -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei
@MKhamenei_ir
Now that the sacred system of Islamic Republic of Iran is in a strategic, fateful confrontation with Global Arrogance, the realization of the following directives is expected:
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
Mohsen Rezaei, a former IRGC commander and close Khamenei ally, was named secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council
My interview @ynet regarding this development:
A. The Supreme National Security Council of Iran has lost some of its luster. There is an attempt to revive it, based on a clear understanding that this is an important body that balances the system and helps the supreme leader make the right decisions
B.There is probably dissatisfaction with the way Zolghadr functioned, because he failed to establish a body capable of helping the leadrr. Of course, there is a question mark here because we do not really know, but there is no doubt that the system is taking shape.
c.it may be that Zolghadr did not see himself as aligned with the current positions of the leadership itself, and that is why the change was made. Will this alter Iran’s positions regarding negotiations with the United States? I doubt it. Could it strengthen the Supreme National Security Council? That is possible
D. Rezaei’s background in the Revolutionary Guards is expected to preserve the strong connection between the IRGC and the council. He noted that Rezaei had also served as an adviser to Ali Khamenei and had, in his words, in a sense mentored Mojtaba
E.Would not exaggerate and say that the system is out of control. It is under control, and we can see that they are managing to establish a consensus regarding their policy on the Strait of Hormuz.
F. Zolghadr will now serve as an adviser to Mojtaba Khamenei in order to keep him close, a method also employed by his father, Ali Khamenei.
Ultimately, these developments need to be kept in perspective. Iran’s political system is clearly undergoing a period of internal adjustment, and the resulting shifts may well be generating tensions within the leadership. Some of these moves also appear designed to weaken particular figures and competing centers of influence likr Ghalibaf.
The controversy surrounding Pezeshkian’s possible resignation further illustrates the challenges of governing Iran in the aftermath of Khamenei’s elimination and amid an ongoing military campaign. These pressures may be complicating the decision-making process in Tehran and creating greater uncertainty at the top.
But the broader picture remains clear: whatever internal maneuvering is taking place, the system itself remains deeply ideological, rigid, and fundamentally uncompromising.
@Liorbenari1
www.ynetnews.com/article/byv54wi8ge -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
"The UAE has crafted a relationship with the United States that is very much to the benefit of the UAE, but much to the detriment of US foreign policy and our national interests,” says the former state department official. “If you actually dig into it, all the stuff about the benefits to the US of the UAE relationship is amorphous, intangible vapour,” the official adds"
#weaponized_interdependence
www.ft.com/content/ec5f7351-7aec-4fe1-80dc-b02c62045109?F… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Report
@HormuzReport
BREAKING: Iran has completely ruled out any future negotiations with the Trump administration, declaring it will wait out Donald Trump's term until January 20, 2029, per Iranian outlets and Ghalibaf advisor's post.
"Trump will not reach an agreement with us. We will accompany him until his term ends," said Majid Shakeri, advisor to Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf.
He posted: "The path to victory is neither fighting nor a deal — it is managing the process of neither war nor peace, up to the point of victory. Publicly confirming negotiations with the U.S. is sheer folly. The winning approach is denial, ambiguity, and strategic patience."
Iran's conditions remain unchanged: $300 billion in compensation, release of frozen assets, and withdrawal of U.S. forces. Until then, the Strait stays closed. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران
@ariel_oseran
Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has appointed several senior military commanders to the regime's top positions:
* Maj. Gen. Ali Abdollahi as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces
* Amir Kiumars Heydari as Deputy Chief of the General Staff
* Maj. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi as Commander of the IRGC
* Maj. Gen. Mostafa Izadi as Deputy Commander of the IRGC
* Rear Admiral Ali Azmaei as the IRGC Navy Commander
* Hojjat al-Islam Ta'eb as Head of the Basij Organization of the Oppressed -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Azeri Times
@AzeriTimes
🔴 BREAKING — 🇦🇿🇮🇷🇺🇸 President Trump asked Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev whether continued U.S. pressure could force Iran to surrender.
Aliyev said he viewed that outcome as unrealistic, arguing that Iran is unlikely to surrender and that the only viable path forward is peace and constructive negotiations.
Azerbaijan, he added, has a strong interest in restoring peace and stability across the region. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
ככל שאיראן מתרחקת משלב הלחימה הפעילה, נראה כי בכירים בצמרת השלטונית מגבירים את מאמציהם כדי לנצל את המצב לביסוס מעמדם בהנהגה החדשה. פרשנות שלי ב-@ynet
www.ynet.co.il/news/article/hkd7vwp8gl -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
I told @ft on Rezaie replacing as Zolqadr as Iran’s top national security advisor “when it comes to advocating a strong stance against the US on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. Rezaei, as a more senior former commander and longest-serving commander of the IRGC [guards], has far more authority and gravitas with military men than Zolghadr. If anything [it] is tightening of control by Mojtaba over the IRGC and decision making.” giftarticle.ft.com/giftarticle/actions/redeem/ac197a91-6e…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
The new SNSC statement setting out conditions for the opening of the strait lines up with my assessment from a few days ago.
Iran won’t let traffic in the strait normalize until Trump credibly agrees to a comprehensive deal.
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
My expectation is that the Iran-Oman deal over a new TSS in the Strait of Hormuz will lead to a modest recovery in vessel traffic, but that tanker transits will remain depressed at pre-MOU levels of around 5-7 million bdp.
Iran will want to open the strait just enough to give itself and its neighbors some relief, significantly easing imports and helping some oil flow to minimize storage issues and production impact. But it will want to maintain pressure on the U.S. and deny Trump the optics of an open strait.
To modulate traffic, Iran can simply deny the strait is fully open, slow roll implementation of new procedures, and rely on hesitation from vessel owners worried about getting stuck (or struck) in the strait. Iran can also take advantage of the fact that U.S. sanctions may prohibit coordination or payments with the Iranian authorities managing the TSS, so a large portion of vessel owners will not engage the channel unless expressly authorized by the Trump administration, putting the ball back in Trump's court to effectively endorse the TSS and its overt administration.
Overall, my sense is that Iran will make a recovery of traffic to pre-war levels conditional on reaching a comprehensive agreement with the U.S. given both strategic and practical considerations. But the progress on the TSS is a strong signal of Iran's intention to find a new modus vivendi with its neighbors and to eventually bring this crisis to a close by replacing American security arrangements with inclusive regional arrangements.
(Chart from @Rory_Johnston) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
عبدالله البندر
@a_albander
حديث لافت لوزير الخارجية التركي هاكان فيدان عن اتفاق مكة للدفاع المشترك:
يؤكد أن الاتفاق بين السعودية وتركيا وباكستان يماثل "فنياً" المادة الخامسة في حلف الناتو، أي أن الاعتداء على دولة يعد اعتداء على الجميع.
لكن الأهم قوله إن التحالف ليس موجهاً ضد إيران أو أي دولة، بل ضد من يعتدي على إحدى الدول الثلاث، وإن السعودية وتركيا وباكستان تمتلك قدرات مختلفة يمكن جمعها في منظومة واحدة.
ثم يكشف عن الطموح الأكبر: ألا يتوقف التحالف عند ثلاث دول، بل يتوسع مستقبلاً ليشمل دولاً أخرى.
عبدالله البندر
@a_albander
وزير الخارجية التركي هاكان فيدان يكشف جانباً من الموقف السعودي تجاه الحرب:
"تحدثنا مع السعودية، وليس لديهم أي استراتيجية أو نية للحرب مع إيران أو تدميرها، بل يركزون على وقف العنف في مضيق هرمز بأسرع وقت".
ويضيف أن أكبر نصيحة قدمها ولي العهد الأمير محمد بن سلمان للأمريكيين، خلال اتصاله بالرئيس ترامب، كانت:
"ضرورة وقف هذه الحرب فوراً، وأن التدخل العسكري ليس حلاً". -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hossein Pak
@hossein_pak69
في إطار التغييرات الجارية على مستوى صناعة القرار الأمني والاستراتيجي في إيران، تمّ تعيين اللواء محسن رضائي ممثلاً لقائد الثورة الإسلامية في المجلس الأعلى للأمن القومي.
وتأتي هذه الخطوة ضمن إعادة ترتيب أوسع لبنية وآليات صناعة القرار وإدارة الملفات الاستراتيجية في المرحلة المقبلة.
Hossein Pak
@hossein_pak69
تشهد إيران تغييرات لافتة في مستويات صنع القرار السياسي والأمني، وفي مقدمتها المجلس الأعلى للأمن القومي.
المؤشرات تتجاوز تبديل الأسماء والمواقع، وتوحي بإعادة ترتيب أوسع لآليات اتخاذ القرار وإدارة الملفات الاستراتيجية في المرحلة المقبلة. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
منصة تحقق
@syrianFactCheck
⚠️ عاجل ⚠️
وزارة الدفاع السورية :
📌 حسم مصير القاعدتين الروسيتين في حميميم وطرطوس بموجب مذكرة تفاهم جديدة بين سوريا وروسيا، جاءت بعد مفاوضات مكثفة استمرت عاماً ونصف العام.
📌 تتولى الدولة السورية بموجب المذكرة إدارة المنشآت المدنية، وفي مقدمتها مطار حميميم والرصيف التجاري الرابع بميناء طرطوس، لإدماجهما تدريجياً ضمن الإدارة المدنية.
📌 تحويل القواعد والمنشآت العسكرية إلى مراكز تدريب وتأهيل مشتركة وفق ترتيبات جديدة تحفظ المصالح المتبادلة.
📌 تحديد سقف زمني لا يتجاوز ثلاثة أشهر لاستكمال عملية التحويل ودخول الترتيبات الجديدة حيز التنفيذ.
📌 تُعد هذه الخطوة الأبرز في مسار المفاوضات، وتؤسس لمرحلة جديدة في العلاقات السورية - الروسية. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Iran’s Jomhouri-ye Eslami offers an interesting reading of the Mecca defense pact between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey.
Shortly, it sees three drivers:
1. declining trust in the US.
2. growing concern over Israel’s regional ambitions.
3. persistent unease about a powerful Iran (noteworthy recognition)
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
My latest on Iran Analytica:
The overwhelming view in Tehran sees the Mecca defense pact as a real shift in the postwar regional order. What Iranian observers can't yet decide is whether this is a coalition assembling against #iran or an architecture whose direction is still open.
www.irananalytica.org/p/how-iran-sees-the-mecca-defense-pact -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Report
@HormuzReport
BREAKING: Just days after Saudi Arabia signed a new defense pact with Pakistan and Turkey, two major Saudi Aramco energy sites have been reportedly hit — a fire at the Berri Gas Plant near Jubail on the Gulf coast and a separate blaze at an Aramco facility at the Jazan refinery on the Red Sea coast, per satellite data and Saudi officials.
NASA FIRMS detected an estimated 125 MW fire radiative power at Berri, while Saudi authorities said Aramco crews extinguished the Jazan fire with no injuries reported. The cause and extent of damage remain unclear, with no confirmed attribution for either incident.
The stakes are enormous. Jubail supplies approximately 8% of global petrochemical production and contributes more than 7% of Saudi Arabia's GDP, hosting major operations involving Saudi Aramco, SABIC, ExxonMobil, Dow Chemical, and Chevron Phillips.
The timing is critical. The attacks come just days after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey signed a NATO-style defense pact in Jeddah. The agreement, which features a collective defense clause, was dismissed by Iran as a "paper agreement" that would not bring security to Riyadh. The strikes may be a test of that new alliance — and a warning from Tehran that no paper pact will protect Saudi energy infrastructure. Saudi authorities have not confirmed the cause of either fire. The region remains on high alert. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Report
@HormuzReport
BREAKING: Donald Trump has quietly admitted defeat and privately signalling he's willing to end the Iran war without a nuclear deal if the Strait of Hormuz simply opens, a humiliating retreat from his demand for "unconditional surrender," per WSJ.
Trump privately told aides he would declare victory based on reopening the Strait — a far cry from his promises to "decimate" Iran's nuclear program. But Iran just raised the price of that exit: $300 billion** in compensation, **$100–123 billion in frozen assets, U.S. troop withdrawal, and an end to the naval blockade.
Trump wanted out. Iran is making him pay for it.
U.S. officials say Trump sees the Strait as his only viable exit. But Iran's new demands mean even that is now in doubt. Tehran knows Washington is desperate to leave — and is holding the waterway hostage until Trump surrenders on every point. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gönül Tol
@gonultol
Worth noting what Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan says here about the Pakistan-Saudi-Turkey defense pact: “efforts to finalise the pact had been underway for two years and eight months.”
That means the parties have been trying to finalize the pact since December 2023. And it is reasonable to assume the talks began well before that: before Trump’s return to office, before the war against Iran, and potentially even before October 7.www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/turkey-pakistan-saudi-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ariel Oseran أريئل أوسيران
@ariel_oseran
Iran’s Mehr News released a video claiming to show Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei “for the first time,” with no date or location specified. The right side of his face cannot be seen in the footage.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
מאמר שלי @Haaretz שטוען שישראל ממשיכה למכור לעצמה את האשליה שאפשר להשתלב במזרח התיכון מעל ראשם של הפלסטינים — באמצעות אינטרסים כלכליים משותפים וברית אזורית נגד איראן. אלא שהסוגיה הפלסטינית אינה מכשול שאפשר לעקוף בדרך לאינטגרציה אזורית; היא אחד התנאים לפתרונה.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
محمود علوش - Mahmoud Allouch
@mahmoudallouch
تأكيد وزير الخارجية التركي أن اتفاقية الدفاع المشترك مع السعودية وباكستان مماثلة من الناحية الفنية لمبدأ الدفاع المتبادل الوارد في المادة الخامسة من ميثاق الناتو، والعمل على تشكيل لجنة وزارية في التحالف الثلاثي على غرار تلك الموجودة في الناتو، يعني أن تحالف مكة الإسلامي مُصمَّم بدرجة أساسية ليكون على غرار الناتو. وحديثه عن إمكانية انضمام مصر إلى التحالف بمجرد تسوية بعض المسائل الفنية، يعني أن فكرة توسيع هذا التحالف ليشمل دولًا إسلامية أخرى موجودة بالفعل ويُعمل عليها.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ibrahim Jalal | إبراهيم جلال
@IbrahimJalalYE
The latest Horizon Brief examines Saudi Arabia’s recalibrating regional posture, the Houthi three-front escalation & the looming war in Yemen
🔹4 Saudi provinces struck in 24 days
🔹4 Yemeni governorates hit in 3 days
🔹A vessel sunk off Hodeidah
🔹Same week: a Saudi-led maritime coalition commander named, a trilateral defence pact signed in Makkah, the Saudi intelligence chief in Baghdad
What does all this mean? What to watch next? Full analysis on Substack: ibrahimjalal.substack.com/p/the-two-strait-war-opens-a-multi
Ibrahim Jalal | إبراهيم جلال
@IbrahimJalalYE
Is Iran preparing for a two-strait war?
Hormuz is under pressure. Bab al-Mandab is held as a conditional second front, potentially linking the US–Iran confrontation with renewed Houthi cross-border escalation into a system-wide regional crisis👇
ibrahimjalal.substack.com/p/the-irgcs-two-strait-war-from… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alan Eyre
@AlanEyre1
SNSC Secretary Zolqadr statement today:
Until America corrects its behavior, the Strait of Hormuz will not open.
'Correcting behavior' means:
1. Never threaten Iran with any language or insult the sanctities of this nation.
2. End the war and aggression against Iran and its allies in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, and Iraq forever.
3. Lift the naval blockade and withdraw its naval and air forces from around Iran.
4. Pay the damages of the two aggressive wars imposed on Iran without fail.
5. Lift the cruel and illegal sanctions against the Iranian people.
6. Release the frozen and stolen assets of the Iranian people unconditionally.
These are the demands of the Iranian people who have been envoys and have been shouting for it in the streets and squares for one hundred and sixty days.
The Supreme National Security Council will never back down; whether in war or in negotiations. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
Très bon article de *Haaretz*, traduit en français et mis en libre accès sur le blog de Mediapart.
À 87 ans, Avishai Margalit, l’un des plus grands philosophes israéliens, livre une réflexion passionnante sur Israël, la manipulation politique, la liberté, le nationalisme, la paix, la justice et l’avenir incertain du projet sioniste.
Un regard israélien précieux, lucide et humaniste, qui mérite d’être lu.
blogs.mediapart.fr/yves-romain/blog/080826/avishai-margal… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Iran's Parliament and National Security Commission is reviewing a formal draft bill on management of the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf to severely tighten transit rules, per Fars.
Under this draft:
1. US, Israeli, and all other "hostile" country vessels will be permanently banned from transiting the Strait of Hormuz
2. Israeli cargo (military or civilian) will not be allowed to transit through the region
3. Vessels or cargo that played a role in actions against the "Axis of Resistance" will also be banned
4. Countries and individuals that have caused damage to Iran will not be granted permission to transit through the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf until the damage is compensated
5. The entry of vessels will be managed by Iran, while the exit will be managed jointly by Iran and Oman, with fees charged on every vessel
6. Heavy penalties of up to 20% of cargo value for violators
7. Iran's government + armed forces will be obligated to assume navigation guidance, monitoring vessel traffic, and protecting the security and environment of the Persian Gulf -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Reuters
@Reuters
Exclusive: Iran has made a concerted diplomatic push with Gulf states, warning them explicitly that Tehran will hit their oil, power and water plants unless they convince Donald Trump to end US strikes on Iran and instead seek a negotiated end to the war www.reuters.com/business/energy/iran-warns-gulf-states-te…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Hakan Fidan has publicly confirmed several key elements that had previously emerged through unofficial reporting.
- According to the Turkish FM, discussions are focused on a 60-day transitional period for the Strait of Hormuz.
- He also noted that technical details are still being worked out, with Oman playing a key role in defining the route configuration.
- The immediate objective is to keep oil flowing and avoid a global energy shock, while using the transition to negotiate a more durable U.S.–Iran agreement.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ragıp Soylu
@ragipsoylu
If you need to read one thing on Hezbollah, that’s it. You should read this one.
Even though @DanielHiltonCFC didn’t accept my proposed headline:
“How Hezbollah survived Israel thanks to youth addicted to playing video games”
www.middleeasteye.net/news/the-resurrection-of-hezbollah -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Perhaps its indicative of general Iran war fatigue, but the US appears poised to agree to a deal that recognizes Iran's claim to control over the Strait of Hormuz--an unthinkable concession even a few weeks ago--and I'm seeing very little discussion of it among the commentariat.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Some sources within Iran’s media space are claiming that Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr had already asked to step down as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, reportedly informing both President Pezeshkian and the new Supreme Leader.
- The same sources say Mohsen Rezaei was expected to join the new Defense Council but may instead have been selected to lead the SNSC, reportedly on the basis of maslahat (state expediency).
- However, these claims remain unconfirmed. Other reports have cast doubt on the story, and even the sources circulating it acknowledge that nothing should be considered reliable until an official decree is publicly issued.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kristian Ulrichsen
@Dr_Ulrichsen
My analysis of the Saudi-Emirati reconciliation
agsi.org/analysis/saudi-arabia-and-the-uae-publicly-recon… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Nick Schifrin
@nickschifrin
According to 4 regional sources:
- The deal between Oman and Iran would open the Strait of Hormuz by directing all inbound traffic into a route closer to Iran, and all outbound traffic into a route closer to Oman.
- The deal would be announced by Iran, Oman, and the UN's International Maritime Organization @IMOHQ, alongside the US.
- There would be no fees or tolls.
- One of the most important aspects: the agreement would be temporary.
- It's designed to return to the ceasefire and the MOU--restarting a 60-day clock to negotiate deals over Iran's nuclear program, frozen assets, and a permanent arrangement for the Strait.
- Iran expects during that time, it would receive relief to sell oil.
- The arrangement is endorsed by the members of the GCC. The fact that the GCC is willing to even entertain this temporary deal--with an emphasis on temporary--shocks some analysts, since Iran could hypothetically block all imports through the Strait of Hormuz. That goes to show how much the GCC is prioritizing stopping the war over anything else. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Yunus Paksoy
@yunuspaksoy
Trump’ın bugün duyurulabileceğini söylediği İran-Umman anlaşması şöyle görünüyor:
Hürmüz’e girişler İran’ın belirlediği rotadan (kendi kıyısı)
Hürmüz’den çıkışlar Umman rotasından (ama İran ile koordineli)
Ücret alma olmayacağı söyleniyor ama İran için “gönüllü” ödeme sistemi olacağı da konuşulanlar arasında.
Bu “gönüllülük” esası sanki “istiyorsan ödememeyi dene”gibi duruyor.
Mayınları temizleme de tamamen İran’ın insiyatifinde.
Bu şartlar, Trump’ın kabul etmek zorunda kaldığı Mutabakat Zaptı’ndan da kötü.
İran Trump’ı her sıkıştırdığında bölgede daha da büyük güç ve yetki kazandığını gördü. Bunu da bozup daha da büyük tavizler almaması için hiçbir sebep yok.
Trump yönetimi için büyük fiyasko. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
ראיון שלי @radio103fm בנוגע למצב המשא ומתן בסוגיית מצרי הורמוז:
א. אם ההסכם המסתמן אכן ייצא לפועל, מדובר בהישג משמעותי של איראן, שכן היא תקבל שליטה אפקטיבית על נתיב הכניסה למצרי הורמוז. עם זאת, ההסכם עדיין חייב לקבל את אישור הממשל האמריקני, משום שהוא תלוי בהסרת הסנקציות ובהשבת ההיתרים לאיראן לייצא נפט.
ב. ההסכם מעיד לא רק על הלחץ שמופעל, אלא גם על ההשפעה הגוברת של מדינות המפרץ ובראשן סעודיה וקטר, על הממשל האמריקני, ובמקביל על היחלשות ההשפעה הישראלית בהקשר הזה.
ג. מבחינת ממשלת ישראל, ההסכם אינו משרת את האינטרס הישראלי. ישראל אינה מעוניינת בהסכם שמחזק את המשטר האיראני, שאותו היא מבקשת להחליש ואף להביא לקריסתו. מבחינתה, עדיף להמשיך במדיניות הלחץ, כולל תקיפה שתפגע קשות במתקני האנרגיה של איראן, מאשר להגיע להסכם שמרחיק את האפשרות לעימות.
ד. באופן עקרוני, יכול להיות הסכם טוב עם איראן – למשל כזה שיחסום באופן אפקטיבי את דרכה לפצצה גרעינית. אולם נראה כי הן ממשלת ישראל והן מרבית המועמדים האפשריים להחליף את ראש הממשלה היו מעדיפים להמשיך ולהגביר את הלחץ על איראן, ולא להגיע להסכם עמה.
ה. תקיפה של אתרי תשתית ואנרגיה תפגע באיראן באופן משמעותי, אך ספק אם תכניע אותה. מנגד, תגובה איראנית צפויה להביא לזינוק חד במחירי הנפט. ישראל עשויה להיות מוכנה לשלם את המחיר הביטחוני הכרוך בכך, אך ארצות הברית כנראה פחות. הבעיה מבחינת ישראל היא שכל הסכם עם איראן יקשה עליה "לעקוף את טראמפ מימין" ויצמצם את מרחב הפעולה שלה מול הממשל האמריקני בהקשר האיראני.
ו. האזרח האיראני סובל מעליות מחירים חדות כתוצאה מהאינפלציה הגבוהה, לרבות במוצרי יסוד, ולכן היה שמח לראות את המתיחות האזורית מגיעה לסיומה. עם זאת, השלטון האיראני פועל מתוך שיקולים אסטרטגיים ולא מתוך המצוקה הכלכלית של הציבור. מבחינתו, אם אכן הוא קרוב להשגת הישג משמעותי בסוגיית מצרי הורמוז, הרי שמדובר ביעד בעל חשיבות עליונה. לכן, גם אם המצב הכלכלי באיראן קשה מאוד, אין בכך כדי לשנות את התחשיב של ההנהגה בכל הנוגע לשאיפתה לבסס שליטה או השפעה משמעותית במצרי הורמוז.
@attaliami
@gidonunewsdesk
www.maariv.co.il/culture/tv/article-1352442
103FM
@radio103fm
התקדמות בהסכם בין איראן וארה"ב בתיווך עומאן וקטאר | דני סיטרינוביץ', חוקר איראן ב-INSS: "זה מעיד בעיקר לא רק על הלחץ, אלא גם על יכולת ההשפעה של מדינות המפרץ בהובלת סעודיה עומאן וקטאר על ארה"ב בניגוד כנראה להשפעה הנשחקת של ישראל על הממשל האמריקאי"
@citrinowicz @attaliami @gidonucko1
צילום: Melina Mara/Pool_Getty Images -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: It is now revealed that Trump has cancelled his planned massive attack on Iran on Saturday explicitly because the US military has exhausted 80% of its THAAD interceptors and 50% of Patriot interceptors, and after talking with Gulf allies who told him they were afraid of Iranian retaliation on their energy infrastructure and fear the US can't defend them anymore due to interceptor shortages, senior officials tell CNN.
Senior US military commanders warn that the Pentagon's munitions stockpile is already "dangerously low," with Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine privately cautioning that carrying out the planned attack would've fully depleted interceptors available to US Central Command to absolute zero.
Sources add "the lack of interceptors means that conventional attacks can backfire if the suicide drones start making it through in-masse," warning "tit-for-tat will never end this," with ATACMS and Precision Strike Missiles primarily used up during the war and 50% of the global Tomahawk supply also depleted. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Interestingly, this has been one of the key points of debate in Iranian pro-government circles over the past few weeks. There is a growing acknowledgment that, after the recent #iran-U.S. conflict, both regional states and global energy consumers are likely to accelerate their search for alternative export routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
At the same time, however, they also argue that these alternatives - whether pipelines or overland transport corridors - would remain vulnerable to Iran's missile and drone capabilities, as well as those of its regional partners and proxy groups (they refer to the recent Houthi attacks on Saudi energy targets as an example).
As a result, there appears to be an increasing compartmentalization in Iranian strategic thinking.
On the one hand, control over the Strait of Hormuz is viewed primarily as a means of denying the United States the ability to rebuild and strengthen its military presence in the region, while also providing Tehran with leverage over neighboring GCC states. On the other hand, the capability to strike energy infrastructure and economic corridors beyond the Strait is increasingly seen as a separate but complementary deterrent that could be employed in the event of a renewed conflict.
In this sense, Iranian strategic thinking increasingly treats control of the Strait of Hormuz and long-range missile capabilities as complementary pillars of the country's evolving deterrence strategy rather than as separate instruments.
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Iran's leverage via the Strait will diminish over time, but the leverage it retains via the missile-interceptor equation will remain considerable.
And it is that leverage that appears to be compelling the US into making concessions over the strait. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Réflexion intéressante d'un témoin expérimenté des relations entre états sur ce qu'il appelle la curieuse réapparition de « l’interrupteur électrique » - ouvert ou fermé, selon les besoins -, comme métaphore des relations internationales.
Le Maroc ( la Turquie, la Tunisie ), avec l’immigration.
Trump et les iraniens, avec le détroit d’Ormuz. Sauf que le premier l’ouvre ou le ferme, virtuellement, en jouant sur les cours de la Bourse et du pétrole. Tandis que les seconds y veillent réellement, en faisant en sorte qu’il n’y ait d’ouverture qu’à leurs conditions.
Tebboune, qui ferme plus qu’il n’ouvre ( OQTF, otages ), mais nous tient en haleine, en laissant espérer un possible rayon de lumière, salué par tous lorsqu’il y consent.
En fait, il s’agit là d’une modalité de la figure classique du « levier », instrument qui permet ( y compris aux « faibles » ) de faire pression sur l’autre, donc de le dominer, quand on garde la maîtrise du bouton.
J’ai bien cherché pour voir si la France possédait encore de tels moyens, de son côté.
Théoriquement, oui. Par exemple, la possibilité de jouer une carte nationale unilatérale en Europe, en mettant, dans la balance, notre poids et notre position centrale.
Pratiquement, non. Car l’état financier du pays rendrait cette audace retrouvée ( on se rappelle l’épisode de la « chaise vide », sous de Gaulle ) particulièrement risquée. Mais, surtout, nos dirigeants ultra-centristes, timorés par construction, semblent avoir renoncé, pour toujours, au recours à la force ( à distinguer, bien sûr, de la violence ) dans les rapports internationaux.
Subir, sans agir. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Iran has abandoned the current Omani proposal for the Strait of Hormuz, officially adding new demands, per WSJ:
1. An immediate end to the US naval blockade
2. The lifting of all US sanctions on Iranian oil, petrochemical products, and gas
3. An explicit acknowledgement of Iran's right to collect maritime fees on every ship
4. The end of all attacks on Iran permanently by all parties
These new demands come on top of the current arrangement, which gives Iran full sovereign control over inbound traffic into the Strait of Hormuz, and supervision over outbound traffic through Omani waters. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
👇 In my latest, I argue much of the debate over a possible Hormuz deal is focused on the wrong question.
Much of the discussion has centered on whether Iran will collect transit tolls or "service fees." But based on the debate among Iranian decision makers and analysts close to the country's security establishment, as well as the public statements of senior officials, Tehran appears to be negotiating for something much more consequential than revenue. It is seeking to convert the leverage it gained during the war into a durable political and institutional role in governing one of the world's most strategically important waterways.
That distinction matters because wartime leverage is inherently temporary. It depends on military power and the continued threat of disruption. Institutionalized leverage endures after the fighting stops. By embedding a lasting role in the governance of Hormuz, Iran could preserve much of the influence it gained during the war without relying on continual military coercion.
This is why Iranian officials keep emphasizing sovereignty, new shipping lanes, routing, oversight, and maritime administration rather than tolls. Their objective is not simply to generate income. It is to ensure the Strait does not return to the prewar status quo and that Iran emerges from the war with lasting authority embedded in the rules governing maritime transit.
This also raises difficult questions for many of the proposals now circulating. Ideas centered on modest maritime service fees or regional governance arrangements that largely preserve the existing U.S.-backed maritime order are thoughtful attempts to find common ground. But they have not been in alignment with what Iranian officials themselves have described as their objective. If Tehran's goal is institutionalized leverage rather than modest economic compensation, the central issue is not how much Iran earns. It is how much political authority it retains after the fighting ends.
Read my full piece here on this emerging Hormuz deal: www.dissidentforeignpolicy.com/p/hormuz-isnt-about-tolls-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aron Lund
@aronlund
The @FinancialTimes is doing a five part series on the United Arab Emirates—two articles published so far, both excellent.
• UAE and Iran, by @cornishft and @NicolasParasie: www.ft.com/content/6d2d0b89-0d26-4e49-8e52-a53bdc178974
• UAE and Africa, by @WWFTUK and @peterjandringa: www.ft.com/content/a4c6e5da-dc9f-43b0-a794-c3f6bb9bca7d -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Financial Times
@FT
Are Americans souring on Israel?
The polls say they are, and fast too. Sixty per cent of Americans now view Israel unfavourably. A sea change in what used to be perhaps the most pro-Israel country on Earth, says John Reed, the FT’s explainer editor. ft.trib.al/ejaonNUThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Daniel Gerlach
@DanielGerlach1
“how an enormous strategic objective -regime change-became an executable mission without the political level,the IDF, and the Mossad ever genuinely agreeing on what it was,how central it was, whether it was feasible, and whether the tools matched the goal” www.nadaveyal.com/p/exclusive-the-warning-netanyahu-got
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
For much of the past month, Iran fired missiles and drones day after day at Jordan. But for many Jordanians, the blame for putting their small country on the front lines falls on President Trump.
“Trump is the cause of this war,” said Tahani Khalaf, 63 years old, as she walked with her sisters here in the Jordanian capital on a recent day, hours after another attack. “America forced Jordan to become part of this.”
www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/jordan-is-learning-its-u-s-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
This is an excellent piece by @njswanson and @AllisonMinor_ on how Trump can end the Iran war.
They argue that Trump can still walk away and claim victory if he does what other presidents have failed to do; avoid the trap of a "forever war."
foreignpolicy.com/2026/07/29/trump-iran-hormuz-mou-cease-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
ORF Middle East
@orfmiddleeast
'#qatar’s involvement in the Board of Peace appears to be part of a recalibration of its foreign policy toward the #gaza file. The recalibration is aimed at reducing the political exposure that accompanied its previously more independent stance, while still maintaining a stake in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.' writes @Saoud_AlEshaq_
Read via link: orfme.org/expert-speak/qatars-board-calculus-from-indepen… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Farnaz Fassihi
@farnazfassihi
Iran and Oman are near finalizing an agreement over the Strait of Hormuz. It may open the flow of ships but would cement Iran's control over the critical waterway, leverage it did not have before the war. Details:
w/ @SangerNYT @EricSchmittNYT
www.nytimes.com/2026/08/03/us/politics/strait-of-hormuz-p… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
@academic_la
After meeting Netanyahu, the Board of Peace has gone back its demands that Israel withdraw from Gaza. Under the text published last week, the IDF withdrawal from the Yellow Line was to be gradual and parallel to Hamas disarmament. The Council now says Israel withdraws after disarmament is complete. The word "fully" was also removed. Therefore, the plan now calls for Hamas disarmament without IDF withdrawal. An absolute joke.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Nathalie Gay-Blum🇨🇦🇫🇷🇮🇱🇨🇮
@Coquillette67
Soon jews (israelis) will have to hide jews (israeli expat) in their basement
החדשות - N12
@N12News
בליכוד חוששים מישראלים שיחזרו מחו"ל להצביע - ומבקשים לאסור אירוח חינם של בוחרים. יועמ"ש התנועה פנה לוועדת הבחירות: "מדובר בתופעה חדשה וחמורה של שידול הגעת מצביעים - בדרך של מתנות אסורות"
@DaphnaLiel | n12.pro/3RBbIoI -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
Je suis d’accord avec Gershon Baskin lorsqu’il écrit :
« Je m’oppose à ce qu’ils appellent un “gouvernement sioniste”. Je n’en veux pas.
La question aujourd’hui n’est pas de savoir si le sionisme possède une légitimité historique, mais ce que nous allons faire en Israël, en 2026, en son nom.
Je veux un gouvernement qui rassemble tous les Israéliens qui pensent que l’État doit être au service de tous ses citoyens et que la démocratie doit protéger tout le monde.
À mesure qu’Israël se rapproche des élections, de plus en plus de responsables politiques promettent de former un “gouvernement sioniste”. Cette expression est présentée comme quelque chose de positif et d’évident, comme si un Israélien progressiste et démocrate ne pouvait tout simplement pas s’y opposer. »
Gershon Baskin🟣 غرشون باسكين גרשון בסקין
@gershonbaskin
אני מתנגד: אינני רוצה את מה שהם מכנים "ממשלה ציונית"
השאלה היום איננה אם לציונות יש לגיטימציה היסטורית, אלא מה נעשה בישראל של 2026 בשמה. אני רוצה ממשלה הכוללת את כל הישראלים המאמינים שהמדינה חייבת לשרת את כל אזרחיה ושהדמוקרטיה חייבת להגן על כולם
ככל שישראל מתקרבת לבחירות, יותר ויותר פוליטיקאים מבטיחים להקים “ממשלה ציונית”. הביטוי הזה מוצג כדבר חיובי ומובן מאליו, כאילו ישראלי ליברלי ודמוקרטי כלל אינו יכול להתנגד לו.
אני מתנגד. אינני רוצה את מה שהם מכנים “ממשלה ציונית”. אני רוצה ממשלה ישראלית.>>>>>
gershonbaskin.substack.com/p/dba -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Drop Site
@DropSiteNews
🟢 Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas:
▪️ Dr. Khalil al-Hayya, head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, met on Monday with Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın to discuss the latest political and field developments related to the Palestinian cause.
▪️ Al-Hayya reviewed the severe humanitarian conditions facing the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, as well as Israel’s continuing violations and daily killings, stressing the need for these violations to stop immediately.
▪️ Al-Hayya said the latest round of negotiations was decisive and important, and required serious efforts to compel Israel to fulfill its obligations under the ceasefire agreement. He also expressed appreciation for Turkey’s role as a mediator in the negotiations and for its consistent positions on the Palestinian cause and the rights of the Palestinian people.
▪️ He stressed the need for Turkey to continue this role alongside the other mediators by following up on implementation and ensuring the realization of the Palestinian people’s goals and aspirations for a free and dignified life.
▪️ Al-Hayya briefed the Turkish official on Israel’s actions in the West Bank and Jerusalem, as well as the escalating abuses against Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails.
▪️ He emphasized the need to put the Palestinian house in order on the basis of partnership and democracy, formulate a unified national strategy, and rebuild the national leadership institution so that it represents all Palestinians.
▪️ For his part, the Turkish intelligence chief reaffirmed Turkey’s consistent position with respect to the Palestinian cause. He praised what had been achieved in the negotiations and the courageous position taken by Hamas and the other factions in the interest of the Palestinian people, while stressing the need to move toward practical steps and implement what had been agreed.
▪️ He said:
“The Palestinian people have the right to live with dignity and humanity.”
He added that Turkey would continue carrying out its role and responsibility. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇸🇾 Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa dismissed claims the 2024 offensive (which led to the fall of Asssad) was orchestrated by external powers:
"At that time, people had largely lost hope in the revolution's chances of succeeding. Turkey was under intense domestic pressure because of the Syrian refugee issue.
Military options were not considered realistic. The dominant approach was reconciliation with the regime. Although many Turkish politicians doubted reconciliation would work, that was the path being pursued.
The Turks also feared that if a military offensive failed, Russia would retaliate with massive airstrikes on opposition-held areas, triggering another refugee wave into Turkey, which was already facing a refugee crisis.
Even Arab states, apart from Qatar, were pursuing normalization with the regime. The goal wasn't to approve of what Assad had done, but to pull Syria away from Iranian influence and reduce the damage it was causing to the region.
The military operation was launched despite those concerns. It was completely our own decision."
Writer: MichaelThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Iran believes Trump will ultimately be forced to make major concessions including a $300B Iran reconstruction package, letting Iran control Hormuz, and accept all of Iran's core demands as the US falls into a "strategic stranglehold," senior Iranian officials tell Reuters.
Iran is pursuing a strategy of calibrated escalation, increasing the economic and political costs for the US and its allies until Trump becomes more willing to compromise, particularly over the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials say sustained pressure will leave Trump with no choice but to negotiate on Iran's terms, especially looking ahead to the November midterms.
Iran's big advantage is that it "can hurt the regional states and the global economy," with Iran believing it can tolerate economic pressure longer than a US-led coalition can tolerate recurring disruption to global commerce and energy markets. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
Comment expliquer la réaction extrêmement dure de Singapour envers Massive Attack après que le groupe a brandi un drapeau palestinien ?
Ses membres auraient été détenus, interrogés séparément, certains fouillés dans leur hôtel, leurs passeports temporairement confisqués… avant d’être finalement bannis du pays.
Pour comprendre cette réaction, il faut regarder les liens étroits — et souvent discrets — qui unissent Singapour et Israël depuis 1969.
Après son indépendance, Singapour s’est retrouvé dans un environnement régional difficile et a rapidement cherché à construire une puissante armée. Israël a joué un rôle important dans sa formation, son entraînement et son équipement.
Les deux pays entretiennent depuis des décennies une coopération étroite dans les domaines militaire, sécuritaire et technologique. Des responsables israéliens se rendent régulièrement à Singapour et Israël y exporte notamment des équipements de défense.
Mais Singapour avance avec prudence : entouré de pays à majorité musulmane, l’État cherche à préserver de bonnes relations à la fois avec Israël et avec le monde musulman.
Singapour entretient des relations diplomatiques avec Israël, avec une ambassade et un consulat à Tel-Aviv, tout en maintenant une représentation permanente à Ramallah auprès de l’Autorité palestinienne.
Cette position permet de mieux comprendre, probablement, la réaction de Singapour envers Massive Attack. Car les liens entre Singapour et Israël sont anciens et particulièrement étroits, notamment dans les domaines militaire et sécuritaire.
Alors, qu’un drapeau palestinien puisse devenir un geste suffisamment « sensible » pour entraîner interrogatoires, confiscation de passeports et finalement l’expulsion d’un groupe musical en dit long.
C'est la politique : parfois, ce ne sont pas les principes qui dictent les réactions d’un État, mais ses alliances, ses intérêts et ses relations de longue date.
Le Parisien
@le_Parisien
Détenus, isolés, fouillés… Massive Attack banni de Singapour pour un drapeau palestinien brandi sur scène
➡️ l.leparisien.fr/mk0a -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
Iraq entered the 2nd Iran War already in a financial crisis owing to former PM a-Sudani's rapid expansion of clientelistic networks to buy loyalty. Even before the war, there were delays in distribution of salaries. With the closure of the Hormuz Straits, Iraq's oil exports plummeted. Those oil exports make up almost 90% of the Iraqi budget because the corrupt politicians ruling Iraq hindered the developments of a private sector & did not work to diversify Iraq's economy.
The current crisis is unprecedented in post-2003 Iraq: Iraq needs about 8 trillion dinars monthly ($6.11 billion) to be able to pay salaries, and according to its minister of finance, it only has 3 trillion dinars ($2.29 billion) in state coffers, and thus salaries will be paid in batches, when Iraq is able to get some funds.
During the 39-day-war, Iran repeatedly bombed tankers attempting to onload oil in the Basra Port and Iraqi militiamen commanded by IRGC personnel attacked their own country's oil fields to drive up the global oil price. The Iranian-backed militias rely almost exclusively on drawing from Iraq's state budget, through being awarded state contracts, access to a preferrable dollar to Iraqi dinar rate, and tens of thousands of militiamen operating within Iranian-backed factions receive state salaries. Despite this, Iran is chocking of Iraq's oil-dependent economy.
This is further proof that the militias Iran sets up, trains and commands are not "allies" of Iran, as the Iranian-backed Axis and some analysts claim. Allies take into account each other's interests. Iran does not care that Iraqis, including those loyal to them, are suffering from an economic crisis. Similarly, the IRGC ordered Hezbollah to intervene in the 2nd Iran War, despite knowing this would severely harm Hezbollah's legitimacy within Lebanon and bring immense destruction and loss to the Lebanese Shia community, which still has not recovered from the 2024 war. Prior to this, when Hamas carried out the Oct 7th massacres and expected Iran to join the war, Iran preferred to stay on the sidelines until it was attached.
Iran did not create, arm and fund these militias to then take their interests into account or operate based on their timing.
english.aawsat.com/arab-world/5302239-iraq’s-government-a… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
נדב איל Nadav Eyal
@Nadav_Eyal
Israel tried to overthrow the Iranian regime. Behind that headline lies a far more revealing story.
Israel's political leadership, military, and Mossad held very different views about the likelihood of success, the methods, and the risks involved.
To many, this story is about Ahmadinejad, the Kurds, the bay of pigs scenario. It is really about how decisions are made in Israel today.
Read my new piece.
נדב איל Nadav Eyal
@Nadav_Eyal
2/ also, the intolerable factual gap: cabinet ministers and Mossad figures say the IDF backed the plan and "went along with it completely in the first phase." The army insists the risks and reservations were presented in full, in writing. Link: www.nadaveyal.com/p/exclusive-the-warning-netanyahu-got
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Report
@HormuzReport
BREAKING: A source close to Iranian officials says Tehran has documented a pattern of oil market manipulation tied to Axios reports and Trump administration insiders, including evidence of a $9 billion insider trading operation linked to Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff.
Some of the documented timeline from the $9 billion insider profit:
Between April and May 2026, a series of suspiciously timed trades in oil futures markets preceded major Iran war announcements—each tied to reporting by Axios.
On March 23, approximately $500–580 million in shorts were placed 15 minutes before Trump announced he was postponing strikes on Iran. Oil dropped.
On April 7, roughly $950–960 million in shorts were placed hours before Trump announced a two-week ceasefire with Iran. Oil fell around 15 percent.
On April 17, around $760 million in shorts were placed 20 minutes before Iran's foreign minister announced the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Oil dropped.
On April 21, approximately $430 million in shorts were placed 15 minutes before Trump extended the ceasefire. Oil dropped again.
On May 6, nearly $920 million to $1.7 billion in crude oil shorts were placed approximately 70 minutes before an Axios scoop claimed the U.S. and Iran were near a "14-point agreement." Oil dropped 12 percent. Traders made an estimated $125 million. Iran called the report "the Americans' wish list."
Previously, a senior Iranian official told investigative outlet Drop Site News that Tehran privately warned JD Vance during Switzerland talks that Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff were "abusing" negotiations—"more interested in exploiting insider knowledge to profit in financial markets than reaching a deal." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Qusay Noor
@QUSAY_NOOR_
Interview | The Life of Ahmad Al-Sharaa: Key Milestones and Defining Moments in the Journey of the Syrian President
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Vaez
@AliVaez
انتخاب ترامپ میان جنگی است که بردنی نیست، و صلحی که پذیرفتنی نیست…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clash Report
@clashreport
Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa:
The conclusion I drew from Iraq was that we must not transfer Iraq's reality to Syria. Every country has its own circumstances and its own problems.
What I learned from Iraq was that the conflicts, divisions, and sectarian strife that consumed Iraq should never be repeated in Syria.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Filippo Grandi
@FilippoGrandi
Migrants manipulated to create political pressure on Spain.
Many governments’ reactions driven by domestic politics — zero genuine concerns.
EU coordination hesitant, difficult to understand.
Not a word of compassion for the victims.
#ceuta: what a failure, Europe. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
I told @FT that in the latest round of war Iran has escalated "with an end result in mind, which is to control American behaviour and force the US to recalculate its options." The message has been that "this will be a regional war and the US will not have the luxury of choosing its battlefields. Iran is expecting a very long war. They are following a very methodological strategy of forcing the US as far away from Iran as possible: out of the Gulf, Syria, Iraq, and having them holed up in Israel and Jordan.”giftarticle.ft.com/giftarticle/actions/redeem/46485f78-94…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
@academic_la
The attempt to bring the Iranian Kurds into the Iranian war was an Israeli idea, and one that the US dismissed as "bullshit" early on. There was never an alternative plan for regime change in Iran and that is why it failed so badly. According to an article by Nadav Eyal today:
1) Kurdish fighters were to invade from the west with Israeli air support opening ground corridors. It was supposed to start with 5,000 and then reach 150,000–200,000 and they were to advance on Tehran.
2) The idea was that they would join with mass protests which Israel hoped would form in the city. Israel tried to impose the monarchist Iranian lion flag (which they provided) instead of the Kurdish one.
3) Mossad and military intelligence knew this would not work. One experienced officer called reliance on the Kurds "a complete, wild delusion."
4) During a February 11 briefing, Rubio reportedly called the presentation "bullshit"; the CIA director called it "ridiculous." A green light was given anyway because no one could come up with a better plan.
5) When the plan did not work, Israel and the US improvised a plan B. It included hunting Basij checkpoints and Netanyahu's public Nowruz call for Iranians to take to the streets. People stayed home.
There was no real plan for regime change. The whole thing was a mess improvised from day one. That is why it failed and we are stuck in this mess. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
تصمیم ترامپ برای حمله دوباره به ایران قطعی بود.
چند عامل همزمان باعث شد سناریوی حمله فوری ترامپ به ایران که در برخی محافل درباره آن صحبت میشد، با موانع جدی روبهرو شود:
۱- پیام بازدارندگی ایران به کشورهای میزبان نیروهای آمریکایی در منطقه
ایران از مسیرهای دیپلماتیک به برخی کشورهای منطقه که میزبان پایگاههای آمریکا هستند پیام داده است که هرگونه حمله مستقیم به زیرساختهای حیاتی ایران، بدون پاسخ نخواهد ماند. منطق این پیام این است که در صورت آغاز درگیری، تبعات آن محدود به مرزهای ایران و آمریکا نخواهد بود و زیرساختهای انرژی، حملونقل و اقتصادی منطقه نیز میتواند در معرض خطر قرار گیرد. این هشدار عملاً تلاش دارد هزینه تصمیم نظامی را برای واشنگتن و متحدانش افزایش دهد.
۲- نگرانی کشورهای عربی از نابودی زیرساختی
برخی کشورهای عربی منطقه، که در سالهای اخیر تلاش کردهاند روابط اقتصادی و امنیتی خود را تثبیت کنند، نگرانند که هرگونه درگیری مستقیم میان ایران و آمریکا، آنها را به میدان نبرد تبدیل کند. پیام این کشورها به آمریکا این است که امنیت پایگاهها و تأسیسات حیاتیشان در صورت تشدید تنش، آسیبپذیر خواهد بود. در این میان، رایزنیهای رهبران کشورهای منطقه با واشنگتن اهمیت زیادی پیدا میکند.
۳- نگرانیهای اطلاعاتی درباره پاسخ سریع ایران و هزینههای نظامی حمله
برخی ارزیابیهای امنیتی معتقدند در صورت آغاز حمله آمریکا، ایران ممکن است تلاش کند با واکنش سریع موشکی و پهپادی، هزینههای فوری برای اسرائیل و پایگاههای آمریکا ایجاد کند. همچنین پیشرفتهای ایران در حوزه موشکی، پدافندی و پراکندگی زیرساختهای نظامی، برنامهریزی برای یک عملیات گسترده و بدون هزینه را دشوارتر میکند.
۴- مسئله تنگه هرمز و شوک احتمالی به بازار انرژی
ایران به مسقط و دوحه اعلام کرده اگر آمریکا حمله کند همه مذاکرات فعلی با عمان بر سر تنگه هرمز را کان لم یکن تلقی کرده و بعد از این هم اجازه عبور یک پرنده از این تنگه را هم نخواهد داد و آمریکا مطمئن باشد این حمله فقط گره فعلی را سفتتر خواهد کرد. عبور نکردن کشتیها به علاوه هدف قرار گرفتن زیرساختهای انرژی منطقه، دنیا را در شوک قیمتی فروخواهد برد.
برآیند این عوامل نشان میدهد که تصمیم برای حمله نظامی علیه ایران، فقط یک محاسبه نظامی نیست؛ بلکه یک تصمیم چندلایه با پیامدهای منطقهای، اقتصادی و سیاسی گسترده است. به همین دلیل، حتی در شرایط افزایش تنش، بسیاری از بازیگران تلاش میکنند میان اعمال فشار و جلوگیری از ورود به یک جنگ فراگیر تعادل ایجاد کنند. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
Scoop: Saudi Crown Prince MBS spoke to President Trump on Saturday and expressed concern over his plans for massive new strikes against Iran, two U.S. officials and another source familiar say. @MarcACaputo and I write for @axios
www.axios.com/2026/08/01/saudi-crown-prince-trump-iran-at… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amit Segal
@AmitSegal
The Americans were surprised by the continuation of the assassinations in Gaza. Israel, according to them, had accepted the terms, including a halt to the targeted killings, so that Hamas would be obligated to take the next step—surrendering its weapons.
'These are the fruits of eight months of negotiations aimed at demilitarizing Gaza—why continue with the assassinations now and give them an excuse to walk away?' the sources said."
“This further isolates Israel in the Middle East as all the mediator countries see this as Bibi not keeping his word or wanting peace.”
“He killed 3 innocent children which makes Israel look like bloodthirsty savages.” -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Unlike Saudi Arabia where Crown Prince MBS held a call just hours before Trump cancelled his massive attack, the UAE is lobbying Trump in recent days for far more decisive action against Iran, suggesting the US should take immediate control over the Strait of Hormuz, carry out harsher strikes and start a major ground operation, so that Iran's IRGC compromises, per WSJ.
Gulf countries are frustrated with a lack of a clear strategy from the Trump administration as the war drags on, subjecting their territories to frequent Iranian attacks, while Patriot interceptor stocks are critically low and without a guarantee of protection. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
ניר לוי
@Niro_life
הימין חולם על מדינה דתית שבה הפלסטינים הם עבדים ונשים הן חצי אזרחיות. אמירה זו פוגעת בול. המאבק אינו פוליטי, הוא רוחני. וכל מי שמצביע לימין היום חותם על חוזה למכירת נשמתו הלאומית. בושה להם, בושה לנו אם נשתוק.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
סומיה בשיר
@bashsomaya
הגיע הזמן להפסיק להתבלבל.
זה כבר לא ויכוח פוליטי.
זו כבר לא מחלוקת בין ימין לשמאל.
זו הבחירה בין דמוקרטיה לדיקטטורה.
בין שלטון החוק לשלטון הכוח.
בין שוויון לעליונות.
בין שותפות לפילוג.
בין תקווה לפחד.
והבחירה הזו עוברת היום דרך המחנה הדמוקרטי.
אנחנו בוחרים בדמוקרטיה.
אנחנו בוחרים בחירות.
אנחנו בוחרים בשוויון.
אנחנו בוחרים בשותפות.
כי דמוקרטיה היא כוח.
כי שוויון הוא כוח.
כי שותפות היא כוח.
לא ניתן לקיצוניים להגדיר מי אנחנו.
לא ניתן לפחד לנהל אותנו.
לא ניתן לשנאה לכתוב את העתיד שלנו.
אנחנו לא נאבקים רק על השלטון.
אנחנו נאבקים על דמותה של מדינת ישראל.
זו המדינה שלנו.
זו האחריות שלנו.
וזה העתיד שלנו.
הגיע הזמן לבחור בדמוקרטיה.
בוחרים בדמוקרטיה.
בוחרים בחירות.
בוחרים בשוויון.
בוחרים בשותפות.
הדמוקרטים כי העתיד שייך למי שבוחר בדמוקרטיה. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ronen Bergman
@ronenbergman
1/9
גרעין התעמולה
כך מעצבת המכונה את המציאות, ואם הנסיבות השתנו, גם את המציאות ההפוכה. שרשור
רוב בני האדם בוחנים עובדות, ראיות ומציאות- ואז מסיקים מסקנות.
במכונה עובדים הפוך: קודם מקבלים את המסקנה ברשימת המסרים, וְאָז לָשִׂים וּמְרַדְּדִים אֶת הַמְּצִיאוּת כְּמוֹ בָּצֵק עַד שֶׁהִיא מַתְאִימָה.
ואם כעבור כמה חודשים המפקד העליון מזמין מסר הפוך- אין בעיה. מַכְנִיסִים לָרֵוֵרְס וְלָשִׂים אֶת אוֹתָהּ מְצִיאוּת בַּכִּוּוּן הַנֶּגְדִּי.
לא את המציאות האמיתית, כמובן. את המציאות החלופית שבה שוטפים לצופים את המוח.
כך, למשל, רק במרץ, כשהמשימה הייתה להגן על נתניהו: כל הצנטריפוגות הושמדו, כל התשתיות הושמדו, האורניום קבור והפצצה הורחקה לשנים, אולי אפילו עשור.
ביולי, כשהמשימה היא להחזיר את טראמפ למלחמה: אלפי צנטריפוגות, אורניום בתנועה, מלאים נעלמים ופצצה בתוך זמן קצר.
כמה מ״עיתונאי״ המכונה הפכו זאת למקצוע במשרה מלאה המסכמת את תרומתם לחברה: שקרנותם–חארטטנותם–אומנותם.
הנה כך זה עובד, שלב אחר שלב. המקרה של פרוייקט הגרעין האיראני -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
roi kais • روعي كايس • רועי קייס
@kaisos1987
גורם המקורב לצוות המו"מ באיראן לסוכנות פארס: אין שום הסכם בעניין פתיחה מחדש של מיצר הורמוז. הידיעות בנושא שקריות. גורם צבאי מעורה שצוטט בסוכנות האיראנית מסר כי כל עוד נמשכים הצעדים העוינים של האמריקנים, מיצר הורמוז יישאר סגור. תנוע הספינות תתאפשר רק בהתאם לנתיב המוכרז ובאישור של הכוח הימי של משמרות המהפכה
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kenneth Roth
@KenRoth
Why would Israel want its ally Morocco to control Ceuta as opposed to its critic Spain? One reason may be that Ceuta is the closest point in Africa to Europe, sitting astride the Strait of Gibraltar, meaning that Spain currently controls both sides of the strait. The Strait of Gibraltar is only 8 miles across, as opposed to the Strait of Hormuz, which is 21 miles. If Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz, Spain could easily control the Strait of Gibraltar and potentially block Israeli access to the Atlantic. www.nytimes.com/2026/07/30/world/europe/ceuta-spain-moroc…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Phone Call: Saudis Issue Ultimatum to Trump on Behalf of GCC
Amid strong rumors that Netanyahu had already agreed with Trump to resume bombings against Iran, Gulf countries like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were already working behind the scenes.
Qatar, in particular, had been warning about the imminent risks to its massive infrastructure and natural gas exports.
This, however, was not enough to dissuade Trump, who was moving forward with his plan, especially since the two major American natural gas exporting companies are benefiting from the scenario and were donors to Trump's campaign. The UAE had also been warning about the risks to its facilities, but with little progress.
In the last 72 hours, these countries informed Washington that local intelligence reports confirmed Iran had already mapped oil fields, refineries, and power plants across all GCC members for an immediate counter-attack should the US initiate the bombings, but also to no avail.
It was Mohammed bin Salman who aligned the GCC's position. On Saturday, he placed a call to Trump and warned that Iran would respond to any bombings by directly attacking the energy infrastructure of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf neighbors. This was nothing Trump and Netanyahu did not already know and had not already ignored in advance when deciding on the attack.
But the Saudi leader went further: on behalf of the GCC, he expressly requested that Trump back down from plans for large-scale attacks against Iranian territory. He directly demanded clarification on Washington and Tel Aviv's plan of action, arguing that missteps at this juncture would destabilize the global energy market for extended periods.
In doing so, he implicitly conveyed two things:
The first is that, if destroyed, the GCC economies would be unable to honor the signed agreements, Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs), and long-term structural partnerships celebrated during Trump's administration, values that range between $2 trillion and $3 trillion. This is not to mention the billions injected directly into the businesses of Donald Trump himself and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner.
To the wise, it became clear that these resources could be redirected toward investments in other blocs, including the Chinese.
The second is that, if Trump refused the request of the Saudis, acting as spokespersons for the Gulf and pressed ahead, he would be solely responsible for the destruction of local economies and a global economic crisis. Faced with structural disaster in their own territories, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries would close their airspace to American fighter jets and revoke permissions for the use of logistical bases in the region.
It was these two implicit messages that deterred Trump. Everything else he had already evaluated and, nonetheless, decided to proceed with the attack.
Continue reading:
open.substack.com/pub/global21/p/phone-call-saudis-issue-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Farnaz Fassihi
@farnazfassihi
Exclusive: Iran plotted a wider war with aid of its proxies during the fragile ceasefire. Iranians covertly devised a plan to raise the war’s costs for President Trump if U.S. forces attacked anew. w/ @NeilMacFarquhar
www.nytimes.com/2026/08/01/world/middleeast/iran-proxies-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Tzvi Joffre
@TzviJoffre
Barak Ravid reports that Trump dropped the strikes after Iranian FM Araqchi agreed to a deal in which all traffic entering the Persian Gulf would be forced to use the Iranian route through the Strait of Hormuz and all traffic exiting the Gulf would go through the Omani route. In the meantime, Iranian state media is denying any progress was made in the talks and even Ravid's report notes that the mediators have so far been unable to get any assurances that the people who actually hold power in Iran will agree to such a deal.
Even if they do agree, it's worth stating clearly what this deal is: an official surrender straight from the White House giving full control over the Strait of Hormuz to Iran (having full control over one direction of traffic means having full control over both directions, especially when you control the entry to the Gulf). There is zero mention about anything concerning the nuclear program and there won't be any agreement on the nuclear program or any other issue with Iran if this deal is actually signed because the US will not have any leverage it could possibly hold over Iran. If Trump is truly considering a deal like this, he's completely given up.
www.mako.co.il/news-world/2026_q3/Article-cf1b00b3d11cf91… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
Saudi Arabia's message to Washington is becoming increasingly clear. It echoes the warning delivered by Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman during his visit to Washington last week: if the United States launches major strikes against Iran's energy infrastructure, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states will likely bear the immediate consequences.
Tehran has already signaled what it would target across the Gulf if President Trump follows through on his threats. From Riyadh's perspective, the timing could hardly be worse. With tensions rising again with the Houthis, the last thing Saudi Arabia wants is a broader regional confrontation with Iran.
This also highlights a broader strategic reality. The war has strengthened Iran's deterrence vis-à-vis the Gulf states. For Gulf leaders, preserving regional stability has become a higher priority than pursuing a decisive confrontation with Tehran.
At the same time, the core dispute remains unresolved. There is still no agreement over the future of the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran shows no indication that it is willing to compromise on what it views as its role there. As long as that issue remains unsettled, there is no obvious diplomatic off-ramp.
So far, Iran's strategy of increasing pressure on the Gulf state, treating them as the weakest link in Washington's regional coalitio, appears to be producing results.
The focus is shifting back to quiet diplomacy between Oman and Iran, as both sides explore whether a compromise over the Strait of Hormuz is still possible. But regardless of what emerges from those talks, the key decision will once again rest with Washington.
If an agreement is reached, will the Trump administration be prepared to accept it? If not, will it ultimately decide that military escalation is the only remaining option?
President Trump's hesitation also suggests that the administration itself is far from convinced that a broader military campaign would weaken Iran or compel it to concede. That uncertainty helps explain why, despite repeated threats, diplomacy continues to be the preferred path.
Ultimately, Washington still appears to view a negotiated outcome as preferable to a conflict whose costs and consequences remain highly unpredictable.
#iran
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
Scoop: Saudi Crown Prince MBS spoke to President Trump on Saturday and expressed concern over his plans for massive new strikes against Iran, two U.S. officials and another source familiar say. @MarcACaputo and I write for @axios
www.axios.com/2026/08/01/saudi-crown-prince-trump-iran-at… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ramazan Bursa
@RBursa
İran Meclis Başkanı Muhammed Bakır Kalibaf, Ayetullah Hamanei'nin İsrail saldırısında hayatını kaybetmesi sonrası süreci nasıl yönettiklerini anlattı:
"O gün, 9 Esfend (28 Şubat) günü bizzat oradaydım. Şimdi detaylara girmek istemiyorum ama olayın gerçekleştiği o andan itibaren, yani Ağa'nın (Ali Hamanei) şehadeti kesinleştiğinde ki muhtemelen bombalamadan bir saat sonraydı durumu anladık ve hemen işe koyulduk.
İran'ın erk başkanlarını (yasama, yürütme, yargı) ve diğer üst düzey yetkilileri bir araya getirmeye çalıştık.
Merhum Laricani'ye, hepimiz onları bulmak ve herkesi bir araya getirmek için uğraştık.
Akşam saat 20:00 sularında toplandık. Ayetullah Laricani ve diğerlerinin, sürecin gerektirdiği bazı meseleleri Düzenin Maslahatını Teşhis Konseyi ve Anayasayı Koruma Konseyi hukukçuları gibi takip etme sorumlulukları vardı. Bu detaylara girmek istemiyorum.
Anlatmak istediğim şey, insanların sokaklarda toplanmasına neyin sebep olduğudur. Orada altı ya da yedi kişiydik ve bir karar vermemiz gerekiyordu: Rehber'in ölümünü ne zaman duyuracaktık?
Sonunda kesin bir karara vardık: Ertesi sabah saat 08:00'de duyuracaktık. O zamanlar mübarek Ramazan ayıydı. Saat 22:00 veya 22:30 civarında herkes hızla dağıldı.
Ancak gece saat 00:30'da, yurt dışı merkezli Farsça yayın yapan televizyon kanalları ölüm haberini duyurdu. O noktada diğerlerine ulaşmamız mümkün değildi; zaten kararımızı vermiştik ve herkes gitmişti.
Saat 01:00 veya 01:30 sularında Sayın Laricani ile birbirimizi tekrar bulmayı başardık. İkimiz daha önce, iletişimde kalabilmek için belirli buluşma noktaları ayarlamıştık. Saat 01:00 civarında tekrar konuştuk ve dedik ki: 'Bu olay artık duyuldu ama karar hala yarın sabah saat 08:00'de açıklanması yönünde.'
Fakat olayların gidişatına baktığımızda, orijinal plana sadık kalamayacağımızı gördük. Bu yüzden Sayın Laricani ile ikimiz bir karar verdik. Durumu göz önüne alarak kararı kendimiz vermeliydik: Ölümü şafak vaktinde, insanlar sahur sofrasındayken duyurmaya karar verdik.
Hemen ardından herkesin sokağa çıkması için çağrıda bulunacaktık.
İnanın bana, aksi takdirde sokaklardaki durum tamamen farklı bir hal alabilirdi."This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
What happened today:
-MBS called Trump and urged him to reconsider escalating against Iranian energy infrastructure, per @axios.
-Iran's FM spoke to his counterparts in Saudi and Turkey, as well as Pakistani army chief of staff Munir, a key mediator.
-Qatari mediators have reportedly called US and Omani officials to discuss a compromise to open the strait. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
Iran is trying to establish a form of energy-based Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD): if its ability to produce and export oil and gas is targeted, no major energy producer in the Gulf should expect to operate normally either.
The strike on the Lapan field, combined with Qatar's unusually sharp reaction following the earlier attack on South Pars, reinforces Tehran's message that it has both the intent and the capability to threaten energy infrastructure across the region.
Iran's preference remains deterrence rather than escalation, but if its own energy sector comes under attack, the administration should assume that missiles and drones have already been pre-designated for retaliatory strikes against critical oil and gas facilities throughout the Gulf.
The consequences would be unprecedented. Iran's leadership would face severe economic pressure, but the heaviest burden would likely fall on ordinary Iranians, whose livelihoods depend on an economy already under extraordinary strain. At the same time, the global economy would also bear enormous costs. It is far from certain that the United States or its regional partners could prevent Iran from striking at least some of these facilities.
Even a limited, symbolic strike on Iranian energy infrastructure carries significant risks. Tehran is unlikely to absorb such an attack without responding forcefully, particularly because its leadership will want to demonstrate that it is not operating under Washington's terms or accepting a new deterrence equation imposed from outside.
Iran's repeated references to gas fields across the Gulf also serve another purpose: increasing pressure on Gulf Arab states to urge Washington against targeting Iranian energy infrastructure. This dynamic is particularly relevant in light of Saudi defense minister's visit to Washington this week and the message he reportedly conveyed regarding Riyadh's strong interest in preventing further escalation. Saudi Arabia, like the other Gulf states, has a profound interest in avoiding a conflict that could place its critical energy infrastructure directly in the crosshairs and destabilize global energy markets.
If the conflict expands to include direct attacks on energy infrastructure, it would mark a fundamentally new phase of the confrontation. Such a development would dramatically increase the economic stakes, heighten the risk of regional escalation, and push any negotiated settlement much further out of reach.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
IISS News
@IISS_org
Having advised against the US-Israel war with Iran, Riyadh and other Gulf states must now contend with its destabilising consequences. They begrudgingly accept that the unnerving cycle of war, economic coercion and diplomacy will dictate their geopolitical and geoeconomic conduct for years to come.
First published in The Financial Times, read @emile_hokayem’s thoughts: www.iiss.org/online-analysis/commentary/2026/07/saudi-ara… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
@vvanwilgenburg
American, British, French and German forces have withdrawn hundreds of troops and key air-defense systems from Erbil International Airport in a surprise 72-hour pull-out that has left the Kurdistan Region badly exposed to intensifying Iranian and militia attacks - Rudaw
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Charles Lister
@Charles_Lister
Airing on Sunday night local time, this @AJArabic feature interview with #syria’s President al-Sharaa regarding his personal life story will be an important & revealing watch.
It’s Part 2 of what was recorded ~10 days ago during Ali al-Dhafiri’s visit to #damascus.
قناة الجزيرة
@AJArabic
حياة أحمد الشرع.. محطات ومواقف مفصلية في مسيرة الرئيس السوري
#المقابلة مع علي الظفيري.. الأحد 22:05 بتوقيت مكة المكرمة على شاشة #الجزيرة ومنصاتها الرقميةThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amberin Zaman
@amberinzaman
Bazı Kürt dostlarımın ABD güçlerinin Erbil’den çekilmekte olduklarına dair bugün yayımlanan özel haberim karşısında inanmama isteklerini anlamakla birlikte biraz da şaşıyorum.
1. Haber doğru. Çoğu çekildi bile. Patriotlar yok artık. Ancak farklı noktalarda özel kuvvetler bulunmaya devam edecekler. Sanırım Fransızlar özel kuvvetleri de var. Ama ABDnin Irak’taki askeri varlığı büyük ölçüde sona erdi, eriyor.
2. Zaten Bağdat’la varılan anlaşmaları gereği 30 Eylül’e kadar çekileceklerdi. İran’ın bitmek bilmeyen saldırıları karşısında takvimi hızlandırdılar. Patriotları farklı bir yere, muhtemelen Ürdün’e kaydırdılar. Bunu teyit edemedim. Ancak ABDnin Patriot stokları hızla tükeniyor ve üretim kayıpları telafi etmeye yetecek düzeyde değil.
3. Mesele son kertede Kürtlerle ilgili değil. Amerika kendi çıkarları için Güney Kürdistan’da bulunuyordu. Tıpkı Rojava’da olduğu gibi. Oradan da çekileceklerini söylediğimizde işitmediğimiz laf kalmamıştı. Durum aşağa yukarı bundan ibaret. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Tehran Times
@TehranTimes79
Speaker Qalibaf recounts how the announcement of the Leader's martyrdom was handled
🔻 "About an hour after the bombing, we realized that the Leader had been martyred. By the time we managed to gather the heads of the three branches of government and Ali Larijani had arrived, it was around 8:00 p.m. At that meeting, we decided that the announcement of the Leader's martyrdom would be made at 8:00 a.m. the following morning. After the meeting, we immediately dispersed."
🔸 "Later, when we saw that foreign TV channels had already reported the news, we decided to announce the Leader's martyrdom before dawn instead and call on the people to take to the streets." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Anas Awan
@AnasMAwan
Hakan Fidan: It's been 4-5 years; I was poisoned with heavy arsenic and mercury. I received treatment.
Host: Who did it?
Hakan Fidan: Let's not get into those matters. It's not just enemies on the inside. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
À Jérusalem, visiblement, boire un café le samedi matin est devenu un acte de courage civil.
Quand la religion est pratiquée de cette manière, elle devient un obstacle à la liberté et au bien vivre ensemble. Pourtant, ce n’est certainement pas, à mes yeux, l’esprit authentique de la spiritualité : une spiritualité vivante devrait ouvrir, relier et rendre plus libre, pas imposer des interdits et des séparations.
אביגדור ליברמן
@AvigdorLiberman
הגעתי הבוקר לחזק את בית הקפה במרכז העיר ירושלים שמותקף על ידי חרדים קיצוניים.
אני מאמין בעיקרון חיה ותן לחיות.
לא יכול להיות ששתיית קפה בשבת בבוקר תהפוך לאקט של גבורה אזרחית. את הוונדליזם שאנחנו רואים מאחוריי - כל זה רק מוכיח שהחבר'ה האלו חייבים להוציא את האנרגיה מול חמאס, מול חיזבאללה, מול החות'ים, אבל לא כאן בירושלים, מול אזרחים שלווים.
כשנגיע לשלטון לא יהיה להם זמן להפגין. כולם ירוצו בטירונות! -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 بات تقدير الموقف لدى كثير من الأوساط الحكومية والاستخبارية حول العالم أن الحرب في الشرق الأوسط ستستمر لأشهر قادمة؛ وهذا الأمر لمسته في كثير من اللقاءات والتقارير الغربية.
بلومبرغ سلطت الضوء على ذلك.
🔷 نقلت تقييمات لمسؤولين حاليين وسابقين من الولايات المتحدة وإيران وأوروبا، وكان التقدير السائد داخل هذه الدوائر أن الحرب الأمريكية الإيرانية مرشحة للاستمرار لأشهر، لأن الطرفين عاجزان حالياً عن كسر الجمود حول مضيق هرمز أو التوصل إلى وقف إطلاق نار دائم.
🔷 نقل التقرير عن مصادر مطلعة على اتصالات بين مسؤولين أمريكيين وإيرانيين كبار أن النمط الذي شهدته الأسابيع الأخيرة سيستمر على الأرجح، أي جولات من الاشتباكات المحدودة يعقبها هدوء نسبي ثم عودة للتصعيد، بدلاً من حرب شاملة أو سلام نهائي.
🔷 يؤكد مسؤول إيراني، أن القيادة الإيرانية واثقة من قدرتها على الصمود أمام حصار بحري أمريكي لفترة أطول، وأنها تعتقد في الوقت نفسه أن الرئيس ترامب سيتجنب التصعيد العسكري الكبير، لأن إيران ما تزال قادرة على إلحاق أضرار واسعة بدول الخليج، ولأن أي تصعيد إضافي قد يؤدي إلى ارتفاع كبير في أسعار النفط.
🔷 ارتفاع أسعار النفط إلى أكثر من 100 دولار للبرميل الأسبوع الماضي كان أحد الأسباب التي دفعت ترامب إلى وقف الضربات الجوية اليومية والعودة إلى محاولة المسار الدبلوماسي، وذلك بحسب أحد المصادر المطلعة.
🔷 تتابع إيران عن كثب القيود التي تواجهها الولايات المتحدة، وتعتقد أن قدرة واشنطن على تصعيد الحرب تتأثر بعاملين رئيسيين، هما استنزاف الذخائر الأمريكية المتطورة، وتراجع الاحتياطي النفطي الاستراتيجي الأمريكي إلى أدنى مستوى له منذ ثمانينيات القرن الماضي نتيجة السحب منه أثناء الحرب للمساعدة في احتواء أسعار الوقود.
🔷 هذه الحسابات الإيرانية لا تعني اعتقاد طهران بأن واشنطن ستنسحب من المواجهة، إذ تنقل المصادر أن ترامب، في تقديرها، لن يتراجع قبل أن تتخلى إيران عن موقفها في قضية مضيق هرمز، التي باتت تمثل محور الخلاف الرئيسي بين الطرفين.
🔷 ما تزال إيران تطالب بحق إدارة حركة الملاحة في مضيق هرمز وفرض رسوم على ناقلات النفط والسفن التجارية، وتعتبر ذلك جزءاً من أمنها القومي وورقة ضغط استراتيجية على الولايات المتحدة. ويقدم التقرير هذه القضية بوصفها العقدة الأساسية التي تمنع التوصل إلى اتفاق سياسي.
🔷 تحاول سلطنة عمان التوصل إلى اتفاق مؤقت يسمح بزيادة حركة السفن عبر المضيق تمهيداً لاستئناف المفاوضات الرسمية بين واشنطن وطهران، لكن هذه الجهود تعثرت لأن إيران ما زالت تصر على أن تكون صاحبة السيطرة الكاملة على السفن الداخلة إلى الخليج، وهو ما تؤكده أيضاً وسائل إعلام إيرانية.
🔷 ينقل التقرير عن أحد الدبلوماسيين السابقين ذوي الخبرة في إدارة النزاعات أن الاتصالات بين الولايات المتحدة وإيران لم تتوقف مطلقاً، حتى في ذروة العمليات العسكرية، وإنما تستمر بصورة غير مباشرة عبر الوسطاء، ويرجح أن تقود في نهاية المطاف إلى اتفاق سياسي حتى لو استمرت الاشتباكات العسكرية بمستوى معين.
🔷 كما يؤكد مصدر مطلع على سير الوساطة أن هذه الاتصالات، بما فيها الجهود العمانية، ما زالت تحقق تقدماً.
🔷 السيناريو الأكثر ترجيحاً لدى غالبية المصادر هو استمرار الحرب عند مستوى منخفض نسبياً، مع قيام دول الخليج وباكستان بمحاولات متواصلة لاحتواء التصعيد، لأن أياً من الطرفين لا يرغب في العودة إلى الحرب الواسعة التي شهدتها المنطقة في مارس وأبريل.
🔷 كما يكشف التقرير عن ضغوط سياسية متزايدة داخل الحزب الجمهوري لإنهاء الحرب قبل انتخابات التجديد النصفي، مستشهداً بتصريح رئيس مجلس النواب مايك جونسون الذي دعا إلى إنهاء الصراع، في حين يورد في المقابل تأكيد ترامب أنه ما زال يمتلك “الكثير من الوقت” للتعامل مع إيران. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
Excellent reportage d’ARTE que je viens de revoir, avec cette enquête approfondie sur ces centaines de Français qui s’installent dans des colonies israéliennes en Cisjordanie occupée, illégales au regard du droit international.
Et bientôt, la France sera peut-être le premier pays d’origine des colons juifs installés en Cisjordanie… Bravo les Français ! 🙄
La France condamne officiellement la colonisation. Mais que fait-elle concrètement lorsque ses propres ressortissants choisissent de s’y installer et participent ainsi à cette entreprise de colonisation ?
J’ai notamment entendu que la Belgique avait décidé de limiter certains services consulaires aux ressortissants belges résidant dans les colonies, avec notamment le refus de renouveler certains passeports. Pourquoi la France ne pourrait-elle pas prendre des mesures similaires ?
Et il existe peut-être aussi d’autres pistes…
En tout cas, moi, je me sens mal à l’aise face à ce phénomène de colonies ou d’implantations en territoires palestiniens, qui existe depuis de nombreuses années et qui contribue à entretenir le cycle de la violence et participe à une forme de nettoyage ethnique.
La France condamne officiellement la colonisation. Mais lorsqu’un État condamne une situation tout en ne prenant aucune mesure concrète à l’encontre de ses propres ressortissants qui y participent, sa passivité peut finir par s’apparenter à une forme de complicité.
Et pour ceux qui pourraient faire l’amalgame : les Israéliens qui refusent la colonisation, ou qui en tout cas sont loin de soutenir ce phénomène, ne vont pas pour autant dans ces territoires. Beaucoup n’ont même jamais mis les pieds dans les colonies — comme moi, par exemple.
Ceux qui s’y rendent régulièrement sont principalement les colons et les militaires israéliens, mais aussi des militants israéliens qui se rendent en Cisjordanie pour défendre les Palestiniens, documenter les violences et parfois protéger les populations palestiniennes.
À voir absolument ici 👇
www.youtube.com/watch?v=RgncU5SEZ2c&t=1377 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Qusay Noor
@QUSAY_NOOR_
President Ahmad Al-Sharaa in an Interview with Al Jazeera.
Saudi Arabia and Türkiye mediated last year to secure the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria.
Lifting economic sanctions will not be sufficient unless Syria is also removed from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
Syria is an important country with a strategic location and has been the focus of global attention throughout history.
The policies of the former regime led to Syria's isolation from the rest of the world.
We have significant interests with Russia, which was quick to open a new chapter in its relations with us.
There are major economic and commercial interests between Syria and Western countries, which also host large numbers of Syrian refugees.
What affects Lebanon affects Syria, as the two countries are linked by strategic interests.
We are discussing solutions with the Lebanese government that will help lead Lebanon to safety and stability.
Any state of chaos in Lebanon will have a direct impact on Syria.
We support the Lebanese state's exclusive control over weapons and its sole authority over decisions of war and peace.
Hezbollah took part alongside the former regime in its war against the Syrian people and was responsible for the displacement of millions of Syrians.
Addressing Lebanon's crisis requires more than a security approach; it demands a comprehensive solution that addresses all dimensions of the crisis.
The Syrian state is working to enable the Lebanese state to fulfill the commitments it has undertaken.
We support the Lebanese state in strengthening its executive institutions and implementing the Taif Agreement as a comprehensive framework for Lebanon.
We have no intention of carrying out any military intervention in Lebanon.
The agreement between Lebanon and Israel contains many loopholes.
The Arab region should have its own independent policy, free from the influence of Israeli or Iranian policies.
We are working toward reaching a security agreement with Israel with the participation of a group of countries.
We seek to avoid any confrontation with Israel, as it is not in our interest.
If the security agreement with Israel succeeds, it will pave the way for comprehensive peace without compromising Syria's rightful claim to the occupied Golan Heights.
The future of relations with Israel depends on the proper implementation of each stage of the agreement.
We support the Arab path toward the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had significant involvement in Syria and believes it has a legitimate role in the countries of the region.
We are concerned about the expansion of the war in the region and the regional consequences that may result.
Over the past year and a half, Syria has sought to avoid becoming involved in any conflict in the region.
Relations with the Republic of Iraq continue to improve.
We are taking measures to address any potential threats from armed factions along our border with Iraq.
A mentality of revenge does not build nations, and our policy is clearly focused on reconstruction and stability.
Our foreign policy is based on credibility, strengthening trust with all parties.
Syria was once a destination for the Gulf states and enjoyed strong relations and shared interests with them.
Investments are already underway on the ground, but they will require time before their impact becomes visible.
We are committed to ensuring the success of Gulf and international investments in Syria.
Gulf investments in Syria are concentrated in the energy sector, airports, real estate, and urban development.
The former regime ran the drug trade in Syria and spread corruption across all sectors.
The Syrian economy is expected to grow, and its results will become evident over time.
From the very first moment of Syria's liberation, we began building state institutions.
We are not able to solve all problems at once, and reforming state institutions requires time.
We established an authority to manage the missing persons file in accordance with international standards and in cooperation with countries that have relevant expertise.
The state operates according to laws and regulations in pursuit of justice.
The SDF is an organization that emerged under specific circumstances and bore arms; it is not linked to the Kurdish community.
The positive effects of the course Syria has followed over the past year and a half are beginning to emerge.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Société des rédacteurs de Marianne
@SRM_Marianne
Communiqué : la rédaction de Marianne proteste contre l'arrivée de Jean Quatremer comme éditorialiste, par un vote à 78% des suffrages exprimés.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sanam Vakil صنم وكىل
@SanamVakil
A worthwhile piece by @AllisonMinor_ and Nate Swanson who make many important points including “There is a myth in Washington that pressure alone can break Iran. For nearly five decades, the United States has used every form of military, economic, and political pressure available to try to bend Iran to its will. It has not worked. Pressure has occasionally shaped Iranian decision-making but only when paired with other tools, such as inducements, coalitions, mutual respect, and patience. If Trump continues to believe Iran will simply surrender to U.S. power, he will fail.”
