There are many intellectuals & artists who aren’t commercially-motivated, but ~all are motivated by an orientation to human attention and judgment, and therefore intellectual achievement is an intensely social & network-based phenomenon. Randall Collins (a sociologist of this stuff, h/t @arnaudschenk) argues that even the solitary act of writing/thinking is motivated and steered by an imagined audience, and the emotional payoff that sustains that productivity is mostly interactions with other people where you focus on the same ideas and concepts. This is why the general equilibrium question is so important, over just whether you in theory can pursue a solitary life of intellectual excellence.
So if AI does all the frontier thinking, will there still be human intellectual activity? Yes, humans can still form groups that orient toward shared or conflicting ideas and get excited by talking to each other about them. But it can’t be organized around insights. There will be no great orientation of human collective effort toward novel insight (or prerequisites to that alone) if that is no longer a path to emotional payoff from peer attention (even though this peer attention can be completely non-monetary!). It could reorganize around human competition in relaying discoveries or insights, or debating in front of human judges (though this is more a sport than science/philosophy), and that will very likely happen and keep some intellectual skills sharp. Moral philosophy is the one thing that will continue because it is grounded in humans (contra claims that the AI can just derive our “utility function”); if anything it will get more intense with AI assistance and fewer other things taking attention.
It is possible that those interested in ideas will not form human networks because the AIs are better partners in the interaction rituals that maintain emotional investment in ideas. This depends on how much the humanness matters intrinsically, versus just the perception of intelligent attention on the same topic. It seems quite likely this will decouple, and people will spend 1-1 time talking with AIs about ideas, learning from superhuman explanations and insights, and then go have in-person interactions with humans where they talk about those ideas. The leaders and core nodes in the intellectual network will be AIs, but there will be human “fan clubs”, like third-tier thinkers getting together in pubs to discuss what their heroes have said recently.
Another alternative is that learning from the AIs will not be interesting since that lacks the human element or is too vastly superhuman. But we have a rich history of thousands of real humans who had human struggles with ideas. Science might become history of science and (non-moral) philosophy might become history of philosophy. There won’t be a hundred books about Newton and Goethe but a hundred thousand. The historical greats will become saints and objects of sacred attention with temples and cults. We’ll add no more names to the list of greats but we’ll keep adding names to the list of High Priests of Keynes, like a now-settled warrior aristocracy clinging forever to the memory of its ancestors who once rode out and conquered new lands.
Smith and Montesquieu thought that markets and commerce made us better: that they create an incentive to pursue self-improvement and to create things of value for others. In the positive AI visions, where the labor of humans is made redundant, I find myself wondering how we fare in the presumptive absence of these incentive gradients. Perhaps we are released to a life of freedom, where we can study Mozart and read Dickens, but that still seems complicated: both Mozart and Dickens were themselves deeply commercially-motivated in the production of their work, as were most of the great artists through human history. If the premise is that nobody will need to work or produce, how confident are we that we actually get the next Mozart and Dickens? The relevant question is not the partial equilibrium of whether one individual can pursue a life of enlightened leisure, but the general equilibrium of what form a society as a whole will take on.
One could maybe invoke Periclean Athens or the aristocratic gentleman scientists of Victorian England as a counterpoint. While these individuals were perhaps not motivated by commercial considerations, they were embedded in wider societies shaped by commerce, attendant betterment, and trade: Byron was himself upper class, but he was also surrounded by and writing for an educated bourgeois audience. So we’re back to the equilibrium question. Furthermore, even these individuals were surely motivated by a sense of high-stakes and consequential agency: if they did not apply themselves to their labors, they presumably believed that the work would not otherwise exist. Thucydides was addressing pressing military matters.
So I would like to read more optimistic cases from AI proponents about what a society (vs individual life) looks like if everything goes well: what people do, why they do it, whether humans achieve excellence (and in which domains), and which historical groups we should look to as relevant precedent.
One can perhaps imagine that humans will turn out to have a strong preference for work created by other humans. This may work in certain domains (ceramics?), but for how many will it actually apply? (I’m told that much of what is sold on indie crafts websites is now in fact manufactured in China.) It’s hard to see how this human preference, even if strong, would, for example, save scholarship.
Another idea would be to accept that nobody will become Einstein or Mozart or Byron, and that human excellence as such diminishes, but that there are compensatory benefits (planet brains and Dyson swarms?).
I believe that we can satisfy individual desires, but to what extent will we cultivate behavior worthy of admiration? Will a post-scarcity society mold capable and ambitious people? Which institutions will sustain them and which responsibilities will they have? I’d like to hear more of the equilibrium for the maximalist case spelled out.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































