Of potential interest: The Syria and Iraq War III chapters from my 2021 book Enough Already: Time to End the War on Terrorism:
Syria
Expediting the Chaotic Collapse
Dick Cheney’s Middle East adviser, neoconservative strategist David Wurmser, wrote in his 1996 article “Coping with Crumbling States” that the U.S. should seek to “expedite the chaotic collapse” of Syria as soon as they were done overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Unfortunately for Wurmser, the opportunity to destroy Syria did not come until after he was out of power. Americans concerned about bin Ladenite terrorism might have wondered why in the world they should want to spread any more chaos in the region after the catastrophe of Iraq War II.
In an age of international terrorism waged by radical Islamists, Bashar al-Assad was a secularist who shaved his chin every morning, wore a three-piece suit and was an old acquaintance of Secretary of State John Kerry. His father’s government had joined George H.W. Bush’s coalition against Iraq in 1991 and cooperated with America and Israel at the Madrid and Oslo meetings. Bashar al-Assad had voted for America’s UN Security Council Resolution 1441 mandating the return of the weapons inspectors to Iraq. He had also been willing to negotiate with Israel over the Golan Heights in the George W. Bush years, before Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice intervened and forced the Israelis to halt the talks.
Assad was a “reformer,” Hillary Clinton had said. Assad’s regime had been torturing people for the CIA as part of the “extraordinary rendition” program since her husband’s administration in the 1990s. Former CIA officer Robert Baer seemed to be honest about his own role in the program when he told the New Statesman that, “If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want someone to disappear — never to see them again — you send them to Egypt.” The George W. Bush administration, in a case of mistaken identity, handed an innocent Canadian named Maher Arar over to the Syrians to be tortured.
As revealed in leaked State Department cables, in 2010 Assad’s government invited the U.S. to join their efforts against bin Ladenites crossing the border from Syria into Iraq.
Assad was not a full-fledged American sock-puppet dictator like Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, but he had been mostly cooperative in the War on Terrorism and certainly had no love for al Qaeda. Syria had been accused of helping to facilitate the entry of foreign fighters into Iraq earlier during Iraq War II, though it was never proven that his government was behind the jihadists’ border crossings. If it were true that Assad had done so, his motives would have been defensive in nature, and understandable, if not justifiable: to get those dangerous terrorists out of his country and help keep the United States bogged down in Iraq before they could move on to the next stage of their publicly stated plan: overthrowing him.
In 2007, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi went to Syria. There she visited the Omayyad mosque in Old Damascus and met with President Assad for three hours, insisting despite the Bush administration’s objections that diplomacy with Syria was vital. “We came in friendship, hope and determined that the road to Damascus is a road to peace,” she said. In 2011, John Kerry told the Carnegie Endowment that “President Assad has been very generous with me in terms of the discussions we have had. And when I last went to — the last several trips to Syria — I asked President Assad to do certain things to build the relationship with the United States.” According to the AP, Kerry listed six requests for Assad, including working together on Iraqi border security and said the Syrians fulfilled them all.
In any case, the Syrian government certainly never attacked or threatened the United States. Intervening in that country did not serve to protect the American people in any way. The hawks would agree and claim this shows that selfless humanitarian concerns were at the core of their policy. The American Superman had to go and save the nice people. But that is not what the U.S. role in Syria was about. The policy was regime change. But after the rise of al Qaeda in Iraq in the aftermath of Iraq War II, the obvious question was if the U.S. did succeed in overthrowing the Ba’athist regime in Syria, what organized force in the country could possibly replace it? The obvious answer was the Muslim Brotherhood if you’re lucky. The Brotherhood had posed a major problem for the Syrian government in the past. In 1982, Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, had massacred thousands of members of the Brotherhood, their supporters and nearby civilians in the town of Hama to successfully repress a four-year armed Islamist uprising. Though the group remained mostly underground, it was obvious years before the war began that any attempt to overthrow the Ba’athists would benefit the Brotherhood first. The U.S. government knew it too. They did it anyway.