Foreign Policy
@ForeignPolicy
If Trump continues to believe Iran will simply surrender to U.S. power, he will fail. foreignpolicy.com/2026/07/29/trump-iran-hormuz-mou-cease-…
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Gaza. Je vous livre le projet de feuille de route pour achever la mise en œuvre du plan de paix dans la bande de Gaza, après l'accord sur le désarmement du Hamas (source proche des négociations).
Article 1 : La feuille de route stipule l'achèvement de la mise en œuvre de l'accord de paix global à Gaza dans un délai débutant 14 jours après l'approbation de toutes les parties.
Article 2 : Le document exige un arrêt complet des opérations militaires et le respect de toutes les obligations figurant dans le protocole de cessez-le-feu avant de passer à la phase suivante.
Article 3 : La feuille de route stipule le transfert de toutes les missions civiles et sécuritaires à Gaza au Comité national chargé de la gestion de la bande de Gaza durant la période de transition.
Article 4 : Le document confirme l'indépendance du Comité national chargé de la gestion de Gaza et l'interdiction de toute ingérence des factions dans son travail durant la période de transition.
Article 5 : Le Comité national poursuivra le fonctionnement des institutions et des services publics et procédera à un audit complet des affaires financières et administratives de la bande de Gaza.
Article 6 : La feuille de route adopte le principe « une seule autorité... une seule loi... une seule arme » dans la bande de Gaza.
Article 7 : Le document stipule l'intégration des membres qualifiés des services de sécurité au sein des institutions officielles, tout en offrant des alternatives civiles ou la retraite à ceux qui ne remplissent pas les conditions.
Article 8 : La feuille de route stipule le lancement du processus de démantèlement et de stockage des armes lourdes, des tunnels et des sites de production militaire sous la supervision du Comité national et d'un mécanisme de contrôle international.
Article 9 : Le document confirme qu'aucune arme ne sera transférée ou remise à Israël ni à aucune autre partie palestinienne durant le processus de désarmement.
Article 10 : Le Comité national sera la seule entité autorisée à réglementer les armes, à délivrer des permis et à faire appliquer la loi dans la bande de Gaza.
Article 11 : La feuille de route appelle à la signature d'un accord de paix civile, à la fin de la violence interne et à l'interdiction des actes de vengeance ainsi que des défilés militaires.
Article 12 : Le document stipule le déploiement d'une force internationale de stabilisation dans la bande de Gaza pour surveiller le cessez-le-feu, sécuriser l'aide et soutenir le Comité national chargé de la gestion de la bande de Gaza.
Article 13 : La feuille de route stipule un retrait progressif des forces israéliennes de la bande de Gaza selon un calendrier convenu.
Article 14 : Le Comité national sera l'entité responsable du traitement des incidents de sécurité intérieure dans la bande de Gaza.
Article 15 : Le document stipule la mise en œuvre d'un plan de reconstruction de la bande de Gaza selon un calendrier précis, sous la supervision internationale et celle du Comité national chargé de la gestion de la bande de Gaza.
Article 16 : La feuille de route stipule le démantèlement des milices dans la bande de Gaza selon un calendrier convenu, sans intégrer leurs membres dans les services de sécurité, et en soumettant l'exécution au contrôle d'un comité de vérification international. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🇺🇸🇯🇴 “Hundreds of Jordanian political, legal and other figures signed an open letter calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Jordan in a rare public challenge to the government, after Iranian attacks on bases”
www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/world/middleeast/jordan-us-mil… via @NYTimes @MazMHussain @GerardAraud -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Martin Konečný
@MartinKonecny
Deep dive into EU Commission's pursuit of a police deal with Israel - another area where @vonderleyen's Commission has sought to cut corners on EU and international law for the sake of ties with Israel euobserver.com/230339/exclusive-leaked-legal-advice-says-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: Trump exploded and lost his temper during a security meeting, shouting and cursing out of frustration over the military options presented to him and the lack of progress toward a deal with Iran, per NBC News.
A US official adds "after all this time, there is no unity" inside the administration, which is "facing a strategic defeat without clear policy guidance or a decision about where this is going."
An ally close to Trump adds the president is "exasperated" and there was "not a real strategy for how long or what they should do." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Israel-Alma
@Israel_Alma_org
A Ukrainian recording of an attack on a Russian gas platform using FPV drones launched from boats reveals a new operational method—one with direct and highly relevant implications for the threat Hezbollah poses to Israel's offshore gas platforms.
At the same time, southern Syria could emerge as an additional drone front against Israel. The FPV drone threat has the potential to evolve from a tactical threat into a strategic threat to critical national infrastructure, and from a single-front threat into a simultaneous multi-front threat.
Read the full analysis. israel-alma.org/the-evolving-drone-threat-fpv-drones-agai… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Platforms and analysts close to the IRGC are beginning to frame the drone strike on the US-owned Energos Winter at Egypt’s Damietta port as evidence of a possible evolution in Iran’s wartime strategy.
- The concept being discussed is a combination of horizontal and vertical escalation.
- Horizontal escalation means widening the geographical battlefield beyond the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Yemen and Jordan-potentially reaching Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean.
- Vertical escalation means expanding the range of targets: not only US military facilities, but also shipping, LNG terminals, logistics corridors and energy infrastructure connected, directly or indirectly, to Washington and its partners.
- In this reading, Damietta would carry a particularly powerful message. As pressure grows on Iran’s southern maritime routes and Ukraine targets Iranian-linked shipping in the Caspian, Tehran may be signalling that alternative energy and commercial corridors elsewhere in the region cannot automatically be regarded as safe.
- The timing is certainly noteworthy: Iranian media had identified Damietta as a possible point of pressure only days earlier, following the Ukrainian attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian.
- But caution is essential. No actor has claimed responsibility, and there is still no publicly available evidence proving that Iran or the IRGC ordered the strike.
- If Iranian involvement is eventually established, Damietta would not necessarily indicate that Tehran wants an open front with Egypt. It would more likely represent calibrated ambiguity: striking a US-linked energy asset while avoiding, at least formally, a direct attack on the Egyptian state.
- That would fit a broader Iranian effort to regain the initiative and move beyond a purely reactive posture-demonstrating that pressure on Iran can generate costs across a much wider regional map.
- But such a strategy is inherently dangerous. As others have also noted, horizontal expansion creates new enemies; vertical escalation increases the risk of civilian, economic and environmental damage. What may appear in Tehran as restored deterrence could quickly become strategic overextension.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
My latest for @TIME:
#iran has absorbed significant hits in the war, disrupted global energy supplies and imposed costs on the U.S. & its allies. But it is not clear how it can remain in a permanent state of confrontation with America and the GCC states
time.com/article/2026/07/30/iran-america-hormuz-forever-war/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🇺🇸 🇸🇦 🇨🇳 Trump’s demands risk sending Saudis into a nuclear deal with China, by @AliShihabi in the @WashingtonPost
“Insisting that the kingdom joins the Abraham Accords might drive it to seek a different nuclear partner.”
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/07/30/trump-is-riski…
“There is also a wider geopolitical cost. Washington regularly warns Gulf partners against becoming technologically dependent on China. It cannot then close the American door whenever those partners decline to subordinate their national priorities to American domestic politics. Alliances do not survive when every field of cooperation becomes leverage for a separate demand.” -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
The more Reza Pahlavi speaks, the more he reveals who he really is: a weak authoritarian and would-be dictator who has learned the language of pluralism but never adopted its values or its principles.
When confronted by Reuters over his close advisors' undemocratic language and threats against non-Monarchists, he says that he is imposing stricter protocol that ensures that - in his words - they "censor themselves," which he says is unfair because it is an infringement of free speech.
Read that again. He is not saying that their undemocratic thinking and approach is wrong. he says that they have to do a better job at hiding it, even if it's unfair to them.
Yes, the people making death threats against non-Monarchists are the victims, in his mind.
And then he makes additional excuses for them because they too have suffered at the hands of the Islamic Republic (which is true).
But the bottom line then is that a) their undemocratic mindset is neither a problem nor wrong, b) they have to conceal it better by "curbing their statements" even if it violates their free speech, c) and that they have to do a better job pretending to be democratic and pluralistic by adopting its language, but not its meaning.
This is why many view the Monarchists as a non-threat to the Islamic Republic, but a major threat - alongside the current theocracy - to a genuinely democratic opposition emerging from inside Iran.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joshua Landis
@joshua_landis
54 MoUs signed by the Syrian government so far this year.
Gulf countries – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait – accounted for half of all signings.
Energy and hydrocarbons ranked first in terms of the number of MoUs and agreements, accounting for 22.2% of the total.
Transport and logistics sector ranked second: 18.5%.
17 have entered the implementation phase,
7 show progress towards implementation.
syria-report.com?p=651833 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
I told @NYT that in restarting the war Trump thought he could control, limiting the battlefield to where U.S. wants to bomb in Iran.“The Iranian response is to extend the battlefield much, much wider, so the United States has to defend a broader battlefield.”
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
Iran's latest ballistic missile attacks and the continued rejection of compromise solutions on the Strait of Hormuz might seem like indications that "hardline" thinking is dominating Iran's national security strategy.
But my conversations with counterparts in Tehran suggest that something else is at play. Iranian decisionmaking is increasingly shaped by an intense pessimism about what diplomacy with the U.S. can achieve. Most senior figures, whether pragmatists or hardliners, simply do not believe a deal is possible. This pessimism has gotten worse since the MOU was signed.
Part of this is about the repeated experience of U.S. escalation during the course of negotiations, but the pessimism is no longer confined to the question of "does Trump want a deal?" Increasingly the belief is that "Trump can't do a deal, even if he thinks he wants one."
Policymakers in Tehran are looking at several things. At a technical level, the Trump administration was unable to execute even the most basic confidence building measures of the MOU. No assets were released and the oil waiver was never really operationalized. Iranian leaders are also looking to other contexts. Even in Venezuela, where the administration has complete political control and a full court press approach to economic reengagement, sanctions relief has floundered (eg. it took a whole month after the massive earthquake for FinCen to take proactive steps to try and provide banks comfort to support humanitarian transactions).
At a political level, the Iranians have seen the overblown reaction to the MOU from the full range of politicians in Washington. Democrats eager to score political points attacked provisions in the MOU that would be fundamental to *any* viable agreement with Iran. The Iranians are also watching the growing rift between the Rubio and Vance camps and are concluding that the administration is inherently dysfunctional. During the Biden years, the issue was whether the president could defend his deal from political rivals in Congress. Now, the rivals are within the cabinet itself.
At an individual level, there is also a growing sense that Trump is too erratic to stick by his own deals. Even Saudi Arabia, the country with perhaps the greatest influence in the White House after Israel, could not shield its own nuclear deal from Trump's excessive demands.
This may be an unprecedented situation. The U.S. has started a war it does not know how to end. Meanwhile, the arguments for diplomacy in Tehran have been reduced to "this has a low chance of succeeding, but we have to still try." That's not a strong, positive case for diplomatic engagement and understandably the strategic thinking is tending towards the idea that U.S. dysfunction will continue to manifest in the form of economic pressure and kinetic action against Iran for a long time to come. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joshua Landis
@joshua_landis
Trump just delivered Israel a major victory in Lebanon
@aviabelow for @JNS_org
"Lebanese President Joseph Aoun traveled to Washington seeking American pressure on Israel to withdraw fully from Southern Lebanon. He left without it. Trump refused. That refusal is a significant diplomatic victory for Israel, and specifically, for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government.
Lebanon walked away with a symbolic prize: restored commercial air links. Israel kept what actually matters: the strategic high ground in Southern Lebanon."
www.jns.org/opinion/avi-abelow/trump-just-delivered-israe… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Tertrais est un spécialiste de la geopolitique de comptoir. En 2003, il soutenait la calamiteuse intervention américaine en Irak. Peu après le début de la guerre russe en Ukraine, il écrivait que le scénario le plus plausible est un effondrement de l'armée russe. Il sait de quoi il parle!
LEON le média
@leonlemedia
« L’idée d’une Palestine comme entité étatique est une invention assez récente ».
Dans son livre « Géopolitique de comptoir » (Éditions Eyrolles), le spécialiste des questions internationales, Bruno Tertrais (@BrunoTertrais), démonte de nombreuses idées reçues et fantasmes sur l’actualité.
—
🔔 Retrouvez tous nos contenus sur les réseaux sociaux : lien en bio !
#actu #israel #palestine #géopolitiqueThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
@academic_la
An incredibly tense and short meeting between Netanyahu and Trump today, after Trump said about Netanyahu's efforts to pressure him to restart the war in Iran fully by presenting him intelligence: "“Well, I don't need Bibi to tell me that. Bibi is telling me that because he wants me to stay involved. “We know exactly what’s going on. But no, I heard Bibi announce that. I said, ‘Why don’t you just tell it to me? Why do you have to announce it to the world?'"
Trump reportedly did not want this meeting at all as he is resentful that Netanyahu got him involved in this disastrous war and will not let him end it.
It was probably the shortest meeting the two had ever had. But this does not mean much in terms of Trump freeing himself from the Israeli influence. They continue to have incredible control over what the US does through Rubio, Hegseth, Kushner and Witkoff. But it is clear that Trump is unhappy with this. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Israel-Alma
@Israel_Alma_org
Why Is Hezbollah Waging a Campaign Against Beirut Airport's Security Chief?
In recent weeks, figures and media outlets affiliated with Hezbollah have launched a coordinated media campaign against Brigadier General Fadi Kfouri, a Christian officer serving as Head of Security at Beirut–Rafic Hariri International Airport.
The timing is no coincidence. Since early 2025, the Lebanese government has introduced a series of measures aimed at reducing Hezbollah's influence at the airport- one of the organization's most important strategic force-building assets.
The campaign against Fadi Kfouri may indicate that, from Hezbollah's perspective, Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport remains a strategic asset that continues to serve the organization's operational needs. Weakening Hezbollah's grip on the airport remains a significant threat, even if the methods used to counter it have changed.
Past experience suggests that information and influence campaigns are often only the first stage. The question is: Will Hezbollah stop there?
Read the full analysis >> israel-alma.org/the-struggle-over-beirut-airport-what-lie… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vivian Nereim
@viviannereim
FT: “Iran has a big population, a big consumer market, and certainly a huge benefit for Dubai as its trading and re-export hub,” says a Dubai official. “It’s very important for us in terms of going back to a normal relationship.”
www.ft.com/content/6d2d0b89-0d26-4e49-8e52-a53bdc178974?s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
עמירה הס כותבת: "אין צורך בדמיון מפותח כדי לנחש מה היה קורה לו צעירים פלסטינים, היו צצים בהתנחלות אריאל... אם יהודי היה יורה ופוגע בפלסטינים, זה לא היה נקרא פיגוע. מעבר לכך, אם רק אחד מהצעירים הפלסטינים היה חמוש – כל יהודי שהיה ממהר להרוג אותם היה מוגדר גיבור. כיבוש צבאי בן 60 שנה כרוך בייצור של אמות מידה כפולות ומכופלות תוך התכחשות מוחלטת לקיומן"
www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/2026-07-25/ty-article/.pr… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
Ce que les soi-disant « pro-Israël » en France refusent obstinément d’entendre, c’est que la colonisation et les violences des colons ne sont pas des phénomènes isolés ou incontrôlés : elles sont encouragées, soutenues et orchestrées par le gouvernement israélien.
Le fait qu’ils n’en parlent jamais est à la fois honteux et profondément révélateur. Et après, ils s’indignent lorsqu’on les expose publiquement… Quelle hypocrisie !
Vidéo de Gideon Levy qui l'explique très bien⤵️
Al Jazeera English
@AJEnglish
Haaretz Columnist Gideon Levy explains how the Israeli government is fully coordinating a rise in Israeli settler attacks against Palestinian communities in the occupied West Bank.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 هذا أهم مقال قرأته خلال الأسابيع الماضية، كتبه روبرت أي. بيب، أحد أبرز منظري الدراسات الاستراتيجية في الولايات المتحدة.
🔷 تكمن أهمية المقال في أنه يعتبر الحرب مع إيران حدثاً تاريخياً ينهي حقبة كاملة من النظام الدولي بدأت مع حرب الخليج عام 1991.
🔷 الحرب ضد العراق أسست لعصر الهيمنة الأميركية الأحادية، بينما تمثل الحرب مع إيران بداية نهاية تلك المرحلة وبداية نظام عالمي مختلف تحكمه قواعد جديدة للقوة.
🔷 ينطلق الكاتب من مقارنة تاريخية بين حرب الخليج الأولى والحرب الحالية مع إيران. فهو يذكّر بأن حرب 1991 لم تكن مجرد تحرير للكويت، بل شكلت صدمة استراتيجية للعالم بأسره.
🔷 فالولايات المتحدة تمكنت خلال أسابيع قليلة من تدمير أحد أكبر الجيوش في العالم آنذاك، مع خسائر بشرية أميركية محدودة للغاية، وهو ما رسخ الاعتقاد العالمي بأن واشنطن تمتلك قدرة شبه مطلقة على فرض نتائج الحروب بسرعة وكلفة منخفضة.
🔷 هذا الانتصار لم يغير ميزان القوى فقط، بل غيّر توقعات العالم. فالحكومات والأسواق والشركات والمستثمرون أصبحوا يتصرفون على أساس أن الولايات المتحدة قادرة دائماً على حماية التجارة العالمية، وضمان أمن الممرات البحرية، وردع أي قوة تحاول تحدي النظام الدولي.
🔷 هذه الثقة هي التي قامت عليها مرحلة العولمة بعد الحرب الباردة، أكثر من اعتمادها على القوة العسكرية المباشرة نفسها.
🔷 يحدد المقال أربعة فرضيات حكمت النظام الدولي بعد 1991. أولها أن الولايات المتحدة تستطيع فرض النتائج العسكرية بسهولة، وثانيها أنها تملك تفوقاً دائماً في التصعيد، وثالثها أنها قادرة على ضمان انسياب التجارة العالمية، ورابعها أن مقاومة الإرادة الأميركية عمل غير مجدٍ في النهاية.
🔷 هذه الافتراضات شكلت الأساس الحقيقي للنظام الدولي طوال العقود الثلاثة الماضية.
🔷 انعكس ذلك في خفض الدول الأوروبية إنفاقها الدفاعي بصورة كبيرة بعد انتهاء الحرب الباردة، وتوسيع التكامل الاقتصادي وتأسيس الاتحاد الأوروبي بصيغته الحالية، اعتماداً على المظلة الأمنية الأميركية.
🔷 الصين نفسها درست حرب الخليج بعناية، واستخلصت منها ضرورة التحول من الجيوش الضخمة إلى الصواريخ الدقيقة والأنظمة المعلوماتية، وهو ما أدى لاحقاً إلى تطوير كثير من القدرات التي تنافس الولايات المتحدة اليوم.
🔷 النظام الذي صنعته الولايات المتحدة حمل في داخله بذور تراجعه. فالعولمة التي نشأت تحت الحماية الأميركية أدت إلى انتشار التكنولوجيا الدقيقة، وتحويل كثير من التقنيات العسكرية المتقدمة إلى منتجات تجارية متاحة عالمياً.
🔷 الرقائق الإلكترونية، وأنظمة الملاحة، والكاميرات، والمستشعرات، والبطاريات، والذكاء الاصطناعي، كل هذه التقنيات أصبحت تستخدم في الهواتف الذكية والأسواق المدنية، وهو ما جعل تصنيع الأسلحة الدقيقة منخفضة الكلفة متاحاً لدول أصغر بكثير.
🔷 يضرب الكاتب مثالاً على ذلك بطائرة شاهد-136 الإيرانية، مؤكداً أن أهميتها لا تكمن في تعقيدها التقني، بل في العكس تماماً. فهي تعتمد بصورة كبيرة على مكونات تجارية متوافرة عالمياً، ما يعني أن القدرة على إنتاج وسائل هجومية دقيقة لم تعد حكراً على القوى الكبرى، بل أصبحت متاحة لدول متوسطة وحتى لفاعلين غير دولتيين.
🔷 من هنا يصل الكاتب إلى ما يسميه “الثورة الثانية في الحرب الدقيقة”. ففي رأيه كانت الثورة الأولى هي القنابل الذكية الأميركية التي ظهرت في بغداد عام 1991، أما الثورة الثانية فهي الطائرات المسيّرة الرخيصة والصواريخ الدقيقة منخفضة الكلفة التي تستطيع إنهاك القوى الكبرى دون الحاجة إلى مواجهتها مباشرة.
🔷 تمثل الحرب مع إيران أول اختبار كبير لهذه الثورة الجديدة. إيران لم تحاول تدمير البحرية الأميركية، وإنما ركزت على هدف مختلف تماماً، وهو إقناع الأسواق وشركات النقل بأن الولايات المتحدة لم تعد قادرة على ضمان أمن مضيق هرمز.
🔷 وبحسب المقال، فإن مجرد ارتفاع أقساط التأمين وتراجع حركة السفن يكفي لتحقيق أثر استراتيجي، حتى لو بقي المضيق مفتوحاً من الناحية العسكرية.
🔷 الضربات الأميركية والإسرائيلية على الرادارات ومنصات الصواريخ الإيرانية كشفت حدود القوة الجوية. فإيران، وفق المقال، استطاعت إعادة نشر منصات الإطلاق وإخفاءها واستبدالها بسرعة أكبر من قدرة الولايات المتحدة على تدميرها، مما حوّل المشكلة من استهداف أهداف محددة إلى السيطرة على مساحات واسعة من الأرض، وهو أمر لا تستطيع القوة الجوية وحدها تحقيقه.
🔷 يستشهد الكاتب بإسقاط إيران مروحية Apache أميركية بواسطة طائرة مسيرة من طراز شاهد، ليؤكد أن سلاحاً تبلغ كلفته نحو 20 ألف دولار تمكن من تدمير منصة قتالية تبلغ قيمتها 35 مليون دولار، ويعتبر أن هذا المثال يجسد اختلال معادلة الكلفة التي أصبحت تصب في مصلحة الطرف الأضعف. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ramazan Bursa
@RBursa
İran Devlet Televizyonu, İran Cumhurbaşkanı Pezeşkiyan'a yine sansür uyguladı.
Pezeşkiyan'ın konuşmasının Devlet Televizyonu tarafından sansürlenen bölümü sosyal medyada yayınlandı.
Pezeşkiyan:
"Yaptığımız bu görüşmelerde, gerek mutabakat zaptı gerekse tartışmalar olsun... 12 günlük savaştan önce ve sonra... Rehber (Ayetullah Ali Hamanei), resmi tutumunda artık Amerika ile görüşmeyeceğimizi ilan etmişti. Medyamız da bu açıklamaları yayınlıyordu.
Biz o dönemde Rehber'in huzuruna çıktık, durumu arz ettik ve kendisine; 'Siz bizzat 'ne savaş ne barış' durumunun ülke için kötü olduğunu buyurmuştunuz, peki şimdi ne yapalım?' diye sorduk.
Bunun üzerine gidip görüşmemizi, müzakere etmemizi emrettiler. Biz görüşmelere onun emriyle başladık. Son mesajında da 'Gidin ve sorunu çözün' dediler. Çünkü 'ne savaş ne barış' halindeki bir süreci sonsuza kadar sürdürmek mümkün değildir.
Ancak bu, bizim geri adım atacağımız anlamına gelmiyordu. Ülkemizin izzetinden ve onurundan asla taviz vermedik, vermeyeceğiz de. Bu, karşısında geri adım atılacak bir mesele değildir.
Fakat oturup konuşmamız ve sorunumuzu çözmemiz gerektiği, verilmiş bir emirdi. Şu an devam eden bu süreçte, Rehber (Mücteba Hamanei) ile diyalog kurma konusundaki tüm zorluklara rağmen, atılan adımlar yine onun rehberliği ve talimatlarıyla gerçekleşmiştir." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Iranian observers close to the security establishment remain deeply skeptical of the proposed 10-day ceasefire.
- From their perspective, the arrangement appears unbalanced from the outset: Washington would quickly regain freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, ease pressure on energy markets and reduce the immediate military burden on US forces. Iran, by contrast, would be expected to suspend its main source of leverage in exchange for a temporary ceasefire, renewed negotiations and the possibility of collecting limited fees for maritime or environmental services.
- Their argument is that, for Tehran, the real issue is not how much money Iran might receive from passing ships. The central question is political and strategic: who guarantees that US attacks will actually stop, that the naval blockade will be lifted, and that Washington will not simply use the ten-day pause to regroup, reinforce its military presence and resume operations from a stronger position?
- Without clear enforcement mechanisms, automatic consequences for violations and broader guarantees covering the conflict as a whole, the proposal risks solving Washington’s most urgent problem- reopening Hormuz-while leaving Iran’s core concerns largely unanswered.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
If reports of a Saudi airstrike on Yemen’s Hodeidah port are confirmed, in my opinion this would mark a very serious escalation-not simply another retaliatory strike, but potentially the beginning of a new phase in the Saudi-Houthi confrontation.
- Hodeidah is not an ordinary military target. It is the Houthis’ main outlet on the Red Sea and a crucial hub for fuel, commercial goods and humanitarian supplies. Striking it would mean targeting the economic and logistical infrastructure that sustains Houthi-controlled Yemen.
The timing would also be significant. The Houthis have announced a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and have already threatened shipping linked to the Kingdom. Riyadh may therefore be signalling that any attempt to restrict Saudi access to the Red Sea will carry a direct cost inside Yemen.
This would also suggest that the relative Saudi restraint maintained since the 2022 truce is coming to an end. Riyadh would no longer be relying exclusively on mediation, deterrence and indirect pressure, but would be returning to direct military action against strategic Houthi infrastructure.
- The real Saudi concern is broader than individual attacks on tankers. With navigation through the Strait of Hormuz already under pressure, the Red Sea and the Yanbu export route have become even more important. A Houthi campaign against Saudi shipping would therefore be seen in Riyadh as a strategic threat, not a limited Yemeni provocation.
- A Saudi strike on Hodeidah could also open the way to wider military coordination with the United States, even without direct joint operations. Washington would continue focusing on Iran, while Saudi Arabia would deal with the Yemeni front.
- This would also create a serious complication for Islamabad. Pakistan is tied to Saudi Arabia by a mutual defence arrangement, while at the same time trying to preserve a mediating role between Iran and the United States. Greater Saudi military activism against the Houthis- who are closely aligned with Tehran-could place Pakistan under increasing pressure to demonstrate where its strategic commitments ultimately lie.
-Islamabad’s credibility as a neutral or at least acceptable intermediary could therefore be weakened. Tehran may begin to view Pakistan less as an independent mediator and more as a country structurally constrained by its defence relationship with Riyadh. In that sense, an escalation in Yemen would not remain confined to the Red Sea: it could directly affect the diplomatic track surrounding the Iran-US conflict.
- The likely Houthi response would be attacks on Saudi economic and energy infrastructure: Jizan, Yanbu, southern airports, oil facilities or additional Saudi-linked vessels. After a strike on Hodeidah, failing to respond would damage the credibility of their announced blockade.
-The greatest danger is therefore not the single airstrike itself, but what could follow: the collapse of the informal truce, renewed fighting along Yemen’s western coast and the reopening of a full Saudi-Houthi war.
If confirmed, Riyadh would not merely be punishing the Houthis. It would be militarily challenging their attempt to control Saudi access to the Red Sea-turning the regional confrontation into a simultaneous struggle over both Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, while also narrowing the diplomatic space available to Pakistan.
#iran #yemen -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
On the eve of another likely escalation by the US, a report from @WSJ on how rapidly Iran is repairing the damage from the last round.
In addition, more evidence to suggest that Iran's ballistic missile program is very resistant to aerial bombardment. www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/satellite-images-show-iran-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sam Dagher
@samdagher
Trump adds new condition to nuclear deal with #saudiarabia
It’s conceivable that the kingdom may have told Trump before the announcement of the nuclear deal that it may be ready to discuss diplomatic recognition of #israel in return for irreversible steps toward Palestinian statehood.
Maybe the thinking in Riyadh is that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is on his way out and that a new Israeli PM is perhaps more willing to engage on this issue.
Riyadh has already sent signals to that effect last week with Saudi-owned channel Al-Arabiya interviewing #israel President Isaac Herzog in his office in Jerusalem
www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000011049244/saudi-a… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 أخطر ما يشير له تقرير وول ستريت جورنال هذه الليلة أن الإحباط والملل هو ما يقود ترامب في توجهه نحو تصعيد الحرب على إيران. هذا يعني أن الحرب لا تتحرك بالاعتماد على رؤية سياسية. وهذه نقطة محورية جدا لدول الخليج والمتابعين للحرب.
هذا أهم ما جاء في التقرير
🔷 ترامب انتقل تدريجياً من السعي لإنهاء الحرب عبر التفاوض إلى الاقتناع بأن القوة العسكرية أصبحت الخيار الأكثر واقعية، مع تزايد شعوره بالإحباط من استمرار الحرب.
🔷 ترامب، خلال اجتماع أخير في المكتب البيضاوي، شن هجوماً لفظياً حاداً على القيادة الإيرانية مستخدماً أوصافاً مهينة وألفاظاً نابية، وفق شخص حضر الاجتماع.
🔷 وينقل التقرير عن مسؤول كبير في الإدارة الأمريكية توصيفاً لافتاً، إذ يقول إن ترامب أصبح في “وضع الانتقام” (revenge mode) تجاه طهران، وإنه بات يعتقد أن إيران لا تفهم إلا القوة العسكرية، وأنه لا يرى أمامه خيارات جيدة سوى مواصلة الضربات العسكرية.
🔷 ترامب يشعر بإحباط متزايد لأن الحرب التي توقع أن تنتهي خلال أسابيع دخلت شهرها الخامس دون أفق واضح لإنهائها، رغم محاولاته السابقة وقفها عبر إعلان وقف إطلاق النار في أبريل، ثم توقيع مذكرة التفاهم الخاصة بإعادة فتح مضيق هرمز في يونيو، وهي ترتيبات انهارت سريعاً مع استئناف القتال.
🔷 الرئيس أصبح أقل ثقة بجدوى المفاوضات، لأنه يرى أن الولايات المتحدة كلما اعتقدت أنها أحرزت تقدماً في التفاوض، عادت إيران إلى تنفيذ هجمات جديدة، كما أنه بات يشكو أمام مستشاريه من صعوبة معرفة من يمتلك القرار الحقيقي داخل القيادة الإيرانية.
🔷 يبين التقرير أن هذا التحول لا يعني انتهاء المسار الدبلوماسي بالكامل، إذ يؤكد أن جاريد كوشنر والمبعوث الخاص ستيف ويتكوف ما زالا يعتقدان أن التوصل إلى اتفاق مع إيران ممكن، في حين أصبح مستشارون آخرون أكثر تشككاً بإمكان تحقيق سلام دائم.
🔷 يكشف التقرير عن وجود قلق متزايد داخل الدائرة المقربة من ترامب من أن الحرب بدأت تهيمن على رئاسته، بعد أن أدت إلى ارتفاع أسعار الطاقة، وتراجع شعبية الرئيس، ومقتل أكثر من اثني عشر عسكرياً أمريكياً، الأمر الذي قد يضر بالحزب الجمهوري في انتخابات التجديد النصفي.
🔷 ويقدم التقرير معلومات لافتة عن العلاقة مع إسرائيل، إذ يكشف أن ترامب أبدى انزعاجاً من بنيامين نتنياهو إلى درجة أنه قال لبعض مساعديه في بعض الأوقات إنه لا يريد التحدث إليه أو الاجتماع به. كما ينقل أن الإسرائيليين سعوا إلى ترتيب لقاء جديد بين الرجلين، لكن هذه الترتيبات لم تكن قد حسمت بعد.
🔷 ويعرض التقرير جانباً أمنياً شخصياً يتعلق بالرئيس، إذ يكشف أن أجهزة الاستخبارات حذرت عدداً من كبار مساعدي ترامب من أنهم أهداف محتملة لمحاولات اغتيال إيرانية، وطُلب منهم التوقف عن استخدام سيارات النقل العادية.
🔷 كما يكشف التقرير أن ترامب، أثناء وجوده في تركيا، تلقى إحاطة استخبارية إسرائيلية عن مخطط إيراني جديد لاستهدافه. ويشير إلى أن أحد مسؤولي الإدارة وصف المخطط بأنه مجرد طموح غير مكتمل، بينما رأى مسؤولون أمريكيون آخرون أنه غير موثوق. ومع ذلك، كان هذا التقييم أحد الأسباب التي دفعت الرئيس إلى استبدال الطائرة الرئاسية التي كان يستخدمها بطائرة أقدم عند مغادرته تركيا، بسبب مخاوف من أن الطائرة الجديدة المهداة من قطر لا تمتلك القدرات الدفاعية الكافية.
🔷 ترامب غضب بشدة من تسريب هذه المعلومة إلى صحيفة نيويورك تايمز، واعتبر أن التسريب نفسه يمثل تهديداً أمنياً، ما دفع فريقه إلى مصادرة هواتف بعض المسؤولين في إطار التحقيق عن مصدر التسريب، مع طلبه تلقي تحديثات مستمرة بشأن التحقيق.
🔷 ترامب كان متحمساً للغاية في يونيو لتوقيع مذكرة التفاهم مع إيران حول مضيق هرمز، إلى درجة أنه تجاهل تحذيرات بعض الجمهوريين الذين أكدوا له أن إيران لن تلتزم بالاتفاق، وكان يكرر أمامهم أنه يريد فقط إنهاء الحرب.
🔷 الحرب بدأت تحدث انقساماً داخل القاعدة المحافظة، إذ أبدت شخصيات مؤثرة مثل لورا إنغراهام قلقها من انعكاسات الحرب على الانتخابات، بينما ذهب ستيف بانون إلى تحميل نتنياهو مسؤولية إدخال الولايات المتحدة في صراع وصفه بأنه كارثي.
🔷 ويستعرض التقرير محاولات البيت الأبيض إعادة تركيز الاهتمام على الاقتصاد، إذ شارك ترامب في مراسم استقبال جثامين الجنود الأمريكيين، ثم توجه إلى ولاية جورجيا للحديث عن خفض الأسعار ومبادرات اقتصادية جديدة، في محاولة لإعادة توجيه النقاش العام بعيداً عن الحرب.
🔷 طلب ترامب خلال اجتماع في يونيو من مساعديه الضغط على شركات النفط ومحطات الوقود لخفض الأسعار، معتبراً أنها مدينة له بما قدمه لها. كما عقد مساعدوه سلسلة اجتماعات لبحث وسائل خفض أسعار الوقود قبل انتخابات التجديد النصفي. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
NEW: Reactions in Iran to the US-Saudi nuclear deal mostly range from incredulity to ridicule. But some also see darker game at play.
As one hardliner put it: what may Trump demand in return for offering Turkiye access to F-35s and now nuclear energy to Saudi Arabia, all within a week..?
amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/saudi-us-nuclear-deal-sparks… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Bozorgmehr Sharafedin
@bozorgmehr
Matthew Gould, former British deputy ambassador to Iran on WP:
When I was stationed in Iran for the British Foreign Service 20 years ago, I developed two rules to explain the actions of the regime:
First: Iranian leaders are focused single-mindedly on preserving their grip on power. They know that the overwhelming majority of Iranians despise them and that the people will not be forgiving if the regime is finally removed.
Second: Iran’s actions often have more to do with internal regime dynamics than with statecraft. Western governments tend to interpret Iranian actions as aimed at them. But often, they are aimed internally.
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2026/07/24/counter-irania… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Clarification from Mohammed Abdulsalam, head of Yemen’s Houthi negotiating delegation: contrary to some reports, Bab el-Mandeb has not been completely closed.
- He says the announced maritime blockade is limited to Saudi Arabia and is presented as a response to Riyadh’s 12-year blockade of Yemen.
-So, for now, this is not a general closure of the strait, but a selective escalation directed at Saudi shipping.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hiba Nasr
@HibaNasr
‼️ New: President Trump and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun agreed to launch discussions toward a bilateral U.S.–Lebanon security agreement aimed at establishing a durable framework for long-term strategic cooperation.
Sources told me that, beyond this significant outcome and the agreement to pursue the re-establishment of direct flights between the United States and Lebanon, the visit also yielded:
• Expand U.S. military assistance and capabilities support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, reinforcing their role as Lebanon’s sole legitimate national defense institution.
• Explore options for post-UNIFIL monitoring and verification arrangements, including the possibility of extending or adapting the current UNIFIL mandate.
• Advance efforts to identify new investment opportunities for U.S. companies in Lebanon, particularly in the energy, telecommunications, digital transformation, and other strategic sectors.
• Work with international partners to support Lebanon’s reconstruction and long-term economic recovery.
@AsharqBusiness -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 يكشف تقرير من CNN حجم الفوضى التي أدار بها ترامب الملف النووي مع السعودية.
هذا ما حصل في الساعات الماضية
🔷 ترامب كان غاضباً من إعلان الاتفاق، لأن وزير الطاقة كريس رايت لم يخبره مسبقاً بأنه سيعلن توقيعه في ذلك اليوم.
🔷 ازداد غضب الرئيس بعد صدور موجة من الانتقادات في وسائل الإعلام المحافظة، ولا سيما على Fox News وفي افتتاحية وول ستريت جورنال، التي تساءلت لماذا قدمت الإدارة الاتفاق من دون اشتراط التطبيع مع إسرائيل، وهو الشرط الذي كانت إدارة بايدن تربطه بالاتفاق أيضاً.
🔷 يكشف التقرير أن إضافة شرط اتفاقيات أبراهام فاجأت حتى المفاوضين الأمريكيين أنفسهم، إذ يقول مصدران مطلعان إن فريق التفاوض النووي لم يكن يتوقع ظهور هذا الشرط بعد توقيع الاتفاق، ما يعكس أن القرار لم يكن جزءاً من الصيغة التي أنجزت المفاوضات.
🔷 بحسب أحد المصادر، كان البيت الأبيض قد طلب من وزارة الطاقة عدم الإعلان عن الاتفاق يوم الأربعاء، لكن الوزير كريس رايت مضى في مراسم التوقيع، وأجرى مقابلات إعلامية للترويج للاتفاق، وهو ما أثار غضب عدد من كبار مسؤولي البيت الأبيض.
🔷 بعض مساعدي ترامب كانوا يعتبرون أن الاتفاق لم يكن قد أصبح نهائياً بعد، لأن الرسائل القانونية المطلوبة إلى الكونغرس لم تكن قد أرسلت، ولذلك رأوا أن الإعلان عنه سابق لأوانه.
🔷 يصور التقرير الساعات التي تلت توقيع الاتفاق باعتبارها مثالاً على الفوضى في عملية صنع القرار، حيث تحول الاتفاق من إنجاز دبلوماسي إلى أزمة سياسية خلال أقل من يوم.
🔷 يكشف التحقيق أن السعوديين أنفسهم فوجئوا بإعلان ترامب الجديد، لأن الاتفاق الذي وقعوه لم يكن يتضمن شرط التطبيع مع إسرائيل. ويضيف التقرير أن الاتفاق كان يسمح للمملكة بتخصيب اليورانيوم داخل أراضيها بعد استيفاء شروط معينة، مع فرض قيود أقل من المعتاد على صلاحيات الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية في تفتيش المواقع المشتبه بها، وهو ما جعل الرياض تعتبر الاتفاق إنجازاً كبيراً قبل أن تتغير شروطه.
🔷 يكشف التقرير أن مسؤولي وزارة الطاقة اعتقدوا أنهم حصلوا على موافقة ترامب أواخر الأسبوع الماضي، ولذلك أطلقوا خطة الإعلان الإعلامية التي كانت معدة منذ أشهر. لكن مصدراً آخر يقول إن ترامب وافق فقط على اتفاق مبدئي ولم يمنح الضوء الأخضر لإعلانه أو اعتماده بصيغته النهائية.
🔷 يكشف التحقيق أن كثيرين داخل الإدارة اعتقدوا فور تغيير موقف ترامب أن بنيامين نتنياهو ربما تدخل في اللحظة الأخيرة، نظراً لمعارضته التقليدية لأي برنامج نووي عربي.
🔷 وينقل عن مصدرين إسرائيليين أن نتنياهو كان يأمل بالفعل في التأثير على الاتفاق، وأنه كان يريد إدراج التطبيع مع السعودية ضمن شروطه أو على الأقل إحراز تقدم في هذا الاتجاه. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
"Être de gauche en Israël signifiait autrefois être laïque et défendre des causes comme l'accès aux transports publics le Shabbat. Aujourd'hui, la gauche sioniste se tourne vers la religion, avec, pour la première fois, des dirigeants ouvertement religieux ou proches de la religion à son avant-garde. Ce n'est pas un hasard."
Extrait de l'article de Joshua Leifer dans le Haaretz ⤵️
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/haaretz-today/2026-07-22/ty-a… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
As was rumored, Iraq's prime minister carried a ceasefire proposal from the US in his recent trip to Iran.
It's not clear what was in the proposal; but in any event, Iran rejected it. www.nytimes.com/live/2026/07/23/world/iran-war-strikes-oi… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Reuters, citing Pakistani sources, reports that Islamabad is exploring ways to revive stalled US-Iran talks through a China-initiated diplomatic effort.
- During Ishaq Dar’s visit to Beijing, Pakistani and Chinese officials reportedly discussed a broader regional initiative.
The key point is not that negotiations have resumed -they have not -but that China may now be providing political cover and strategic weight to a renewed Pakistani mediation effort between Washington and Tehran. Noteworthy.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
ממשל טראמפ דוחף להתחלת עבודות הבנייה של עיר ברפיח שבה יוכלו לחיות כ-50,000 פלסטינים שכיום נתונים לשלטון חמאס. הסיבה להתנגדות חמאס לצעד זה ברורה - לא איכפת לארגון מרווחת הפלסטינים והוא חושש מאוד לאבד את השליטה על אוכלוסיית עזה www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/defense/1040502/
הדרג המדיני בישראל מתנגד אף הוא. נראה כי "העיכוב נובע מחשש שהתהליך האמריקני בדרום הרצועה עלול להזיק לממשלה הנוכחית בבחירות המתקרבות."
news.walla.co.il/item/3855533
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
כאילו כדי להוכיח את טענתי, שוב אחידות מסרים בין הימין הישראלי והציר האיראני, הפעם בנוגע לנסיגה הישראלית מאיזור הפיילוט בדרום לבנון.
לחזבאללה ובן בריתו המשמעותי היחיד בלבנון, תנועת אמל בראשות נביה ברי, חשוב להבהיר כי המשא ומתן הישיר של ממשלת לבנון עם ישראל לא יביא להישגים, והפתרון הוא השענות על המשטר האיראני למו"מ (או חידוש התקיפות על ישראל). לאחר הנסיגה הישראלית מהכפר זוטר אל-ע'רביה, שהוצג על-ידי ממשלת לבנון כהישג משמעותי, נביה ברי הצהיר "זו בקושי נחשבת נסיגה בגלל שהכפר קטן ולא היה כבוש במלואו."
x.com/tafasillb/status/2079883053430644792
ומי מהדהד את דבריו של נביה ברי ומפחית מההישג של ממשלת לבנון באמצעות שיח ישיר עם ישראל? שהב"ט כץ שהצהיר: "אנשים לא צריכים לעצור את נשימתם ולתהות מהו המקום הבא שממנו ישראל תיסוג בלבנון [לאחר זוטר אל-ע'רביה], כי זה לא יקרה עד שחיזבאללה יפורק מנשקו. אין לנו שאיפות טריטוריאליות בלבנון, אבל עד שחיזבאללה יפורק מנשקו – לא ניסוג במילימטר".
את מי הצהרה כזו משרתת בלבנון, את מי שדוגל בדיאלוג ישיר עם ישראל ודיפלומטיה, או את מי שלא?
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
אין לי ספק שהימין הישראלי רואה בציר האיראני איום אמיתי, אך לעיתים, האינטרסים הפוליטיים שלו מביאים לכך שהוא משתף פעולה עם הציר הזה, כמו העברת המליונים הקטרים לחמאס לצד החלשה שיטתית של הרשות הפלסטינית.
הנה דוגמה אחרת: מאז טבח ה7.10, הימין הישראלי הדהד באופן מוחלט את המסר האיראני על כך שישראל ניצבת במלחמה מול שבע חזיתות, בעוד שבפועל, איראן הפקירה את השלוחות הערביות שלה ואת בני רצועת עזה ודרום לבנון לגורלם, ולא התערבה עד שישראל לא פגעה בשגרירות האיראנית בדמשק.
לצורך מחקרי יחב"ל, חוקרים ייצרו מאגרי מידע על מלחמות ולפיכך הגדירו מה מהווה מלחמה. אחד הסטנדרטים הוא מספר ההרוגים - לרוב 1,000 הרוגים בשנה. במאגר המידע הידוע ביותר שעוסק בכל הסכסוכים האלימים הפוליטיים ולא רק מלחמות, של מכון מחקר השלום באוסלו, הרף הוא נמוך משמעותית - 25 הרוגים בשנה כדי ליפול תחת הגדרת "סכסוך". לפי ההגדרה הזו, ישראל לא הייתה במלחמה או אפילו סכסוך מול החות'ים (שהרגו ישראלי אחד), המיליציות השיעיות בעיראק (שהרגו שני ישראלים), המשטר הסורי (שלא ירה אפילו כדור לעבר ישראל), או הפלגים הפלסטינים בגדה המערבית (שהרגו 46 ישראלים בשנתיים וחצי, כלומר פחות מ-25 בשנה).
ברור למה לאיראן יש אינטרס להסתיר את העובדה שהציר שלה לא באמת ציר, ש"בנות הברית" שלה הם בעצם כלי שרת שלה שתפקידם למות למען הגנת איראן והמחויבות אינה הדדית. איראן משקיעה מליונים על תעמולה בעולם הערבי בניסיון להסתיר שהסיוע שטהראן ויתר מרכיבי הציר העניקו לפלסטינים היה עלוב וחסר השפעה על מהלך הקרבות. לאחרונה, למשל, חברות הפקה המקושרות למשטר האיראני הפיקו עשרות שירים של זמרים ערבים המזוהים עם המיליציות של "הציר" לרגל ההלוויה של ח'מנאי, שכמובן גם עברה דרך המקדשים השיעים בעיראק כדי לגרוף הון פוליטי בעיראק וניצול רגשותיהם הדתיים של השיעים בעיראק בתקופת האבל על האמאם חוסין בחודש מחרם.
הנה פלייליסט שהרכבתי למעקב אחר ההפקה התרבותית הזו
www.youtube.com/watch?v=uf5xvFf8DpU&list=PLZn3NO8WXZh0
במקום הגישה הצ'רצ'ליאנית של "שמרו על קור רוח והמשיכו הלאה", ההנהגה הישראלית פעלה להעצמת תחושת האיום שנשקפה לישראלים, כנראה כדי לגרום להתאחדות סביב ההנהגה. הבעיה היא שהשיח הרשמי הישראלי הזה הודהד ללא הפסקה בתקשורת שתומכת בציר האיראני כהוכחה לאמיתות הטענה של איראן והציר שלה שהן אכן עומדות לצד חמאס ועזה.
דוגמה אחרת היא החלטת רוה"מ לערוך את כינוס הממשלה הראשון לאחר חיסול ממשלת החות'ים בבונקר תחת האדמה. שב"כ אמר, בצדק, שאין כל צורך בכך. ההחלטה הזו סוקרה ללא הרף באל-ג'זירה ויתר ערוצי הציר בצהלות: גם מוכיחים את המיתוס הנפוץ בקרב הציר שהיהודים פחדנים, וגם מעצימים את יכולות החות'ים.
מנסיוני האישי, רבים מחברי מיליציות הציר מצטרפים אליהן, בין היתר, בשל הרצון שלהם להרגיש חזקים ומפחידים ביחס לאוכלוסיה שבקרבה הם חיים, שמתייחסת אליהם בזלזול בשל מעמדם החברתי הנמוך. גם התפיסה שהם בני ברית של איראן ולא כלים זולים בידיה חשובה להם. הם לא רוצים להרגיש שהם שכירי חרב. למה לעזור להם להרגיש חזקים, מפחידים ושאיראן עומדת לצידם? -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Furkan Gözükara
@FurkanGozukara
🚨 WOW! Former CIA Director Leon Panetta openly confesses that Iran officially controls the Strait of Hormuz.
He admits the Trump administration's own agreements gave Tehran this massive leverage.
Washington is completely trapped and begging to return to negotiations!This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post.
Furkan Gözükara
@FurkanGozukara
🚨 BOMBSHELL! Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta admits the Pentagon is completely humiliated.
He confirms the US, Saudis, and UAE all tried to destroy the Houthis and completely failed.
He reveals Washington has absolutely no viable military strategy. Total defeat!This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jacob Magid
@JacobMagid
🧵New: Pakistan military chief Asim Munir leveraged joint oil transport venture w/ IRGC chief Ahmad Vahidi to secure agreement between Iran & Saudi under which Tehran agreed to halt attacks against Gulf kingdom, three officials told @TimesofIsrael (1/10) www.timesofisrael.com/pakistan-army-chief-leveraged-priva…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
For Trump, the calculation increasingly comes down to this: Does he escalate toward a far more catastrophic conflict, including a ground invasion and/or widespread attacks on Iranian infrastructure that invite reciprocal retaliation across the region? Or does he return to diplomacy and accept a deal in which Iran retains meaningful leverage over Hormuz?
The political costs of a deal would be significant. He would face intense criticism from the hawkish foreign policy establishment and influential elements of his own coalition, particularly pro-Israel groups and donors.
But those costs may ultimately be far lower than owning another endless, enormously costly war with no clear path to strategic success.
A deal he can always be spin as a victory. A quagmire he cannot. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Iranian media and observers see Iraqi PM Ali al-Zaidi’s Tehran visit as potentially serving three purposes at once:
1) carrying a message from Washington;
2) offering Baghdad as a venue for a new round of direct or indirect Iran-US talks,
3) reviving a GCC+2 framework bringing Iran and Iraq together with the six Gulf states.
- IRNA, Tabnak and ISNA all suggest that Baghdad is trying to turn its vulnerability into diplomatic relevance.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
Houthis don't do anything without Iranian 'green light' but they retain agency and autonomy from the IRGC to conclude their own deals serving their own local interests
There is a way Saudi with the help of Oman can rein in the Houthis in a deal involving salary payments, a lifted embargo and other concessions - that is if Saudi decided it doesn't want to take the war to the Houthis on the ground
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
The Houthis are not going to stop attacking, just as Iran is not going to stop supporting them.
These threats are unlikely to change behavior in either Sana'a or Tehran. If anything, repeated ultimatums that are not enforced risk highlighting the limits of American deterrence rather than its strength.
President Trump is free to escalate if he believes that serves U.S. interests. But he should also recognize that every public threat that is not followed by action further erodes the credibility of American deterrence. Threats alone are not a strategy.
The United States is not negotiating with business partners seeking the best deal. It is confronting deeply ideological actors that have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to absorb significant costs rather than capitulate under pressure. Expecting Tehran to reverse course simply because Washington raises the rhetorical stakes misunderstands how the Iranian leadership makes decisions.
Iran is not waiting for another agreement at any price, nor is it pleading for negotiations. If Washington's approach relies primarily on threats without a clear strategic objective and a credible plan to achieve it, it risks reinforcing the perception that the administration is reacting tactically rather than pursuing a coherent long-term strategy.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
« Allez au diable » : Vance accuse Israël de financer une campagne contre l’accord avec l’Iran
Répondant à Joe Rogan, le vice-président dit que des éléments du 'système ' israélien chercheraient à influencer l’opinion américaine pour prolonger la guerre.
fr.timesofisrael.com/allez-au-diable-vance-accuse-israel-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
"Un Israélien sur quatre dit qu'il envisagerait de quitter le pays si Netanyahu est réélu. Sondage de la Chaîne israélienne 12."
נדב איל Nadav Eyal
@Nadav_Eyal
One in four Israelis says they would consider leaving the country if Netanyahu is re-elected. Channel 12 poll, this evening.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
Pendant ce temps, le mouvement israélien Standing Together "Se tenir debout ensemble" nous rappelle :
"Il n'y a pas de cessez-le-feu sur le terrain à Gaza, il n'y a que des bombardements incessants. Des familles palestiniennes sont bombardées dans leur sommeil, des enfants sont extraits des décombres, et les survivants sont contraints d'endurer, jour après jour, les horreurs de ces frappes, la chaleur insoutenable et le manque de fournitures de première nécessité.
Depuis que l'accord de cessez-le-feu est entré en vigueur le 10 octobre 2025, les forces israéliennes ont tué 1 158 Palestiniens et blessé 3 756 autres, tandis que les corps de 802 autres Palestiniens ont été retrouvés dans les ruines, selon les autorités sanitaires palestiniennes.
Combien de familles palestiniennes devront encore être enterrées avant que cette horreur ne prenne fin ? Combien de temps faudra-t-il encore avant que la reconstruction et la réhabilitation deviennent possibles ? Combien de temps cela peut-il encore durer ?
Un cessez-le-feu ne laisse pas derrière lui des enfants morts dans leurs tentes, des familles ensevelies sous le béton et des parents hurlant au-dessus de corps enveloppés dans des linceuls blancs. Nous ne pouvons pas accepter ce statu quo."
עומדים ביחד نقف معًا Standing Together🟣
@omdimbeyachad
There is no ceasefire on the ground in Gaza there is only continuing bombardment. Palestinian families are bombed in their sleep, children are pulled from the rubble, and survivors are forced to endure the horrors of these strikes, the unbearable heat, and lack of basic supplies day after day.
Since the ceasefire agreement took effect on October 10, 2025, Israeli forces have killed 1,158 Palestinians and injured 3,756 others, while the bodies of another 802 Palestinians have been recovered from the ruins, according to Palestinian health authorities.
How many Palestinian families must be buried before this horror ends for good? How much longer until recovery and rehabilitation is possible? How much longer can this go on?
A ceasefire does not leave children dead in their tents, families buried beneath concrete, and parents screaming over bodies in white shrouds. We cannot accept this status quo.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
"Des colons israéliens attaquent un village palestinien, lancent de l'essence par une fenêtre sur un bébé, manquant de brûler vif le jeune enfant, et frappent une femme enceinte à coups de pierres.
Aucune couverture médiatique occidentale.
La complicité est si profonde..."
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
So Israeli settlers attack a Palestinian village, throw gasoline through a window onto a baby, nearly burning the young child alive, and beat a pregnant woman with stones.
Zero Western media coverage.
The complicity runs so deep...This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
Haïm Yavin, « Monsieur Télévision », est mort à 93 ans.
Le légendaire présentateur des informations télévisées israéliennes s’est éteint hier. Pendant près de quarante ans, il a incarné le visage et la voix de l’information en Israël, accompagnant plusieurs générations de téléspectateurs à travers les moments les plus marquants de l’histoire du pays.
Dès août 1968, il présente Mabat (« Regard sur l’actualité »), le journal télévisé de la seule chaîne israélienne existant alors. Il poursuivra sa carrière à la télévision jusqu’à sa retraite, en février 2008.
Avec sa voix reconnaissable entre toutes, son style précis et mesuré et son professionnalisme, Haïm Yavin a couvert les grands événements de l’histoire israélienne : le « bouleversement » politique de 1977, qui voit le Likoud de Menahem Begin arriver au pouvoir après près de trente ans de domination travailliste, ou encore l’assassinat du Premier ministre Yitzhak Rabin, qu’il annonce à la nation en 1995.
Au-delà du journal télévisé, il réalise de nombreux documentaires sur les grandes questions de société, notamment les relations entre Juifs et Arabes. Considéré comme proche du centre gauche, il s’est notamment prononcé en faveur d’une solution à deux États pour deux peuples et a estimé que la poursuite du contrôle israélien sur la Cisjordanie pouvait compromettre l’avenir d’Israël en tant qu'État à la fois juif et démocratique.
Sa série documentaire Eretz HaMata'alim ("La Terre des colons", consacrée aux colonies israéliennes en Cisjordanie, suscite de vives critiques dans les milieux favorables à la colonisation.
"Depuis 1967 -date de l'occupation des territoires palestiniens-, nous avons été des conquérants brutaux, des occupants, supprimant un autre peuple qui revendiquait cette terre" , déclare-t-il dans un de ses films.
Il ajoute : "Nous devons effectuer une révolution mentale. Les Palestiniens sont un peuple et nous devons partager cette terre avec eux."
Après son départ de la télévision, il exprime à plusieurs reprises sa profonde déception face à l’évolution politique d’Israël et à la montée de l’extrémisme, critiquant notamment Benjamin Netanyahu et ses gouvernements.
En 2022, évoquant l’arrivée du Likoud au pouvoir en 1977, il déclarait : « J’ai ressenti un choc profond. »
"Ce n'est pas moi qui suis plus à gauche, explique-t-il, c'est la société qui est tombée plus à droite."
Haïm Yavin est né Heinz Kluger, le 10 septembre 1932, à Beuthen, en Haute-Silésie, en Allemagne, aujourd’hui Bytom, en Pologne.
Sa famille émigre en Palestine mandataire en 1933 et s’installe à Kiryat Bialik. Une grande partie de sa famille est assassinée à Auschwitz pendant la Shoah.
Récompensé par de nombreuses distinctions, dont le Prix Israël de la communication en 1997, Haïm Yavin restera une figure majeure du journalisme israélien.
Pendant près d’un demi-siècle, sa voix aura accompagné l’histoire d’Israël. Une voix devenue, pour des millions d’Israéliens, presque indissociable de celle de leur pays.
Il sera inhumé vendredi au cimetière de Givat HaShlosha.
Qu’il repose en paix. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Moulin Emmanuel 🟣
@MoulinEmmanuel3
Mur Occidental, 1929 : une manifestation à Tisha BeAv marque le début du conflit israélo-arabe
Dans son livre « Ghosts of a Holy War », Yardena Schwartz détaille un moment charnière de l’histoire de l’Israël pré-État et ses répercussions, qui hantent encore le pays
Par la journaliste Yardena Schwartz
fr.timesofisrael.com/mur-occidental-1929-une-manifestatio… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Nathalie Gay-Blum🇨🇦🇫🇷🇮🇱🇨🇮
@Coquillette67
When Nero meets Caligula
www.nadaveyal.com/p/the-crocodiles-are-the-least-of-it?r=… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Israel-Alma
@Israel_Alma_org
The threats from the Shiite axis place Israel's energy infrastructure and ports - including the offshore gas rigs (Karish, Leviathan, and Tamar), the Haifa Bay refining facilities (Bazan), power stations, and ports - at risk of damage. The threats include combined attacks of ballistic missiles, drones, UAVs, cruise missiles, unmanned watercraft, and naval and underwater commando capabilities.
This paper examines the current threat and Israel's defensive response, which is based on three main pillars:
Exposure reduction and early prevention: Proactive shutdown of vulnerable infrastructure (such as gas rigs) when necessary to prevent a direct and catastrophic hit, alongside managing an emergency energy economy and maintaining functional continuity in the ports.
Multi-layered defense at sea and on land: Deployment of advanced systems aboard the Israeli Navy's Saar 6 ships (such as the naval "Iron Dome" – C-Dome and the Barak MX system), together with land-based defense systems (Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow) and the integration of an underwater detection layer using autonomous vessels.
Maintaining maritime functional continuity: Ensuring the regular operation of the ports (Haifa and Ashdod) under strict emergency procedures and dealing with cyber threats, with the goal of preventing economic paralysis.
Read the full article>> israel-alma.org/assessing-the-security-of-israeli-ports-a… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Iran’s state broadcaster reportedly cut from President Pezeshkian’s speech the passage in which he said the late Supreme Leader had approved the opening of negotiations.
The same remarks had already been published in full by the presidency.
- To me, interestingly, this looks like a struggle over the official narrative: who authorized the talks, who gets to invoke Khamenei’s legacy, and how much political space Pezeshkian should be allowed to occupy (not too much I guess).
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Nicole Grajewski
@NicoleGrajewski
There has been an extraordinary amount of U.S. military activity overnight, with combat aircraft, bombers, tankers, special-operations personnel, and medical support moving from the continental United States through Europe and toward the Middle East.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Escalation has been the likely basecase because 1) the current standoff isn't sustainable, 2) the US window for action is not open-ended, 3) the route to de-escalation is unattractive and difficult, and 4) little scope of Iran backing down.
Things are going to get worse, before they get better.
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Tbh more interesting takeaway here is not that Trump could escalate air strikes on Iran, but that Iran apparently rejected a ceasefire proposal.
www.axios.com/2026/07/23/trump-axios-iran-interview -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
Can the U.S. force the Strait open? “Steve Williams, chief executive of logistics company Nippon Express UK: It’s not going to be popular, but the quickest way of doing this, [other than] with a ceasefire . . . is to flood the region with a global force that protects the vessels coming out. The only other way is to come to an arrangement with Iran, which means the Americans are going to have to lose face. www.ft.com/content/1cbe4fd0-6b81-42c5-bc30-070fec3cd9dd
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
گزارش فایننشال تایمز؛ چرا کویت به هدف ایران تبدیل شده است
روزنامه فایننشال تایمز در گزارشی تحلیلی، کویت را یکی از آسیبپذیرترین کشورهای خلیج فارس در برابر حملات موشکی و پهپادی ایران توصیف کرده و نوشته است که موقعیت جغرافیایی، نزدیکی به ایران و میزبانی نیروهای نظامی آمریکا، این کشور را در معرض خطر بیشتری قرار داده است.
بر اساس این گزارش، کویت که در دهههای گذشته تلاش کرده روابط متعادلی با تهران حفظ کند، در شرایط جدید منطقهای با نگرانیهای امنیتی جدی مواجه شده است. فایننشال تایمز به نقل از مؤسسه مطالعات امنیت ملی اسرائیل (INSS) اعلام کرده که کویت در میان اهداف حملات موشکی و پهپادی، پس از امارات در رتبه دوم قرار گرفته و حدود ۱۴۰۰ حمله علیه آن ثبت شده است.
این گزارش تأکید میکند که نگرانی کویتیها فقط به تهدیدهای نظامی محدود نیست؛ خاطره حمله عراق به کویت در سال ۱۹۹۰ همچنان در حافظه عمومی این کشور باقی مانده و هرگونه بحران منطقهای، حساسیت اجتماعی و امنیتی بالایی ایجاد میکند.
از نگاه تحلیلگران، یکی از عوامل افزایش آسیبپذیری کویت، وجود پایگاهها و نیروهای آمریکایی در این کشور است؛ موضوعی که در صورت تشدید تقابل تهران و واشنگتن، میتواند کویت را به یکی از اهداف واکنشهای نظامی تبدیل کند.
با این حال، گزارش فایننشال تایمز اشاره میکند که کویت دارای سامانههای دفاع هوایی و روابط امنیتی گسترده با آمریکا است، اما تجربه سالهای اخیر نشان داده که مقابله با حملات گسترده موشکی و پهپادی، حتی برای کشورهای مجهز به سامانههای پیشرفته نیز چالشی پیچیده است.
این گزارش در نهایت تصویری از یک معادله دشوار برای کشورهای کوچک خلیج فارس ارائه میدهد: حفظ روابط اقتصادی و سیاسی با همسایگان، در کنار وابستگی امنیتی به قدرتهای خارجی. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
Firstpost: موشکهای ایران با فناوری MaRV به سمت قابلیتهای پیشرفتهتر حرکت میکنند
رسانه هندی Firstpost در گزارشی اعلام کرده است که برنامه موشکی ایران در حال حرکت به سمت استفاده از فناوریهای پیشرفتهتری مانند MaRV (وسیله بازگشتی مانورپذیر) است؛ فناوریای که میتواند کلاهکهای موشکی را در مرحله پایانی پرواز قادر به تغییر مسیر و انجام مانور کند. به نوشته این رسانه، چنین قابلیتی باعث میشود موشکها نسبت به نمونههای سنتی بالستیک، مسیر غیرقابل پیشبینیتری داشته باشند، دقت اصابت افزایش یابد و مقابله با آنها برای سامانههای دفاع موشکی دشوارتر شود.
فناوری MaRV در واقع با هدف کاهش امکان رهگیری توسعه یافته است. در موشکهای بالستیک معمولی، مسیر کلاهک پس از ورود به جو تا حد زیادی قابل محاسبه است، اما کلاهکهای مانورپذیر میتوانند در فاز نهایی مسیر خود را تغییر دهند.
تحلیلگران نظامی معتقدند تمرکز ایران بر این فناوری بخشی از راهبرد افزایش بازدارندگی موشکی است؛ زیرا ایران با توجه به محدودیتهای موجود در نیروی هوایی، سرمایهگذاری گستردهای روی موشکهای بالستیک، دقت بیشتر و توان عبور از سامانههای دفاعی انجام داده است. با این حال، میزان واقعی قابلیتهای عملیاتی این فناوری در موشکهای ایرانی، از جمله سطح دقت و نوع سامانههای هدایت، همچنان موضوع ارزیابیهای متفاوت میان کارشناسان است.
در مجموع، اگر گزارش مطرحشده درباره توسعه گسترده MaRV در موشکهای ایران درست باشد، نشاندهنده حرکت برنامه موشکی این کشور از افزایش صرفِ برد به سمت افزایش دقت، مانورپذیری و پیچیدهتر کردن فرآیند رهگیری خواهد بود؛ تغییری که میتواند معادلات دفاع موشکی در منطقه را تحت تأثیر قرار دهد. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
حمله آمریکا به مرز شلمچه به عنوان یکی از چند مرز اصلی خروجی زائران اربعین در شلوغ ترین ایام این مرز.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
نخست وزیر علی الزبیدی با اسکورت جنگندههای اف-۱۶ برای یک سفر رسمی وارد تهران شده است. علاقهای به نوشتن درباره مهمان یکی- دوروزه خودمون ندارم ولی چون دیدم بعضیها موضوع اف-۱۶ های عراق را برجسته کردند بالاجبار چند جمله توضیح میدم.
نیروی هوایی عراق پس از سقوط صدام و بازسازی ارتش، برای نوسازی ناوگان خود از آمریکا جنگندههای F-16IQ Block 52 خریداری کرد. عراق در ابتدا قراردادی برای خرید ۳۶ فروند F-16 امضا کرد. نخستین فروندها در سال ۲۰۱۴ تحویل شدند و عراق از سال ۲۰۱۵ استفاده عملیاتی از این جنگندهها را آغاز کرد. نسخه عراقی این جنگنده، F-16IQ Block 52 است؛ یعنی از خانواده F-16های نسل چهارم محسوب میشود، اما برخی محدودیتهای صادراتی نسبت به مدلهای آمریکایی پیشرفتهتر دارد.
عراق به شدت برای پشتیبانی فنی این ناوگان به شرکتهای آمریکایی وابستگی زیادی دارد. یعنی آمریکاییها نباشند این جنگنده ارزشی نداره.
اما در مقایسه با F-16های جدیدتر کشورهای منطقه (مثل برخی مدلهای ارتقایافته در ترکیه، اسرائیل یا امارات)، ناوگان عراق از نظر رادار، جنگ الکترونیک، تسلیحات و آمادگی عملیاتی در سطح پایینتری قرار دارد. یعنی همین الان اگر عراق مثلاً با امارات هم درگیر بشه بر فرض اینکه آمریکاییها پیچ و مهره اف ۱۶ را هم براشون تأمین کنند این اف ۱۶ ها نمیتونن از پس اف ۱۶ های امارات بربیان. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Signs of a Major Escalation in the U.S.-#iran War
🔹Multiple developments over the past several hours suggest that the U.S. war on #iran may be approaching a significant escalation.
🔹Last night’s U.S. strike on the Shalamcheh border crossing between Iran and Iraq has been interpreted as a possible preparatory move for the deployment of special operations or ground forces. Alternatively, the strike may have been intended to facilitate the advance of armed insurgent groups.
🔹In the same context, the drone strike on the Al-Abdali border crossing between Iraq and Kuwait was likely carried out by Iran or its Iraqi allies in an effort to disrupt the U.S. logistical corridor linking the two countries.
🔹Meanwhile, reports indicate that shelters have been opened at multiple locations across Israel. Similar measures preceded earlier escalations, including the 12-Day War and the 40-Day War, suggesting that Israeli authorities are preparing for possible Iranian missile attacks.
🔹France and the United Kingdom have also reportedly evacuated their embassies in Iran as of today.
🔹Trump, for his part, has declared that he holds Iran responsible for Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. This statement could provide a pretext for intensifying U.S. strikes against Iran in response to future Houthi operations.
🔹The warning should be viewed alongside Trump’s earlier statement on Wednesday that any future Iranian attack on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz would be met with a U.S. strike on an Iranian bridge or power plant. He has also indicated that a U.S. attack on Iran’s underground nuclear facilities at “Pickaxe Mountain” is inevitable.
🔹At the same time, the United States appears to be reducing its military presence at bases closer to Iran, including in Qatar. Open-source reporting also points to a large-scale transfer of military equipment from the United States and Europe to Israel, along with increased activity by reconnaissance, command-and-control, and electronic warfare aircraft across the region. The United States has also deployed B-1 strategic bombers to the theater.
🔹Iran has warned that any attack on its infrastructure or nuclear facilities will be met with comparable strikes against regional targets. Several Iranian analysts also argue that, should the United States substantially intensify its campaign, Iran would likely strike strategic targets inside Israel regardless of whether Israel is directly involved in the operation.
🔹Overall, these developments suggest that the conflict may be entering a more dangerous phase, potentially comparable to the peak of the 40-Day War. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hiba Nasr
@HibaNasr
‼️ Reviewing the guest list from the dinner hosted 2 nights ago by the Lebanese Ambassador in Washington Nada Hamadeh Mouawad in honor of President Joseph Aoun, the caliber and breadth of those in attendance immediately stand out.
For a country the size of Lebanon, the guest list is striking—reflecting the breadth of Washington’s diplomatic, political, and policy interest at this moment.
Worth a look at who was in the room:
• Secretary of Energy Chris Wright
• World Bank President Ajay Banga
• Senator Jim Risch, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
• Senators Jeanne Shaheen, Chris Coons, Chris Murphy, James Lankford, Bill Hagerty, Jack Reed, Joni Ernst, and Jacky Rosen
• Congressman Brian Mast, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
• Members of Congress Darrell Issa, Darin LaHood, Abe Hamadeh, Joe Wilson, Carol Miller, Debbie Dingell, and Marcy Kaptur
• Deputy Secretary of State Chris Landau
• Deputy Secretary of Commerce Paul Dabbar
• Deputy National Security Advisor Mike Needham
• Under Secretary of War Elbridge Colby
• Ambassadors Michel Issa, Mike Waltz, and Monica Crowley
• Dr. Massad Boulos, Senior Advisor to the President for Arab and Middle Eastern Affairs
• Dr. Sebastian Gorka, Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security Council
• Various Assistant Secretaries from the Departments of State, War, and Treasury
• Senior Directors from the National Security Council and the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🌍🛢️“Barrack's corridor removes Israel from IMEC. It routes trade through Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad. Meanwhile, Israel expands its Syrian footprint, backs Druze secession, calls Kurdish collapse alarming, and is adamant about keeping a chunk of Lebanon”
👉theacedispatch.substack.com/p/the-fertile-crescent-redraw…
via @theacedispatch -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
My interview @cnni
@PoloSandovalCNN:
The real question is not what the administration is trying to achieve militarily. That part is relatively clear: Washington is attempting to weaken Iran's ability to control the Strait of Hormuz, and strikes on Bandar Abbas and related military infrastructure contribute to that objective. The tactical gains should not be dismissed. The real uncertainty lies in their strategic value.
Iran still retains multiple escalation options. It can intensify attacks against Gulf states, target undersea communications cables that pass through the region, strike critical civilian infrastructure, and encourage the Houthis to expand operations against Gulf shipping and energy assets. In other words, if Washington raises the stakes, Tehran still has several ways to respond.
Any realistic strategy should begin with one core assumption: Iran is unlikely to capitulate. If that assumption is correct, the United States will eventually face a strategic choice. It can continue escalating in pursuit of objectives that may require a much larger military commitment, or it can accept a negotiated outcome that reflects at least some of Tehran's terms.
The broader strategic question therefore remains unanswered: How does the administration envision this ending? Thirty-nine days of military operations did not force Iran to surrender or fundamentally alter its decision-making. There is little evidence that a limited extension of the current campaign would produce a different result. Before expanding the conflict further, Washington needs to define a realistic political end state rather than relying on military pressure alone.
#iranwarThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 تقرير مهم من نيويورك تايمز لا يكتفي بعرض بنود الاتفاق النووي السعودي التي كشفتها WSJ، بل يكشف التنازلات السياسية والاستراتيجية التي قدمتها إدارة ترامب للوصول إليه.
هذا أهم ما جاء في التقرير
🔷 ترامب اضطر إلى تقديم تنازلات مهمة لولي العهد الأمير محمد بن سلمان لإتمام الاتفاق، أهمها الموافقة على احتمال السماح للسعودية مستقبلاً بتخصيب اليورانيوم أو إعادة معالجة البلوتونيوم داخل أراضيها بعد انتهاء الدراسة الاقتصادية المشتركة.
🔷 ويكشف التقرير معلومة جديدة لم ترد في التقارير السابقة، وهي أن الاتفاق يتضمن رسالتين جانبيتين سريتين (Secret Side Letters) بين الولايات المتحدة والسعودية.
🔷 وينقل أن الإدارة الأمريكية ستحاول إقناع الكونغرس بعدم نشر هاتين الرسالتين بحجة أنهما تحتويان معلومات تجارية مملوكة للشركات وأخرى تتعلق بالأمن القومي، لكنه يشير إلى أن بعض أعضاء الكونغرس قد يرفضون التصويت قبل الاطلاع الكامل عليهما.
🔷 ترامب وافق أيضاً على ترتيبات قد تحد من قدرة مفتشي الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية على دخول أي موقع يشتبه في إمكانية استخدامه لتحويل الوقود النووي إلى برنامج تسليحي.
🔷 ينقل التقرير عن مسؤولين أمريكيين أن الاتفاق لا يهدف فقط إلى التعاون النووي، وإنما أيضاً إلى إعادة ترسيخ العلاقة الاستراتيجية بين واشنطن والرياض بعد التوتر الذي أحدثته الحرب مع إيران.
🔷 ويكشف أن الإدارة تتوقع أن يوفر الاتفاق مليارات الدولارات للصناعة النووية الأمريكية، وأن شركة وستنغهاوس (Westinghouse) ستكون أول المستفيدين باعتبارها المرشح الرئيسي لبناء المفاعلات السعودية.
🔷 ويشير التقرير إلى أن المفاوضات التفصيلية انتهت خلال الربيع والصيف، وأن الإدارة كانت تستعد لإرسال الاتفاق إلى الكونغرس منذ أسابيع.
🔷 الخلاف بين ترامب ومحمد بن سلمان خلال مايو بشأن الحرب مع إيران كان أحد أسباب الحاجة إلى الاتفاق، إذ يذكر أن ولي العهد رفض السماح للولايات المتحدة باستخدام الأجواء السعودية لمرافقة ناقلات النفط في مضيق هرمز، وأن الاتفاق النووي ساعد على إعادة الاستقرار إلى العلاقة الثنائية.
🔷 التفاهمات التي توصل إليها ترامب ومحمد بن سلمان تشمل ترتيباً دفاعياً جديداً يتضمن بيع مقاتلات F-35 للسعودية، لكنه لن يصل إلى مستوى معاهدة دفاع مشترك ملزمة يصادق عليها مجلس الشيوخ، وهو ما كانت الرياض تطالب به منذ سنوات.
🔷 السعودية اعتمدت خلال الحرب مع إيران على الولايات المتحدة للحصول على صواريخ اعتراضية للدفاع الجوي، لكنها في الوقت نفسه أصبحت تشكك في أن السياسات الأمريكية في المنطقة، وخاصة الشراكة مع إسرائيل، تزيد المخاطر الأمنية على دول الخليج.
🔷 ويكشف أن هذا أحد أسباب استمرار الجهود السعودية لإجراء حوار مع إيران رغم الحرب، مذكراً بأن البلدين أعادا العلاقات الدبلوماسية عام 2023 بوساطة صينية.
🔷 يشير التقرير إلى أن عدداً من أعضاء الكونغرس من الحزبين، إضافة إلى مسؤولين إسرائيليين، يعارضون الاتفاق خشية أن يؤدي البرنامج المدني في النهاية إلى امتلاك السعودية قدرة عسكرية نووية.
🔷 ويؤكد أن ترامب تخلى عن النموذج الذي أصبح يعرف داخل دوائر منع الانتشار باسم “المعيار الذهبي” (Gold Standard)، وهو النموذج الذي طبق مع الإمارات عام 2009.
🔷 ويعتبر التقرير أن الإدارة ستجادل بأن الشراكة الأمريكية المباشرة تمنح واشنطن قدرة كافية على مراقبة البرنامج السعودي، إلا أن الواقع هو أن ترامب تراجع عن القيود التي تفاوضت عليها إدارتا جورج بوش وباراك أوباما.
🔷 يستعرض التقرير تاريخ المفاوضات، موضحاً أن إدارة بايدن كانت تريد ربط التعاون النووي السعودي بالتطبيع مع إسرائيل، بينما فصل ترامب الملفين بالكامل. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
السفير رياض طبارة لـ"ليبانون ديبايت": "وقعنا في فخ إسرائيل"
@RiadTabbarah:
"في تقييمه لنتائج التفاوض المباشر مع إسرائيل، رأى سفير لبنان الأسبق في واشنطن رياض طبارة أن بنود اتفاق "الإطار" وآلية تنفيذه تضمنت أفخاخاً إسرائيلية وقع فيها لبنان. وانطلاقاً من تجربته السابقة، قال لـ"ليبانون ديبايت" إن المفاوض الإسرائيلي يدرج دائماً نقاطاً معقدة في أي اتفاق أو تفاهم أو حتى إعلان نوايا. وأشار إلى مثال يتمثل بالمطالبة بوقف لبنان للملاحقات القضائية الدولية المتعلقة بجرائم الحرب مقابل وقف ملاحقة لبنان أمام المحكمة الجنائية الدولية، رغم أن لبنان غير ملاحق، فيما تواجه إسرائيل ملاحقات مرتبطة بالحرب.
ومع انتهاء الجولة الأولى من مفاوضات روما، تحدث طبارة عن "تنازلات لبنانية غير ضرورية وغير مبررة" خلال جولات التفاوض الست، معتبراً أن الدولة اللبنانية "معذورة" بفعل الضغوط الأميركية، إلا أن إسرائيل توقّع الاتفاق ثم لا تلتزم به وتواصل عملياتها الميدانية.
وأضاف أن ما تحقق في روما اقتصر على بدء البحث في التفاصيل التنفيذية لاتفاق الإطار، ولم يتجاوز إعلان مبادئ ونوايا لا تلتزم بها إسرائيل، ما يجعل توقيعها بلا جدوى عملية.
وأكد أنه كان ينبغي ربط أي تنازل بشروط مسبقة تتعلق بالانسحاب قبل تنفيذ المطالب الإسرائيلية، ولا سيما أن التنازلات جاءت لوقف الحرب وتحقيق الانسحاب، إلا أن أياً منهما لم يتحقق. وبرأيه، فإن ربط الانسحاب بحصر السلاح ووقف الملاحقات القضائية من الطرفين شكّل أحد هذه الأفخاخ، إذ إن الملاحقات أمام المحكمة الجنائية الدولية تتعلق بإسرائيل لا بلبنان.
وانتقد طبارة السياسة الخارجية لعدم الاستفادة من فرص الدعم، داعياً إلى التواصل مع الفاتيكان وفرنسا وسائر العواصم العربية والدولية، وحتى الصين إذا اقتضى الأمر، معتبراً أن التركيز ينصب بصورة كبيرة على واشنطن.
وشدد على تفعيل السياسة الخارجية بإشراف رئيس الجمهورية جوزف عون، واستثمار تراجع الموقف الإسرائيلي دولياً لحشد دعم للموقف اللبناني عبر تحرك دبلوماسي مدروس، معتبراً أن الفرصة لا تزال قائمة لأن المفاوضات ما زالت في مرحلة بحث التفاصيل التنفيذية لاتفاق الإطار، بما يسمح بالعمل على تصويب آليات التنفيذ بما يحقق مصلحة لبنان."
#lebanondebate #lebanondebate #ليبانون_ديبايت -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Michael Young
@BeirutCalling
Nathan J. Brown examines how the Trump Plan is approaching Gaza and its population, but can't seem to find anything in the agreement about who represents the Palestinians. This sets us up for another failure, he predicts, at Diwan: carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2026/07/in-gaza-d…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Michael Young
@BeirutCalling
A few takeaways from the president's meeting with Trump yesterday:
The pilot zones project is a good idea, but only if two conditions are met: that Israel withdraw from significant areas of the south, as a prelude to a full withdrawal, and that this mechanism and Israel's commitment to a full withdrawal be clarified and tightened (perhaps through simultaneous Lebanese-Israeli negotiations on border demarcation); and that the displaced inhabitants of evacuated villages be allowed to return quickly, showing that negotiations can lead to tangible outcomes, which would greatly bolster the credibility of the state.
Aoun went further than Lebanon's official position on peace with Israel by remarking that he shared Trump's views on peace, leading the U.S. president to follow up with a comment on the Abraham Accords. Yet this is not the official Lebanese position, which commits to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. By going out on a limb, Aoun may soon face pushback from regional states who do not want Lebanon to go so far.
