The UK/ Europe’s Scale-Up Failure Is Now a Strategic Risk
Good to spend time with colleagues at @Economie_Gouv in Paris this week, discussing access to finance and the Kukies/Noyer report. It offers a stark diagnosis of Europe’s growth problem - and clear conclusions.
Europe’s innovation challenge is stark and while things might be a little better in the UK, we have some similar issues and much to gain by thinking how to interconnect to a bigger European tech industry and the capital market required to build it.
Facts that struck me:
• Euro-area labour productivity is now around 20% below the US, despite parity in the late 1990s. Almost the entire gap is explained by technology; excluding ICT, European productivity would have matched the US between 2000 and 2019.
• Europe has produced no €100bn+ companies in 50 years; the US has produced all six trillion-dollar firms. Only 14 European firms founded in that period have reached $10bn market capitalisation, versus 240+ in the US.
• Seven US tech firms generated $245bn a year in economic profit (2020–24) and spent $239bn on R&D in 2024, nearly matching total EU business R&D.
• Those same firms invested $25bn in VC in 2024, close to the entire European VC market ($31bn). Late-stage mega-rounds now dominate global VC, driven by AI.
• Result? Europe is strategically dependent on US tech. 70% of the EU cloud market is controlled by three US firms. The largest European AI company is valued at ~$13.5bn; leading US firms approach $1tn.
• Yet this is not a savings problem. European households save heavily (15.4% in the euro area), hold €39.5tn in financial assets - yet 30.6% sits in cash. But long term pension savings are underweight. EU pension assets amount to ~25% of GDP (vs ~150% in the US), with just 23% of Europeans in occupational pension schemes.
This helps explain just why European IPO activity is at a near 20-year low.
Key messages
1.The problem is scale, not innovation. Europe produces startups — it fails to scale them.
2.The scale-up gap is now strategic. It drives the productivity gap and deepens dependence in cloud, AI and data.
3.capital markets are too shallow and fragmented. Risk capital is scarce, pensions are small, and the Single Market remains fractured.
4.Public finance helped early stages — but cannot fund AI-scale growth. Private institutional capital is essential.
5.Time is running out. AI and deeptech are becoming more capital-intensive as European VC weakens.
What to do — the “FIVE” agenda
1.Reform pensions to build long-term capital pools
2.Mobilise institutional capital via Tibi-style initiatives
3.Upgrade public tools into true late-stage catalysts
4.Create a genuine “28th regime” for scaleups
5.Restore competitiveness to European public markets
So what does this mean for the UK? Let me know as we finalise our Committee’s Report on Financing the Real Economy.