The Redirection
As discussed previously, in direct contravention of its designers’ intentions, the second Iraq war (2003–2011) resulted in the installation of Iran’s closest allies, the Shi’ite Da’wa Party and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), in the new Iraqi parliament. Crucially, it also included the creation of the new Iraqi army which drew primarily from the ranks of ISCI’s murderous Badr Brigade and other allied Shi’ite militias. The failure of the United States, by increasing of the influence of its major regional competitor, was apparent to neoconservative policy advisers such as Zalmay Khalilzad and Elliot Abrams by 2006, not to mention the outraged Saudi royals. Even before Hussein’s trial was over, some administration hawks were already telling the media it was time to tilt back toward the Sunnis. Khalilzad even pushed for a deal with Sunni tribal leaders and a new effort to turn around and use them against sectarian Shi’ite militias, but was overruled. It was too late for that. But by the end of 2006, the administration did adopt major aspects of Khalilzad’s argument for the “Sunni turn.”
This policy was the reason for the massive propaganda campaign of early 2007, coinciding with President Bush and Gen. Petraeus’s “surge” of reinforcements to Iraq, which blamed all their failures on Iranian intervention and intransigent Shi’ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr. At the same time, Petraeus began bribing the local Sunni tribal leaders with money and weapons to turn against al Qaeda in Iraq, marginalize the most radical and destructive forces in their insurgency against the new Shi’ite regime and promise to cease their attacks against U.S. forces. Petraeus attempted to use this support for some Sunni tribal leaders during the “surge” of 2007 — the so-called “Awakening” movement — as leverage against his own Shi’ite allies, futilely trying to separate the latter from their primary Iranian patrons.
But the policy went much further than that. As journalist Seymour Hersh showed in his articles “The Next Act,” “The Redirection” and “Preparing the Battlefield” for The New Yorker in 2007, beginning in 2006 the Bush government began backing the bin Ladenite-type groups against the Shi’ites across the region. They began with supporting Fatah al-Islam and Asbat al-Ansar against Hezbollah in Lebanon, a policy which was seen as more urgent after Hezbollah defeated the Israelis when they invaded Lebanon in the summer of 2006. They also backed Muslim Brotherhood groups in Syria; the Party for Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), a leftist Kurdish group in Iranian Kurdistan tied to the Turkish sometimes-terrorist organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK); as well as Jundallah, an incredibly dangerous group of al Qaeda-connected terrorists in the eastern Iranian Sistan and Baluchistan region. Pentagon reporter Mark Perry wrote in his 2012 piece, “False Flag,” for Foreign Policy that it was actually the Israeli Mossad posing as CIA that recruited Jundallah to wage attacks against the Iranian military — which they did, including multiple deadly attacks against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a failed assassination attempt against then-president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as well as numerous attacks against civilian targets such as Shi’ite mosques.
Hersh wrote in “The Redirection” back in March 2007:
"To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shi’ite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has cooperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shi’ite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to al Qaeda.
"One contradictory aspect of the new strategy is that, in Iraq, most of the insurgent violence directed at the American military has come from Sunni forces, and not from Shi’ites. But, from the Administration’s perspective, the most profound — and unintended — strategic consequence of the Iraq war is the empowerment of Iran. …
"The key players behind the redirection are Vice-President Dick Cheney, the deputy national-security adviser Elliott Abrams, the departing Ambassador to Iraq (and nominee for United Nations Ambassador), Zalmay Khalilzad, and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi national-security adviser. …
"The new strategy “is a major shift in American policy — it’s a sea change,” a U.S. government consultant with close ties to Israel said. The Sunni states “were petrified of a Shi’ite resurgence, and there was growing resentment with our gambling on the moderate Shi’ites in Iraq,” he said. “We cannot reverse the Shi’ite gain in Iraq, but we can contain it.” …
"[T]he U.S. government consultant told me, Bandar and other Saudis have assured the White House that “they will keep a very close eye on the religious fundamentalists. Their message to us was ‘We’ve created this movement, and we can control it.’ It’s not that we don’t want the Salafis to throw bombs; it’s who they throw them at — Hezbollah, Moqtada al-Sadr, Iran, and at the Syrians, if they continue to work with Hezbollah and Iran.” …
"[T]he Saudi government, with Washington’s approval, would provide funds and logistical aid to weaken the government of President Bashir Assad, of Syria. The Israelis believe that putting such pressure on the Assad government will make it more conciliatory and open to negotiations. Syria is a major conduit of arms to Hezbollah."