The focus on bolstering the Lebanese army is a good thing, but on condition that the United States not use this as leverage to push for a military confrontation with Hezbollah. The army can and must defend the pilot zones against Hezbollah's efforts to undermine the army's mission in these areas, but pushing beyond that at the moment has to be thought out carefully, based on avoiding a major clash. That's why a step-by-step approach that slowly erodes Hezbollah's hold over the south is best. Sun Tzu's famous dictum that "the supreme art of war is to subdue the opponent without fighting" is fully applicable here.
Finally, the president should have intervened to correct Trump when he again raised the issue of Syrian intervention in Lebanon to help subdue Hezbollah. The Lebanese position is very clear on this, as is the Syrian position, but it would have been very useful to hear him make that statement in public. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rosemary Kelanic
@RKelanic
At the start of the war, many of us warned that U.S. interceptor stockpiles were finite and vulnerable to attrition by cheap and plentiful Iranian missiles and drones.
The result would be worsening damage to US targets as the war progressed.
Given reports of massive U.S. stockpile depletion from the first phase of war, I can’t help but wonder if Iran landing several strikes on U.S. bases in Jordan signals that the hits-per-volley curve has begun its inexorable rise.
If so, we can expect future escalation rounds to be even deadlier to U.S. forces.
All because Trump refuses to accept reality and recognize Iranian leverage over the Strait of Hormuz — for to do so would mean acknowledging that the entire war was a mistake.
www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-missile-struck-housing… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
אין לי ספק שהימין הישראלי רואה בציר האיראני איום אמיתי, אך לעיתים, האינטרסים הפוליטיים שלו מביאים לכך שהוא משתף פעולה עם הציר הזה, כמו העברת המליונים הקטרים לחמאס לצד החלשה שיטתית של הרשות הפלסטינית.
הנה דוגמה אחרת: מאז טבח ה7.10, הימין הישראלי הדהד באופן מוחלט את המסר האיראני על כך שישראל ניצבת במלחמה מול שבע חזיתות, בעוד שבפועל, איראן הפקירה את השלוחות הערביות שלה ואת בני רצועת עזה ודרום לבנון לגורלם, ולא התערבה עד שישראל לא פגעה בשגרירות האיראנית בדמשק.
לצורך מחקרי יחב"ל, חוקרים ייצרו מאגרי מידע על מלחמות ולפיכך הגדירו מה מהווה מלחמה. אחד הסטנדרטים הוא מספר ההרוגים - לרוב 1,000 הרוגים בשנה. במאגר המידע הידוע ביותר שעוסק בכל הסכסוכים האלימים הפוליטיים ולא רק מלחמות, של מכון מחקר השלום באוסלו, הרף הוא נמוך משמעותית - 25 הרוגים בשנה כדי ליפול תחת הגדרת "סכסוך". לפי ההגדרה הזו, ישראל לא הייתה במלחמה או אפילו סכסוך מול החות'ים (שהרגו ישראלי אחד), המיליציות השיעיות בעיראק (שהרגו שני ישראלים), המשטר הסורי (שלא ירה אפילו כדור לעבר ישראל), או הפלגים הפלסטינים בגדה המערבית (שהרגו 46 ישראלים בשנתיים וחצי, כלומר פחות מ-25 בשנה).
ברור למה לאיראן יש אינטרס להסתיר את העובדה שהציר שלה לא באמת ציר, ש"בנות הברית" שלה הם בעצם כלי שרת שלה שתפקידם למות למען הגנת איראן והמחויבות אינה הדדית. איראן משקיעה מליונים על תעמולה בעולם הערבי בניסיון להסתיר שהסיוע שטהראן ויתר מרכיבי הציר העניקו לפלסטינים היה עלוב וחסר השפעה על מהלך הקרבות. לאחרונה, למשל, חברות הפקה המקושרות למשטר האיראני הפיקו עשרות שירים של זמרים ערבים המזוהים עם המיליציות של "הציר" לרגל ההלוויה של ח'מנאי, שכמובן גם עברה דרך המקדשים השיעים בעיראק כדי לגרוף הון פוליטי בעיראק וניצול רגשותיהם הדתיים של השיעים בעיראק בתקופת האבל על האמאם חוסין בחודש מחרם.
הנה פלייליסט שהרכבתי למעקב אחר ההפקה התרבותית הזו
www.youtube.com/watch?v=uf5xvFf8DpU&list=PLZn3NO8WXZh0
במקום הגישה הצ'רצ'ליאנית של "שמרו על קור רוח והמשיכו הלאה", ההנהגה הישראלית פעלה להעצמת תחושת האיום שנשקפה לישראלים, כנראה כדי לגרום להתאחדות סביב ההנהגה. הבעיה היא שהשיח הרשמי הישראלי הזה הודהד ללא הפסקה בתקשורת שתומכת בציר האיראני כהוכחה לאמיתות הטענה של איראן והציר שלה שהן אכן עומדות לצד חמאס ועזה.
דוגמה אחרת היא החלטת רוה"מ לערוך את כינוס הממשלה הראשון לאחר חיסול ממשלת החות'ים בבונקר תחת האדמה. שב"כ אמר, בצדק, שאין כל צורך בכך. ההחלטה הזו סוקרה ללא הרף באל-ג'זירה ויתר ערוצי הציר בצהלות: גם מוכיחים את המיתוס הנפוץ בקרב הציר שהיהודים פחדנים, וגם מעצימים את יכולות החות'ים.
מנסיוני האישי, רבים מחברי מיליציות הציר מצטרפים אליהן, בין היתר, בשל הרצון שלהם להרגיש חזקים ומפחידים ביחס לאוכלוסיה שבקרבה הם חיים, שמתייחסת אליהם בזלזול בשל מעמדם החברתי הנמוך. גם התפיסה שהם בני ברית של איראן ולא כלים זולים בידיה חשובה להם. הם לא רוצים להרגיש שהם שכירי חרב. למה לעזור להם להרגיש חזקים, מפחידים ושאיראן עומדת לצידם? -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rosemary Kelanic
@RKelanic
Kuwait is now rationing electricity because of Iranian retaliation against its power grid.
Today's high in Kuwait City: 117 degrees Fahrenheit
It is madness for Trump to strike Iran's civil infrastructure when the reprisals are so bad.
www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/07/kuwaitis-ration-elec… via @AlMonitor -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Hormuz Report
@HormuzReport
BREAKING: Iran's IRGC says it has completely destroyed Amazon's central data hub in Bahrain with several cruise missiles and warns more are coming, per Fars News.
The attack marks a new phase: Iran is now targeting U.S. tech infrastructure. The IRGC has warned 18 American tech companies — including Microsoft, Intel, Cisco, and Google — that they are legitimate targets. AWS facilities in the UAE and Bahrain have already been hit before, disrupting banking and critical systems that rely on Amazon's cloud.
Data centers are now strategic targets. Iran argues these companies support U.S. military and intelligence operations. By striking Amazon, Tehran is signaling that American tech firms operating in the region are no longer off-limits. The war has expanded into the digital domain. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
I told @latimes on what might be US next steps: “Everything is dependent on the mood of one man. It’s not the system that’s making the decision; it’s not the country making the decision. It’s one man, and it depends how he feels like at one particular point in time.”
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Interesting calls by Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister with his Saudi, Omani and Bahraini counterparts.
- it looks like regional diplomacy is intensifying to contain escalation, uphold existing understandings and build a broader framework for de-escalation. Doha appears to be coordinating closely with the Persian Gulf capitals most directly exposed to the conflict, an essential step if any ceasefire initiative is to gain credibility and durability.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
درباره « شب شوم» راداری آمریکا
از ۸ شب دوشنبه تا ۵ صبح سه شنبه، «شب سیاه» راداری آمریکا در منطقه بود. ایران به صورت هدفمند تعداد قابل توجهی از رادارهای اصلی آمریکا در منطقه را هدف قرار داد. این موضوع به طور مؤثر توان رزم آمریکا و اسرائیل در اطراف ایران را محدود( نه نابود) میکند.
ایران در جنگ ۴۰ روزه هم با استفاده از تجربه جنگ ۱۲ روزه ابتدا رادارها و سپس پدافند آمریکا و اسرائیل در منطقه را هدف قرار میداد. حتی بهترین پدافند دنیا هم برای عملکرد خود به «رادار» وابسته است و پدافند بدون رادار مثل داشتن اسلحه بدون تیر است.
حالا چرا عملیات دیشب ایران اینقدر مهم است؟
در جنگهای مدرن، قدرت دفاع هوایی فقط به تعداد موشکهای پدافندی یا سامانههای پیشرفته وابسته نیست؛ عامل تعیینکننده، توانایی «دیدن» میدان نبرد است. این وظیفه بر عهده رادارهاست؛ چشمهایی که آسمان را زیر نظر دارند و اطلاعات لازم را برای تصمیمگیری سریع در اختیار فرماندهی قرار میدهند.
رادارها با کشف هواپیماهای جنگی، پهپادها و موشکهای مهاجم، مسیر، سرعت و ارتفاع آنها را مشخص میکنند و به سامانههای پدافندی اجازه میدهند در زمان مناسب واکنش نشان دهند. بدون اطلاعات راداری، حتی یک سامانه موشکی قدرتمند ممکن است فرصت کافی برای درگیری با هدف را نداشته باشد.
به همین دلیل، در عملیاتهای ایران، یکی از اهداف اصلی، از کار انداختن شبکه راداری منطقه است. این کار معمولاً با حمله مستقیم، استفاده از موشکهای ضدتشعشع، جنگ الکترونیک، ایجاد اختلال یا فریب اطلاعاتی انجام شود. همه ابزار این حمله هم بومی است.
هدف از این حملات ایجاد «کوری اطلاعاتی» در شبکه دفاعی آمریکا و اسرائیل است. وقتی رادارها آسیب ببینند، زمان واکنش کاهش پیدا میکند، تصمیمگیری دشوارتر میشود و احتمال نفوذ پهپادها و موشکهای ایران افزایش مییابد.
با این حال، این را هم باید درنظر گرفت که پدافندهای آمریکا معمولاً شبکهای و چندلایه هستند. استفاده از رادارهای متحرک، سامانههای اپتیکی، اطلاعات ماهوارهای و روشهای پدافند غیرفعال باعث میشود آمریکا حتی پس از از دست دادن بخشی از توان راداری، همچنان تا حد خوبی قدرت دفاعی خود را حفظ کند.
در جنگ آینده، برتری فقط متعلق به کشوری نیست که موشک بیشتر دارد؛ بلکه متعلق به کشوری است که زودتر تهدید را ببیند، دقیقتر تحلیل کند و سریعتر تصمیم بگیرد. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jackson Hinkle 🇺🇸
@jacksonhinkle
China openly challenges Trump.
Trump: "We need two billion dollars a day to reopen the Strait of Hormuz."
Chinese Foreign Minister: "The Strait was open before the war. The root of the problem lies in your illegal actions against Iran; you have created a global crisis out of nothing." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 مسؤولون خليجيون ومصادر مطلعة تحدثوا لبلومبرغ بشرط عدم الكشف عن هوياتهم. وقدموا صورة عن النقاشات الجارية داخل العواصم الخليجية بشأن الحرب.
هذا أهم ما جاء في التقرير
🔷 تنقل بلومبرغ عن مصادرها أن الحرب دفعت بعض الدول الخليجية إلى إعادة تقييم مدى قدرة الولايات المتحدة على حماية حلفائها، وأن عدداً منها بدأ يبحث تعميق التعاون الدفاعي مع دول أوروبية نتيجة لذلك.
🔷 الإمارات ترغب في أن تلعب الدول الأوروبية دوراً أكثر نشاطاً في إعادة تأمين الملاحة البحرية، ومسؤولين إماراتيين ناقشوا خلال الأسبوع الماضي مع نظرائهم الأوروبيين إمكانية إطلاق بعثة لإزالة الألغام البحرية عندما تسمح الظروف الأمنية بذلك.
🔷 كما تنقل المصادر أن أياً من دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي لا يخطط حالياً للمساهمة في صندوق إعادة تأهيل إيران البالغة قيمته 300 مليار دولار، الذي كان مطروحاً ضمن التفاهمات المرتبطة بمذكرة التفاهم الأمريكية الإيرانية.
🔷 تضيف المصادر أن مسؤولين خليجيين أبدوا استياءهم من فكرة أن يطلب منهم عملياً تمويل إعادة إعمار إيران أو دفع تعويضات لها، بينما كانت دولهم نفسها قد تعرضت لأضرار كبيرة نتيجة الضربات الإيرانية.
🔷 حلفاء واشنطن الخليجيين باتوا منقسمين بشأن الخطوة التالية التي ينبغي أن تتخذها الولايات المتحدة في الحرب مع إيران، بعد أن كانوا موحدين قبل أسابيع في الدعوة إلى التهدئة والدبلوماسية.
🔷 يعتقد بعض المسؤولين الخليجيين أن الرئيس ترامب ينبغي أن يصعد عملياته العسكرية، بما في ذلك إرسال قوات برية إلى أجزاء من إيران، وربما السيطرة على جزيرة خرج (Kharg Island)، التي تمثل أهم مركز لتصدير النفط الإيراني.
🔷 بحسب هؤلاء المسؤولين، فإن القيادة الإيرانية لن تتراجع عن سيطرتها على مضيق هرمز ولن تقدم تنازلات ما لم تواجه ضغطاً عسكرياً أكبر.
🔷 يرى أحد المصادر أن البديل هو استمرار حرب منخفضة الوتيرة قد تستمر أشهراً، وهو ما سيؤدي إلى هروب الاستثمارات الأجنبية والسياحة من المنطقة.
🔷 في المقابل، تكشف المصادر أن دولاً أخرى، وعلى رأسها قطر، تعارض هذا التوجه وتدعو إلى خفض التصعيد فوراً لمنع عودة الحرب إلى مستوى القصف المكثف الذي شهدته المنطقة في مارس وأوائل أبريل.
🔷 يكشف التقرير أن الوحدة الخليجية التي سبقت توقيع مذكرة التفاهم الأمريكية الإيرانية في يونيو قد انهارت خلال الأسبوعين الأخيرين، بعدما تبادل الطرفان الاتهامات بشأن مسؤولية انهيار الاتفاق.
🔷 ينقل التقرير عن مايكل راتني، السفير الأمريكي السابق لدى السعودية، أن المسؤولين الخليجيين يشعرون بالإحباط والغضب، لكنهم يتجنبون التعبير عن ذلك علناً لأنهم يحاولون إدارة علاقاتهم مع ترامب، وكل ما يريدونه هو عودة تدفق النفط واستقرار اقتصاداتهم.
🔷 كما ينقل عن علي واعظ، مدير مشروع إيران في مجموعة الأزمات الدولية، أن دول الخليج تشعر بالإحباط لكنها لا تمتلك القدرة على إيقاف أي من طرفي الحرب.
🔷 كما يوضح التقرير أن الحركة البحرية في مضيق هرمز تراجعت مجدداً، وأن كثيراً من المسؤولين الخليجيين لا يتوقعون عودة الملاحة إلى طبيعتها في المستقبل القريب.
🔷 ويشير إلى أن الإمارات، إلى جانب السعودية والكويت، ما زالت ترسل ناقلات النفط عبر المضيق رغم التهديدات الإيرانية، وغالباً مع إغلاق أجهزة التعريف بالأقمار الصناعية لتقليل إمكانية تتبعها. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Laura Rozen
@lrozen
WaPo: US intel agencies assess that Trump’s escalation vs Iran is failing.
“Trump’s current course of ever-expanding attacks appears to have led to a stalemate.”
gift link:
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/07/20/us-st… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
مش ممد📖
@mhmdhsyn__
#حفره_امنیتی که عراقچی گفت چه طور ایجاد شد؟
صحبتهای ۵ سال پیش یونسی وزیر اطلاعات دولت اصلاحات:
نفوذ موساد به حدی است که همه مسؤولین باید نگران جان خودشان باشند؛
سازمانهایی که در مقابل وزارت اطلاعات ایجاد شد باعث تضعیف آن شد؛
به جای مبارزه با نفوذ دشمن، به جان خودی ها افتادند… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Firas Kontar
@fkontar78
Je pensais qu'il s'agissait d'un fake, mais j'ai vérifié : il s'agit bien d'une communication officielle du Syndicat des médecins syriens. Les femmes médecins ayant participé à un congrès consacré aux soins des nouveau-nés à Hama sont représentées sur les supports de communication par des personnages animés plutôt que par leurs photographies.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇮🇷🇺🇸 Instead of trying to shoot U.S. aircraft out of the sky, Iran is taking away the runways.
There's a name for it now: debasification. And by the numbers, it's working.
Prewar, the U.S. could run operations against Iran from roughly 20 airbases. Strip out Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi and Jordan and you're down to about five.
Hundreds of airframes compressed onto a handful of tarmacs, with less time between launch detection and impact than it takes to get them airborne. More planes parked, more hits.
Jordan was supposed to be the fallback. Per NYT reporting, 4 Iranian strikes there in a week produced casualties and aircraft losses, including personnel killed at Muwaffaq Salti. Interception rates in the footage look nothing like the official ones.
And the retreat carries its own penalty. Pull back to Israel and every tanker now flies a thousand-plus miles to reach Iran's border. More when carrier aircraft are launching from 1,700 miles out in the Arabian Sea.
No tankers, no loiter time. No loiter time, no suppressing Iranian air defenses. No suppression, no cheap bombs. And the cruise missile stocks are already thin.
The one lever left is accepting losses the U.S. hasn't accepted in a generation. Is Washington willing to pull it?
Source: Amerikanets on Substack / Writer: Oliver -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joshua Landis
@joshua_landis
Syria Poll -- three findings stand out.
1. Syrians have become increasingly critical of the country’s trajectory, with 46% expressing a negative assessment in June. “The country is like a bomb; once the fuse is lit, it will explode,” a woman warned in a focus group. Government approval ratings have fallen in parallel, to just 20%.
2. There is a striking gap between high- and low-income areas in assessments of government performance, public services, safety and the rule of law. “Syria has become two classes: one very high, and one under the ground,” another women said. In the June wave, fewer than 10% of respondents in low-income areas reported feeling safe or experiencing a meaningful presence of the rule of law – dramatically lower than the equivalent proportion in high-income areas. In June, 56% of respondents said they had difficulty covering basic living expenses at least once a month, while 23% experienced such difficulties weekly or daily.
3. Confidence in surrounding transitional justice is fragile. In February, 56% of respondents said they trusted the government to achieve transitional justice. By June, only 28% said that the trial of former security chief Atef Najib — the first of its kind against a senior Assad regime figure — had increased their trust in the justice process.
syriaintransition.com/en/home/archive/issue-37/what-syria… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Vaez
@AliVaez
The timing of these leaks is no accident. They appear designed to prompt more escalation to foreclose any pathway back to diplomacy and lock both sides into a conflict that becomes not a means to an end, but a forever war.
The Wall Street Journal
@WSJ
Israel believes Iran moved thousands of uranium-enrichment centrifuges into tunnels deep inside a mountain last fall, Israeli and U.S. officials say, a development that would heighten concerns that Tehran could reconstitute its nuclear program. www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-believes-iran-moved-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kamran Bokhari
@KamranBokhari
Ultimately, the future security architecture of the Gulf will depend less on the precise contours of any agreement with Iran than on how the broader Middle East is reordered under the United States’ emerging grand strategy of regional burden-sharing.
In that evolving framework, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and now Pakistan - supported by Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and even Azerbaijan - will increasingly bear the responsibility for managing an Iran that is likely to undergo a prolonged and uncertain internal transformation.
Doing so, however, will require these regional powers to first reconcile their own competing interests and develop a more coherent strategic framework capable of sustaining a stable balance of power, and, more importantly, forge a durable working relationship with Israel.
In essence, these Arab and Muslim stakeholders will need to balance between the two principal warring parties.
My latest in @newlinesmag
newlinesmag.com/argument/the-paths-forward-for-the-gulf-s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Current Report
@Currentreport1
BREAKING:
Israeli intelligence believes that Iran has moved thousands of nuclear centrifuges into tunnels deep inside Pickaxe Mountain, a heavily fortified underground facility near Natanz – WSJ
The assessment says the centrifuges could be used to enrich Iran's existing stockpile of 60% highly enriched uranium to weapons-grade for potential use in nuclear warheads. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House MENA
@CH_MENAP
'Tehran cannot compel Washington to abandon its regional interests, and Washington cannot eliminate Tehran’s ability to impose costs without risking exactly the wider war it says it wants to avoid,' writes @SanamVakil for @TIME.
time.com/article/2026/07/16/war-america-iran-trump-hormuz/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
AbdiMedia | عبدی مدیا
@AbdiMedia_net
🔴 موگویی: شنیدیم از دولت تهدید استعفا بوده مثلا از سمت شما؟
💢 من؟؟؟ هیچ وقت. اتفاقا در سیاست خارجی وضع من خوب بود و جنگ سیاست خارجی ما را به نقطه ای رسانده بود که پرچم ما بالا بود. البته خدا وکیلی کسی استعفا نکرد.
📌 موگویی: آتش بس با نظر آقا مجتبی است؟
📌 عراقچی: آن روزها ارتباط با ایشان سخت بود و ارتباط ما با رابط ها بود و مسائل اینگونه منتقل شد.
📌 موگویی: اولین بار پیشنهاد آتش بس از سمت چه کسی رود؟
📌 عراقچی: از پایان هفته دوم جنگ پیشنهاد آتش بس از سمت امریکا شروع شد. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ramazan Bursa
@RBursa
İran Dışişleri Bakanı Abbas Erakçi'den Türkiye'nin rolü ile ilgili açıklama:
"İran'ı bölmek için planlar yapmışlardı. Savaşın dördüncü günü Trump, Irak Kürdistan Bölgesi'ndeki bazı liderleri aradı. O günün akşamında ben de hem Sayın Barzani'yi hem Sayın Talabani'yi hem de Türkiye Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Fidan'ı aradım. Ayrıca Irak Başbakanı Sayın Sudani ile görüştüm. Onlara şu uyarıyı yaptım: Eğer Kürdistan bölgesinden bize yönelik en ufak bir tehdit gelirse, karşılık veririz; başka bir yerle meşgul olduğumuzu sanmayın.
Türkiye bu süreçte çok etkili bir rol oynadı. Hem Amerikalılarla görüştüler hem de bu konuda çok sağlam bir duruş sergilediler. Bu kolektif çabalar, İran'ı bölme ve iç karışıklık çıkarma komplosunun başarısız olmasını sağladı.
O 'küçük kuş' (Rıza Pehlevi'yi kastediyor) İsrail ziyareti sırasında İran'ın parçalanması konusunda anlaşmış. 'Kenar bölgeler sizin olsun, merkezde ben şah olayım' demiş. İran'ı bölmek, rejimi çökertmek ve iç karışıklık çıkarmak için tüm planlarını yapmışlardı ama başaramadılar."
Ramazan Bursa
@RBursa
İran Dışişleri Bakanı Abbas Erakçi'den çok önemli açıklamalar:
◾️Bu dönemde Mücteba Hamanei hiç görmedim. Birkaç kişi dışında kimsenin onu gördüğünü sanmıyorum.
◾️(Mücteba'nın Rehber seçileceğini düşünüyor muydunuz?) O her zaman adaylardan biri, bu makam için uygun kişilerden biri olarak görüldü. Karar Uzmanlar Meclisi'ne aittir.
◾️Bölge, bizim tüm bölgeyi (stratejik noktaları) vuracağımıza ve onların buna cevap veremeyeceğine inanamıyordu. Bu, gerçekleşen büyük bir dönüşümdü ve aslında bölgenin güvenlik yapısını tamamen değiştirdi. İran'ın tüm bölgeyi vurması, hem de tamamını...
◾️Savaştan önce Ulusal Güvenlik Yüksek Konseyi’nde çok sayıda toplantı yaptık. Tüm senaryolar incelenmişti. Örneğin; eğer Amerika tek başına saldırırsa ne yaparız? Rejim (İsrail) ile birlikte saldırırlarsa ne yaparız? Eğer altyapı tesislerimize yönelirlerse ne yaparız?
◾️Ve bir senaryo daha vardı ki o en son ihtimaldi: "Ya Liderlik (Rehberlik) makamını vururlarsa ne yapacağız?"
◾️Toplantıda hiç kimsenin dili bunu söylemeye varmıyordu. Bunu dile getirmek bile çok zordu. Bu yüzden buna bir kod vermiştik: "110 Kodu". Herkes "110 Kodu" denildiğinde neyin kastedildiğini biliyordu.
◾️İşte bu yüzden karşı saldırı anında başladı; hem de çok düzenli, planlı ve organize bir şekilde başladı. Kesinlikle gafil avlanmadık. Her şeye karşı hazırlıklıydık.
◾️Görüştüğüm tüm bakanlar, dost ya da düşman fark etmeksizin, İran'ın bu savaştan daha güçlü çıktığını söylüyorlar. İran dünyayı şaşırttı.
◾️On gün önce ateşkes yapmış olsaydık hem Laricani'yi kaybetmezdik hem de Asaluye ve Mübareke Çelik tesisleri elimizde zarar görmemiş bir şekilde olurdu.
◾️İki kez tünele toplantı için girdim. Ben ve Dışişleri Bakanlığı yardımcıları, savaş sırasında Dışişleri Bakanlığı binasını terk etmedik.
◾️Bölge liderlerinden biri İran’ı askeri saldırıyla tehdit etti; ona, 'Eğer vurursan doğrudan seninle savaşa gireriz' uyarısında bulundum ve savaşın sonuna kadar o Arap ülkesini bombaladık.
◾️Dey ayı (Aralık-Ocak) olayları için hazırlıklı değildik. Elbette 18 ve 19 Dey tarihlerinde dış bir komplo devreye girdi; halkın üzerine ateş açmaya başlayan silahlar ve eğitimli güçler ülkeye sokuldu.
◾️18 Dey’den sonraki Çarşamba günü, savaşın eşiğine kadar geldik. O iki günün olayları, düşmanın savaş için toplumsal zeminin hazır olduğunu düşünmesine yol açtı.
◾️12 günlük savaşta, ne tür değerlere sahip olduğumuzu anladık; ne yazık ki 12 günlük savaştan sonra da bu değerlerin kadrini bilmedik.
◾️Sayın Hicazi’yi neredeyse enkazın altından çıkardılar. Özel kalem müdürü ise bedeninden hiçbir iz kalmayacak şekilde şehit oldu. Birkaç saniye içinde "Beyt" (Rehberlik Ofisi) yerleşkesine üç saldırı gerçekleştirildi.
◾️Savaşın üçüncü günü, bölge ülkelerinden birinin dışişleri bakanı beni aradı ve şöyle dedi: "Topraklarımıza yaptığınız saldırıların misillemesi olarak birkaç saat sonra ülkenizin falan noktasını vuracağız; ancak biz devam etmeyeceğiz, siz de devam etmeyin. Aksi takdirde, bizimle sizin aranızda da savaş başlayacaktır."
◾️Son savaş, bölgenin güvenlik yapısını değiştirdi. Tüm adımlarımız, daha öncesinden Şehit Lider'in onayından geçmişti.
◾️Biz petrol ihraç edemezsek, bölgedeki hiç kimsenin petrol ihraç etmesi mümkün değildir.
◾️ABD’nin "sıfır zenginleştirme" şeklindeki mantıksız talebine karşı direndik. Karşı taraf, müzakere yoluyla istediği sonuca ulaşamayacağını görünce savaşa yöneldi; "müzakerelerin savaşa yol açtığını" söylemek doğru değildir.
◾️Bence 12 günlük savaşı durdurmak, nizamın aldığı doğru bir karardı. 12 günlük savaş, 40 günlük savaştaki zafer için bir ön hazırlık oldu.
◾️40 günlük savaştan önce müzakerelere, esasen ileride kimse "Eğer müzakere etseydiniz savaş çıkmazdı" diyemesin diye başladık. Biz ve askeri güçler, savaşın yeniden patlak vereceğinden emindik.
◾️Ben kendi itibarımı korumak için değil, İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin çıkarları için dışişleri bakanıyım. Bunun aksi bir tutum ihanet sayılır.
Sunucu: Eğer biz 7 Esfend’de (26 Şubat) birkaç yıllık askıya almayı (nükleer faaliyetleri durdurmayı) kabul etseydik savaş çıkmaz mıydı?
◾️Bunu kesin olarak söyleyemeyiz ama kabul etseydik savaştan daha büyük bir zarar görürdük; çünkü ülkenin onurunu satmış olurduk.
Sunucu: Ben olsaydım, Trump ve Netanyahu gidene kadar birkaç yıllık askıya almayı kabul eder, sonra zenginleştirmeye yeniden başlardım.
◾️Biz zorbalığı ve teslimiyeti bir gelenek (yol) haline getirmemeliydik; bu yüzden savaş pahasına da olsa müzakerelerde dik durduk.
◾️Bölge liderlerinden biriyle görüştüm. Çok kibirli bir tavırla ve davranışlarında hissedilen bir tür sevinçle şöyle dedi: 'Emin olun ki size saldıracaklar. Nükleer tesislerinizi yok edecekler, petrol tesislerinizi de mahvedecekler ve siz karşılık vermeyeceksiniz; çünkü bizzat sizi (şahıslarınızı) vuracaklar ve liderliğinizi de hedef alacaklar.
◾️Onlara, konunun sizin hayal ettiğiniz kadar basit olmadığını söyledim. Eğer bizim herhangi bir noktamızı vururlarsa, biz de buna karşılık gelen noktayı hedef alırız.
◾️Ancak daha sonra bazı Amerikan ve Siyonist çevrelerden gelen analizler duyduk. Bazıları bize, onların bölge ülkelerine şu açıklamayı yaptıklarını söyledi: 'En fazla bir ay daha dayanın; bu hikaye sonsuza dek bitecek.
◾️Anayasa'da barış zamanı mı, savaş zamanı mı yoksa başka bir durum mu; buna Ulusal Güvenlik Yüksek Konseyi'nin karar vermesi gerektiği belirtilir. Ayrıca barış ve savaş kararı, anayasaya göre nihayetinde Rehberlik makamına bağlıdır. Yani tüm bu karar alma süreçleri önceden belirlenmiştir. Bu, "sen ben şöyle olur, böyle olur" diyeceğimiz bir şey değil; her şeyin tam olarak hesaplanması gerekir.
◾️Amerika ile savunma muhtırasının (Mütabakat Zaptı) onaylandığı o son toplantı günü. Hani şu çokça sorgulanan ve hakkında çok konuşulan toplantı. O malum son toplantı, akşam saat 9’da başladı, gece 3’e kadar sürdü.
◾️Ateşkes çok daha zor güvenlik şartları altında gerçekleşti. O sırada Yüksek Konseyi (tek bir yerde) toplama imkanı yoktu. Çünkü toplansak, o bina anında bombalanırdı ve ülke büyük bir felaket yaşardı.
◾️O dönemde daha küçük çaplı toplantılar yapıldı (4'erli, 3'erli gruplar halinde) ve onların sonuçları birleştirildi.
◾️Tabii ki o zaman da hem lehte hem de aleyhte görüşler vardı. Ama o günün şartlarını, sonraki şartlarla asla kıyaslayamazsınız. İki kişinin bir araya gelmesinin bile çok zor olduğu savaş koşulları altındaydınız. Ama sonuçta görüşmeler yapıldı.
◾️ Ancak nihayetinde şu şartla kabul edildi: "Eğer Amerika, bizim sunduğumuz 10 maddelik planın müzakerelerin temeli olmasını kabul ederse."This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sanam Vakil صنم وكىل
@SanamVakil
Western Iran analysts or Iranian analysts based in the West rarely support the Iranian regime. Yet time and again, those of us who try to explain what we see rather than what we might want to see are accused of being pro regime. Analysis is not advocacy. Explaining the regime’s calculations, constraints, or its resilience does not mean justifying its actions, ignoring Iranian society, or endorsing its rule.
Most serious scholars do not work for Tehran, cannot regularly return to Iran, and do not have privileged access. We spend our time trying to interpret incomplete evidence as carefully and objectively as possible.
Our conclusions should be challenged on the basis of evidence and method, not dismissed as pro regime simply because they do not satisfy opponents of the Islamic Republic be it in the region, the diaspora or the West.
The rich diversity of work on Iran is something I am proud to see. It reflects a broad and increasingly sophisticated field. @CH_MENAP just last week we convened a fantastic day-long research discussion on Iran and the war. There was no consensus view, but there was thoughtful, respectful, and dynamic discussion among participants from across the analytical spectrum. That is what a serious academic and analytical community should look like. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Regional mediators are trying to get Iran and the US to agree to a pause in the fighting.
A longer-term deal on the strait would then be negotiated.
The proposals for that seem to acknowledge the payment of fees--a key demand for Iran. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
In the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, chaos is unfolding rapidly
The Houthis announced this week the closure of the strait to Saudi vessels, escalating a naval blockade in response to the air and land blockade that Saudi Arabia imposes on Yemen.
Until last week, Saudi Arabia was exporting around 4 to 4.5 million barrels per day through the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. Of that total, approximately 2.5 million barrels needed to sail south, crossing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to supply the Asian market.
That route is now interrupted. The alternative, circumnavigating the African continent, adds between 6,000 and 6,500 kilometers to the journey, equivalent to 10 to 14 extra days of continuous sailing. The additional cost, solely in fuel and crew operational expenses, could reach up to US$1.5 million per vessel.
The cost of maritime insurance has also skyrocketed and some insurers are refusing coverage.
The Saudis are refusing to negotiate and have already issued alerts to their navy and allied ships. It is precisely at this point that the situation could escalate, and significantly.
The European Union maintains Operation Aspides, with a strictly defensive mandate: protection of legitimate commercial traffic in the region, without authorization for strikes on Yemeni territory.
In contrast, the United Kingdom and the United States, which also operate in the area, act under separate commands with missions of an offensive nature targeting sites in Yemen.
Years ago, a coalition of around 30 ships in the region already faced difficulties containing the Houthis, who at the time possessed an arsenal inferior to the one they have today.
Now, with the ongoing conflict involving Iran, the political will led by the US could drag European countries into a broader escalation, beginning with attempts to force the reopening of the strait.
Read more:
open.substack.com/pub/global21/p/in-the-bab-el-mandeb-str… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
John Hudson
@John_Hudson
Scoop: U.S. intelligence reports offer a pessimistic view of new rounds of U.S. military strikes against Iran: They are unlikely to have a significant impact on Iran or soften its negotiating position, current and former officials tell @wstrobel and me.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
"The countries surrounding the Gulf would treat it as a shared territory — a regional commons of sorts — and charge a nominal fee only to oil tankers for the water’s maintenance"
The way forward is a solution with no American input or oversight, but led by regional integration -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ömer Özkizilcik
@OmerOzkizilcik
Why does the reshuffle in Syria's security apparatus mean 👇👇
📌 Anas Khattab as Director of the National Security Office and continuing to be Interior Minister.
📌 Hussein al-Salama as Deputy Director of the National Security Office.
📌 Maleh al-Shantut as Deputy Minister of the Interior for Security Affairs.
📌 Abdul Qader Tahhan as Head of the General Intelligence Agency.
ℹ️ Since the end of the Assad regime, two Ministers in Syria play an outsized role. Anas Khattab and Shaibani. Both still operate as they are still in the days of HTS. Thus, Khattab and Shaibani focus on topics that is beyond the standard responsibilities of their Ministries.
In the HTS days, Shaibani was responsible for the political bureau and thus responsible not only for foreign relations but also for domestic politics. He continued to operate in that way, but due to confusion over responsibilities Sharaa reduced his power by limiting his responsibilities.
In the case of Khattab, the situation is different. In HTS days he was responsible for intelligence and police forces. In Idlib, these two were largely the same. After the fall of Assad, Khattab was appointed initially as head of intelligence and then later as interior minister. Currently, as both the intelligence and the internal security forces of the interior ministry are responsible in the counter terrorism file, we had many disputes over who is in charge over what in Syria. This created friction between Khattab and Salamah.
Unlike in the case of Shaibani, Shara resolved this issue by expanding Khattab's responsibilities and appointing his associate as the new head of intelligence and subordinated Salamah legally under Khattab.
ℹ️ Syrian intelligence officers who are not new recruits are largely people who worked under Khattab for years. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
It’s funny to read a criticism about the “poverty of analysis” about Iran that reflexively refers to the “mullahs in Tehran” making decisions.
There is a single Islamic jurist (Ejei) on Iran’s 12-person Supreme National Security Council!
The actual issue in Iran analysis today is that people in senior roles at major institutions (1) fail to update their knowledge of Iran as the country evolves, (2) fail to engage alternative viewpoints with intellectual curiosity, (3) refuse to enter into collegial and respectful debate, opting instead to throw around accusations like “regime supporter.”
Jonathan, if you have to append a disclaimer at the end of a post, it’s probably because that post is discrediting to you and your employer and will be read as such. And yet! -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
أحـمـد حـسن Ahmed Hasen
@ahmedhasen313
ينقل وزير خارجية إيران السيد عباس عراقجي الحوار الذي دار بينه وبين حاكم خليجي، الاغلب انه الأمير محمد بن سلمان، ويبدو ان تاريخ هذا الحوار كان في 8 يوليو تموز 2025 في مكة المكرمة، أي بعد نهاية حرب الـ 12 يوم بأسبوعين.
توقف عراقجي في السعودية وهو في طريقه للعودة من قمة مجموعة بريكس في البرازيل.
خلال هذه الزيارة التقى بولي العهد الأمير محمد بن سلمان، ووزير الخارجية الأمير فيصل بن فرحان، ووزير الدفاع الأمير خالد بن سلمان، وجرى هذا الحوار:
قال السيد عباس عراقجي:
عندما التقيت بأحد قادة المنطقة، تحدث من موقف متعجرف جداً وبفرحة كان يمكنك الشعور بها بداخله... قال: كونوا على يقين بأنهم سيهاجمونكم... سيدمرون منشآتكم النووية، وسيقضون على قدراتكم الصاروخية، وسيدمرون منشآتكم النفطية... ولا تردوا لأنهم سيضربونكم شخصياً، سيضربون قيادتكم.
المقدم: من قال هذا؟
وزير خارجية إيران: أحد قادة المنطقة.
المقدم: السعودية إذن؟
وزير خارجية إيران: الآن دعنا لا ندخل في التفاصيل، فنحن في النهاية لدينا عمل معهم.
المقدم: هذا الأسلوب في الحديث يشبه أسلوب بن سلمان.
وزير خارجية إيران: الآن دعنا لا ندخل في الأسماء، لا، هو ينطبق عليهم جميعاً... دعنا نقم بعملنا. لا، كانت معنوياتهم جميعاً هكذا، كلهم كانوا ينتظرون هذه الواقعة، لكنهم كانوا خائفين. أنا هناك قلت له..
المقدم: يعني كانوا يعتقدون أن الأمر قد انتهى؟
وزير خارجية إيران: نعم، قلت له إن القضية ليست بهذه السهولة التي تتحدثون عنها. إذا ضربوا أي نقطة منا، فسنضرب النقطة المقابلة لها. إذا ضربوا منشآتنا النووية، فسنضرب منشآتهم النووية. إذا ضربوا قدراتنا العسكرية، فسنضرب القدرات العسكرية لإسرائيل.
وإذا شاركت أمريكا، فسنضطر لضرب القواعد الأمريكية في المنطقة، لأن صواريخنا لا تصل إلى الأراضي الأمريكية، لكنها تصل إلى قواعدهم في المنطقة. وإذا ضربوا منشآتنا النفطية ولم نتمكن من بيع النفط، فلن يتمكن أحد في المنطقة من بيع النفط. قلت هذه الجملة نصاً.
وهذا بالطبع جعل الطرف الآخر يغضب قليلاً وقال: لا أحد يستطيع تهديدنا، إذا هددنا أحد، فإن كل أوروبا وكل أمريكا ستقف ضده. حتى الصين ستقف ضده لأن لدينا علاقات تجارية واسعة جداً مع الصين. تدفق النفط في العالم بأيدينا، سلسلة التوزيع وما إلى ذلك بأيدينا، ومثل هذا الكلام.
فضحكت وقلت: يا سيدي، لا سمح الله، نحن لا نريد ضربكم أنتم. نحن سنضرب القواعد الأمريكية التي للأسف تقع على أراضيكم.
لاحقاً سمعنا تحليلات من مؤسسات أمريكية وصهيونية، وقال لنا البعض إنهم ذهبوا إلى دول المنطقة وقاموا بتحريضهم قائلين: اصمدوا لشهر آخر كحد أقصى، وستنتهي هذه القصة إلى الأبد. نعم، إيران ستضرب، ستطلق صواريخ وتفعل كذا، ولكن إذا صمدنا لشهر واحد فسيتم إصلاح كل شيء. وقاموا بتجهيزهم للصمود لمدة شهر وسينتهي الأمر.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sara Massoumi
@SaraMassoumi
سیدعباس عراقچی:
قانون اساسی بررسی شرایط جنگ و صلح را به شورای عالی امنیت ملی واگذار کرده است.
🔷البته اعلام صلح و جنگ نیز طبق قانون اساسی در نهایت با مقام رهبری است.
اعضای شعام از حوزههای مختلف هستند؛ نظامی، سیاسی، سیاست داخلی، سیاست خارجی، اقتصادی و امنیتی./1 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
It is fair to say that the Trump Administration tried to change the landscape of diplomacy through the creation of a southern corridor in the Persian Gulf while the MOU was still in effect.
It is one thing to argue that the southern corridor lies in the US's interest.
It is a different matter altogether to argue that WHILE the final status of the Strait is being negotiated WITHIN the MOU, an effort should have been pursued OUTSIDE of the MOU to create that corridor.
And then, once this effort has contributed to the MOU collapsing, take military action to create new facts on the ground that renders such a corridor more likely within a final settlement.
In essence, that's a strategy centered on military action shaping the landscape of diplomacy, rather than a strategy in which the final outcome is determined through PEACEFUL diplomacy.
Either the commitment is to diplomacy within the MOU, or it is to actions (military and non-military) outside of the MOU.
It can't be both. I suspect we will not see any SERIOUS diplomacy unless this question has been settled.
Unfortunately, we are not there yet. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
مش ممد📖
@mhmdhsyn__
محمدجواد ظریف در مقاله جدید خود که امروز منتشر شد، چه گفته است؟
خلاصه این مقاله در ۱۰ بند:
«چشمانداز ایرانی از خاورمیانه جدید»
۱. آمریکا حملات به ایران را از سر گرفته و تفاهمنامه اخیر (امضا شده در سوئیس) به دلیل اختلاف تفسیر درباره تنگه هرمز کاملاً فروپاشیده است.
ترامپ اعلام کرده دیگر با ایران معامله نمیکند.
این شکست اجتنابناپذیر بود چون دو طرف برداشتهای متفاوتی از تعهدات داشتند.
۲. ادامه جنگ به نفع هیچ طرفی نیست. ایران جنگ را تحمیلشده میبیند و مردم و نیروهای مسلحش در برابر دو قدرت هستهای مقاومت کردهاند، اما ترجیح میدهند جنگ تمام شود.
آمریکا هم با این درگیری از هدف اصلی خود — کاهش حضور در غرب آسیا و تمرکز روی هندو-اقیانوسیه — دور میماند.
۳. حملات آمریکا و اسرائیل نتوانست نظام ایران را ساقط کند و فقط ثابت کرد که تهران را نمیتوان از هر معماری امنیتی آینده منطقه حذف کرد.
این مقاومت، ایران را به بازیگر محوری در امنیت انرژی و کشتیرانی تبدیل کرده است.
۴. تنگه هرمز برای ایران مسئله وجودی شده.
تحریمهای آمریکا قبلاً تنگه را عملاً برای تجارت ایران بسته بود.
حالا ایران برای جلوگیری از استفاده دشمنان از تنگه علیه خود، ترافیک را محدود کرده و تفاوتی بین کشتیهای تجاری و نظامی قائل نیست.
۵. ایران حق دارد تا زمانی که جنگ و تحریم ادامه دارد، از تنگه به عنوان اهرم استفاده کند، اما باید خویشتنداری کند چون بستن طولانیمدت ممکن است جهان را علیهاش متحد کند و سرمایهگذاری در مسیرهای جایگزین را ارائه دهد.
۶. بهترین راهحل، ایجاد شبکه امنیتی منطقهای توسط خود کشورهای ساحلی خلیج فارس است.
ایران و عمان باید با دیگر همسایگان، اداره آینده تنگه را بر اساس حقوق بینالملل و حقوق حاکمیتی ساحلی تعریف کنند تا حضور نظامی خارجی بیمعنی شود.
۷. توافق پایدار با آمریکا باید واقعبینانه باشد:
دو طرف نمیتوانند دوست شوند، اما میتوانند پیمان عدم تجاوز متقابل امضا کنند.
آمریکا باید تحریمها را بردارد، اقدامات تروریستی را متوقف کند، تمامیت ارضی ایران را به رسمیت بشناسد و در بازسازی کمک کند (از جمله صندوق ۳۰۰ میلیارد دلاری).
۸. در مقابل، ایران تضمینهای عدم اشاعه دائمی (مانند تصویب پروتکل الحاقی آژانس و تبدیل فتوای هستهای به قانون) میدهد.
دو طرف میتوانند روی مسائل مشترک مثل افغانستان، مواد مخدر و مهاجرت همکاری کنند.
۹. آمریکا اگر واقعاً صلح میخواهد، باید با نقش اسرائیل به عنوان خرابکار اصلی مقابله کند.
اسرائیل همیشه با توافقها مخالفت کرده، در غزه و لبنان بیثباتی ایجاد کرده و منافع آمریکا را قربانی میکند.
واشنگتن باید فشار واقعی روی اسرائیل وارد کند.
۱۰. امنیت بلندمدت منطقه نیازمند فاصله گرفتن از مدل وابستگی به قدرتهای خارجی است.
گفتگوی نهادی منطقهای، اقدامات اعتمادساز و حتی شبکه غنیسازی هستهای صلحآمیز مشترک (با یک مرکز واحد برای کل منطقه با نظارت مشترک) پیشنهاد میشود تا ثبات و توسعه پایدار محقق شود.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alireza Talakoubnejad
@websterkaroon
Full Hour and Half Video of Part One of Javad Mogoei's Interview with Abbas Araghchi as a part of the "Story of the War 2" series.
Topics covered include the war, MoU, diplomacy, restarting of the conflict.
The second part of the interview has not been released yet.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post.
Alireza Talakoubnejad
@websterkaroon
Conservative journalist Javad Mogoei conducted a new interview with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
In released preview clip he asks Araghchi questions such as,
"Was it not your negotiations that got us again to war?"
"Would it not have been better if we continued the war [and not done a ceasefire]?"
"Is the credibility of the negotiators not going away when you keep going to talk and war keeps happening?"
"If we would have accepted the American proposal would the war not had happened?"
"If we had the upper hand why did we accept the ceasefire?"This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Araghchi’s unusually candid (and interesting) interview is now drawing criticism across IRGC-linked platforms. The issue is not only about revealing sensitive information during wartime but the increasingly visible emergence of a deeper struggle over how the war should be understood, and how it should eventually end.
- At the heart of the criticism is Araghchi’s argument that diplomacy and negotiations were collective decisions of the system, not personal initiatives by him or President Pezeshkian. He also suggested that an earlier ceasefire might have spared lives and critical infrastructure. For parts of the security establishment, that risks undermining the narrative that prolonging the war was both necessary and strategically justified.
- While the official criticism focuses on his disclosure of details about wartime meetings and decision-making, the real fault line appears to be more strategic. Araghchi sees military pressure as a tool to strengthen diplomacy; influential voices close to the IRGC increasingly argue, instead, that diplomacy should serve the battlefield, not the other way around.
- Araghchi’s emphasis seems indeed more balanced: military leverage should ultimately create the conditions for a negotiated outcome.
- Taken together, these reactions suggest that Araghchi is coming under growing pressure from parts of the IRGC camp. His interview also reads as an attempt to defend both the diplomatic track and his own role from becoming the convenient scapegoat for the costs of a prolonged war.
- This does not necessarily point to an institutional split, but it does reinforce what many observers, including myself, have long suspected: there are genuine differences between Araghchi and parts of the military establishment over escalation, the role of diplomacy, and the conditions under which the war should end.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سیدصادق حسینی
@sadeq_hosseini
مقاله جدید مهم محمدجواد ظریف در فارنافرز؛ چرایی اهمیت راهبردی تنگه هرمز برای ایران را برای مخاطب غربی به خوبی توضیح داده و تاکید کرده است:
تحرکات دریایی در خلیج فارس باید در چارچوب قواعد درگیری و نیت راهبردی درک شود، نه بر اساس مقرراتی که در زمان صلح حاکم است.
@JZarif
ایالات متحده و اسرائیل جنگ اخیر با ایران را با این فرض آغاز کردند که فشار مستمر میتواند حکومت ایران را وادار به تسلیم کند یا موجب فروپاشی جمهوری اسلامی شود. اما در عوض، آنها خود را در یک بنبست راهبردی گرفتار دیدند.
هیچیک از اقدامات آنها، از جمله حملات بیسابقه به رهبران سیاسی و نظامی ایران و خسارات قابلتوجه به زیرساختهای آن، نتوانست تهران را وادار به تغییر مسیر کند.
تمامیت ارضی و نظام سیاسی ایران پابرجا مانده است و تابآوری ملت ایران و ظرفیت آن برای دفاع از حاکمیت خود حتی در دشوارترین شرایط را ثابت کرده است.
قدرتهای خارجی ناگزیرند این واقعیت و پیامدهای آن را بهدرستی دریابند.
هدف غالب و اصلی ایران در تنگه این است که اطمینان حاصل کند مخالفان نمیتوانند از این آبراه برای آمادهسازی، تسهیل یا تداوم فشار علیه ایران – اعم از نظامی، سیاسی یا اقتصادی – سوءاستفاده کنند.
تمایز پذیرفتهشده پیشین میان ناوبری تجاری و عبور نظامی رنگ باخته است.
تحرکات دریایی در خلیج فارس باید در چارچوب قواعد درگیری و نیت راهبردی درک شود، نه بر اساس مقرراتی که در زمان صلح حاکم است. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ilan Goldenberg
@ilangoldenberg
I’ve worked on Iran for nearly 20 years. Our options are never great, but I’ve never seen things this bad. For the first time in my career, I’m at a loss.
When this war began, I warned that Iran would likely emerge weakened but more aggressive and risk-tolerant—leaving the region trapped in a cycle of military clashes and chronic instability. That has happened. What I underestimated was the leverage Iran would gain through its stranglehold over the Strait of Hormuz.
For a moment, the MOU offered a possible way out. It was deeply flawed, but better than the alternatives. Then vague terms and shoddy negotiating caused it to collapse: Iran believed it could retain some control over the Strait; Washington believed the Strait would reopen to international shipping.
But the fundamental problem wasn’t the negotiation. It was Trump’s catastrophic decision to go to war in the first place.
The result: higher oil prices, economic shocks, depleted US missile-defense stocks, immense regional damage and civilian suffering, alienated allies and very little achieved in return.
So what now?
We could pay Iran off through sanctions relief, oil exports and access to the international banking system. But after surviving forty days of war, Tehran is angry, distrustful and convinced it holds the stronger hand. Its price is so high – and so humiliating – that Trump will never accept it.
We could escalate militarily, which is what the US is doing. But bombing has not produced meaningful Iranian concessions, and Trump appears unwilling to bear the costs of the maximalist alternatives. More pressure means an expensive, dangerous and potentially endless war, with serious risks to US forces and the entire region as we tragically saw this weekend. And it has little chance of success.
Or we could encourage the Gulf states to negotiate a regional arrangement. That may ultimately be the most promising path, but the Gulf states are divided, this remains fundamentally a US-Iran conflict, and any agreement will require major American concessions while leaving Iran strategically stronger than it was before the war. So this isn’t very appealing and hard to get to as well.
The likeliest outcome is therefore that we are looking at a new normal: recurring US-Iran clashes, periodic American or Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear program, Iranian control over the SOH, higher oil prices and a larger, longer-lasting American military presence in the Middle East. But since the costs of all out escalation are too high both sides try to keep it from going there, though there is always a risk.
Iran’s leverage will eventually depreciate as countries build pipelines, diversify energy supplies and establish alternative trade routes. But that could take years.
Eventually, exhaustion may produce a deal. Iran may decide that controlling the Strait while living under blockade is unsustainable. Washington may accept that it must offer more. The Gulf states may finally unite around a workable diplomatic framework. But not soon.
Trump took a situation in which better options plainly existed, started an unnecessary war and produced a strategic disaster that will take years to unwind.
For now, we are all stuck with this mess. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Negar Mortazavi
@NegarMortazavi
Trump is trying to rewrite the Iran deal on the battlefield. Unable to force Iran to capitulate during the war, he is now using renewed military pressure to secure what he failed to achieve through negotiations.
My piece for @The_NewArab
www.newarab.com/analysis/how-trump-trying-rewrite-iran-de… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
Anyone who thinks a ground invasion of Iran is a serious possibility needs to watch this...
Matt Bracken is a former Navy SEAL and spec ops veteran, and he just delivered one of the most sobering comparisons I've heard yet:
Kharg Island is the size of Iwo Jima, where the U.S. pounded the island with battleships for WEEKS before landing 70,000 Marines... and still lost 7,000 lives and had 19,000 wounded in a single month.
Qeshm Island is bigger than Okinawa, which took 3 months and cost 12,000 American lives.
Iran has had decades to tunnel these islands, study U.S. tactics, and prepare for precisely this scenario, and unlike Japan in WWII, they have precision missiles that can reach every inch of the Persian Gulf.
"If we went into Iran, I think we will lose everybody we send in, the more we send in, the more we lose, and the Iranians have been very open about saying, come on in, we welcome you."
Matt ended by saying rationality is out the window, and that this started with a February 28th sneak attack, so nothing should be considered off the table.
Great talking to you, @Matt_Bracken48This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arian Zaman 🚩
آدرس تونل ها
۱-تونل در پیروزی و دربند
۲-جاهای دیگه هم هست شما نمی دانید
۳-همه در تونل ها هستند همه=رهبر فرمانده ها
۴-مدت بودن در یک تونل(بری تو تا چند روز باید اون تو باشی)تعدد اصابت
۵-اکسیژن را پر کردند یعنی اکسیژن تمام می شود پس از چند روز در صورت اصابتThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Charles Enderlin
@Charles1045
Complètement dingue Le régime Netanyahu est composé de fous furieux
The Times of Israel
@TimesofIsrael
Environmental Protection Minister Idit Silman, of Likud, reclassified the Nile crocodile as a “tended” wild animal this week, paving the way for their use in the penitentiary system according to the wishes of National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir.
Ben Gvir’s proposal appeared to draw inspiration from the South Florida Detention Facility, colloquially known as Alligator Alcatraz, which the White House opened in an alligator-infested area of the Florida Everglades in July to jail migrants.
The far-right politician first proposed jailing Palestinian security inmates in crocodile-surrounded facilities in a December meeting with Prison Service chief Kobi Yaakobi, Channel 13 reported.
Despite Ben Gvir’s insistence and a subsequent Prison Service visit to the Hamat Gader crocodile farm in northern Israel, Nature and Parks Authority officials have argued against the plan, noting that the creatures can only be held for educational and research purposes under the law.
Read more on The Times of Israel. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
إيران بالعربية | عاجل
@IranArabic_ir
وزير الخارجية الايراني عباس عراقجي:
منذ يوم الجمعة (قبل الحرب بيوم) كانت الأجواء تتجه نحو الحرب. التقيت برئيس الجمهورية يوم السبت في الساعة 8 صباحًا، وأخبرته أن "الأجواء حربية". كنا عادةً نقدم التقارير للسيد حجازي، وكان هو يرسلها إلى القيادة. التقيت بالسيد حجازي في الساعة 9، وقدمت له تقرير المفاوضات، وعندما كنت أتحدث عن الأجواء الحربية المشحونة، تعرض المكان للهجوم.
كان المجلس الاستراتيجي للعلاقات الخارجية يعقد اجتماعه الأسبوعي المعتاد في ذلك الوقت، وكان الإمام الراحل موجودًا في مكتبه، كما كان الشهيد شمخاني يعقد اجتماع مجلس الدفاع. كان عقد الاجتماعات المتزامنة في ذلك اليوم أمرًا غير غريب؛ ولكن علم العدو بهذه الاجتماعات كان نتيجة لثغرة استخباراتية، والتي ربما لا تزال موجودة.
كان اجتماع الشهيد شمخاني مع القادة في مجلس الدفاع، ومكتب الشهيد شيرازي، ومكتب السيد حجازي، ومكتب الإمام الراحل، كلها تقع ضمن نطاق مكتب الإمام. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ramazan Bursa
@RBursa
İran Eski Cumhurbaşkanı Hasan Ruhani:
"Cumartesi günü, Salı günü öğleden sonra sistemin tüm yetkililerinin Rehber'in (Ayetullah Ali Hamanei) huzurunda toplantıya davet edildiğini öğrendim. Hemen o Cumartesi günü kendisine bir mesaj gönderdim.
Öğle vakti mesajım kendisine ulaştı; ofisi aracılığıyla değil, başka bir kanal üzerinden gönderdim. Rehber şöyle buyurmuştu: 'Peki, eğer Sayın Ruhani böyle diyorsa, ama biz bu toplantı için herkesi davet ettik ve ben de bu toplantı için çok önemli bir konuşma hazırladım.'
Cevabından tam olarak ikna olmadığını hissettim.
Başka bir yoldan tekrar mesaj gönderdim. Üç dört kez daha girişimde bulundum. Kendi koruma ekibimin başkanına gidip Rehber'in koruma sorumlusuna bu işin önünü kesmelerini, durumun tehlikeli olduğunu söylemesini istedim. Yine de tereddüt ettim; Sayın Pezeşkiyan'ın ofisini aradım, Sayın Hac Mirzai ile görüştüm. Sayın Pezeşkiyan'ın bizzat gidip Rehber'le görüşmesini ve bu toplantının mutlaka iptal edilmesi gerektiğini, durumun çok tehlikeli olduğunu söyledim.
Sayın Laricani'yi üç kez aradım, her seferinde toplantıda olduğunu söylediler. Sayın Hicazi'yi iki kez aradım, ona da ulaşılamadı. Hamdolsun, sonunda o toplantı iptal edildi.
O toplantı iptal edildiği için çok mutluyum, vicdanım rahat ve Allah'a şükrediyorum. Eğer o toplantı gerçekleşseydi, Trump ve Netanyahu'nun asıl planı o toplantıyı vurmaktı.
Bu, tüm ülkeyi felç ederdi. Tüm yetkililer, erklerin başındakiler, hükümet, Uzmanlar Meclisi, Meclis; herkes oradaydı. Üstelik savunmasız bir yerdi, sadece normal bir çatısı olan bir Hüseyniye ... İki uçakla herkesi yok edebilirlerdi."
Ramazan Bursa
@RBursa
İran Eski Cumhurbaşkanı Hasan Ruhani, Ayetullah Ali Hamanei ile 56 yıllık ilişkisine dair hatıralarını anlatıyor; Devrim öncesinden İran-Irak Savaşı'na, Ulusal Güvenlik Yüksek Konseyi'ndeki otuz yıllık görevine kadar bir çok konudan bahsediyor... Dinlemeye değer.
Ruhani 11 Eylül olayı dönemine ait bir hatırasını paylaşıyor:
"Ona [Hamanei'ye] dedim ki: "Efendim, bir gün bizim güçlü olduğumuz, Amerika'nın ise zayıf olduğu bir zamanda Amerika ile konuşmamız gerektiğini söylememiş miydiniz?"
"Evet," dedi.
Dedim ki: "Peki, şimdi o zaman değil mi? Şimdi Amerika zayıf, biz ise güçlüyüz. Şimdi vaktinin geldiğini düşünmüyor musunuz?"
Dedi ki: "Fena bir fikir değil, bir toplantı ayarlayın ve bu konuyu tartışın."
O toplantı için birkaç kişinin ismini verdi. "Şu beyefendi, bu beyefendi..." dedi. Ben de birkaç isim önerdim, o da kabul etti. Bana dedi ki: "Sen Sayın Hatemi'ye git, Sayın Hatemi de sana üç dört kişi önersin. Siz bu grubu oluşturup bir toplantı yapın, bakalım nasıl bir sonuca varacaksınız."
Bence o toplantının sonucu, Rehberin nihai onayıyla birlikte dış politikamızda büyük bir dönüşüm yaratabilirdi. Ancak birkaç gün geçtikten sonra, bazı gazeteler "Şimdi gidip Amerika ile ilişki kurma vaktidir" diye yazdılar.
Bunun üzerine Rehber, Sayın Ali Asgar Hicazi aracılığıyla bana bir mesaj göndererek, bahsettiği o toplantının artık iptal olduğunu bildirdi. Daha sonra yanına gittiğimde ise şöyle dedi: "Gazetelerin başlattığı bu şekilde olmaz... Bizim niyetimiz [gizlilik içinde] bir şeyler yapmaktı."
Bana göre çok önemli bir fırsat elden kaçtı; belki o dönemde çok daha kapsamlı bir karara varabilirdik."This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
Iranian Attacks on Bases in Jordan Break the American Logistical Backbone
Hours ago, the U.S. Embassy in Jordan warned that Aqaba International Airport and the Aqaba seaport had been evacuated due to a specific and credible security threat, urging U.S. citizens to stay away.
This is likely because U.S. forces had turned the airport and seaport into military support hubs, making them legitimate targets for Iran.
Following the U.S. Embassy’s alert, Jordanian authorities quickly denied the evacuation, attempting to prevent panic in a country that receives approximately $1.5 billion annually in economic and military aid from the United States.
All of this reflects the recent Iranian attacks on bases in Jordan, where the U.S. operates around 4 to 5 military bases with approximately 3,000 to 4,000 troops.
In these attacks, Iranian missiles and drones killed 2 U.S. service members, left 1 missing, and wounded others. They also caused significant destruction of assets, including damage to aircraft and Black Hawk helicopters.
It is from Jordanian bases such as Muwaffaq Salti and Al-Azraq Air Base that a significant portion of F-15 and F-16 fighter jets and attack drones take off. These aircraft cross Syrian and Iraqi airspace to strike targets in those countries and in Iran. These bases also serve as the main logistical hub, housing tanker aircraft and stocks of interceptors.
Why Jordan and not Israel?
Full article:
open.substack.com/pub/global21/p/iranian-attacks-on-bases… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alireza Talakoubnejad
@websterkaroon
Darkhovin has a really interesting history that is in many ways parallel to Iran's nuclear program.
Originally the Shah signed a contract with the French to build it. They renegaded on it after the revolution.
Then in the 90s the Islamic Republic signed a contract with China to build it. They also pulled out after pressure from Clinton.
Iran later continued work itself. The plan was to build a heavy water plant. The latest projections were that it would come online in 2030.
Darkhovin is located between Ahvaz and Khorramshahr (it's very near Iran's western border).
I discussed this nuclear plant among other things in Episode 3 of my podcast (open.spotify.com/episode/5iAY2IhBDtYNK3o3Q4zvU3)
The Hormuz Letter
@HormuzLetter
BREAKING: The US has directly struck the Dar Khweyn nuclear power plant construction site in southwestern Iran with multiple projectiles a few hours ago, per Tasnim.
This is the first direct US strike on an Iranian nuclear power plant, with Dar Khweyn being Iran's only commercial nuclear power reactor indigenously designed and built purely by Iran.
This also triggers Iran's IRGC and Yemen‘s warnings from yesterday and earlier this week that any further US strikes on Iranian civilian and power infrastructure would trigger Iran's comprehensive regional infrastructure destruction and Houthi Bab el-Mandeb closure. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ahmed Quraishi
@_AhmedQuraishi
#bahrain media shows the aftermath of #iran's bombing of civilian areas of the capital Manama.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Israel-Alma
@Israel_Alma_org
For more than two decades, Hezbollah has been building its "Land of Tunnels" in Lebanon an extensive underground project constructed with Iranian and North Korean assistance.
The offensive component of the project six attack tunnels into Israel was exposed by the IDF in December 2018. In August 2021, the Alma Research and Education Center revealed the project's strategic tunneling dimension, followed by additional research on its tactical and approach tunnels.
The latest war publicly exposed the true scale of Hezbollah's "Land of Tunnels." Our assessment is that the organization invested at least $1–3 billion in this underground network evidence of the unprecedented scale of Hezbollah's long-term military buildup.
Read the full analysis.
israel-alma.org/hezbollahs-land-of-tunnels-in-lebanon-an-…
#lebanon #hezbollah #underground #iran #northkorea -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
عَبْداللَّه قمْح
@AbdlhKamh
ما جرى داخل الدوائر الأمنية في دمشق ليس تغييرات أمنية طبيعية، بل مشهد متجدد من صراعات أمنية يُعاد تشكيلها.
أحدث القرارات، كان نقل مدير جهاز الاستخبارات العامة السورية، حسين السلامة، من مركزه وتعيينه معاوناً لمدير مكتب الأمن الوطني. في هذا الأخير، عُيّن وزير الداخلية، أنس الخطاب، مديراً عاماً للمكتب المذكور. يعني باختصار، تم تهميش دور السلامة كمدير لجهاز أمني، ووضعه على الرف، تحت مسمى معاون في مكتب هامشي.
عملياً، السلامة يتحدر من شرق سوريا، من الشحيل تحديداً، حيث نفوذ عشائر "العكيدات". هناك في الشرق السوري، تدور نزاعات عشائرية - قبلية مع السلطة الجديدة منذ مدة، قد يشكل نقل السلامة شكلاً من أشكالها، أو ربما أكثر. الأساس يبقى أن هناك عملية ضم وفرز تجري داخل البنية الأمنية السورية، حيث ترتفع أسماء وتسقط أخرى، بموازاة "فلتان" أمني فصائلي.. في كل ذلك، فتش عن لبنان بين سطور التعيينات الأمنية، المعلوم منها وغير المعلوم، ما حصل وما سيحصل، لا سيما عند المنطقة الحدودية الفاصلة بين لبنان وسوريا. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Egypt's Intel Observer
@EGYOSINT
🛰 Recent satellite imagery confirms additional direct hits from the Iranian ballistic missile strikes on Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base in Jordan carried out between July 15 and 17.
One strike completely destroyed a U.S. aircraft shelter located at 31°49'27.60"N, 36°47'08.57"E.
Egypt's Intel Observer
@EGYOSINT
NASA FIRMS/VIIRS shows fires at two locations inside Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base in Jordan following recent Iranian ballistic missile strikes.
The first hotspot, at 31.83402, 36.79553, is within a U.S. troop barracks and accommodation area.
The second, at 31.83264, 36.79442, is inside a warehouse complex. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
پایگاه خبری جماران
@jamarannews_ir
جزئیاتی از تونلهای حفاظتی از زبان عراقچی
من دو جلسه در تونل رفتم؛
من و معاونین وزارت خارجه، در جنگ، ساختمان وزارت خارجه را ترک نکردیم؛
ساعاتی از روز را در خودرو در شهر میچرخیدیم؛ نمیتوانستم موبایل را کنار بگذارم؛This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aaron Magid
@AaronMagid
The New York Times revealed that Iran had injured dozens of US troops and damaged several US Blackhawk helicopters in Jordan during a series of strikes this week against the Hashemite Kingdom, previously not disclosed by the Pentagon.
(@GregJaffe, @julianbarnes, @jonathanvswan) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mostafa Ghamari Vafa
@GhamariVafa
🎥عراقچی: ۴ صبح روز سوم جنگ وزیر خارجه یکی از کشورهای منطقه با من تماس گرفت و گفت ۸ صبح فلان منطقه شما را میزنیم و شما هم جواب ندهید و تمام؛ گفتم اگر ما را هدف قرار بدهید از بعد آن جنگ میان ما کشور شماست و جنگ با آمریکا و اسرائیل جای خودش جنگ با شما هم شروع میشود
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hazem Kallass حازم كلاس
@Hazem_Kallass
وزير خارجية ايران عباس عراقتشي:
👈لا نخوض الحرب إلا إذا كانت تكلفة "عدم القتال" أكبر من تكلفة القتال.
👈لو قبلت إيران وقف إطلاق النار قبل عشرة أيام على التاريخ الذي قبلت به لما تم اغتيال لاريجاني و خطيب و لما استهدفت منشآت الصلب في اصفهان و منشآت عسلوية جنوب البلاد
👈لو اعطينا العدو ما اراده في النووي لكنا أرسينا نموذجا معناه أنه كلما اردت شيئا من الجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية اضرب و دمر و تعال خذ ما تريد
👈المنطقة فهمت أن ما يحصل حربا عندما استهدفت بناها التحتية
👈كل السيناريوهات كانت في الحساب بما في ذلك اغتيال المرشد و قد كان لها "كلمة سر محددة" في حال وقعت
👈لا يمكن اتخاذ القرار في البلاد بناء على الاحتمالات و اللعب بمصيرها و بأرواح الناس .. بأنه لو استمر القتال لبضعة أيام أخرى لكان العدو يأس و ما فكر بمهاجمة إيران ثانيةThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
AbdiMedia | عبدی مدیا
@AbdiMedia_net
🔴 عراقچی: در فاصله چند ثانیه، سه حمله به مجموعه بیت صورت گرفت
💢 وزیر امور خارجه:
📌 آقای حجازی را تقریبا از داخل آوار درآوردند و منشی دفتر ایشان طوری به شهادت رسید که هیچ چیزی از پیکر او پیدا نشد. در فاصله چند ثانیه، سه حمله به مجموعه بیت صورت گرفت.
📌 روز سوم جنگ، وزیر خارجه یکی از کشورهای منطقه به من زنگ زد و گفت چند ساعت دیگر، به تلافی حملاتی که به خاک ما انجام دادید، فلان نقطه از کشور شما را میزنیم اما دیگر ادامه نمیدهیم و شما هم ادامه ندهید؛ در غیر این صورت، جنگ بین ما و شما هم آغاز خواهد شد.
📌 جنگ اخیر، ساختار امنیتی منطقه را تغییر داد. تمام اقدامات ما، از قبل به تصویب رهبر شهید رسیده بود.
AbdiMedia | عبدی مدیا
@AbdiMedia_net
🔴 عراقچی: برای حوادث دیماه آمادگی نداشتیم
💢 وزیر امور خارجه در گفت و گو با برنامه «ماجرای جنگ»:
📌 برای حوادث دیماه آمادگی نداشتیم. البته ۱۸ و ۱۹ دی، یک توطئه خارجی وارد شد؛ سلاح و نیروهای آموزشدیده وارد شد که شروع به تیراندازی به سمت مردم کردند.
📌 چهارشنبه بعد از ۱۸ دی، ما تا مرز جنگ رفتیم. حوادث آن دو روز، باعث شد دشمن تصور کند زمینه اجتماعی برای جنگ فراهم است.
📌 ما در جنگ ۱۲ روزه، فهمیدیم که چه سرمایههایی داشتیم و متاسفانه پس از جنگ ۱۲ روزه نیز قدر این سرمایهها را ندانستیم. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aaron David Miller
@aarondmiller2
Based on 50 years of dealing with Israelis, I can say without reservation most are clueless about US. They either take
US support for granted; or lworry we’ll sell them down river. David has become Goliath; and no influence campaign will change that.www.wsj.com/politics/israels-50-million-experiment-to-cha… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
عبد العزيز الخميس
@alkhames
لماذا أصبحت الكويت الهدف الأبرز للهجمات الإيرانية في الخليج؟
مصدر مقرب من دوائر الحكم في الكويت يجيب👇
هيئة البث الإسرائيلية
تبدو الكويت في الوقت الحالي أكثر دول الخليج تعرضًا للهجمات الإيرانية، في ظل التصعيد المتجدد بين طهران والولايات المتحدة حول منطقة مضيق هرمز، وسط تساؤلات حول أسباب تحولها إلى نقطة التركيز الرئيسية في موجة الهجمات الأخيرة.
وقال مصدر مقرب من دوائر الحكم في الكويت، وفق ما نقلته هيئة البث الرسمية كان، إن استهداف بلاده "ليس أمرًا عشوائيًا"، مشيرًا إلى أن هناك عوامل سياسية وأمنية تقف خلف تصاعد الهجمات عليها.
وقال المصدر إن الكويت تعتقد أن استهدافها مرتبط برفضها فتح قنوات اتصال سرية مع الحرس الثوري الإيراني، وعدم استجابتها لمطالب إيرانية خلال الفترة الماضية.
وأضاف أن أحد أسباب التوتر يعود إلى رفض الكويت الإفراج عن ضباط تابعين للحرس الثوري، قالت السلطات الكويتية إنها ألقت القبض عليهم بعد محاولة تسلل عبر البحر لتنفيذ أعمال عدائية داخل البلاد.كما أشار إلى عوامل جغرافية وسياسية تزيد من حساسية موقع الكويت، بينها قربها من إيران ومن مناطق نفوذ حلفائها في العراق، إضافة إلى اعتمادها الكبير على الاستقرار الإقليمي لحماية مصالحها الاقتصادية والأمنية.
ورغم أن القواعد العسكرية الأميركية في الكويت تُعد من أبرز الأهداف التي تهددها إيران، فإن توسع الهجمات بات يثير مخاوف من انتقال الاستهداف إلى البنية التحتية الحيوية والمنشآت المدنية. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
مالك الروقي
@alrougui
تحديث أخبار النووي السعودي :
- قناة CNN الأمريكية تنشر تقريرا تقول فيه التالي :
وافقت إدارة ترامب مبدئيًا على السماح للمملكة العربية السعودية بتخصيب اليورانيوم، من دون تطبيق الضمانات الدولية المصممة لمنع تطوير الأسلحة النووية، وذلك وفقًا لمصادر مطلعة على الأمر ووثائق اطلعت عليها شبكة CNN.
ومسودة الاتفاق النووي، التي تحدد دعم الولايات المتحدة للبرنامج النووي المدني السعودي، لا تزال بانتظار توقيع الرئيس دونالد ترامب، رغم انتهاء المفاوضات الأمريكية السعودية في أكتوبر 2025.
وقال أربعة مصادر إن الاتفاق، الذي يتضمن اتفاقية للتعاون النووي المدني تُعرف باسم “اتفاقية 123”، إلى جانب اتفاقية إلزامية للضمانات النووية، لم يُرسل بعد إلى الكونغرس لمراجعته، رغم أن القانون الفيدرالي يلزم البيت الأبيض بإحالته إلى الكونغرس بعد توقيعه.
ولم يُجب البيت الأبيض عن أسئلة CNN المتعلقة بالاتفاقيات، واكتفى بإحالة الشبكة إلى بيان صدر في أكتوبر 2025 عن وزير الطاقة كريس رايت أعلن فيه انتهاء المفاوضات.
وقال رايت آنذاك:
“توصلنا إلى اتفاق بشأن التعاون النووي المدني. ومع اتفاقيات الضمانات الثنائية، نريد توسيع شراكتنا، وإدخال التكنولوجيا النووية الأمريكية إلى السعودية، مع الحفاظ على التزام قوي بمنع الانتشار النووي.”
وكانت إدارة ترامب قد أطلعت بعض أعضاء الكونغرس في وقت سابق من هذا العام على الخطوط العريضة للاتفاقيات النووية مع السعودية، وتضمنت منذ ذلك الوقت ترتيبًا خاصًا يسمح بدرجة من تخصيب اليورانيوم محليًا و/أو إعادة معالجة البلوتونيوم، وفقًا لمصدر مطلع. وأضاف المصدر أن مثل هذا الترتيب سيكون “غير مسبوق” في مثل هذه الاتفاقيات.
وقال مصدران لـCNN إن بند تخصيب اليورانيوم يتضمن شروطًا فرضتها الولايات المتحدة، إلا أن تفاصيل القيود المحتملة لا تزال غير واضحة.
كما أن “اتفاقية 123” لن تكون الكلمة النهائية بشأن ما إذا كانت السعودية ستحصل على التكنولوجيا والمواد النووية الحساسة.
وتُعد هذه الاتفاقية إطارًا قانونيًا أساسيًا يسمح للشركات الأمريكية أو للحكومة الأمريكية بنقل المواد والتكنولوجيا النووية إلى البرنامج النووي المدني للدولة المستفيدة، على أن تخضع عمليات النقل لاحقًا لمراجعات إضافية.
ويُعد تخصيب اليورانيوم وإعادة معالجة البلوتونيوم المسارين الرئيسيين لإنتاج المواد الأساسية اللازمة لصنع أسلحة نووية. ومعظم الدول التي تمتلك مفاعلات نووية مدنية تحتاج إلى يورانيوم مخصب لا تقوم بإنتاجه محليًا، بل تشتريه من موردين مثل الولايات المتحدة أو روسيا، ويصل إليها في شحنات مختومة تخضع لإشراف دولي صارم.
لكن مسودة الاتفاق لا تُلزم السعودية أيضًا باعتماد اتفاقية الضمانات النووية المعززة المعروفة باسم “البروتوكول الإضافي” مع الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية، وذلك وفقًا لإعفاء قدمته الإدارة إلى الكونغرس العام الماضي، ورسالة أرسلتها وزارة الخارجية إلى المشرعين في مايو، وكلاهما اطلعت عليهما CNN. وبدلًا من ذلك، ستكون اتفاقية الضمانات مقتصرة على الولايات المتحدة والمملكة العربية السعودية.
مالك الروقي
@alrougui
تحديث النووي السعودي :
سمو وزير الطاقة السعودي الأمير عبدالعزيز بن سلمان يجتمع بالمدير العام للوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية رافايل غروسي في الرياض.
-بعد الاجتماع قال غروسي :
من المهم أن أكون في المملكة العربية السعودية اليوم، في وقت تمضي فيه البلاد قدمًا في تطوير برنامجها النووي المدني.
مع الأمير عبدالعزيز بن سلمان آل سعود، راجعنا أوجه التعاون المتنامية بين الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية والمملكة العربية السعودية، ورحبنا بالتزام المملكة بالشفافية.
وستواصل الوكالة الدولية للطاقة الذرية العمل مع 🇸🇦 لضمان تقدم هذه العملية بطريقة آمنة ومأمونة وسلمية.
شكرًا لكم على كرم الضيافة وحسن الاستقبال. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jason Brodsky
@JasonMBrodsky
This raises many questions. In this new interview, #iran's regime's foreign minister Abbas Araghchi says he has never met Mojtaba Khamenei since he became supreme leader. Araghchi says only a handful of people have met him.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amichai Stein
@AmichaiStein1
🇺🇸🇮🇷🇮🇱 Israel's current assessment is that Iran will refrain from launching attacks against Israel as long as the United States does not significantly escalate its military campaign against Tehran.
Regarding the possibility of Israel joining the strikes on Iran, two Israeli officials told @Jerusalem_Post that it could happen under three scenarios:
1. If f Iran launches attacks against Israel
2. If Israeli intelligence detects that Iran is preparing to launch missiles or drones at Israel
3. If President Trump formally requests Israeli participation in the operation. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
@yarbatman
Great to see this big piece in the @nytimes featuring the proposal that @MehranHaghirian and I put forward last week for the shared administration of the Strait of Hormuz.
Grateful to @NeilMacFarquhar for the coverage.
Gift link here:
www.nytimes.com/2026/07/19/world/middleeast/strait-hormuz… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Omar Abu Layla
@OALD24
President Ahmed Al-Sharaa has a clear understanding of the phase Syria is currently navigating. The new appointments announced today are aligned with the country’s current needs and the progress Syria continues to achieve:
Official security appointments:
1- Anas Khattab will continue serving as Minister of the Interior while simultaneously taking on the position of Director of the National Security Office.
2- Hussein Al-Salama was appointed Deputy Director of the National Security Office.
3- Mulham Al-Shantout was appointed Assistant Minister of the Interior for Security Affairs.
4- Brigadier Abdul Qader Tahhan was appointed Head of the General Intelligence Directorate. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
چرکنویس مدیا(CMO)
@Rfrenss
((حرفهای سید عباس پر از معناست ))
عراقچی : در طول جنگ ما ساختمان وزارت خارجه رو ترک نکردیم، البته توی دفاترمون نبودیم اما اطراف ساختمان وزارت خارجه مکان امن داریم!!
عراقچی: تونل های زیادی دیگه هست که کسی نمیدونه؟
عراقچی با این مصاحبه، بخش جدیدی از معاملات پشت پرده را با زبان دیپلماسی گفت.
کاشکی نظرش را در مورد کوشنر و ویتکاف میگفت..
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
خبرگزاری فارس
@FarsNews_Agency
🎥 عراقچی: در روز حمله به بیت رهبری آنجا بودم
ساعت ۹ با آقای حجازی دیدار داشتم و گزارش مذاکرات را به ایشان منتقل کردم و وقتی داشتم به فضای سنگین جنگی اشاره میکردم، آنجا هدف حمله قرار گرفت.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post.
خبرگزاری فارس
@FarsNews_Agency
🎥 عراقچی: آتشبس اولیه با آمریکا در جلسات کوچکتر از شورایعالی امنیت ملی پذیرفته شد
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
محمود ایرانی
@mahmoud_iranii
تنگه هرمز بیت رهبری ، علی اصغر حجازی بود
همه چی از کانال حجازی میگذشت
جالبهThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Nicolas Sawaya
@sawaya_nicolas
Since Oct 7 2023, Israel has militarily occupied an incremental 1,000-1,250 km2 of land, between Gaza* (200-250 km2), Syria (300-400 km2) & Lebanon (550-600 km2).
Israel has also "advanced de facto annexation of the West Bank at an unprecedented pace", per Peace Now.
Map: AP -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
IRGC-linked platforms insist that Tehran is “responding in kind.” However, if the United States expands its attacks, they argue, Iran will impose comparable costs across the regional military architecture supporting those operations.
- The repeated use of expressions such as “for now” suggests that the current level of response is a political choice, not the limit of Iran’s capabilities. In other words, restraint is being presented as conditional and reversible.
- The main message appears to be: Iran still claims to be responding proportionally, but it is warning that proportionality may not last. The real threat lies in the suggestion that the next phase could be broader and qualitatively different.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ehsan Taghadosi
@demokracy
درباره حمله موشکی ایران به عمان
همانطور که دیروز نوشتم سفر دیروز عباس عراقچی به عمان متفاوتترین سفر یک وزیر خارجه ایران به این کشور در ۵ دهه گذشته بود و هدف اصلی هشدار به عمانیها درباره خوش رقصی برای آمریکا بود.
سفر دیروز عراقچی موفق نبود و کار بالاجبار به نیروهای نظامی سپرده شد.
ینابر آنچه روابط عمومی سپاه اعلام کرده «مراکز پشتیبانی لجستیکی ناوها و سکوهای سوختگیری ناوهای هواپیمابر آمریکایی در بندر دُقم عمان، با یک حمله سنگین و غافلگیرانه درهم کوبیده شد.»
این حمله مهمترین حمله ایران از پایان رسمی جنگ ۴۰ روزه بوده است.
اهمیت بندر دُقم در موقعیت جغرافیایی و نقش لجستیکی آن نهفته است. این بندر در ساحل دریای عرب و خارج از تنگه هرمز قرار دارد؛ به همین دلیل ناوهای آمریکایی میتوانند بدون ورود به خلیج فارس، در آن پهلو بگیرند، سوختگیری کنند و خدمات تعمیراتی و تدارکاتی دریافت کنند. آمریکا و عمان در سال ۲۰۱۹ توافقی برای دسترسی نیروهای آمریکایی به بندرهای دُقم و صلاله امضا کردند. نیروی دریایی آمریکا نیز پیشتر از دُقم برای پشتیبانی گروه رزمی ناو هواپیمابر هری ترومن و دیگر شناورهای خود استفاده کرده است. از این منظر، حمله ادعایی ایران نه فقط یک نقطه بندری، بلکه بخشی از عقبه عملیاتی ناوگان آمریکا در شمال اقیانوس هند را هدف گرفته است.
اما چرا ایران در جنگ ۱۲روزه یا درگیری ۴۰روزه به این بندر حمله نکرد؟ پاسخ قطعی فقط در اختیار فرماندهان نظامی است، اما چند احتمال وجود دارد. نخست اینکه عمان همواره میان ایران و غرب نقش میانجی داشته و حمله به خاک آن میتوانست مسقط را از موضع بیطرفی خارج کند. دوم، در مراحل پیشین جنگ، اولویت ایران احتمالاً پاسخ مستقیم به اسرائیل و پایگاههای آشکارتر آمریکا بوده است. سوم، هدفگرفتن دُقم میتوانست جنگ را به دریای عرب گسترش دهد. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇮🇷🇮🇱 Araghchi on how the Ayatollah was taken out so quickly:
“The security services are investigating the matter. In my opinion, they knew very well that the Supreme Leader is in his office every morning, making that a readily identifiable target.
But they had also realized that a meeting of military commanders was taking place in the adjacent building or perhaps one or two buildings away, and that is why they chose that particular time to attack.”
There had long been rumors that Mossad had infiltrated the inner circles of Khomeini’s government. They are right to question everyone and everything on the inside. Mossad is an elite force for a reason.
Writer: Jamie -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Wall Street Journal
@WSJ
The CIA’s man in Abu Dhabi was sent in to spy on the "spy sheikh"—and went on to play a role in the U.A.E.’s AI win www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/cia-spy-united-arab-emirate…
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Alors que la guerre semble avoir repris entre Iraniens et Américains, cette nouvelle flambée de violences est clairement appelée de ses voeux par les éléments radicaux du pouvoir à Téhéran, dont les appels portent de plus en plus. Lire mon analyse dans Le Figaro.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shaiel Ben-Ephraim
@academic_la
Netanyahu turned down a fully formed plan to normalize with Saudi Arabia in 2024 because he refused to commit to a future Palestinian state. Israeli journalist Nadav Eyal reveals this in a new column. The terms Biden and MBS offered Israel were incredibly generous and would have ended the genocide too:
1) A hostage deal ending the Gaza war, with Israel keeping a security perimeter inside the Strip. MBS even told the administration, "I'm willing to send Saudi soldiers to manage Gaza."
2) On the Palestinian question, the Saudis accepted a relatively soft formula: an Israeli commitment to a Palestinian state within 5–7 years. They even reassured Israel that if statehood stalled, they'd blame Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) rather than blow up the agreement in 2034.
3) Since Ben Gvir and Smotrich would have toppled the government over such a deal, the Biden administration arranged a political "safety net": opposition leader Yair Lapid agreed to support Netanyahu's government for several months to complete the process.
4) A senior American official told an Israeli counterpart that Iran is about to "switch sides" toward the West — a historic shift, a "perestroika," with Mojtaba Khamenei becoming the Gorbachev of Shiite fundamentalism.
The US and Saudi Arabia offered Israel a way to get its hostages back, normalize with Saudi Arabia and begin rapprochement with Iran. All in exchange for some recognition of a Palestinian right to a state. Israel refused and chose genocide, war with Iran, death to many of the hostages and a continued coalition with Ben-Gvir. All to avoid giving Palestinians hope. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rouhani Office
@rouhanioffice
خاطرات دکتر روحانی از شهید آیتالله خامنهای-بخش ۹:
روایت یک جلسهی مهم دربارهی پایان جنگ ایران و عراق و پذیرش قطعنامهی ۵۹۸2 media couldn't be displayed. See them on the original post.
Rouhani Office
@rouhanioffice
خاطرات دکتر روحانی از شهید آیتالله خامنهای- بخش ۸:
- اولین حکمی که رهبر شهید به من دادند فرماندهی پدافند هوایی بود
- رهبری دستور دادند که مسئولیت ستاد ملی کرونا را بپذیرم
-کاهش تعهدات هستهای تصمیمی بود که در محضر رهبری اتخاذ شد
-رهبر شهید درباره رفع آسیبهای اجتماعی جدی بودندThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alireza Talakoubnejad
@websterkaroon
Conservative journalist Javad Mogoei conducted a new interview with Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
In released preview clip he asks Araghchi questions such as,
"Was it not your negotiations that got us again to war?"
"Would it not have been better if we continued the war [and not done a ceasefire]?"
"Is the credibility of the negotiators not going away when you keep going to talk and war keeps happening?"
"If we would have accepted the American proposal would the war not had happened?"
"If we had the upper hand why did we accept the ceasefire?"This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
بن شبلان
@d3ani001
محلل إيراني : هذا الفيديو للرئيس الإيراني السابق هاشمي رفسنجاني يتحدث فيه ويقول : علي خامنئي مُحاط بدائرة شيطانية حقيقية، تتألف هذه الدائرة من عناصر بالحرس الثوري وجهاز المخابرات ودوائر أخرى، هؤلاء العناصر هم من يعرقلون سير الأمور في البلاد.، نحن نواجه هيكلاً يتجاوز خامنئي 1️⃣
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
We have seen a major escalation between the US and Iran over the past 24 hours, but it is likely only a prelude to what appears to be coming next week.
Trump appears to have concluded that Tehran’s hard line in the negotiations stemmed from the United States not hitting Iran hard enough during the 38-day war. Seemingly indifferent to the costs for the GCC states, the global economy, inflation and the American cost of living—not to mention the risk to U.S. troops—he is gambling that a few more weeks of war will degrade Iran’s ability to close the Strait and force Tehran into a more accommodating negotiating position.
It is, at best, a perilous gamble. Tehran has grown increasingly convinced that while Trump is unconventional enough to pursue diplomacy with Iran, he lacks the discipline and strategic patience to see negotiations through.
Herein lies the paradox of Trump: his willingness to break with convention makes him open to pursuing peace with Iran—a possibility previous presidents scarcely entertained. Yet that same disregard for convention leads him to dismiss the discipline, protocols and methods that successful diplomacy requires.
Read the full analysis here: tritaparsi.substack.com/p/yesterdays-us-iran-escalation-is -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Alfoneh علی آلفونه
@Alfoneh
1. Why we are where are now: @JDVance & @mb_ghalibaf reached a memorandum of understanding that could have paved the way for lasting peace between the two countries. However, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu predictably sabotaged the agreement by striking Lebanon.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Al Mayassa Al Thani
@almayassahamad
‘Yuba’ – My dear father
www.aljazeera.com/amp/opinions/2026/7/17/yuba-my-dear-father -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Mon interview au site italien Dissipatio sur le conflit Iran États-Unis.
www.dissipatio.it/georges-malbrunot-intervista/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Charles Lister
@Charles_Lister
This 26-min video from #syria’s Interior Ministry reveals a lot — about #isis’s June 2025 attack; what #isis’s current priorities are in #syria; and ongoing government efforts to combat the group.
A lot of important insights here.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Patricia Marins
@pati_marins64
The War is Back: Iran Attacks Bases in 7 Countries While the U.S. Prepares Invasion
In the last 48 hours, American attacks destroyed 7 bridges, highways, a maritime observation tower, and various military targets along the coast of Hormuz and in Khuzestan, including police posts and civilian infrastructure, such as electrical facilities and water desalination pumps in Iran’s Hormozgan province.
There is no doubt that the war is back. The Americans are systematically destroying Iranian civilian and military infrastructure in several regions, as well as the connections needed to send reinforcements to these areas, which will continue to be bombed in the coming days.
After the defeat in the attempted invasion of Isfahan, disguised as a “pilot rescue” operation involving around 150 aircraft, the Americans appear to have reformulated the plan and are now acting more assertively: massively bombing coastal defenses, bridges, towers, and intensifying attacks on Khuzestan, the flat province and oil heart of Iran.
It appears that this entire package is part of the American invasion plan, which reportedly envisages the support of at least three European countries and two others, with the opening of three fronts and the occupation of Iranian islands. The operation apparently will have extensive air and naval support, along with around 25,000 troops. I will go deeper into this in the coming days.
The Iranian retaliation was severe. Iran opened fire on American bases in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan. Air raid sirens were activated in Amman, Zarqa, Al-Kharj, and Yanbu, with reports of American casualties at a Jordanian base.
The largest base in the region, Al Udeid in Qatar, was hit multiple times, and Iran claimed to have destroyed a long-range radar system installed in the area.
In Bahrain, in addition to multiple attacks on the U.S. 5th Fleet base, oil installations and refineries of Bapco Energies were also struck, as well as the country’s artificial intelligence center.
In Kuwait, Iran hit military installations hard, but also electrical and desalination facilities, causing fires and paralyzing operations.
In Syria, the target was the U.S. special operations command center at the Al-Tanf military base, located in the Syrian desert, which the United States had claimed to have evacuated in February, but remains active, likely training local forces.
What stood out most in this wave of Iranian attacks was the precision of the missiles launched against Al-Azraq air base in Jordan. This shows that the upgrade of Iranian missiles was successfully completed during the truce period, as I had reported was underway.
Iran did not need to open a corridor by destroying Patriot and THAAD radars: boldly, it struck targets in Jordan multiple times from nearly 1,000 km away, forcing the USAF to relocate its aircraft to Ben Gurion in Israel. A second American base in Jordan, Prince Hassan, was also hit days ago, consolidating the threat posed by the upgraded Iranian missiles in this resumption of the war.
Another situation that will keep many people in Pakistan up at night is that Iran opened fire on the American Prince Sultan base, as well as the Yanbu Logistic and Industrial Complex in Saudi Arabia.
This puts Pakistan, which plays an intermediary role, in a delicate position, since it renewed its defense pact with the Saudis.
Full article:
open.substack.com/pub/global21/p/the-war-is-back-iran-att… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Current Report
@Currentreport1
JUST IN:
Pakistan is negotiating defense pact with Kuwait in exchange for energy cooperation and investment – Reuters
The proposed deal may be modeled on Pakistan's existing defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, where an attack on Saudi Arabia is considered an attack on Pakistan -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sarah Leah Whitson
@sarahleah1
Good analysis of Hamas' near total destruction and the useful fiction of its persistent menace:
"The rest of the world, then, needs to stop being complicit in the fiction that Hamas is still a menace. U.S. and European governments must begin asking Israel to account for the gap between the threat it describes and the reality on the ground."
www.foreignaffairs.com/palestinian-territories/end-hamas via @ForeignAffairs -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The New Yorker
@NewYorker
As America’s war in the Middle East gets more complicated, President Trump appears to be ad-libbing policy. According to Richard Haass, a senior official in both Bush Administrations, Trump has tried three strategies so far: regime change, relentless bombardment, and then diplomacy. The U.S. has “come up short each and every time,” Haass wrote on Substack this week. In Washington, there is a growing sense of despair among foreign-policy experts and former policymakers about the direction of the war. Read more about Trump’s chaotic Iran strategy: newyorkermag.visitlink.me/g9dK6o
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ayman Abdel Nour
@aabnour
Iraq has concluded “investigation and accountability procedures” for some 85 % of (ISIS) detainees transferred from Syria earlier this year
Rudaw
www.rudaw.net/english/categories/interview/1078364 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Fatima Alasrar
@YemeniFatima
The proxy fig leaf is dropping.
A few days before yesterday's U.S. military intervention, Tehran's ultimate hardline bellwether, Kayhan, explicitly called to choke off the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Hossein Shariatmadari argued Iran's own precision missiles can strike the chokepoint from 2,300 km away.
Regional blackmail as usual, but this time bypassing the Houthis likely because Iranian missile components keep getting intercepted. 1/2 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aron Lund
@aronlund
The National’s Khaled Yacoub Oweis reports that Syria’s intelligence chief, Hussein Salameh, has been replaced by the deputy interior minister, Abdelqader Tahhan, allegedly due to friction with Interior Minister Anas Khattab. www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/07/15/syria-securi…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇷 Ex-CIA officer Michael Scheuer on why he believes a war against Iran can't be won:
"You have to remember we haven't won a war since 1945. I'm not sure we've fought a war that was worth fighting since 1945.
The basic problem here is no one has looked at a history book. They would know the Iranians weren't going to run; they never run.
You're looking at a U.S. government that displays a complete ignorance of the world.
There is no one who can speak to what the characteristics of that country is in terms of operating under strife.
It's the same problem we had in Iraq, the same problem we had in Vietnam."
Writers: Mhedi, Michael -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Syria in Transition
@SyriaTransition
What remains of Iran's networks in Syria is a thinner but more adaptable form of influence: ideological alignment and networks built over years through overlapping ties of crime, religion, family and patronage - networks that tend to endure, and can be reactivated when conditions allow.
Exit without departure: What’s left of Iran’s influence in Syria? [From the SiT archive - April 2026]
syriaintransition.com/en/home/archive/issue-34/exit-witho… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
Senior Advisor to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati harshly criticized Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Zaidi's visit to the United States, calling it "an unimaginable blow" to the struggles and sacrifices of the Iraqi people and "a source of great pain for every Muslim and every free person."
According to Velayati, the very fact that the visit took place during the mourning ceremonies for Ali Khamenei and that Al-Zaidi met with President Trump, whom he described as "the evil Satan" and compared to Pharaoh, Genghis Khan, and Hitler, was inconceivable.
Moreover, instead of responding forcefully to Trump's remarks expressing pride over the killings of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Al-Zaidi merely stated that he had not been involved in politics at the time of their deaths. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
The #iran-U.S. conflict enters a new phase of escalation
🔹Developments on July 17 suggest that both Iran and the United States are broadening the scope of the conflict. While it remains too early to draw firm conclusions, the pattern of reported military activity points toward preparations for a potentially more dangerous phase.
🔹On the U.S. side, reports indicate that several aerial refueling aircraft have been redeployed from Europe to the CENTCOM area of operations. Many of these assets had left the region following the ceasefire, making their return noteworthy amid renewed tensions.
🔹At the same time, the geographical scope of U.S. strikes appears to be further expanding. In addition to previous areas in the south, reported attacks have reached Lar in Fars Province and Yazd in central Iran – areas hosting some of Iran’s missile bases.
🔹Iran, meanwhile, appears to be widening its own target set. The IRGC claimed to have struck American UAV facilities and an AI center in Bahrain allegedly used to support U.S. targeting operations, while warning that it would increasingly target economic, technological, and industrial assets linked to American interests across the region.
🔹This marks a potentially important shift. Rather than focusing primarily on military targets, Tehran is signaling that infrastructure associated with U.S. economic and technological interests may now be considered legitimate targets if attacks on Iran continue.
🔹Maritime developments are also becoming more concerning. Iranian sources reported that a Thailand-flagged vessel was targeted after attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz without coordinating with Iran, while later claiming that two oil tankers struck mines in the Strait and caught fire.
🔹Whether or not all of these claims can be independently verified, they underscore the growing risks to commercial shipping. Even previously deployed mines could have a significant impact on maritime traffic.
🔹Perhaps the most significant reported development is the Iranian strike on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia after U.S. refueling aircraft allegedly operated from the base. It represents the first reported Iranian attack on a U.S. facility in Saudi Arabia since the April ceasefire.
🔹It is also noteworthy that, the previous day, Iran announced an attack on the al-Tanf base in Syria. Some Iranian analysts interpreted the strike as a warning to the Syrian government not to intervene in Lebanon against Hezbollah.
🔹This suggests that Tehran may be setting aside some of the restraint that shaped its earlier responses. Over the past several weeks, Iran’s attacks have focused primarily on Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, with far more limited strikes against the UAE, Qatar, and Oman. That calculation may now be changing, as Tehran appears to believe that these attacks have neither altered U.S. calculations nor changed the military balance on the ground.
🔹Reports that further bridges and transportation infrastructure in southern Iran continue to be targeted have also attracted attention. As mentioned yesterday, many Iranian analysts interpret these strikes as part of a gradual effort to degrade mobility and logistics in southern Iran, potentially laying the groundwork for future military options involving ground troops.
🔹From the Iranian perspective, this does not necessarily mean that a U.S. ground operation is imminent. However, repeated attacks on transportation infrastructure fit a broader pattern of battlefield preparation that cannot be ignored. As such, the question may increasingly be one of "when" rather than "if."
🔹Meanwhile, Iran continues operations on other fronts. The Iranian Army announced additional operations against Kurdish insurgent groups in Iraqi Kurdistan, claiming multiple commanders were killed and several facilities destroyed.
🔹There are also unverified reports that the Houthis are preparing measures that could affect shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. While these claims remain uncertain, they contribute to perceptions inside Iran that the conflict may increasingly extend beyond the immediate Persian Gulf region.
🔹Overall, Tehran appears to be concluding that its previous level of “restrained engagement” has not generated sufficient deterrence. As a result, it is increasingly willing to expand both the geographical scope of its operations and the categories of targets it is prepared to strike.
🔹Whether this reflects the collapse of expectations surrounding a negotiated framework or simply an effort to restore deterrence remains unclear. What is becoming increasingly evident, however, is that both sides are incrementally raising the stakes, increasing the risk that the conflict could enter a broader and significantly more dangerous phase.
P.S.: I cannot believe I’m doing this again… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
My take on the regional diplomatic landscape.
- One of the most striking features of the current phase of the Iran-US confrontation is not only the daily exchange of strikes, but also the relative absence of the regional diplomacy that proved so important only a few weeks ago.
- During the previous crisis, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt-the so-called Islamabad Quartet (STEP)-worked through different channels, with Qatar and Oman also playing important roles, creating the conditions that eventually led to the ceasefire and the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding. Today, that diplomatic momentum appears much weaker.
- Pakistan, which had emerged as perhaps the most effective intermediary between Washington and Tehran, now finds itself operating in a much narrower diplomatic space. Islamabad has developed pragmatic and constructive relations with Iran over the years, shaped by geography, shared security concerns and the presence of a large Shiite community representing around one-fifth of Pakistan's population. At the same time, Pakistan remains deeply connected to the Persian Gulf monarchies through decades of political, economic and military cooperation. Its security partnership with Saudi Arabia-including a long-standing mutual defence framework-remains one of the pillars of its regional policy, while reports have recently suggested discussions on a similar arrangement with Kuwait.
- As long as Tehran and the Persian Gulf monarchies manage their differences, Pakistan can effectively and successfully balance these relationships. But the more direct the confrontation becomes, the narrower Islamabad's diplomatic room for manoeuvre. The renewed Houthi-Saudi escalation, combined with growing tensions around Bab al-Mandab, makes that balancing act increasingly delicate. Pakistan is not stepping away from diplomacy; it is being forced to navigate between two strategic relationships that have both become more difficult to manage simultaneously.
- Saudi Arabia itself is once again focused on its own security concerns, while Qatar also finds itself in a much more difficult position. Doha was previously one of the few actors able to speak credibly with both Washington and Tehran. Today, however, it has become directly exposed because of the Iranian strikes. A mediator inevitably loses room for manoeuvre once it becomes part of the battlefield.
- At the same time, Iranian security-linked media have become increasingly critical of Erdogan and Turkey’s regional posture, openly portraying Ankara as a strategic rival. This does not necessarily signal a rupture, but it does suggest that the political cohesion which characterised the Islamabad Quartet during the previous round of diplomacy has weakened.
- Egypt, which was the first country to promote the regional diplomatic initiative that later evolved into the Islamabad Quartet, bringing Saudi Arabia into the process with Washington’s encouragement, now appears increasingly isolated. Cairo remains committed to diplomacy, but it no longer seems to enjoy the same regional alignment that made the previous initiative possible.
- This, perhaps, is the main difference from the previous crisis. Regional diplomacy has not disappeared, but each of its key actors is now constrained by a different strategic dilemma. Pakistan is trying to preserve its balancing role between Iran and the Persian Gulf monarchies. Saudi Arabia is preoccupied with Yemen. Qatar is directly exposed. Relations between Iran and Turkey have become more strained. The result is a fragmented diplomatic landscape precisely when a coordinated regional effort is needed the most.
- The key question is therefore not only whether Washington and Tehran can eventually return to negotiations, but whether the regional diplomatic architecture that made the last de-escalation possible can be rebuilt. Without that convergence, another ceasefire will be considerably harder to achieve.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Orwa Ajjoub | عُروة
@OAjjoub
"#syria President replaces intelligence chief to solve internal power struggle." there could be some tension but "power struggle" is an exaggeration. www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/07/15/syria-securi…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Arash Reisinezhad
@arashreisi
Four months ago, in my @ForeignPolicy piece, I argued that five strategic locations in southern Iran would constitute the primary targets in any sustained U.S. military campaign. Today, the emerging pattern of strikes appears increasingly consistent with that assessment.
The sequence is notable. The US operations began with the islands, then shifted to the coastline, and are now reaching deeper into southern Iran, including locations beyond the immediate littoral. This is not simply a collection of isolated tactical strikes. It appears to reflect a broader effort to progressively degrade Iran’s defensive architecture responsible for controlling the Strait of Hormuz and other strategic nodes, including Kharg Island.
Whether this campaign ultimately stops there remains an open question. But the evolving pattern raises the possibility that these strikes are only the visible beginning of a broader operational design aimed at neutralizing, or potentially enabling future control over, key strategic positions in southern Iran.
The five locations identified months ago are, one by one, now under pressure.
Foreign Policy
@ForeignPolicy
A ground invasion of Iran may appear increasingly conceivable. But that appearance rests on a fundamental misreading of geography, writes @arashreisi. foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/31/scenarios-ground-war-iran-tr…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Farnaz Fassihi
@farnazfassihi
In Iran, Trump Risks Another American ‘Forever War’
President Trump, who promised to “end wars,” not start them, may have fallen into a familiar presidential trap. @StevenErlanger
www.nytimes.com/2026/07/16/world/middleeast/forever-war-t… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
This is highly unlikely. Even a limited island operation would be a massive risk with no decisive solution to unlocking the Strait. It would require 10,000+ troops for airborne and amphibious landing
Seizing ground under immense fire is possible but holding and sustaining a force is extremely difficult without seizing the mainland belt
Seizing and holding enough territory to deny the IRGC access to the Strait, would be a bigger op than Iraq 2003 in excess of 500k boots on the ground that would be pulled into a protracted insurgency
The escalation of the IRGC against the Gulf would be severe with no red lines, Houthis would shut the Bab el Mandab,
The cost would be exorbitant for a limited sustainable benefit - there is no constituency in the US or Iran for this - let alone in the Gulf
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Is the United States Preparing for a Ground Invasion of #iran?
🔹The escalating pattern of U.S. strikes against southern Iran in recent days – particularly over the past several hours – may point to a gradual strategy aimed at preparing the ground for a potential deployment of ground forces. Such an operation, if it were to materialize, could be intended to seize control of Iran’s southern coastal belt in order to remove Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.
🔹Reports indicate that recent U.S. strikes have targeted several bridges and railway links in southern Iran. At the same time, there have been reports of attacks on airports. These actions may have been intended to disrupt the logistics and mobility of Iranian military forces in the south. Additional reports also suggest strikes against fuel tankers in Bandar Abbas.
🔹Meanwhile, attacks in Sistan and Baluchestan in southeastern Iran targeted the Iranian Army’s 88th Armored Division, alongside similar strikes against positions of the 92nd Armored Division in Khuzestan in the southwest. Some analysts interpret these operations as an effort to degrade Iran’s military capabilities along its principal southern axes, aimed at reducing the risks associated with any future ground deployment.
🔹At the same time, in what appears to be a recurring pattern, U.S. strikes have continued to target Iranian military, missile, drone, and radar installations, as well as IRGC Navy facilities along Iran’s southern coastline on the Persian Gulf.
🔹Taken together, these developments increasingly suggest a gradual but persistent U.S. movement toward a possible ground operation in southern Iran. In other words, the campaign may extend beyond simply degrading Iran’s ability to threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. It could instead indicate that Washington views control of Iran’s southern coastal strip as the only definitive solution to the Strait of Hormuz challenge.
🔹If such an approach exists, it would go well beyond earlier ideas centered on seizing Kharg Island to cut off Iran’s oil exports or occupying islands overlooking the Strait to secure maritime traffic. However, given the length of Iran’s southern coastline – roughly 1,800 kilometers – and the country’s considerable strategic depth, establishing comprehensive control would likely require hundreds of thousands of troops. Moreover, even capturing these areas would not necessarily translate into the ability to sustain long-term control.
🔹In any event, current indicators suggest that we may be approaching the most significant escalation in the U.S.-Iran confrontation since February, driven by Washington’s failure to achieve its strategic objectives. On the other hand, as noted previously, Iran’s actions thus far have also failed to present a meaningful obstacle to this gradual trajectory. One alternative for Tehran could be to shift toward targeting regional economic infrastructure – a move that would significantly broaden the scope of the conflict and lead to a region-wide catastrophe. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Current wave of US strikes goes beyond previous waves.
Targets include a number of railway bridges in the southern provinces--at least four have been struck.
Iran has vowed to retaliate in the event of infrastructure attacks.
Likely vectors are GCC infrastructure and the Red Sea. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Unconfirmed reports from Arab sources claim that Iranian strikes in Kuwait directly hit equipment belonging to the US Army’s Arkansas-based 142nd Field Artillery Brigade.
- The unit had reportedly fired dozens of HIMARS rockets at Iran from Kuwaiti territory in recent days.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Good piece from @SanamVakil.
The current dynamic is a lose-lose for both the US and Iran. Trump cannot compel Iran to back down over the strait through air strikes and intimidation. Iran cannot force the US to exit the region through resistance and drone/missile strikes. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Michael Young
@BeirutCalling
As Joseph Aoun prepares to visit Washington, the reported progress on the establishment of "pilot zones" is good news. While the Lebanon-Israel MOU was eminently condemnable, if Lebanon can secure Israeli withdrawals from occupied areas, army deployment, and the return of civilians, this would be a major step in the right direction—leading to security guarantees that prevent cross-border attacks in the future. @mounir_rabih discusses the Rome meetings here: www.lorientlejour.com/article/1541423/negociations-liban-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
It is not. Either you have a documented set of goals and means - an official long-term strategy - that explicitly includes certain elements, or you have to assess the existence of a strategy and its components inductively.
#iran does not have a tradition of publishing doctrinal documents, so even concepts such as "forward defense" are products of inductive analysis. At a lower, shorter-term level, the same applies to its current wartime strategy - or lack thereof.
When using an inductive approach, you have to rely on hard evidence; otherwise, it becomes pure speculation.
Again, regarding the specific case of Houthi involvement, it could only be considered part of Iran's strategy if there were clear understandings between the two partners regarding the threshold for intervention. That may or may not be the case. In any event, however, you cannot rely on it with complete confidence when you do not exercise absolute control over it.
This has always been the challenge with the idea of the Axis of Resistance as a deterrence strategy. Once the Axis became decentralized, its value within Iran's deterrence strategy began to decline - although it was not eliminated entirely - and, in some cases, it even became a source of vulnerability.
عمیر حسن Umayr
@umayr
If we can't infer a strategy from possible options, then we can't talk of any strategy at all. By definition a strategy is *long-term plan* of actions: not just tactics that have materialized.
This seems like a serious category error. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joshua Landis
@joshua_landis
The U.S. had to bribe the U.A.E. to strike Iran by offering AI chips to enter the war on America's side.
www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/uae-ai-chips-iran-war-26c10d77 via @WSJ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Prof Mahjoob Zweiri (محجوب الزويري )
@Profmzweiri
🚨تصريحات اية الله علي رضا أعرافي تبدو ملفتة للاهتمام إذا أخذنا السياقات التالية:
أولاً، علي رضا أعرافي هو مرجعية دينية ذات وزن، وكان مرشحاً لتولي منصب المرشد الأعلى قبل وفاة علي خامنئي. ثانياً، تولى علي رضا أعرافي مع رئيس الجمهورية مسعود پزشكيان مع رئيس السلطة القضائية محسن إجي، المجلس الانتقالي الذي أدار إيران بعد اغتيال المرشد علي خامنئي، ومهد لتولي آية الله مصطفى خامنئي.
ثالثاً، من موقعه الوظيفي الآن ( مدير الحوزات العلمية) ، هل هذه التصريحات تأتي في إطار النصيحة أم في إطار التوجيه المباشر؟ وهل شخص في مثل هذه الوظيفة يمتلك مثل هذه الصلاحية لإصدار توجيهات للسلطة التنفيذية متمثلة في رئيس الجمهورية ؟
السؤال المهم، هل يمكن أن يكون الرجل يقوم بدور قيادي أهم في ظل الغموض الذي يكتف غياب المرشد الأعلى الثالث مجتبى خامنئي؟ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Jana Choukeir
@ChoukeirJ
Iran’s top negotiator Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said on Wednesday that if Iran did not benefit from its memorandum of understanding with the U.S., “we have no reason to adhere to such an understanding”.
Iran’s national security depends on maintaining “Iranian arrangements” in the Strait of Hormuz, Qalibaf added in a statement posted on Telegram.
He said Iran’s approach to its war with the U.S. and negotiations to end it should be based on national interests, national security and a long-term perspective, adding that Tehran had no choice but to rely on its own strength. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Restitutor Orientis 🇱🇮
@restitutorII
🇺🇸🇮🇱
Etats-Unis: Le vice-président JD Vance affirme Jeffrey Epstein entretenait des liens évidents avec les services de renseignement américains et israéliens:
"Il avait clairement des connexions avec les plus hauts niveaux du renseignement américain, et il avait également des liens évidents avec les plus hauts échelons du renseignement israélien." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karim Emile Bitar
@karimbitar
🇱🇧 Interview à @LaCroix : "Il y a un véritable piège : le risque que l’on retombe dans le mécanisme d’Oslo qui avait finalement conduit à un renforcement de l’occupation et parallèlement à un renforcement du Hamas”, souligne Karim Bitar.”
www.la-croix.com/international/guerre-au-liban-les-zones-…
“Et le risque est aussi de «légitimer un mécanisme profondément déséquilibré où les États-Unis vérifieraient surtout ce que fait l’armée libanaise, sans imposer de limites aux frappes et à l’occupation israéliennes», craint-il.
« Techniquement, la zone pilote devrait être un moyen de tester la réciprocité de l’accord, pas seulement la capacité du Liban à exécuter des ordres ou des obligations unilatérales », observe Karim Bitar, pointant le caractère asymétrique du texte.
Le projet porté par Washington prévoit le retrait israélien de cinq localités, situées à la fois au nord et au sud du fleuve Litani, dont deux ne sont pas occupées par Israël. « Il est plus facile d’annoncer une “réussite” dans un secteur où il n’y a pas eu de retrait israélien important à organiser », ironise Karim Bitar.
Les forces armées libanaises sous pression
Pour l’armée libanaise, soumise à une forte pression de résultats, l’enjeu est de taille. Elle doit démontrer qu’elle peut exercer un contrôle effectif du territoire libanais sans devenir l’exécutante de renseignements ou d’objectifs fixés par Israël. Si elle peut renforcer son déploiement, multiplier les postes permanents ou sécuriser certaines opérations, la nature exacte des attentes demeure floue. « Que lui demande-t-on exactement de plus ? Doit-elle procéder à des fouilles systématiques de maisons privées sur la base de renseignements israéliens ? », interroge Karim Bitar. (Comme l’avait d’ailleurs reconnu lui-même l’envoyé spécial américain Tom Barrack), l’armée ne peut pas transformer des villages entiers en espaces soumis à des perquisitions permanentes sans mandat… »
Par @JennyFrLb -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clash Report
@clashreport
JD Vance exposes Israel:
There's a lot of talk about how much is the Israeli government influencing American politics, and there are certainly certain people within the Israeli government who hate the deal.
We see exact evidence. There was a Times story that came out yesterday that basically said there are certain influencers in America who are being paid in order to attack the deal.
Source: Joe Rogan Experience -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Farnaz Fassihi
@farnazfassihi
Breaking News: After being trapped in Iran since December 2024 and facing charges of espionage and collaboration with a hostile state, Dena Karari, a dual American and Iranian citizen, is free and out of Iran and on her way back to the United States, said Jared Genser, her lawyer in the United States. She was banned from leaving Iran after visiting her family in Shiraz, and was repeatedly interrogated but not detained, said Genser.
President Trump said in a social media post that the United States appreciated the gesture of goodwill. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ayman Abdel Nour
@aabnour
Syrian Public Opinion Survey (June 2026)
A three-fielding YouGov survey of Syrian adults shows stable support for President Al-Sharaa, stable rejection of Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, and stable openness to eventual peace with Israel, alongside a softening on the U.S. role and on a U.S.-brokered Israel–Syria security arrangement that tracks the absence of new publicly disclosed U.S.-mediated talks since the January Paris meeting.
councilforsecureamerica.org/research-and-insights/syria-p… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Alfoneh علی آلفونه
@Alfoneh
Thank you for your service Mr. @VP Vance!
Asked about the Israeli influence campaign aimed at derailing the Iran deal he is pursuing, his response was unequivocal: "GO TO HELL!!"
Link: www.youtube.com/watch?v=vtxyvD58eDg -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Charles Lister
@Charles_Lister
NEW -- significant changes in #syria's security leadership:
- General Intelligence chief Hussein Salama named National Security Director;
- Deputy Interior Minister Abdulqader al-Tahhan named General Intelligence Director.
- Dharar al-Shamalan named Deputy Interior Minister. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
The White House believes military action will soften Iran and compel it to give up its leverage (the Strait)
In reality, the more the US is willing to bomb Iran to control the Strait, the more it convinces Iran that it must control the Strait to defeat American military plans. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amichai Stein
@AmichaiStein1
🇺🇸🇮🇱🇱🇧 Israeli official to @Jerusalem_Post on Lebanon talks:
• The discussions were positive.
• The Pilot Zones will serve to test the successful expression of Lebanese sovereignty through the implementation of agreed upon conditions by the Lebanese armed forces and verification by a third party.
• UNIFIL and UNTSO will not be part of any verification model.
• With respect to private property, discussions continue to be underway for a solution which will facilitate the removal of contraband weapons while Lebanese law is respected.
• The two pilot zones in question were agreed upon. Any further implementation of pilot zones is contingent on the successful implementation of the initial pilot program. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clash Report
@clashreport
JD Vance on Iran:
If the Iranian people want to rise up and change their government, that's up to them.
But we're not going to send 150,000 ground troops in order to accomplish a change in a regime unless the people on the ground themselves want to accomplish that outcome.
Now, we're not going to send the troops in regardless, but to propose sending in the troops, you're basically saying that the U.S. military should do the job for the Iranian people.
We're not in that business anymore. We're just not.
Source: Joe Rogan ExperienceThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Forbidden Stories
@FbdnStories
Le revendeur officiel de NSO en France raconte ses échanges avec les services de renseignement et évoque un montant de “60/80 millions” d’euros pour l’achat du logiciel Pegasus.
Plus d’informations à venir.
📰 Découvrez l’enquête complète : forbiddenstories.org/fr/projects_posts/projet-pegasus-au-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
قوات العمالقة الجنوبية
@alamalikah
قوات العمالقة الجنوبية تكشف تفاصيل شحنة نوعية لتصنيع الأسلحة ضبطتها في باب المندب، كانت متجهة للحوثيين
كشفت قوات العمالقة الجنوبية، اليوم، عن تفاصيل شحنة نوعية من المواد والمعدات المخصصة للتصنيع العسكري، كانت قد ضبطتها دورية بحرية تابعة لها متمركزة في قطاع باب المندب، أمس الثلاثاء، 14/ يوليو/ 2026م، على متن قارب تهريب في طريقه إلى مليشيا الحوثي الإرهابية في محافظة الحديدة.
وتمكنت الدورية البحرية التابعة لقوات العمالقة الجنوبية في هذه العملية النوعية من اعتراض قارب التهريب وضبط الشحنة، والقبض على طاقمه المكون من سبعة بحارة من المهربين التابعين لمليشيا الحوثي؛ إذ جرى التحفظ عليهم وإحالتهم مع المضبوطات إلى الجهات المختصة لاستكمال الإجراءات القانونية.
وتحتوي الشحنة المضبوطة على أدوات ومعدات تصنيع عسكري متطورة، وأجزاء دقيقة تدخل في تجهيز مصانع الأسلحة النوعية التابعة للمليشيا؛ إذ شملت على آلات التحكم الرقمي (CNC) المخصصة لتشكيل هياكل الألمنيوم، التي تستخدم لصناعة الطيران المسيَّر (الدرونز) المجنَّح وهياكل الصواريخ، ومحركات خاصة بالطائرات النفَّاثة، بالإضافة إلى قطع غيار ومستلزمات لسلاح الهاون وسلاح القناصة، وأجهزة الفحص والقياس البصرية الدقيقة الخاصة بمراقبة الجودة (QC)، وأدوات ومعدات حفر الأنفاق وتفتيت الصخور، وآلات رفع وأجهزة كبس هيدروليكية مخصصة للأعمال الصناعية العسكرية.
وأشاد عضو مجلس القيادة الرئاسي، القائد العام للقوات المسلحة الجنوبية، عبد الرحمن المحرمي أبو زرعة، بهذا الإنجاز الأمني الكبير لمنتسبي الدوريات البحرية لقوات العمالقة الجنوبية، مشددًا على ضرورة مضاعفة الجهود ورفع مستوى اليقظة في مكافحة التهريب وتجفيف منابعه، بما يضمن قطع شريان الإمداد البحري عن مليشيا الحوثي الإرهابية المدعومة من إيران.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Reem Al-Harmi ريم الحرمي
@Reem_AlHarmi
In 2011, the Financial Times interviewed the Father Amir, His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani:
FT: And how do you want to be remembered?
Sheikh Hamad: “Well, first, I want to tell you the doctor told my father that his woman [Sheikha Aisha bin Hamad Al Attiyah] (my mother) will not be able to have children, and that any baby that comes will die. I had a sister, my mother’s first child, and she died. Then I was born and my mother passed away after that, two days after. We didn’t have a good hospital at that time and she had surgery without anesthesia. This is how I was born and I found myself in power, and I have to do… I have to do things; it’s not just to be remembered.
Believe me, this never came in my mind, although people love people saying good things about them, but to me, as I told you, the measurement, I always do everything for Qatar. Qatar to me is the most important.” -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
VivaRevolt
@VivaRevolt
According to @Charles_Lister; The United States Congress has sets conditions for future security cooperation with The Syrian Transitional Government including weapons and arm sales, including:
1-“all foreign fighters and jihadists” are removed from the armed forces and “other government services” and “disarmed”
2-a “system to monitor foreign fighters and jihadists” is established to “prevent attacks on the United States and allies and partners…including the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces”
3-“Al-Qaeda and associated or successor groups” are countered
“members and leaders of al-Qaeda” are prevented from entering or remaining in Syria
4-the SDF is “fairly integrated” into Syria’s armed forces
5-“attacks and violence” against Kurds and Druze are prevented. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Chatham House MENA
@CH_MENAP
'From the viewpoint of the Revolutionary Guard, it is not a problem that Mojtaba Khamenei is not visible... On the contrary, it helps them.'
@Alfoneh in our event 'Iran, the ceasefire and the Gulf: what comes next'
Watch live ➡️ www.youtube.com/watch?v=l5jTnB4XzNk -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Mamouri
@AliAlMamouri
For years, misconceptions about Iranian society have driven policy. Narratives shaped from outside Iran, rather than evidence from within, have contributed to sanctions and war that damaged Iran, the USt, and the wider region without reflecting the aspirations of most Iranians.
Mehdi Jami
@MehdiJami
مردمان خشمگین و مغموم ایران!
۲۳ تیر
سمیه توحیدلو
دو روزی است که سایت ایرانوایر گزارشی محرمانه را که دستیار اجتماعی رییسجمهور از نظرسنجیهای محرمانه در کشور نوشته، در دسترس همگان قرار داده است. اینکه سند محرمانه چرا پخش میشود مسئله من نیست؛ اما چنانچه پیشتر نوشته بودم، شناخت واقعی مردم ایران و دستهبندیهای آن، مستلزم فراگیر شدن همین نظرسنجیها و قرار گرفتنشان در اختیار پژوهشگران است.
با نبود این آمار دقیق، هر گروهی دچار «تونل ذهنی» میشود؛ صرفاً خودش را میبیند و گروه مقابل را محدود، قلیل، انگشتشمار و بیاهمیت برمیشمرد. مردمانی که به دنبال جنگ و انتقامند و پرچم خونخواهی برداشتهاند، خودشان را میلیونی و تمام ایران میدانند. از آن سو، مردمانی که دیماه در خیابان معترض بودند، و یا خواهان تغییر نظامند خودشان را تمام ایران میدانند و طرف مقابل را اقلیتی کوچک میبینند که صرفاً به خاطر منفعت و پول ایستادهاند.
این در حالیست که مردم ما اصلاً به این دو بخش محدود نمیشوند. ما برای شناختن و ایجاد شرایط گفتگو، نیاز به آمار داریم. نیاز به تحلیلهای دقیق داریم. خطاهای آماری هم تنها زمانی قابل رصد و اندازهگیری میشوند که این پژوهشها که اتفاقاً با پول بیتالمال انجام میشوند، پیش چشم همه قرار گیرند.
اما این گزارش به نظرم سند جامع و خوبی است و با بسیاری از مشاهدات ما در جامعه همخوانی دارد. این سند، تصویر مردمانی به غایت خشمگین و بیاندازه غمگین را نشان میدهد که در تضادهای عجیبی زیست میکنند؛
مردمانی که هم عزت میخواهند (مخالفت ۶۶.۱ درصدی با تعطیلی کامل برنامه غنیسازی هستهای) و هم تنش و دشمنی با آمریکا را نمیخواهند (اگرچه به دلیل شرایط جنگی موافقان کاهش رابطه با آمریکا به ۴۵ درصد رسیده و از موافقان افزایش رابطه با ۳۴.۱ درصد جلو زدهاند). هم توافق میخواهند و هم از جنگ گریزانند (۴۴.۳ درصد بهترین اقدام در شرایط فعلی را حفظ آتشبس و ادامه مذاکرات میدانند).
مردمانی که به هویت ایرانی خود افتخار میکنند اما بیش از پیش از هویت دینی فاصله میگیرند؛ (در این آمار، ۸۵.۶ درصد به ایرانی بودن خود افتخار میکنند و سهم کسانی که خود را قبل از هر چیز «ایرانی» معرفی میکنند به ۳۶.۸ درصد رسیده است (این رقم در تهران حتی ۵۰ درصد است). در حالی که کسانی که خود را صرفاً «مسلمان» معرفی میکنند به ۱۱.۶ درصد در کل کشور و کمتر از ۱ درصد در تهران کاهش یافته است. آمار روزهداری کامل نیز که در سال ۱۳۵۴ حدود ۷۹ درصد بود، در سال ۱۴۰۵ به حدود ۳۰ درصد رسیده است.) البته این فاصله و تغییرات ارزشی هنوز دوقطبیها را از بین نبرده است.
مردمانی که سخت درگیر معیشت اند. فرهنگ، رسانه و آموزش که مدتهاست از سبد خریدشان حذف شده، حالا نوبت به دارو و درمان رسیده؛ آمارها میگویند سه چهارم جامعه (۷۴.۸ درصد) در تأمین هزینههای درمان با مشکل مواجهند (۴۳.۳ درصد خیلی مشکل دارند). ۵۴ درصد صراحتاً اعلام کردهاند درآمدشان اصلاً کفاف مخارج زندگی را نمیدهد و بیش از ۸۱ درصد در تأمین مواد غذایی روزمرهشان با درصدی از مشکل روبهرو هستند.
برای این مردم «نان» اسم اعظم خداست و ملاک اصلی سنجش عملکردها؛ ۵۷.۲ درصد از قیمت فعلی نان ناراضیاند و ۷۲ درصد (که در تهران به ۷۶.۱ درصد میرسد) با ایده آزادسازی قیمت نان حتی در قبال پرداخت یارانه یا کالابرگ بیشتر، کاملاً مخالفند.
مردمانی که ناکارآمدی در حکمرانی را بزرگترین مشکل میدانند؛( ۴۶.۹ درصد علت اصلی مشکلات کشور را ناکارآمدی مسئولان میدانند و سهم تحریمهای خارجی در ذهنشان تنها ۲۰.۷ درصد است.) با این حال، همین مردم تغییرات اساسی (۵۲.۷ درصد) و اصلاحات محدود (۱۲.۹ درصد) را در قالب جمهوری اسلامی میخواهند و سهم طرفداران تغییر کل سیستم تنها ۱۹ درصد است.
مردمانی که میانهاند. اعتماد نهادیشان بسیار پایین است؛ (اعتماد به نهادهای عمومی کمتر از ۳۰ درصد است و متوسطی ۲۵ درصدی دارد.). با این حال پای کشورشان ایستادهاند (۵۴.۳ درصد در صورت حمله خارجی، برای دفاع از کشور از حکومت حمایت میکنند). اما باور دارند مسئولین پای آنها نایستادهاند و از این روست که به مهاجرت فکر میکنند؛ به طوری که یکسوم کل جامعه (۳۳ درصد) و نزدیک به نیمی از جوانان زیر ۲۹ سال و تحصیلکردگان، در صورت فراهم بودن شرایط مایل به خروج از کشور هستند.
برای خواندن بخش دوم این تحلیل خوب و خواندنی کانال تلگرامی نویسنده را ببینید:
web.telegram.org/a/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Iran’s release of the American detainee: a CBM ahead of another round of talks? Many would say no.
#iran
*Walter Bloomberg
@DeItaone
TRUMP: IRAN HAS ALLOWED AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, WHO WAS WRONGFULLY DETAINED IN DECEMBER OF 2024 UNDER BIDEN, TO LEAVE COUNTRY
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
Reports from #iran indicate that, over the past couple of days, attacks on different areas in Sistan and Baluchestan Province in southeastern Iran have increased.
That region is important for two reasons. On the one hand, it is where Chabahar is located, which is Iran’s only oceanic port and provides the country with maritime access beyond the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.
On the other hand, given the region’s ethnic and religious composition and the history of insurgent groups operating there, there are concerns that the attacks in Sistan and Baluchestan may be aimed at creating conditions for the rise and advance of Balochi insurgents and increasing pressure on the Islamic Republic.
In this context, there was an attack on the night of July 14 against the headquarters of Brigade 388 in Bampur, Sistan and Baluchestan, in which several soldiers were killed and dozens were injured. This is important because Brigade 388 is the third brigade of the 88th Armored Division of Sistan and Baluchestan, which is tasked with countering potential amphibious assaults.
As such, according to Iranian military analysts, the U.S. may also be preparing for a ground operation in southern Iran - especially since the USS Boxer Amphibious Ready Group is still in CENTCOM area of operation.
At the same time, analysts note that together with the two other brigades of the same division, Brigades 188 and 288, the Brigade 388 has also been involved in counterterrorism operations and in securing Iran’s eastern borders against armed insurgent groups. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kamran Bokhari
@KamranBokhari
The renewed U.S. air campaign against Iran is obscuring a much larger story: a fundamental geopolitical realignment is underway across the Middle East.
As Tehran remains preoccupied with conflict in the Gulf, Turkey is moving to expand its influence across Iran’s western flank, consolidating its position in territories long dominated by the Islamic Republic.
Backed by Washington and increasingly aligned with key Arab states, Ankara is emerging as the principal beneficiary of Iran’s weakening regional posture.
Yet Iran is far from out of the game. Growing tensions between Turkey and Israel could offer Tehran an opportunity to slow Ankara’s advance and shape the contours of the new regional order.
My latest: geopoliticalfutures.com/as-iran-declines-turkey-advances/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Michael Young
@BeirutCalling
According to @mounir_rabih, in Trump's meetings in Ankara with Sharaa and Erdogan, the sides discussed Lebanon, and the Syrian and Turkish leaders warned against resorting to military measures to disarm Hezbollah, proposing instead a potential alternative approach that would include coordination on controlling the Lebanese-Syrian borders and preventing the party's rearmament, as well as an inter-Lebanese dialogue leading to Hezbollah giving up its weapons. This comes amid reports that Trump asked Netanyahu, after the U.S. president's meeting with Sharaa, to pull Israeli forces out of Syria and Lebanon. “They don't want you there. You should redeploy,” Trump allegedly said, according to Axios: shorturl.at/qP7Ph
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Qalibaf has just delivered one of the most comprehensive statements of Iran's strategic thinking since the latest phase of the conflict began.
Few lines here:
- He argues that Iran neither seeks war nor fears it, but must always be prepared to fight while using diplomacy as an equally essential instrument of national security.
- He defends the closure of the Strait of Hormuz during the 40 day war, says it enabled Iran to secure an "Iranian arrangement" for the Strait later reflected in Article 5 of the MoU, warns that the United States is now trying to weaken that achievement through military pressure, and insists that Tehran has no reason to uphold any agreement from which it no longer benefits.
- He rejects any separation between military action and diplomacy, extends the same logic to sanctions, Lebanon, U.S. bases in the region and revenge for Khamenei's assassination, and calls for national unity while reaffirming that Iran's armed forces retain full freedom of action.
- From my point of view, the speech signals something more significant than a reaffirmation of Iran's traditional deterrence doctrine. Qalibaf is publicly describing a strategic framework in which military operations, negotiations, economic pressure and political messaging are no longer treated as separate tracks but as different phases of the same campaign.
- As emerged elsewhere, the battlefield is expected to shape diplomatic outcomes, while diplomacy is expected to preserve and legitimize the gains produced on the battlefield. I guess this is a more integrated conception of statecraft than the one Tehran articulated in previous years.
- The emphasis on the "Iranian arrangement" in the Strait of Hormuz is particularly revealing. It suggests that Tehran increasingly sees the post-war maritime order not as a temporary emergency measure but as a strategic reality that should survive the fighting itself.
- In this narrative, the MoU is valuable only insofar as it protects and institutionalizes that new balance of power. If Washington attempts to reverse it through military coercion or fails to implement its commitments, Iran reserves the right to abandon the agreement while continuing to defend what it now considers an established strategic achievement.
- That is a much broader message than simply threatening retaliation: it is an attempt to redefine the political terms on which any future negotiation with the United States will eventually take place.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Didier Maïsto
@DidierMaisto
En effet. Les pertes sont considérables dans l’absolu, mais quasiment de l’ordre du pourboire pour CMA CGM. Rodolphe Saadé et Emmanuel Macron entretiennent depuis 2017 une relation de proximité visible, marquée par des rencontres régulières, des visites communes à Marseille et des éloges publics réciproques.
Le régime de la taxe au tonnage, dispositif sectoriel existant mais maintenu et défendu sous la présidence Macron, a permis à CMA CGM de bénéficier d’une imposition extrêmement réduite sur ses bénéfices, indépendamment des super-profits records réalisés pendant le boom du fret mondial lié au Covid et aux perturbations géopolitiques –plusieurs dizaines de milliards de dollars cumulés, avec un pic à environ 25 milliards en 2022.
Selon les travaux de la commission d’enquête sénatoriale de 2025, cela s’est traduit pour l’État par un manque à gagner estimé à plusieurs milliards d’euros par an, dont près de 5,7 milliards pour la seule année 2023 alors que le groupe ne payait que 180 millions d’impôts environ.
Cette niche fiscale a considérablement enrichi Rodolphe Saadé et sa famille, qui contrôlent environ 73 % du capital, faisant exploser leur fortune. En échange, Saadé a recruté plusieurs anciens collaborateurs des cabinets macronistes, tandis que l’Élysée apportait un soutien diplomatique et facilitait l’ouverture de marchés internationaux pour le groupe, notamment en Inde ou en Afrique.
En retour, Saadé et les médias qu’il a acquis -La Provence, BFM, RMC- ont élaboré de véritables panégyriques de monsieur Macron et de sa politique. Ce système illustre avec éclat la symbiose entre le pouvoir macroniste -monsieur Macron considérant l’État comme son bien privé- et grand capital stratégique : l’État préserve un outil de compétitivité qui profite massivement à un acteur proche, au prix d’un coût fiscal pour les finances publiques, dans une relation mutuellement bénéfique en termes d’influence, de rayonnement économique et de richesse, sans qu’un accord illégal formel ait été démontré, mais au cœur de débats récurrents sur l’équilibre entre intérêts privés et intérêt général.
Emmanuel Paquette
@empaquette
Info. Acquis en 2024 par @cmacgm, le groupe @BFMTV et @RMCInfo a perdu près de 40% de sa valeur en raison, notamment, de la montée en puissance de @CNEWS www.linforme.com/medias-culture/article/dix-huit-mois-apr…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Clément Garin
@cgtvoff
💰🔴 𝐒𝐚𝐚𝐝𝐞́ 𝐚 𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐝𝐮 𝐩𝐫𝐞̀𝐬 𝐝𝐞 𝟓𝟎𝟎 𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐥𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐝'𝐞𝐮𝐫𝐨𝐬 𝐚̀ 𝐜𝐚𝐮𝐬𝐞 𝐝𝐞 𝐁𝐅𝐌𝐓𝐕
Racheté en 2024 par CMA CGM pour 1,57 milliard d'euros, le groupe audiovisuel RMC-BFM a vu sa valorisation chuter de manière spectaculaire.
Selon @LInforme_, les titres de RMC BFM ont été dépréciés de 464 millions d'euros, passant de 1,2 milliard d'euros à 730,4 millions d'euros fin 2025 (hors prêts ayant servi au financement de l'opération).
Plusieurs facteurs expliquent cette dégradation. D'abord, le coût des nombreux départs liés à la clause de cession après le rachat. Ensuite, la perte du leadership de #bfmtv face à #cnews, devenue numéro un des chaînes d'information en continu à l'automne 2024. Enfin, le recul du marché publicitaire télévisé, en baisse de 8,1 % en 2025, a encore pesé sur les comptes.
Conséquence : CMA Média a lancé un vaste plan d'économies. Il prévoit notamment une cinquantaine de départs volontaires, la cession des neuf chaînes locales BFM, (➡️🔴 longtemps démentie alors que #cgtv l'annonce depuis des mois, mais il est coutume de toujours dire que CGTV se trompe) ainsi que plusieurs restructurations au sein de @LaTribune et de @laprovence.
Interrogée par Le Figaro il y a quelques mois, Claire Léost assurait encore que le groupe retrouverait une trajectoire rentable. Huit mois plus tard, le discours a changé : la priorité est désormais à la réduction des coûts et au redressement financier.
Finalement, le recrutement de Claire Léost, censée redresser la barre, s'est révélé être un fardeau de plus à gérer. La patronne, passée par @PrismaMedia, n'a rien pu faire, et a au contraire aggraver la situation.
👉 www.linforme.com/medias-culture/article/dix-huit-mois-apr… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
A few thoughts on the latest escalation:
During the 40-day war, #iran had a clear targeting strategy, and each set of targets served a specific purpose. In the first stage, Iran targeted U.S. radar and early-warning systems at bases across the region. The aim was to enable longer-range strikes against Israel later. At the same time, Iran targeted those U.S. bases that could be used for a potential ground operation against Iran, including bases in Kuwait, Al-Harir in Iraq, as well as some bases in the UAE that could be used for operations against Iranian islands. At the same time, attacks on energy infrastructure in the region were intended to maximize economic pain.
This time, however, despite the effective resumption of war, Iran continues to target U.S. bases (in Kuwait and Bahrain) that have already been attacked several times. This may partly reflect efforts to strike new installations deployed by the United States at those bases. But when judged against current U.S. objectives, these attacks do not appear particularly helpful to Iran.
During the previous round of war, the U.S. had a broader set of objectives, including regime change, a potential ground operation to sieze HEU stockpile, and the targeting of Iran’s missile capabilities. In this round, however, the U.S. is focused on weakening Iran’s ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, and it is carrying out strikes toward that objective every night.
These operations rely primarily on capabilities that the United States already has in the region, as well as on the reimposition of the naval blockade, which depends on U.S. warships and naval forces. Iranian attacks therefore do not appear to be deterring the United States from continuing its strikes.
Therefore, it appears that Iran’s only strategy at this moment is to keep the Strait closed for as long as possible while the United States continues drawing down its strategic oil reserves, until the impact on the global oil market and the U.S. economy becomes irreversible. Iran hopes that this would push Trump to reconsider his position. Of course, this is a risky bet at a time when Iran remains under constant and heavy attack. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Diplomatie. Alexandre Garcia devrait être le prochain ambassadeur de France en Irak, en remplacement de Patrick Durel, nommé à Beyrouth.
Alexandre Garcia, qui a déjà servi en Irak, a été ambassadeur de France au Niger et en Mauritanie, ces dernières années. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Miad Maleki
@miadmaleki
Today @USTreasury sanctioned 50+ more individuals, entities & vessels tied to Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani's illicit shipping empire. Oil trader Hossein Shamkhani is the son of the late Ali Shamkhani, Iran's former Defense Minister, longtime Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and senior adviser to Supreme Leader Khamenei, who was killed in U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iran in early 2026.
USTreasury also issued an Iran general license. But unlike GLX this is not broad relief, it's a narrow wind-down license covering only some of the newly designated entities.
Key limits of this license are that no new transactions authorized and any payments owed to sanctioned entities must be deposited into a blocked, interest-bearing U.S. account — not paid out. Overall, this is a safety license, allowing an orderly close-out only, not business as usual.
Don't mistake it for a sanctions carve-out
home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0562 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
Scoop: President Trump told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a phone call Thursday that Israel should start redeploying its forces out of Syria and urged him to do the same in Lebanon. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/07/14/trump-netanyahu-syria-lebanon-re… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amberin Zaman
@amberinzaman
Iraqi PM Ali al-Zaidi has sent all the right signals ahead of his first official visit to the US to meet Trump, inking energy deals, arresting scores of officials in an anti-corruption drive and giving Iran backed militias until Sept. 30 to disarm. But how far can he push against Iran's outsize influence? My take: www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/07/first-foreign-trip-i…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alex Vatanka
@AlexVatanka
Iran's Majlis is often far (far) less influential than outsiders assume. But the shake-up in the leadership of its National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is worth watching.
Two of the committee's most outspoken opponents of diplomacy with the U.S. have been voted out of the leadership.
They were replaced, in part, by former diplomat Hassan Qashqavi, who served under both Ahmadinejad and Rouhani and is now the committee's spokesman.
It looks like Tehran is trying to present a more disciplined public message as negotiations (maybe) continue. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joshua Landis
@joshua_landis
Why it's so difficult for the U.S. to fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz
""Those naval escorts, U.S. warships, larger commitments like boots on the ground never came because I think that the rhetoric got a little ahead of our risk tolerance," Seigle said. "And when push came to shove, the United States was not ready to deploy its Navy, to deploy its other military forces in the capacity that would be needed to even have a shot at neutralizing those threats."
www.pbs.org/newshour/world/why-its-so-difficult-for-the-u… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
בקורס על הרפובליקה האסלאמית, שאני מעביר בשנים האחרונות באוניברסיטת ת"א, אני מגדיר את תקופת נשיאותו של מחמוד אחמדינז'אד כתקופת הפופוליזם והאופורטוניזם. הוא קרא להשמדת ישראל והכחיש את השואה, אך גם סירב להדיח את סגנו מעורר המחלוקת, רחים משאא'י, לאחר שזה הצהיר כי האיראנים הם ידידיהם של כל עמי העולם, לרבות הישראלים. הוא פעל לקידום רעיונות של "צדק חברתי", אך במקביל ניצב לצד דיכוי "התנועה הירוקה", שקמה ב-2009 בעקבות הטענות לזיוף תוצאות הבחירות לנשיאות כדי להבטיח את בחירתו לתקופת כהונה נוספת. הוא נודע בהשקפותיו הדתיות-שמרניות, אך אחד מצעדיו הראשונים כנשיא היה למנות – לראשונה מאז המהפכה – אישה לתפקיד שרה ולהתיר כניסת נשים לאצטדיוני כדורגל (החלטה שבוטלה תוך זמן קצר בלחץ אנשי הדת). הוא אימץ גישה משיחית, אך גם הדגיש את המרכיב הלאומי-תרבותי הפרסי על פני המרכיב הדתי-אסלאמי בזהות הלאומית האיראנית.
גם כשנבחר לנשיאות ב-2005 נתפס אחמדינז'אד כאאוטסיידר וכמי שנעדר בסיס כוח פוליטי משמעותי. הוא זכה בזכות תמיכת הממסד הדתי-שמרני בהובלת ח'אמנהאי, בעיקר משום שאלה ראו בו פתרון ראוי לאחר שמונה שנות נשיאותו של מוחמד ח'אתמי הרפורמיסטי ("איתאללה גורבצ'וב"), שנתפס כאיום משמעותי על ערכי המהפכה האסלאמית. ואולם, במהלך השנים הוא נתפס כנשיא הקורא תיגר על אנשי הדת ועל ח'אמנהאי עצמו. לאחר שפיטר באפריל 2011 את שר המודיעין שלו מבלי שקיבל לכך אישור מהמנהיג, פרץ משבר חסר תקדים בינו לבין ח'אמנהאי, שהפך את אחמדינז'אד ל"ברווז צולע" עד תום כהונתו. הוא ומקורביו הוצגו כ"זרם סוטה" ברפובליקה האסלאמית. גם משמרות המהפכה, שמילאו תפקיד משמעותי בבחירתו, הצטרפו עד מהרה למערכה נגדו.
בשנים האחרונות ניסה אחמדינז'אד למצב את עצמו מחדש בפוליטיקה האיראנית, לא רק באמצעות ניסיונות חוזרים ונשנים להתמודד במערכות הבחירות (שבהן נפסלה מועמדותו על ידי מועצת שומרי החוקה), אלא גם באמצעות פעילות ברשתות החברתיות, לרבות ציוצים מעוררי עניין שבהם הביע תמיכה בקבוצת הפוטבול של אוניברסיטת מישיגן וציטט את הראפר האמריקאי טופאק שאקור. הוא אף שיבח את הנשיא טראמפ על מאבקו נגד השחיתות במערכת הפוליטית האמריקאית. הופעותיו ברשתות נתפסו כניסיון לבנות תדמית של מדינאי פופולרי ומתון לכאורה בעיני הקהל המערבי והאיראני.
לנוכח כל אלה, אין לתהות על כך שהיו בארה"ב ובישראל מי שכנראה ראו באחמדינז'אד מועמד פוטנציאלי להובלת "הנהגה חלופית" למשטר האסלאמי הנוכחי. יתר על כן, סקרי דעת קהל שהתפרסמו בשנים האחרונות באיראן הצביעו על תמיכה משמעותית יחסית מצד רבים באיראן בנשיא לשעבר, שסומן כ"אנטיתזה" לשלטון הנוכחי.
עם זאת, סקרי דעת קהל – מוצלחים ככל שיהיו – והשמעת סיסמאות בזכותו, בעיקר מצד בני המעמדות הנמוכים במהלך גלי המחאה, אינם יכולים להכשיר את דרכו של פוליטיקאי כזה או אחר לנטילת השלטון במדינה בת למעלה מ-90 מיליון אזרחים, גם (ואולי בעיקר) כשהוא נישא על כידוניהם – או במקרה הזה, על מטוסיהם – של ישראל וארצות הברית.
קשה להבין כיצד היה מי שסבר שאחמדינז'אד יכול להפוך לשליטה החדש של איראן, כאשר המערכת האיראנית כולה, לרבות משמרות המהפכה והממסד הדתי-שמרני, רואה בו דיסידנט, וחשוב לא פחות מכך בהעדר כל תשתית ארגונית של תומכים, שעליה הוא יכול היה להתבסס כדי לשמש כחלופה של ממש למשטר האסלאמי.
יש הטוענים כי מנהיג המהפכה האסלאמית, איתאללה ח'ומייני, הצליח לחולל את המהפכה חרף העובדה שחי משנת 1964 בגלות (רוב הזמן בעיראק ובחודשים האחרונים בצרפת). אלא שבכך יש התעלמות מוחלטת לא רק מהצלחתו לבסס תנועה מהפכנית מאורגנת תוך שיתוף פעולה בין קבוצות, מפלגות ומגזרים בעלי השקפות שונות ואף מנוגדות, למען מימוש המטרה המשותפת של הפלת השאה, אלא גם מהרשת המאורגנת והמסועפת של פעילים נאמנים, מסגדים ונציגים בקרב המגזרים השונים, ששימשה אותו כפלטפורמה ארגונית ורעיונית והפיצה מסרים ישירות להמונים. בין היתר הופצו ברחבי המדינה קלטות אודיו עם דרשותיו של ח'ומייני, ששוכפלו והופצו באופן נרחב ושימשו בסיס להתארגנות אזרחית, להפגנות המוניות ולהכרזת שביתות.
הרפובליקה האסלאמית סובלת ממשבר לגיטימציה משמעותי, ורוב הציבור אינו תומך במשטר הנוכחי. עם זאת, היא ניצבת גם בפני משבר של היעדר חלופה. המשטר האיראני דיכא במשך 47 שנים כל פוטנציאל שיכול היה להתפתח לחלופה משמעותית. אם ארה"ב וישראל אכן מעוניינות לקדם שינוי פוליטי
באיראן, עדיף שלא להתפתות לפתרונות קסם המתבססים על מנהיגים איראנים גולים, פוליטיקאים חסרי תשתית ארגונית או קבוצות אתניות, שתמיכה בהן רק מחזקת את הנרטיב המשטרי שלפיו מטרתן של ישראל וארצות הברית היא לפרק את איראן – ולא רק להפיל את המשטר.
הצבת אתגר משמעותי ליציבות המשטר מחייבת גיבוש קואליציה כלל-ארצית רחבה, שתצליח לאחד בין קבוצות חברתיות המתמקדות בדרישה לשיפור כלכלי ולצדק חברתי, דוגמת פועלים וגמלאים, לבין קבוצות בעלות תודעה פוליטית גבוהה, למשל סטודנטים הנחשבים לנושאי הדגל של המאבק למען חירויות פוליטיות ואזרחיות.
סקרי דעת קהל וניתוח סיסמאות המושמעות בגלי מחאה יכולים לשמש כלי אחד בניסיון להבין את מגמות העומק בחברה האיראנית ולהצביע על כיוונים אפשריים להחלשת המשטר. אך ניתוח פשטני, התעלמות מהגוונים המאפיינים את החברה האיראנית ומעוצמתה של "המדינה העמוקה", שהופכת את המשטר האיראני לחסין, הם מתכון להערכות שגויות ופשטניות, המובילות לרוב גם לאימוץ מדיניות כושלת. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Interestingly, a growing interpretation inside Iran is that the renewed stream of stories targeting Ahmadinejad is not really about revealing anything new.
- Alongside outright falsehoods, much of the material is old, recycled and already widely known.
- The real objective may be to prepare the ground for other factions to take full control in the not-too-distant future, without carrying the stigma of being seen as proxies of Israel or the United States.
#iran
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
The real question raised by this reconstruction is: who has an interest in discrediting Ahmadinejad inside Iran and why?
- His trips to Budapest were never a secret. They were widely reported both inside and outside Iran. It would have been extremely easy for the IRGC’s intelligence apparatus to identify any allegedly “improper” contacts.
- The political point is that Ahmadinejad still retains a genuine base of support inside the country. That is probably where the analysis should begin.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Qatar. Alors qu'Emmanuel Macron charge Jean-Yves Le Drian de le représenter mardi à Doha pour présenter ses condoléances à l'émir Cheikh Tamim al-Thani, après la mort de son père, cheikh Hamad, l'ancien ministre de la Défense emmenera-t-il avec lui Nicolas Sarkozy, l'ancien président de la République grâce à qui le Qatar, sous le règne de cheikh Hamad, a intensément développé ses relations et ses investissements à partir de 2007 en France? Réponse demain.
#hamad
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Finalement, c'est le Premier ministre Sébastien Lecornu qui accompagnera Jean-Yves Le Drian à Doha.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran/Etats-Unis. Donald Trump ne trouve rien de mieux que de reprendre à son compte l'idée iranienne de faire payer la protection américaine du détroit. Il s'attire les félicitations du ministre iranien des Affaires étrangères, sarcastique. A lire dans Le Figaro.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Seyed Abbas Araghchi
@araghchi
POTUS is absolutely right. Whoever provides secure and safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz should be compensated for this service.
Iran has always been the GUARDIAN of the Strait and will remain so FOREVER.
20% is of course too much. We will be fair -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Benjamin Fève
@BenjaminFeve
I spoke to @ArabNews about what France actually hopes to gain from re-engaging with Syria following President Emmanuel Macron's historic visit to Damascus.
www.arabnews.com/middle-east/what-france-hopes-to-gain-fr…
France can, in theory, contribute to almost every sector of Syria's recovery:from energy and ports to banking, health, education, and institutional reform.
The key word, however, is theoretically.
As I argued, French companies remain highly risk-averse, something to be added to lingering sanctions concerns (effectively lifted since then), weak banking connectivity, unclear investment rules, limited arbitration mechanisms, high operating costs, and weak domestic purchasing power continue to hold back investment.
For now, France's most important contribution may not be financing reconstruction itself, but helping create the conditions that make investment possible: stronger laws, clearer procedures, technical assistance, and institutions that are more reliable and predictable... And this is actually what transpired from the bilateral agreements signed between Syria and France: technical support instead of big headline investments.
Yet, whether France can translate its early diplomatic engagement into long-term economic influence remains an open question. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Bloomberg
@business
A growing rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia is splitting the Middle East's deepest pockets — and Wall Street is terrified of being caught in the crossfire. Read the Big Take www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2026-07-12/why-wall-stree…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇮🇱 Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz says Iran keeps making one demand at the start of every negotiation: stop the targeted killings.
"One of the very first conditions they raise whenever negotiations begin is that the targeted killings must stop.
This Israeli method drives them crazy."
"Targeted killings" being the softer term for what many call extrajudicial assassinations.
Writer: JulieThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
The real question raised by this reconstruction is: who has an interest in discrediting Ahmadinejad inside Iran and why?
- His trips to Budapest were never a secret. They were widely reported both inside and outside Iran. It would have been extremely easy for the IRGC’s intelligence apparatus to identify any allegedly “improper” contacts.
- The political point is that Ahmadinejad still retains a genuine base of support inside the country. That is probably where the analysis should begin.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
سياسي واستراتيجي
@political0s
🔴 أخطر تحقيق استخباري من نيويورك تايمز عن تجنيد الاستخبارات الاسرائيلية لأحمدي نجاد. يكشف عن اجتماعه برئيس الموساد واستعمال جامعة أوروبية غطاء للتواصل السري بين الطرفين.
🔷 أهمية التحقيق كبيرة من زاوية العمل الاستخباري لأنها تقدم، للمرة الأولى بهذا التفصيل، تسلسلاً شبه كامل لعملية استمالة سياسية بدأت بمؤتمرات صورية ولقاءات خارجية وانتهت بمحاولة إخراج ميدانية داخل طهران.
🔷 التحقيق منشور في نيويورك تايمز وأعده أربعة من أبرز صحفييها في ملفات الاستخبارات والأمن القومي وإيران: كما أن المعلومات منقولة عن مسؤولين أميركيين وإيرانيين وإسرائيليين سابقين وحاليين، ومن شهادات مباشرة لبعض الأشخاص الذين شاركوا في توفير الغطاء اللوجستي للعملية.
هذا أهم ما جاء في التقرير
🔷 إسرائيل عملت لسنوات على استمالة الرئيس الإيراني الأسبق محمود أحمدي نجاد وتحويله إلى أصل استخباري وسياسي يمكن استخدامه في خطة لتغيير النظام الإيراني وتنصيبه زعيماً بديلاً.
🔷 الصحيفة تنسب هذا التوصيف إلى مسؤولين أميركيين وإيرانيين مطلعين على العملية، وتقول إن المشروع لم يكن مجرد قناة اتصال، بل خطة طويلة الأمد شملت لقاءات سرية، تمويلاً، ترتيبات سفر، ثم محاولة فعلية لنقله إلى مكان آمن داخل إيران مع بدء الحرب.
🔷 أهم المعلومات الحصرية في التقرير أن جامعة لودوفيكا للخدمة العامة في بودابست استُخدمت غطاءً لعقد لقاءات بين أحمدي نجاد ومسؤولين استخباريين إسرائيليين.
🔷 هذه المعلومة لا تأتي فقط من مصادر مجهلة، بل من شهادة مباشرة لرئيس الجامعة غيرغيلي ديلي، الذي قال إن مسؤولاً حكومياً هنغارياً كبيراً طلب منه تنظيم مؤتمر عن المناخ ودعوة أحمدي نجاد إليه، بينما كان الهدف الحقيقي ترتيب محادثات سرية مع الاستخبارات الإسرائيلية. ديلي أقر بأنه أدرك أن المؤتمر واجهة، ووصف نفسه لاحقاً بأنه لعب دور “الواجهة” أو “الدمية” في العملية.
🔷 ويكشف التحقيق أن رئيس الموساد السابق دافيد برنياع سافر شخصياً إلى بودابست عام 2024 للقاء أحمدي نجاد، وفق مسؤولين أميركيين سابقين.
🔷 وبعد ذلك أبلغ الموساد وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية الأميركية بأنه بات على اتصال بالرئيس الإيراني الأسبق.
🔷 وتقول الصحيفة، نقلاً عن مسؤولين أميركيين، إن إسرائيل دفعت في السنوات الأخيرة أموالاً لأحمدي نجاد لتغطية السكن والسفر، وإن ضباطاً إسرائيليين التقوه خارج إيران في مناسبات عدة.
🔷 وتبلغ العملية ذروتها في 28 فبراير 2026، عندما استهدفت غارة إسرائيلية مجمع أحمدي نجاد في طهران، فأصابت مبنى حراسه وسيارته المصفحة.
🔷 وتنقل الصحيفة عن أربعة مسؤولين إيرانيين كبار أن سيارة بيجو سوداء وصلت بعد الضربة، ونقلت أحمدي نجاد بسرعة من المكان. أما المعلومة الأكثر حساسية فتأتي من مسؤولين أميركيين وإيرانيين مطلعين على العملية، قالوا إن السيارة كان يقودها عناصر من الموساد، وإنهم نقلوه إلى منزل آمن سري داخل إيران.
🔷 بحسب التقرير، لم تسِر عملية الإنقاذ كما خطط لها الإسرائيليون. أحمدي نجاد انزعج من طريقة نقله الفوضوية وبدا محبطاً من الخطة الإسرائيلية لإعادته إلى السلطة. ثم غادر المنزل الآمن في ظروف ما زالت غير واضحة.
🔷 وتنقل الصحيفة عن أربعة مسؤولين إيرانيين كبار أن أحمدي نجاد أصبح لاحقاً في قبضة استخبارات الحرس الثوري ووُضع قيد الإقامة الجبرية، بعد أن تمكنت السلطات الإيرانية من كشف أجزاء واسعة من اتصالاته بإسرائيل.
🔷 هذه المعلومة تفسر ظهوره القصير والمقيد في جنازة علي خامنئي، حيث ظهر محاطاً برجال أمن، مطأطئ الرأس، ولم يتحدث.
🔷 ويكشف التقرير أن خطة تنصيب أحمدي نجاد كانت جزءاً من مشروع أوسع لتغيير النظام. ومن عناصره تسليح وتدريب جماعات كردية إيرانية معارضة متمركزة في شمال العراق، كي تعبر إلى غرب إيران وتسيطر على أراضٍ ثم تتقدم لاحقاً باتجاه طهران.
🔷 الصحيفة تقول إن هذا المسار لم يتحقق. كما تستشهد بتصريح سابق لتامير هايمان، الرئيس الأسبق للاستخبارات العسكرية الإسرائيلية، قال فيه إن خطة تغيير النظام تضمنت سلسلة عمليات خاصة فريدة، وإن أحمدي نجاد كان جزءاً منها.
🔷في الخلفية السياسية، يوضح التحقيق أن إسرائيل رأت في تحوّل أحمدي نجاد بعد خروجه من الرئاسة فرصة يمكن استثمارها. فقد خفف خطابه المعادي لإسرائيل، وانتقد أجهزة الأمن والفساد، وقدم نفسه بصورة أكثر اعتدالاً، واحتفظ بقاعدة شعبية بين الطبقات الفقيرة.
🔷 وينقل التحقيق عن شخص من دائرته المقربة أن أحمدي نجاد تحدث أمام عدد محدود من مساعديه عن رغبته في العودة إلى الحكم بمساعدة قوى أجنبية. وبحسب هذا المصدر، كان يرى أن النظام القائم لن يسمح له بالعودة، وأنه يستطيع تقديم نفسه بديلاً داخلياً أفضل من معارضين يعيشون في الخارج. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amre Moussa
@amremoussa
أهنئ الرئيس محمود عباس وأرحب بقراره بالدعوة إلى إجراء انتخابات تشريعية فلسطينية شاملة في الثامن والعشرين من نوفمبر المقبل، تتبعها انتخابات رئاسية في الربع الأول من العام القادم. لقد دعوت مرارًا إلى ضرورة استئناف المسار الديمقراطي الفلسطيني بعد انقطاعٍ دام نحو عشرين عامًا، لما يمثله ذلك من ضرورة وطنية وخطوة سياسية لا يمكن الاستغناء عنها.
إن إجراء الانتخابات التشريعية الفلسطينية يمثل البداية الحقيقية ليقظة سياسية ووطنية جديدة، تعزز صمود الشعب الفلسطيني، وتجدد شرعية مؤسساته، وتفتح الآفاق أمام ممارسة حقه الأصيل في تقرير المصير ونحو إقامة دولته المستقلة.
المسؤولية كبيرة على المجتمع الدولي ممثلاً في الأمم المتحدة، وجامعة الدول العربية، والولايات المتحدة وسلطة الاحتلال الإسرائيلية ومنظمات المجتمع المدني العالمية، وكافة الأطراف المعنية، للعمل على توفير جميع الضمانات السياسية والقانونية والأمنية اللازمة لإجراء الانتخابات بحرية ونزاهة في جميع الدوائر الفلسطينية، بما في ذلك القدس الشرقية، باعتبارها جزءًا لا يتجزأ من الأرض الفلسطينية المحتلة، ودون أي عوائق أو استثناءات.
إن نجاح هذه الانتخابات يمثل خطوة مهمة نحو تعزيز الوحدة الوطنية الفلسطينية، وإعادة بناء المؤسسات على أسس ديمقراطية، وتقوية الموقف الفلسطيني في مواجهة التحديات الخطيرة الراهنة، بما يخدم قضية فلسطين ويعزز فرص تحقيق السلام القائم على إنهاء الاحتلال وإقامة الدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🚨 BREAKING:
🇮🇷🇰🇼🇺🇸 Iran has reportedly carried out surprise strikes on ATACMS missile systems in Kuwait.
This is significant for two reasons:
1. It's the first time since the ceasefire that Iran initiates the attack, after the tit-for-tat is over.
2. These ATACMS systems were reportedly used in U.S. strikes on Iran yesterday.
If this was the first land-to-land missile use by the U.S. since the ceasefire, it strongly suggests Kuwait approved launches from its territory.
Now Iran responds and the unraveling continues...
Writer: Michael -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La disparition de Cheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, l'homme qui a propulsé le Qatar sur la scène mondiale.
Avec Christian Chesnot, j’ai beaucoup écrit sur cheikh Hamad al-Thani, qui vient de mourir à l'âge de 74 ans, en particulier dans notre premier livre sur l’émirat « Qatar, les secrets du coffre-fort », paru il y a 13 ans.