There it is. This is why the following unbelievable things in this chapter are true. Bush had brought Iran’s power in the region up two pegs by installing their best friends in power in Baghdad. So now, realizing his error, he would try to take them down a peg by weakening or overthrowing Iran’s ally Assad in Damascus. Remember, al Qaeda hated the U.S. for being too closely allied with their local governments. They did not serve Iran, but radical dissident factions within Saudi Arabia and Egypt, primarily. So overall, many of al Qaeda’s regional enemies were the same as those of America and its Sunni alliance system.
To be clear, when President Barack Obama chose the side of al Qaeda terrorists in Libya and Syria, this was not because he was a Muslim terrorist sleeper agent from Kenya, as much of the political right believed. The policy was a reflection of the generations-long Roosevelt-Eisenhower-Carter-Bush Doctrine of support for and deference to the Saudi and other Arabian kings’ wishes, and more specifically the continuation of George W. Bush “redirection” in his second term. The primary concern of America’s post-Iraq War II Middle Eastern strategy is centered on the question of how to make up for the fact that the U.S. handed Baghdad over to the closest Iraqi allies of our government’s main strategic rival, Iran. It was too late to start the Iraq war all over again, turn around and march east to give Baghdad back to the Sunnis, and it was too dangerous to launch another full-scale regime-change war against Iran. So Obama decided that he could instead get a consolation prize by targeting Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus.
That was why in 2011, the first year of the Arab Spring, when the U.S. still had thousands of troops in Iraq chasing down the last of the bin Ladenites, it was already siding with them on the other side of the line in Syria. It had been going on for years. As Hersh reported and State Department cables leaked by Spc. Chelsea Manning later proved, the U.S. had been financing the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s “Movement for Justice and Development” since the redirection began in 2006.
In a spring 2012 interview, the Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg suggested to President Obama that, “it would seem to me that one way to weaken and further isolate Iran is to remove or help remove Iran’s only Arab ally, [Syria].” The president responded, “Absolutely.”
“What else can this administration be doing?” Goldberg pressed.
"Obama: [The Arab Spring is] now engulfing Syria, and Syria is basically [Iran’s] only true ally in the region. And it is our estimation that [Assad’s] days are numbered. It’s a matter not of if, but when. Now, can we accelerate that? We’re working with the world community to try to do that. … [W]hat we’re trying to do — and the secretary of state just came back from helping to lead the Friends of Syria group in Tunisia — is to try to come up with a series of strategies that can provide humanitarian relief. But they can also accelerate a transition to a peaceful and stable and representative Syrian government. If that happens, that will be a profound loss for Iran.
"Goldberg: Is there anything you could do to move it faster?
"Obama: Well, nothing that I can tell you, because your classified clearance isn’t good enough. (Laughter.)"
Obama’s national security adviser Tom Donilon agreed that the “end of the Assad regime would constitute Iran’s greatest setback in the region yet — a strategic blow that will further shift the balance of power in the region against Iran.” As Reuters reported that August, Obama had signed a new finding — an order to the CIA — to increase support for the insurgents. For more than a year, Americans had helped coordinate the war at a “secret command center” in the Turkish city of Adana, though he could not admit it.
The president’s main political opposition in the U.S. Senate could not agree more with the motive for the policy. As Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, told the New York Times just a few weeks before,
"Breaking Syria apart from Iran could be as important to containing a nuclear Iran as sanctions. If the Syrian regime is replaced with another form of government that doesn’t tie its future to the Iranians, the world is a better place."