Cheikh Hamad était une personnalité assez extraordinaire au Moyen-Orient. Visionnaire, il renversa son père en 1995 sans verser une goutte de sang, après avoir prévenu Américains, Britanniques et Français. Cheikh Khalifa ne voulait pas développer les gigantesques réserves de gaz qui font aujourd’hui la richesse du Qatar.
Frustré que son minuscule pays ne soit pas connu, le jeune émir plaça le Qatar sur la carte du monde en créant en 1996 Al-Jazeera, la chaîne de télévision qui allait être pendant une décennie la voix du monde arabe.
Il mêlait un ADN islamiste conservateur à un sens de l’opportunité quasi inné. Il voulait que le Qatar soit présent partout. Ses adversaires raillaient « une société de communication ». Il les irritait profondément par son désir d’exister et sa proximité avec les Frères musulmans, dont Doha allait devenir la « capitale ».
Hamad avait la chance de disposer de deux autres personnes qui feront briller le Qatar: sa seconde épouse – Cheikha Moza – et son cousin Hamad Bin Jassem, l’ordonnateur de sa diplomatie vibrionnante, le « Talleyrand de l’émir », qui n’avait pas froid aux yeux et pour qui « tout individu a prix, il faut simplement le connaître ».
Sous Hamad, le Qatar était à la fois ami du Hamas et abritait une mini ambassade d’Israël, sans avoir formellement de relations diplomatiques avec l’Etat hébreu. On croisait à Doha aussi les biens des leaders tchétchènes, qu’Abassi Madani, l’islamiste algérien et des responsables talibans. Mais il avait su, aussi, attirer les Etats-Unis pour sa protection et savait se rendre indispensable.
Il avait mis le pied à l’étrier de son fils Tamim en lui confiant la gestion d’événements sportifs, dont le premier fut en 2006 les Jeux Asiatiques d’hiver, avant l'apothéose de la Coupe du monde de football en 2022.
Il trouva en Nicolas Sarkozy, président de la République, un relais d’influence qui lui ouvrit les portes de la France pour des investissements importants. Hamad et le Qatar derrière lui achetaient de l'influence, un peu partout dans le monde.
« Quand on joue dans la cour des grands, il faut accepter de se prendre des claques de grands », confiait-il à ses amis. Avec l’éclatement des révoltes arabes en 2011 et la montée en puissance un peu partout de ses amis Frères musulmans, Cheikh Hamad pensait devenir "le nouveau leader d’un nouveau monde arabe", recomposé à sa main. L’échec des islamistes égyptiens au pouvoir au Caire a sonné le glas de l’islam politique conquérant au Moyen-Orient.
Après les excès du Qatar en Libye, Cheikh Hamad en tira – où on l’incita à tirer – la leçon qu’il devait prendre du recul. Il se retira au profit de son fils et prince héritier cheikh Tamim, un retrait suffisamment rare pour être signalé.
Hamad était indiscutablement le père du « miracle » qatarien, c’est-à-dire d’une remarquable « success story » même si le miracle comporte également des zones d’ombre.
#qatarhamad -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Hashem علي هاشم
@Alihashem
في النقاشات التي سبقت اغتيال آية الله خامنئي، لطالما ذكرت أن علي خميني سيكون له دور في المرحلة الجديدة. هجرته إلى النجف للدرس والتدريس في آن، والشبكة العائلية التي يتوسطها، ولاحقا عودته إلى إيران وبروزه صوتاً ثورياً بعد الحرب الأولى. الآن يتقدم علي خميني خطوة جديدة نحو ماسسة حضوره في قلب النظام بانتظار الموقع الرسمي القادم.
التغريدة ادناه من العام 2019.
Ali Hashem علي هاشم
@Alihashem
علي الخميني شخصية تستحق الانتباه، فهو إلى جانب حفيد #الخميني المؤسس، والدته هي إبنة شقيقة السيد #موسى_الصدر، وهو متزوج من حفيدة آية الله #السيستاني. انتقاله إلى النجف اثار الكثير من التساؤلات في حينه، لكنه يتردد بشكل دائم إلى #إيران
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
independentpersian
@indypersian
صادق خرازی، سفیر پیشین تهران در فرانسه، در گفتگویی با یک برنامه اینترنتی درباره مجتبی خامنهای، رهبر جدید جمهوری اسلامی گفت او «در مباحث سیاست خارجی» مانند پدرش فکر میکند.
خرازی که برادر همسر مسعود خامنهای، پسر سوم رهبر پیشین جمهوری اسلامی است، با ذکر آنکه مردم ایران «حاج آقا مجتبی» را نمیشناسند گفت: «ایشان در مباحث سیاست خارجی، عین آقا فکر میکند.»
مجتبی خامنهای، فرزند رهبر پیشین جمهوری اسلامی، از زمان انتصاب به عنوان جانشین پدرش، در انظار عمومی ظاهر نشده و تصویر و یا صدایی نیز از او منتشر نشده است.
شباهت تفکرات مجتبی خامنهای و پدرش در سیاست خارجی در حالی مطرح میشود که مسعود پزشکیان، به دفعات اعلام کرده است مذاکره با آمریکا و امضای تفاهمنامه پایان جنگ مورد تایید و حمایت مجتبی خامنهای بوده است.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mehran Haghirian
@MehranHaghirian
Here is how a “Hormuz Fee” can be viewed as an opportunity to institutionalize regional cooperation in ways that recognize the shared interests of all 8 Persian Gulf littoral states—Iran, Oman, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, & the UAE.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Michael Weiss
@michaeldweiss
If you want to know where things stand with the MOU and U.S.-Iranian "ceasefire," have I got a special Saturday afternoon treat for you. Below are excerpts of what J.D. Vance told a group of reporters in a background call yesterday at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon. I wasn't on the call but someone kindly sent me a transcript.
As you know, the MOU isn't looking so hot right now. Iran keeps opening fire on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and the CENTCOM spent two nights this week retaliating, striking at least 170 Iranian targets, including "air defense systems, coastal surveillance assets, missile and drone storage sites, naval capabilities, and military logistics infrastructure along Iran’s coastline."
Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were also on the call yesterday, but Vance, rumored to be the "fall guy" if this tenuous deal collapses, led the conversation. He did it so well that at one point Witkoff professed he had "nothing to add" to a "perfect articulation of where we are today."
When asked if perhaps Iran didn't interpret the MOU to mean that Iran was in control of the Strait of Hormuz, the Vice President said: "What happened is they were caught off guard after they signed the MOU by how rapidly traffic was moving, and especially how much traffic was moving through the southern lane of the Strait of Hormuz. So in reality, and we saw this again with many of the pragmatic people within their system, they recognized that our interpretation was not just reasonable, but it was the only plausible interpretation. That some of the hardliners, and you can even see this in some of the social media posts, started to attack [Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas] Araghchi and [Speaker of Iranian Parliament Mohammad] Ghalibaf for making a bad deal. This is not an interpretive difference. What it is is that certain elements within Iran decided, 'Oh wait, we gave up leverage that we didn't want to give up.' They decided to renege on the deal. So I think it's very important to characterize this accurately, and it's not a reinterpretation of the MOU. They they were reneging on the deal because they felt caught off guard by how quickly oil and gas was moving through the southern channel."
Paragraph 5 of the agreement states: "Upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels, with no charge for 60 days only, from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman, and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles, and de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days."
Most read this as implicit confirmation that Tehran did indeed control the Strait; otherwise, why would the Iranians have to make arrangements for the safe passage of commercial vessels and why would they have to de-mine a waterway they had no custody over?
Vance now says that's not how to read paragraph 5 at all. Rather, the U.S. is simply a victim of its own naval success. By opening the Strait, the "pragmatic" Iranians acknowledged their loss of leverage but the hardline radicals felt bamboozled and started firing at commercial ships and, well, here we are now!
Vance is very disappointed in the Iranians, maybe even in the cool new super-friends he's made in the IRGC. "The simple deal was," he said, "we lift the blockade, and the Iranians stop shooting at ships, and that's the easiest but the most important end of the bargain for the Iranians to keep. And so far, I would give them an F on, or at least a D minus, on keeping their end of the bargain."
(Earlier in the call, Kushner said: "Iran is showing a lot of signs of wanting to make this deal.")
But what if it all falls apart? Not to worry, Vance assured reporters, "it's not a forever war if the Iranians violate the terms of the agreement and shoot commercial shipping, and and we respond to it."
They can shoot, we can shoot, and this can go on indefinitely -- but no forever war. Got that? Please don't put in the newspaper this is a forever war.
What else did J.D. Vance say yesterday?
Remember the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), or "nuclear dust" (it's not dust), to which Trump often alludes? Removing or destroying HEU was one of the objectives of Operation Epic Fury. Except Trump suggested weeks ago -- round about the time said it'd be very unfair to leave Iran without an arsenal of ballistic missiles (even though doing so was another stated objective of the war) -- that he might not even bother trying to remove the HEU from Iran at all, as the stuff was not very "valuable."
Vance now hints at leaving the HEU right where it is; the U.S. might just entomb it: "You know, look, either they're going to give us the nuclear dust, or we have very low-cost military options to ensure that it remains buried underground forever." (The reporter who asked about this noted that the U.S. might have just used such a low-cost military option earlier in the campaign but didn't because it expected to exfiltrate the HEU somehow.)
Vance was also queried about reported Israeli intelligence suggesting that the Iranians are still plotting to assassinate Trump. "On on the question of what Israeli intelligence about assassination slots and so forth," he responded, "I've seen the same public reporting that you guys have seen. I'm not going to comment on, you know, private conversations that have been had between you know leaders in our government and leaders in their government. What I will say with great confidence is Donald Trump is not a person who makes decisions based on fear or based on threats to his personal safety."
With great confidence, he says that.
Donald Trump posted to TruthSocial last night, about eight hours after this background briefing, about what happens in the event Iran assassinates him or tries to assassinate him: "1000 Missiles are Locked and Loaded and aimed at the Islamic Republic of Iran, with thousands of more to immediately follow, should the Iranian Government act on its threat, pronounced in many corners of the Globe, to assassinate, or attempt to assassinate, the sitting President of the United States of America, in this case, ME!"
We are therefore invited to believe that J.D. Vance, who would succeed Donald Trump as president of the United States in the event of Trump's assassination by the Iranian government, is prepared to fire these thousand missiles at Iran. But not in a forever war kind of way, mind you. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
The IRGC has disclosed the missile types used in today’s operation: Qadr, Emad, Kheibar Shekan, Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar ballistic missiles.
- The mix is noteworthy. It suggests a deliberate combination of medium-range strategic systems with more precise short-range missiles, pointing to a calibrated strike package rather than the employment of a single missile family.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Juvénal MUNUBO
@juvenalmunubo
Lorsque,ce lundi 26 juin 1995, le téléphone sonne dans le bureau de Henri Deniaud, l'Ambassadeur de France au #qatar reste coi. "Venez rapidement au Diwan,nous avons un important message à vous transmettre". Quelques heures plus tard, il se trouve aux côtés de ses homologues americain et britannique pour un entretien séparé avec le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Hamad Bin Jassem.
- Je vous annonce que le fils de l'émir, le prince héritier, Hamad al-Thani, va prendre le pouvoir demain. Les choses devraient bien se dérouler. Informez-en vos autorités. (extrait du livre "Qatar,les secrets du coffre-fort" de @cchesnot et @Malbrunot p.13).
Ainsi, Hamad ben Khalifa Al Thani (au pouvoir entre 1995 et 2013) succéda à son père, Khalifa ben Hamad Al Thani(au pouvoir entre 1972 et 1995),en séjour en Suisse.
L' ancien émir du Qatar Hamad Al-Thani est décédé aujourd'hui 12 juillet 2026.
Au pouvoir depuis 2013, grâce à une transmission volontaire après abdication de son père, se trouve son fils @TamimBinHamad.
Le Qatar a donc une certaine tradition des "coups d'état de palais", soit entre cousins, soit entre père et fils. Excepté celui actuellement en fonction. À lire. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Qatar. Avec la mort de l'ancien émir Cheikh Hamad al-Thani à l'âge de 76 ans disparaît le père du miracle qatarien. Celui qui a transformé un village de pêcheurs de perles en un pays incontournable sur la scène mondiale. En 2013, il avait cede le ppuvoir à son fils, Tamim. J'y reviendrai.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Mojtaba Khamenei’s funeral message is worth reading carefully. It is not simply an emotional tribute to his father: it offers a first glimpse into the religious and strategic narrative likely to shape the next phase of the Islamic Republic.
- The central theme is unmistakably Karbala. The late Supreme Leader is described as Husayni in every dimension: he thought like Husayn, fought like Husayn, lived like Husayn and ultimately embraced martyrdom like Husayn. This is not only religious symbolism. It embeds his death within the foundational narrative of Shia political identity, transforming a military defeat into a sacred act of sacrifice.
- the second pillar of the message is equally important: revenge. Mojtaba does not portray retaliation as a political choice or a matter of state policy. He defines it as the will of the nation and, above all, as a divine mission. He explicitly says it will not depend on him or on any current official, and that “free people around the world” will each carry out part of this mission.
- This language is significant because it shifts revenge from the realm of immediate military retaliation to that of a long-term religious obligation. In other words, the message suggests that justice for the “martyrs” is not tied to a specific timeline or battlefield but becomes part of a broader ideological project that can be pursued by various different actors over time.
- Whether or not this translates into concrete action is a separate question. But, in my view, as a statement of political theology, the speech is highly revealing: Mojtaba is framing continuity through the twin concepts of Karbala and enduring retribution.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Nicolas Sawaya
@sawaya_nicolas
Vaat majority of Israeli Jews (67%) reject withdrawal from Lebanon even if Hizballah complies w/ "ceasefire" agreement vs 23% who support it, per June 16-22 INSS survey.
A reminder that Israeli govt policies reflect the depraved views of the majority of their constituents. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ragıp Soylu
@ragipsoylu
Exclusive: Syria, Iraq and US plan to unveil Mediterranean pipeline deal to bypass Strait of Hormuz
• US will announce plans to resurrect a five-decade-old pipeline running from Iraq to the Syrian port of Baniyas
@SeanPmathews’s story with my assist
www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-syria-iraq-and-us-pl… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
Mojtaba Khamenei: We pledge to avenge the pure blood of Ali Khamenei and all those martyred in these two wars from the criminal and dishonorable murderers. This revenge is the demand of our nation, and it must inevitably be carried out.
These criminals, whose names are known from top to bottom, will go to their graves without ever realizing their wish of dying peacefully in their beds. They must understand that this does not depend on my personal presence or that of any other official.
Whether we are here or not, this will be accomplished. Soon, free people around the world will each fulfill a part of this divine mission. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Je serai à 20H15 sur LCI pour parler de l'Iran et des risques de reprise de la guerre.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Negar Mortazavi
@NegarMortazavi
On escalation in Hormuz:
Under the MOU, Tehran agreed to facilitate safe/innocent passage through the Strait of Hormuz, but with coordination. In Iran’s view, that doesn’t give the U.S. the right to unilaterally escort or organize commercial shipping.
Tehran’s message is clear: the Strait is open but not on U.S. terms.
Trump signed an agreement on paper but is now trying to stretch it at sea. Iran is responding by pulling the dispute back to the text of the MOU and demonstrating that military power cannot rewrite what was negotiated. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇮🇱🇱🇧A U.S. official says the first "pilot zone" in southern Lebanon that the IDF is supposed to withdraw from "will launch in a matter of days"
🇺🇸🇮🇱🇱🇧This statement comes as the Lebanese government refuses to hold another round of negotiations with Israel in Rome next week, before Israel implements its commitment to start an initial withdrawal
🇺🇸🇮🇱🇱🇧The U.S. official said "further pilot zones are being mapped out and planned. CENTCOM is coordinating with both countries to move forward"
🇺🇸🇮🇱🇱🇧According to the U.S. official the Rome meeting is "a closed discussion" that will enable the Israeli and Lebanese senior negotiators to hand off to technical teams, which will work on all issues outlined in the Framework agreement between the countries
🇺🇸🇮🇱🇱🇧"We will soon begin outreach to international partners to help the Lebanese Government effectively restore sovereignty in these zones and across their country more broadly", the U.S. official said -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Caroline Rose
@CarolineRose8
I told the New Arab that “there are a number of groups with a hostile attitude towards the Syrian government, including #isis, #assad-affiliated elements, #druze groups, #hezbollah-linked cells and even hardcore Islamist elements within the government’s core constituency.”
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Dr Andreas Krieg
@andreas_krieg
"Closer ties with Israel are more likely to become the UAE's greatest vulnerability than its winning hand. The Abraham Accords already deliver what Abu Dhabi actually wants: high-end defense technology, cyber tools, intelligence cooperation, counter-drone systems and access to Israel's innovation ecosystem. None of that requires a deeper political embrace of Benjamin Netanyahu's government. Going further offers diminishing returns and rising strategic costs.
The problem is that Israel has become a liability multiplier. Netanyahu's Israel has a reverse Midas touch—almost everything it handles in the region grows more toxic, more polarizing and harder to manage. For Abu Dhabi, that matters. Visible identification with Israel antagonizes Iran, deepens mistrust among Gulf Arab states, and irritates Saudi Arabia precisely when the UAE already faces isolation over its ‘Axis of Secessionists’ in the region.
There is also a deeper contradiction. Israeli help during the Iran war may have been operationally useful for the Emiratis, but it should be read through the logic of the arsonist arriving as the firefighter. Israel's escalation against Iran exposed the UAE to Iranian retaliation in the first place. Welcoming Israeli systems is one thing; treating Israel as a strategic shield is another. The Emirati advantage lies in cooperation that is controlled, discreet and transactional—not further political integration.
Israel can add to UAE statecraft as a supplier and intelligence partner. But it should not become the organizing principle of Emirati strategy. In other words, the UAE can use Israel as a tool but it must not be defined by it in grand strategic terms"
amwaj.media/en/debate/debate-will-israeli-ties-be-the-uae… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
Saudi Arabia blocking payments to UAE accounts, businesses say
Transfers from kingdom to companies and individuals in Dubai repeatedly returned or delayed in a sign of economic tensions
tensionwww.ft.com/content/07d5de48-468d-4ba9-ab82-dcfeef5f0dae via @ft -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Negar Mortazavi
@NegarMortazavi
I told @AFP that Iran wants to make clear that it is in charge of Hormuz, and opposes the US unilaterally escorting ships through the Strait without coordination.
Tehran is trying to avoid another full-scale war. But it also believes that failing to respond carries its own risks because it would project weakness and invite further pressure.
Iran's calculation is that calibrated, limited escalation can restore deterrence without crossing the threshold into all-out war.
www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/07/iran-plays-fire-calc… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'Iran a enterré son ancien guide Ali Khamenei, en l'absence de son fils et successeur, Mojtaba. Autour de lui, les nouveaux leaders sont militaires, moins religieux, mais plus sûrs d'eux, et tout aussi cruels envers les opposants. Mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Syrie. Au lendemain de la visite d'Emmanuel Macron à Damas, "l'armée syrienne s'est rapprochée du camp du djihadiste français Omar Omsen dans le nord-ouest de la Syrie", confie une source diplomatique européenne, qui s'interroge sur le timing de ce qui pourrait annoncer une opération contre cet islamiste radical, qui gêne également le pouvoir syrien.
L'information n'a pas été confirmée par les autorités syriennes.
Deux bombes ont explosé à Damas pendant la visite d'Emmanuel Macron. L'attentat n'a pas été revendiqué.
#syriemacron -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A écouter.
Amichai Stein
@AmichaiStein1
רגע לפני שהוא נפרד מישראל: שגריר צרפת היוצא @FJournes על היחסים עם ישראל ("לא יכול להיות גרוע יותר") על ההחלטה למנוע ממטוסים עם נשק לעבור בשמי צרפת ("מדברים על ה6 שאמרנו 'לא' ולא על המאות ש'כן') וגם על ההכרה במדינה פלסטינית ('לא פרס לחמאס')
youtu.be/t3qw84OXKC4 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rahm Emanuel
@RahmEmanuel
Prime Minister Netanyahu and his government have led Israel into a dead end.
For too long, the United States has confused being a strong ally with being a silent one. A blank check has come without expectations, accountability, or consequences.
That approach has allowed Prime Minister Netanyahu to ignore America's concerns over settlements, expand a regional war, and believe there would be no strategic cost. It has also allowed the denial of food and medical relief to innocent Palestinians in Gaza, fueling a perception around the world that Israel is indifferent to the suffering of civilians.
That is not good for Israel. It is not good for America. And it is not a path to peace.
The strongest alliances are built on honesty, shared values, and the willingness to tell each other hard truths. It's time for a fundamentally new approach to the U.S.-Israel relationship—one that advances Israel's security, Palestinian’s right to self-determination, and the Arab world’s desire for regional stability.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alice Rufo
@RufoAlice
J'étais honorée d'accompagner le Président de la République lors de sa visite à Damas, un acte fort qui a marqué le plein soutien de la France à une Syrie souveraine, sûre, pluraliste, unie.
Lors de mon entretien avec le ministre de la Défense, le général Mourhaf Abou Qasra, nous avons évoqué les perspectives concrètes pour appuyer les capacités souveraines de la Syrie, par des coopérations en matière de formation et de renforcement des capacités. La lutte contre le terrorisme, le déminage et la destruction des stocks d'armes chimiques sont des priorités partagées. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
I told @nyt that to Iran is risking going back to war because the “M.O.U. increasingly looked like a mirage. The view from Tehran is that the U.S. is engaged in a concerted effort to take control of the Strait out of Iran’s hands, to weaken its position in Lebanon and to regain its own strength in order to put even more pressure on Iran or to go back to war.” www.nytimes.com/2026/07/09/world/middleeast/iran-us-war-s…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
The current status quo may be preferable in the short term to a problematic agreement or another war. However, it does not provide a stable solution, but at most a temporary pause. The more time passes without an arrangement and without effective monitoring, the greater the danger of sudden deterioration, while Iran will be able to rebuild its military capabilities in the meantime. My latest piece for @ynetnews
www.ynetnews.com/opinions-analysis/article/h1csocnmmg -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran: L'accord-cadre avec les Etats-Unis est en état de mort clinique. Donald Trump menace de frapper "fort" et traite l'Iran de pays "malade". Téhéran de son côté se sent suffisamment fort pour attaquer de nouveau les pays du Golfe. Les dessous d'une crise qui n'en finit plus. Mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
#iranwar
www.lefigaro.fr/international/le-protocole-d-accord-est-s… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
Khamenei’s funeral draws masses, but Iran’s real crisis begins now. My recent piece for @ynetnews share.google/bdReo417ViDVK1Vx1
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Harith Hasan
@harith_hasan
My latest article for @newlinesmag. I argue that upcoming Khamenei’s funeral ceremonies in Iraq are more than a moment of mourning. They offer a window into how the Axis of Resistance sustains its influence while navigating a complex social and political landscape in which solidarity is fraught with ambiguities. newlinesmag.com/argument/the-ambiguities-of-solidarity-at…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Teymour Joumblatt
@TeymourJoumblat
بات من الواضح أن اتفاق الإطار المنحاز لا يحقق وقفًا حقيقيًا ومستدامًا لإطلاق النار، ولم يلزم إسرائيل بوقف اعتداءاتها وإنهاء احتلالها، ولا يفرض عليها احترام سيادة لبنان، وهي تستقوي به لتتهرب من مسؤوليتها في كل ما ارتكبته. وإذا كنّا من الأساس قد أيّدنا تفاوض الدولة اللبنانية وحدها باسم لبنان، فهي مُطالبة بحسن إدارته والاستفادة من كل التجارب السابقة، وأن تسعى للتوصل لاتفاق يحقق انسحاباً فورياً للاحتلال، ويضمن عودة كل أبناء الجنوب، ويحفظ حقوق لبنان كاملة وفق الهدنة والطائف وكل القرارات الدولية، بموازاة دعم الجيش اللبناني ومدّه بكل المستلزمات المطلوبة لبسط سلطة الدولة على كامل أراضيها.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ayman Abdel Nour
@aabnour
السيد الرئيس أحمد الشرع يصدر المرسوم رقم (149) لعام 2026 القاضي بتعيين السيد عصام خالد الخليف رئيساً للمحكمة الدستورية العليا وتعيين أعضاء المحكمة وهم:
📌القاضي المستشار خير الله نديم غنوم
📌القاضي المستشار محمد مصطفى سبيع
📌القاضي المستشار إيمان أنطوان نوري
📌الدكتور إسماعيل حمادي الخلفان
📌الدكتورة ريعان حسن كحيلان
📌المحامي عارف أحمد الشعال -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Bassam Barabandi بسام بربندي
@BASSAMVA
غدًا، يلتقي الرئيس أحمد الشرع بالرئيس الأمريكي، بحضور عدد من أعضاء مجلس الشيوخ المعروفين بمواقفهم المتشددة تجاه سورية، وبعضهم لديه أيضًا تحفظات على السياسات التركية.
في هذا التوقيت، يلفت الانتباه أن الخطاب التركي داخل نقاشات الناتو حول سورية بدأ يتغير.
فبعد سنوات كانت سورية تُذكر فيها فقط كملف حرب وأزمة، أصبحت تُطرح في بعض الدراسات والنقاشات الاستراتيجية التركية كجزء من أمن الجبهة الجنوبية للناتو، وكموقع يمكن أن يلعب دورًا مهمًا في ربط الخليج وتركيا وأوروبا عبر ممرات التجارة والطاقة.
وفي المقابل، تنظر إسرائيل بقلق إلى أي مشروع يعيد لسورية دورها الجغرافي والاقتصادي أو يعزز ارتباطها بتركيا ودول الخليج، وهو ما يفسر جانبًا من التنافس الدائر حول مستقبل الممرات الإقليمية.
العالم بدأ ينظر إلى سورية بصورة مختلفة. لم تعد تُختصر فقط بالحرب، بل أصبحت أيضًا جزءًا من نقاشات الأمن الإقليمي، والطاقة، والتجارة، وإعادة رسم خريطة الممرات الاقتصادية.
وما سيُناقش في المرحلة المقبلة قد يكون مؤثرًا في موقع سورية ودورها خلال السنوات القادمة و المتطلبات الداخلية السورية لتحقيق ذلك -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Annmarie Hordern
@annmarie
FT: Saudi Arabia has been blocking or delaying financial transfers from banks in the kingdom to accounts based in the United Arab Emirates, raising concerns among businesses that friction between the Gulf powerhouses is spilling over into trade.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Houda Atassi
@HoudaAtassi
سعدت بحضور اجتماع ممثلي المجتمع المدني مع الرئيس الفرنسي إيمانويل ماكرون على هامش زيارته التي أجراها إلى سوريا، كممثلة للمجتمع المدني وعضو في لجنة الحوار الوطني.
خلال اللقاء، كان صوت المرأة السورية وتطلعاتها هو المحرك الأساسي للحديث، حيث ركزتُ على جانبين أساسيين:
- التمكين السياسي وصنع القرار: ناقشنا الواقع الجديد للمرأة السورية، والفرص المتاحة لتعزيز حضورها في الحياة المدنية والسياسية ومشاركتها الفعالة في مراكز صنع القرار.
- دعم نساء المخيمات: سلطتُ الضوء على المعاناة المستمرة للنساء في المخيمات وحاجتهن الملحة للدعم؛ ليس فقط الإغاثي، بل التمكيني الذي يساعدهن على مغادرة المخيمات من خلال تأمين السكن الكريم، وفتح آفاق وفرص عمل حقيقية تمكنهن من إعالة عائلاتهن واستعادة استقرارهن.
صوت المجتمع المدني سيبقى دائماً جسراً لنقل الواقع والعمل من أجل التغيير. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
France-Syrie. Quand Emmanuel Macron appelle la Syrie à respecter la souveraineté du Liban, alors que Donald Trump a demandé à son président Ahmed al-Sharaa de s'y engager contre le Hezbollah, c'est parce que Paris a peur qu'une intervention militaire syrienne chez son voisin libanais soit appuyée par l'armée de l'air israélienne, confiait récemment un diplomate français, s'appuyant sur les craintes de militaires.
Sentant le piège, Ahmed al-Sharaa a rejeté la demande américaine.
#macronsyrie -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
Excellent piece by @peterson__scott on how the war saved and changed the Islamic Republic www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2026/0706/khamenei-fu…
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Les défis d’Emmanuel Macron à Damas.
Vues depuis l’Elysée et le Quai d’Orsay, les relations entre la France et le pouvoir syrien, qui a renversé en décembre 2024 Bachar el-Assad, sont bonnes. C’est en France qu’Ahmad al-Sharaa, le président par intérim, a effectué sa première visite officielle en Europe. Et Emmanuel Macron renvoie l’ascenseur en devenant le premier dirigeant européen à se rendre à Damas. Mais au-delà des symboles, certaines réalités dépeignent un tableau légèrement moins rose.
Pour avoir soutenu à bout de bras les Kurdes dans leur bras de fer avec le nouveau pouvoir syrien, Paris a irrité Ahmed al-Sharaa et ses amis. Celui-ci a préféré son allié Donald Trump qui l’a aidé à réduire les ambitions autonomistes des Kurdes.
La Syrie est encore un pays exsangue économiquement. Quand Ahmad al-Sharaa a reçu en fin d’année dernière une délégation du Médef, il leur a dit en substance : « ahlan wa salan (bienvenue), les portes de la Syrie vous sont ouvertes, mais venez avec vos financements ». Et pour cause : « les nouvelles autorités manquent de financement propres », analyse l’économiste franco-syrien, Samir Aita. « Il n’y a pas encore de reconstruction économique, en raison du maintien de la plupart des sanctions internationales. Damas multiplie les signatures de protocoles d’accord qui ne sont pas contraignants », poursuit Samir Aita.
Mardi matin, une série de MOU – protocoles d’accord – devrait être signés entre des entreprises françaises et la Syrie. Mais cela ne peut masquer la réalité : même les pays du Golfe, notamment l’Arabie saoudite et le Qatar qui soutiennent pourtant politiquement Ahmad al-Sharaa, n’aident pas massivement par le biais d’instruments étatiques la nouvelle Syrie. La guerre avec l’Iran ne va pas les aider à changer de braquet. Y aura-t-il des contrats fermes conclus pendant la visite d’Emmanuel Macron à Damas ?
Un autre grief affleure quand on interroge des Syriens, officiels ou simples citoyens. La France n’est pas assez présente dans le pays. Ses diplomates ne s’y rendent que trois ou quatre jours par semaine, depuis Beyrouth. Et quand ils rencontrent des Syriens, ils sont protégés par une escouade d’hommes en armes. « Cinq voitures blindées pour protéger une mission culturelle, c’est beaucoup », confie un Syrien. Les Français donnent la fâcheuse impression de jouer aux Américains surarmés et peu en confiance à Bagdad en 2003 à la chute de Saddam Hussein. « Je ne comprends pas pourquoi on traîne autant pour rouvrir notre ambassade », avoue un ancien ambassadeur de France à Damas. Pour des raisons de sécurité ? D’autres pays européens sont eux bien présents. L’Italie, qui a rapidement retourné sa veste à la chute d’Assad, est plus présente que la France. L’Allemagne aussi avance ses pions. Ne parlons pas de la Grande-Bretagne qui jouit d’une relation particulière avec Sharaa. Est-ce à cause des djihadistes français encore présents sur zone qu’Ahmad al-Sharaa entend pourtant contrôler ? Mais le peut-il complètement ? Le veut-il ? Pour atténuer cette critique, Emmanuel Macron, qui aime faire ce qui ne se fait pas, effectuera-t-il un tour dans la vieille-ville de Damas, comme certaines sources l'affirment? Et ce malgré les contraintes sécuritaires, quelques jours après un attentat dans la capitale.
La visibilité réduite de la France en Syrie est d’autant plus difficile à comprendre que Paris a été à la proue de la révolution, qui renversa Assad et porta au pouvoir l’ancien djihadiste, qui a beaucoup évolué au point de devenir l’un des chouchous de Donald Trump au Moyen-Orient. « Mais quand on a Trump comme principal défenseur, on n’a pas vraiment besoin d’autres avocats », constate un diplomate onusien, en charge de la Syrie.
A Paris, jusqu’à récemment, le mot d’ordre était : « on ne critique pas publiquement Ahmed al-Sharaa », me confia il y a quelques mois un diplomate.
La France a raison de soutenir Ahmad al-Sharaa. Son échec plongerait de nouveau la Syrie dans l’inconnue. Mais rappeler plus fort et plus souvent certaines réalités – sur l’inclusivité manquante du nouveau pouvoir notamment – serait bienvenu.
#macrondamas -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Fair point. This may also explain why figures such as Hossein Taeb, as well as lesser-known individuals who may hold prominent roles within the system, were not visibly featured during the funeral, while more publicly recognizable officials like Ahmad Vahidi appeared in plain sight.
- If Tehran deliberately managed the visibility of senior officials for security reasons, quite apart from the speculation surrounding Mojtaba, what the cameras captured may not necessarily reflect the regime’s actual hierarchy. #iran
🇸🇦Abdulsalam Saleh
@abdulslam2017
🚨 Scenes from Khamenei’s funeral… where the Israeli Mossad seizes its golden opportunity. Not to mourn, but to hunt.
Amid this imposing crowd, where thousands of military officials and Revolutionary Guard commanders mingle, the Mossad is at the height of its activity. They aren’t waiting for statements—they’re waiting for faces. 85% of the Mossad’s intelligence on Iranian leadership, their locations, and their communications is gathered in moments like these.
How? Through advanced technologies: long-range iris scanning; facial recognition; microchips implanted or slipped in unnoticed; and malicious code transmitted via cell phone signals the moment someone enters the area. Ultra-high-resolution cameras capture a face, which is transformed within seconds into a complete profile: name, rank, travel patterns, and network of connections.
This is the silent hunt. The Mossad never sleeps. And the tragedy is that this crowd, in its most sacred moments, may be within the range of technology before it is within the range of aircraft.🦅This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le Figaro donnait en décembre 2023 les détails du refus iranien à se joindre aux frappes contre Israël, après le 7 Octobre.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/comment-le-hamas-a-organise…
Michael Young
@BeirutCalling
Secret Hamas documents, summarized by the Israeli site Osint 613, indicate that the October 7 attack was not a closely coordinated Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran operation. Hamas sought to persuade Hezbollah to enter the fray and use its Radwan force to invade Israel, but the party demurred, limiting its actions to cross-border bombing. Clearly, Nasrallah sensed the real risks in such an operation. Some Hamas members also understood, against the assessment of Sinwar and other members of the Hamas leadership, that Hezbollah still had “psychological barriers” to going all in. www.osint613.com/article/why-hezbollah-never-joined-octob…
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
En étant le premier dirigeant occidental à se rendre en Syrie depuis la chute de Bachar el-Assad en décembre 2024, Emmanuel Macron perpétue la tradition des présidents de la République française à être pionnier en Europe vis-à-vis du pouvoir syrien.
En 1998, Jacques Chirac avait déjà été le premier dirigeant européen à adouber le jeune Bachar el-Assad, deux ans avant de succéder à son père. On ne peut pas dire que ce fut un pari gagnant.
En 2008, Nicolas Sarkozy fut, à son tour, le premier dirigeant européen à réintégrer le même Bachar el-Assad dans le concert des nations, accusé alors d’être partie liée dans l’assassinat de Rafic Hariri, en l’invitant le 14 juillet au sommet pour la Méditerranée à Paris. On ne peut pas dire là non plus que ce fut un vrai succès.
En 2012, un an après le début de la révolution, le même Nicolas Sarkozy a entraîné les autres leaders européens pour fermer leurs ambassades à Damas. Ce ne fut pas non plus un geste décisif qui fit tomber rapidement le dictateur.
Dans ses relations avec la Syrie, dont la France fut la puissance mandataire, Paris a souvent manié le symbole, sans avoir la capacité de transformer la communication en actes décisifs.
#macrondamas -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Policy
@ForeignPolicy
A newfound bloc has emerged as a potential winner from the Iran war. foreignpolicy.com/2026/07/01/saudi-qatar-pakistan-turkey-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mehdi H.
@mhmiranusa
Video of a warehouse in Iran where Shahed-136 drones airframes are assembled.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Talal Al-Haj
@TalalAlhaj
We sat down lately for an exclusive interview on "Diplomatic Avenue show" @AlArabiya with seasoned Dutch diplomat @SigridKaag, who currently serves in an advisory role on the Gaza Executive Council, having previously held leadership roles in the political and humanitarian sectors at the United Nations, as well as serving at one stage or another of her illustrious career, as Deputy Prime Minister, Finance Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.
Our discussion was candid, addressing what has —or has not— been achieved in Gaza, since hopes rose for ending the humanitarian suffering & were revived following the adoption of Resolution 2803 in November 2025, and the subsequent formation of the Board of Peace, chaired by U.S. President Donald Trump. We also discussed the pressing issues in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. Watch the full 27 minutes in English below.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Karam Shaar كرم شعّار
@Karam__Shaar
بدء محاكمات المسؤولين عن مجازر السويداء المؤلمة فرصة لاستمالة أهالي المدينة، وإبعادهم عن مشروع الهجري.
فرصة لتذكيرهم بأن دماءهم ودماء السوريين جميعاً متساوية، على أمل التمكن يوماً ما من محاكمة المسؤولين عن العنف من الطرف الدرزي بحق البدو، بالرغم من كون نطاق تلك الانتهاكات أضيق بحسب تقييم أطراف ثالثة.
بمقوماتها الاقتصادية المحدودة، عزلتها الجغرافية، وغياب الدعم الدولي خارج تل أبيب، تستمر الرياح بالهبوب لصالح دمشق. ومع مرور الوقت، ستكتشف السويداء عبر المعاناة فشل مشروع الهجري.
يبدو أن حكومة الشرع تعي ذلك تمامًا آملة أن يدفع الزمن سكان الجيب الدرزي إلى خفض سقف مطالبهم. غير أن الواقع يبدو مختلفاً؛ فبحسب قراءتي المتواضعة، تتحول الضغوط المعيشية الحالية إلى كراهية أعمق وتصلب في المواقف جراء شعور الناس بالإذلال. شعور يتجاوز الحكومة ليمتد إلى كل السوريين الصامتين عن الواقع المعيشي المتدهور للمدينة.
المؤكد أن هذه الحالة من الجمود ليست في صالح سوريا وواجبنا جميعًا الدفع نحو تغليب العقل وقبول أحقية الكثير من مطالب كل الأطراف.
www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/بدء-محاكمة-المتهمين-في-أحداث-ا… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Farnaz Fassihi
@farnazfassihi
Huge Crowds Mass in Tehran for Ayatollah Khamenei's State Funeral. It is a turbulent moment for Iran, which has spiraled from crisis to crisis. Reporting from Tehran @Lattif
www.nytimes.com/2026/07/04/world/middleeast/iran-ayatolla… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Nada Maucourant Atallah
@MaucourantNada
If the Lebanon-Israel deal has been publicly hailed as constructive, western diplomats have been telling a very different story behind closed doors, with one going as far as describing it as a “non-starter.”
Our latest with @NadaOHomsi & @JamiePrentis
www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/07/04/non-starter-…? -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش
@citrinowicz
הסוגיה הזו איננה רק אירוע היסטורי, אלא גם רלוונטית מאוד לימינו.
צריך להודות שביחס לציר ההתנגדות, ההרתעה הישראלית עבדה. חסן נסראללה חשש מאוד להיגרר להרפתקה שתכניס את חיזבאללה ואת לבנון כולה למצב קשה ביותר. כך גם איראן, שלמרות מצבה של ישראל באותה נקודת זמן, חששה ממעורבות ישירה. גם מדיניותו של ממשל ביידן תרמה לכך (Dont).
למה זה חשוב גם היום? משום שמדינת ישראל היא מדינה חזקה ומרתיעה, ואויביה מכירים היטב בעוצמתה. אין טעם, וגם אין אפשרות, לנהל מלחמת נצח. לצד שמירה על עליונות צבאית, ישראל צריכה להישען גם על ההרתעה המשמעותית שבנתה לאורך השנים.
במקום להפריז באיומים ביחס ליכולות הפוטנציאליות של אויבינו, ראוי להכיר בכך שלישראל יש יכולת מוכחת להרתיע אותם, ובמידת הצורך גם להסב להם נזק כבד. אם גם בתקופה שבה מצבה של ישראל היה מורכב נשמרה ההרתעה מול חיזבאללה ואיראן, אפשר להניח שכיום היא חזקה אף יותר.
תמיד יהיו לנו אויבים ותמיד יהיו להם יכולות. השאלה איננה כיצד נעלים את כל האיומים, אלא כיצד ננהל אותם בתבונה. החוכמה היא לא להיגרר למלחמות בלתי פוסקות שיתישו את החברה, הכלכלה והצבא, אלא לשלב בין כוח צבאי משמעותי לבין הרתעה אפקטיבית. רק כך נוכל לשמור על ביטחוננו ובמקביל לאפשר לאזרחי ישראל לחיות חיים נורמליים.
לא כל איום מחייב מענה צבאי, ולא כל איום מצדיק יציאה למערכה רחבת היקף.
כך או כך, המידע הזה רק ממחיש את עומק המחדל המודיעיני. אנשי ציר ההתנגדות דיברו במשך שנים על היערכות למערכה אזורית, וכאשר מחברים זאת למסמכים כמו "חומת יריחו", ברור שהיו לא מעט נורות אזהרה שהיו צריכות להידלק.
השאלות המתבקשות הן: היכן היה המידע הזה? האם הוא לא נאסף, לא נותח כראוי, או שלא זכה למשקל הראוי בתהליך קבלת ההחלטות? ומדוע הגורמים שהיו אמונים על השגתו, עיבודו והצגתו לא הצליחו לחבר את כלל חלקי התמונה לכדי התרעה אפקטיבית?
אלה שאלות יסוד שכל ועדת חקירה תידרש לבחון לעומק, משום שהן נוגעות לא רק לכשל נקודתי, אלא לאופן שבו מערכת המודיעין מזהה, מנתחת ומתריעה מפני איומים אסטרטגיים.
וכבונוס – מצורף מאמר שכתבתי מיד לאחר מבצע שומר החומות, שבו טענתי כי המבצע אינו אירוע נקודתי אלא מבוא למערכה אזורית רחבה יותר.
www.runi.ac.il/research-institutes/government/ips/activit…
דורון קדוש | Doron Kadosh
@Doron_Kadosh
המסמכים שחשפנו הבוקר על קשרי חמאס וחזבאללה בשנים שקדמו ל-7.10 מעלים לא מעט סימני שאלה:
כיצד המוסד הישראלי לא שם את ידיו על התכתובות שעברו בין אנשי חמאס חו״ל וחזבאללה - לבין אנשי חמאס בעזה?
המוסד, שנמנע מפרסום כל תחקיר לציבור על אירועי 7 באוקטובר, אם בכלל עשה תחקיר כזה - יידרש לענות על לא מעט שאלות ביחס לחלקו בפספוס המודיעיני האדיר של מתקפת חמאס. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Foreign Affairs
@ForeignAffairs
“Netanyahu’s entire political career has been built on managing the Palestinian question, not resolving it, and he has been happy to indirectly partner with Hamas to do so,” writes Jaser AbuMousa.
www.foreignaffairs.com/palestinian-territories/end-hamas -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Beirut Time
@beiruttime_leb
علمت "بيروت تايم" أن قائد الجيش رودولف هيكل أبلغ كل المسؤولين ما سبق أن أكده الوفد العكسري خلال الجولتين الأخيرتين في واشنطن. وكانت تلك الاساسيات محور لقائه مع رئيس مجلس النواب نبيه بري. وتدور "لاءات" هيكل حول ٤ نقاط:
📌 لا للمناطق التجريبية التي لا تخضع للاحتلال الاسرائيلي. فقد رفض قائد الجيش البدء من منطقة علي الطاهر كما من منطقتي فرون والزوطرين، معتبرا أن توريط الجيش في اشتباك مع الاهالي هو فخ يرغب به الاسرائيلي. كما ان تحديد تلك المناطق هو انقلاب على اتفاق الاطار الذي لم يأت على ذكر منطقة شمالي الليطاني أو مناطق مأهولة ينتشر فيها الجيش اللبناني وتدخلها أجهزة الدولة. علما أن الوفد الاسرائيلي أبلغ انسحابه من بعض المناطق فور التوقيع على الاتفاق ثم تراجع عن وعده بسرعة وصرح مسؤولوه خلافا لما ورد في الاتفاق حول الانسحاب من المنطقة الأمنية
📌 لا للتنسيق المباشر مع الجيش الاسرائيلي بمعنى عدم الموافقة على نشر عناصر الجيش في مناطق يتواجد فيها الاسرائيلي مما يضطر الجيشين الى العمل سويا. كما رفض هيكل أن يأتمر العناصر بأي تعليمات من تل أبيب حول أماكن سحب السلاح أو البنى التحتية المفترض تدميرها. ويشدد هيكل على التزامه قرار الدولة اللبنانية والمتفق عليه في اتفاق الاطار حول آلية التنسيق التي تقوم على ادارة أميركية برئاسة قائد سنتكوم الأدميرال براد كوبر.
📌 لا للدخول بأي مواجهة مسلحة مع حزب الـ/ـله لما سيؤدي ذلك من انقسام في المؤسسة العسكرية والتلاعب بالسلم الأهلي مما يدفع الى سحب صفة الوطنية عن الجيش اللبناني
📌 لا استقالة من قيادة الجيش. وترى مصادر عسكرية في حديثها لـ"بيروت تايم" أن ثمة لوبي لبناني أميركي إسرائيلي يعمل على تغيير هيكل تحت عنوان تغير المرحلة وضرورة تعيين قائد جديد يتعامل بطريقة أشد مع حزب الـ/ـله. غير أنه مصر على استكمال مهامه بالطريقة التي يراها مناسبة وبالتنسيق مع الحكومة على الاهداف الرئيسية
#بيروت_تايم -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
I told @farnazfassihi @NYT regarding the intensification of rivalry between pragmatic and hard-line wings in Tehran asMoU and the funeral dominate politics that “we are witnessing real, tense politics, and a fight for the future of the country. If the pragmatics prevail, the hard-liners will be pushed to the margins, and they are fighting it.” www.nytimes.com/2026/07/04/world/middleeast/iran-supreme-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
"#iran therefore approaches the next stage of negotiations from a position that is simultaneously more confident and more anxious.
It believes the war demonstrated its capacity to impose costs Washington could find intolerable.
It also fears those gains are being reduced one by one, through arrangements that stop short of a new war while steadily reshaping the environment in which the next war – or the next agreement – would take place.
The most dangerous feature of the present moment lies here, in the fact that diplomacy itself has become part of the conflict."
www.irananalytica.org/p/the-war-to-win-the-peace -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran: Début des funérailles sous haute sécurité à Téhéran de l'ancien guide suprême Ali Khamenei, tué par une frappe israélo-américaine au début de la guerre. Son fils Mojtaba, qui lui a succédé, « ne devrait pas prendre le moindre risque d’apparaître en public », confie depuis Téhéran un journaliste qui tient à rester anonyme. Selon un diplomate européen, familier de l’Iran, « Mojtaba a subi de graves blessures au visage et aurait encore des difficultés à s’exprimer ». A lire dans Le Figaro.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/nous-sommes-en-deuil-mais-n… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
גיא עזריאל Guy Azriel | Diplomatic Correspondent
@GuyAz
🚨New Details: Behind-the-scenes planning for the “day after” in Gaza is moving forward, with concrete plans for humanitarian zones even if Hamas fails to disarm in near future
A series of meetings held this week in Cyprus brought together members of the Palestinian technocratic committee (NCAG), advisers to the Peace Council, High Representative for Gaza Nikolay Mladenov and Board of Peace Executive Board member Tony Blair.
Sources present in the meetings told i24NEWS the discussions went far beyond general principles and focused for the first time on concrete timelines, security arrangements, the number of Gazans expected to relocate, and the future governance of the Strip.
Participants say the key decision was to move ahead with the plan even if Hamas does not disarm in the immediate future.
Under the emerging plan, land and infrastructure preparations could be completed within 3–6 months, allowing the first civilians to move into areas inside the yellow zone. The first site is expected to be Tel al-Sultan, where tens of thousands of residents would be relocated initially, with temporary communities later expanding to house hundreds of thousands.
As long as Hamas remains armed, no permanent reconstruction using heavy building materials will take place. Instead, the plan calls for high-quality temporary housing, schools, healthcare facilities and employment opportunities.
Security inside the new areas would be handled by a new Palestinian police force trained in Egypt, alongside an international stabilization force expected to deploy in the coming months. The IDF would maintain the outer security perimeter and withdraw only from areas where a civilian population has been established.
Major questions remain unresolved — including how residents will be selected, what the demographic makeup of the new zones will be, and how to prevent Hamas from deciding who gets to leave for the new areas.
Sources involved in the talks say the decision to push ahead without waiting for Hamas to disarm stems from growing international pressure to improve Gaza’s humanitarian situation, as well as a US desire to create momentum on the ground and begin building a civilian alternative.
According to people involved in the planning, the initiative is not being framed as a concession to Hamas, but as an attempt to reduce its control over territory, civilians, aid, money and services. The distinction, they argue, is not between humanitarian relief and reconstruction, but between rebuilding under Hamas control and creating spaces outside Hamas rule. Advocates of the plan say under Hamas would have no role, authority or operational control inside the new zones.
One participant warned: “Hamas will try to sabotage every stage of the plan. That’s why every detail is being examined several steps ahead. Adjustments will be needed, but the sense is that the process has already begun — and no one wants to stop it.” -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
Indeed. It is still too early to assess the directions that the Islamic Republic 3.0 will take. Even what we have learned in recent weeks about the new leadership and its performance under wartime conditions may not necessarily hold true in the post-war period, when the leadership will be required to respond to citizens' demands and grievances in the face of the deepening economic crisis.
Many questions remain unanswered: whether and when Mojtaba will appear in public and how he will succeed in consolidating his authority effectively; what the dynamics among the various power centers in the state will be; whether the new leadership will be able to preserve at least an appearance of internal cohesion (despite clear disagreements); and whether the new leadership will choose to respond positively to calls for advancing toward a new social contract and bridging the gap between society and the regime, or instead seek to preserve the ideological base of regime supporters within the Paydari faction.
There are many question marks, particularly in light of what appears to be a hardline, bolder, revenge-driven, and self-confident leadership—one that derives a sense of achievement from the war while possibly recognizing that it requires a period of recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction.
Sina Azodi
@ProfSAzodi
Every revolutionary regime eventually confronts a generational transition. Ayatollah Khamenei's funeral represents such a moment for the Islamic Republic: the passing of one of its last revolutionary architects and the beginning of a new political era whose contours are still uncertain.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Raz Zimmt
@RZimmt
Israel will not carry out any significant withdrawal from any area before the October elections. Moreover, there is considerable doubt as to whether any new Israeli government would undertake a significant withdrawal, at least during the first months of its tenure.
According to Israeli public opinion polls, any withdrawal is perceived (although this can, of course, be debated) as running counter to Israeli interests and as a step that could, over time, make it more difficult for Israel to prevent a return to the status quo that existed prior to October 6, 2023.
Therefore, even a change of government in Israel would first require a reassessment of Israel's security strategy, the formulation of the necessary defensive and offensive measures to prevent the emergence of security threats along its borders, and progress in implementing arrangements in each of the relevant arenas. In Syria, this would entail progress toward a security arrangement with the Syrian government in Damascus; in Lebanon, progress in accordance with the memorandum of understanding signed between Israel and Lebanon, with particular emphasis on the ability of the Lebanese Armed Forces (with American assistance and cooperation) to act to prevent the reconstruction of Hezbollah's capabilities south of the Litani River.
It is doubtful whether all of these conditions would allow for a significant withdrawal before the second half of 2027 at the earliest.
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
U.S. officials tell the Jerusalem Post that the chances that Israel will withdraw from newly occupied Syrian territory before the Oct 2026 elections are "slim". This implies these US officials recognize that Israel is continuing to occupy southern Syria due to political & not security considerations (as security threats aren't related to elections).
The Trump administration forced Israel into halting the wars on Gaza and Iran, stopping bombings across Syria, negotiating with Lebanon & ceasing fire there - all politically costly for Netanyahu. The chances for an Israeli withdrawal from Syria can turn from "slim" to "highly likely" with a single phone call from President Trump. www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-900872 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
مالك الروقي
@alrougui
صور من حضور الوفد السعودي بقيادة معالي نائب وزير الخارجية
-والوفد القطري الذي يضم كبار مسؤولي الخارجية
-والوفد الباكستاني بقيادة رئيس الوزراء شهباز شريف
-و الوفد الأفغاني الذي يضم قادة طالبان لتقديم التعزية الرسمية.
مالك الروقي
@alrougui
أول ظهور علني لقائد الحرس الثوري الجنرال الإيراني أحمد وحيدي منذ بداية الحرب
-ظهر في جنازة خامنئي اليوم
-تولى وحيدي قيادة الحرس الثوري الإيراني مطلع مارس بعد مقتل اللواء محمد باكبور في غارات إسرائيلية وأميركية -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
In my latest on Iran Analytica, I explain how diplomacy has become part of the #iran-US conflict.
Tehran believes Washington is using the 60-day MoU window to dismantle its leverage (Hormuz, Lebanon, the nuclear file, Gulf investment) piece by piece, before serious negotiations even begin.
The question in Tehran is whether enough leverage will remain to make a settlement worth accepting.
www.irananalytica.org/p/the-war-to-win-the-peace -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇮🇷Witkoff and Kushner have been trying to convey to the Iranians that their demand for tolls could blow up a U.S.-Iran deal that would ultimately be far more lucrative for Iran.
🇺🇸🇮🇷"The U.S. message to Iran was 'Think bigger,'" a U.S. official said.
🇺🇸🇮🇷The official claimed the sums Iran could generate from developing and selling oil and other resources freely — if the U.S. lifted all sanctions under a deal — "would be 100 times more valuable to them than using a gangster tactic to try and charge a toll."
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇮🇷U.S. tries to talk Iran out of strait of Hormuz tolls as talks resume in Doha. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/07/01/iran-talks-doha-tolls-strait-hormuz -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
عبد العزيز الخميس
@alkhames
مقتطف مثير للاهتمام من مقابلة محمد باقر قاليباف رئيس البرلمان ورئيس فريق التفاوض الإيراني مع التلفزيون الرسمي، حيث صرّح :"يجب ألا نحول مضيق هرمز إلى شيء ضدنا. مضيق هرمز قيّم فقط عندما يزداد المرور فيه يومًا بعد يوم، وليس العكس..."
وأشار إلى أن المضيق لم يكن يتمتع بالأهمية الجيوسياسية التي يتمتع بها اليوم قبل مئة عام، حين لم تكن صناعة النفط تعمل فيه، ملمحًا إلى أن إبعاد حركة الملاحة سيقلل من نفوذ إيران، وأن من غير مصلحة إيران أن تؤدي هذه المسألة إلى لجوء جميع الدول إلى طرق بديلة على المدى البعيد.
وقال: "لذا، من مصلحة إيران البالغة جعل المضيق والجانب الإيراني منه جذابًا قدر الإمكان وزيادة حركة الملاحة فيه". -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
NEW: In aftermath of the Iran-Israel-US war, many ask: Who won?
But another equally consequential question is whether the war has lowered or heightened the threshold for future wars.
Rare (and superb) @amwajmedia debate among experts from Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Michael Young
@BeirutCalling
Here, @Malekj321 examines the Sunni community’s position toward the framework deal with Israel. Until now, most Sunni leaders are awaiting the Saudi reaction, but I agree with @karimbitar that Riyadh doesn’t want Lebanon to fall into an Israeli sphere of influence:
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Firas Maksad
@FirasMaksad
“Gulf capitals are more open than they have been in years to a durable understanding with Iran that can bring security and stability to the region. That stability could unlock significant GCC investment in Iran, provided the right economic conditions exist and investment can proceed on a free market basis. This is Tehran’s real opening”
Ali Shihabi علي الشهابي
@aliShihabi
My piece for @ArabNews Iranian extortion does not weaken foreign influence in the Gulf. It guarantees it | www.arabnews.com/node/2649309
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
داود الشريان
@alshiriandawood
زيارة وزير الخارجية السوري إلى بيروت تبدو أقرب إلى رسالة سياسية منها إلى زيارة بروتوكولية. دمشق لا تريد دخول لبنان من بوابة المواجهة مع #حزب_الله كما يدعو ترامب، وإنما من بوابة الدولة، عبر تطبيق #اتفاق_الطائف، وحصر السلاح بيدها، وفتح صفحة جديدة مع مختلف المكونات. ومن الصعب فصل هذه الزيارة عن الحراك الهادئ الذي تقوده السعودية في لبنان، ومساعيها لفتح قنوات تواصل مع مختلف الأطراف، وفي مقدمهم #نبيه_بري، تمهيدا لدفع البلاد نحو الدولة لا المحاور.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran: Le New York Times raconte comment les dirigeants iraniens ont réclamé des garanties de sécurité pour rentrer à Téhéran, à l'issue de négociations au Pakistan, en avril. Le Figaro détaillait le 10 juin ces précautions.
« Leur avion du retour d’Islamabad jusqu’à Machhad en Iran a été escorté par des avions de combat pakistanais pour éviter une frappe israélienne, et à partir de Machhad, la délégation iranienne a été éclatée. Certains sont rentrés en train, d’autres par la route en bus ou en voiture, et les derniers en avion. Ils étaient convaincus que les Israéliens feraient quelque chose contre eux. »
www.lefigaro.fr/international/apres-une-brusque-montee-de… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
RTL France
@RTLFrance
🎙️ Les 250 ans des États‑Unis c'est demain et la question c'est : comment Trump cherche à s’approprier les Pères fondateurs ?
Les explications de @Malbrunot dans RTL autour du monde sur #rtlmatin avec @ThomasSottoThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
𝙵𝚒𝚕𝚒𝚙𝚙𝚘 𝙳𝚒𝚘𝚗𝚒𝚐𝚒
@FilippoDionigi
Interview on Italian newspaper La Stampa with Ita MoD. He reports of talks of new mil mission to #lebanon to enforce peace agreement.
"None wants to go to war with #hezbollah" he says.
Possible: US involvement for an ISAF-type mission but with UNSC res. mandate. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohamed ElBaradei
@ElBaradei
The "Board of Peace”, established by the Security Council to "privatize" the Palestinian cause and entrusting it to a council headed by Trump, declares that "UNRWA has no place in the new Gaza"!!!
This is an expected first step for the implementation of the Israeli/American plan, conceived years ago, to eliminate @UNRWA—established by a @UN General Assembly resolution in 1949 to protect and support Palestinian refugees—in order to strip six million Palestinians of their legal status as "refugees” paving the way to the liquidation of their cause and their right of return including the establishment of their own independent state.
It pains me to imagine that the members of the “Board of Peace”, particularly those from the Arab and Islamic countries, are partners in this diabolical scheme or that the great majority of UN members will go along with it !
The least that can be done now is for the UN members to provide the necessary financial assistance to UNRWA—to confront the American plan to choke it financially so that it can not carry out its humanitarian work- in accordance with the mandate entrusted to it by the United Nations- and preserve the legal status of the "Palestinian refugees" until a just solution is reached.
Board of Peace
@BoardOfPeace
UNRWA has no place in the new Gaza. We are turning the page on the complex of perpetual aid dependency & conflict. The people of Gaza deserve better.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Rosemary Kelanic
@RKelanic
Europe is resigned to paying Hormuz transit fees, per Bloomberg.
“Some leading European powers now accept that ships transiting the vital Strait of Hormuz will have to pay fees to Iran and Oman… Privately, some Gulf Arab officials hold the same view.”👇
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-07-02/hormuz-europea… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Progressive Socialist Party
@psp_lebanon
الرئيس وليد جنبلاط لـ"لوريان لو جور"
📌لن أكون جزءًا من ائتلاف لإسقاط اتفاق الإطار بين لبنان وإسرائيل كما أننا لن ندعمه ولا أرغب في تكرار سيناريو الـ 1983
📌الاتفاق يشكّل "خطوة خاطئة للدولة اللبنانية"، وأدعو إلى إعادة النظر فيه
📌اتفاق لن يكون قابلًا للتطبيق
📌أذكّر بأن اتفاق 17 أيار كان ينص على انسحاب الجيش الإسرائيلي، في حين أن اتفاق عام 2026 ينص على إقامة مناطق تجريبية يفترض أن يتولى الجيش اللبناني السيطرة عليها ويُبقى القرار لإسرائيل لتحدد ما إذا كانت ستنسحب أم لا
📌بعض بنود الاتفاق تضع الجيش اللبناني تحت رحمة الجيش الإسرائيلي، من دون أي موعد واضح للانسحاب، علمًا أن كلمة "الانسحاب" نفسها لم ترد ولو مرة واحدة في نص الاتفاق
📌لسنا أمام نسخة جديدة من اتفاق 17 أيار. لكن هناك بعض البنود التي تثير إشكاليات، ولا سيما المادة 13 التي تمنع لبنان من ملاحقة مرتكبي جرائم الحرب وقتلة الأطفال أمام القضاء
📌خلال المفاوضات، كان ينبغي التمسك باتفاقية الهدنة التي تنظّم العلاقات بين لبنان وإسرائيل منذ عام 1949
📌ضغوطًا أميركية مورست، إلى جانب وجود لوبي لبناني في واشنطن يدفع نحو هذا النوع من المقايضة التدريجية، رغم أنها تتعارض مع مصلحة لبنان
📌يزداد الأمر خطورة عندما نرى رئيس الوزراء الإسرائيلي بنيامين نتنياهو يؤكد يوميًا أنه لن ينسحب من لبنان
📌مستعد لمساعدة الدولة إذا قررت إعادة النظر في الاتفاق
ط📌فالمفاوضات بين إيران والولايات المتحدة لا تزال غامضة جدًا. لذلك، علينا التركيز على المسار اللبناني وعلى مبدأ التوصل إلى اتفاق ثنائي برعاية الأمم المتحدة
📌بعض القادة اللبنانيين لم يقتنعوا بعد بأهمية إقامة علاقات جيدة مع دمشق. سوريا اليوم ليست سوريا الأمس
📌يجب أن نفهم أن بشار الأسد لم يعد موجودًا في السلطة، وبالتالي ينبغي طي هذه الصفحة وإقامة علاقات سياسيةواقتصادية طبيعية مع سوريا الجديدة.
📌أنا شخصيًا أثق بالرئيس السوري أحمد الشرع عندما يقول إنه لن يتدخل في لبنان، لا سيما أن لديه تحديات كثيرة أخرى
📌أذكّر بضرورة تحسين الوضع على الحدود اللبنانية–السورية، في وقت تستمر فيه عمليات تهريب الأموال والأسلحة من لبنان إلى سوريا.
📌 أدعو إلى إعادة تنظيم البنية الأمنية في معبر المصنع، بما يسهّل تركيب وتشغيل أجهزة المسح (السكانر). -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇮🇷🇺🇸 Witkoff and Kushner went to Iran with a message: drop the toll idea and "think bigger"
The pitch apparently is that full sanctions relief unlocks oil export revenues that dwarf anything Iran could collect, explicitly calling the toll approach a "gangster tactic" that would blow up a much larger prize.
It's actually a coherent argument. Let's see if Iran bites 😂
Source: Axios / Writer: Oliver -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Damage to the Bazan refinery in Haifa, the largest in Israel, is far more extensive than either the company or the Israeli govt has made public.
The repairs will take years. In the meantime, Israel will need to import refined products to make up the loss. www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-haifa-refinery-require-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mounir Rabih
@mounir_rabih
على المستوى الاستراتيجي يعتبر بري أن لا مناص للبنان من التنسيق مع سوريا، وهذه ثابتة تاريخية بالنسبة إليه، لأن سوريا صاحبة الحدود الأطول مع البلد، ولا يمكن للبنان أن ينسق مع إسرائيل. وإذا رفض لبنان التنسيق مع سوريا فهذا يعني أن لا خيار للبنانيين إلا السباحة باتجاه البحر، ويقول:" قلت للشيباني إما أن نسبح جميعنا أو ننسق مع بعضنا البعض، فسوريا هي العمق الطبيعي للبنان". ويضيف:" شرحت له علاقتي التاريخية بسوريا، والعلاقة المميزة التي ربطتني بحافظ الأسد، أما مع بشار فعلاقتي لم تكن جيدة، وهنا يستذكر بري أنه رفض الانخراط في الحرب السورية.
يثني على المقاربة السورية لتطورات الوضع في المنطقة، ويعتبر أن الهم مشترك، ويقول: " لم ألمس من الشيباني أي حقد تجاه حزب الله، ولم يتحدث إلا بالكلام العالي المسؤولية عن لبنان كما عن كل المكونات فيه، لا بل أنه أبدى الاستعداد، كما صرّح بنفسه بعد اللقاء، للانفتاح على التواصل أو اللقاء مع الحزب إن اقتضت المصلحة اللبنانية والسورية ذلك، مع التأكيد بأن سوريا منفتحة على كل المكونات في لبنان، وهي لن تكون في صف طرف لصالح الطرف الآخر".
أما لدى سؤال بري عن اتفاق الإطار بين لبنان وإسرائيل فيمد يده للمصافحة، ويقول: "العوض بسلامتك".
التفاصيل كاملة في المقال👇 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Vali Nasr
@vali_nasr
Per @wsj Iran is deliberately delaying further talks. That is half the picture. Trump is not a hapless victim of Iranian delaying tactics. His own mixed signals and meandering strategies have created confusion and distrust which only leads Tehran to proceed even more cautiously. Latest has been the contradictions between Rubio negotiated Israel Lebanon deal and Vance negotiated MOU.
www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-pledged-no-f… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
In our latest blog in the @Clingendaelorg series Iran in Transition, Erwin van Veen and I argue that the recent war has paradoxically created a more favourable environment for a US-Iran deal:
#iran lacks a viable route to lasting security, while the US lacks a realistic theory of victory. A sequential, verifiable tit-for-tat framework could turn this stalemate into a durable agreement.
www.clingendael.org/publication/war-political-psychology-… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
So...the MOU says Iran will gain access to frozen funds if it opens the strait. So far, no funds have been released.
The strait is slowly opening...but Iran is insisting on the right to charge tolls after the 60 day period.
The US is trying to push them away from that...by offering access to more frozen funds. www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-dangles-rewards-for-ope… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The National Context
@NatlContext
The Sunni Dimension of Zaidi's Anti-Corruption Crackdown
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's anti-corruption campaign follows a familiar template in one respect and breaks new ground in another. The Shia component of the crackdown targets the networks of his predecessor, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. This is by now standard practice: every incoming Iraqi prime minister dismantles the patronage structures of the man he replaced. What distinguishes this campaign is its second component, a sweep through Sunni politics that has no precedent in the post-2003 order.
The pattern of the Sunni arrests is unmistakable. Every significant anti-Halbousi Sunni politician is now either in detention or subject to an arrest warrant.
Muthanna al-Samarrai, the leader of Azm and the most institutionally serious rival to Mohammed al-Halbousi, was arrested in the campaign. Muhammad al-Karbuli, an Azm MP and among the most outspoken critics of Halbousi, was also detained. Ziad al-Janabi, who defected from Taqadum with eight MPs and contested the last election alongside Khamis al-Khanjar, and who was widely regarded as the "most dangerous" threat to Halbousi's position, was arrested as well. Outside parliament, and on other separate issues outside the recent anti-corruption crackdown, Mishan al-Jubouri and his son Yazan both face arrest warrants. Yazan has been detained and sentenced to five years in prison, while Mishan remains in self-imposed exile, unable to return to federal Iraq because of complaints filed by Halbousi.
This reads as a dual campaign: one purge conducted for the prime minister, and a second Sunni-track conducted in ways that benefits Halbousi more than anyone else. That the state's anti-corruption machinery can be directed so comprehensively at one Sunni faction's rivals is a measure of how far Halbousi's power has grown. It also lends weight to persistent talk of his alignment with the judicial chief Faeq Zaidan, with Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali, and to a lesser extent with Bafel Talabani of the PUK. Zaidi himself is considered close to Zaidan, which makes the convergence between the prime minister's campaign and Halbousi's interests easier to explain.
A second reading, which may sit alongside rather than against the first, concerns Nouri al-Maliki. The Sunni politicians swept up in the campaign were largely aligned with Maliki, who counted them among his principal allies in the Sunni arena. On the Shia side, the crackdown targets Sudani's networks, and Sudani's chief rival is Maliki. The Sunni arrests therefore cut in a different direction: they weaken not only Halbousi's opponents but Maliki's Sunni depth as well. The campaign, in other words, damages both poles of the Shia rivalry at once, stripping Sudani of his networks and Maliki of his Sunni allies.
There is a third way to read the arrests, and it concerns Halbousi himself. Detaining Sunni politicians of this seniority normalises a practice that Iraqi politics had largely avoided, and precedents of this kind rarely stay contained. The same machinery now serving Halbousi's consolidation could one day be turned against him. For the moment, his influence and his regional ties are strong enough to insulate him from the fate of those who have fallen from grace. Whether that insulation outlasts the precedent he has helped set is another question.
Read more: thenationalcontext.com/the-sunni-dimension-of-zaidis-anti…
On Zaidi's broader anti-corruption campaign: thenationalcontext.com/zaidis-anti-corruption-raids-follo… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sam Heller | سام هيلر
@AbuJamajem
My current best sense of Israel's ideal endstate in Lebanon:
Normal relations with a Lebanese vassal government, while, at the same time, Israel continues to target Hizbullah and enforce its disarmament militarily, something the Israelis are unwilling to entrust to the Lebanese. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sina Toossi
@SinaToossi
On @BeckyCNN this morning discussing US-Iran MOU.
US & Tehran have competing interpretations of what they signed. The main sticking points include Hormuz & Lebanon. The Qatar meeting seems focused on MOU implementation, not nuclear file. Unclear where Oman will pivot on Hormuz.This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
L'Orient-Le Jour
@LOrientLeJour
✍️ Article 13 de l’accord-cadre : renonciation aux poursuites contre Israël ou suspension du droit d’action ?
Par Claude Assaf
www.lorientlejour.com/article/1539708/article-13-de-lacco… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Shalom Lipner
@ShalomLipner
"More & more, the Saudis see the US govt as unreliable and even on occasion a risk to Gulf Arab nations... While KSA is relieved by the ceasefire, none of the most difficult issues emerging from the war have been dispelled by the prelim agreement." @ewong www.nytimes.com/2026/07/01/us/politics/trump-saudi-crown-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
LibanVision by JMD
@DruartJeanMich1
🇱🇧📺 Le Premier ministre libanais Nawaf Salam a donné ce soir sur la LBCI son interprétation du texte signé à Washington vendredi dernier :
- Je conteste le terme « accord-cadre » car il est trompeur. Ce qui est discuté est un cadre trilatéral pour guider les négociations, et non un accord ou un traité.
- Nous ne cherchons pas les négociations pour elles-mêmes. Nous sommes arrivés à ce point après deux guerres qui ont fait des milliers de victimes et causé des milliards de dollars de dégâts.
- Notre objectif est de permettre aux résidents du sud de retourner chez eux et de mettre fin aux effusions de sang.
- Si le cadre est mis en œuvre, il devrait conduire au retrait d’Israël du Liban et permettre le retour sûr et digne des résidents déplacés dans leurs villages.
- Le cadre prévoit le redéploiement des forces israéliennes en dehors de tout territoire libanais, ce qui signifie un retrait complet.
- Notre priorité dans les prochaines rondes de négociations est d’établir un calendrier pour le retrait israélien.
👉 Autrement dit, pour le premier ministre libanais, le texte signé serait tout de même un cadre qui servirait donc de support à des négociations pour que le Liban obtienne tout ce qu’il n’a pas obtenu jusque là. Avouons que cela n’est pas vraiment clair !
Dans l’intervalle, l’occupation de territoires par Israël a été validée sans limite temporelle. Le plus dur reste donc à faire pour un Liban paraissant bien affaibli politiquement.
Au final, cette prestation télévisée de Nawaf Salam n’avait-elle pas d’abord comme objectif de tenter d’esquiver un vote parlementaire ?
À suivre…This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
L'Orient Today
@lorienttoday
#focus | Syria’s Shaibani in Beirut Thursday: An Arab vision for collective security
In the wake of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, Damascus fears an expansion of Tel Aviv's influence and is emphasizing the implementation of the Taif Agreement.
Read @mounir_rabih's article below
today.lorientlejour.com/article/1539897/syrias-shaibani-i… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
رئاسة مجلس الوزراء 🇱🇧
@grandserail
في مستهل المقابلة سئل الرئيس #نواف_سلام عن اتفاق واشنطن بين #لبنان واسرائيل فقال: لديّ ملاحظتان فقط. في الحقيقة، لديّ مشكلة مع استخدام تعبير "الاتفاق"، لأن هذا الوصف قد يفتح باب الالتباس حول ما إذا كنا بصدد اتفاقية أم لا. والجواب هو: لا، لسنا بصدد اتفاقية. لذلك يُسمّى هذا إطاراً Framework، وليس Framework Agreement. وهذه نقطة مهمة.
أنا أوضح ذلك حتى نعرف جميعاً عمّ نتحدث. نحن نتحدث هنا عن إطار. وما هو هذا الإطار؟ إنه إطار توجيهي للمفاوضات يحدد مسارها. وضمن هذا الإطار نفسه يجري التمييز بين الهدف وبين الوصول إلى اتفاقات لاحقة. بل إن النص، ولا سيما في المادة الثانية عشرة، يشير إلى أن هناك اتفاقات ستُبرم في مرحلة لاحقة.
وهذا التوصيف له أهمية، لأن مفاعيله القانونية والسياسية مختلفة. فإذا اعتبرناه اتفاقية، فهذا يعني أنه بمثابة معاهدة، وتترتب عليه مفاعيل قانونية وأمنية. أما ما نحن بصدده، فهو إطار سياسي، والإطار السياسي يتضمن بطبيعة الحال التزامات، لكنها تبقى التزامات سياسية ...
www.facebook.com/share/p/1ADUsPePyX/
#مجلس_الوزراء #pcm -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Gregg Carlstrom
@glcarlstrom
I didn't expect much from the MOU technical talks but even I am underwhelmed that they're basically turning out to be the "help me help you" scene from Jerry Maguire
Barak Ravid
@BarakRavid
🇺🇸🇮🇷U.S. tries to talk Iran out of strait of Hormuz tolls as talks resume in Doha. My story on @axios
www.axios.com/2026/07/01/iran-talks-doha-tolls-strait-hormuz -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Negar Mortazavi
@NegarMortazavi
Iran’s Axis of Resistance Under Fire
I told Aljazeera that Iran’s forward defense doctrine did not fail but has undergone a necessary strategic adaptation.
Recent wars exposed the limits of Iran’s regional strategy but also accelerated a shift toward homeland-based deterrence.
While regional partners remained crucial for opening new fronts and creating strategic depth, Iran’s long-range missiles, inexpensive drones, and leverage over the Strait of Hormuz became the new centrepieces of its defence strategy.
That refocuses Iran’s deterrence. By showing that it can absorb U.S./Israeli attacks and retaliate directly, in a more powerful way than its allied forces can, Iran has reestablished deterrence, in a different form.
The Axis is likely to become less reliant on exposed infrastructure and more dependent on asymmetric tools. The result is likely to be a leaner, more decentralised, and more technologically adaptive network, focusing on asymmetric capabilities like cyber warfare, intelligence, and precision missiles rather than quasi-conventional armies.
The Middle East is entering a period of managed competition. Iran’s allies may now be just one component of a broader, more integrated deterrence strategy, but they remain a resilient, mutating force designed to project power across a volatile Middle East.
www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/30/evolution-under-fire-ira… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joshua Landis
@joshua_landis
Important to understand that the "elected members" of #syria's parliament, were chosen by only 6,000 electors who were indirectly appointed by President Sharaa.
No general citizens participated in a direct nationwide vote. The rational for this top down formation of the parliament has been that Syria remains too chaotic, which begs the question of whether President Sharaa intends to move Syria toward real elections.
Qalaat Al Mudiq
@QalaatAlMudiq
#syria: 15 women are among the 70 members of the People Assembly appointed by Sharaa.
This means the share of women is roughly 4 times higher than among the elected members (2/3 vs 1/3).
Among the unexpected names, there's an actress from Hama. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mouin Rabbani
@MouinRabbani
For @The_NewArab I place the US-Israel-Lebanon Trilateral Framework agreement in the broader context of the US effort to rewrite its Memorandum of Understanding with Iran.
www.newarab.com/opinion/how-lebanon-framework-reshapes-us… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇮🇷🇮🇱 The most dangerous question in the Middle East this week: does Iran's ghost leader attend his father's funeral with an Israeli death mark on his head?
The collision is set.
Ali Khamenei's long delayed state funeral begins July 4, five days of mourning spanning Tehran, Qom, and Mashhad, with millions of mourners and foreign dignitaries expected.
His son Mojtaba, the new supreme leader, has not been seen publicly since taking power after his father's assassination in the February 28 strikes.
Days before the ceremonies, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz declared Mojtaba "marked for death," saying no leader directing attacks against Israel has immunity.
Araghchi answered by warning Washington to "muzzle its pets in Tel Aviv," insisting the MOU obligates the U.S. to restrain Israel, and vowing an "immediate powerful response" to any threat against Iran's leadership.
So the funeral becomes THE test.
Mojtaba appearing at a stationary, publicized venue under an active death threat is a security nightmare.
Staying hidden at his own father's funeral is a humiliation the regime can barely afford.
And any Israeli move during the mourning would detonate the ceasefire in front of the world.
One funeral, three impossible choices. Watch July 4.
Source: Al Jazeera, BBC, Reuters / Writer: Daniel -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Elizabeth Tsurkov
@LizHurra
Syrian President a-Sharaa has appointed his share of 70 MPs to the 210-seat Syrian parliament, after 140 were selected by government-appointed electoral committees.
Notably, a-Sharaa appointed Laith Bal'ous as one of the 2 representatives to Sweidaa'. I've spoken to multiple people in and from Sweidaa': even those who oppose al-Hijri and his militias, see Bal'ous as a sellout and tales about his criminality against Druze civilians abound. He does not enjoy a support base inside Sweidaa', unlike more neutral professional Druze figures, including the former Druze Minister of Agriculture, Amjad Badr (recently fired to be replaced by an HTS senior official).
The Druze make up about 3% of the Syrian population. The Syrian government currently has 0 Druze ministers. The Syrian parliament has 1 MP (so 0.47% of parliament is Druze).
Damascus cannot treat Swediaa' as an area that needs to be subjugated. The government is yet to apologize for the massacres last year, or demonstrate that it is prosecuting the perpetrators of these war crimes. The appointment of Bal'ous signals to the population of Sweidaa' that they must either be loyal puppets (like Bal'ous) or they are not welcomed inside the Syrian polity. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Leila Nicolas - 10452 ليلى نقولا
@lnicolasr
"اتفاق الإطار" وإشكالية المبادئ الآمرة في القانون الدولي
بغض النظر عن الجدل حول البنود الأخرى الواردة في اتفاق الإطار الذي وقعته السلطة السياسية اللبنانية مع إسرائيل برعية أميركية، إن البندين (2) و(13) من النص يثيران إشكاليات قانونية عميقة، تتجاوز الإطار التفاوضي لتلامس حدود عدم المشروعية الدولية.
أولاً: البند الثاني: انتهاك لحق تقرير المصير وسيادة الدولة
يقوم البند (2) على معادلة مفادها: إن انسحاب القوة الأجنبية (إسرائيل) مشروط بتحقق ترتيبات داخلية لبنانية، وعلى رأسها نزع سلاح جهات غير حكومية، ومرتبط بتقييم إسرائيل للتهديدات.
إن هذا النص يتعارض مباشرة مع مبدأ مستقر في القانون الدولي، وهو عدم جواز ربط إنهاء الاحتلال أو الانسحاب من أراضي دولة ذات سيادة بأي شروط داخلية تتعلق ببنية تلك الدولة.
فالانسحاب من أرض محتلة، وفقاً للقانون الدولي وميثاق الأمم المتحدة هو واجب قانوني غير مشروط، وليس موضوع تفاوض تبادلي أو مقايضة سياسية، وعليه إن النص يمس بأحد المبادئ الأساسية في القانون الدولي وهو "حق الشعوب في تقرير مصيرها".
يُعدّ حق تقرير المصير من المبادئ الآمرة في القانون الدولي، كما أكدت على ذلك الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة، ومحكمة العدل الدولية في عدة آراء استشارية، وهذا ما يؤكد أن وجود احتلال في دولة ما، يشرّع حق الشعب في مقاومة الاحتلال والعمل على طرد الاستعمار أو الاحتلال وتحقيق الاستقلال.
ويتفرع عن هذا الحق أن الشعب وحده يحدد نظامه السياسي والأمني الداخلي، من دون تدخل أو اشتراط خارجي، اذ يُعتبر مبدأ عدم التدخل من ركائز القانون الدولي العرفي. بخلاف ذلك، يُدخل البند المذكور أطرافاً خارجية (الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل)، كجهات مقيمة ولها الحق بتحديد موجبات السيادة اللبنانية.
يضاف إلى ما سبق، أن البند يمس بطبيعة السيادة كوحدة غير قابلة للتجزئة. إن السيادة في الفقه القانوني الدولي هي مطلقة وغير قابلة للتدرج التجريبي أو المرحلي. وهذا ما يتناقض مع البند 2 الذي يحوّل السيادة اللبنانية إلى حالة وظيفية خاضعة للاختبار الدولي، لا حقاً أصيلاً للدولة.
ثانياً: البند الثالث عشر وإلغاء حق التقاضي الدولي
ينص البند (13) على "وقف جميع الأعمال العدائية أو المناوئة في المحافل السياسية أو القانونية الدولية".
هذا يتضمن عملياً منع لبنان من الشكوى ضد إسرائيل في المحكمة الجنائية الدولية أو أي وسيلة تقاضي أخرى، كذلك منع لبنان من اللجوء إلى مجلس الأمن والجمعية العامة ومحكمة العدل الدولية.
مع العلم أن الحق في التقاضي الدولي هو حق غير قابل للتصرف، اذ إن اللجوء إلى القضاء الدولي يعد امتداداً لسيادة الدولة، وتجسيداً لمبدأ حل النزاعات بالوسائل السلمية بموجب المادة 33 من ميثاق الأمم المتحدة. وعليه، إن حرمان دولة من هذا الحق أو تقييده يشكّل انتقاصاً من شخصيتها القانونية الدولية.
مع العلم أنه لا يحقّ للدول التنازل عن حقها في ملاحقة أو مقاضاة دولة أخرى أو رعاياها عند ارتكاب "جرائم حرب" أو "جرائم ضد الإنسانية". تنص اتفاقيات جنيف الأربعة على أنه يحظر على الدول إعفاء نفسها أو غيرها من المسؤولية عن الانتهاكات الجسيمة (جرائم الحرب). وتنصّ الاتفاقيات صراحةً على أنه: "لا يجوز لأي طرف متعاقد أن يعفي نفسه أو أي طرف متعاقد آخر من المسؤوليات التي تقع عليه أو على طرف آخر بسبب الانتهاكات".
في النتيجة، ووفق اتفاقية فيينا لقانون المعاهدات (1969)، إن أي اتفاق يخالف قاعدة آمرة من القانون الدولي يُعدّ باطلاً بطلاناً مطلقاً.
تنص المادة 53 من اتفاقية فيينا على أن "المعاهدة تكون باطلة إذا تعارضت عند إبرامها مع قاعدة آمرة من قواعد القانون الدولي العام". وبالتالي، إن منع شعب من ممارسة حقه في تقرير مصيره، والتخلص من الاحتلال أو الاستعمار، أو منع دولة من اللجوء إلى القضاء الدولي، أو يقيد هذا الحق، يُعدّ متعارضاً مع قواعد آمرة أو قواعد أساسية، وبالتالي فاقداً للمشروعية القانونية.
وبالنظر إلى أن البندين (2) و(13) نجدهما يمسّان مباشرة بالسيادة، وتقرير المصير، والحق في التقاضي وهي جميعها حقوق محمية لا يجوز الاتفاق على خلافها، حتى برضا الدول.
وعليه، إن القراءة القانونية تكشف أن إشكالية "اتفاق الإطار" لا تكمن فقط في المضمون السياسي الذي يتنازع عليه اللبنانيون، بل في تعارض البندين البنيوي مع قواعد القانون الدولي، إذ إن ربط الانسحاب بشروط داخلية يمسّ صميم حق تقرير المصير، كما أن تقييد اللجوء إلى القضاء الدولي يفرغ السيادة من مضمونها القانوني.
ومن هنا، فإن أي مقاربة جدية لمثل هذا النص يجب أن تنطلق من مبدأ بسيط لكنه حاسم، مفاده: ليست كل الاتفاقات الدولية مشروعة، حتى لو وقعتها الدول، إذا تعارضت مع المبادئ الآمرة التي تشكّل الأساس القانوني للنظام الدولي. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
حسن الدّر
@HasanDorr
عن رسالته إلى رئيس الجمهورية، اكتفى الرئيس برّي بالقول إنه لا يملك في الوقت الحاضر أي رسالة يوجهها.
وعن سبل الخروج من الأزمة، جدد بري رؤيته أن لبنان يحتاج إلى مظلة دولية تساعد على إنجاز التسوية، معتبراً أن هذه المظلة يجب أن تضم الولايات المتحدة الأميركية والمملكة العربية السعودية والجمهورية الإسلامية الإيرانية، لأنها تشكل، برأيه، الضمانة الأساسية لأي تسوية قابلة للحياة.
صحيفة الديار ٢-٧-٢٠٢٦ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
انتخاب
@Entekhab_News
قالیباف:
من وظیفه دارم برای همه مردم ایران که با هر سلیقه و دین در سایه جمهوری اسلامی زندگی میکنند، نوکری کنم
ما وظیفه داریم مشکلات اقتصادی را حل و امنیت کشور را تامین کنیم
امروز بیش از هرچیز وحدت برای ما مهم است
اتحاد مقدس حول رهبر انقلاب معنی دارد و هیچ خیمهای جز خیمه ولایت، خیمه امیرالمؤمنین نیست -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
According to Iranian media, including Tasnim, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister and chief negotiator Kazem Gharibabadi announced the conclusion of the Iranian delegation’s talks in Doha, held to follow up on the implementation of the Islamabad Memorandum.
Several noteworthy developments emerged:
- The Iranian delegation first met with Qatar’s Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, followed by two trilateral meetings involving Iran, Qatar and Pakistan.
- The first meeting of the Memorandum’s Monitoring Group was officially convened. During the session, Iran formally raised what it described as U.S. violations of Article 1 of the Memorandum, including:
1. the continuation of the war in Lebanon;
2. reports of increased U.S. military deployments and equipment in the region;
3. what Tehran called threatening and interventionist statements by U.S. officials.
- Gharibabadi stressed that the Memorandum constitutes an integrated package and cannot be implemented selectively. Tehran is signaling that progress on one track cannot be separated from compliance with the agreement as a whole.
- The parties agreed to establish an emergency communication channel for the Monitoring Group by tomorrow. Alleged violations will be formally documented, circulated among the parties and discussed through the mechanism established by the Memorandum.
- On the economic side, the Iranian delegation also met with Qatari officials, including the Central Bank. According to the Iranian readout, discussions focused on the use of part of the initial $6 billion (3?) package, with Qatar expected to procure goods requested by Iran.
- Taken together, the statement suggests that, despite publicly accusing Washington of non-compliance, Tehran is choosing to activate the implementation and dispute-resolution mechanisms of the Islamabad Memorandum rather than suspend the process. That is, in itself I guess, a noteworthy signal.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Haaretz.com
@haaretzcom
Palestinian reports said the latest expansion of Israel's 'Yellow Line' in southern Gaza has further reduced civilian territory, as aid groups warned of mounting humanitarian consequences www.haaretz.com/gaza/2026-07-01/ty-article/.premium/medic…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Amwaj.media
@amwajmedia
After months of delay following his assassination on Feb. 28, Iran has begun publicly organizing a funeral procession for former supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
As officials prepare for "tens of millions" of mourners, the move offers a clear look into Tehran's view of the current security environment.
More on @amwajmedia 👇 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Alireza Talakoubnejad
@websterkaroon
Interesting excerpt from Ghalibaf's (Speaker of Parliament and head of the Islamic Republic's negotiating team) interview with State TV in which he says that the Strait of Hormoz is valuable to Iran when there is *increasing* traffic in it.
He points out the Strait didn't have the geopolitical importance it did today 100 years ago when there was no oil industry moving through it (implying scaring away traffic will reduce Iran's leverage) and that it isn't in Iran's interest to make a situation where in the long run all countries come up with alternate routes.
As such it is very much in Iran's interest to make the Strait (and Iranian side of it) as appealing as possible & increase traffic.
This interview comes as there is an increase in vocal disagreement in Tehran between pro-deal factions led by Ghalibaf & Pezeshkian and opponents of the agreement. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sophia
@les_politiques
Israel's allies can now be counted with the fingers of one hand.
Israel fears it can no longer count on the US alone and calls for a strategic alliance against Iran through a 'new' regional architecture 'stretching from India to the UAE, Greece and Cyprus.' -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Edward Wong
@ewong
Gift link to my @nytimes story: www.nytimes.com/2026/07/01/us/politics/trump-saudi-crown-…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Negar Mojtahedi
@NegarMojtahedi
"The IRGC has become a huge liability, both domestically and internationally."
@Omid_M says Tehran may be trying to rebrand—not reform—the IRGC. His argument: the name has become toxic, but the same people remain in charge.
"There is an unwritten consensus that Iran needs a massive departure from the pre-war era."
READ: www.iranintl.com/en/202606304964 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ali Alfoneh علی آلفونه
@Alfoneh
1. Re. the planned funeral service: The Islamic Republic is not merely burying Ayatollah @Khamenei_fa, but also the fundamental principle of velayat-e faqih.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Palestiniens, Syriens et Libanais sont avertis. Le ministre israélien de la Défense, Israël Katz, déclare que l'armée israélienne resterait "indéfiniment" dans ce qu'elle qualifie de "zones de sécurité" établies au Liban, en Syrie et dans la bande de Gaza. "Les Forces de défense israéliennes (armée, NDLR) resteront dans les zones de sécurité au Liban, en Syrie et à Gaza pour une durée indéterminée afin de protéger nos habitants et nos communautés contre les éléments jihadistes", a-t-il déclaré dans un discours prononcé lors d'une cérémonie militaire.
Le Liban, qui a signé un accord-cadre avec l'Etat hébreu, a avalisé cette nouvelle donne, le texte ne mentionnant pas un retrait militaire israélien du sud, notamment. Mais cet accord difficilement applicable pourrait être rejeté par le Parlement. De son côté, la Syrie et son président Ahmed al-Charaa semblent moins disposés à jouer le jeu de la nouvelle doctrine sécuritaire israélienne, adoptée après l'attaque terroriste du Hamas en Israël.
,
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Une source officielle israélienne souligne que le ministre de la Défense, Israël Katz, n'a pas mentionné le mot "indéfiniment", comme l'AFP l'a rapporté, mais que les soldats israéliens resteraient "pour une durée indéterminée" au Liban, en Syrie et dans la bande de Gaza.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Aron Lund
@aronlund
Surveys by @ArabBarometer show that Iran’s regional popularity has increased after the US-Israeli attacks. Of the countries below, only Mauritania was polled after the start of the 2026 conflict. Future Gulf respondents will perhaps be less enthusiastic.
www.arabbarometer.org/2026/06/changing-views-of-iran-afte… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Farnaz Fassihi
@farnazfassihi
Exclusive: Oman proposes Strait of Hormuz fee plan. Under the proposal, Iran and Oman would collect payment for ships passing through the Strait and would call it a service fee not tolls. w/ @viviannereim @ErikaSolomon
www.nytimes.com/2026/06/30/world/middleeast/iran-war-oman… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Liban. Info sur le nouveau Groupe de coordination militaire pour le Liban (GCML), mentionné dans les annexes de sécurité de l'accord-cadre israélo-libanais, en vue de désarmer le Hezbollah.
Je vous livre les confidences d'un militaire, au fait de la situation: "Ce groupe reprend les mêmes officiers américains dépendant du CentCom que ceux à l'oeuvre dans le mécanisme de surveillance franco-américain du cessez-le-feu de novembre 2024. Mais il n'y a plus de Français en son sein. Les officiers américains sont retournés à l'ambassade américaine à Beyrouth et de là, ils réaniment une boucle Whattsapp qui fonctionne avec les mêmes acteurs qu'en 2024, sans les Français et la Finul. Cette boucle est activée pour dialoguer entre les Israéliens et les Forces armées libanaises (FAL)".
Selon cette source, "la question pendante et qui reste critique: qui va vérifier sur le terrain le désarmement prévu du Hezbollah? Il y a deux solutions: soit un pays sort du bois et est accepté par les parties. Il enverrait alors des conseillers militaires derrière les FAL pour attester de façon indépendante de la réalité du désarmement enclenchée. Soit on se résout à la fin des fin à une solution qu'on acceptera du bout des lèvres sans trop en parler pour éviter de chagriner les Israéliens: on demandera à des unités internationales, pourquoi pas Finul, de réaliser cette action de tiers de confiance qui n'a jamais été vraiment acceptée de la part de la Finul, ni jamais poussée par les Américains en direction des différents partenaires entre 2024 et maintenant". -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Liban-Israël. On comprend pourquoi les autorités libanaises souhaitaient que les annexes à l'accord-cadre signé avec l'Etat hébreu restent secrètes. A lire ci-dessous (clauses 3,4 et 5 en particulier).
1. Désignation des Zones Pilotes (où le désarmement du Hezbollah commencera) : Les parties désigneront immédiatement et lanceront la zone pilote initiale dans le Secteur Sud Litani dans un processus de planification militaire convenu, en utilisant un modèle en quatre étapes : 1) Déblaiement, prenant des mesures légales contre tout personnel armé non étatique s’engageant dans une activité non autorisée, et détruire ou rendre inopérante l’infrastructure associée, y compris mais sans s’y limiter aux armes, caches d’armes, tunnels et centres de commandement, par ces groupes armés non étatiques. 2) Vérification du déblaiement de tous les groupes armés non étatiques et de leur infrastructure militaire par une entité tierce mutuellement convenue. 3) Présence des Forces armées libanaises (FAL) hautement qualifiées qui assument et maintiennent un contrôle opérationnel exclusif, pour prévenir toute résurgence d’activité armée non étatique. 4) L’État libanais dirige les efforts de reconstruction, soutenus par une assistance internationale et coordonnés par la voie politique.
2. Mise en œuvre et Vérification : Les FAL dirigeront la mise en œuvre de ce modèle, le succès étant mesuré par une vérification du processus de désarmement et de démantèlement à convenir dans le cadre de cette négociation. Israël et le Liban établiront le Groupe de Coordination Militaire pour le Liban (GCM4L), chargé de la mission d’opérer 24 h/24, 7 j/7, gérant la déconfliction, la vérification et la mise en œuvre globale. Cette cellule rendra compte aux autorités politiques respectives d’Israël et du Liban via des canaux militaires indirects entre Israël et le Liban. La vérification continue se déroulera simultanément avec les opérations de déblaiement.
3. Engagements de Sécurité : Les FAL s’engagent à prendre les mesures opérationnelles nécessaires pour assurer le désarmement du Hezbollah et de tous les autres groupes armés non étatiques, et à ce qu’ils n’aient aucun rôle ou capacité militaire au Liban.
4. Redéploiement séquentiel : En attendant l’achèvement réussi d’un processus de désarmement et de démantèlement convenu et vérifiable, Israël s’engage à une réduction progressive, conditionnelle et échelonnée, et à un redéploiement éventuel de ses forces du territoire libanais, planifié et séquencé par le GCM4L, pour coïncider avec le déploiement des FAL.
5. Résultat Souhaité : Dans le cadre de l’effort plus large relatif au désarmement et au démantèlement de tous les groupes armés non étatiques mutuellement convenus dans ce cadre de négociation, restaurer l’autorité étatique libanaise complète dans tout le Liban et assurer la sécurité à long terme d’Israël.
6. Supervision et Résolution des Litiges : Les parties, avec la facilitation des États-Unis, procéderont à des examens périodiques de la mise en œuvre et pourront modifier cette Annexe par accord mutuel. Tout litige concernant son interprétation ou son exécution sera résolu par des discussions trilatérales. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Iraq Oil Report
@iraqoilreport
Maarij arrested in widening corruption crackdown www.iraqoilreport.com/news/maarij-arrested-in-widening-co…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Critical Threats
@criticalthreats
Clerics within Iran’s Assembly of Experts, including within the body’s leadership, appear divided over how the regime should implement the US-Iran MoU and how much latitude Iranian negotiators should have in talks with the United States. The Assembly of Experts is an 88-member clerical body that is responsible for appointing and supervising the Supreme Leader, according to the Iranian constitution.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hassan I. Hassan
@hxhassan
Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s Damascus meeting with Egyptian billionaire Naguib Sawiris signals conciliation and a step toward postwar reconstruction.
An overview by @chrysographer in @newlinesmag. newlinesmag.com/running-notes/naguib-sawiris-visit-to-dam… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Open Source Intel
@Osint613
The U.S. recently passed Israel a written demands document, with Washington expecting written approval.
The paper reflects American eagerness to advance Trump's Gaza plan even without Hamas disarming, and little appetite for renewed large-scale fighting.
According to the reported document:
• The plan would move forward even if Hamas refuses to disarm.
• The focus shifts from resuming the war to replacing Hamas’s governance.
• Israel would allow infrastructure projects, including water and electricity, in designated areas.
• Civilians would gradually move from Hamas controlled areas to Peace Council administered zones by the end of 2026.
• Israel would approve a headquarters for a technocratic government and bases for an international stabilization force.
• The European Hospital would be rebuilt, with construction materials, medical equipment, laboratories, and an access corridor approved.
• Gaza related Palestinian Authority tax revenues would be transferred to the Peace Council.
• Israel would begin recognizing the technocratic government as Gaza’s governing authority.
• The technocratic government would oversee the Palestinian side of the Kerem Shalom and Rafah crossings.
• Israel would allow fuel deliveries, digital payments, and 4G service in Gaza.
• Conditional amnesty would be offered to anyone who surrenders their weapon and commits to peace.
In return, the Peace Council would:
• Manage Gaza’s supply chain, fuel, and payments.
• Reduce Hamas’s taxation and financial control.
• Maintain security through an international stabilization force backed by an unarmed Palestinian civil guard.
• Recognize Israel’s right to take any necessary security measures if Hamas refuses to disarm.
If accurate, the document suggests US is prioritizing an alternative governing structure in Gaza over waiting for Hamas to surrender its weapons.
@kaisos1987 -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Negar Mortazavi
@NegarMortazavi
Told Aljazeera that the 2015 JCPOA was a Reformist-Democratic diplomatic project, diplomatically elegant but domestically fragile for both Iran and the US, due to opposition in both countries to the deal.
This MoU is the mirror image: it is a bargain between Iran’s hardline security establishment and a Republican White House. That makes it less polished, but potentially more durable.
The paradox is that a less liberal agreement may be more sustainable, because it is rooted in the power centres that can actually enforce it or sabotage it.
Despite the Iran-US ceasefire officially being on hold, limited strikes and mutual accusations in the region persist, including strikes on southern Iranian ports by the US and Iran’s targeting of Kuwait and Bahrainthis week.
Rather than viewing these skirmishes as the immediate collapse of the framework, analysts suggest they are merely a violent extension of diplomacy.
Mortazavi describes the situation as a “dangerous but familiar phase of post-war bargaining” where both sides are testing the boundaries, but careful not to restart the war. This is being done by each side to maximise benefits and minimise concessions for the next stage of the deal.
The risk is that this kind of coercive bargaining can easily spiral. The key test is not whether all violence stops immediately. The key test is whether these incidents remain contained and whether the negotiating channel stays open.
Mortazavi agrees that the most realistic outcome is neither war nor friendship. It’s a managed rivalry with rules, and that’s a significant improvement over open conflict.
www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/29/the-us-iran-mou-looks-at… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mark Pyruz
@INTELonIRAN
🗯️ Protest in Iran during USA-Iran 60 day negotiations period
#️⃣ Daily turnout observed from visual evidence
29 JUN 2026: ≈517 (tentative) @Grok
• Back-to-back high mark daily turnouts for ceasefire period
• Six observed, regular Monday protests by telecom retirees over pension-benefit issues— with biggest protest in Rasht displaying multiple Supreme Leader allegiance images
• Two labor protests by medical workers: medium-sized protest of estimated 160 protesters in Tehran seen displaying pro-IRI flag, and an estimated 30 in Tabriz
• Labor assembly by estimated 24 workers at Iran Barak Woolen Factory in Rasht
• Renewed, medium-sized protest in Garmsar county by estimated 110 farmers and dependents over water share issues
• Previous day visual emerged for estimated 18 retirees protesting in Rasht over pension-benefit issues
Amended count:
28JUN ≈392 (+18)
🗒️ Data sheet 📷 Visuals 📊 Turnout charts ⬇️
🧵 Thread 1/2 ⬇️ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
NEW: In aftermath of the Israel-Lebanon deal and escalation in Hormuz, there are heated reactions in Iran to what's perceived as either a) Trump administration being internally divided, with Rubio and Vance pursuing polar opposite goals, or b) the US simply being engaged in mischief and deception once again.
Hardline journalist and former MP Nezamoddin Mousavi puts it perhaps most clear:
Washington is accused of being engaged in what he called "parallel-tracking"—advancing its strategic interests on multiple fronts while keeping Tehran engaged at the negotiating table. Mousavi lists two examples: the creation of an alternative shipping corridor through the Strait of Hormuz with Oman’s help to bypass Iranian control, and the Lebanon framework deal. "Continuation of this parallel-tracking will neutralize all our leverage," he argues. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hiba Nasr
@HibaNasr
‼️ Sources told WSJ that the framework between Lebanon and Israel is “the U.S. interpretation of the MOU’s language regarding Lebanon & the Vice President backs Rubio & nobody wants to force Israel to cede southern Lebanon to Iran’s proxy”. www.wsj.com/opinion/u-s-lebanon-israel-framework-marco-ru…
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Réaction mesurée de la France à l'accord cadre entre le Liban et Israël. Paris rappelle bien ce qui doit être accompli.
"La France salue l’accord-cadre signé vendredi à Washington entre les gouvernements du Liban et d’Israël, sous médiation américaine.
Cet accord doit ouvrir la voie au recouvrement total de la souveraineté libanaise au sein des frontières du pays, à l’instauration du plein monopole de l’Etat libanais sur les armes et au retrait de l’armée israélienne du territoire libanais. Il doit permettre l’accès humanitaire aux zones affectées par la guerre et le retour des populations déplacées.
Attachée à la sécurité d’Israël comme à celle du Liban et engagée dans le maintien de la paix au Sud-Liban, la France se tient prête à contribuer à la mise en œuvre de cet accord-cadre et à la réalisation de l’ensemble de ces objectifs". -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Michael Young
@BeirutCalling
In an interview with @mounir_rabih, Berri uses regional realities to bolster his opposition to the Israel-Lebanon agreement, which “will not pass.” He says it will undermine domestic unity, and argues the “Israeli project” also threatens Arab countries. This sounds like standard rhetoric, but is not: the Saudis, for example, have pushed hard for Lebanon to avoid domestic discord, particularly in their talks with Berri envoy Ali Hassan al-Khalil; regionally, he’s speaking to the emergence of a coalition of countries seeking to contain Israeli hegemony—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, and Pakistan. And @almodononline is regarded as a Qatar-backed outlet. Berri knows what he’s doing by playing the regional card, and Lebanon cannot afford to ignore this regional reality: www.almodon.com/politics/2026/06/28/بري-لالمدن-الاتفاق-ضد…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇺🇸🇮🇱🇱🇧 The United States asked Israel for 2 key changes to the text to secure the deal:
• Withdrawal from a village in southern Lebanon currently under Israeli occupation
• A clear statement that this would be the beginning of a broader redeployment out of Lebanon
Source: @BarakRavid / Writer: Samuel -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Pour la première fois depuis 1989, le sultan d'Oman effectue une visite officielle en France. La situation dans le détroit d'Ormuz sera au centre des discussions entre Emmanuel Macron et Haïtham ben Tariq. Après une ostracisation, la France redécouvre les vertus de médiateur de ce pays original de la Péninsule arabique. Mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/le-detroit-d-ormuz-au-centr… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Khaldoun El Charif
@CharifKhaldoun
أن يختلف المرء مع الحزب، أو يخالفه، أو حتى يعاديه، شيء. وشيءٌ آخر أن يقوده هذا الخلاف إلى تجاهل حقيقة أن إسرائيل ما زالت تحتل وتعتدي وتهدد لبنان، فضلًا عن تهديدها المستمر للإقليم بأسره.
المرونة السياسية ليست استسلامًا، والدبلوماسية وُجدت لتجنيب البلاد الحروب، لا لتبريرها. أما ما يجري اليوم، فيضع رؤوسنا جميعًا تحت مقصلة إسرائيل، ويجعلنا ندفع من استقرارنا الداخلي، ومن أرضنا ومياهنا، ثمنًا يحتاجه بنيامين نتنياهو لتحسين حظوظه الانتخابية.
والأغرب أننا مستعدون للتفريط بما نملك، على أمل شراء وهمٍ قد لا يأتي أبدًا.
الأيام وحدها كفيلة بأن تحكم. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le texte intégral de l'accord cadre, signé vendredi par Israël et le Liban, tel que restitué par le site Ici Beyrouth. L'annexe relative à la sécurité n'a pas encore été publiée.
Préambule
Le gouvernement de l'État d'Israël et le gouvernement de la République libanaise, avec le plein soutien des États-Unis sous la direction du président Donald J. Trump, affirment leur objectif commun de parvenir à une paix et une sécurité durables. À travers ce cadre trilatéral et les futurs accords, les deux pays déclarent leur volonté de mettre fin au conflit qui les oppose, de garantir la souveraineté et la sécurité de chacun des deux États et d'établir des relations de bon voisinage pacifiques.
1.
Israël et le Liban réaffirment le droit de chacun à exister en paix ainsi que leur volonté commune de vivre en sécurité en tant que deux États souverains voisins. Dans ce cadre, ils déclarent leur intention de mettre définitivement fin au conflit qui les oppose, d'en traiter les causes profondes et de mettre officiellement un terme à tout état de guerre existant.
Ce cadre, issu de plusieurs cycles de négociations directes, s'appuie sur les accords et ententes conclus par le passé et traduit un engagement irréversible à résoudre toutes les questions en suspens par des négociations bilatérales directes, avec la médiation et le soutien des États-Unis.
2.
Israël et le Liban s'engagent dans un processus réciproque et progressif, soumis à des conditions clairement définies. Les Forces armées libanaises rétabliront l'autorité effective de l'État sur l'ensemble du territoire libanais après le désarmement vérifié des groupes armés non étatiques et le démantèlement de leurs infrastructures, permettant ainsi un redéploiement progressif des Forces de défense israéliennes hors du territoire libanais.
Les modalités de ce processus figureront dans une annexe sécuritaire soutenue par les États-Unis, définissant les dispositifs de sécurité, les mécanismes de vérification et les mesures de mise en œuvre. La réussite de ce processus doit ouvrir la voie à une relation stable et pacifique entre les deux pays.
3.
Conformément à l'annexe sécuritaire, les Forces armées libanaises assumeront progressivement l'entière responsabilité de la sécurité dans des zones pilotes déterminées. Ces zones serviront de mécanisme pour le redéploiement progressif et vérifié des forces israéliennes ainsi que pour le déploiement de l'armée libanaise.
Deux zones pilotes initiales ont déjà été convenues, d'autres devant être sélectionnées d'un commun accord. Une fois le désarmement des groupes armés non étatiques et le démantèlement de leurs infrastructures achevés dans ces secteurs, les Forces armées libanaises exerceront la responsabilité exclusive de la sécurité, la reconstruction avec le soutien de la communauté internationale pourra débuter et les civils libanais pourront regagner leurs foyers en toute sécurité.
Les États-Unis entendent travailler en étroite coopération avec les deux pays afin de vérifier et d'accompagner ce processus.
4.
Le Liban réaffirme son engagement ferme et irréversible à restaurer et exercer pleinement sa souveraineté sur l'ensemble de son territoire. Le gouvernement libanais rétablira le monopole de l'État sur l'usage de la force, procédera au désarmement complet et vérifié de tous les groupes armés non étatiques, veillera à ce qu'ils ne jouent plus aucun rôle militaire ou sécuritaire et éliminera leurs capacités armées partout au Liban.
Le Liban sollicite un soutien international, en particulier de la part de ses partenaires arabes, sous la direction des États-Unis.
5.
Israël souligne que ses opérations militaires au Liban répondent uniquement aux attaques, aux menaces et aux intentions hostiles des groupes armés non étatiques, en particulier du Hezbollah.
Israël affirme que l'élimination de cette menace, par le désarmement et le démantèlement de ces groupes, ainsi que par les autres dispositions sécuritaires convenues, supprimera tout besoin futur d'opérations militaires israéliennes ou de présence militaire au Liban.
Israël déclare en outre n'avoir aucune revendication territoriale sur le Liban.
6.
Le Liban affirme, conformément à la Charte des Nations unies et à sa souveraineté, que ses forces de sécurité sont seules responsables de la sécurité et de la défense du pays et que seul le gouvernement libanais est habilité à décider des questions de guerre et de paix.
Le Liban rejette toute prétention d'un État ou d'un acteur non étatique à recourir à la force en son nom sans autorisation expresse et réaffirme que de telles prétentions sont illégales au regard des décisions du gouvernement libanais et contraires aux intérêts nationaux du Liban.
7.
Le Liban et Israël affirment qu'aucune disposition du présent cadre ne limite leur droit inhérent à la légitime défense, conformément à la Charte des Nations unies et au droit international applicable, tout en soulignant qu'aucune tierce partie ne peut exercer ce droit en leur nom.
Les deux gouvernements s'engagent également à créer un groupe de coordination militaire, avec le soutien et la participation des États-Unis, chargé de superviser la mise en œuvre de l'accord.
8.
Les deux pays partagent l'objectif d'un Liban sûr et reconstruit, placé sous la pleine souveraineté de l'État libanais, où aucun groupe armé non étatique ne représente une menace pour Israël, le Liban ou les citoyens des deux pays.
Ils reconnaissent que le rétablissement de la sécurité dans le sud du Liban, grâce au déploiement des Forces armées libanaises, le retour en toute sécurité des civils et la protection des communautés du nord d'Israël constituent des éléments essentiels pour assurer une stabilité durable et une paix pérenne.
9.
Le Liban s'engage à mettre en œuvre un programme strict fondé sur des objectifs mesurables afin de permettre aux Forces armées libanaises d'établir un contrôle militaire et sécuritaire total sur l'ensemble du territoire, de procéder au désarmement de tous les groupes armés non étatiques et d'exercer une autorité effective dans tout le pays.
Les États-Unis saluent l'opportunité de soutenir ces efforts, tout en précisant que leur assistance future sera strictement conditionnée à l'atteinte d'étapes vérifiées, à la transparence du processus, à des résultats mesurables et à un contrôle permanent.
10.
Parallèlement, les États-Unis mobiliseront leurs partenaires internationaux afin d'aider le Liban à reconstruire ses infrastructures, relancer son économie et créer les conditions d'une prospérité durable.
Ce soutien devrait comprendre une aide substantielle à la reconstruction et à l'action humanitaire, des programmes de relance économique ainsi que des initiatives d'investissement.
11.
Le Liban et les États-Unis s'engagent à empêcher tout transfert de fonds vers une entité, une organisation ou un individu lié à des groupes armés non étatiques et à prendre toutes les mesures juridiques disponibles pour interdire leurs activités.
Le Liban s'engage également expressément à veiller à ce que les fonds destinés à la reconstruction ne parviennent pas à ces groupes ni aux entités qui leur sont affiliées.
12.
Dès la signature du présent cadre, les parties établiront des groupes de travail chargés de rédiger un accord global de paix et de sécurité.
Elles mettront également en place, sans délai, des canaux complémentaires de communication directe et permanente, sous la facilitation des États-Unis.
Les deux gouvernements s'engagent à négocier de bonne foi jusqu'à la conclusion d'une paix complète et durable.
13.
Conformément à leur objectif commun d'établir des relations stables et pacifiques, Israël et le Liban s'engagent à adopter des mesures de confiance reflétant leur volonté de rapprochement.
Ces mesures comprennent la fin de toute action hostile ou négative dans les enceintes politiques et juridiques internationales, la coopération pour localiser et restituer les dépouilles humaines, ainsi que les efforts visant à obtenir la libération des détenus.
14.
Les deux gouvernements reconnaissent le rôle des États-Unis dans le soutien apporté à leurs efforts pour mettre fin à plusieurs décennies de conflit et instaurer une stabilité durable ainsi qu'une paix globale.
Ils expriment leur profonde gratitude pour la vision et le leadership du président Donald J. Trump. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L’accord-cadre signé entre le Liban et Israël est un mauvais accord pour la souveraineté libanaise. Il est extrêmement favorable à l’Etat hébreu, qui n’est ni contraint de se retirer, ni de cesser-le-feu. C’est le Liban qui doit faire les premiers pas – désarmement du Hezbollah, redéploiement de l’armée – avant d’engranger des concessions de la part de son voisin.
Il me rappelle les Accords d’Oslo que j'ai suivis au jour le jour, où l’autonomie palestinienne était conditionnée à la réalisation d’un certain nombre d’engagements, alors que l’armée israélienne ne devait que se redéployer des territoires palestiniens, le même terme utilisé entre Tel Aviv et Beyrouth. Ils ont échoué. Comme Oslo, cet accord est le reflet des rapports de forces, avec en prime un arbitre encore plus aligné sur l’Etat hébreu. Le Liban officiel a mis tous ses œufs dans le panier américain. Donald Trump saura-t-il faire pression sur Benjamin Netanyahou pour que ce dernier renvoie l’ascenseur à Joseph Aoun ? Explications de texte.
Cet accord ne devrait pas fonctionner, le retrait militaire israélien n’intervenant que lorsque le Hezbollah sera désarmé. Or l’Iran empêchera son désarmement. De son côté, Benjamin Netanyahou a d’ores et déjà déclaré que ses forces resteraient dans la bande territoriale d’une dizaine de kms qu’elles occupent au sud du Liban. D’autre part, dans le texte, le Liban a dû accepter que les civils qui en ont été chassés se seront pas autorisés à y retourner. Un retrait militaire israélien et le retour des civils étaient pourtant le minimum que le Liban devait accepter, sous peine de perdre la face.
Un début de retrait israélien se fera dans deux "zones pilotes", dont la localisation reste à définir, conjointement avec l’armée israélienne. Mais au-delà, c’est le séquençage qui pose question. L’accord prévoit que « les groupes armés non-étatiques » (le Hezbollah) seront d’abord désarmés avant que l’armée libanaise s’y déploie et qu’en dernière étape l’armée israélienne s’en retire. Cela augure de difficultés importantes. Qui va désarmer le Hezbollah dans ces zones : les militaires libanais avec l’armée israélienne ? « On veut le désarmement du Hezbollah, mais nous ne sommes pas une milice à la solde d’Israël », me confiait la semaine dernière à Beyrouth un haut gradé libanais. Pour avoir une chance de réussite, il aurait fallu un séquençage inverse, afin de consolider le poids des forces libanaises face à la mission dangereuse et délicate de désarmer le Hezbollah.
L’accord stipule que « le gouvernement du Liban rebâtira le monopole de l’Etat sur l’usage de la force, réalisera le désarmement complet et vérifié de tous les groupes armés non-étatiques, et veillera à ce que de tels groupes n’aient aucun rôle militaire ou sécuritaire et aucune capacité armée nulle part au Liban ». L’accord suggère donc une confrontation à venir entre l’armée et le Hezbollah. Ce que des commentateurs israéliens ont déjà traduit par une guerre civile, dont certains se félicitaient.
L’accord ne fait nullement mention des prisonniers libanais détenus en Israël, une exigence initiale de Beyrouth. Il créé également une dépendance à l’égard des Etats-Unis, reconnaissant que « toute nouvelle assistance américaine sera strictement conditionnée à des étapes vérifiables, une transparence totale, des résultats démontrés et un contrôle continu ». La France, pourtant vielle amie du Liban, aura du mal à se frayer un chemin.
Il stipule enfin que chaque partie peut continuer à exercer « son droit inhérent à se défendre, tel que reconnu dans la charte des Nations unies et conforme au droit international applicable ». « Cela signifie, estime l’analyste Michaël Young, que les Israéliens continueront à mener des actions militaires au Liban, comme ils l’ont fait après l’accord de cessez-le-feu de novembre 2024, et prétendront que c’est de la légitime défense ». D’ailleurs ce dimanche, ils ont déjà mis en application cette clause, en frappant le sud du Liban. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Hiba Nasr
@HibaNasr
مصادر الشرق :
وفد لبنان المكون من السفير سيمون كرم ، السفيرة ندى حمادة معوض، القنصل وسام بطرس، العميد جورج رزق الله, العميد أوليفر حكمة, العميد زياد رزق الله, العقيد وائل عباس، العقيد رشاد بو كروم، العقيد مازن الحاج، العقيد وديع رافول، وبتكليف من الدولة اللبنانية حقق الاتي:
ان يتضمن الاتفاق الإعلان عن انسحاب على مراحل لإسرائيل خارج الأراضي اللبنانية، الاشارة إلى عدم وجود اطماع لإسرائيل no territorial ambition ، حق الدفاع عن النفس للدولتين ، مساعدات إنسانية وعسكرية ، دول إقليمية راعية، وعلى ان يبدأ الانسحاب فور بدء الخلية التي اعلن روبيو عنها عملها.
@AsharqNews -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ayman Abdel Nour
@aabnour
Syria Is Caught Between Trump and His Two Best Friends in the Middle East
www.newsweek.com/syria-caught-between-trump-friends-middl… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Michael Young
@BeirutCalling
Here is the text of the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement signed yesterday in Washington. www.naharnet.com/stories/en/320949-full-text-of-lebanon-i…
There are several takeaways from the agreement:
(1) The agreement strains to assert Lebanese sovereignty, but the reality is that Lebanon's sovereignty is one only in name. The fact that Hassan Fadlallah reacted to the agreement by saying it violated the U.S. agreement reached with Iran—an agreement to which neither Israel nor Lebanon is a party—showed what Lebanon is up against: a Hezbollah whose sole compass remains Iran, which therefore refuses to recognize Lebanon and its government as legitimate, independent entities.
(2) The agreement places the burden of implementation on Lebanon, making Israeli steps conditional on prior Lebanese measures. There is little real reciprocity here, and no commitment that Israel will withdraw from Lebanon if the conditions it has imposed are not met. The most that the Israelis say is that "pursuant to the above [conditions], the Government of Israel declares that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon." This is a vague phrase offering no commitments on returning occupied territory.
(3) The most troublesome passage is this one: "The Government of Lebanon will rebuild the State's monopoly on the use of force, achieve the complete and verified disarmament of all non-state armed groups, and ensure that such groups will have no military or security role and no armed capabilities anywhere in Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon herewith requests the support of international and particularly Arab partners, under the leadership of the United States, to achieve this outcome."
This suggests that, in the absence of a consensual disarmament of Hezbollah, the agreement compels the Lebanese state to enter into a confrontation, perhaps a military confrontation, with Hezbollah. There are no guarantees it may prevail in such a case, and it's no surprise that Israeli commentators have described the agreement as one that may provoke a civil war in Lebanon, which the Israelis would very likely welcome, frankly. But since neither the army nor Hezbollah wants to enter a civil war, therefore will hesitate to enter into armed conflict with each other, Israel has an excuse to stay in Lebanon indefinitely.
(3) On the so-called "pilot zones," the parties agreed to two such zones, and while news reports have suggested that one of these is located south of the Litani, nothing in the agreement specifies where these zones are located. The agreement also speaks of a Security Annex, in which the components of the process of disarmament, the restoration of state sovereignty, and Israel's withdrawals "will be" detailed. The wording suggests it is still a work in progress. That is not particularly reassuring.
(4) The agreement reiterates that either side can continue to exercise "their inherent right to defend themselves, as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations and consistent with applicable international law." This means that the Israelis will continue to engage in military action in Lebanon, much as they did after the November 2024 agreement, and claim that it is in "self-defense." However, the accord also reaffirms that no third party may exercise that right of self-defense on the parties' behalf, which effectively delegitimizes Hezbollah's latitude to defend itself in the event of Israeli actions.
(5) The agreement fails to mention specifically a number of prior Lebanese demands, namely the release of Lebanese held in Israeli prisons and the process of border demarcation—a key component of Israeli recognition of Lebanon's international borders.
(6) The agreement also betrays heavy reliance on the United States, especially in this passage: "The Government of Lebanon welcomes the readiness of the United States to support such efforts, recognizing that any new U.S. assistance will be strictly conditioned on verifiable milestones, full transparency, demonstrated results, and ongoing oversight. This effort will enable the safe and orderly re-establishment of Lebanese sovereignty, also contributing to the broader stability and security of the entire Middle East." Too much reliance on the Americans is never a good idea. What this outlines, furthermore, is that Lebanon will have to constantly satisfy the United States with "verifiable milestones," which shows just how limited is Lebanon's sovereignty in reality.
Overall, this is quite a bad agreement for Lebanon, but also one that is a logical consequence of the fact that the state has no cards to play. This has led some enthusiasts to say that Hezbollah is that card. I beg to differ. Hezbollah is the primary cause of the state's weakness, and let's get over the illusion the party has mounted decisive "resistance" to the Israelis, who have leveled most Shiite villages south of the Litani, and are now destroying villages north of it. With more resistance like this, not much will be left of Lebanon.
I have much more to say about the agreement, but for now these are my preliminary thoughts. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
נדב איל Nadav Eyal
@Nadav_Eyal
גדי איזנקוט ירד השבוע לדרום, לעוטף עזה. ליוויתי את המפגשים שלו, משדרות דרך רוחמה ועד כפר עזה. שורה תחתונה: הוא משוכנע לגמרי שנתניהו יפסיד בבחירות. "הוא כבר מוכן למכור כליה". מדבר על הפעם שהסכים "עם העגל הזה, בן גביר" בתקיפה באיראן, ומבטיח את הפלת משטר חמאס בעזה, במלחמה אם צריך.
הצהרות חזקות זה דבר אחד; הוא צריך להיזהר ממה שקרה לציפי לבני מ-2009 - חיבוק עז מהמחנה, ללא העברת קולות מהימין, ולבסוף כישלון. זה המבחן, ואין בלתו. לינק בציוץ הבא. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Joshua Landis
@joshua_landis
Iran can sell oil now. Here’s a look at what that means for the global oil market in coming weeks and beyond www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/iran-can-now-sell-oil-how…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kamran Bokhari
@KamranBokhari
Oman floating Hormuz fees is a negotiating signal, not a policy.
And yet no one is asking about enforcement.
Iran only has fast boats, the U.S. has already said it will intercept toll-paying ships, and UNCLOS makes the whole scheme legally indefensible.
Intent without capability is just messaging.
File this under info ops until someone shows you the wherewithal to pull this off.
Bloomberg
@business
Oman has told European officials the Strait of Hormuz won't return to its pre-war status and ships may have to be charged fees www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-26/oman-tells-all…
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Cradle
@TheCradleMedia
Leaked draft reveals Lebanon recognizes Israel, commits to disarming Lebanese resistance as condition for Israeli withdrawal under US-backed framework
——
A leaked draft of the US-backed framework agreement obtained by Al-Jadeed outlines a sweeping roadmap toward normalization between Lebanon and Israel, despite Israel's continued military attacks and occupation of parts of southern Lebanon.
The text states that both governments recognize each other's right to exist in "peace," declare their intention to formally end the state of war, pursue direct bilateral negotiations under US mediation, establish permanent channels of direct communication, and begin drafting a comprehensive peace and security agreement. It also commits both sides to refraining from hostile political and legal actions against one another in international forums.
The draft further commits the Lebanese state to restoring its monopoly over the use of force by disarming all non-state armed groups, dismantling their military infrastructure, and gradually deploying the Lebanese Armed Forces into agreed "pilot areas" before Israeli occupation forces carry out a phased redeployment. The process would be verified with US support and backed by an additional security annex. The text also reaffirms that only the Lebanese state has the authority to decide questions of war and peace, while Israel claims it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and says its occupation will end once non-state armed groups are fully disarmed. The agreement concludes by thanking the United States and President Donald Trump for their leadership in advancing what it a path toward "lasting peace." -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Al Arabiya reports that the next round of U.S.-Iran talks is expected to take place in Switzerland on 28–29 June, at the technical/expert level and with mediators present.
- The report also says Lebanon is insisting that any final statement from its negotiations with Israel explicitly include a complete Israeli withdrawal.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Rubio contre Vance: Le piège libanais.
Ci-dessous l'analyse d'Ahmad Husseini, fin connaisseur de la scène politique américaine et de son pays, le Liban, au moment où celui-ci signe un fragile accord avec Israël, sous l'égide des Etats-Unis.
L'accord qui circule aujourd'hui à Washington se présente, en apparence, comme une réussite diplomatique libanaise. Un retrait est promis. La souveraineté, sans que l'accord d'armistice ne soit mentionné une seule fois, est invoquée. La présidence libanaise présente le texte comme la récupération de terres occupées et le rétablissement de l'autorité de l'État sur le Sud. Lu plus attentivement, à la lumière du moment régional qui l'a produit, le document apparaît tout autre : un instrument conçu moins pour stabiliser le Liban que pour atteindre par-delà le Liban et frapper l'entente naissante entre Washington et Téhéran.
La première chose à relever est l'écart entre ce qu'Israël a gagné sur le terrain et ce qu'il extrait aujourd'hui sur le papier. La capitulation rédigée à Washington ne reflète en rien la position réelle d'Israël dans le Sud. Les forces israéliennes qui s'y trouvent ne sont pas des occupants maîtres du terrain. Elles vivent à l'intérieur de leurs chars, dormant dans leur blindage au point qu'un habitant a ironisé sur la bienvenue à l'hôtel Merkava, ou repassant la frontière chaque nuit pour échapper aux drones FPV qui rendent le terrain impossible à tenir après la tombée du jour. Une armée incapable de demeurer sur la terre où elle est entrée ne dicte pas ses conditions par droit de conquête. Ces conditions lui sont remises à une table de négociation. Le document consigne une victoire que le champ de bataille n'a jamais livrée.
Cet écart est la clef de toute la manœuvre. L'encerclement de l'Iran, tenté et défait dans le golfe Persique, se poursuit désormais par d'autres moyens. Ce que les illusionnistes en Israël et au Liban n'ont pu obtenir en cernant l'Iran dans la région, ils tentent de le dérober à la table des négociations, aspergé de l'eau bénite des bénédictions de Rubio pour faire passer le vol pour un sacrement.
Pour comprendre, il faut distinguer les deux projets américains à l'œuvre dans la région, car ce ne sont pas le même projet et ils ne sont pas portés par les mêmes hommes.
Le premier appartient au courant de l'administration associé à Vance. Sa logique est la retenue comme stratégie. Il considère le long enlisement américain au Moyen-Orient comme un coût à réduire plutôt qu'une mission à prolonger, et il admet qu'un arrangement négocié avec l'Iran, si imparfait soit-il, sert mieux les intérêts américains qu'une nouvelle confrontation sans terme menée pour l'essentiel au profit d'Israël. Le mémorandum d'entente avec l'Iran est le produit emblématique de cette pensée. Il repose sur une seule prémisse : que Washington peut faire baisser la tension avec Téhéran et contenir l'aventurisme militaire israélien assez longtemps pour que la désescalade devienne autosuffisante.
Le second projet appartient au courant associé à Rubio. Sa logique est la pression comme stratégie. Il n'admet pas l'arrangement avec l'Iran comme un intérêt américain établi. Il tient l'endiguement et l'affaiblissement progressif de l'Iran pour une affaire inachevée, et il traite toute ouverture vers Téhéran comme une concession à annuler plutôt qu'un acquis à consolider. Là où le premier courant voit une guerre à terminer, le second voit une campagne à mener à son terme par d'autres moyens.
Ce ne sont pas des différences de degré. Ce sont deux réponses concurrentes à la question de l'après-Trump, avancées par deux hommes qui entendent chacun être cette réponse. Pour l'un comme pour l'autre, la succession est un projet de tout ou rien, et chacun l'a misé sur une vision irréconciliable du rôle de l'Amérique. Vance propose une restauration MAGA tournée vers l'intérieur, une Amérique qui se retire des guerres d'autrui. Rubio propose le vieux credo interventionniste en habit MAGA, une Amérique qui reste et achève le travail. Les deux ne peuvent hériter ensemble de la coalition de Trump, et chacun le sait. Le Liban est le terrain où cette rivalité a trouvé son champ de bataille, et le terrain que le second courant a choisi pour sa contre-offensive.
Il faut suivre l'enchaînement. La campagne militaire contre le Hezbollah a infligé de réels dégâts. Elle n'a pas produit le résultat politique recherché par ses architectes. Le Hezbollah a été blessé sans être éliminé. L'Iran a été pressé sans être retiré de l'équation libanaise. L'objectif de restructurer en profondeur l'ordre sécuritaire et politique du Liban n'a pas été atteint sur le champ de bataille. C'est le plus ancien des schémas dans la conduite de la guerre et de la diplomatie : quand la campagne n'atteint pas son but politique, la table des négociations devient l'instrument qui obtient ce que les armes n'ont pu obtenir.
Le mécanisme est habile précisément parce qu'il paraît innocent. Israël et le courant de Rubio n'ont pas besoin que le Liban perde une guerre. Ils ont besoin que le Liban signe un papier. Un État libanais qui appose sa signature sur un accord rédigé entièrement selon les termes israéliens accomplit ce que le champ de bataille n'a pu accomplir : il permet à Washington de se tourner vers Téhéran et de dire que l'Iran n'a aucun titre au Liban, aucune compétence, aucun rôle, puisque l'État libanais lui-même a choisi de négocier sans lui et contre lui. L'accord devient la preuve que la position régionale de l'Iran s'effondre non sous la pression américaine, mais par le libre choix des partenaires de l'Amérique.
C'est pourquoi le document compte bien au-delà des deux lambeaux de terre du Sud qu'il concerne. Netanyahou l'a reconnu à sa manière. Il décrit le retrait comme l'abandon de zones auxquelles il n'attache aucune valeur, tandis que la liberté d'action militaire d'Israël sur le Liban demeure intacte. La présidence célèbre une victoire souveraine qu'elle ne sait pas expliquer dans les faits. La majorité des Libanais rejettent le texte comme une capitulation. Ces trois réactions concordent avec une même réalité de fond : l'accord demande au Liban d'assumer des obligations contraignantes tout en laissant à Israël une latitude militaire pour l'essentiel intacte. Un arrangement de cette forme ne consolide pas la souveraineté libanaise. Il entérine le déséquilibre et l'appelle paix.
L'instrument par lequel cela se réalise est une direction libanaise trop compromise et trop sensible aux menaces de sanctions américaines pour résister au cadrage. Une troïka compromise de la présidence, de la primature et de la présidence du Parlement, incapable de refléter une position nationale, devient par défaut l'instrument de la stratégie d'un autre. Quand un État refuse de se servir du levier qu'on lui tend, le levier passe à la partie disposée à s'en servir. L'insistance de l'Iran sur un cessez-le-feu et un retrait israélien du Sud avait ouvert une perspective qu'un État libanais cohérent aurait pu convertir en conditions réciproques. Il a préféré négocier selon les termes de l'autre camp et remettre au courant de Rubio précisément l'outil qu'il lui fallait.
Ici, la mémoire historique des Libanais eux-mêmes devient décisive, et c'est la raison pour laquelle le piège pourrait ne pas se refermer. L'armée libanaise comprend, mieux que toute partie extérieure, ce que produit un arrangement de sécurité imposé sans légitimité interne. Elle porte la mémoire institutionnelle de l'accord du 17 mai 1983, un document qui promettait lui aussi sécurité et retrait, négocié lui aussi sous pression extérieure, et qui s'est effondré faute du moindre fondement dans le consentement libanais. Le 17 mai n'est pas un précédent parce que l'histoire se répète. C'est un précédent parce qu'il a établi une règle permanente : un arrangement de sécurité que la population tient pour une capitulation ne peut être appliqué par les institutions chargées de le porter, quel que soit le nombre de signatures qu'il recueille. L'alternative légitime n'est pas l'imposition extérieure, mais le cadre dont le Liban dispose déjà, l'accord de Taëf et son séquencement, qui ordonne le rétablissement de l'autorité de l'État par des étapes nationales convenues plutôt que par des conditions dictées du dehors.
C'est le vice de structure que le courant de Rubio a inscrit dans son propre dispositif. Pour convertir le texte de Washington en engagement national contraignant, le Liban devrait le ratifier, et la ratification, dans un pays aussi divisé, équivaut à quelque chose de proche d'un référendum, formel ou de fait, sur la survie de l'accord. Certains s'opposeront à ce processus, et une part de cette opposition sera violente. Un accord qui exige un verdict national qu'il ne peut emporter n'est pas un règlement. C'est un détonateur à retardement.
La question qui se pose donc au Liban n'est pas de savoir s'il faut célébrer un retrait. Elle est de savoir s'il faut se laisser utiliser comme le mécanisme par lequel un courant américain en sabote un autre. L'accord est vendu comme la récupération de la souveraineté. Il fonctionne comme une arme dirigée contre l'entente américano-iranienne, avec le Liban pour rampe de lancement et une direction divisée pour détonateur.
Si le courant de Vance l'emporte, la voie passe par une désescalade réciproque, des institutions libanaises renforcées et un règlement que la société libanaise peut véritablement faire sien, mené dans le cadre de l'accord de Taëf et de son séquencement. Si le courant de Rubio l'emporte, ce qui n'a pas été pris sur le champ de bataille l'aura été à la table, et l'ouverture régionale plus vaste aura été tuée non pas à Téhéran ni à Tel-Aviv, mais à Beyrouth, par des mains libanaises tenant un stylo.
Voilà le piège. Il faut le nommer avant qu'il ne soit signé. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mousavian
@hmousavian
خط تماس سنتکام و سپاه
معاون رئیسجمهور آمریکا، جی.دی. ونس، اعلام کرد که واشنگتن و تهران توافق کردهاند برای جلوگیری از تشدید تنشهای آینده، یک کانال ارتباطی مستقیم نظامی میان فرماندهی مرکزی ایالات متحده (سنتکام) و سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی (سپاه) ایجاد کنند. این اقدامی است که مدتها ضرورت آن احساس میشد و اکنون گامی اساسی به شمار میرود.
در طول دهه گذشته، در مقالات و سخنرانیهای متعدد بارها تأکید کردم که ایالات متحده و ایران، همراه با عراق و عربستان سعودی، باید سازوکارهای ارتباط مستقیم نظامی ایجاد کنند تا از سوءتفاهمها، محاسبات نادرست و وقوع ناخواسته جنگ جلوگیری شود.
به دلیل طرح چنین پیشنهادهایی، افراطگرایان تندرو در ایالات متحده، اسرائیل و ایران به ناحق مرا متهم کردند و حملات شدید و ناعادلانهای علیه من به راه انداختند.
اگر چنین کانال رفع تنش و هماهنگی نظامی از پیش وجود داشت، شاید میتوانست به جلوگیری از جنگهای ویرانگر سالهای ۲۰۲۵ و ۲۰۲۶ کمک کند.
حتی اگر در پایان دوره ۶۰ روزه مذاکرات، توافق نهایی حاصل نشود، کانال ارتباطی نظامی به عنوان یک سازوکار دائمی اعتمادساز ضروری است تا از تشدید تنشها، رویدادهای اتفاقی و وقوع جنگهای ناخواسته در آینده جلوگیری کند.
لینک ها:
aftabnews.ir/fa/news/592125/
fararu.com/fa/news/982446/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mohammad Ali Shabani
@mashabani
NEW: Two months before the 12-Day War between Iran and Israel last summer, @araghchi wrote about the "trillion-dollar opportunity" that the Iranian economy presents in the Washington Post.
With the Iran-US MoU outlining a $300B fund for reconstruction and investment, prominent economist @BijanKK looks into the genuine entry points—and the pitfalls of the belief among some observers that Iran's economy simply can't absorb a large capital inflow. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Ronen Bergman
@ronenbergman
במלחמה הזו יש מפסידה אחת בטוחה: האמת.
למרות הישגים מודיעיניים וצבאיים גדולים, פעמים רבות ניצבו המנהיגים - בין אם נתניהו ובין אם טראמפ - וניסו לשווק ניצחונות מוחלטים והישגים היסטוריים, שלעיתים היו רחוקים מהמציאות ולעיתים פשוט שקרים. אבל הם לא היו לבד: פעם אחר פעם, גם אנשי מקצוע במערכת הביטחון העניקו לכזבים האלו רוח גבית.
ממדענים בוועדה לאנרגיה אטומית שחתמו על מסמך שלפיו פרויקט הגרעין נסוג בשנים רבות (הוא לא), ועד לקציני צה"ל שמכרו לציבור שלאיראן לא נשארו מדעני אטום מובילים (נותרו, ולא מעטים): איך הפכו בכירים במערכת הביטחון לשחקנים במבצעי ההשפעה הפוליטיים - ולמה זה מסוכן לכולנו. מאוד מסוכן.
עם @YRubovitch
@YediotAhronot @ynetalerts
(הכתבה בציוץ הבא בשירשור) -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
נדב איל Nadav Eyal
@Nadav_Eyal
יש לי חברים בימין שלא רוצים ממשלה עם מפלגות ערביות, ואפילו לא עם יאיר גולן. זה מדאיג אותם מאוד, עד כדי הצבעה למפלגות גוש נתניהו.
יש לי חדשות טובות ורעות, ואתחיל בטובות. אם נתניהו ינוצח ויהיה 61 נגדו, תקום ממשלה רחבה. סביר להניח שמפלגות ערביות ויאיר גולן לא יהיו בה. אני לא כותב את זה כדעה - הדעה האישית שלי היא שרצוי מאוד שתהיה ממשלה שמייצגת גם 20% מהציבור, ושגולן והדמוקרטים ראויים מאוד. אני כותב את זה כהערכה ריאלית.
והנה מדוע.
איזנקוט, לפיד ואחרים לא ירצו את בן גביר וסמוטריץ בממשלה. האגף הימני בגוש השינוי ירצה להביא את הליכוד. אין דרך לעשות זאת עם מפלגות ערביות ועם גולן. ואין דרך לקיים ממשלה יציבה איתם, בהתחשב בכך שבנט וחלקים אחרים מהגוש הם ימין. זה פשוט ייפול.
יתירה מזו: זה תרחיש ממשלת אחדות מרכזית מאוד- בלי חרדים, בלי ערבים, בלי ימין קיצוני ובלי הדמוקרטים.
(אני יודע שעף לחלקכם הפיוז; אנא, זה ניתוח, לא מאמר דעה).
עד כאן החדשות הטובות- עבור אנשי ימין מגוש עציון, עופרה, ראשון לציון ורעננה, שרוצים ממשלה אחרת. אם נתניהו יובס, זו כנראה הממשלה שתקום. למה? כי כל אופציה אחרת תהיה בלתי יציבה בעליל.
החדשות הרעות הן שזה בלתי אפשרי עם נתניהו. לפיד, בנט ואיזנקוט ישמחו שהליכוד יצטרף לממשלה בלי ערבים, וגם בלי חרדים ובן גביר סמוטריץ. רק אדם שלא מבין א' ב' של פוליטיקה בישראל יאמין שנתניהו יעשה זאת. זה פירוק השותפים הטבעיים שלו, זו בגידה. זה מפקיר את גורלו בידי אנשים הגונים!
הוא בשום פנים ואופן לא יילך לאחדות שאליה מייחלים אנשי ימין מרכזיים. עדיף לו להגיד לא- ולהישאר בראשות ממשלת מעבר. עד הבחירות. שאחריהן יהיו עוד בחירות. מה אכפת לו. לבגוד בחרדים ובימין הקיצוני? זה אומר שהמפתחות לסיום הקריירה בידי לפיד ואיזנקוט. נראה לכם?
לסיכום. אם יהיה רוב ציוני נגד נתניהו, הצד הימני בקואליציית השינוי ימכור את יאיר גולן (ובוודאי לא ישקול את הערבים בקואליציה ממש) תוך 20 שניות כדי לקבל ממשלת אחדות חילונית ללא הימין בקיצוני. לא רק "ימכור". יתנה את כניסתו. זו זכותם.
אם נתניהו ינוצח ללא רוב ציוני, ייתכן שאנשי גוש השינוי יילכו לממשלת מיעוט. ללא הערבים בקואליציה. היא לא תהיה יציבה.
אם נתניהו ינצח- תקום ממשלת סמוטריץ חרדים בן גביר על ספידים, מקסימום מדוללת בקרם בשאמל צמחי בסגנון בני גנץ. הכל יישאר אותו דבר. נתניהו לא יוותר על אף קיצוני - כי זה מסכן את שלטונו. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
The Syria Report
@TheSyriaReport
A major development in Syria’s energy sector: Syrian-British businessman Ayman Asfari and the Syrian-Qatari Al-Khayyat family have signed an agreement with the Syrian government to rehabilitate and expand the country’s gas production capacity. The deal could play a significant role in strengthening energy infrastructure and supporting economic recovery.
syria-report.com/asfari-and-al-khayyat-family-alliance-in… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
L'Orient-Le Jour
@LOrientLeJour
🚢 Trois pétroliers « étrangers » ont tenté de passer par le détroit d'Ormuz « sans autorisation préalable, et ont reculé après un avertissement lancé par la marine du Corps des gardiens de la révolution, selon la télévision d'Etat iranienne, citée par Reuters.
-
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Sohrab Ahmari 🇺🇸
@SohrabAhmari
"The Emiratis — by far the most hawkish, by far the most pro-Israel country in the Gulf — they’re having conversations with the Iranians that have never happened before, including with the IRGC."
JD Vance to me, on the new Mideast emerging from the war.
unherd.com/2026/06/jd-vance-our-new-relationship-with-iran/ -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Trita Parsi
@tparsi
Trita Parsi said the war has “been a disaster for the democratization of Iran.”
“Trump’s war saved the Islamic Republic at a moment when it was facing the greatest legitimacy crisis that it had in the last 20 years,” Parsi said.
Ultimately, Parsi said he believes that sanctions relief will encourage the Iranian government to roll back some of its repressive policies and improve the lives of the Iranian people. But he cautioned “it is not a quick fix.”
“In the long run, if you have an open economy in which the middle class is strengthened and society is strengthened vis-à-vis the state, the path we have seen in almost every other country is a movement towards democracy,” he said.
www.washingtonpost.com/world/2026/06/20/war-weary-iranian… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Kamran Bokhari
@KamranBokhari
The U.S.-Israel rift isn't about whether Iran is a threat - both agree it is.
The split is over the endgame: Washington wants a diplomatic framework to stabilize the region; Israel wants coercion until the regime is fundamentally transformed or gone.
Fighting a war together papered over that divergence, but the ceasefire exposed it fast.
Managing the gap between these two strategies may prove as hard as managing Iran itself.
My latest: geopoliticalfutures.com/america-between-an-ally-and-an-ad… -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
Just read an interesting analysis published by NourNews on how Tehran interprets the current phase of negotiations with the United States.
I'll try to briefly summarize its core argument here.
The key word throughout the analysis is perception.
- The central argument is that, after failing to achieve its political objectives through military pressure, the Trump administration is now trying to shape perceptions before a final agreement even exists.
- From Tehran's perspective, recent U.S. statements on nuclear inspections, access for inspectors, and even the future management of the Strait of Hormuz are not descriptions of an agreed outcome. Rather, they are part of an effort to establish a public narrative first and negotiate the details later.
- NourNews even invokes the Persian expression-rah biandaz va ja biandaz-roughly, "launch it, then make it stick." In other words, create a political reality in the media before it becomes a diplomatic reality at the negotiating table.
- Whether one agrees with this interpretation is almost beside the point. What matters is that Tehran increasingly views the negotiations as unfolding on two parallel tracks.
- The first is the diplomatic track: sanctions relief, sequencing, inspections, regional security arrangements, and implementation.
- The second is the information track: public statements, media narratives, political messaging, and the battle to define what has-or has not-already been agreed.
- This helps explain why Iranian officials repeatedly insist that, in the end, the real benchmark will not be press conferences or presidential remarks, but the final text, the sequencing of commitments, and their actual implementation.
- In the described analysis Nour News highlights that in high-stakes diplomacy, perception is often negotiated alongside policy. Sometimes the first agreement reached is not between governments, but between competing public narratives.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
JD Vance, quoted by Iranian media, reportedly said that one outcome of the Swiss talks was an agreement in principle to create a direct military communication channel between the US and Iran.
- The interesting part: according to Vance, Iran said it would send someone from the IRGC to Doha to engage with someone from CENTCOM.
#iran
Babak Vahdad
@BabakVahdad
JD Vance, as quoted by Iranian media, reportedly said that the UAE-once among the most hawkish and pro-confrontation actors in the GCC -is now holding unprecedented talks with Iran, including with the IRGC, over various economic incentives.
#iran -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
RTL France
@RTLFrance
🎙️ "Il n'y aura pas de péage au détroit d'Ormuz en Iran"
Les explications de @Malbrunot dans « RTL autour du Monde » dans #rtl MatinThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot reposted
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇮🇷 Turkey gets paid for its straits, and Iran wants the same deal. There's one fatal catch.
Dr. Anas Alhajji, an energy market expert, explains why Iran's model is built on shaky ground.
Natural waterways generally can't be taxed, but Turkey does collect a "service charge" for managing the Turkish Straits, a privilege handed to it through a formal international agreement covering passage and upkeep.
Here's where Iran's plan breaks down.
It can't simply recreate that setup through a handshake with Trump, because real authority like Turkey's requires broad international consensus, which makes any solo attempt likely to collapse.
And the GCC pushback runs deeper than money. Even a token fee gets rejected outright, because paying it would mean accepting that Iran has the power to grant or deny passage through international waters.
@anasalhajjiThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post.
Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal
🇮🇷🇺🇸 Trump keeps saying "no tolls," but Iran isn't asking for tolls... It's a trap of words.
Dr. Anas Alhajji, an energy market expert, points to a legal misunderstanding sitting at the heart of the Hormuz standoff.
Trump keeps framing everything around "tolls," while Iran is carefully proposing something different: a "service charge."
Those two terms aren't interchangeable, and the gap matters.
A service charge could be enforced in sneaky ways, mandatory Iranian navigation apps, or drone-led guidance escorting vessels through the strait.
So the real question Alhajji raises is whether Trump will end up permitting these service charges, because his fixation on "no tolls" completely sidesteps the technical and legal path Iran is actually walking to plant a presence in Hormuz.
@anasalhajjiThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Mon reportage au sud-Liban où les drones à fibres optiques du Hezbollah ont changé la donne, rendant les soldats israéliens vulnérables. « Ils s’embarquaient bizarrement en colonnes avec leurs Merkava sur les deux routes de Naqoura sans créer de surprise », se rappelle Ali, un habitant. Les filières d'approvisionnement en aéronefs de la formation chiite. Les caches d'armes dans les cimetières. A lire dans Le Figaro.
#hezbollah
www.lefigaro.fr/international/dans-le-sud-du-liban-les-so… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Derrière l'ingérence visant LFI aux municipales, un mode opératoire "complexe" lié à Israël.
L'opération d'ingérence ayant visé des candidats La France Insoumise (LFI) aux élections municipales a mobilisé un réseau "complexe" de sites web et comptes de réseaux sociaux, menant vers une entreprise liée à un ex-membre des renseignements israéliens, selon les autorités françaises (AFP).
Cette campagne fait partie des quatre ingérences numériques étrangères détectées dans le cadre du scrutin municipal des 15 et 22 mars par Viginum, le service chargé de lutter contre ces manipulations en ligne. Ces actions ont eu une visibilité "limitée", rappelle Viginum dans un rapport publié jeudi.
Deux ont été attribuées à des réseaux prorusses: l'une ayant visé le candidat à Paris de la majorité présidentielle, Pierre-Yves Bournazel, l'autre ayant consisté en la création de faux sites de presse locale française.
La troisième, à visée "lucrative", a été imputée à un acteur non-étatique localisé au Vietnam qui a diffusé des contenus polémiques en lien avec les élections dans le but d'entraîner du trafic monétisé sur de faux sites de médias et pages Facebook.
Viginum explique avoir détecté celle ayant ciblé les candidats LFI début février 2026, avec la création de quatre sites web, de pages et faux comptes Facebook, X, Instagram et TikTok destinés à amplifier les contenus visant LFI.
L'analyse de ces comptes a permis d'identifier des opérations de manipulation similaires en Angola, au Togo ou pour les municipales à New York en 2025, a précisé jeudi Marc-Antoine Brillant, chef de Viginum, lors d'une conférence de presse.
Les auteurs de cette campagne, baptisée "Rokh Solis" par les autorités françaises, avaient deux objectifs.
Le premier visait à "dénigrer" le parti et trois de ses candidats - Sébastien Delogu (Marseille), François Piquemal (Toulouse) et David Guiraud (Roubaix) - via notamment de fausses accusations de viol, pédocriminalité ou des dénonciations de prises de positions propalestiniennes.
L'opération poursuivait un second objectif: "polariser le débat public national en instrumentalisant la communauté musulmane", précise le rapport.
Viginum explique avoir relevé plusieurs éléments laissant soupçonner des opérateurs liés à Israël, notamment la présence de "caractères hébreux dans les métadonnées d'un site" et des "publications associées à l'organisation pro-israélienne Elnet".
Leurs analyses ont mené vers une entreprise nommée Blackcore, au statut légal douteux, appartenant à "un vaste écosystème d'entreprises et d'entités cyber israéliennes", dont la "figure centrale" est Yigal Unna, auparavant passé par l'Unité 8200, au sein de l'armée israélienne, et le Shin Bet, le service de renseignement intérieur israélien. Il est aujourd'hui "à la tête d'un incubateur d'entreprises cyber israéliennes, Cygun LTD".
Mais "nos investigations n'ont pas permis d'identifier le ou les commanditaires", a rappelé jeudi Marc-Antoine Brillant.
"Au regard de la complexité, de la longévité et de l'étendue" de l'opération, Viginum dit "poursuivre ses investigations" à propos de cette campagne, sur laquelle le parquet de Paris a aussi ouvert une enquête. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Les dangers de l'ingérence étrangère. La campagne d'ingérence ayant visé des candidats LFI lors des municipales de mars a été opérée depuis Israël, a indiqué jeudi à l'AFP une source informée du dossier, les quotidiens français Libération et israélien Haaretz évoquant le rôle de deux entreprises basées dans ce pays.
Cette opération, dévoilée le 10 mars, mettait en oeuvre plusieurs sites et comptes présentant des "caractéristiques d'inauthenticité", notamment des "photos générées par intelligence artificielle et des dates de création communes", avait annoncé Viginum, le service chargé de lutter contre ces manipulations en ligne, selon qui elle n'avait eu qu'une "faible visibilité" sur les réseaux.
"Les services de renseignement de notre pays soupçonnent l'entreprise israélienne BlackCore d'ingérences contre nous pendant la campagne municipale. Trois candidats LFI ont été visés : Sébastien Delogu, François Piquemal et David Guiraud", candidats à Marseille, Toulouse et Roubaix, selon le leader de La France insoumise Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
"Résultat: des milliers de messages diffusés pour mentir, les traîner dans la boue. Nous demandons au gouvernement une loi permettant de combattre les ingérences étrangères", a-t-il affirmé sur X. Son parti de gauche radicale est très critique à l'égard de la politique du gouvernement israélien à l'encontre des Palestiniens et dans la bande de Gaza.
Les services français ont en effet mis en lumière le rôle d'une entité liée à des intérêts israéliens nommée "BlackCore", mais qui n'est que "la porte d'entrée d'une entreprise beaucoup plus complexe", a indiqué à l'AFP une source informée du dossier.
Selon cette source, la campagne de manipulation provient bien d'Israël mais le caractère étatique ou non de cette ingérence n'est pas établi.
Selon Libération et Haarezt, BlackCore, dont le site internet est désormais hors ligne, se prévaut de 15 ans d'expérience mais son nom de domaine n'a été enregistré qu'en août 2025.
L'entité, qui ne figure pas dans le registre israélien des entreprises, se présente comme une "entreprise d'élite spécialisée dans l'influence, le cyber et les technologies, conçue pour l'ère moderne de la guerre de l'information", selon Libération.
Dans une longue enquête, Libération explique avoir étudié avec Haaretz les sous-domaines internet liés à BlackCore. Ceux-ci renvoient vers deux entreprises israéliennes, Galacticos Ltd. et SNI Digital, qui ont toutes les deux pour directeur le même homme, Doron Afik.
"Galacticos n'a aucune affiliation, aucun partenariat ni aucune connaissance d'une entité nommée BlackCore", a réagi Don Afik, interrogé par Libération et Haaretz. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Journée de Jérusalem: Déferlement de haine anti-Palestiniens dans la vieille-ville. Ils ont des airs de pré-adolescents en colonie de vacances, sauf qu'ils chantent "Mort aux Arabes" et "Que votre village brûle". En marge de la "Journée de Jérusalem" jeudi, des jeunes Israéliens déferlent dans les rues de la Vieille ville, où les Palestiniens restent cloîtrés (AFP).
La "Journée de Jérusalem" réunit chaque année des dizaines de milliers d'Israéliens, défilant pour célébrer ce que les autorités présentent comme la "réunification" de la ville après la conquête et l'annexion de Jérusalem-Est à l'issue de la guerre israélo-arabe de 1967.
L'ONU ne reconnaît pas l'annexion de Jérusalem-Est, où vit une majorité de Palestiniens, et qu'elle juge "illégale" au regard du droit international.
Tous les ans depuis une dizaine d'années, une petite partie de manifestants ultranationalistes - souvent très jeunes - se défoulent à l'occasion de cette journée dans la Vieille ville, multipliant violences, crachats et attaques haineuses et racistes.
Alors dès la fin de matinée, par précaution, la plupart des petites échoppes de la Vieille ville avaient baissé leurs rideaux de fer, et les habitants palestiniens déserté les ruelles pavées.
Certains ont gardé boutique ouverte, protégés par des militants pacifistes israéliens du mouvement Standing Together, qui se sont déployés partout dans la Vieille ville pour tenter d'empêcher ces groupes d'extrême droite de "terroriser" les habitants, comme le dit à l'AFP la codirectrice du mouvement, Rula Daoud.
Sur les vidéos circulant sur les réseaux sociaux, on voit les militants se faire bousculer par un large groupe de jeunes portant des t-shirts blancs à l'effigie de Jérusalem, avant que ces derniers ne se mettent à jeter violemment des chaises en plastique en direction d'un commerçant palestinien. Puis ils poursuivent leur route en chantant "Arabes, fils de putes", pendant que le commerçant furieux balance à son tour une chaise dans leur direction.
Sur d'autres vidéos, des jeunes scandent, sous le regard de policiers déployés pour assurer leur sécurité, "Mort aux Arabes" et "que vos villages brûlent", en frappant dans leurs mains ou sur les rideaux de fer des boutiques.
A quelques centaines de mètres de là, le ministre de la Sécurité nationale israélien Itamar Ben Gvir a célébré cette journée en se rendant sur le site hautement sensible de l'esplanade des Mosquées, troisième lieu saint de l'islam, et pour les juifs, le mont du Temple, lieu le plus sacré du judaïsme.
"59 ans après la libération de Jérusalem, j'ai hissé le drapeau d'Israël sur le mont du Temple, et on peut dire avec fierté : nous avons rétabli la souveraineté sur le mont du Temple," se réjouit sur Telegram le ministre d'extrême droite, habitué des provocations et qui vient régulièrement sur place.
En fin de matinée sur les marches de la porte de Damas, l'une des entrées de la Vieille ville, des dizaines de militants pacifistes israéliens vêtus de blanc avaient distribué des fleurs aux passants, comme pour s'excuser par avance.
Parmi eux, Ilan Perez, 52 ans, venu du centre du pays, explique vouloir montrer "une forme de solidarité avec la communauté locale". "En tant que juif, en tant que sioniste (...) je veux qu'ils fassent partie du pays avec des droits égaux", déclare-t-il, fleurs blanches à la main.
Tout au long de la journée via la porte de Damas, les jeunes entrent par grappes, sous étroite surveillance policière. Ils chantent "Israël pour toujours", ou "Que leur nom soit effacé", "Nous n'avons pas peur d'un long chemin", en dansant pour certains bras dessus dessous.
Régulièrement, ils bousculent les militants de Standing Together, reconnaissables à leurs chasubles violettes. Certains de ces militants sont évacués par la police, sous les acclamations, applaudissements et coups de sifflet des jeunes.
Comme l'année dernière et les années d'avant, ils empêchent aussi les journalistes de travailler, plaçant leurs mains et leurs kippas devant les objectifs des caméras. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Dans une lettre ouverte, 350 anciens ambassadeurs et hauts responsables européens réclament la suspension de l'accord d'association entre Israël et l'Union européenne.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Cessez-le-feu de deux semaines. Eléments de réflexion.
L’Iran a reculé sur une exigence : Téhéran a accepté un cessez-le-feu de deux semaines sans être parvenu à une fin permanente des hostilités. Mais il garde un certain contrôle sur le détroit d’Ormuz, en attendant un règlement définitif du conflit.
Les Etats-Unis ont reculé sur plusieurs de leurs conditions initiales : que l’Iran cesse tout nouvel enrichissement, accepte des limites à son programme de missiles et mette fin à son soutien aux groupes armés de la région. Ces points ne figurent pas dans ce que l’on sait de la trêve.
Outre bien sûr le Pakistan, la Chine a joué un rôle important en dernière minute. Elle a convaincu l’Iran de faire des concessions en échange de son véto à la résolution proposée par l’ONU sur la circulation dans le détroit d’Ormuz.
Contrairement à ce qu’a annoncé le premier ministre pakistanais, le Liban n’est pas concerné par le cessez-le-feu. Israël a continué ce matin de frapper le pays du Cèdre.
Israël, qui respecte le cessez-le-feu, est loin de ses objectifs initiaux, notamment celui d’un changement de régime en Iran. Benjamin Netanyahou avait entraîné Donald Trump dans la guerre. Trump a entraîné Bibi dans le cessez-le-feu avec l’Iran.
Il est important que chaque partie sauve la face. L’Iran, les Etats-Unis, et même les Emirats arabes unis, à priori pourtant les grands perdants de la guerre, ont clamé « victoire ».
La guerre s’achève, pour l’instant, par une sorte de match nul, avec avantage à Téhéran. Son plan en dix points pour parvenir à la fin de la guerre a été qualifié de "viable" par Donald Trump. Il pourrait servir de base à des négociations plus tard cette semaine. Il comporte toutefois plusieurs points de blocage que Washington a jugé irréalisables par le passé, notamment "le maintien du contrôle iranien sur le détroit d'Ormuz, l'acceptation de l'enrichissement, la levée de toutes les sanctions primaires et secondaires".
Les deux semaines à venir - au cours desquelles des négociations, peut-être directes entre Américains et Iraniens, vont s’ouvrir - seront déterminantes pour savoir si cette trêve se transformera en cessez-le-feu définitif et durable.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Lire cette tribune dans Le Monde d'anciens ambassadeurs sur une guerre israelo-americaine "injustifiable" qui ne résoudra aucun problème. Et sur une position française incohérente.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Dans le secret de la communication israélienne dans sa guerre au Liban. A Paris, un militaire lève le voile.
« J’observe que les autorités israéliennes confrontées à un dommage collatéral (comme la mort après un tir de Merkava d’un casque bleu indonésien, dimanche au sud du Liban) commencent, dans le mécanisme de déconfliction qui existe, à réfuter leur responsabilité, et à mettre un tel dommage collatéral sur le dos du Hezbollah. Ensuite quelques heures plus tard, quand la Finul (Force des Nations unies au Liban) déclare ce dommage collatéral, l’armée israélienne explique en long en large et en travers que ce n’est pas eux, et quelques jours plus tard, quand la Finul a rassemblé les preuves, comme cela avait été le cas lors du tir sur le bataillon ghanéen de la Finul le 6 mars, là ils minimisent en disant que c’était un tir en riposte à un tir du Hezbollah. Sauf que ce jour-là, le 6 mars, il n’y a pas eu un mais trois tirs israéliens en sept minutes. Leur communication est bien huilée. Quand c’est à chaud, ils enfument tout le monde en jurant que c’est pas eux. Quand c’est tiède, ils vont faire une enquête. Et quand leur responsabilité devient avérée, ils nous expliquent que c’est un dommage collatéral lié à la présence du Hezbollah. Leur rhétorique est parfaitement calibrée et très opportuniste. Elle est dans un rapport de forces écrasant en leur faveur, puisque la Finul ne peut pas se permettre de dire n’importe quoi, elle doit documenter tout ce qu’elle affirme. Les Israéliens ont systématiquement un temps d’avance, alors que la Finul reste dans une communication plutôt minimaliste des années 70. Elle ne publie jamais des photos et des images alors qu’elle en dispose en quantité à l’appui de ses accusations. Si la Finul est victime aujourd’hui de ces dérives dangereuses, c’est aussi en partie de sa faute », conclut ce militaire.
#libanguerre -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A lire. Sur la seule initiative diplomatique connue.
Arnaud Bertrand
@RnaudBertrand
The most interesting part of the China-Pakistan 5-point initiative to end the war on Iran is arguably what it says about Hormuz.
First of all, it calls for "allow[ing] the early and safe passage of civilian and commercial ships," which means that military vessels are deliberately excluded.
For a waterway where the US Navy has operated as if by divine right for decades - the famous "freedom of navigation" principle - this is pretty meaningful: this framework effectively writes the US Navy out of the picture.
Secondly it calls to "restore normal passage" in Hormuz which seems to be ambiguous by design: what does "normal" mean? It doesn't say "free and unimpeded passage" or "going back to status quo ante": "normal" could include, say, some form of toll fee in Hormuz as Iran has suggested they want to put in place. This could be the new "normal".
What this sounds like to me is a rebuke of Iran's position that Hormuz be only open to passage by "friendly" nations, but they're open to Iran having a formalized sovereign role over the strait - potentially including some form of regulated transit or toll.
In essence, what China and Pakistan are gesturing toward is neither the American "freedom of navigation" status quo ante nor Iran's wartime blockade, but a third option: a Suez-like Hormuz paradigm where Iran's sovereignty over it is acknowledged but passage is open to all commercial traffic, for a fee.