Though Assad is a member of the Ba’ath Party, unlike Sunni Saddam Hussein he is an Alawite, which is Syria’s ruling minority sect and closely associated with the Shi’ites. They also have an alliance with Iran. The primary concern of the neoconservatives had always been Syria’s role in helping Iran support Lebanese Hezbollah, and they had been pushing for war with Assad’s government since after the 2003 invasion. Bush had balked, but Obama gave them half of what they wanted. Not full regime change, but an Israeli-approved policy of prolonging the war for as long as possible.
Neoconservative Max Boot also wrote in 2012 that the “first” reason the United States should attack Assad’s government in Syria was to “diminish Iran’s influence in the Arab world. … Iran knows that if his regime fell, it would lose its most important base in the Arab world and a supply line to pro-Iranian Hezbollah militants in Lebanon.” Oh, and regime change against the Ba’athists will somehow help to diminish, rather than enhance al Qaeda’s influence.
It was not just the neocons. Bill and Hillary Clinton’s long-time associate, former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Jamie Rubin, wrote an important memo to Secretary Clinton in April 2012. It outlined why he also thought the U.S. must take the opportunity to hurt Iran and Hezbollah on behalf of Israel by attacking the Ayatollah’s Ba’athist allies in Damascus. He later ran a version of the memo as an article in Foreign Policy in June 2012, calling it “The Real Reason to Intervene in Syria.” It had nothing to do with protecting the safety and liberty of the American people.
"It is the strategic relationship between Iran and the regime of Bashar Assad in Syria that makes it possible for Iran to undermine Israel’s security — not through a direct attack, which in the thirty years of hostility between Iran and Israel has never occurred, but through its proxies in Lebanon, like Hezbollah, that are sustained, armed and trained by Iran via Syria. The end of the Assad regime would end this dangerous alliance. Israel’s leadership understands well why defeating Assad is now in its interests. …
"With Assad gone, and Iran no longer able to threaten Israel through its proxies, it is possible that the United States and Israel can agree on red lines for when Iran’s program has crossed an unacceptable threshold. In short, the White House can ease the tension that has developed with Israel over Iran by doing the right thing in Syria."
In the memo, Rubin expressed support for the current operation to help Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey arm and train Syria’s Sunni-based insurgency. He also insisted that the U.S. needed to go around the UN Security Council and even its own NATO alliance to team up with Persian Gulf states to launch a major air campaign to quickly oust the Assad government and its forces.
And do not worry, Rubin promised:
"Some argue that U.S. involvement risks a wider war with Russia. But the Kosovo example shows otherwise. In that case, Russia had genuine ethnic and political ties to the Serbs, which don’t exist between Russia and Syria, and even then, Russia did little more than complain. Arming the Syrian rebels and using western airpower to ground Syrian helicopters and airplanes is a low-cost high payoff approach."
Rubin then broke fully into his neoconservative routine, mixing Wurmser’s crazy Clean Break policy with Paul Wolfowitz’s pipe dreams of being greeted with flowers and candy.
"As long as Washington’s political leaders stay firm that no U.S. ground troops will be deployed, as they did in both Kosovo and Libya, the costs to the United States will be limited. Victory may not come quickly or easily, but it will come. And the payoff will be substantial. Iran would be strategically isolated, unable to exert its influence in the Middle East. The resulting regime in Syria will see the United States as a friend, not an enemy. Washington would gain substantial recognition as fighting for the people in the Arab world, not the corrupt regimes.
For Israel, the rationale for a bolt from the blue attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be eased. And a new Syrian regime might well be open to early action on the frozen peace talks with Israel [over the Golan Heights]. Hezbollah in Lebanon would be cut off from its Iranian sponsor since Syria would no longer be a transit point for Iranian training, assistance and missiles."
What, no pipeline to Haifa?