If that's the direction of travel, this 5-point document isn't just a peace plan - it's the first sketch of a post-American Persian Gulf. Plenty of people have already called this war America's Suez moment: a toll-operated Hormuz under Iranian sovereignty would make that comparison pretty literal. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Irak. J'ai une pensée ce soir pour la journaliste américaine Shelly Kitlesson, enlevée à Bagdad. Je la connaissais personnellement depuis une dizaine d'années. Je l'avais rencontrée à de nombreuses reprises à Bagdad où elle couvrait avec passion l'Irak et la Syrie, après avoir travaillé en Afghanistan. On espère tous qu'elle sera libérée le plus rapidement possible.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Liban-Finul-Israël. Le harcèlement militaire israélien contre les Forces des Nations unies au sud-Liban n'est pas nouveau. Voici les images du premier tir de contre mesure par les casques bleus de l'ONU le 5 janvier sur un drone israélien, jugé dangereux.
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Sud-Liban. Des soldats français de la Finul actionnent des contre mesures sur un drone israélien dangereux. Deux drones israéliens porteurs d'explosifs ont été neutralisés au cours de cette mission de la Force des Nations unies régulièrement la cible des drones israéliens. #liban
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Guerre. On a eu chaud au Louvre d'Abou Dhabi. Des tableaux du musée implanté aux Emirats arabes unis devaient théoriquement être stockés dans les deux entrepôts de la base navale française d'Abou Dhabi, qui ont été détruits par des frappes de deux ou trois drones iraniens au début de la guerre, le 1er mars. "C'est là qu'ils devaient être mis à l'abri en cas de conflit, heureusement, ils sont restés au musée, sinon ces pièces seraient parties en fumée", observe une source sur place.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
On peut penser différemment.
Gérard Araud
@GerardAraud
J’ai travaillé sur ce sujet pendant plus d’une décennie dans différentes fonctions : jamais, cette préoccupation n’est apparue dans nos conversations.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Si ce monsieur savait ce que ceux qui dans le Golfe où je me trouve pensent de tels propos, il se tairait.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Guerre Hezbollah-Israël. Au moment où Israël semble surpris par la résilience du Hezbollah, je vous propose mon enquête au Liban en octobre dernier publiée dans Le Figaro: De Beyrouth au Sud-Liban, comment le Hezbollah tente de reconstituer ses forces dans une semi-clandestinité?
Wafic raconte la panique qui a suivi l’assassinat par Israël du chef du Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, le 27 septembre 2024 à Beyrouth. « J’étais à Dahiyé (le fief du Parti de Dieu dans la capitale libanaise, NDLR). De hauts responsables militaires ou sécuritaires dormaient dans des voitures, ils allaient chez des gens de confiance pour prendre une douche et repartaient », se souvient ce membre de la milice chiite pro-iranienne, qui accepte de nous parler sous un prénom d’emprunt afin de préserver son anonymat. Un témoignage rare, dans une organisation classée comme terroriste par la plupart des pays occidentaux, et qui cultive le secret.
Alors que Nasrallah et son numéro deux, Hachem Safieddine, ont été tués et que la direction militaire vient d’être décapitée, personne ne répond à ses appels. « Pendant dix jours, tout le monde était perdu. Nous étions comme un corps plongé dans le coma. Seuls les combattants au sud faisaient la guerre, suivant des plans qui prévoyaient qu’en cas de disparition de leur direction, ils continueraient. Beaucoup de ces jeunes ont tenu quelques jours, avant de tomber. Ils sont tous morts, 1 200 environ. Ce sont eux qui ont résisté et sauvé un peu la situation », raconte-t-il en préparant un café dans sa cuisine.
« Au bout de quinze jours, ajoute Wafic, des Iraniens sont arrivés pour reprendre la situation en main. Esmail Qaani (le chef de la branche al-Qods, l’unité d’élite en charge des alliés de l’Iran hors de ses frontières) a réuni des gens. Des instructeurs iraniens ont rétabli en une dizaine de jours le gros de la chaîne de commandement. Mais sur le plan politique, c’était toujours le vide. À Dahiyé, je ne voyais personne et quand je suis sorti, tout le monde était parti et s’était dispersé ».
Vint ensuite le temps de la critique. « Une critique interne forte », raconte-t-il, mais restée sous les radars pour ne pas affaiblir une formation décapitée. « Comment en est-on arrivé là ? », se demandent beaucoup, stupéfiés. Certains comme Wafic mettent en cause la conduite de la guerre qu’Hassan Nasrallah avait décidée, peu après l’attaque terroriste du Hamas le 7 octobre 2023 en Israël. « Ce que je lui reproche, c’est d’avoir tergiversé, soit il fait la guerre, soit il ne la fait pas, mais il ne prend pas une position intermédiaire. Puisque le Hezbollah n’avait pas été informé par le Hamas du 7 Octobre, il ne devait pas entrer dans la guerre. Et surtout pas de cette manière, par solidarité, c’est-à-dire avec mesure », poursuit Wafic.
Pendant un mois, en effet, le charismatique leader chiite se tait, avant de dévoiler son plan à la télévision, que nous résumera quelques semaines plus tard Mohamed Raad, le chef des députés Hezbollah : « Solidarité avec le Hamas mais service minimum, notre priorité est la protection du Liban. » Tragique erreur, alors que les régions chiites du Sud vont être détruites et leurs habitants, la base du Hezbollah, jetés sur les routes de l’exil.
Dès le lendemain du 7 Octobre, « un débat eut lieu au sein du Hezbollah et des divergences existaient », nous ont confirmé plusieurs autres sources. Il oppose deux camps : d’un côté Hassan Nasrallah, qui prône la prudence, de l’autre Hachem Safieddine, le numéro deux, ainsi que des militaires, notamment la direction de la Force Radwan, qui sera décimée un an plus tard. Ces derniers veulent profiter de la désorganisation suscitée en Israël par l’attaque du Hamas pour pénétrer à leur tour dans le nord de l’État hébreu, frontalier de leur bastion du Sud. Un plan échafaudé depuis des années qu’Israël avait dévoilé en 2018, montrant plusieurs tunnels sous la frontière et sortant dans son territoire.
Nasrallah pouvait-il faire autrement, alors que son parrain iranien préconisait une réponse symbolique menée par ses alliés de « l’Axe de la résistance » - mis sur pied par Téhéran au Liban, en Syrie, en Irak et au Yémen pour être sa force de dissuasion face à Israël ? « Le Hezbollah ne voulait pas entraîner l’Iran dans une guerre contre les États-Unis, qui avaient déployé deux navires de guerre en face de nous », explique un autre cadre du Parti de Dieu, qui requiert l’anonymat.
En cet automne 2023, le patron de la DGSE, Bernard Émié, ancien ambassadeur de France au Liban qui a rencontré Nasrallah dans le passé, vient secrètement le voir pour lui dire qu’après le 7 Octobre, « c’est autre chose ». Régulièrement ensuite, la France, qui entretient un dialogue politique avec le Hezbollah, répète le même avertissement.
Le 2 janvier 2024, alors que le Hezbollah maintient un niveau de frappes limité contre Israël, un drone abat à Beyrouth un haut responsable du Hamas, Saleh al-Arouri, en charge du lien avec le Hezbollah et les gardiens de la révolution en Iran. La fronde s’amplifie. « Des chiites du Sud humiliés par Israël disent au Hezbollah : “Ça suffit, il faut réagir !” Mais les Iraniens et Nasrallah disaient non », se souvient Wafic.
Nicholas Blanford, ancien journaliste et auteur d’un livre sur le Hezbollah, confirme : « En février et mars 2024, beaucoup devenaient nerveux. “C’est une guerre futile, disaient-ils, les Israéliens explosent nos maisons, tuent des commandants, on sait qu’il y a des collaborateurs, et que fait-on ? On tire quelques katiouchas ? Qu’on fasse la guerre proprement !” » Les plaintes atteignent la direction, qui durcit ses attaques contre l’État hébreu. Le piège commence à se refermer. « Hassan Nasrallah a commis une grosse erreur en pensant que les Israéliens allaient accepter le niveau de violence que lui-même avait décidé. Leur réponse a été l’écrasement », observe Ghassan Salamé, ministre de la Culture du Liban.
« Ce que Nasrallah ne mesurait pas, renchérit Wafic, c’est le degré de pénétration israélienne de son système de communications. Tous les quinze jours, des gens contrôlaient les communications, mais le travail était mal fait. Probablement aussi que depuis vingt ans qu’il vivait dans un bunker, Nasrallah avait fini par perdre ses repères », regrette ce fidèle du parti.
« Nasrallah n’était pas uniquement la cible de l’espionnage technologique, rectifie un technicien, proche du Hezbollah. Il a aussi été leurré et il n’avait pas forcément perdu le sens des repères. Mais les repères qu’il utilisait pour décider étaient phagocytés par les Israéliens, qui ont réalisé la plus grande opération de contre-espionnage menée dans le monde moderne. Non pas, comme les Soviétiques le faisaient, en torturant les agents démasqués pour les transformer en agents doubles, mais en les laissant opérer au sein ou à la périphérie du Hezbollah ».
Isolé, caché sous terre, Nasrallah avait besoin de plusieurs cercles de contacts ou de sources. « Certains membres de ses réseaux étaient travaillés par des agents à la solde d’Israël qui les abreuvaient d’infos vraies pour gagner leur confiance, mais aussi d’intox, poursuit le technicien. Ce qui explique que jusqu’à la dernière minute, après avoir donné son accord pour un cessez-le-feu deux jours avant sa mort, il était convaincu qu’Israël ne le frapperait jamais, alors qu’ils avaient commencé à détruire ses capacités avec l’épisode des bipeurs. » Ironie de l’histoire, beaucoup de membres de ses cercles d’informations ont été éliminés par l’État hébreu.
D’autres, comme Wafic Safa qui faisait le lien avec les partis libanais, sont aujourd’hui marginalisés. D’autres encore, par négligence, ont tout simplement été trahis par leur entourage. Fouad Shouqr, haut cadre militaire, âgé de 62 ans, qui avait une maîtresse qu’Israël surveillait, se cachait peu. Il a été tué deux mois avant Nasrallah par une frappe aérienne israélienne. Depuis, au sein du Parti de Dieu, certains le surnomment « Shahid al-zob » (« le martyr du sexe »). « Les vieux comme lui, qui avait pourtant établi dans les années 1980 l’appareil sécuritaire du Hezbollah, s’étaient endormis sur leurs lauriers en déléguant certaines de leurs responsabilités à d’autres qui n’avaient pas la même expérience », décrypte Nicholas Blanford.
D’autres enfin s’étaient laissé gagner par l’hubris de leurs leaders, comme s’en souvient un notable du Sud. « Un de leurs gars m’avait dit après le 7 Octobre qu’ils allaient aller reprendre des villas en Galilée, dans le nord d’Israël. “En veux-tu une ?”, m’avait-il lancé. “On est prêts, les plans de la Force Radwan sont là”, il y croyait dur comme fer. »
En veste et chemise blanche, Ali Fayad, député du Hezbollah, arrive au rendez-vous dans un café peu fréquenté de Beyrouth face à la mer, un sac cadeau Hermès à la main. « Mohammed Raad ne peut pas vous voir cette fois », dit-il à l’envoyé spécial du Figaro. Craignant pour sa vie, celui qui occupe le poste non officiel de numéro deux du Hezbollah se déplace le moins possible, ne voyant que le président de la République, Joseph Aoun, où l’émissaire d’Emmanuel Macron, Jean-Yves Le Drian.
« Le Hezbollah a payé un prix lourd mais il n’est pas détruit », assure Ali Fayad, qui dirige un think-tank, levant le voile sur certaines mutations d’après-guerre. « Nous avons une nouvelle structure militaire, elle est secrète, car nous devons faire face à de nouvelles circonstances. L’aspect positif est que notre nouvelle direction militaire est assez jeune, plus dynamique, et capable de suivre les progrès technologiques. »
« On ne les voit plus dans la rue, dans les cafés, comme avant, précise Wafic. Sous l’égide des Iraniens, une nouvelle génération de deuxième ou troisième rang est montée dans la hiérarchie. Elle a pris la place d’une caste, parfois corrompue, se sentant protégée et toute-puissante parce que de la même génération que Nasrallah ». « Cette passation de pouvoirs aurait dû avoir lieu d’une manière naturelle et pas en temps de guerre », regrette Ali Fayad.
Comme à la création du Hezbollah au début des années 1980, le retour à la clandestinité est la règle chez ses combattants. Les responsabilités dans l’appareil militaire ont été redistribuées et nul ne doit savoir qui fait quoi. « Après la précédente guerre de 2006 contre Israël et l’intervention du Hezbollah en Syrie à partir de 2013, les effectifs de la résistance avaient gonflé et celle-ci était devenue une formation hybride, avec des secteurs peu visibles et d’autres d’une quasi-armée régulière, ce qui a rendu les choses beaucoup plus faciles pour Israël », constate le cadre du parti, précité.
Aujourd’hui, les militaires sont, le plus souvent, séparés des politiques. Ils sont plus autonomes. Dans les villages, les commandants n’ont plus besoin d’en référer à la direction centrale à Beyrouth. « Les boucles de décision sont courtes, les ordres se font en présentiel, une personne face à une autre, ce n’est plus par le réseau de communications qu’ils échangent », explique l’expert. Quant au secrétaire général, Naïm Qassem, décrit comme faible, il ne fait pas tout comme son prédécesseur.
En parallèle, le Hezbollah a limité et verrouillé ses contacts avec l’extérieur. Walid Joumblatt, le chef de la communauté druze, avait un seul interlocuteur. « C’était Wafic Safa qui m’avait donné son téléphone, et quand il s’agissait de questions plus sensibles, Nasrallah m’envoyait également Hajj Hussein al-Khalil. Maintenant, je n’ai plus de contacts. Wafic Safa a disparu, il est en danger » après avoir échappé à la mort, l’an dernier. Le second se terre.
Après avoir arrêté de nombreux collaborateurs – un processus toujours en cours –, la formation chiite a renvoyé des combattants, notamment ceux qui n’avaient pas fait la guerre, dans la Bekaa, son autre bastion à l’est. Les hommes mariés ont reçu deux mois de salaire, les célibataires un seul. Le Hezbollah aurait également entamé une phase de recrutement, mais l’entraînement dans certains de ses camps dans la Bekaa n’a pas encore commencé, selon un témoin. « D’après nos informations, le Hezbollah n’a pas fini de restructurer sa branche militaire », affirme un haut gradé de l’armée libanaise, qui suit de près l’évolution de la milice.
Affaibli militairement, le Hezbollah affiche une nouvelle posture défensive, probablement dictée par son parrain iranien, qui a repris la main sur la milice libanaise. « Les Iraniens continuent de nous soutenir, mais la situation est considérablement différente, estime Ali Fayad. La résistance est passée à une position défensive libanaise. Cela veut dire que, si demain l’Iran est attaqué, le Hezbollah n’interviendra pas pour le soutenir. Au sud, Israël occupe toujours les Fermes de Chebaa et six positions à l’intérieur du Liban, la résistance n’intervient pas. Il y a eu un développement très important, après l’accord de cessez-le-feu du 27 novembre 2024 : nous avons encouragé l’État libanais à aller de l’avant pour qu’il prenne à sa charge la gestion de la situation politique et militaire sur le terrain. Nous avons dit à l’État et à l’armée : nous sommes en position de soutien de votre action. »
En vertu de cet accord, l’armée libanaise doit se déployer au sud de la rivière Litani. Elle le fait progressivement et timidement, comme nous l’avons constaté durant deux jours, près de la frontière israélienne. Pas plus de 2 000 soldats, au lieu des 10 000 prévus. « Pour l’instant, l’armée est discrète au sud, ce n’est pas la peine d’exciter le Hezbollah car l’avenir n’est pas clair », explique le haut gradé libanais.
Si l’on ne voit effectivement aucun milicien, « les activités politiques du Hezbollah sont encore là, affirme le chercheur Samir Zoughair, c’est une force politique majeure. Qui pouvait croire qu’elle allait disparaître ? » « Le Hezbollah, c’est une communauté avec vingt-sept députés au Parlement », renchérit auprès du Figaro Tom Barrack, l’émissaire de Donald Trump pour le Liban et la Syrie, croisé au sommet de la paix à Charm el-Cheikh. Il aurait pu ajouter : avec des relais maintenus dans le service de renseignement de l’armée (B2), celle-là même qui doit désarmer le Hezbollah. Dans les principales villes du Sud, l’officier du B2 traditionnellement proche du Hezbollah est toujours en place dans le comité tripartite qui gère la sécurité aux côtés d’un représentant du Parti de Dieu et un d’Amal, l’autre formation politique chiite.
À chacune ou presque de nos rencontres avec le maire des villages visités, un homme du Hezbollah l’accompagnait. Dès la sortie de Saïda, la dernière grande ville sunnite au sud de Beyrouth, l’autoroute vers le « Hezbollah land » est bordée de nouveaux drapeaux jaunes et verts, placardés il y a trois semaines pour le premier anniversaire de l’assassinat de Hassan Nasrallah. Dans les villages ou sur les petites routes escarpées à flanc de collines boisées où le Hezbollah cachait ses armes dans des tunnels ou des bunkers, trônent les portraits des « martyrs » de la guerre. Partout, les bombardements israéliens, souvent ciblés, ont provoqué l’écroulement de nombreuses maisons. Certains villages le long de la frontière avec Israël sont presque totalement détruits.
C’est le cas de Naqoura, où siège la Force intérimaire des Nations unies (Finul), à un kilomètre de la frontière avec l’État hébreu. « Les gens commencent à revenir, la vie est trop chère à Beyrouth, se lamente Ali, un de ses habitants. On vit dans l’arrière de nos maisons, sans électricité et l’hiver arrive, comment allons-nous faire ? » Il y a un mois, des armes du Hezbollah ont encore été retrouvées, ainsi qu’un tunnel débouchant en face de la Finul.
En remontant par une route sinueuse vers le village voisin chrétien d’Alma al-Chaab, les carcasses de maisons se succèdent au milieu de rares pelleteuses qui déblaient. Pendant la guerre, les combattants du Hezbollah se déplaçaient entre les deux localités en utilisant un tunnel qui débouchait en pleine forêt. Une femme peste contre la milice dont les hommes occupaient sa maison en son absence, avant qu’elle soit bombardée par l’armée israélienne. Alma al-Chaab et les autres villages du Sud s’étaient vidés de leurs habitants. « Les Israéliens qui occupaient toutes les maisons le long de la route principale ont écrit sur les murs en anglais : vous ne nous oublierez pas », raconte Shaadi Faya, le maire d’Alma al-Chaab, où 90 habitations ont été détruites et 200 endommagées. « Pourquoi avoir fait tomber le clocher de l’église ? Que veulent-ils faire ? Peut-être une zone tampon ? », se demande-t-il.
Parce qu’il occupe une position stratégique à 1 km d’Israël, Alma est le seul village chrétien du Sud Liban à avoir subi autant de dégâts. « Israël n’a pas besoin de réoccuper la région, un seul mot de la porte-parole de l’armée suffirait pour faire repartir les habitants », jure Danny Ghafari, qui n’est pas encore revenu à Alma.
Comme tant d’autres, il espère avec impatience que sa maison soit reconstruite. Mais il risque d’attendre longtemps, les riches monarchies du Golfe - Arabie saoudite en tête - conditionnant le financement de la reconstruction au désarmement complet du Hezbollah par les autorités libanaises. Or, si le sud l’est à 80 % environ, selon les estimations de l’armée, rien n’est prévu pour les zones au nord du Litani et surtout dans l’est du pays, où la milice stocke ses missiles. « Le Hezbollah a donné environ 12 000 dollars au propriétaire de chaque maison détruite, explique le maire, mais il semblerait qu’il ait moins d’argent. Regardez, j’ai un chèque de 18 000 dollars émis par Qard al-Hassan, sa société financière, mais je ne peux pas l’encaisser », se plaint-il. Maigre consolation : le gouvernement a déployé une cinquantaine de soldats depuis quelques semaines dans l’école d’Alma.
On n’en voit guère sur la route vers la forteresse croisée de Tibnine qu’il est conseillé d’emprunter pour ne pas s’approcher des positions militaires qu’Israël a installées après le cessez-le-feu. « L’armée israélienne se montre de plus en plus agressive », assure une source militaire occidentale. Il y a un mois, un de leurs drones a chuté pour la première fois dans le camp de la Finul à Naqoura. La semaine dernière, un Casque bleu a été blessé par une grenade israélienne près de sa position à Kfar Kila, le troisième incident en un mois. Et jeudi 16 octobre, huit frappes ont encore visé des « infrastructures liées au Hezbollah », selon Israël, entre Mazraa et Sinaï, près de Nabatiyé. Alors que l’État hébreu dit vouloir empêcher le Hezbollah de se reconstituer, le gouvernement libanais l’accuse d’avoir violé plus de 1 500 fois le cessez-le-feu en onze mois, et tué près de 300 personnes. Sans la moindre réaction du Hezbollah.
Au sud, « personne ne croit que les Israéliens vont quitter leurs positions qu’ils fortifient et parfois étendent », ajoute la source militaire. Un des 29 postes de la Finul est pris en sandwich entre un fortin israélien au Liban et un autre de l’autre côté de la frontière dans l’État hébreu. Avec ses drones, Tsahal intimide. « On les entend presque jour et nuit, se plaint Hassan Jafar, le maire du village de Yatir, non loin de Tibnine. On en a même eu un qui est descendu à 20 mètres devant la mairie. Face à cette occupation, ce sont les armes du Hezbollah qui nous protègent, ni la France, ni les régimes arabes ne peuvent nous donner de garanties. »
Leur bourdonnement vise aussi à empêcher les Libanais de rentrer chez eux et la reconstruction de commencer. Le contingent français de la Finul se souvient d’un avion sans pilote évoluant à 25 mètres seulement d’un de leurs véhicules blindés l’été dernier, créant un début de panique. « Ils rechargent leurs bases de données ou enregistrent des visages », commente le haut gradé libanais. « Leurs renseignements sont efficaces », constate Nabil Fawaz, le maire de Tibnine, qui montre la résidence d’été du président du Parlement, Nabih Berri, totalement anéantie. Sept corps de combattants du Hezbollah ont été retrouvés à l’issue de la guerre dans les décombres d’une maison utilisée là encore comme planque.
Quelques jours avant notre passage, un drone israélien a tué un homme près de l’hôpital de Tibnine. C’était un membre du Hezbollah qui cherchait à acquérir discrètement une maison pour en faire un centre de santé. Trois semaines auparavant, et pour le même motif, un autre avait subi le même sort en fuyant au volant de sa voiture, restée calcinée le bord de la route. « À quoi bon ouvrir un centre de santé près de l’hôpital ? », s’interrogent dubitatifs des voisins.
À quelques kilomètres, une image surprend : un décor de Beverly Hills parmi la désolation. Sur les collines du village de Harris, la plupart des mini-palais de riches financiers du Hezbollah, des hommes d’affaires chiites d’Afrique de l’Ouest où ils ont fait fortune, sont intacts, avec une vue imprenable sur la ville de Tyr et la Méditerranée en contrebas. Le Hezbollah n’y avait pas envoyé ses hommes.
Le parti chiite a-t-il encore beaucoup d’argent ? Il disposerait de 60 millions de dollars chaque mois, selon Tom Barrack, l’émissaire de Donald Trump. Une estimation jugée élevée par d’autres sources. Les vols Téhéran-Beyrouth ont été supprimés et les contrôles à l’aéroport sont draconiens. Mais « on a encore mis la main sur des hommes en provenance de Turquie avec de l’argent dans leurs valises », confie un ministre libanais, qui ajoute qu’il y a toujours un peu de contrebande à partir de la Syrie et du trafic au port de Beyrouth, où des scanners doivent bientôt arriver.
« Nos institutions sociales, éducatives et nos hôpitaux fonctionnent », assure le député Ali Fayad. Pas sûr toutefois qu’il puisse satisfaire ses 60 000 à 70 000 salariés comme il y a dix ans, au temps de l’opulence. Ses députés sont fréquemment moqués au Parlement et dans les débats télévisés. « Ils ont perdu de leur superbe, d’autres parlementaires ne craignent plus de les insulter », confie un élu, qui ne veut pas être cité, redoutant comme d’autres leur capacité de nuisance persistante.
Pourtant, même s’il est affaibli militairement et s’il a perdu des alliés sunnites et chrétiens, le Hezbollah devient plus agressif politiquement, poussé par l’Iran qui a dépêché à trois reprises ces derniers mois à Beyrouth Ali Larijani, le nouvel homme fort de la galaxie sécuritaire à Téhéran.
En décembre 2024, la chute de la Syrie d’Assad, par laquelle le Hezbollah acheminait ses armes d’Iran, a été un autre coup dur. Mais depuis, les attaques contre les minorités alaouites et druzes perpétrées par le nouveau régime de Damas ont ressoudé la base chiite du Hezbollah. « On voit ce qu’il se passe en Syrie, résume Moufid Jaber, un trentenaire qui aspire à un rôle politique hors du duo Hezbollah-Amal. Comme moi, la plupart des chiites pensent que le gouvernement libanais n’est pas capable de nous défendre. Alors entre deux maux, Hezbollah et Joulani, le leader syrien, on choisit le moindre : le Hezbollah. On le voit comme un protecteur qui en l’absence d’autre forces capable d’assurer notre sécurité face à Joulani, ne doit pas être désarmé, pour le moment.»
Un diplomate qui suit au jour le jour la situation résume la nouvelle « logique » du Parti de Dieu : « Ils ont accepté de désarmer au sud, mais ils nous demandent de ne pas toucher au nord du Litani. D’ailleurs, c’est là où Israël tape le plus fort, la preuve qu’ils ont fait le plus gros du travail au sud. Le Hezbollah ne représente plus une menace pour Israël, mais au-delà, a-t-il gardé suffisamment de capacités pour peser sur la scène intérieure libanaise ? », s’interroge cet observateur.
Au sommet de l’État, les avis divergent. Poussé par l’Arabie saoudite et les États-Unis, le premier ministre Nawaf Salam plaide pour le désarmement rapide du Hezbollah sur l’ensemble du territoire. Le président de la République, le général Joseph Aoun, et l’armée, eux, ne veulent pas l’affronter, craignant un éclatement de la troupe, voire du pays. Ils redoutent une bête blessée, mais encore loin d’être à terre.
#hezbollah
www.lefigaro.fr/international/de-beyrouth-au-sud-liban-co… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Parle t il également pour d'autres ds le royaume? En tout cas, le prince, une des voix les plus respectées en Arabie, est autorisé à parler.
Defence Index
@Defence_Index
🚨🇸🇦🇮🇱NEW: Former Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki Al-Faisal, responding to a question about whether the main threat to the region comes from Iran or Israel:
“The real danger now is certainly Israel, which has reached a surplus of power and has begun to threaten the entire region. Israel is the one stirring problems and it must be restrained.” -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Guerre. Au moment où 6 soldats français ont été blessés dans les régions Kurdes d'Irak par un drone, un groupe irakien proche de l'Iran publie ce message de menace.
"Au nom de Dieu, Celui qui humilie les arrogants.
Après l’arrivée du porte-avions français dans la zone d’opérations du Commandement central américain et son engagement dans les opérations, nous annonçons à partir de cette nuit que tous les intérêts français en Irak et dans la région seront sous le feu des attaques.
Nous appelons donc nos frères au sein des forces de sécurité à s’éloigner d’un rayon de 500 mètres autour de la zone où se trouve une force française à la base K1, afin de préserver leur sécurité.
Vos frères du groupe « Ashab al-Kahf ».
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Guerre. La première semaine de la guerre contre l'Iran a coûté plus de 11,3 milliards de dollars aux Etats-Unis, selon un briefing des membres du Congrès par le Pentagone, affirme le New York Times (AFP).
Selon le journal, qui cite des sources anonymes ayant assisté au briefing s'étant tenu mardi, ce chiffre exclut de nombreux coûts liés à la préparation des frappes, laissant penser que le montant final pourrait être, en réalité, bien plus élevé.
Et des responsables du Pentagone ont précédemment déclaré au Congrès qu'environ 5,6 milliards de dollars de munitions avaient été dépensés au cours des deux premiers jours du conflit, un chiffre bien supérieur aux estimations antérieures, selon la presse américaine.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Jean-Dominique, l'éditorial dresse un constat lucide fondé sur des faits historiques. Il n'a rien de gauche ou de droite. Quand on couvre le Moyen-Orient, comme je je fais depuis 40 ans bientôt, on ne se pose pas la question gauche droite. Suis bien placé pour le savoir.
jean-dominique merchet
@jdomerchet
Je suis un lecteur quotidien du Monde @lemondefr depuis plus d'un demi-siècle et je le resterai. S'il est toujours un journal très professionnel, sa lecture devient chaque jour plus irritante à cause de son orientation à gauche (souvent radicale) toute ! Y-a-t-il un seul journaliste de droite dans cette rédaction ?
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Désolé Darius cette explication ne tient absolument pas la route. Mme Bermann devrait savoir qu'au Quai d'Orsay l'Iran a été très souvent traité sous l'angle de l'antiproliferation nucléaire et parler de la politique arabe de la France concernant l'Iran c'est grotesque.
Darius Rochebin
@DariusRochebin
«Certains diplomates et militaires français espèrent que l’Iran mette en échec les USA. Par antiaméricanisme. Par tradition politique.»
L’éclairante explication de l’ambassadrice @SylvieBermann sur les complexités du moment, où l’histoire du Proche Orient pèse de tout son poids. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Guerre. Donald Trump a dit lundi à une journaliste de la chaîne CBS que la guerre était "quasiment" finie, faisant valoir que l'Iran n'avait plus de "marine" ni de "communications" ou de "force aérienne".
Le président américain a ajouté, dans un entretien téléphonique, que le conflit était "très en avance" sur le calendrier de quatre à cinq semaines qu'il avait évoqué auparavant.
Ce que semblent confirmer des militaires français en contact avec des Américains, selon une source française dans le Golfe.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Guerre. Jusqu'à la guerre des 12 jours de juin 2025 contre l'Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei n'était pas l'option privilégiée pour succéder à son père en tant que guide suprême d'une république islamique qui rejetait la succession dynastique. La guerre israelo-américaine lancée il y a 10 jours a changé la donne à Téhéran, où le pouvoir favorise la continuité pour survivre. Comme une sorte de plus petit dénominateur commun entre décideurs. Sans garantie que cela marche. #iranisraeluswar.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Guerre. Mojtaba Khamenei, probable guide suprême. L'Assemblée des experts a choisi le nouveau guide suprême iranien pour succéder à l'ayatollah Ali Khamenei, tué le 28 février par des frappes israélo-américaines, ont indiqué dimanche des membres de cette instance cléricale iranienne, sans donner le nom de l'élu (AFP).
"Le vote pour nommer le guide a eu lieu et le guide a été choisi", a déclaré Ahmad Alamolhoda, membre de l'Assemblée des experts, cité par l'agence de presse Mehr. D'autres membres de l'assemblée ont confirmé la désignation, l'un d'eux suggérant que le nouveau guide serait Mojtaba Khamenei, fils du défunt ayatollah, dont le nom circulait comme son possible successeur.
"Le candidat le plus approprié, approuvé par la majorité de l'Assemblée des experts, a été choisi", a déclaré Mohsen Heydari, représentant de la province du Khouzestan à l'Assemblée, cité par l'agence de presse Isna.
Donald Trump avait affirmé jeudi qu'il "devait être impliqué" dans le choix du successeur de Ali Khamenei, et fait savoir qu'il n'accepterait pas que son fils prenne la relève.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Guerre. Donald Trump a dit samedi ne "pas vouloir" que les Kurdes lancent une offensive contre l'Iran, dans un échange avec la presse à bord de son avion (AFP).
"Je ne veux pas que les Kurdes y aillent", a déclaré le président américain. "Nous n'envisageons pas que les Kurdes y aillent. Nous avons une relation très amicale avec les Kurdes, vous le savez, mais nous ne voulons pas rendre cette guerre plus compliquée qu'elle ne l'est déjà."
Dans une interview jeudi avec l'agence Reuters, Donald Trump avait dit qu'il serait "tout à fait pour" une offensive des milices kurdes iraniennes contre le pouvoir.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Guerre. Après avoir déclaré lors de la guerre des 12 jours de juin, qu'Israël faisait "notre boulot" en Iran, le chancelier allemand a mis en garde vendredi contre un effondrement de l'Iran qui pourrait déclencher une vague migratoire incontrôlée.
"Une guerre sans fin n'est pas dans notre intérêt (...). L'économie iranienne ne doit pas s'effondrer. Il faut empêcher les mouvements migratoires incontrôlés en provenance d'Iran", a déclaré Friedrich Merz, évoquant aussi le risque d'un "effondrement de l'Etat iranien".
Questionné au salon des artisans à Munich (sud) sur les risques de l'afflux de migrants en Allemagne, le dirigeant conservateur a déclaré: "nous ne pouvons pas encore nous prononcer définitivement à ce sujet. C'est l'une des raisons pour lesquelles nous insistons tant pour que l'Iran conserve son intégrité. Nous ne voulons pas voir se reproduire ici le scénario syrien, mais souhaitons que cet État fonctionne par lui-même".
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Guerre. Donald Trump a déclaré mardi que l'Iran allait "attaquer en premier" et qu'il avait "peut-être forcé la main d'Israël" pour lancer l'opération militaire contre Téhéran. La veille, son secrétaire d'Etat, Marco Rubio, avait dit le contraire.
"Compte tenu de la tournure des négociations, je pense qu'ils (l'Iran) allaient attaquer en premier. Et je ne voulais pas que ça arrive. Alors j'ai peut-être forcé la main d'Israël. Mais Israël était prêt. Et nous étions prêts", a affirmé le président américain dans le Bureau ovale de la Maison Blanche aux côtés du chancelier allemand Friedrich Merz.
Lundi, Marco Rubio avait au contraire déclaré que « nous savions qu’Israël allait passer à l’action. Nous savions que cela précipiterait une attaque contre les forces américaines, et nous savions que si nous ne les attaquions pas préventivement avant qu’ils ne lancent ces attaques, nous subirions des pertes plus importantes ».
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Guerre. Un général des Gardiens de la Révolution a prévenu mardi que toute poursuite des bombardements de l'Iran par les Etats-Unis et Israël entraînerait des représailles contre "tous les centres économiques" du Moyen-Orient.
"Nous disons à l'ennemi que s'il décide de frapper nos principaux centres, nous frapperons tous les centres économiques de la région", a affirmé le général Ebrahim Jabbari.
"Nous avons fermé le détroit d'Ormuz. Actuellement, le prix du pétrole dépasse les 80 dollars et atteindra bientôt les 200 dollars", a-t-il ajouté, cité par l'agence Isna, alors que le baril de pétrole Brent a dépassé mardi 85 dollars pour la première fois depuis juillet 2024.
#iranwar -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
IMA. Félicitations à Anne-Claire Legendre, nommée, comme nous le laissions entendre hier soir, à la tête de l'Institut du monde arabe, à la place de Jack Lang.
Elle était jusque-là conseillère Afrique du nord/Moyen-Orient d'Emmanuel Macron à l'Elysée, où elle avait su être efficace et ouverte à l'égard de la presse. Anne-Claire Legendre, 46 ans, connaît très bien le monde arabe, même si elle n'a été ambassadrice qu'à Koweït. Arabisante, elle avait également été porte-parole du Quai d'Orsay.
"La nomination d'Anne-Claire Legendre est une bonne nouvelle", confie un de ses prédécesseurs à l'IMA, l'ancien ambassadeur Denis Bauchard. Il était en effet à craindre qu'Emmanuel Macron recase un politique. Mais son choix s'est finalement porté sur une technicienne, au fait de la réalité du monde arabe, plutôt mal connu en France. Mabrouk!
#institutdumondearabe -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
CNews à l'amende, après des propos de l'ancienne ministre Noëlle Lenoir et de François Laborde. L'Arcom a infligé des amendes totalisant 100 000 euros à la chaîne d'information CNews pour deux séquences diffusées à l'été 2025 et pouvant inciter à la discrimination des musulmans et des Algériens, selon des décisions publiées mercredi au Journal officiel (AFP).
La première séquence visée par l'Arcom, diffusée le 8 août dans l'émission "L'heure des Pros 2 Eté", portait sur la rétention des étrangers en situation irrégulière. En plateau, l'ancienne ministre déléguée aux Affaires européennes, Noëlle Lenoir, avait déclaré: "vous avez des millions d'Algériens qui présentent des risques majeurs, qui peuvent sortir un couteau dans le métro, dans une gare, dans la rue, n'importe où, ou prendre une voiture et rentrer dans une foule".
Quatre jours plus tard, la chroniqueuse Françoise Laborde avait critiqué à l'antenne de la même émission "tous les penseurs de l'Ouest libéral" qui prennent la défense des "Palestiniens".
"Arrive le 7 octobre (2023)", jour des attaques du Hamas, sans précédent en Israël, qui ont entraîné la mort de plus de 1.200 personnes, en majorité des civils. "Et qu'est-ce qu'ils découvrent avec horreur? Tous ces... j'allais dire, naïfs occidentaux, que ces gens, ces opprimés qui étaient des gens qu'il fallait absolument défendre, se révèlent être les sauvages, sanguinaires, les plus épouvantables qu'on puisse imaginer, et font un pogrom le 7 octobre", avait-elle poursuivi.
Dans les deux cas, l'Arcom a jugé que les propos étaient de nature à "encourager des comportements discriminatoires". D'une part en "assimilant (...) la présence en France des ressortissants Algériens y résidant (...) à un facteur majeur de risque pour la sécurité publique", et d'autre part en associant "l'ensemble des Palestiniens aux auteurs des attaques terroristes du 7 octobre", écrit le régulateur dans les deux décisions datées du 5 février.
La séquence du 8 août 2025 a été sanctionnée d'une amende de 25.000 euros, celle du 12 août d'une amende de 75.000.
Dans ses deux décisions, l'Arcom rappelle qu'elle avait déjà mis en demeure CNews, après de précédentes séquences litigieuses, de veiller "à ne pas encourager des comportements discriminatoires".
Contactée, CNews n'a pas réagi dans l'immédiat.
#cnews -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Confidences. "Si les Etats-Unis avaient frappé à Téhéran au cours des premiers jours les 8 et 9 janvier, nous aurions eu du mal à faire face", reconnait un diplomate iranien, joint dans la capitale iranienne.
"Ces deux jours-là, confirme un autre Iranien, sorti de son pays, il y avait des dizaines et des dizaines de milliers de personnes qui marchaient de la place Haft-e-tir vers la guidance où le guide suprême a des bureaux au centre de Téhéran. Le régime a eu peur que la foule approche des lieux du pouvoir, c'est à partir de là qu'ils ont tiré sur la foule et fait des milliers de morts", ajoute cet habitant de Téhéran, qui regrette que les Etats-Unis n'aient pas décidé alors de prêter secours aux manifestants en attaquant le pouvoir.
#iranrevelution2026 -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Gaza, la nouvelle riviera, selon Donald Trump et son gendre Jared Kushner, vouée à un "succès effrayant", avec ses dizaines de tours d'appartements avec terrasse surplombant une allée ombragée. Le promoteur immobilier israélien Yakir Gabay "s'est porté volontaire pas pour le profit, mais vraiment en écoutant son coeur", a assuré Jared Kushner. Les Gazaouis sont sauvés! "Il va y avoir de fantastiques opportunités d'investissement", a conclu M. Kushner.
En 10 ans, le PIB de Gaza serait de 10 milliards de dollars, et le revenu moyen par foyer atteindrait 13 000 dollars, grâce "au plein emploi à 100% et aux possibilités offertes à tous". Les diplomates qui se penchent sur l'insoluble paix israélo-palestinienne auraient pu y penser plus tôt!
#gaza -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Syrie. La défaite rapide des Forces kurdes face aux hommes du président Ahmed al-Charaa dans le nord-est a été rendue possible "par une aide apportée par la Turquie à Damas avec un feu vert des Etats-Unis", confie une source diplomatique qui suit le dossier syrien. Cette aide turque aux hommes de l'ancien djihadiste, devenu président par intérim de la Syrie, s'est faite sous forme de fourniture de renseignements, d'infanterie et d'un appui avec des drones, ajoute cette source.
#syrie -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Sud-Liban. Des soldats français de la Finul actionnent des contre mesures sur un drone israélien dangereux. Deux drones israéliens porteurs d'explosifs ont été neutralisés au cours de cette mission de la Force des Nations unies régulièrement la cible des drones israéliens. #liban
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Les Etats-Unis viennent d'inaugurer à Erbil au Kurdistan irakien leur plus grand consulat au monde. Cet investissement revêt une signification diplomatique importante. C'est d'abord un engagement réaffirmé en faveur de l'autonomie des Kurdes d'Irak, alors que les relations entre les Américains et le gouvernement central de Bagdad restent tendues en raison de la pression que font peser les milices chiites pro-iraniennes sur l'Irak et sur la présence américaine dans ce pays. C'est aussi une façon de renforcer sa présence aux portes de l'Iran, et au-delà sur le reste du monde kurde et l'Asie centrale.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'annulation par le Collège de France après des pressions du pouvoir politique d'une conférence sur la Palestine continue de susciter des réactions, et prend de l'ampleur.
Dans une tribune au « Monde », un collectif de plus de 250 universitaires, parmi lesquels Jean-François Bayart, Judith Butler et Pierre-Cyrille Hautcœur, s’élève contre l’interdiction de l’événement. Ils y voient une « atteinte sans précédent à la liberté académique ».
"Nous, membres de la communauté scientifique, chercheurs, enseignants, étudiants et citoyens attachés à l’indépendance du savoir, exprimons notre profonde inquiétude face à l’annulation du colloque « La Palestine et l’Europe : poids du passé et dynamiques contemporaines », initialement prévu au Collège de France.
Cette décision, prise à la suite d’un article polémique et de pressions directes exercées par le ministère de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, constitue une atteinte sans précédent à la liberté académique en France. Sous prétexte de garantir l’intégrité scientifique, le ministère a légitimé une intervention politique dans le champ de la recherche, en contradiction avec sa mission première : protéger l’indépendance des universitaires et la pluralité des approches scientifiques.
Issus d’universités prestigieuses telles que l’Ecole polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne (Suisse), la School of Oriental and African Studies de Londres, l’université d’Amsterdam, l’Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) et le Centre national de la recherche scientifique, à Paris, ou la Queen Mary University of London, les intervenants ont été injustement discrédités, sur la base d’amalgames et d’accusations infondées. Leur compétence, leur rigueur et la reconnaissance internationale de leurs travaux ne sauraient être effacées par des campagnes de dénigrement.
La recherche n’a pas vocation à plaire ni à se conformer à un « équilibre politique » dicté par le pouvoir. Elle repose sur la méthode, la critique, le débat argumenté, des principes aujourd’hui mis en péril. En confondant évaluation scientifique et contrôle idéologique, cette interdiction ouvre la voie à une ère de censure institutionnelle, où des calomnies médiatiques suffiraient à bâillonner la réflexion universitaire.
Nous refusons que la France suive cette pente. Nous refusons que le Collège de France devienne le réceptacle d’une telle dérive. Nous affirmons que la mission des universités et des institutions de recherche n’est pas de conforter le pouvoir, mais d’éclairer la société.
Nous appelons le Collège de France à revenir sur sa décision et à garantir la tenue de ce colloque dans le respect de la liberté intellectuelle. Nous appelons le ministère à honorer son devoir de protection de la recherche, non à en devenir le censeur. Et nous appelons la communauté scientifique tout entière, en France et en Europe, à défendre fermement le principe fondateur de toute science : le droit de penser librement.
Parmi les signataires : Michel Agier, anthropologue, directeur d’études EHESS ; Bertrand Badie, professeur émérite à Sciences Po ; Frédéric Bauden, professeur à l’université de Liège ; Jean-François Bayart, professeur à l’IHEID (Genève) ; Sophie Bessis, historienne ; Karim Emile Bitar, enseignant à Sciences Po ; Judith Butler, professeure distinguée à l’université de Californie ; Bernard Chazelle, professeur à Princeton ; Delphine Dulong, professeure à l’université Paris-I-Panthéon-Sorbonne ; François Héran, professeur honoraire au Collège de France ; Pierre-Cyrille Hautcœur, directeur d’études à l’EHESS ; Michel Kaplan, président honoraire de l’université Paris-I-Panthéon-Sorbonne ; Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen, professeure d’histoire contemporaine à Sorbonne Université ; Maurice Sartre, professeur honoraire à l’université de Tours. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'annulation sur demande du ministre de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche, Philippe Baptiste, de la conférence au Collège de France sur la Palestine suscite un certain émoi chez des professeurs de cette ancienne et noble institution. Voici le communiqué conjoint publié par la Chaire d’histoire contemporaine du monde arabe du Collège de France et le Centre arabe de recherches et d’études politiques de Paris
"Nous avons le regret d’annoncer que l’administrateur du Collège de France a décidé d’annuler la tenue du colloque « La Palestine et l’Europe : poids du passé et dynamiques contemporaines » – prévu les 13 et 14 novembre – pourtant programmé depuis plusieurs mois par la chaire d’histoire contemporaine du monde arabe du Collège de France et le Centre arabe de recherches et d’études politiques de Paris (CAREP Paris).
Cette décision fait suite à un article publié dans Le Point le 7 novembre, ainsi qu’aux pressions directes exercées par le ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche, publiquement revendiquées par le ministre Philippe Baptiste sur son compte X.
Sous couvert de « garantir la scientificité », le ministère justifie ainsi une intervention politique dans le champ de la recherche, en contradiction avec sa mission première : protéger la liberté académique.
Le colloque a été conçu dans le strict respect des procédures scientifiques en vigueur. Les intervenantes et intervenants proviennent d’universités aussi prestigieuses que l’École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne, l’Université d’Amsterdam, l’INALCO, la SOAS (University of London), l’Université libre de Bruxelles, l’Université de Turin, l’Université Complutense de Madrid, Randolph-Macon College, Rice University, l’Université Roma Tre, l’EHESS, le CNRS ou encore la Queen Mary University of London.
La réputation de ces chercheurs et chercheuses, internationalement reconnus, est ainsi injustement mise en cause par une presse partisane relayant les propos calomnieux de la LICRA. Les axes du colloque ont scrupuleusement respecté une diversité aussi bien disciplinaire que de courants académiques.
Les deux premières sessions, consacrées à l’histoire du mouvement sioniste et à la Palestine sous mandat britannique, réunissaient notamment Rina Cohen-Muller, rattachée au département d’études hébraïques de l’INALCO, et Élisabeth Davin-Mortier de l’Université de la Sorbonne également hébraïsante. Les débats académiques relatifs à l’histoire du sionisme opposent, en effet, les chercheurs qui inscrivent ce mouvement dans la résurgence des nationalismes européens du XIXᵉ siècle et ceux qui y voient une ramification du colonialisme. Or, l’universitaire Lorenzo Kamel entendait précisément dans sa contribution évaluer de manière critique chacune de ces approches, dépassant ainsi les lectures parfois manichéennes de l’historiographie contemporaine.
Outre la pluralité des écoles, pleinement respectée, nous rappelons que le choix des intervenants a avant tout été guidé par des critères d’excellence. Accuser ces chercheurs d’antisémitisme ou de militantisme revient à disqualifier sans fondement leurs travaux, pourtant validés par leurs pairs et publiés dans les revues scientifiques les plus prestigieuses.
Cette confusion entre évaluation savante et contrôle idéologique met directement en péril l’indépendance du savoir. La recherche n’a pas vocation à être « équilibrée » politiquement : elle doit reposer sur la compétence, la méthode et la probité intellectuelle.
Si ce type de dérive est déjà assumé outre-Atlantique, nous constatons avec consternation sa propagation à toute l’Europe et refusons de rester passifs face à son extension aux institutions académiques françaises.
En cédant à la pression du ministre, Philippe Baptiste, l’administrateur du Collège de France compromet l’indépendance d’une institution fondée il y a plus de quatre siècles, qui a accueilli les plus grands noms de la pensée française, de Foucault à Bourdieu. Cette décision crée un précédent dangereux : il suffira désormais d’un article polémique ou d’un tweet ministériel pour censurer un colloque jugé « sensible ».
Que le ministère reprenne, sans examen critique, les arguments d’un article de presse et d’une association comme la LICRA soulève une question de fond : depuis quand le pouvoir politique se substitue-t-il aux instances de la recherche pour décider de ce qui est « scientifique » ou non ?
Le colloque « La Palestine et l’Europe » vise, dans une perspective historique et critique, à analyser la manière dont la question de Palestine s’inscrit dans les dynamiques européennes contemporaines.
Confondre cette démarche académique avec un débat militant témoigne d’une méconnaissance profonde de la vocation des sciences sociales et d’une inquiétante instrumentalisation du mot « scientificité ». Nous regrettons que, par cette annulation, ne soit ainsi remis en cause la crédibilité du Collège de France. Il en va de la liberté académique, condition première de toute véritable démarche scientifique". -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
From Beirut to southern Lebanon, how Hezbollah is attempting to rebuild its forces in semi-secrecy.
By Georges Malbrunot, special correspondent in Beirut and southern Lebanon. Le Figaro.
Wafic (first name changed) recounts the panic that followed Israel's assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, 2024, in Beirut. "I was in Dahiyé (the stronghold of the Party of God in the Lebanese capital, editor's note). Senior military and security officials were sleeping in their cars, going to the homes of trusted individuals to shower and then leaving," recalls this member of the pro-Iranian Shiite militia, who agreed to speak to us on condition of anonymity. This is a rare testimony from an organization classified as terrorist by most Western countries and which cultivates secrecy.
With Nasrallah and his second-in-command, Hashem Safieddine, killed and the military leadership decapitated, no one was answering his calls. "For ten days, everyone was lost. We were like a body in a coma. Only the fighters in the south were waging war, following plans that stipulated that if their leadership disappeared, they would continue. Many of these young people held out for a few days before falling. They all died, about 1,200 of them.
They were the ones who resisted and saved the day," he says as he makes coffee in his kitchen. “After two weeks,” adds Wafic, "the Iranians arrived to take control of the situation. Esmail Qaani (the head of the al-Quds branch, the elite unit in charge of Iran's allies outside its borders) gathered people together. Iranian instructors reestablished most of the chain of command within ten days. But politically, there was still a vacuum. In Dahiyé, I didn't see anyone, and when I went outside, everyone had left and scattered."
Then came the time for criticism. “Strong internal criticism,” he says, but it remained under the radar so as not to weaken a decapitated organization. “How did we get here?” many ask, stunned. Some, like Wafic, question the conduct of the war that Hassan Nasrallah had decided on shortly after the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. "What I blame him for is procrastinating. Either he wages war or he doesn't, but he doesn't take a middle ground. Since Hezbollah had not been informed by Hamas about October 7, it should not have entered the war. And especially not in this way, out of solidarity, that is, with restraint," Wafic continues.
A debate after October 7
For a month, the charismatic Shiite leader remained silent, before unveiling his plan on television, which was summarized a few weeks later by Mohamed Raad, the leader of Hezbollah's deputies: “Solidarity with Hamas but minimum service, our priority is the protection of Lebanon.” This was a tragic mistake, as the Shiite regions of the south were about to be destroyed and their inhabitants, Hezbollah's base, thrown onto the roads of exile.
The day after October 7, “a debate took place within Hezbollah and differences of opinion existed,” several other sources confirmed to us. It pitted two camps against each other: on one side, Hassan Nasrallah, who advocated caution; on the other, Hashem Safieddine, the number two, as well as military leaders, notably the leadership of the Radwan Force, which would be decimated a year later. The latter wanted to take advantage of the disorganization caused in Israel by the Hamas attack to penetrate the northern part of the Jewish state, bordering their stronghold in the south. This plan had been in the works for years and was revealed by Israel in 2018, showing several tunnels under the border leading into its territory.
Could Nasrallah have done otherwise, when his Iranian pnd Yemen to serve as its deterrent against Israel? “Hezbollah did not want to drag Iran into a war against the United States, which had deployed two warships opposite us,” explains another senior member of the “Party of God,” who requested anonymity.
In the fall of 2023, the head of the DGSE, Bernard Émié, a former French ambassador to Lebanon who had met Nasrallah in years gone by, came to see him secretly to tell him that after October 7, “it's a different story.” France, which maintains a political dialogue with Hezbollah, then regularly repeated the same warning.
On January 2, 2024, while Hezbollah maintained a limited level of strikes against Israel, a drone shot down a senior Hamas official in Beirut, Saleh al-Arouri, who was in charge of liaising with Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Guards in Iran. The rebellion grew. "Shiites in the south, humiliated by Israel, told Hezbollah: 'Enough is enough, we must react! But the Iranians and Nasrallah said no," recalls Wafic.
“Nasrallah was deceived.”
Nicholas Blanford, a former journalist and author of a book on Hezbollah, confirms: "In February and March 2024, many were becoming nervous. It's a futile war, they said, the Israelis are blowing up our houses, killing commanders, we know there are collaborators, and what are we doing? Firing a few Katyushas? Let's fight a clean war! “ The complaints reached the leadership, which stepped up its attacks against the Jewish state. The trap began to close. ”Hassan Nasrallah made a big mistake in thinking that the Israelis would accept the level of violence he had decided on. Their response was crushing," observes Ghassan Salamé, Lebanon's Minister of Culture.
“What Nasrallah didn't realize,” adds Wafic, “was the extent of Israeli penetration of his communications system. Every two weeks, people checked the communications, but the work was poorly done. Probably also because he had been living in a bunker for twenty years, Nasrallah had ended up losing his bearings,” regrets this party loyalist.
“Nasrallah was not only the target of technological espionage,” corrects a technician close to Hezbollah. "He was also deceived, and he hadn't necessarily lost his bearings. But the bearings he used to make decisions were swallowed up by the Israelis, who carried out the largest counter-espionage operation in the modern world. Not, as the Soviets did, by torturing exposed agents to turn them into double agents, but by allowing them to operate within or on the fringes of Hezbollah.
One of their guys told me after October 7 that they were going to retake villas in Galilee in northern Israel. “Do you want one?” he asked me. Isolated and hidden underground, Nasrallah needed several circles of contacts or sources. “Some members of his networks were being worked on by agents in the pay of Israel, who fed them real information to gain their trust, but also disinformation,” the technician continues. This explains why, until the last minute, after agreeing to a ceasefire two days before his death, he was convinced that Israel would never strike him, even though they had begun to destroy his capabilities with the beeper episode." Ironically, many members of his information circles were eliminated by the Jewish state.
Others, such as Wafic Safa, who liaised with the Lebanese parties, are now marginalized. Still others, through negligence, were simply betrayed by those around them. Fouad Shouqr, a 62-year-old senior military officer who had a mistress that Israel was monitoring, did little to hide. He was killed two months before Nasrallah in an Israeli air strike.
Since then, within the “Party of God,” some have nicknamed him “Shahid al-zob” (“the martyr of sex”). “The old guard, like him, who had established Hezbollah's security apparatus in the 1980s, had become complacent, delegating some of their responsibilities to others who did not have the same experience,” explains Nicholas Blanford.
Others, finally, had been seduced by the hubris of their leaders, as a prominent figure from the south recalls. “One of their guys told me after October 7 that they were going to retake villas in Galilee in northern Israel. ‘Do you want one?’ he asked me. ‘We're ready, the Radwan Force plans are in place,’ he said, believing it wholeheartedly.”
A secret military branch
Wearing a jacket and white shirt, Ali Fayad, a Hezbollah deputy, arrives at the meeting in a quiet café in Beirut overlooking the sea, carrying a Hermès gift bag. “Mohammed Raad can't see you this time,” he tells Le Figaro's special correspondent. Fearing for his life, the man who holds the unofficial position of Hezbollah's number two travels as little as possible, seeing only the President of the Republic, Joseph Aoun, or Emmanuel Macron's emissary, Jean-Yves Le Drian.
“Hezbollah has paid a heavy price, but it has not been destroyed,” says Ali Fayad, who heads a think tank, lifting the veil on some post-war changes.
“We have a new military structure, which is secret because we are facing new circumstances. The positive aspect is that our new military leadership is quite young, more dynamic, and capable of keeping up with technological advances.”
“We no longer see them in the streets or cafes as we did before,” says Wafic. Under Iranian auspices, a new second or third generation has risen through the ranks. It has replaced a caste that was sometimes corrupt and felt protected and all-powerful because it was of the same generation as Nasrallah. “This transfer of power should have taken place naturally and not in wartime,” Ali Fayad regrets.
As when Hezbollah was created in the early 1980s, a return to clandestinity is the rule among its fighters. Responsibilities in the military apparatus have been redistributed and no one is to know who does what. “After the previous war against Israel in 2006 and Hezbollah's intervention in Syria from 2013 onwards, the resistance's ranks had swelled and it had become a hybrid formation, with some sectors that were not very visible and others that were almost like a regular army, which made things much easier for Israel,” notes the party official mentioned above.
Today, the military is, for the most part, separate from politics. It is more autonomous. In villages, commanders no longer need to refer to the central leadership in Beirut. “Decision-making loops are short, orders are given face-to-face, one person to another, and they no longer communicate via the communications network,” explains the expert. As for the secretary general, Naim Qassem, described as weak, he does not do everything his predecessor did.
At the same time, Hezbollah has limited and restricted its contacts with the outside world. Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze community, had only one contact person. "It was Wafic Safa who gave me his phone number, and when it came to more sensitive issues, Nasrallah also sent me Hajj Hussein al-Khalil. Now I have no contacts. Wafic Safa has disappeared; he is in danger" after escaping death last year. The second is in hiding.
A new defensive posture
After arresting many collaborators—a process that is still ongoing—the Shiite group sent fighters, especially those who had not fought in the war, back to the Bekaa, its other stronghold in the east. Married men received two months' salary, single men only one. Hezbollah has also reportedly begun a recruitment phase, but training in some of its camps in the Bekaa has not yet begun, according to a witness.
“According to our information, Hezbollah has not finished restructuring its military wing,” says a senior Lebanese army officer who closely follows the militia's developments.
Militarily weakened, Hezbollah is adopting a new defensive posture, probably dictated by its Iranian sponsor, which has regained control over the Lebanese militia. “The Iranians continue to support us, but the situation is considerably different,” says Ali Fayad. "The resistance has shifted to a Lebanese defensive position. This means that if Iran is attacked tomorrow, Hezbollah will not intervene to support it. In the south, Israel still occupies the Shebaa Farms and six positions inside Lebanon, and the resistance is not intervening. There has been a very important development since the ceasefire agreement of November 27, 2024: we have encouraged the Lebanese state to move forward and take charge of managing the political and military situation on the ground. We have told the state and the army: we are in a position to support your action."
Under this agreement, the Lebanese army must deploy south of the Litani River. It is doing so gradually and timidly, as we have seen over the past two days near the Israeli border. No more than 2,000 soldiers, instead of the 10,000 planned. “For the moment, the army is keeping a low profile in the south. There's no point in provoking Hezbollah because the future is unclear," explains the senior Lebanese official.
Although there are no militiamen to be seen, “Hezbollah's political activities are still there,” says researcher Samir Zoughair. "It is a major political force. Who could believe that it would disappear?“ ”Hezbollah is a community with 27 members of parliament," adds Tom Barrack, Donald Trump's envoy for Lebanon and Syria, whom Le Figaro met at the peace summit in Sharm el-Sheikh. He could have added: with contacts maintained in the army's intelligence service (B2), the very same service that is supposed to disarm Hezbollah. In the main cities of the south, the B2 officer traditionally close to Hezbollah is still in place in the tripartite committee that manages security alongside a representative of the Party of God and one from Amal, the other Shiite political group.
At almost every meeting we had with the mayor of the villages we visited, he was accompanied by a Hezbollah representative. As soon as you leave Saida, the last major Sunni city south of Beirut, the highway to “Hezbollah land” is The street is lined with new yellow and green flags, put up three weeks ago to mark the first anniversary of Hassan Nasrallah's assassination. In villages and on small, steep roads on the slopes of wooded hills where Hezbollah hid its weapons in tunnels and bunkers, portraits of the “martyrs” of the war are displayed prominently. Everywhere, Israeli bombing, often targeted, has destroyed many houses. Some villages along the border with Israel are almost completely destroyed.
This is the case in Naqoura, where the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) is based, one kilometer from the border with Israel. “People are starting to come back, life is too expensive in Beirut,” laments Ali, one of the residents. “We are living in the back of our houses, without electricity, and winter is coming. How are we going to manage?” A month ago, Hezbollah weapons were found again, as well as a tunnel leading to the UNIFIL headquarters.
Driving up a winding road to the neighboring Christian village of Alma al-Chaab, the ruins of houses line the roadside, dotted with the occasional excavator clearing the rubble. During the war, Hezbollah fighters moved between the two towns using a tunnel that led into the forest. A woman rails against the militia whose men occupied her house in her absence, saying, “They took everything, even the furniture.”
Alma al-Chaab and other villages in the south had been emptied of their inhabitants. “The Israelis who occupied all the houses along the main road wrote on the walls in English: ‘You will not forget us,’” says Shaadi Saya, mayor of Alma al-Chaab, where 90 homes were destroyed and 200 damaged. “Why did they knock down the church bell tower? What do they want to do? Maybe create a buffer zone?” he wonders.
Harassment by Israeli drones
Because it occupies a strategic position one kilometer from Israel, Alma is the only Christian village in southern Lebanon to have suffered such extensive damage. “Israel doesn't need to reoccupy the region, a single word from the army spokesperson would be enough to get the residents to leave,” says Danny Ghafari, who has not yet returned to Alma.
Like so many others, he eagerly hopes that his house will be rebuilt. But he may have to wait a long time, as the wealthy Gulf monarchies—led by Saudi Arabia—are making the financing of reconstruction conditional on the complete disarmament of Hezbollah by the Lebanese authorities. However, while the south is about 80% disarmed, according to army estimates, nothing is planned for the areas north of the Litani River and especially in the east of the country, where the militia stores its missiles.
“Hezbollah gave about $12,000 to the owner of each destroyed house,” explains the mayor, "but it seems they have less money. Look, I have a check for $18,000 issued by Qard al-Hassan, its financial company, but I can't cash it," he complains. Small consolation: the government has deployed about 50 soldiers to the Alma school in recent weeks.
There are hardly any to be seen on the road to the Crusader fortress of Tibnine, which it is advisable to take in order to avoid approaching the military positions that Israel has set up since the ceasefire. “The Israeli army is becoming increasingly aggressive,” says a Western military source. A month ago, one of their drones crashed for the first time in the UNIFIL camp in Naqoura. Last week, a peacekeeper was wounded by an Israeli grenade near his position in Kfar Kila, the third incident in a month.
And on Thursday, October 16, eight strikes again targeted “Hezbollah-related infrastructure,” according to Israel, between Mazraa and Sinai, near Nabatiyeh. While Israel says it wants to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding, the Lebanese government accuses it of violating the ceasefire more than 1,500 times in eleven months and killing nearly 300 people. Hezbollah has not reacted in any way.
In the south, “no one believes that the Israelis will leave their positions, which they are fortifying and sometimes expanding,” adds the military source. One of the 29 UNIFIL posts is sandwiched between an Israeli fort in Lebanon and another on the other side of the border in Israel. With its drones, the IDF is intimidating. “We can hear them almost day and night,” complains Hassan Jafar, mayor of the village of Yatir, not far from Tibnine. “We even had one that descended to 20 meters in front of the town hall. Faced with this occupation, it is Hezbollah's weapons that protect us; neither France nor the Arab regimes can give us any guarantees.”
Their buzzing also aims to prevent the Lebanese from returning home and reconstruction from beginning. The French contingent of UNIFIL remembers an unmanned aircraft flying just 25 meters from one of their armored vehicles last summer, causing panic to break out. “They are reloading their databases or recording faces,” comments the senior Lebanese officer. “Their intelligence is effective,” notes Nabil Fawaz, the mayor of Tibnine, who points to the summer residence of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, which has been completely destroyed. Seven bodies of Hezbollah fighters were found after the war in the rubble of a house used as a hideout.
The Shiites stand united
A few days before our visit, an Israeli drone killed a man near the hospital in Tibnine. He was a member of Hezbollah who was trying to discreetly purchase a house to turn into a health center. Three weeks earlier, and for the same reason, another man had suffered the same fate while fleeing in his car, which was left charred by the side of the road. “What's the point of opening a health center near the hospital?” ask skeptical neighbors.
A few miles away, a surprising sight greets the eye: a Beverly Hills setting amid the desolation. On the hills of the village of Harris, most of the mini-palaces belonging to wealthy Hezbollah financiers, Shiite businessmen from West Africa who made their fortunes there, are intact, with breathtaking views of the city of Tyre and the Mediterranean below. Hezbollah had not sent its men there.
Does the Shiite party still have a lot of money? According to Donald Trump's emissary, Tom Barrack, it has $60 million at its disposal every month. Other sources consider this estimate to be high. Flights between Tehran and Beirut have been canceled and airport controls are draconian. But “we have still caught men coming from Turkey with money in their suitcases,” says a Lebanese minister, adding that there is still some smuggling from Syria and trafficking at the port of Beirut, where scanners are due to arrive soon.
“Our social and educational institutions and our hospitals are functioning,” assures Representative Ali Fayad. However, it is unclear whether he can satisfy his 60,000 to 70,000 employees as he did ten years ago, during the era of prosperity. His representatives are frequently mocked in Parliament and in televised debates. “They have lost their prestige, and other parliamentarians are no longer afraid to insult them,” says one elected official, who does not want to be named, fearing, like others, their persistent ability to cause harm.
However, even though it has been weakened militarily and has lost Sunni and Christian allies, Hezbollah is becoming more aggressive politically, pushed by Iran, which has sent Ali Larijani, the new strongman of Tehran's security apparatus, to Beirut three times in recent months.
In December 2024, the fall of Assad's Syria, through which Hezbollah used to transport its weapons from Iran, was another blow. But since then, attacks on the Alawite and Druze minorities by the new regime in Damascus have reunited Hezbollah's Shiite base. “We see what is happening in Syria,” sums up Moufid Jaber, a thirty-something who aspires to a political role outside the Hezbollah-Amal duo. Like me, most Shiites believe that the Lebanese government is incapable of defending us. So between two evils, we choose the lesser: Hezbollah. We see it as a protector that must not be disarmed."
A diplomat who follows the situation on a daily basis sums up the new “logic” of the Party of God: "They have agreed to disarm in the south, but they are asking us not to touch the north of the Litani. Moreover, that is where Israel is hitting hardest, proof that they have done most of the work in the south. Hezbollah no longer poses a threat to Israel, but beyond that, has it retained enough capacity to influence the domestic scene in Lebanon?" wonders this observer.
At the top of the state, opinions differ. Pushed by Saudi Arabia and the United States, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam is calling for the rapid disarmament of Hezbollah throughout the country. The President of the Republic, General Joseph Aoun, and the army, however, do not want to confront it, fearing a split in the troops, or even in the country. They fear a wounded beast that is still far from being defeated.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/de-beyrouth-au-sud-liban-co… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Commentaire sur le plan Trump-Blair que je viens de publier sur l'administration de Gaza.
Ce plan révèle une volonté internationale de restructurer la gouvernance de Gaza via une administration civile et économique d’apparence neutre, mais en réalité, il écarte les Palestiniens de toute décision souveraine, transforme Gaza en zone administrée à but lucratif. Et pose les bases d’un nouveau type de tutelle étrangère.
Sans consensus national palestinien, sa mise en œuvre risque d’entraîner une nouvelle explosion politique, voire un conflit armé. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
CONFIDENTIEL. Voici le Plan d’Administration Transitoire pour Gaza dirigé par Tony Blair. Un document de 21 pages, intitulé : “Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA)”
(Autorité Internationale de Transition pour Gaza)
Ce document confidentiel révèle un projet complet de gestion de la bande de Gaza après la guerre. Ce plan, élaboré par une équipe liée au bureau de Tony Blair (ancien Premier ministre britannique) et à des cercles américano-israéliens proches de l’administration Trump, propose la création d’une autorité internationale indépendante pour gouverner Gaza pendant une phase de transition de 3 à 5 ans.
Structure proposée
1. Conseil d’administration international
• Composé de 7 à 10 membres : hommes d’affaires, diplomates, experts économiques.
• Supervisé par Tony Blair en tant que coordinateur général ou président exécutif.
• Prend toutes les décisions clés en matière de politique, sécurité et économie.
• Siège provisoire : probablement à Al-Arich (Égypte) ou Doha (Qatar).
2. Directeurs palestiniens “neutres”
• Sélectionnés parmi des personnalités professionnelles et non partisanes.
• Gèrent les secteurs publics : santé, éducation, municipalités…
• Travaillent sous la supervision directe du conseil international.
• Soumis à des audits réguliers par un comité international.
3. Conseil consultatif local
• Composé de figures palestiniennes de Gaza et de Cisjordanie.
• Rôle purement consultatif, sans pouvoir exécutif.
Noms proposés dans le document
Tony Blair, Royaume-Uni Président de l’autorité transitoire
Sigrid Kaag, Pays-Bas, Vice-présidente aux affaires humanitaires
Marc Rowan, États-Unis, Président du fonds de reconstruction
Naguib Sawiris, Égypte, Investissements régionaux
Aryeh Lightston, Israël États-Unis, Représentant des Accords d’Abraham
Un représentant palestinien, Non nommé (pour des raisons symboliques), sans pouvoir.
Composante économique
• Création d’un fonds international nommé :
“Gaza Recovery & Investment Fund”
• Dirigé par les hommes d’affaires cités ci-dessus.
• Financement via :
• Dons du Golfe (notamment Arabie saoudite et Émirats).
• Investissements occidentaux.
• Prêts garantis internationalement.
• Projets de reconstruction selon un modèle commercial lucratif : les entreprises investissent et partagent les bénéfices.
Aspect sécuritaire et politique
• Mise en place d’une force de sécurité multinationale sous l’égide de l’ONU (ou coalition dirigée par les États-Unis).
• Interdiction de toute faction armée palestinienne dans Gaza durant la période de transition.
• Réorganisation des forces de sécurité palestiniennes, sous supervision internationale.
Phase, Durée, Objectifs
1️⃣ Préparation (hors Gaza), 3 mois, Établir la GITA et choisir ses membres
2️⃣ Déploiement initial, 6 mois, Début de la gestion et sécurisation
3️⃣Reconstruction, 2–3 ans, Projets d’infrastructure
4️⃣ Transfert progressif, Après 5 ans Remise du pouvoir à une autorité palestinienne “modifiée”
GITA
• Exerce tous les pouvoirs : exécutif, législatif, judiciaire.
• Nomination des juges, ministres, chefs de sécurité.
• Prend des décisions au nom de l’autorité internationale.
• Aucune entité palestinienne ne peut annuler ses décisions.
Axe, Préoccupation principale
Souveraineté: Marginalisation complète des institutions palestiniennes
Légitimité : Absence de tout processus démocratique ou consultation locale
Économie : Privatisation de la reconstruction au profit d’acteurs étrangers
Sécurité : Contrôle étranger absolu sur Gaza
Identité : Exclusion des symboles nationaux palestiniens -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Naufrage en direct.
Marcello🐝
@Marcel81048792
Pascal Praud répond à une question posée par un auditeur :
" Est ce que vous condamnez les bombardements d'Israël sur les civils à Gaza "
Réponse : " non je ne peux pas les condamner "
Ni oubli ni pardon
#cnews #europe1 -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Volte-face historique de l’opinion américaine vis-à-vis d’Israël. Pour la première fois, les Américains sont plus nombreux à soutenir les Palestiniens qu’Israël. Les résultats d'un récent sondage devraient interpeler Israël et les communautés juives en diaspora.
Selon un sondage réalisé par le New York Times, 35 % des Américains disent soutenir les Palestiniens, contre 34 % Israël - une baisse par rapport à la situation au début de la guerre, où 47 % affirmaient soutenir Israël et 20 % soutenaient les Palestiniens.
40 % des Américains considèrent également qu’Israël tue délibérément des civils à Gaza, un chiffre presque doublé par rapport à 2023. De plus, la plupart des Américains s'opposent à la poursuite de l'aide américaine à Israël, plus de 60 % affirment qu'Israël doit mettre fin à la guerre même si tous les otages ne sont pas libérés ou si le Hamas n’est pas détruit. Parmi les personnes de 30 ans ou moins, plus de 70 % des Américains s'opposent à la poursuite de l'aide à Israël.
Qu'en serait-il en France si un sondage avec les mêmes questions étaient posées? -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Tony Blair futur administrateur de la bande de Gaza- Commentaire d'un proche d'Emmanuel Macron. "Toutes les bonnes volontés sont bienvenues, tout ce qui est réaliste est bienvenu. Nous sommes en contact étroit avec Tony Blair et nos partenaires arabes". Le mot réaliste est important dans le soutien français au plan Trump.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Impressionnant si c'est vrai
Camille Moscow 🇷🇺 🌿 ☦️
@camille_moscow
🇮🇱⚡️ Scène hallucinante devant une commission : des soldats israéliens vident des sacs entiers de pilules — antidépresseurs, fentanyl — en avouant que leurs rangs sont ravagés par la folie et les suicides.
This media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Gaza: la tour détruite par Israël à Gaza dimanche abritait un atelier de l'école biblique française de Jérusalem.
Selon un de ses membres, "70% du contenu de notre atelier d'archéologie a pu être sauvé, il avait été déménagé en urgence vers un lieu privé, discret en ville" de Gaza.
"Il ne doit pas y avoir, dans ce cas précis, de victimes, car les gens étaient prévenus de la destruction imminente. Mais des familles s'obstinent parfois à rester, ne sachant où aller, et alors périssent", ajoute cette source française, dépitée qui a longtemps oeuvré à Gaza. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Au Qatar, les pays arabes appellent à revoir les relations diplomatiques avec Israël, une semaine après l'attaque au Qatar. Gênés par l'aventurisme militaire israélien, les Emirats arabes unis, Bahreïn et le Maroc, qui ont normalisé en 2020 avec l'Etat hébreu, n'étaient pas représentés par leurs dirigeants. Contrairement à l'Arabie qui avait dépêché le prince héritier Mohammed ben Salmane. Mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/au-qatar-les-pays-arabes-de… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Hamas-Israël. Confirmation de ce que nous écrivions dans un précédent post, les frappes israéliennes contre la direction du Hamas au Qatar n'ont tué aucun dirigeant de la mouvance islamiste, mais le fils et le directeur de cabinet de Khalil al-Hayya, son principal négociateur pour libérer les otages israéliens détenus à Gaza. Trois gardes du corps, ainsi qu’un membre des forces de sécurité qatarienne ont également été tués.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Qatar: l'éducation islamique obligatoire au lycée français de Doha. Un courrier de la direction du lycée Bonaparte de Doha, établissement conventionné géré par l’Agence pour l’enseignement du français à l’étranger, suscite les craintes de parents d’élèves.
« Les autorités locales nous ont rappelé que l’enseignement de l’éducation islamique doit obligatoirement être dispensé aux élèves de religion musulmane, qu’ils viennent d’un pays arabe ou non. Si vous relevez de cette obligation, votre enfant devra être inscrit au cours d’enseignement islamique », écrit le proviseur Bruno Asselin aux parents d’élèves dans un courrier dont nous avons eu connaissance.
« C’est du n’importe quoi », réagit l'un d'eux, lui-même de confession musulmane. Selon lui, « cette directive existait l’an dernier, mais elle n’était pas appliquée, son application était facultative ».
Ce durcissement s’opère en l’absence d’un ambassadeur de France au Qatar. Le précédent, Jean-Baptiste Faivre, a été nommé en Syrie, et le prochain, vraisemblablement Arnaux Pescheux, n’est pas encore arrivé.
Les parents d’élèves sont divisés sur l’opportunité d’appliquer cette directive, alors que la direction semble décidée à s'y contraindre.
Les lycées français au Moyen-Orient sont assez régulièrement le théâtre de tensions de ce genre. Récemment, un incident, rapidement étouffé, eut lieu au lycée français de Damas, tandis qu'à Riyad, l'ambassadeur Patrick Maisonnave a réussi à reprendre en main la situation au lycée français de la capitale saoudienne. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël mène à Gaza une "campagne de famine délibérée", estime Amnesty International dans un communiqué publié lundi alors que l'ONU et de nombreuses ONG ne cessent de mettre en garde contre une famine imminente dans le territoire palestinien en guerre (AFP).
Cette campagne détruit "systématiquement la santé, le bien-être et le tissu social" à Gaza, écrit l'organisation de défense des droits humains après avoir mené des entretiens avec 19 Palestiniens de Gaza vivant dans des camps de déplacés et deux membres du personnel médical traitant des enfants souffrant de malnutrition.
Sollicitée par l'AFP pour une réaction, les Affaires étrangères et l'armée israéliennes n'ont pas immédiatement réagi.
Pour l'ONG, les témoignages qu'elle a recueillis confirment que "la combinaison mortelle de la faim et de la maladie n'est pas une conséquence malheureuse des opérations militaires israéliennes" à Gaza.
"C'est le résultat intentionnel de plans et de politiques qu'Israël a conçus et mis en oeuvre, au cours des 22 derniers mois, pour infliger délibérément aux Palestiniens de Gaza des conditions de vie calculées pour entraîner leur destruction physique - ce qui fait partie intégrante du génocide en cours d'Israël contre les Palestiniens à Gaza", ajoute-t-elle.
Amnesty International avait accusé en avril les autorités israéliennes de commettre un "génocide en direct" à Gaza, allégations qualifiées de "mensonges sans fondement" par le ministère des Affaires étrangères israélien.
Le Cogat, organe du ministère de la défense israélien gérant les affaires civiles dans les Territoires palestiniens occupés, a estimé le 12 août qu'il n'y avait "aucun signe de phénomène de malnutrition généralisée" dans la bande de Gaza, réfutant des chiffres du mouvement islamiste palestinien Hamas sur les décès dus à la malnutrition.
Depuis le début de la guerre déclenchée le 7 octobre 2023 par une attaques sans précédent du Hamas sur le territoire israélien, Israël assiège à Gaza 2,4 millions de Palestiniens, qu'il a soumis début mars à un blocus humanitaire total, ensuite allégé en mai puis de nouveau fin juillet face aux critiques internationales.
Le territoire palestinien, totalement dépendant de l'aide humanitaire, est menacé d'une "famine généralisée", selon l'ONU, qui appelle à l'"inonder" d'aide. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A lire la tribune de 34 anciens ambassadeurs dans Le Monde appelant Emmanuel Macron à reprendre l'initiative au Moyen-Orient. Texte important qui rappelle que la France peut et doit agir pour stopper "l'entreprise de destruction d'un peuple" menée par le gouvernement israélien.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Je serai à 17H40 sur France 5 dans C dans l'air pour parler des conséquences de la prise de contrôle de la bande de Gaza par Israël, annoncée par le gouvernement de Benjamin Netanyahou.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël-Gaza. Impressionnante et inédite liste d'anciens patrons du Mossad, du Shin bet et de Tsahal demandant à Donald Trump de mettre la pression sur Netanyahou pour faire cesser la guerre à Gaza et ramener les otages. Mon décryptage dans Le Figaro.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/gaza-la-crise-humanitaire-e… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Ehoud Barak, Danny Yatom, Tamir Pardo notamment. Près de 600 anciens responsables de l'appareil sécuritaire en Israël, parmi lesquels plusieurs ex-patrons du Mossad et du Shin Bet, appellent Donald Trump à faire pression sur Benjamin Netanyahu pour mettre fin à la guerre à Gaza.
"Arrêtez la guerre à Gaza!", exhorte ce courrier du mouvement des "Commandants pour la sécurité d'Israël" (CIS), signé par 550 anciens chefs espions, militaires, policiers et diplomates et rendu public dans la nuit de dimanche à lundi. "Cette guerre a cessé d'être une guerre juste et conduit l'État d'Israël à perdre son identité", alerte Ami Ayalon, ancien directeur du Shin Bet, le service de sécurité intérieure, dans une vidéo diffusée par le même mouvement pour accompagner la publication de ce courrier.
Trois anciens patrons du Mossad, le service de renseignement extérieur, (Tamir Pardo, Efraim Halevy, Danny Yatom), cinq ex-dirigeants du Shin Bet (Nadav Argaman, Yoram Cohen, Ami Ayalon, Yaakov Peri, Carmi Gilon) et trois ex-chefs d'état-major (Ehud Barak, Moshe Bogie Yaalon, Dan Halutz) figurent parmi les signataires de la lettre, et apparaissent dans la vidéo.
"Au nom de CIS, le plus grand groupe israélien d'anciens généraux de l'armée, Mossad, Shin Bet, police et corps diplomatiques équivalents, nous vous exhortons à mettre fin à la guerre à Gaza. Vous l'avez fait au Liban. Il est temps de le faire à Gaza également", plaident-il auprès du président Trump.
"Tsahal (l'armée israélienne) a depuis longtemps atteint les deux objectifs qui pouvaient être réalisés par la force: démanteler les formations militaires et le gouvernement du Hamas", estiment les membres du CIS.
"Le troisième, et le plus important, ne peut être atteint que par un accord: ramener tous les otages chez eux".
"Nous considérons, en tant que professionnels, que le Hamas ne représente plus une menace stratégique pour Israël, et notre expérience nous indique qu'Israël dispose de tout ce qu'il faut pour gérer ses capacités résiduelles de terreur, à distance ou autrement", estiment-ils.
"Traquer les derniers hauts responsables du Hamas peut être fait plus tard", mais les "otages ne peuvent pas attendre", insistent les anciens généraux et maître espions.
"Votre crédibilité auprès de la grande majorité des Israéliens renforce votre capacité à guider le Premier ministre Netanyahu et son gouvernement dans la bonne direction", ajoutent les signataires: "Mettre fin à la guerre, ramener les otages, arrêter les souffrances et former une coalition régionale internationale qui aide l'Autorité palestinienne (une fois réformée) à offrir aux Gazaouis et à tous les Palestiniens une alternative au Hamas et à son idéologie perverse". -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Gaza. Insupportables vidéos diffusées ces derniers jours par le Hamas et le Djihad islamique, instrumentalisant la détresse d'otages israéliens, détenus depuis bientôt deux ans à Gaza. Leur libération est plus que jamais une urgence.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
France-Israël. "Ces violences sont des actes terroristes", a déclaré le porte-parole du Quai d'Orsay, à propos du "meurtre" attribué à un colon israélien d'un militant anti-occupation des territoires palestiniens.
"La France condamne ce meurtre avec la plus grande fermeté ainsi que toutes les violences délibérées commises par des colons extrémistes à l'encontre de la population palestinienne qui se multiplie à travers la Cisjordanie", a déclaré le porte-parole du ministère des Affaires étrangères.
Paris hausse à juste titre le ton contre ces violences qui se multiplient. Mais elles ne sont pas nouvelles, 31 ans après l'assassinat de sang-froid un matin de février 1994 de 27 fidèles palestiniens en prière à la mosquée d'Hébron par un terroriste Barouch Goldtsein.
Ces violences des colons visent également les chrétiens palestiniens, comme ceux de la petite ville de Taybeh, près de Ramallah, une ville proche historiquement de la France, qui y avait jadis un coopérant. Les défenseurs des chrétiens d'Orient en France, surtout à droite, ont brillé par leur absence de réaction, à Taybeh comme après le bombardement de l'église de Gaza, il y a quelques semaines. Deux poids deux mesures. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Même le New York Times
Ahmad Tibi
@Ahmad_tibi
“I saw a baby die in front of me. He didn’t even cry – he didn’t have the strength.”
– Testimony from an American officer at a GHF food site in Gaza.
This is not a humanitarian crisis.
It’s a military policy.
Intentional starvation.
A war crime. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Il est difficile d'écrire des informations positives sur Israël, ces temps ci. A leur tour, deux organisations israéliennes de défense des droits humains affirment ce lundi que l'Etat hébreu commet "un génocide" dans la bande de Gaza, selon des enquêtes qu'elles ont menées.
"Rien ne vous prépare à réaliser que vous faites partie d'une société qui commet un génocide. C'est un moment particulièrement douloureux pour nous", a déclaré Yuli Novak, directrice exécutrice de B'Tselem, qui dénonce ce "génocide" aux côtés de l'ONG, Physicians for Human Rights-Israël. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Gaza. Une analyse interne du gouvernement américain n'a trouvé aucune preuve de vol systématique par le groupe militant palestinien Hamas de fournitures humanitaires financées par les États-Unis, remettant en cause le principal argument avancé par Israël et les États-Unis pour justifier le soutien à une nouvelle opération d'aide privée armée (Reuters).
Cette analyse, qui n'avait pas été rendue publique auparavant, a été menée par un bureau de l'Agence américaine pour le développement international et achevée fin juin. Elle a examiné 156 incidents de vol ou de perte de fournitures financées par les États-Unis signalés par des organisations partenaires américaines entre octobre 2023 et mai dernier.
Elle n'a trouvé « aucun rapport alléguant que le Hamas » ait bénéficié de fournitures financées par les États-Unis, selon une présentation PowerPoint des conclusions consultée par Reuters. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
C'est tout le contraire Jordan Bardella. Emmanuel Macron ne se précipite pas, en reconnaissant l'Etat de Palestine. Le président du RN a qualifié de "précipitée" la décision d'Emmanuel Macron, assurant qu'elle accordera au Hamas "une légitimité institutionnelle et internationale inespérée". Vous vous trompez: c'est l'adversaire irréductible du Hamas, l'Autorité palestinienne qu'Emmanuel Macron favorise, celle-là même que celui que vous défendez - Benjamin Netanyahou - voulait au contraire affaiblir en soutenant le Hamas pour qu'il n'y ait jamais d'Etat de Palestine. Reprenez le fil de l'histoire récente.
Quant à votre argument d'une "sincère recherche de justice et de paix", là encore le RN doit réviser sa copie et relire l'histoire, plus ancienne celle-là (De Gaulle, Giscard, Mitterrand, notamment). Vous préférez un état binational où les juifs israéliens seraient minoritaires à terme? La géopolitique est trop sérieuse - et trop grave compte tenu de ce qu'il se passe actuellement à Gaza, après ce qu'il s'est passé le 7 octobre 2023 - pour en faire un sujet de politique politicienne française! Un peu de profondeur historique ne nuit jamais. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Emmanuel Macron a probablement eu peur d'être dépassé par les événements dramatiques qui se jouent actuellement à Gaza. Il annonce que la France reconnaîtra l'Etat de Palestine. Il en fera l'annonce solennelle à l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies en septembre à New York. Il y avait urgence. Ne pas le faire maintenant reviendrait à reconnaître un "cimetière" comme le dit le chercheur Vincent Lemire, d'autant que pour ce qui est de la Cisjordanie occupée, l'autre bout de cet Etat de Palestine à construire outre la bande de Gaza, la Knesset a voté hier une résolution (certes non contraignante) rejetant toute perspective d'Etat palestinien.
Comme le dit Emmanuel Macron dans son annonce, il en allait de la fidélité de la France à "son engagement historique pour une paix juste et durable au Proche-Orient". Faut-il rappeler une fois encore l'histoire: la France de Valéry Giscard d'Estaing motrice à la fin des années 1970 pour initier la "Déclaration de Venise", appelant à l'autodétermination des Palestiniens. La France de François Mitterrand en 1982 qui depuis la Knesset appelle à la création d'un Etat palestinien. La France de Jacques Chirac et même de Nicolas Sarkozy qui reconnaîtra l'Etat de Palestine à l'Unesco.
Emmanuel Macron a beaucoup tardé à s'inscrire dans cette filiation historique. Israël a été victime le 7 octobre 2023 de la pire attaque terroriste depuis sa fondation en 1948, par les islamistes du Hamas. Reconnaître un Etat de Palestine vivant en paix et en sécurité aux côtés d'Israël, c'est non pas reconnaître un Etat Hamas, comme feignent de le clamer ceux qui s'y opposent: c'est même le contraire, à savoir la meilleure façon de lutter contre le Hamas qui lui ne veut pas de cet état sur les seules frontières de 1967. Son "meilleur allié" en Israël Benjamin Netanyahou l'avait compris, qui déclarait il y a quelques années vouloir favoriser le Hamas pour qu'il n'y ait jamais d'Etat de Palestine, administré par l'Autorité palestinienne. Cela étant, le plus dur reste maintenant à faire. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Georges Ibrahim Abdallah devrait être libéré ce soir à minuit ou demain matin de la prison de Lannemezan dans les Hautes-Pyrénées. Il devrait prendre ensuite un avion - civil ou militaire - pour l'aéroport de Roissy à Paris où l'ancien militant de la cause palestinienne, qui a passé 41 ans en prison après avoir été condamné pour complicité dans l'assassinat de diplomates américain et israélien dans les années 1980, sera placé en centre de rétention à Roissy jusqu'au décollage de son avion de la Middle East Airlines demain vendredi, selon son avocat Me Jean-Louis Chalanset. Il devrait être accueilli à Roissy par le chargé d'affaires de l'ambassade du Liban en France.
Deux officiers de sécurité français l'accompagneront jusqu'au Liban. En février, la France avait demandé au Liban de payer les billets d'avion des deux agents de la sécurité. Ce que Beyrouth avait refusé. Cette fois, Paris paiera pour les trois - Abdallah et les deux agents de la sécurité.
Comment sera-t-il accueilli à Beyrouth? Selon son avocat, il est prévu qu'à l'aéroport, les partis politiques qui le soutiennent l'accueilleront à l'aéroport et une fête sera organisée dans son village. Une chaîne de télévision a prévu douze heures de programme, consacrée à Georges Ibrahim Abdallah. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël: à ceux qui pensent que le problème, ce n'est que le gouvernement Netanyahou! Plus de 70 députés israéliens ont voté mercredi un appel au gouvernement à annexer la Cisjordanie occupée, afin de "retirer de l'ordre du jour tout projet d'Etat palestinien".
Adopté par 71 voix contre 13, le texte n'a pas valeur de loi mais veut affirmer "le droit naturel, historique et légal" d'Israël sur ce territoire palestinien.
Dans ce vote, soutenu par des élus de la coalition de droite du Premier ministre Benjamin Netanyahu mais aussi par des députés de l'opposition, les élus ont affirmé que l'annexion de ce territoire "renforcera l'Etat d'Israël, sa sécurité et empêchera toute remise en question du droit fondamental du peuple juif à la paix et la sécurité sur sa patrie".
"La souveraineté en Judée-Samarie (le nom par lequel Israël désigne la Cisjordanie, occupée par Israël depuis 1967), fait partie intégrante de la réalisation du sionisme et de la vision nationale du peuple juif, qui est retourné dans sa patrie", affirme encore ce texte.
Quelque 500.000 Israéliens vivent dans des colonies en Cisjordanie, au milieu de trois millions de Palestiniens. La colonisation israélienne est régulièrement dénoncée par l'ONU comme illégale au regard du droit international et comme l'un des principaux obstacles -- avec la poursuite des violences entre les deux camps -- à une solution de paix durable entre Israéliens et Palestiniens passant par la création d'un Etat palestinien viable ayant autorité sur la Cisjordanie et la bande de Gaza. -
Post not available here, view on X
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Cher confrère l'Aiea ne disait pas que l'Iran disposait de la bombe. Pas plus que les renseignements US. Rappel factuel important. Base du journalisme.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran. Emmanuel Macron a raison. "Tous ceux qui croient qu'en frappant avec des bombes depuis l'extérieur on sauvé un pays malgré lui-même et contre lui-même se sont toujours trompés", a-t-il déclaré au G7 au Canada, allusion à la menace israélienne de changer par la force le régime iranien.
"Les peuples sont souverains. Ils changent leurs dirigeants par eux-mêmes et tous ceux qui ont voulu par le passé changer des régimes par des frappes ou des opérations militaires ont commis des erreurs stratégiques", a-t-il martelé. Il suffit de se rappeler ce que fut la calamiteuse guerre américaine en Irak en 2003, soutenue par les néo-conservateurs américains et quelques-uns en France, ceux-là même que Donald Trump a fustigés le mois dernier dans un discours retentissant en Arabie saoudite. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël-Palestine. La nouvelle ne va pas faire les titres des journaux. Et pourtant, elle sape encore un peu plus toute chance de solution au conflit israélo-palestinien. L'Etat hébreu a annoncé la création de 22 nouvelles colonies juives en Cisjordanie occupée. Les colonies sont une violation du droit international. Cette annonce du gouvernement est une première réponse au projet d'Emmanuel Macron de reconnaître l'Etat de Palestine, avec d'autres pays, en juin à New York. Elle a été rendue publique sur X par le ministre des Finances, Bezalel Smotrich, lui-même colon d'extrême droite.
"Il s'agit d'une décision historique [...] qui change la face de la région et façonne l'avenir de l'implantation [israélienne en Cisjordanie] pour les années à venir", a abondé dans un communiqué le ministre de la Défense, Israël Katz.
La colonisation des territoires palestiniens occupés depuis 1967 est l'un des principaux obstacles à une solution de paix durable entre Israéliens et Palestiniens en ce qu'elle empêche la création d'un Etat palestinien viable. Entamée peu après 1967 par les gouvernements de gauche, elle s'est poursuivie ensuite et s'est intensifiée sous l'actuel gouvernement extrémiste. 500 000 Israéliens vivent dans des colonies. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Dramatique
Mairav Zonszein מרב זונשיין
@MairavZ
82% of Jewish Israelis support the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/2025-05-22/ty-article-magazine…
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Avec une ou deux petites révélations.
RTL France
@RTLFrance
Frères musulmans : les coulisses de leurs finances
"Les secrets de l'actualité internationale" @Malbrunot dans #rtlmatinThis media couldn't be displayed. See it on the original post. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël refuse des visas à 27 parlementaires français, qui devaient se rendre dans l'état hébreu et dans les territoires palestiniens, à l'initiative du Consulat général de France à Jérusalem. La prochaine fois, pour être les bienvenus en Israël, je leur suggère de se faire inviter comme tant d'autres par Elnet, groupe de pressions pro israélien. Seul problème, ils n'iront pas en Cisjordanie occupée. Ce qui serait dommage si on veut avoir une image réaliste et globale du conflit.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
"Va te faire f....": l'insulte du fils de Benjamin Netanyahou envers Emmanuel Macron, furieux qu'il s'apprête à reconnaître la Palestine. Marc Henry, l'un de nos correspondants en Israël, dépeint Yaïr Netanyahou, 33 ans, résidant en Floride depuis plus d'un an, comme un "islamophobe, misogyne, prompt à dénoncer des complots fomentés par des « gauchistes » avec l’aide de juges et de policiers tous complices d’un «État profond» dont le seul objectif serait de bouter son père hors du pouvoir". A lire.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/va-te-faire-f-le-fils-de-be… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Confirmation de l'influence grandissante d'Elnet auprès des décideurs français. 2 000 personnes - dont plusieurs ministres - étaient rassemblées hier à Paris à l'initiative du groupe de pression en faveur d'Israël autour du thème : "Pour la république, la France, contre l'islamisme".
Parmi les orateurs, Manuel Valls, Bruno Retailleau, Eric Danon, de "bons clients" d'Elnet (European Leadership Network) qui se définit comme "une organisation indépendante" et "dédiée au renforcement des relations entre la France, l'Europe et Israël". Elnet ambitionne en fait de devenir l'AIPAC européen.
En 2022, dans notre livre "Le déclassement français", nous révélions les liens profonds entre Elnet et la ville et la Communauté de communes de Nice.
Une enquête récente de Médiapart a également rappelé qu'Elnet avait envoyé une centaine de parlementaires français, tous frais payés, en Israël depuis 2017. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Manifestation contre le Hamas ce mardi dans la bande de Gaza, à Beit Lahya.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Gaza-Manifestation contre le Hamas. "Je crois que le Hamas va faire le nécessaire pour que des manifestations comme celle d'aujourd'hui à Beit Lahya ne s'étendent pas trop", nous confie un Palestinien de la bande de Gaza, qui connaît bien le mouvement islamiste. "Le Hamas ne peut pas tolérer ce genre de manifestations contre lui", ajoute-t-il. "Ce n'est pas bon en ce moment", alors qu'Israël a repris ses frappes contre la bande de Gaza.
Jeudi pourtant, une nouvelle manifestation doit avoir lieu à Khan Younès dans le sud de la bande de Gaza, selon notre source. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La voix du bon sens chez Alain Duhamel.
This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Hommage et respect pour Jean-Louis Debré, ancien président de l'Assemblée nationale et du Conseil constitutionnel, décédé à l'âge de 80 ans. Il était une figure iconoclaste.
Proche de Jacques Chirac, le fils de Michel Debré, ancien Premier ministre de Charles de Gaulle, a été juge d'instruction, ministre de l'Intérieur de 1995 à 1997 dans le gouvernement d'Alain Juppé, et fut pendant vingt ans député de l'Eure avant de diriger l'Assemblée après la réélection de Jacques Chirac en 2002. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Échanges non politiquement corrects mais voulus ce matin entre le ministre des affaires étrangères et le dessinateur Jul lors du discours de Jean-Noel Barrot devant les ambassadeurs de France, réunis au Quai d'Orsay.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'inquiétude d'Emmanuel Macron sur la retour des djihadistes français de Syrie. Mardi en Arabie devant des journalistes, le chef de l'Etat plaçait les enjeux de sécurité nationale en tête de ses préoccupations, à propos de la Syrie.
« Nous avons des intérêts sécuritaires dans la région, des personnes qui ne sont pas sans représenter un certain danger », alertait le chef de l’État. Il faut « éviter la résurgence de mouvements terroristes qui puissent avoir des capacités de déstabilisation régionale et de préparer des attentats projetés », ajoutait Emmanuel Macron.
Il faisait allusion aux 130 djihadistes français qui étaient jusque-là confinés dans la province d'Idleb, dans le nord-ouest de la Syrie. Ils sont aujourd'hui plus libres de leurs mouvements.
Mercredi auprès du Figaro, le ministre des Armées, Sébastien Lecornu, évoquait lui « plus de 70 » djihadistes français, détenus dans des conditions précaires dans des prisons aux mains de nos alliés kurdes dans le nord-est syrien. La question de leur retour risque de nouveau de se poser. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël: Un ancien ministre de la Défense Moshé Yaalon affirme que l'armée israélienne mène un "nettoyage ethnique" dans la bande de Gaza, provoquant un tollé au sein de la classe politique (AFP).
"La route sur laquelle on est entraînés, c'est la conquête, l'annexion et le nettoyage ethnique", a déclaré M. Yaalon lors d'une interview sur la chaîne privée DemocratTV.
Relancé par la journaliste qui lui a demandé s'il pensait qu'Israël se dirigeait vers un "nettoyage ethnique", M. Yaalon a répondu: "Que se passe-t-il là-bas? Il n'y a plus de Beit Lahia, plus de Beit Hanoun, l'armée intervient à Jabalia et en réalité on chasse les Arabes", en référence à plusieurs villes de la bande de Gaza bombardée par l'armée israélienne.
Les réactions ont fusé, le ministre de la Sécurité nationale, Itamar Ben Gvir, qualifiant de "honte" le fait qu'Israël ait eu "un tel personnage comme chef de l'armée et ministre de la Défense".
Le Likoud, le parti du Premier ministre Benjamin Netanyahu, a réagi dans un communiqué fustigeant M. Yaalon "dont les propos (...) mensongers sont un cadeau à la CPI et au camp des ennemis d'Israël".
Moshé Yaalon, 74 ans, a été le chef de l'armée israélienne entre 2002 et 2005, juste avant le retrait unilatéral d'Israël de la bande de Gaza. Il a été ministre de la Défense et vice-Premier ministre, avant de démissionner en 2016, à la suite de différends avec M. Netanyahu, alors Premier ministre. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le Premier ministre israélien, Benjamin Netanyahu, a qualifié jeudi d'"antisémite" la décision de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) d'émettre un mandat d'arrêt international contre lui et son ex-ministre de la Défense, Yoav Gallant, s'estimant victime d'un nouveau "procès Dreyfus".
"La décision antisémite de la Cour pénale internationale est comparable à un procès Dreyfus d'aujourd'hui qui se terminera de la même façon", a-t-il déclaré dans un communiqué diffusé par son bureau.
Condamné pour espionnage, dégradé et envoyé au bagne à la fin du XIXe siècle en France, le capitaine français de confession juive Alfred Dreyfus avait été innocenté et réhabilité quelques années plus tard. L'affaire Dreyfus a profondément divisé la société française et révélé l'antisémitisme d'une grande partie de la population.
"Israël rejette avec dégoût les actions absurdes et les accusations mensongères qui le visent de la part de la [CPI], dont les juges "sont animés par une haine antisémite à l'égard d'Israël" , ajoute le texte.
"C'est un jour noir pour [la CPI], qui a perdu toute légitimité à exister et à agir", réagit de son côté le ministre israélien des Affaires étrangères, Gideon Saar, sur son compte X.
La cour de La Haye "s'est comportée comme un jouet politique au service des éléments les plus extrêmes oeuvrant à saper la sécurité et la stabilité au Moyen-Orient", a-t-il ajouté, accusant la cour d'avoir émis "des ordonnances absurdes sans en avoir l'autorité" contre MM. Netanyahu et Gallant. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Avec le mandat d'arrêt de la CPI, Benjamin "Netanyahu est officiellement un homme recherché", réagit Amnesty international.
De son côté, le chef de la diplomatie européenne, Josep Borrell, a affirmé que les mandats d'arrêt émis jeudi par la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) contre le Premier ministre israélien Benjamin Netanyahu, son ex-ministre de la Défense, Yoav Gallant, et le chef militaire du Hamas, Mohammed Deif, devaient être "appliqués".
"Ce n'est pas une décision politique. C'est une décision d'une cour, d'une cour de justice, d'une cour de justice internationale. Et la décision de la cour doit être respectée et appliquée", a dit M. Borrell lors d'une conférence de presse à Amman avec son homologue jordanien, Aymane Safadi.
La CPI a émis jeudi des mandats d'arrêt contre MM. Netanyahu et Gallant "pour crimes contre l'humanité et crimes de guerre commis au moins à partir du 8 octobre 2023 jusqu'au 20 mai 2024".
Elle a également émis un mandat d'arrêt contre Mohammed Deif, chef de la branche armée du Hamas palestinien "pour crimes contre l'humanité et crimes de guerre présumés commis sur le territoire de l'Etat d'Israël et de l'Etat de Palestine depuis au moins le 7 octobre 2023", date de l'attaque sans précédent du Hamas contre Israël à partir de Gaza ayant déclenché la guerre en cours.
La décision de la CPI limite théoriquement les déplacements de Benjamin Netanyahu, puisque n'importe lequel des 124 Etats membres de la cour serait obligé de l'arrêter sur son territoire.
"Cette décision est contraignante, et tous les Etats, tous Etats parties au statut de la cour, y compris tous les membres de l'Union européenne, sont tenus de mettre en oeuvre cette décision de la cour", a encore dit M. Borrell. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Civil war is coming....
The Cradle
@TheCradleMedia
A high-ranking Lebanese security source to Al Akhbar:
○ US Ambassador to Lebanon, Lisa Johnson, is continuing her agenda to prepare Lebanon for a "post-Hezbollah era” by mobilizing "sovereignists" in Lebanon.
○ In discussions with Lebanese politicians, she reportedly said, “Israel cannot achieve everything through war; it’s time for you to do your part and launch an internal uprising under the banner of ‘Enough’.”
○ Johnson encouraged her allies to hold meetings to advocate for the election of Lebanese Armed Forces Commander General Joseph Aoun as President of Lebanon, saying, “He (Aoun) will appoint a strong commander for the Lebanese Army, and we will support the Army in restraining all Hezbollah supporters. You will have backing from Arab states and the West. But the time to act is now.” -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Polygamie diplomatique. Les deux plus proches alliés de la France au Moyen-Orient ont participé au sommet des Brics en Russie aux côtés de Vladimir Poutine: le président égyptien Sissi et le président des Emirats arabes unis, cheikh Zayyed. On pourrait ajouter l'Inde, principal allié de Paris en Asie, avec la présence du Premier ministre Narendra Modi à Kazan pour ce sommet destiné à promouvoir une alternative à l'actuelle gouvernance mondiale sous l'égide des Etats-Unis.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
CMA CGM-Hezbollah. De l'utilité de parler au Hezbollah. L'été 2020, peu après l'explosion du port de Beyrouth, un deal avait été discrètement passé entre la France et le Hezbollah au terme duquel Emmanuel Macron ne parlerait pas lors de ses déplacements au Liban des armes du Hezbollah en échange de quoi le Parti de Dieu laisserait CMA-CGM, propriété de Rodolphe Saade qui accompagnait le président de la République, remporter le marché des porte-conteneurs au port de Beyrouth. (Voir ci-dessous notre livre Le déclassement français).
Une source libanaise précise aujourd'hui qu'en vue de la conclusion du contrat entre le ministre des Transports du Liban, proche du Hezbollah, Ali Hamieh, et M. Saadé, qui possède également BFM TV, celui-ci proposa au ministre de lui envoyer son avion privé à Marseille. CMA-CGM remporta finalement ce contrat, grâce à la bienveillance du Hezbollah.
Comme quoi la diplomatie et les affaires c'est plus compliqué que ce qu'on nous déclare à la télé. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël - Palestine. Des démocraties occidentales -- Etats-Unis, Canada, France, Allemagne, Belgique -- ont été accusées vendredi à l'ONU d'avoir "durement" réprimé le droit de manifester pour la cause palestinienne, notamment au début de la guerre dans la bande de Gaza (AFP).
Dans un rapport présenté à l'Assemblée générale et à la presse, la rapporteure spéciale pour la promotion et la protection du droit à la liberté d'opinion et d'expression, Irene Khan, a aussi accusé Israël de "graves attaques", contre les médias dans les Territoires palestiniens occupés, parlant notamment d'"assassinats ciblés de journalistes".
Cette avocate bangladaise en droits humains, experte "indépendante" de l'ONU depuis 2020, a reproché à "nombre de pays européens d'avoir imposé des mesures de restriction à la liberté d'expression, de répression de protestations contre le carnage à Gaza et d'interdiction de manifestations propalestiniennes".
Et, a-t-elle insisté, "des manifestations sur des campus aux Etats-Unis ont été durement réprimées", en allusion à l'intervention fin avril de la police anti-émeute de New York pour déloger des dizaines de militants pro-palestiniens qui occupaient une partie de l'université Columbia.
Quant aux pays européens, Mme Khan a pris pour cible "l'Allemagne (qui) a imposé une interdiction totale des manifestations propalestiniennes en octobre dernier, et depuis lors, des restrictions à ces protestations dans diverses régions allemandes".
"Jamais sur des manifestations pour Israël, mais toujours sur des propalestiniennes", a-t-elle souligné.
"La France a essayé de prendre les mêmes mesures mais les tribunaux les ont rejetées et l'évaluation se fait au cas par cas", a poursuivi la juriste, citant encore "la Belgique et le Canada ayant adopté des positions identiques".
Au début de l'offensive israélienne à Gaza il y a un an, le ministère français de l'Intérieur avait demandé que les manifestations propalestiniennes soient systématiquement interdites en raison de troubles potentiels à l'ordre public. Le Conseil d'Etat, plus haute juridiction administrative, avait rappelé à l'ordre le gouvernement en exigeant des décisions au cas par cas. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Sud du Liban. Le village de Kfar Kilah avant et après les bombardements israéliens contre le Hezbollah.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Pour clore la polémique sur les propos d'Emmanuel Macron sur la création par l'ONU d'Israël, ce que dit le site de l'ambassade d'Israël en France, donnant raison au président de la République, loin du brouhaha politico-mediatique.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Gérard Larcher, le président du Sénat qui se dit "stupéfait" des déclarations d'Emmanuel Macron sur Israël, va quand même avoir du mal à faire passer le président de la république pour un dirigeant qui "met en cause l'existence d'Israël", alors qu'il a, au contraire, infléchi la politique française en faveur de l'Etat hébreu, après l'attaque terroriste du Hamas le 7 octobre 2023.
On a bien compris que vous succombiez aux délices - ou au poison - de la politique politicienne, mais sur un sujet aussi grave, on attend plus de hauteur de vues de la part du numéro 3 de l'Etat. Lisez mon papier sur les raisons qui ont poussé Emmanuel Macron à dire les choses franchement à Benjamin Netanyahou. Et si vous en avez le temps, demandez quelques rappels historiques - puisque vous faites, à juste titre, allusion à l'histoire dans votre interview - à votre conseiller diplomatique, si vous en avez toujours un. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Emmanuel Macron a raison quand il affirme que c’est une « décision de l’ONU » qui a « créé » l’Etat d’Israël. Il fait à juste titre référence à la résolution 181 adoptée le 29 novembre 1947, c’est-à-dire six mois seulement avant la création d’Israël, par l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies, qui partageait la Palestine historique en un Etat juif et un Etat arabe.
« Les états indépendants arabe et juif….. commenceront d’exister en Palestine deux mois après l’évacuation des forces armées de la puissance mandataire », stipule la résolution 181.
Benjamin Netanyahou n’a pas complètement tort non plus quand il répond vertement à Emmanuel Macron que la création de l’Etat d’Israël résulte « plutôt de la victoire obtenue dans la guerre d’indépendance avec le sang de combattants héroïques ». Mais il oublie d’ajouter que cette guerre d’indépendance s’est traduite par des massacres et le départ forcé de 700 000 Palestiniens, aujourd’hui réfugiés. Le sionisme enraciné depuis la fin du 19ème siècle a permis à Israël d’arracher son état, mais c’est un fait que l’ONU a avalisé cet état, avant sa création.
Benjamin Netanyahou entend surtout critiquer la nouvelle posture du président français, qui commence d’avoir la dent dure, contre celui que Joe Biden, Nicolas Sarkozy et Jacques Chirac, notamment, accusaient d’être « un menteur ».
Quant à la phrase d’Emmanuel Macron, estimant que Benjamin Netanyahou ne devrait pas « s’affranchir des décisions de l’ONU », le chef de l’Etat a encore une fois raison quand on sait qu’Israël n’a pas respecté les résolutions 242 et 338 de l’ONU adoptées après la conquête de la Cisjordanie, de la bande de Gaza et de Jérusalem-est en 1967. Quant au "mépris souverain" affiché par l'Etat hébreu envers la Finul (Force des Nations unies au Liban), selon l'expression de son ancien chef le général Pellegrini, les exemples abondent. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Hezbollah-Israël. Intéressante déclaration du chef de la diplomatie américaine qu'il convient de décrypter. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent les efforts déployés par le Liban pour "s'affirmer" face au Hezbollah, en guerre avec Israël, a déclaré Antony Blinken. "Il est clair que le peuple libanais a intérêt, grand intérêt, à ce que leur Etat s'affirme et prenne la responsabilité du pays et de son avenir", a déclaré M. Blinken à la presse.
Traduction, comme le constate un diplomate français de haut rang : Israël a le feu vert des Etats-Unis pour continuer de bombarder le Liban. Washington contrairement à Paris ne réclame plus un cessez-le-feu. Les attaques israéliennes doivent continuer pour affaiblir grandement le Hezbollah. Même si la guerre tue de nombreux civils. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
"Le Moyen-Orient est devenu une question de politique intérieure en France", regrette un diplomate de haut-rang au Quai d'Orsay. "Emmanuel Macron est prisonnier d'une droite qui a oublié le gaullisme et d'un bavardage médiatique loin de la réalité du terrain", ajoute-t-il.
"Il ne faut pas désarmer Israël" dans les circonstances actuelles, a déclaré la présidente de l'Assemblée nationale Yaël Braun-Pivet, en réaction aux déclarations d'Emmanuel Macron appelant à cesser les livraisons d'armes servant à Gaza.
Il ne s'agit pas de désarmer Israël - qui vient de recevoir 8,7 milliards de dollars d'une aide militaire américaine qui ne se tarit pas - mais de pousser Benjamin Netanyahou à cessez-le-feu à Gaza pour récupérer des dizaines d'otages, qu'il semble avoir abandonnés. C'est ça le vrai enjeu. Beaucoup plus que d'alimenter un débat partisan.
Mme Braun-Pivet devrait s'informer auprès de l'Elysée. La semaine dernière à New York, le refus du cessez-le-feu au Liban - qui conditionne celui de Gaza - est venu de Benjamin Netanyahou, comme l'ont reconnu les proches de Joe Biden et d'Emmanuel Macron.
"Tout le monde fait le maximum d'efforts pour qu'il y ait enfin un cessez-le-feu. Mais force est de constater qu'aujourd'hui le refus du cessez-le-feu, il vient du Hamas (...) Et donc malheureusement, il ne faut pas désarmer Israël dans ces circonstances là", a martelé la présidente de l'Assemblée. Ces déclarations ne correspondent pas à la réalité. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Comment Benjamin Netanyahou a leurré Français et Américains? « La démonstration est claire, Benjamin Netanyahou n’a pas tenu sa parole ». A Paris, on ne se prive pas d’imputer au Premier ministre israélien la responsabilité de l’échec de la proposition américano-française de cessez-le-feu temporaire de 21 jours entre l’Etat hébreu et le Hezbollah au Liban.
« Il y avait bien un accord qui résultait de négociations que les Américains et nous avions menées avec les deux parties », Israël et le Liban, cette semaine en marge de l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies à New York, souligne un diplomate au fait du dossier.
Un séquençage des prises de parole avait été convenu avec le Liban et Israël. Comme prévu, le premier ministre libanais Najib Mikati a d’abord accueilli favorablement mercredi l’appel franco-américain, espérant qu’un arrêt des combats pourrait être obtenu rapidement.
Jeudi, Benjamin Netanyahou était censé déclarer à sa descente d’avion à New York qu’il accueillait lui aussi favorablement ce projet de fin provisoire des hostilités. Mais « il a dit autre chose », sourit amèrement ce diplomate français. L'armée poursuivra son combat contre le Hezbollah "avec toute la force nécessaire", martela-t-il, au contraire, à l’aéroport de New York, tandis que son bureau n’hésitait pas à dire que le « Premier ministre n’avait même pas répondu » à cette offre américano-française.
L’élément réellement nouveau de cette séquence diplomatique était l’aval donné par le Hezbollah au Premier ministre libanais pour ouvrir des négociations sur le retrait de ses hommes du sud du Liban, reconnait la source diplomatique française. Jusqu’à maintenant, le Hezbollah ne se déclarait prêt à ouvrir des discussions sur les « non papers » français et américains que lorsqu’Israël aurait cessé son « agression » contre les Palestiniens de la bande de Gaza. « Si Mikati a donné son accord, dit-on à Paris, c’est que le Hezbollah le lui avait transmis » par le biais du président du Parlement, Nabi Berri, chiite comme le Hezbollah. Sous très forte pression militaire, la milice pro iranienne avait intérêt à une pause des violences.
Les Etats-Unis ont été les premiers, jeudi, à blâmer Benjamin Netanyahou, le porte-parole de la Maison blanche affirmant que le Premier ministre et Ron Dermer, son ministre des Affaires stratégiques, avaient été « régulièrement informés » et qu’ils avaient tous les deux donné leur « bénédiction » à cette offre de cessez-le-feu.
Côté français, on regrette le manquement à la parole donnée par Benjamin Netanyahou. Avant les frappes d’une ampleur inédite hier après-midi contre la banlieue sud de Beyrouth, Paris voulait encore croire que la diplomatie pouvait encore porter ses fruits.
« Bibi exploite-t-il le veto de ses ministres extrémistes à un cessez-le-feu pour dire non à l’accord, ou c’est lui-même qui n’en veut pas ? », se demandait ce diplomate. Désormais, la réponse parait claire. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël bombarde le QG du Hezbollah à Beyrouth dans une zone habituellement densement peuplée.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Liban: Jean-Yves Le Drian, envoyé spécial d'Emmanuel Macron au Liban où il arrive ce soir en pleins bombardements israéliens, ne sera pas le Hervé de Charrette de 1996 lorsque le ministre des Affaires étrangères de Jacques Chirac avait su, en pleine guerre déjà entre l'Etat hébreu et le Hezbollah, imposer la France dans l'instauration d'un mécanisme de sécurité régionale qui associait outre la France, l'Etat hébreu, la Syrie et indirectement l'Iran.
Le message français est aujourd'hui inaudible. Du président de la république - cf sa vidéo lunaire de la semaine dernière - à celui du Premier ministre Michel Barnier - on a pu s'en rendre compte hier.
En 1996, il avait fallu du courage à Jacques Chirac pour bousculer certaines règles. Aujourd'hui, il en manque cruellement ainsi qu'une vision. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Félicitations à Michel Barnier, qui vient d'être nommé Premier ministre. En tant que ministre des Affaires étrangères en 2004, il avait ardemment oeuvré à notre libération d'Irak, sous l'autorité de Jacques Chirac.
Il était venu nous chercher à Paphos sur l'île de Chypre en compagnie de Pierre Brochand, le patron de la DGSE (services de renseignements extérieurs). J'avais fait sa connaissance dans l'avion qui nous ramena en France.
Michel Barnier avait su porter efficacement la voix de la France auprès du monde arabe, alors que des menaces pesaient sur nous. Respect et gratitude. Et bonne chance pour Matignon. Ce ne sera d'évidence pas facile. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Pour la première fois depuis trente ans, il n'y aura pas de conférence des ambassadeurs, cette année. "Elle n'a pas été programmée pour cause de JO, selon un diplomate, mais sans doute aussi par manque d'intérêt d'un président de la république qui continue à avoir des problèmes avec les diplomates".
C'est dommage. C'était un rendez-vous utile. Les ambassadeurs recevaient une sorte de feuille de route de la part de l'Elysée. Ce passage à la trappe constitue un nouveau signe de la marginalisation regrettable du ministère des Affaires étrangères par l'Elysée. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Il y a vingt ans, le 20 août 2004, j'étais enlevé avec Christian Chesnot en Irak. En ce jour, je pense aux otages israéliens détenus à Gaza, aux prisonniers français en Iran, à tous ceux et à toutes celles injustement emprisonnés en Palestine, en Arabie saoudite et partout à travers le monde. N'oublions pas leurs souffrances, leurs doutes, parfois leurs désespoirs. Que tous recouvrent rapidement la liberté.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Vidéo à regarder..
This post is unavailable. See it on X. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La lettre d'Emmanuel Macron au roi du Maroc, annonçant l'inflexion de la politique française sur le Sahara occidental.
LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
Sire,
Alors que les Marocains s’apprêtent à célébrer Son accession au trône, je suis très heureux de présenter à Votre Majesté mes vœux personnels de santé, de bonheur et de réussite et de Lui renouveler l’expression du sentiment de profonde amitié que le peuple français porte au peuple marocain. A n’en pas douter, la célébration, le 30 juillet prochain, du 25ème anniversaire de l’intronisation de Votre Majesté donnera cette année aux festivités un éclat et un retentissement tout particuliers. A cette occasion, c’est l’ensemble du peuple marocain qui célèbrera la modernisation continue que le Maroc a connue sous l’impulsion de Votre Majesté dans tous les domaines, et qui a conforté au fil des années son statut d’acteur incontournable en Afrique et dans le monde.
Au cours de ces 25 années, la France, sous mon mandat comme sous ceux de mes prédécesseurs, s’est montrée fidèle à son amitié séculaire avec le Maroc, en se tenant à ses côtés, chaque fois qu’il le souhaitait, pour l’accompagner dans ses réalisations les plus ambitieuses. La confiance du Maroc et la qualité des projets réalisés avec lui sont pour la France et le peuple français un motif de grande fierté. Dans le contexte actuel, je souhaite assurer Votre Majesté de mon attachement indéfectible à poursuivre, comme nous en sommes convenus au cours des derniers mois, l’approfondissement et la modernisation du partenariat d’exception qui lie nos deux pays, pour leur permettre de mieux relever ensemble les nouveaux défis auxquels ils font face, avec le continent africain et le reste de la communauté internationale. La France, en particulier, continuera à ancrer la sincérité de son amitié pour le Maroc et l’efficacité de son partenariat avec lui dans une position claire et forte sur les questions les plus essentielles pour Votre Majesté et les Marocains. A ce titre, je considère que le présent et l’avenir du Sahara occidental s’inscrivent dans le cadre de la souveraineté marocaine. Aussi, je Vous affirme l’intangibilité de la position française sur cet enjeu de sécurité nationale pour Votre Royaume. La France entend agir en cohérence avec cette position à titre national et au niveau international. Pour la France, l’autonomie sous souveraineté marocaine est le cadre dans lequel cette question doit être résolue. Notre soutien au plan d'autonomie proposé par le Maroc en 2007 est clair et constant. Pour la France, celui-ci constitue désormais la seule base pour aboutir à une solution politique juste, durable et négociée conformément aux résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies. Au demeurant, la poursuite du développement économique et social de cette région est un impératif. Je salue tous les efforts faits par le Maroc à cet égard. La France l’accompagnera dans cette démarche au bénéfice des populations locales. Il est temps d’avancer. J’encourage donc toutes les parties à se réunir en vue d’un règlement politique, qui est à portée de main. Aujourd’hui un consensus international de plus en plus large se dégage à cet égard. La France y prend toute sa part dans l’ensemble des enceintes concernées. Dans ce contexte, elle soutient les efforts du Secrétaire général des Nations unies et de son Envoyé personnel. Ceux-ci doivent constituer l’amorce d’un processus d’intégration régionale renouvelé, favorisant la coopération, la stabilité et la prospérité au Maghreb. Ainsi renforcé, le Maroc m’apparaît à l’évidence non seulement comme un partenaire de premier plan pour la France comme pour l’Union européenne mais aussi, dans un contexte international particulièrement troublé, comme un pôle de stabilité appelé à jouer un rôle international croissant.
Très attaché, comme Votre Majesté, à ce que la relation entre la France et le Maroc puisse continuer de croître et de se renforcer, j’espère pouvoir me rendre bientôt au Maroc à Son invitation, pour donner corps à Ses côtés à la vision renouvelée que je partage avec Elle, comme les jeunesses de nos deux pays, de la relation entre la France et le Maroc. C’est dans ce sentiment que je prie Votre Majesté d’agréer l’expression de ma très haute considération et de ma profonde amitié.
Emmanuel MACRON -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L’AFP nous apprend que des chrétiens de Mossoul en Irak, choqués par la cérémonie d’ouverture des JO, ont été appelés à jeûner par l'archevêque syriaque catholique de la ville en réaction à cette "insulte à la religion mais aussi à l'humanité".
"Nous n'avons rien d'autre à offrir que la prière et le jeûne pour que Dieu pardonne cette grande insulte", a affirmé à l'AFP Younan Hano, archevêque syriaque catholique de Mossoul. "Nous avons été choqués, alors que la France est un pays de laïcité et d'humanité, un pays qui respecte toutes les nationalités et toutes les religions, qu'un tel comportement offensant envers les symboles religieux vienne de ce pays ", a-t-il ajouté.
A la veille de cet appel, l'Église catholique chaldéenne d'Irak a aussi fait part de son émotion dans un communiqué, mentionnant que son patriarche, le cardinal Louis Raphaël Sako, principal dirigeant chrétien d'Irak, "se tient aux côtés de l'Église de France".
"Ce qui s'est passé durant la cérémonie (...) est honteux", blessant "la foi et les sentiments (...) des chrétiens dans le monde", a-t-elle mis en avant. "Les principes des Jeux olympiques visent à rassembler les peuples dans l'amour, le respect et la coopération, et non dans la blessure et la division", a-t-elle ajouté. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A propos de la dramatique attaque meurtrière attribuée au Hezbollah contre le village druze occupé par Israël depuis 1967 sur le plateau du Golan, j entends bcp de confrères et experts parler du "Golane", prononciation en hébreu du plateau éponyme. Restons dans notre belle langue de Moliere. Dirait-on Perpignane? On pourrait étendre cette remarque au Hamas. J'entends souvent sur les plateaux télés la prononciation "ramas", en hébreu. Gardons le français. C'est mieux.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël: Pour la première fois de son histoire, le parlement israélien a adopté hier à une écrasante majorité une résolution s'opposant à la solution des deux états - la Palestine aux côtés de l'Etat hébreu - comme voie de règlement négociée du conflit. Israël et le Hamas se rejoignent dans le refus d'accepter cette solution pour en finir avec leur différend territorial.
La résolution a été coparrainée par des partis de la coalition du Premier ministre Benjamin Netanyahu ainsi que par des partis de droite de l’opposition et a même reçu le soutien du parti centriste HaMahane HaMamlahti de Benny Gantz.
En réaction, "la France exprime sa consternation à la suite de l’adoption par la Knesset d’une résolution rejetant la perspective d’établissement d’un État palestinien, en contradiction avec les résolutions adoptées au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies".
Selon Paris, "seule la solution à deux États est à même d’apporter une paix juste et durable aux Israéliens comme aux Palestiniens et de garantir la stabilité de la région. La France appelle à ce que cessent les remises en cause de cet impératif reconnu comme tel par l’immense majorité de la communauté internationale".
La réaction française est louable. Mais Paris aurait dû se réveiller beaucoup plus tôt. Il y a belle lurette qu'une telle décision couvait.
C'était très bien de demander à l'Autorité palestinienne de se "réformer", mais dans le même temps, il fallait être exigeant avec Israël sur le sujet de "la solution des deux états".
Et de ce point de vue, la prise de position récente d'Emmanuel Macron sur son refus de reconnaître la Palestine était déséquilibrée dans la mesure où elle oubliait de rappeler cette exigence à Israël, mettant surtout l'accent sur une normalisation à venir des pays arabes avec l'Etat hébreu.
Ce vote de la Knesset a au moins le mérite de clarifier le débat. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Arrivée à Paris des forces de sécurité du Qatar qui participeront à la sécurisation des prochains Jeux Olympiques.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Législatives: "L'état profond français ne souhaitait pas la réélection de Meyer Habib, car il le considérait trop clivant", confie une source sécuritaire à Paris.
Le député sortant de la 8e circonscription des Français de l'étranger, apparenté LR et proche du Premier ministre israélien Benjamin Netanyahu, a été battu par la députée Renaissance Caroline Yadan, selon des résultats disponibles sur le site du ministère des Affaires étrangères et le groupe Renaissance.
Meyer Habib est arrivé largement en tête dans les bureaux de votes israéliens, mais a été nettement battu dans les autres.
Défenseur inlassable d'Israël, ce Franco-Israélien de 63 ans a toujours assumé son amitié avec Benjamin Netanyahu, en faisant même un atout de campagne. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran : la surprise a bel et bien eu lieu. Le réformateur Massoud Pezeshkian (16 millions de voix) et quasi inconnu du grand public a gagné l’élection présidentielle face à l’ultraconservateur Saïd Jalili (13 millions). La république islamique va connaître de nouveau une sorte de cohabitation entre un guide suprême conservateur et détenteur des principaux pouvoirs, l’ayatollah Ali Khamenei, et un président réformateur aux pouvoirs limités, partisan d’un Iran plus tolérant sur le plan social et davantage ouvert à l’Occident. C’est un retour à la posture dominante au cours de ces vingt-cinq dernières années.
La participation, plus forte qu’au premier tour, n’a été que de 50%. C’est une fois de plus le signe que de très nombreux Iraniens se démarquent des institutions de leur pays. Généralement, la mobilisation du camp conservateur est grande. Ca n’a vraisemblablement pas été le cas ce vendredi. La désaffection gagne aussi ses rangs.
Que pourra faire Massoud Pezeshkian ? Depuis cinq ans, les conservateurs ont purgé les rouages de l’état iranien de la présence des réformateurs. Sa marge de manœuvre sera limitée. Le président iranien ne dispose pas des pouvoirs en matière sécuritaire, ni pour infléchir réellement la posture de l’Iran dans le conflit à Gaza. Mais ce chirurgien de 69 ans a affirmé vouloir des relations plus apaisées avec les Etats-Unis. La nomination du très expérimenté Javad Zarif au poste de ministre des Affaires étrangères serait un signe. "Nous ne serons ni anti-Ouest ni anti-Est", a-t-il déclaré, en souhaitant que l'Iran sorte de son "isolement". Il a promis de négocier directement avec Washington pour la relance des pourparlers sur le nucléaire iranien, au point mort depuis le retrait américain en 2018. "Si nous parvenons à faire lever les sanctions américaines, les gens auront une vie plus confortable", a-t-il estimé, conscient que l’enjeu économique est le plus important en Iran. Sur le plan intérieur, il dénonce le recours à la force par la police pour appliquer l'obligation du port du voile par les femmes. "Nous nous opposons à tout comportement violent et inhumain (...) notamment envers nos soeurs et nos filles, et nous ne permettrons pas que de tels actes se produisent."
La composition de son gouvernement, qui s'annonce ardue, donnera une idée de sa marge de manoeuvre par rapport à ses opposants au sein du système.
Quoi qu'il en soit, l’élection d’un réformateur redonne une image moins radicale à la république islamique d’Iran. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A bas bruit, Israël poursuit une annexion, qui ne dit pas son nom, de la Cisjordanie. L'Etat hébreu a approuvé la saisie de 1 270 hectares de terres en Cisjordanie occupée, la plus importante saisies de terres en territoire palestinien depuis trois décennies, selon l'organisation israélienne La Paix maintenant.
"Un pas dans la mauvaise direction", a condamné l'ONU, par la voix de son porte-parole. Ces terres sont situées dans la vallée du Jourdain et pourraient être attribuées à des colons. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Dépêche AFP à lire. Un nombre effarant de journalistes - plus de cent, essentiellement palestiniens - ont été tués depuis le début de la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas à Gaza, faisant de ce conflit un des plus meurtriers pour la presse.
Pour Phil Chetwynd, directeur de l'information de l'AFP dont les bureaux à Gaza ont été gravement endommagés par un probable tir de char israélien le 2 novembre 2023, le nombre de journalistes tués est "complètement inacceptable". "Et la chose qui m'inquiète le plus, c'est que ça ne fait pas scandale. Autour du monde, je ne vois pas les voix des différents gouvernements s'en plaindre. C'est quelque chose qui est extrêmement inquiétant", dit-il.
Les journalistes, dommages collatéraux ou cibles pour l'armée israélienne ? Un consortium de médias internationaux, 50 journalistes représentant 13 organisations, a enquêté sous l'égide de Forbidden Stories, réseau international spécialisé dans l'investigation, pendant quatre mois.
L'enquête publiée mardi par des médias dont Der Spiegel, Le Monde, ARIJ (groupe de presse arabe basé en Jordanie), The Guardian, ZDF et d'autres étudie les cas de journalistes tués ou blessés alors qu'ils couvraient le conflit ou tentaient de raconter la vie quotidienne des Gazaouis en proie à une crise humanitaire sans précédent.
Le nombre de journalistes tués - plus de 100 - est vertigineux. "C'est une des plus flagrantes attaques contre la liberté de la presse que j'ai jamais connues", affirme Carlos Martinez de la Serna, directeur du Comité de protection des journalistes (CPJ), interrogé par le consortium.
L'armée israélienne a rejeté "les fausses accusations selon lesquelles elle vise des journalistes".
L'armée "ne blesse pas intentionnellement des journalistes, qui ont pu être touchés durant des frappes aériennes ou des opérations visant des cibles militaires", a-t-elle écrit en réponse à des questions du consortium.
Elle affirme aussi que "la plupart des cas mentionnés (de journalistes tués, ndlr) sont des militants tués durant des activités militaires, mais recensés comme journalistes".
Le consortium a analysé des milliers d'heures d'images et de sons en provenance de la bande de Gaza, enquêté sur des dizaines de cas dans lesquels des journalistes ont été tués ou blessés.
Selon des chiffres compilés par Arij, au moins 40 journalistes ou travailleurs des médias ont été tués alors qu'ils se trouvaient à leur domicile. Quatorze ont été tués ou blessés ou présumément visés alors qu'ils portaient leur veste de presse à Gaza, en Cisjordanie ou dans le sud du Liban, 18 ont été tués ou blessés dans des frappes de drones à Gaza.
Quatre ont été tués ou blessés dans des frappes de drones alors qu'ils portaient leur gilet presse. Et au moins 40 journalistes travaillant pour des médias affiliés au Hamas ont été tués, selon cette étude.
Pour Laurent Richard, cofondateur de Forbidden Stories, "les journalistes gazaouis savent depuis longtemps que leur veste presse ne les protège plus. Pire, elle les expose peut être davantage", écrit-il dans un éditorial publié mardi.
"Cette veste était supposée nous identifier et nous protéger, en vertu des lois internationales et des conventions de Genève, elle est maintenant une menace pour nous", dit en écho Basel Khair Al-Din, un journaliste palestinien à Gaza affirmant avoir été visé par une attaque de drone lors d'un reportage à Beit Lahia, dans le nord de la bande de Gaza.
Pourtant, "les journalistes sont les témoins dont l'Histoire a besoin", souligne Laurent Richard.
Selon le syndicat des journalistes palestiniens, près de 70 infrastructures de presse ont été partiellement voire entièrement détruites depuis le début du conflit.
"S'il y avait 100 ou 140 journalistes israéliens ou ukrainiens tués, je ne pense pas que la réaction du monde serait la même", dit à Forbidden stories Shourouk Assad, porte-parole du syndicat des journalistes palestiniens.
"Je ne souhaite à aucun journaliste de mourir, qu'il soit israélien, ukrainien ou palestinien. Les journalistes devraient être protégés quel que soit le pays dans lequel ils se trouvent", lance-t-elle. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Haro sur le RN chez des diplomate. Un collectif de 170 diplomates et ancien diplomates a publié dimanche une pétition dans le quotidien Le Monde contre une victoire de l'extrême droite aux prochaines législatives, qui viendrait selon eux "affaiblir la France et l'Europe alors que la guerre est là" (AFP).
"Nous avons vu la Russie envahir des Etats souverains et défaire d'un sillon de chars ce qui avait garanti la paix sur le continent européen. (...) Nous avons vu le terrorisme frapper les démocraties, des régimes illibéraux réduire le pluralisme et la liberté des médias, l’antisémitisme monter de manière inacceptable et des violations massives du droit international humanitaire dans la bande de Gaza, qui déstabilisent toute la région".
"Nous ne pouvons nous résoudre à ce qu'une victoire de l'extrême droite vienne affaiblir la France et l'Europe alors que la guerre est là. En Europe" et que le "nationalisme" "défait les alliances et déconstruit les sociétés", observent les signataires. Et de citer les "atteintes graves aux institutions et au pluralisme en Hongrie", où l'extrême droite gouverne, mais aussi "aux Etats-Unis sous Donald Trump" ou encore la "perte d'influence internationale du Brésil sous Jair Bolsonaro" ou "du Royaume-Uni après le Brexit".
"Nos adversaires liront une victoire de l'extrême droite comme un affaiblissement français et une invitation : à l'ingérence dans notre politique nationale, à l'agressivité contre l'Europe, y compris militairement, à la vassalisation économique de la France et du continent", listent les 170 diplomates et ancien diplomates.
"L'armure fendue de notre pays l'exposera aux coups plus nombreux portés par eux, assénés avec une énergie décuplée, répandant le poison de la division, du communautarisme, du racisme et de l'antisémitisme et menaçant tant la cohésion que la sécurité nationales", pronostiquent-ils. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Confidence d'un connaisseur des arcanes du pouvoir français: "Quand je vois le nombre de diplomates et de hauts fonctionnaires qui font des offres de services auprès de Jordan Bardella, il aura de quoi faire son cabinet ministériel, s'il est désigné Premier ministre, sans compter les avocats, les juristes, les ambassadeurs aussi, qui expliqueront qu'ils assurent la continuité de l'Etat" en soutenant Jordan Bardella et le RN.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le chef de la diplomatie européenne, Josep Borrell, a appelé Israël à ne pas "intimider" et "menacer" les juges de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI), dont le procureur général a requis des mandats d'arrêt contre le Premier ministre israélien Benjamin Netanyahu et son ministre de la Défense (AFP).
"Je demande à tout le monde, à commencer par le gouvernement d'Israël, mais aussi certains gouvernements européens, de ne pas intimider les juges, de ne pas les menacer", a déclaré M. Borrell dans une interview à la télévision publique espagnole TVE, en appelant au "respect de la Cour pénale internationale". -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le procureur de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) a demandé lundi des mandats d'arrêt contre le Premier ministre israélien Benjamin Netanyahu et des dirigeants du Hamas pour des crimes de guerre et crimes contre l'humanité présumés commis dans la bande de Gaza.
Karim Khan a déclaré dans un communiqué qu'il demandait des mandats d'arrêt contre Netanyahu et le ministre de la Défense israélien Yoav Gallant pour des crimes tels que "le fait d'affamer délibérément des civils", "homicide intentionnel" et "extermination et/ou meurtre".
Yahia Sinwar, Mohamed Deif et Ismaël Haniyeh du Hamas sont également visés. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'Unrwa a annoncé jeudi soir fermer ses bureaux de Jérusalem-Est après que "des extrémistes israéliens" ont "mis le feu" à des zones en plein air de l'enceinte, a annoncé sur X le patron de l'agence de l'ONU pour les réfugiés palestiniens.
"Des Israéliens ont mis le feu deux fois au périmètre du QG de l'Unrwa dans Jérusalem-Est occupée", ce alors que "du personnel de l'Unrwa et d'autres agences de l'ONU étaient présents" à l'intérieur, a indiqué Philippe Lazzarini, précisant avoir "pris la décision de fermer l'enceinte jusqu'à ce que soit rétablie une sécurité adéquate". Il a dénoncé un "deuxième incident odieux en moins d'une semaine", commis selon lui par des "extrémistes" et dans lequel "les vies d'employés de l'ONU ont été mises gravement en danger". -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La France a accueilli en novembre 2004 Yasser Arafat, le chef de l’Autorité palestinienne, pour se faire soigner à Paris, avant de mourir, quelques jours après.
Elle a accueilli en mars 2023 en « visite privée », le ministre israélien des Finances, Bezalel Smotrich, suprémaciste juif, partisan du « Grand Israël de la Méditerranée au Jourdain ».
Le 4 mai 2024, elle refuse l’entrée sur son territoire du chirurgien palestino-britannique, Ghassan Abu-Sitta, qui était allé soigner les Palestiniens à Gaza en début d’année, sous prétexte que l’Allemagne l’a banni pour un an de tout l’espace Schengen. Il devait participer à une conférence organisée au Sénat par la sénatrice écologiste Raymonde Poncet-Monge. Finalement, avant d’être expulsé ce soir vers Londres par les autorités françaises, le Dr Abu-Sitta a pu faire une visio-conférence depuis l’aéroport de Roissy.
L'image, déjà écornée dans certaines parties du monde, de la France "pays des droits de l'homme" ne va s'améliorer. -
Gérard Larcher
@gerard_larcher
À @sciencespo une poignée de militants d’extrême gauche prend des milliers d’étudiants en otage avec le soutien purement électoraliste de la @FranceInsoumise . L’accord octroyé par la direction est un renoncement qui interpelle. L’impunité n’est pas acceptable, ça suffit !
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
M. Le président, prendre en otage a une toute autre signification. Je ne vous souhaite pas d'expérimenter cette douloureuse épreuve.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Hamas-Israël-Trêve? Si l'on en croit le site Axios, citant des responsables israéliens, la récente bienveillance du Hamas à l'égard de la dernière proposition de trêve portée par Israël et l'Egypte serait liée au fait que "pour la première fois" depuis le 7 octobre, Israël se dit prêt à discuter de l'établissement "d'une période de calme durable", une des principales revendications du Hamas dans les pourparlers qui se tiennent depuis des mois au Caire et à Doha. En échange de la libération d'otages israélien, le mouvement islamiste palestinien réclame en effet un cessez-le-feu durable et un retrait militaire israélien de la bande de Gaza. Les prochains jours nous en diront plus sur la position des uns et des autres. A suivre!
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Voici ce qu'il reste de la belle maison du general Antoine Lahad à Marjayoun au sud-Liban, anéantie par une frappe israélienne. Il etait l'ancien chef de la milice libanaise pro-israelienne jusqu'au départ des soldats israéliens du sud Liban en 2000. Région passée sous le contrôle du Hezbollah, depuis. Israël l'a frappée ces derniers jours dans sa guerre contre la formation pro-iranienne.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A tous ceux qui prétendaient qu'il n'y avait pas d'ambassadeur d'Iran à Paris, relayant "une fake news" comme l'a dit le ministre des Affaires étrangères Stéphane Séjourné, une lecture de mon tweet du 9 avril les aurait informés. Il annonçait l'arrivée quasi concomitante des nouveaux ambassadeurs d'Iran (Mohamed Amin Nejad) et.... d'Israël (Joshua Zarka) en France.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Attaque inédite de l'Iran contre Israël. Premières leçons.
1- 99% des drones et missiles ont été interceptés par les systèmes de défense israéliens aidés par les US, la GB et la France. Très peu de dégâts causés. Efficacité du Dôme de fer confirmé.
2- L'Iran a rompu avec sa politique traditionnelle de riposte asymétrique. Besoin de laver l'affront de l'assassinat par Israël des 7 gardiens de la révolution au consulat iranien de Damas. Une ligne rouge avait été franchie par Israël. Téhéran répond en franchissant une ligne rouge. Sa crédibilité avait déjà été sérieusement entachée par l'élimination de très nombreux cadres militaires iraniens en Syrie par Israël au cours des dernières années. La guerre de l'ombre iranienne contre Israël ne suffisait plus, selon Téhéran.
3- L'Iran considère l'affaire "close". Elle ne veut pas aller plus loin. Il n'y a pas eu de collaboration massive de ses alliés - deux roquettes tirées par le Hezbollah contre le plateau du Golan et d'autres par les Houthis. Son attaque suivie en direct peut-être considérée comme une attaque à minima. Téhéran a averti qu'en cas de riposte israélienne, la réponse iranienne serait cette fois plus massive. L'Iran a pris un risque. Téhéran a perdu le bénéfice de l'accusation d'escalade. C'est Benjamin Netanyahou qui légitimement peut accuser l'Iran de vouloir une escalade. Les pays arabes sans dénoncer nommément l'Iran désapprouvent.
4 - Quelle suite? La réponse est en grande partie aux Etats-Unis. Selon le site Axios, Joe Biden s'opposera à une nouvelle attaque de riposte israélienne. Joe Biden a convoqué une réunion du G-7 cet après-midi pour entériner une "réponse diplomatique" à la plus grave crise irano-israélienne de ces dernières décennies. -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'Iran appelle les Etats-Unis à "rester en dehors" de son conflit avec Israël, après ses tirs de drones contre l'Etat hébreu. Des informations avaient fait état de messages transmis ces derniers jours par Téhéran à Washington selon lesquels l'Iran indiquait aux Etats-Unis que ses bases au Moyen-Orient pourraient être visées si les US participaient à une attaque contre la république islamique.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël-Hamas. Trois enfants du chef du bureau politique du Hamas, Ismaël Haniyeh, ont été tués dans une frappe israélienne dans la bande de Gaza. "Leur mort n'affectera pas nos demandes" en vue d'un cessez-le-feu avec Israël, a réagi Haniyeh, qui vit en exil à Doha au Qatar.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Sortie le 4 avril de mon prochain livre écrit avec @cchesnot "MBS Confidentiel. Enquête sur le nouveau maître du Moyen-Orient" chez @michellafon.
Pour se le procurer
shorturl.at/jlwDH -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le porte-parole du Quai d'Orsay annonce que la justice française est "compétente pour connaître des crimes commis par des ressortissants français à l'étranger, y compris dans le cadre du conflit" entre Israël et le Hamas à Gaza, où des binationaux, en l'occurrence de nombreux Franco-israéliens, sont engagés. Il évoque "une vidéo choquante et abjecte" d'un Franco-israélien face à un Palestinien. D'autres vidéos, selon nos informations, ont été transmises aux autorités françaises. Des avocats entendent porter ces affaires devant la justice française.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Avec un cynisme assumé, Jared Kushner, gendre de Donald Trump, propose de "déplacer" les 2 millions de Palestiniens de la bande de Gaza dans le Néguev en "passant juste un coup de bulldozer" dans ce désert israélien. Ca promet en cas d'élection de Trump!
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/19/jared-kushner-gaz… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Plus d'enfants ont été tués dans la bande de Gaza en 4 mois de guerre avec Israël qu'en 4 ans de conflits à travers le monde, assure le patron de l'agence de l'ONU pour les réfugiés palestiniens. "Vertigineux", selon Philippe Lazzarini qui dénonce une "guerre contre les enfants"
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'ONU exhorte le monde à "inonder" Gaza avec de l'aide pour sauver les enfants "qui commencent à mourir de faim", après s'être rendue dans 2 hôpitaux du nord de l'enclave pour la 1ère fois depuis le début du conflit. L'OMS a fait état de scènes "sinistres" d'enfants affamés.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Depuis le début de la guerre dans la bande de Gaza, le nombre de colonies sauvages et de nouvelles routes pour les colons israéliens a connu une progression "sans précédent" en Cisjordanie occupée, soutient dans une nouvelle étude l'ONG israélienne Peace Now.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L’arrivée à la tête de la DGSE de Nicolas Lerner, qui dirigeait les Renseignements intérieurs (DGSI), suscite des remous à la « Piscine ». « Des agents lui reprochent d’avoir laissé la DGSI s’associer avec la société US Palantir proche de la CIA », confie une source sécuritaire.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
L'agent du ministère des Affaires étrangères français qui a été tué lors d'un bombardement israélien à Rafah dans le sud de la bande de Gaza est un Palestinien qui travaillait depuis plusieurs années pour le consulat général de France, selon nos informations.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Un leader politique libanais, proche de la France mais déçu de ses positions actuelles, me montre 2 articles de presse sur le conflit israélo-palestinien qu'il a envoyés sur le portable d'Emmanuel Macron dans l'espoir de faire évoluer sa position. Réponse du président: "merci".
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La situation dans la bande de Gaza est "apocalyptique", a averti le patron de la diplomatie européenne Josep Borrell, pour qui le niveau de destruction dans le territoire palestinien est "plus ou moins, voire supérieur" à celui de l'Allemagne lors de la Seconde guerre mondiale.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le Premier ministre du Qatar, cheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahmane al-Thani, affirme qu'une "génération entière d'habitants du Moyen-Orient risque de se radicaliser en raison de la guerre à Gaza".
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
"En continuant à fournir 1 couverture diplomatique aux atrocités à Gaza (les Etats-Unis) signalent que la vie de certaines personnes compte moins que celle des autres", réagit l'ONG MSF après le veto US à 1 résolution du Conseil de sécurité exigeant "un cessez le feu humanitaire"
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël-Gaza: Censure dans un centre de recherche. "On a reçu instruction de ne pas débattre de la situation à Gaza. La direction a interdit aux enseignants de signer des articles, faute de quoi ils pourraient être convoqués par la commission de discipline", déplore un enseignant.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Après Emmanuel Macron et le secrétaire US à la Défense, la vice-présidente US Kamala Harris avertit Israël. "Trop de Palestiniens innocents ont été tués. Franchement, l'étendue de la souffrance ainsi que les images et les vidéos qui nous viennent de Gaza sont dévastatrices".
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël savait depuis un an que le Hamas avait un plan d'attaque sans précédent, révèle le New York Times. Documents secrets à l'appui. A lire. Ci-dessous la dépêche AFP.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Netanyahou veut accélérer la colonisation en Cisjordanie. «Si les US et la France qui ont relancé la solution à 2 États ne réagissent pas à ce que vient d’annoncer le gvt israélien, la crédibilité de leur narratif sera gravement mise en cause.» Le Figaro.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/profitant-de-la-treve-israe… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Transfert: La ministre israélienne du Renseignement, Gila Gamliel, appelle la communauté internationale à "promouvoir la réinstallation volontaire" des Palestiniens "hors de la bande de Gaza", "plutôt que d'envoyer de l'argent pour reconstruire" le territoire pilonné par Israël.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Début de fronde d'ambassadeurs au Moyen-Orient contre E. Macron. Le Figaro révèle une "note commune" rédigée collectivement par un groupe de diplomates mécontents de son virage pro-israélien. "Du jamais vu ds la diplo française à l'égard du monde arabe".
www.lefigaro.fr/international/conflit-israel-hamas-des-am… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Lire l'entretien lucide de Charles Sitzenstuhl, député Renaissance du Bas-Rhin, au Figaro. Condamnation du terrorisme du Hamas et analyse contextualisée pour avancer et comprendre les défis qui nous attendent. Loin des boutefeux de tous bords.
www.lefigaro.fr/politique/charles-sitzenstuhl-attention-a… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Près de la moitié des Israéliens (49%) seraient opposés à une opération terrestre militaire "immédiate" dans la bande de Gaza, selon une enquête du quotidien Maariv. 29% sont pour. Ils étaient 65% à soutenir une invasion militaire, la semaine dernière, sans référence à une date.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Second pays à avoir fait la paix avec Israël, la Jordanie a encore une fois sévèrement critiqué l'Etat hébreu: "Israël transforme Gaza en enfer sur Terre perpétuel. Le traumatisme hantera des générations entières", a dit Ayman Safadi ministre des Affaires étrangères à l'ONU.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Face au scepticisme, l'Elysée rétropédale sur la proposition d'E. Macron de créer une coalition internationale anti-Hamas sur le modèle de celle contre Daech. Il s'agit "de s'inspirer de l'expérience de la Coalition anti-Daech et voir quels aspects st réplicables contre le Hamas.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Il n'est pas exagéré de dire qu'Israel a vécu son 11 Septembre. En 35 ans de suivi du conflit, je ne me souviens pas d'un tel bilan: des dizaines de morts, des infiltrations de dizaines d'hommes en armes des dizaines d'otages. Des images sidérantes. Reoccuper Gaza ne réglera rien
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Commentaire d’un diplomate français après le coup d’état au Gabon : «On reproduit à chaque fois le même logiciel. Nous savons ce qui est bon pour l’Afrique. C’est de la faute aux Russes. Il y a les démocrates et les putschistes. On est dans l'aveuglement et le déni de réalité".
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
UAE-Israël: "We postponed Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the UAE, and we have to differentiate between our long term commitment to the relationship and dealing with the current Israeli authorities", says an Emirati high official. "We have three red lines" vis-à-vis Israël.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Niveau de destructions au camp de réfugiés palestiniens de Jenin en Cisjordanie, après l'opération militaire israélienne qui a tué 10 Palestiniens hier.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
20 ans après la guerre en Irak: le journaliste Pierre Prier rappelle que des intellectuels français l'avaient soutenue: BHL, Alain Finkielkraut, Pascal Bruckner, André Glucksmann et le chercheur Bruno Tertrais. Une "guerre légitime", selon ce dernier!
orientxxi.info/magazine/des-intellectuels-francais-en-cro… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
"L'image de la France se dégrade énormément en Afrique. Nous ne voulons pas apparaître comme son seul soutien", s'inquiétaient des proches du pdt ivoirien Alassane Ouattara lors de son récent séjour à Paris. "Vous devez faire quelque chose", ont-ils demandé à des diplo français.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Hommage et respect, Lucien George, ancien correspondant du Monde au Liban, est mort à l'âge de 85 ans. Ses papiers durant la guerre civile m'ont donné le goût de l'Orient.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Qatargate-Morocco: confidences of a French diplomat. "Emmanuel Macron is due to go to Morocco, probably in February; but we don't have a date yet. Moroccans would like us to publish a press release against Algeria before," added this diplomat a few days ago.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Qatargate : La justice belge a transmis aux autorités françaises des mandats d’arrêt contre « plusieurs responsables marocains » impliqués dans le Qatargate, révèle Le Figaro. « Nous sommes embarrassés, confie un diplomate. Ces personnes ont des enfants en France ".
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Décision courageuse de l'ambassadrice d'Israël en France, Yael German, qui démissionne le jour de la formation du gouvernement de Benjamin Netanyahu, le plus à droite de l'histoire d'Israël. "Votre politique, les déclarations des ministres sont contraires à ma conscience".
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Les renseignements israéliens, qui sont ceux qui connaissent probablement le mieux le pouvoir iranien pour l'avoir copieusement infiltré, estiment que "le régime répressif parviendra à survivre aux manifestations (...)" qui secoue la république islamique depuis 2,5 mois.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Qatar. Emmanuel Macron a raison: "Il ne faut pas politiser le sport. Ces questions-là (de boycott de la coupe du monde), il faut se les poser quand on attribue l'événement", a déclaré le président de la république. Et on ne peut pas le soupçonner de tropisme pro-Qatar.
-
Nabil Ennasri
@NabilEnnasri
Tweets un peu en mode NRV 😡. C’est quand même dommage de voir certains parler de la Coupe du monde ⚽️ & du #qatar avec de grosses contre vérités et erreurs factuelles. Exemple à l’instant avec @cchesnot sur @France5tv qui sort deux belles boulettes en 10 secondes. Mini thread 👇
Post not available here, view on X
Nabil Ennasri
@NabilEnnasri
👉🏻 2e erreur : « aucune infrastructure sportive au🇶🇦 avant 2010 ». L’émirat a accueilli les Jeux d’Asie en 2006, soit l’un des événements sportifs le + important de la planète après le Mondial & les JO. Il a sans doute organisé cette compétition « sans aucune infrastructure » 😊.
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Nabil, n'essaie pas de te rappeler au bon souvenir de tes amis Qatariens. Non il n'y a pas de tradition sportive chez les Qatariens. Ce qui n'a pas empêché Doha de développer un soft power sportif.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Algérie : Quelques semaines après le voyage d'Élisabeth Borne et qques mois après celui d'Emmanuel Macron, les nouveaux billets sont en anglais.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Arabie saoudite: Aucun responsable politique américain n'a été invité au "Forum du désert", organisé à partir de mardi à Riyad par le prince héritier Mohamed Bin Salman. En revanche, une très importante délégation chinoise, avec 80 chefs d'entreprises, sera présente.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Emmanuel Macron irrité devant sa ministre des Affaires étrangères. Un diplomate raconte: "le Président lui a signifié durant l'été que notre diplomatie était trop plan-plan au Moyen-Orient. Il faut me trouver quelque chose", lui a intimé Emmanuel Macron. "Je veux une initiative"
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Entretien avec Guilhem Giraud, spécialiste des écoutes et ex-DST, qui publie un livre. Une info dans l'itw: les services de rens français se débarrassent du logiciel US Palantir. Egalement dans son livre: comment Israël a capté des écoutes aux Pays-Bas?
www.lefigaro.fr/livres/guilhem-giraud-la-surveillance-de-… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Il y a 18 ans, C. Chesnot et moi-même étions enlevés en Irak, avant d'être libérés 124 jours + tard. Demain, le journaliste Olivier Dubois sera détenu depuis 500 jours. La mobilisation forte en 2004 doit être la même aujourd'hui pour obtenir la libération de notre confrère.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Qatar : manifestation rare de travailleurs étrangers dans le centre de Doha. A 3 mois de la Coupe du monde. Ils n'ont pas reçu leurs salaires. De telles manifestations ont déjà eu lieu dans la zone industrielle, mais rarement en centre-ville.
مرسال قطر
@Marsalqatar
وزارة العمل رداً على فيديو العمال:
جاري اتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة ضد المنشآت المخالفة
#مرسال_قطر | #قطر 🇶🇦 -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Espionnage industriel à Paris. Un patron d'un groupe de la distribution s'est fait "dépoussiérer" son appartement parisien par des services spécialisés selon nos informations. Trois systèmes de micros apparemment reliés aux services de renseignements chinois y ont été découverts.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La Russie a perdu 28 000 soldats en trois mois de guerre en Ukraine, selon les estimations de la DGSE, les services de renseignements extérieurs français, confie un agent. "C'est une véritable bérézina", ajoute notre source.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Guerre en Ukraine: "82% de la population mondiale refuse de condamner Vladimir Poutine", affirme sur BFMTV l'ancienne ambassadrice de France en Russie, Sylvie Bermann, en se fondant sur les votes aux Nations unies.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
"Les Anglais nous ont fait passer le message que si personne n'arrête les mercenaires russes de Wagner en Afrique et surtout s'ils rentrent dans la partie anglophone du Cameroun, leurs services spécialisés se chargeraient de les stopper", confie une source diplomatique française.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
On apprend ce vendredi la visite de Bachar el-Assad à Dubai aux Emirats arabes unis, sa 1ère dans un pays arabe en 11 ans de révolte. Le même jour, les EAU et l'Arabie laissent filtrer qu'ils ne recevront pas Blinken sec d'état US en quête de geste sur le marché pétrolier mondial
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Liban: Le FMI devrait verser en sept 860 millions de dollars en droits de tirage spéciaux à la Banque centrale, dans le cadre des crédits pour lutter contre le Covid. «Paris et d’autres ne veulent pas que cet argent soit versé à la BDL mais juridiquemt peuvent-ils s’y opposer? »
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Très grande discrétion en France après la frappe israélienne, il y a + de 24 h, contre la tour des médias AP et Al-Jazeera à Gaza-ville. Ni le Quai d'Orsay, ni Emmanuel Macron, à l'Elysée, qui affirme pourtant régulièrement son attachement au droit d'informer n'ont encore réagi.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Calme précaire ce matin dans la vieille ville de Jérusalem. 20 morts palestiniens - dont 9 enfants - à Gaza, après les 130 frappes israéliennes contre des cibles militaires. 200 roquettes tirées depuis Gaza, 90% interceptées, 30 blessés israéliens, la plupart à Ashekelon.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
En 2009 et 2017, la municipalité de Mulhouse qui accorda un don global de 460 000 euros à la mosquée An-Nour liée aux Frères était dirigée par le centre puis LR. Strasbourg qui en fait autant en 2021 est dirigée par les Verts. Le clientélisme transcende les clivages politiques.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Iran-Occident: Retour de la diplomatie des otages. "L'Europe est le ventre mou", confie un diplomate européen. "On n'est plus dans un échange un contre un", prévient un Franco-Iranien, après la révélation de la détention d'un Français. Lire dans Le Figaro.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/teheran-reprend-sa-diplomat… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le prince Hassan est un véritable homme de dialogue... francophile et francophone. Son professeur de français était il y a plus de 50 ans le père Tournay de l'école biblique de Jérusalem.
Hanan Ben Rhouma
@HananBR
"Le meilleur moyen de défendre le Prophète consiste à donner un bon exemple et à incarner les vertus du Prophète devant l'Humanité." Le message responsable de l'oncle du roi de Jordanie aux musulmans pour le #mawlid 👉xfru.it/ZNEXUu via @saphirnews #exclusif #caricatures
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le Premier ministre canadien Justin Trudeau a défendu la liberté d'expression tout en estimant qu'elle n'était "pas sans limites" et ne devait pas "blesser de façon arbitraire et inutile" certaines communautés. Prise de distance vis-à-vis d'E. Macron.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le Renseignement territorial est souvent excellent pour détecter les prédicateurs, influenceurs. Le problème se situe au-dessus au niveau de la hiérarchie du min Int ou + haut où notes et rapports s'entassent. Nous en avons eu la preuve au cours de notre enquête sur Qatar Papers.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Israël: l'intellectuel pacifiste Zeev Sternhell, 85 ans, est mort. Il était un militant sincère de la paix avec les Palestiniens, opposé à la colonisation de leurs territoires par l'Etat hébreu. Francophone parfait, il était aussi un spécialiste du fascisme. Il manquera à Israël.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La kaaba à La Mecque désespérément vide en ce début de ramadan. Lire mon reportage avec témoignages d'habitants de la ville la plus sainte de l'islam, dans Le Figaro.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/coronavirus-la-mecque-foyer… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
#qatarpapers Dans les Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace. La mosquée centre de vie An-Nour de Mulhouse, 1er investissement de Qatar Charity en Europe. Révélation de notre livre sur Hanane Aboulhana, tuée dans l'assaut du Raid à la prison de Condé-sur-Sarthe, début mars.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
A l'issue de plus de trois heures d'entretien au Quai d'Orsay, le vice-ministre iranien des Affaires étrangères Abbas Araghchi annonce au Figaro que Paris et Téhéran vont échanger "très prochainement" des ambassadeurs.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/2019/02/05/01003-20190205AR… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Le Quai d'Orsay empêtré dans l'affaire Khashoggi. Jean-Yves Le Drian affirme ne pas avoir eu connaissance des rens fournis par Ankara à la France sur l'assassinat du journaliste. Alors que, selon Ankara, "le 24 oct un agent français a écouté un enregistrement audio".
-
Post not available here, view on X
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Et même ceux comme Le Figaro qui sont allés au Yémen, depuis bien plus lgts que les autres, et qui n'ont pas été invités...
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
J. Khashoggi: la Turquie met la pression sur l'Arabie. Le quotidien pro-gouvernemental Sabah publie photo à l'appui les noms de 15 Saoudiens présentés comme des agents du renseignement, impliqués dans la disparition du journaliste-dissident, il y a 8 j au consulat d'Istanbul.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Arabie: quelqu'un a-t-il entendu une réaction du Quai d'Orsay après l'expulsion de l'ambassadeur du Canada à Riyad par l'Arabie saoudite, qui avait critiqué les atteintes aux droits de l'homme dans le royaume?
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
La carte de visite qu'Alexandre Benalla m'avait remise le 14 mars 2017 au Ritz à Paris à l'issue de l'itw du cheikh irakien Jamal al-Dhari, qu'il protégeait. Se présente comme "Directeur de la sûreté et de la sécurité" d'En Marche. Il devait faire quelques "ménages" à côté.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Yémen : comment un Français s'est retrouvé détenu deux mois dans une prison secrète entre les mains de nos alliés dans cette guerre, dont on parle si peu.
www.lefigaro.fr/international/2018/05/31/01003-20180531AR… -
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Avec la nomination de Mike Pompeo au Département d'Etat, l'Iran récupère un "faucon" dans la relation Washington-Téhéran. Avec le départ de Rex Tillerson du State Department, le Qatar perd un allié précieux ds sa guerre contre l'Arabie et les Emirats.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Les contradictions de Valls: "je ne crois pas à des décisions unilatérales", dit-il à propos de la dde d'Abbas à l'UE de reconnaître l'Etat de Palestine. Mais quand Trump unilatéralement transfère son ambas à Jéru, Valls dit que "tt le monde sait que Jéru est la capit d'Israël".
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
Selon le Financial Times l Arabie va etablir des "hubs" de communication à Paris Londres Berlin et Moscou pour ameliorer son image.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
I- Confidence d'un proche des Emirats: "Le Qatar a gagné la guerre de la communication" dans le conflit entre Doha, Riyad et Abou Dhabi.
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
II- "Le Qatar a très bien su se poser en victime" des sanctions qui lui ont été imposées par ses voisins, ajoute la source.
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
III- "Notamment en insistant sur les mesures qui ont frappé les binationaux et le blocus qui n'en est pas un réellement", ajoute-t-il.
-
Georges Malbrunot
@Malbrunot
I- Philippe Etienne nommé conseiller diplo d'E. Macron: "une personnalité consensuelle et de grande qualité" (diplo qui le connait bien).



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































